Updated 9 June 2015
PDF version [388KB]
Marty Harris
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security Section
-
This Research Paper focuses on the public position of the Labor
Governments, in power between 2007 and 2013, towards the Israeli-Palestinian
dispute. It does so by looking at the Rudd and Gillard Governments’ responses
to developments and their statements regarding key issues such as Israeli
settlements and Palestinian statehood.
-
Updated to cover the period up to the 2013 election, it includes
discussion of potential policy or rhetorical shifts made in the lead-up to that
election.
-
This paper complements another Parliamentary Library publication—Australia
and the Middle East conflict: a history of key Government statements
(1947–2007)—which tracks the evolution of Australia’s publicly
stated position on the Middle East conflict up until the election of the Rudd
Labor Government in 2007.
Contents
Executive
summary
Introduction
Increasing aid to the Palestinians
Graph 1: Australian ODA to the
Palestinian territories: 1995–96 to 2013–14 (current prices)
United Nations General Assembly votes
Table 1: Australia’s voting pattern
at the UNGA—selected resolutions (vote changes in bold)
The Palestinians’ unilateral
statehood bid
Israeli settlements
Responding to events
Durban World Conference against
Racism and subsequent Review Conferences
The 2008–09 Gaza War and the
Goldstone Report
The passport affair
The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions
campaign
The 1967 borders
Conclusion
Introduction
When the Australian Labor Party won the November 2007
Australian federal election, the Israeli-Palestinian situation was characteristically
unstable.
In 2005, Israel unilaterally disengaged from the Gaza Strip,
partially ending its 38 year occupation (Israel retained control of Gaza’s
airspace and territorial waters).[1]
In January 2006, Hamas, designated as a terrorist organisation by the United
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Egypt, Israel, Japan and Australia, won the
Palestinian legislative elections. The formation of a Hamas-led
government—which refused to commit to non-violence, to recognise Israel or to
accept previous agreements signed between Israel and the Palestinians—resulted
in a reduction in international aid to the Palestinians, and economic sanctions
by Israel.[2]
In June 2006, Palestinian militants crossed the border into Israel, killing two
Israeli soldiers and capturing a third, Sergeant Gilad Shalit. In response,
Israel launched ‘Operation Summer Rains’, a large-scale offensive intended to
suppress rocket fire from Gaza and secure Shalit’s release.
In mid-2007, simmering factional tensions between Hamas and the
Fatah party of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas ended in open conflict: a
mini civil war in the Palestinian territories that resulted in the de facto
separation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with Fatah (referred to as the
Palestinian National Authority (PA)) ruling the former and Hamas in control of
the latter. A Western-supported government was appointed in the West Bank in
June 2007, allowing foreign aid to resume and peace negotiations with Israel to
resume. These negotiations would lead to the Annapolis peace conference in
November 2007, in which Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian
President Abbas committed to make ‘every effort to conclude a [final peace] agreement
before the end of 2008’.[3]
The Annapolis conference, to which Australia sent a delegation, occurred
between Labor’s election victory and the swearing in of the Rudd Government.
This Research Paper outlines the public positions taken by
the Rudd and Gillard Governments towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By
charting the governments’ responses to key events, and how their
representatives spoke about Israel and the Palestinians, it analyses whether
any substantial policy shift occurred following the 2007 election. Examples of
discontinuity with the previous Coalition Government are highlighted—such as in
the language used to refer to Israeli settlements in the West Bank and how
Australia voted at the United Nations (UN). While it is not possible to know
how a Coalition government would have reacted to similar situations, the
current Abbott Government has shifted back to Howard-era public approaches to
some of these issues (particularly on Israeli settlements and UN votes).[4]
The Australian Labor Party’s (ALP’s) National Platform
and Constitution 2007 provides a good representation of the party’s policy
on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the time of the 2007 federal election:
Labor is convinced that all Australians seek a lasting and
equitable solution to the problems that have worked against stability and
development in the Middle East. Labor will pursue a sustained Australian
engagement in the Arab/Israeli conflict based on the rights of all people in
the Middle East to peace and security and livelihood ... Labor believes that
urgent attainment of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
is the best way to reduce violence and conflict across the Middle East.[5]
Less than a month after the ALP came to power, Parliamentary
Secretary for International Development Assistance Bob McMullen announced that
Australia was effectively doubling its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to
the ‘Palestinian territories’.[6]
The announcement was made at the December 2007 Paris Donors Conference for the
Palestinian territories, with McMullen stating at the time:
I will pledge Australia's $45 million assistance package at
the Donors' Conference for the Palestinian Territories in Paris today.
...Australia's pledge sends an important signal that
Australia remains committed to a two State solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict which will see a viable Palestinian State living side by side in peace
with Israel.[7]
Australian aid to the Palestinians grew
substantially while the ALP was in power. By June 2011, Foreign Minister Kevin
Rudd was able to declare that Australia was among the top ten contributors of
development assistance to the Palestinian National Authority (PA).[8]
The graph below clearly shows a dramatic rise in aid disbursements after 2007.
Sources:
Figures from 1995–96 through 2012–13 are from AusAID annual reports
and AusAID ‘statistical summaries’. The figure for 2013–14 is a budget figure from B Carr
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), Budget: Australia's International Development Assistance
Program 2013–14: Effective aid: Helping the world's poor, Commonwealth
of Australia, Canberra, 14 May 2013, p. 12 (accessed 31 October 2014). Note
that the figures in the graph include funds provided not only to the PA but
also to international organisations such as the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) for use on Palestinian
programs. The figure for 2013–14 is a budget figure provided by the Gillard
Labor Government in May 2013.
While this increase in aid coincided with the election of
Labor, it should not be viewed as a clear-cut policy shift, as other factors
were at play. The increase in aid corresponded with Hamas’s violent takeover of
the Gaza Strip in mid-2007, the disintegration of the Fatah-Hamas unity
government, and the installation of Western-supported Salam Fayyad as prime
minister in the West Bank.[9]
Hamas’s victory in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative
elections and the formation of the Hamas-Fatah unity government complicated
Australia’s ability to increase aid levels to the Palestinians. Hamas was
listed as a terrorist organisation under the Charter of the United Nations
Act 1945 (Cth) in December 2001, while the organisation’s military wing—Izz
al-Din al-Qassam Brigades—was listed under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)
in November 2003.[10]
The Criminal Code Act makes it a criminal offence to ‘give funds,
financial assets or economic resources to sanctions designated persons or
entities’.[11]
Therefore, according to Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, Australia could not
provide funds to a PA Government in which Hamas played such a central role:
[As] a listed entity under the Charter of
the United Nations Act 1945, it is illegal for Australians to provide
assistance to Hamas. This will constrain any Australian support to the PA as
long as Hamas retains its current charter.[12]
After Hamas’s military takeover of Gaza and Fatah President
Mahmoud Abbas’s appointment of an ‘emergency’ government in the West Bank, this
situation changed. Foreign Minister Downer ‘supported’ the appointment of the
independent politician Salam Fayyad as prime minister in the West Bank, and in
June 2007 held talks with Fayyad in Ramallah, promising $4 million ‘of
support to the [emergency] Palestinian Government’.[13]
The Hamas-Fatah split therefore enabled those governments who had proscribed
Hamas (or its armed wing) to once again disburse aid directly to the PA. Had
the Howard Government been in power at the time of the Paris Donors Conference
for the Palestinian territories in December 2007, it is possible that it too
would have increased aid to the Palestinians.[14]
The increase in aid to the Palestinian administration in the
West Bank coincided with the new governance program adopted by Prime Minister
Fayyad. A former World Bank and International Monetary Fund official and
independent Palestinian politician, Fayyad had broad support in the West, and
his governance program, entitled Palestine: ending the Occupation, building
the state, received international support.[15]
This program, known as ‘Fayyadism’, involved sourcing large amounts of foreign
aid, building state institutions in the West Bank and developing the economy as
a way to prepare for statehood.[16]
For a few years at least, the economy of the West Bank grew
substantially under Fayyadism. This is especially significant considering that
it occurred during the global financial crisis. Economic growth averaged around
ten per cent between 2008 and 2011, but growth has since declined significantly,
the West Bank economy entering recession for the first time in a decade in 2013.[17]
The International Monetary Fund attributed the period of increased growth to
the ‘Fayyad government’s sound economic management and reforms supported by
donor aid, as well as some easing of Israeli internal barriers’.[18]
Implementing law and order reform was a central part of
Fayyad’s ‘ending the occupation, building the state’ program, with the PA
declaring under its ‘vision for the State of Palestine’:
The state of Palestine respects human rights and guarantees
equal rights and duties for all citizens. Its people live in safety and
security under the rule of law, safeguarded by an independent judiciary and
professional security services.[19]
And as Palestinian spokesperson Ghassan Khatib said in 2010:
... reforming the security forces is the main and integral
part of the Fayyad plan. Many of the government’s other successes, such as
economic growth, came as a result.[20]
To this end, the PA sought international funding to retrain
and re-arm its police forces and improve the criminal justice system. Between
2007 and 2012, more than 6,000 PA police officers were trained in part by US
advisers, and deployed throughout the cities and towns in the West Bank under PA
security control.[21]
Israeli-PA security cooperation increased to levels not seen since the 1990s,
and the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported in November 2010 that Israel
Defence Force personnel stationed in the West Bank were at their lowest levels
since the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987.[22]
In terms of Australia’s response to these economic and
security developments, Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd said in December 2010:
Australia is determined to help the
Palestinian Authority lay strong foundations for a future Palestinian state and
build its infrastructure and economy.
I have been pleased to see these activities
on the ground and commend the Palestinian Authority for the progress it has
made.[23]
And when addressing the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) in late 2012, Prime Minister Julia Gillard commended ‘the genuine
progress President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad have made in building the
institutions and infrastructure for statehood,’ adding:
Australia is resolutely committed to the establishment of a
Palestinian state which is both independent and viable.
This is why we provide significant support to the foundations
of a future Palestinian state and build its infrastructure and economy – more
than $300m in aid from 2011 to 2016.[24]
In September 2010 the Australian Agency for International
Development (AusAID, since absorbed into the Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade) and the PA signed a ‘Partnership Arrangement’.[25]
As part of the Arrangement, the Australian Government committed itself to:
-
ensuring consistent or increased development assistance to the PA
-
building the capacity of the PA through, among other things,
targeted scholarships and
-
providing budget support for service delivery and mutually
determined reform targets.[26]
Then, on 28 May 2012 Foreign Minister Bob Carr announced
that Australia had signed an agreement with the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to provide that organisation
with $90 million over five years to support ‘education and medical care for
Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip and the West
Bank’.[27]
Finally, in the lead-up to the September 2013 election,
Foreign Minister Carr suggested that under a Coalition Government, aid to the
Palestinians would be cut. During the election’s ‘foreign policy
debate’ at the Lowy Institute on 7 August 2013, Foreign Minister Carr stated
that ‘aid to Palestine has been criticised [by the
Coalition]—I’ve been quizzed in the Senate about it—and there’s no doubt that
that would be withdrawn’.[28]
While the Coalition on occasion ‘quizzed’ the Foreign Minister about particular
aspects of aid to the Palestinians (particularly during Senate Estimates in May
2012), it did not explicitly censure the Labor Government for the post-2007
increase in aid to Palestinian programs.[29]
Labor received criticism from the Opposition for altering
Australia’s voting pattern on some recurring UNGA resolutions concerning the
Middle East conflict.[30]
Between 2008 and 2011 the Government instructed its representatives at the UNGA
to change Australia’s vote on a number of recurring resolutions, including:
- Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the other
occupied Arab territories—Australia changed its vote in November 2008 from
‘abstain’ to ‘in favour’
- Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, which reaffirms
that Israeli settlements in these areas are ‘illegal and an obstacle to
peace’—Australia changed its vote in November 2008 from ‘against’ to ‘in
favour’
- The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, which
‘reaffirms the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including
the right to their independent State of Palestine’—Australia changed its vote
in December 2009 from ‘abstain’ to ‘in favour’ and
- Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab
population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources—Australia
changed its vote in December 2011 from ‘against’ to ‘abstain’.[31]
The Howard Government in its later years either voted to
abstain or voted against very similar resolutions. In justifying the Labor
Government’s changes, Foreign Minister Stephen Smith said in November 2008:
It is important to make the point to the House that, when it
comes to General Assembly resolutions, the government adopts the following
approach. Firstly, we treat these resolutions on a case-by-case basis and
consider them on their merits. Secondly, we consider these resolutions firmly
within the context of our very strong adherence to our support for a
two-nation-state solution and our support of the peace process. If the
resolutions are consistent with that approach then we support them.[32]
The Rudd and Gillard Governments maintained this voting
pattern in subsequent sessions of the UNGA. The table below shows Australian
votes on these resolutions up to 2012, and indicates that Labor returned to the
voting pattern of the early years of the Howard Government.[33]
|
Year/
UNGA session
|
Israeli settlements are illegal
|
The right of the
Palestinian people to self-determination
|
The Fourth Geneva convention
applies
|
Permanent
sovereignty of the Palestinian people over natural resources
|
|
2012/67
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
Abstain
|
|
2011/66
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
Against to abstain
|
|
2010/65
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
Against
|
|
2009/64
|
In favour
|
Abstain to in favour
|
In favour
|
Against
|
|
2008/63
|
Against to in favour
|
Abstain
|
Abstain to in favour
|
Against
|
|
2007/62
|
Against
|
Abstain
|
Abstain
|
Against
|
|
2006/61
|
Against
|
Abstain
|
Abstain
|
Against
|
|
2005/60
|
Against
|
Abstain
|
Abstain
|
Abstain to against
|
|
2004/59
|
Abstain to against
|
In favour to abstain
|
In favour to abstain
|
Abstain
|
|
2003/58
|
In favour to abstain
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
In favour to abstain
|
|
2002/57
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
|
2001/56
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
|
2000/55
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
Abstain to in favour
|
|
1999/54
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
In favour to abstain
|
|
1998/53
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
In favour
|
Source: United Nations General
Assembly, Voting records, various dates, accessed 12 March 2015.
The Palestinians’ bid for unilateral statehood (and/or
recognition by the UN and other international bodies) is one of the most
significant developments in Israeli-Palestinian relations in recent years.
Israel strongly opposes Palestinian efforts at international recognition,
arguing that a Palestinian state can only come into being through direct negotiations.[34]
Israel also contends that unilateral moves violate previous peace agreements,
and is fearful that if the Palestinians were to gain entry to the International
Criminal Court (ICC) they would attempt to stigmatise Israel by initiating war
crimes or crimes against humanity charges.[35]
Following Brazil’s recognition of a Palestinian state in
December 2010,[36]
Foreign Minister Rudd was asked whether Australia would support a request from
the PA to recognise ‘Palestine’, should it receive one. Rudd responded:
[We] appreciate the reality that this [two-state solution]
will be shaped very much by the current peace process and that the questions of
a final state of settlement include many unresolved questions including
boundaries and other matters which are yet to be determined. Therefore we
believe it’s appropriate to await the conclusion of those deliberations.[37]
In September 2011, while the PA was seeking to have its
unilateral bid for statehood recognised by the UN, Prime Minister Julia Gillard
wrote in The Australian:
Like most people across the world, not least our friends in
Israel and the Palestinian Territories, Australia aspires to see a future
Palestinian state existing alongside Israel in peace and security. We are
strong backers of a two-state solution and we firmly support all initiatives
that contribute constructively to this end.
...
As is well known, efforts to reach a peace between the
Israeli and Palestinian people face significant challenges and progress has
been halting for many years. Many sincere and determined efforts to break the
impasse have not succeeded and the sense of stalemate has led many to look for
alternative answers.
Ultimately, however, the only durable basis for resolution of
this conflict is negotiation. However hard it may be, it is only through
negotiation between the two sides that final status issues such as borders,
security and Jerusalem can be solved.
Australia understands the sense of frustration the impasse in
peace talks has brought and we understand the strong desire of Palestinians to
have their own state. If a Palestinian statehood resolution is introduced to
the General Assembly we will consider it carefully and will consult widely
before making our decision on how we will vote. But no UN resolution will
change present realities on the ground. That is why we believe direct
negotiation is the only true path to peace.[38]
The PA submitted its application for UN membership on 23
September 2011, but did not fully pursue its bid, as the US threatened to veto
the move in the Security Council.[39]
The PA instead sought to become the 195th member of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), which voted on 31 October
2011 to admit ‘Palestine’.[40]
Australia, along with 13 other members, voted against admitting ‘Palestine’ to
UNESCO.[41]
To get around the US Security Council veto, in 2012 the
Palestinians sought to have their status at the UN upgraded from ‘permanent
observer’ to ‘non-member observer state’. This move only needed approval from
the UNGA, would let the Palestinians participate in General Assembly debates,
and would increase their chances of being able to join the ICC.[42]
There was significant debate in Australia regarding whether the
Government should support a resolution giving the Palestinians upgraded UN
status.[43]
According to media reports, a rancorous debate occurred within Cabinet and the
Labor Caucus, with Prime Minister Gillard advocating a ‘no’ vote while many of
her colleagues called for Australia to ‘abstain’ or to vote ‘yes’ on a
prospective resolution.[44]
In the end, the Australian Government announced that it would abstain, with the
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister stating in a joint media release:
The Government’s position balances our long-standing support
for the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and their own
state with our concern that the only durable basis for resolution of this
conflict is direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.[45]
On 29 November 2012 the UNGA voted to accord ‘Palestine’ ‘non-member
observer state status’—138 states voted in favour of the resolution; nine
countries voted against it and 41, including Australia, abstained.[46]
Shadow Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, indicating a clear partisan divide on this
issue, stated on a number of occasions that the Coalition would have voted ‘no’
on a resolution upgrading the Palestinians’ status at the UN.[47]
The Rudd and Gillard Governments regularly criticised
Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The language
contained in these statements remained, until 2013 at least, largely
consistent. Prior to 2013, Government officials rarely used the term ‘illegal’
or ‘contrary to international law’ in statements criticising Israel over
settlement construction—something that was normal practice in the Hawke and
Keating years. However, as outlined above, Australia did change its vote from
‘against’ to ‘in favour’ on a recurring UNGA resolution that defined Israeli
settlements as ‘illegal’. Additionally, on two occasions while Julia Gillard
was Prime Minister, Australia’s ambassador to the UN, Gary Quinlan, referred to
Israeli settlements as ‘illegal’ when addressing the UN Security Council. In
January 2011, Quinlan stated:
Both sides must refrain from actions that undermine
confidence, including — decisively — the construction of settlements. Australia
unambiguously opposes new Israeli settlements. They are illegal. They are not
only an obstacle to peace — they actively undermine the prospects for achieving
peace. They compromise the future of a two-State solution, and they must stop.[48]
And in October 2012:
The continuing settlement activity in the West Bank remains a
fundamental concern. A Palestinian State must not just be independent; it must
be viable and contiguous. Settlement activity, which is illegal under
international law, must cease.[49]
Aside from these examples, in the period from late 2007 to
early 2013 the Government’s comments generally advocated a ‘freeze’ of Israeli
settlement activity, or stated that settlements ‘undermine’ or are
‘counter-productive’ to the peace process.[50]
In 2013, there was a strengthening of public language
regarding Israeli settlements. In January, the communique from the fifth
Australia-UK Ministerial Consultations (AUKMIN) contained the following: ‘We
call on Israel to stop settlement activity. All settlements are illegal under
international law and settlement activity undermines the prospects for peace’.[51]
Defence Minister Stephen Smith and Foreign Minister Carr attended AUKMIN 2013,
and the latter was extensively questioned in Senate Estimates over the use of
‘illegal’.[52]
Then, during the 2013
election campaign, Foreign Minister Carr said while visiting Lakemba mosque in
western Sydney:
We say, unequivocally, all settlements on Palestinian land
are illegal under international law and should cease. That is the position of
Kevin Rudd, the position of the Federal Labor Government, and we don't make
apologies for it.[53]
This contrasts considerably with language used by Howard
Government ministers when discussing Israeli settlements. Prime Minister John Howard
was once asked specifically whether he thought the ‘Israelis should stop
expanding their settlements’ and he responded by stating:
I’m not going to express a view on that. I
come here [to Israel and the Palestinian territories] as somebody who wants the
[peace] process to work and not as a foreigner giving gratuitous advice to
either side.[54]
On another occasion, Prime Minister Howard said that he had
asked Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to ‘understand why the Palestinians
[rather than the Australian Government] view the expansion of Israeli
settlements as provocative’.[55]
Foreign Minister Downer, on occasion, used stronger language, without specifically
stating that Israeli settlement practices negatively affected the peace
process.[56]
The use of the label ‘illegal’ by members of the Rudd and
Gillard Governments marked the first time such language had been used since the
mid-1990s.
Australia sent representatives to the Durban World
Conference against Racism in 2001, which, according to some, focused too heavily
on Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians.[57]
The US and Israeli delegations walked out of the Conference as a result. The
Howard Government, in a joint statement by Foreign Minister Alexander Downer
and Attorney-General Daryl Williams, expressed regret:
[A] great deal of time at the Conference had
been consumed by divisive exchanges on issues that had done nothing to advance
the cause of combating racism. Despite the efforts of many delegations,
including Australia's, to achieve a more balanced outcome, the final documents
include language on the Middle East which neither helps bring peace to that
region nor advances the objectives of this Conference. The Australian
delegation made clear at the closing session of the Conference that, while
there was much in the final documents which Australia welcomed, there was also
some language with which we could not be associated.[58]
In April 2009, the ‘Durban Review Conference’ was held in
Geneva, Switzerland. The Australian Government indicated, as late as March
2009, that it was considering attending. Foreign Minister Smith stated,
however, that ‘if we form the view that the [draft declaration] text is going
to lead to nothing more than an anti-Jewish, anti-Semitic harangue and an
anti-Jewish propaganda exercise, Australia will not be in attendance’.[59]
On 19 April, Foreign Minister Smith announced that Australia would join other
countries in boycotting the Durban Review Conference, arguing:
The Durban Review Conference should be an
occasion for the world to unite against racism in all its forms.
Australia has worked with a range of
countries in Geneva these past weeks to promote an acceptable outcome document
from the Review Conference and to ensure that the Conference does not see a
repeat of the problems that marred the Durban World Conference Against Racism in
2001.
These efforts, the hard work of the Russian
Chair and the flexibility shown by many countries, has led to significant
improvements in the document to be presented to the Conference on Monday.
Australia, however, cannot support a
document which reaffirms the 2001 Durban Declaration and Program of Action in
its entirety — as is currently the case. The 2001 Declaration singled out
Israel and the Middle East. Australia expressed strong concerns about this at
the time. The Australian Government continues to have these concerns.
Regrettably, we cannot be confident that the Review Conference will not again
be used as a platform to air offensive views, including anti-Semitic views.[60]
For similar reasons, Australia also
boycotted a UN General Assembly meeting—known as ‘Durban III’—on 22 September
2011.[61]
Deputy Prime Minister Julia Gillard was acting Prime
Minister when the December 2008–January 2009 Gaza conflict began.[62]
In an interview on 5 January 2009 Gillard said:
The escalation of the conflict in Israel and Gaza, the new
movement of ground troops by Israel obviously underlines the urgency of getting
a diplomatic solution to this problem. We’ve said all along that Australia
strongly supports the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations
to see a halt to all violence. We obviously want to see an end to this conflict
and a lasting solution for peace in the Middle East.
...
We have condemned in the strongest possible terms the action
of Hamas in sending rockets into southern Israel. Obviously, Israel has
responded, we’ve now seen a further escalation.
...
We’ve always said we recognise Israel’s right to defend
itself, but we have urged Israel to be very mindful of the civilians involved,
of the prospect of civilian casualties, and obviously we have seen civilian
casualties. And we have been strong in our continuing endorsement of the United
Nations Security Council resolution for a halt to all violence.[63]
These comments, particularly the condemnation of Hamas
compared with the ‘urging’ of Israel to be mindful of civilians, were
interpreted by some as ‘bias’ towards Israel.[64]
On 12 January 2009 the United Nations Human Rights Council
decided to send a fact-finding mission to Gaza ‘to investigate all violations
of international human rights law and international humanitarian law’ during
the recent conflict.[65]
The report resulting from this investigation, known as the Goldstone Report,
found that war crimes had been committed on both sides of the conflict.[66]
Some, however, criticised the report on the grounds that its mandate was
one-sided, the report focused too heavily on the actions of Israeli troops, or
that the Human Rights Council itself was prejudiced against Israel.[67]
The Australian Government rejected the findings in the
Goldstone Report. On 5 November 2009, Australia voted against a UNGA resolution
that called for, among other things, the Goldstone Report to be sent to the UN
Security Council.[68]
Explaining this decision, Australia’s ambassador to the UN said:
We voted against resolution 64/10 because of a number of
genuine concerns arising from the language of the text and from the flawed
nature of the report it is based on, which we simply cannot endorse. However,
this vote in no way reduces our fundamental concern about the humanitarian
situation of the people of Gaza. Consistently before, during and after the Gaza
conflict, we called on all the parties to take all necessary steps to minimize
harm to civilians, and we call on the parties now to act to prevent the
continuing humanitarian crisis in Gaza, a situation that is unacceptable.[69]
Deputy Prime Minister Gillard would later state it was the
Government’s commitment to Israel’s ‘security’ that caused it to vote against
the UNGA Resolution.[70]
In May 2010 an Israeli diplomat was expelled from Australia
following alleged misuse of Australian passports by Israeli intelligence
organisations as part of their alleged involvement in the death of a senior
Hamas commander. The so-called ‘passport affair’ is significant because of the
strong language used by the Australian Government towards Israel.[71]
A month after the death of the Hamas commander, Foreign
Minister Smith made a statement to Parliament highlighting that the authorities
in Dubai claimed that three (later four) Australian passport holders were
wanted in relation to the man’s death, condemning ‘in the strongest possible
terms’ the misuse of Australian passports, and indicating that Australian
security agencies would investigate.[72]
Later that day Smith stated at a press conference:
... if the results of that investigation cause us to come to
the conclusion that the abuse of Australian passports was in any way sponsored
or condoned by Israeli officials, then Australia would not regard that as the
act of a friend. We would not regard that as the act of a friend.[73]
In late March 2010, the British Government announced that it
was expelling an Israeli diplomat from the UK, stating that there were ‘compelling
reasons to believe Israel was responsible for the misuse of the British
passports’.[74]
Foreign Minister Smith stated at this time that ‘we will await the results of
that investigation by the Australian Federal Police’ before making any
decisions regarding the Australian Government’s response.[75]
Australia announced its response on 24 May 2010, with
Foreign Minister Smith telling the House of Representatives:
[I]nvestigations and advice have left the government in no
doubt that Israel was responsible for the abuse and counterfeiting of these
passports. I note that a similar conclusion was reached by the United Kingdom
government in the course of their official investigations.
No government can tolerate the abuse of its passports,
especially by a foreign government.
...
These are not the actions of a friend. I regret to advise the
House that this is not the first occasion that Australian passports have been
misused by Israeli authorities. The Dubai passports incident also constitutes a
clear and direct breach of confidential understandings between Australia and
Israel dating back some years. This is not what we expect from a nation with
whom we have had such a close, friendly and supportive relationship.
...
After careful deliberation, the government has asked that a
member of the Israeli Embassy in Canberra be withdrawn from Australia. I have
asked that the withdrawal be effected within the week ... Australia regard[s] the
abuse of these passports as inconsistent with the friendship and support
provided by successive Australian governments to Israel since its creation as a
nation. Australia’s relationship with Israel has always been founded on a basis
of mutual respect and trust. But Israel’s actions in this regard have
undermined that respect and trust.[76]
The Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop,
argued that the Government’s response was an overreaction, and was bound up
with the Government’s campaign to win a seat on the UN Security Council.[77]
As well as Australia and the UK, Ireland expelled an Israeli diplomat in June
2010 over the passport affair.[78]
The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign urges
that ‘non-violent punitive measures’ should be imposed on Israel until it ‘fully
complies with the precepts of international law’, which it argues Israel can
achieve by:
-
ending its ‘occupation and colonisation’ of ‘all Arab lands’
-
granting ‘full equality’ to the Arab citizens of Israel and
-
respecting the ‘right of return’ of Palestinians displaced in the
1948 and 1967 wars.[79]
Critics of the campaign have argued that BDS targets
Israel’s ‘legitimacy as a nation-state’ rather than its policies, is
anti-Semitic, incorrectly equates Israel’s policies with those of apartheid
South Africa, and, because it supports the ‘right of return’, is effectively calling
for an Israeli state with a Palestinian majority (or the ‘destruction of
Israel’ as a Jewish state).[80]
Supporters argue that BDS is a legitimate, non-violent campaign to pressure
Israel to change its policies, that non-violent boycotts helped end apartheid, and
that BDS is about making Israel pay a price for its occupation of Palestinian
lands.[81]
In 2011, protesters in Australia began targeting Max Brenner
chocolate and coffee shops. Max Brenner operates as a subsidiary
of the Strauss Group, a large Israeli food and beverage company, and the
Strauss Group sponsors part of the Golani Brigade, an elite unit in the Israel
Defense Force.[82] In July of that year, violence was reported at a protest in Melbourne,
with 19 demonstrators arrested. Subsequently, Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd
visited the Max Brenner store in question, declaring ‘I am here because I
object to the boycotting of Jewish businesses’.[83]
The Labor Government was criticised a number of times by the Opposition regarding the BDS movement. In
September 2012, Shadow Foreign Minister Julie Bishop claimed that the
Government had provided ‘encouragement and support’ for BDS for failing to
support a Senate motion that would have, among other things, condemned BDS.[84] Foreign Minister Carr responded by saying that the Government was ‘fiercely,
unequivocally, strongly’ opposed to BDS, but did not support the Senate motion
due to ‘a long established practice of not attempting to navigate complex
foreign policy matters through Senate motions’.[85]
Prime Minister Gillard denounced the BDS movement in April 2013, in
response to protests planned for the opening of a Max Brenner store at the
University of New South Wales. Through a spokesperson, the Prime Minister said:
This campaign does not serve the cause of peace and diplomacy
for agreement on a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine.
I welcome the strong ties our universities have
with Israeli researchers and academic institutions, and I hope those ties will
deepen in the years ahead.[86]
Members of the Rudd and Gillard Governments did, on
occasion, outline Australia’s broader position on the Middle East conflict and
the Government’s position on what a final peace settlement should look like. Some
of these statements went further in terms of their prescription than previous
Australian Government public statements. In February 2011, for example, Foreign
Minister Rudd suggested:
Many of us who are friends of Israel and
friends of the Palestinian people are familiar with the broad architecture of a
comprehensive settlement which would create a two state solution — an
independent and secure Israeli state and an independent and secure Palestinian
state.
These elements include the 1967 borders,
with mutually agreed land swaps; the question of the right of return; the
question of Jerusalem and the holy sites; as well as necessary security
guarantees.[88]
It should be noted that this was the first time since the
1960s a member of an Australian Government had referred to the 1967 borders as
a basis for a final peace settlement.[89]
Rudd’s statement preceded a similar statement made by US President Barack Obama
in May 2011.[90]
There are a couple of areas where, regarding the
Israeli-Palestinian dispute, the Rudd and Gillard Governments evidently differed
from their predecessor. The most obvious and measurable differences relate to Australia’s
voting pattern at the UNGA and the language used concerning Israeli settlements.
Another less conclusive difference concerns the way the
Australian Government responded to the ‘passport affair’. Former Foreign
Minister Downer labelled the Rudd Government’s decision to expel an Israeli
diplomat in May 2010 as a ‘triumph of politics’ and a ‘folly’, suggesting
perhaps that the Howard Government would not have chosen this path in response
to a similar incident.
It is difficult to conclude that the post-2007 increase in
aid to the Palestinians, while substantial, represents an actual change in
policy. Faced with similar circumstances, a Coalition Government may also have
increased development assistance to the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank,
although it is impossible to determine whether an increase would have been on a
similar scale.
Despite the areas of (largely rhetorical) change, however,
in broad terms the Rudd and Gillard Governments maintained the Howard
Government’s policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—support for Israel to
exist within secure and recognised boundaries (including supporting Israel’s
‘right to defend itself’) and support for the creation of a Palestinian state
in the West Bank and Gaza.
[1]. L Hajjar, ‘Is
Gaza still occupied and why does it matter?’ Jadaliyya weblog, 14 July
2014, accessed 12 March 2015; W Buss, ‘Unsettled
in Gaza,’ Washington Post, 17 July 2005, accessed 12 March 2015.
[2]. JM Sharp and
CM Blanchard, ‘U.S.
foreign aid to the Palestinians,’ CRS Report for Congress, Congressional
Research Service, Washington DC, 27 June 2006, accessed 12 March 2015.
[3]. ‘Annapolis
agreement: full text,’ The Guardian, (online edition), 28 November
2007, accessed 12 March 2015.
[4]. See, for
example, M Harris, ‘West
Bank settlements illegal? Julie Bishop not so sure,’ Lowy Interpreter
weblog, 17 January 2014, accessed 12 March 2015; and M Harris, ‘Israel-Palestine:
Australia changes government, changes UN vote,’ Lowy Interpreter weblog, 26
November 2013, accessed 12 March 2015.
[5]. Australian
Labor Party (ALP), National
Platform and Constitution 2007, ALP, Canberra, 2007, p. 229,
accessed 12 March 2015.
[6]. Note that
Australian ODA to the ‘Palestinian territories’ includes funds provided not
only to the Palestinian Authority and organisations working in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip. It also includes aid, provided to international organisations
such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East (UNRWA), to assist Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Syria and
Jordan.
[7]. B McMullen (Parliamentary
Secretary for International Development Assistance), Australia
boosts support for the establishment of a viable and sustainable Palestinian
state, media release, 18 December 2007, accessed 12 March 2015. A
total of US$7.7 billion was pledged by the international community to the
Palestinian territories at the Paris Donors Conference; see The World Bank, Implementing
the Palestinian Reform and Development Agenda, The World Bank,
Washington DC, May 2008, p. 2, accessed 12 March 2015; and I Black, ‘Paris donor
nations pledge billions for Palestinians’, The Guardian, (online
edition), 17 December 2007, accessed 3 November 2014.
[8]. K Rudd
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), Deeper
engagement with the Muslim world: speech at the Organisation of Islamic
Conference, Astana, media release, 29 June 2011, accessed 12
March 2015.
[9]. On the
election of Hamas see AD Pina, ‘Palestinian elections’,
CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 9 February
2006, accessed 12 March 2015; on the Hamas takeover of Gaza see T Youngs and B
Smith, Hamas
and the seizure of Gaza, Research Paper 07/60, House of Commons
Library, London, 6 July 2007, accessed 12 March 2015; and ‘A
pyrrhic victory’, The Guardian, (online edition), 16 June
2007, accessed 12 March 2015.
[10]. D Williams
(Attorney-General), Perth:
transcript of doorstop interview: terrorist assets, media release, 21
December 2001. On the listing of Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades see
Australian Government, Hamas’s
Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Australian National Security
website, no date, accessed 12 March 2015; and N Brew and M Donaldson, Criminal
Code Amendment (Hamas and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba) Bill 2003, Bills
Digest, 60, 2003–04, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2003, accessed 12 March
2015.
[11]. Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australia’s
implementation of United Nations Security Council financial sanctions,
DFAT website, no date, accessed 12 March 2015.
[12]. A Downer
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), Challenges
in the Middle East: speech to the United Israel Appeal: Melbourne, media
release, 5 April 2006, accessed 12 March 2015.
[13]. A Downer
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), Transcript
of doorstop, media release, 27 June 2007, accessed 2 December
2014.
[14]. It should be
noted that the US Government also dramatically increased its aid to the
Palestinians in 2007–08. US bilateral assistance to the Palestinians increased
from US$69.5 million in the 2007 fiscal year (FY) to US$414.5 million in FY2008
and US$980.7 million in FY2009; J Zanotti, ‘The Palestinians:
background and US relations’, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional
Research Service, Washington DC, 30 August 2011, p. 11, accessed 12 March
2015.
[15]. Palestinian
National Authority, Palestine:
ending the occupation, establishing the state: program of the Thirteenth
Government, Palestinian National Authority, Ramallah, released
in English in August 2009, accessed 12 March 2015.
[16]. On Fayyadism
see TL Friedman, ‘Green
shoots in Palestine’, International New York Times, (online
edition), 4 August 2009, accessed 2 December 2014; N Thrall, ‘Our
man in Palestine’, New York Review of Books, (online edition), 16
September 2010, accessed 2 December 2014; T Alhomayed, ‘Salam Fayyad: a brave
man’, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, 6 February 2010, accessed 12 March 2015; B
Birnbaum, ‘The
visionary: a Palestinian reformer’s downfall’, New Republic, 243
(4923), 24 May 2012, pp. 14–18, accessed 12 March 2015.
[17]. N Browning, ‘West
Bank economy shrinks for first time in decade - World Bank,’ Reuters, 8
October 2013, accessed 27 March 2015; I Issacharoff, ‘World
Bank: Economic slowdown in Palestinian Authority endangers state-building
efforts’, Haaretz, 15 March 2012, accessed 2 December 2014; O
Niksic, N Nasser Eddin and M Cali, Area
C and the future of the Palestinian economy, a World Bank Study,
World Bank, Washington DC, 2014, accessed 1 December 2014.
[18]. International
Monetary Fund (IMF), Macroeconomic
and fiscal framework for the West Bank and Gaza: staff report for the meeting
of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, IMF, Brussels, 13 April 2011,
p. 3, accessed 12 March 2015.
[19]. Palestinian
National Authority, Palestine:
ending the occupation, establishing the state: program of the Thirteenth
Government, p. 6.
[20]. Quoted in N
Thrall, ‘Our man in Palestine’, op. cit.
[21]. J Zanotti, ‘U.S. foreign aid to the
Palestinians,’ CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research
Service, Washington DC, 3 July 2014, p. 16, accessed 11 March 2015.
[22]. A Pfeffer, ‘West
Bank sees lowest IDF troop levels since first intifada’, Haaretz, 28
November 2010, accessed 12 March 2015. In 2009 Israeli and PA forces took part
in 1,297 ‘coordinated activities’, many of them against Palestinian militant
groups; see State of Israel, Measures taken by
Israel in support of developing the Palestinian economy, the socio-economic
structure, and the security reforms: report of the Government of Israel to the
Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC), Madrid, 13 April 2010, accessed 12
March 2015.
[23]. K Rudd
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), Australian
assistance to Palestine, media release, 14 December 2010,
accessed 12 March 2015.
[24]. J Gillard
(Prime Minister), ‘Practical
progress towards realising those ideals in the world’: speech to the United
Nations General Assembly, media release, 26 September 2012, accessed 12
March 2015.
[25]. AusAID and
the PA, Partnership
arrangement between the Government of Australia (as represented by the
Australian Agency for International Development) and the Palestinian Authority,
signed on 18 September 2010, accessed 12 March 2015.
[26]. Ibid.
[27]. B Carr
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), Australia
to support UN relief works for Palestinian refugees, media
release, 28 May 2012, accessed 2 December 2014.
[28]. Lowy
Institute for International Policy, Australian
Foreign Policy Debate, transcript, Sydney, 7 August 2013,
accessed 12 March 2015.
[29]. Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Official
committee Hansard, 31 May 2012, pp. 61–74.
[30]. For some
opposition to this move see P Hudson, ‘UN vote:
Rudd breaks with Howard over Israel’, Sydney Morning Herald, (online
edition), 10 November 2008, accessed 12 March 2015; N Levin, ‘Australian
Government denies United Nations policy shift’, Australian Jewish News,
27 November 2009, p. 3, accessed 12 March 2015.
[31]. See United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA), A/RES/63/96:
Applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the other occupied Arab territories,
18 December 2008, accessed 12 March 2015; UNGA, A/RES/63/97:
Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, 18 December 2008,
accessed 12 March 2015; UNGA, A/RES/64/150:
The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, 19
December 2009, accessed 12 March 2015; UNGA, A/RES/66/225:
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan over their natural resources, 22 December 2011,
accessed 12 March 2015.
[32]. S Smith, ‘Questions
without notice: Middle East,’ [Questioner: M Parke], House of
Representatives, Debates, 10 November 2008, p. 10,281, accessed 12
March 2015.
[33]. See voting
records for particular resolutions, available on the General Assembly of the United
Nations website, accessed 12 March 2015. In 2013, the newly elected Abbott
Government reverted to Howard-era voting patterns on some, but not all, UNGA
resolutions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; see M Harris, “‘Diplomatic
terrorism”: Palestinian statehood, the United Nations, and Australia’s voting
record,’ FlagPost weblog, 5 December 2014, accessed 12 March 2015.
[34]. Israeli
President Benjamin Netanyahu, for example, said in April 2014: ‘The
Palestinians have much to lose by taking unilateral steps. They will achieve a
state only through a direct negotiation, not by empty declaration or unilateral
measures. These will only push further away a peace agreement. Unilateral steps
on their part will be answered by unilateral steps from our side. We are
willing to continue with the talks but not at any cost’. Quoted in ‘Are
the Middle East peace talks in jeopardy?’ Inside Story, Al Jazeera
America, 7 April 2014, accessed 27 March 2015.
[35]. For more on
the 2011 campaign by the Palestinian Authority (West Bank) to achieve
diplomatic recognition as a ‘state, and on the possibility of a unilateral
declaration of independence’, see A Shatz, ‘Is Palestine
next?’ London Review of Books, 14 July 2011, accessed 12 March 2015;
K Vick, ‘The
Palestinians' statehood dilemma: full U.N. Membership or Observer Status?’ Time
Magazine, (online edition), 1 September 2011, accessed 12 March 2015; and ‘Fact
Sheet: Palestinian Unilateral Declaration of Independence,’ Jewish
Virtual Library, 23 September 2011, accessed 12 March 2015. On Israel’s
opposition, see I Kershner, ‘Israel
heightens warnings over Palestinians’ UN bid,’ International New
York Times, (online edition), 14 November 2012, accessed 12 March 2015, IR
Prusher, ‘Israel
rejects Palestinian statehood bid via the UN,’ The Christian Science
Monitor, 15 November 2009, accessed 12 March 2015, and A Safian, ‘Backgrounder:
The Palestinian “Non-Member State” drive at the UN’,
Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America, 26 November
2012, accessed 12 March 2015.
[36]. See ‘Brazil
recognises Palestine’, Al Jazeera English, 5 December 2010, accessed
12 March 2015.
[37]. K Rudd
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), Manama
Dialogue press conference, media release, 4 December 2010,
accessed 12 March 2015.
[38]. J Gillard, ‘Direct
negotiations are the true path to peace’, The Australian, 21
September 2011, p. 14, accessed 12 March 2015.
[39]. United
Nations, Application
of the State of Palestine for admission to membership in the United Nations,
submitted 23 September 2011, accessed 12 March 2015.
[40]. J Irish, ‘UNESCO
gives Palestinians full membership’, RealClearWorld.com, 31 October
2011, accessed 12 March 2015.
[41]. Those that
voted against were: Australia, Canada, Czech Republic,
Germany, Israel, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Palau, Panama, Samoa, Solomon
Islands, Sweden, United States of America, and Vanuatu. A further 52 members
abstained. See ‘UNESCO vote to admit Palestine: Who objected?’ UN Watch, 1 November 2011, accessed 12 March 2015.
[42]. ‘Q&A:
Palestinians’ upgraded UN status,’ BBC News, 30 November 2012,
accessed 12 March 2015.
[43]. See, for
example, D Flitton, ‘Palestinian
statehood stirring “hot debate”,’ The Age, 2 November 2012,
p. 11, accessed 12 March 2015, and K O’Dwyer, ‘Adjournment:
Palestine,’ House of Representatives, Debates, 29 November 2012, p.
14076, accessed 12 March 2015.
[44]. G Dobell, ‘When
the foreign minister rolls the PM,’ Lowy Interpreter weblog, 6 December
2012, accessed 12 March 2015; and ‘Julia Gillard backs down on plans to vote against improving Palestine's
status in the United Nations,’ News.com.au, 28
November 2012, accessed 12 March 2015.
[45]. J Gillard
(Prime Minister) and B Carr (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Palestinian
UN observer status, media release, 27 November 2012, accessed 12
March 2015.
[46]. UNGA, A/RES/67/19:
Status of Palestine in the United Nations, 29 November 2012, accessed
12 March 2015. Countries voting ‘no’ were Canada, Czech Republic, Israel,
Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Panama, Palau and the
United States; see UNGA, General Assembly
Votes overwhelmingly to accord Palestine ‘Non-Member Observer State’ status in United
Nations, media release, 29 November 2012, accessed 12 March
2015.
[47]. See, for
example, J Bishop (Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs), Labor
decision to abstain on Palestinian UN vote, media release, 27
November 2012, accessed 12 March 2015; J Bishop (Shadow Minister for Foreign
Affairs), Troubling
precedent in Palestinian vote, media release, 30 November
2012, accessed 12 March 2015.
[48]. UNSC, 6470th
meeting of the Security Council, New York, 19 January 2011,
accessed 12 March 2015.
[49]. UNSC, 6847th
meeting of the Security Council, New York, 15 October 2012,
accessed 12 March 2015.
[50]. See, for
example, S Smith (Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Answer
to question in writing: Israeli settlement construction’, [Questioner: J
Bishop], House of Representatives, Debates, 28 October 2009, p. 11308,
accessed 12 March 2015; S Smith (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Speech
at lunch hosted by the Executive Council of Australian Jewry at the Adele
Southwick Centre St Kilda Hebrew Congregation: Australia and Israel,
speech, 19 May 2009, accessed 12 March 2015; S Smith (Minister for Foreign
Affairs), Interview
with Kieran Gilbert, media release, 11 March 2010, accessed 12
March 2015; K Rudd (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Joint
press conference with Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit, media
release, 11 December 2010, accessed 12 March 2015; B Carr (Minister for Foreign
Affairs), Israeli
settlements, media release, 10 April 2012, accessed 12 March
2015.
[51]. B Carr
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), AUKMIN
2013 communique, media release, 18 January 2013, accessed 12 March
2015.
[52]. Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Official
Committee Hansard, 13 February 2013, pp. 21–3, accessed 12 March
2015.
[53]. Quoted in D
Singer, ‘Palestine:
Rudd and Carr tight-lipped on anti-Jewish policy,’ Online Opinion,
27 August 2013, accessed 12 March 2015.
[54]. J Howard
(Prime Minister), Press
conference at King David Hotel, media release, 2 May 2000,
accessed 12 March 2015.
[55]. J Howard
(Prime Minister), Speech:
39 Annual Conference: Australian Federation of Islamic Councils,
media release, 12 April 2003, accessed 2 December 2014.
[56]. See, for
example, A Downer (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Joint
press conference with Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister Silvan Shalom,
media release, 27 January 2004, accessed 12 March 2015.
[57]. See ‘US abandons racism
summit’, BBC News, 3 September 2001, accessed 12 March 2015; ‘Racism summit turmoil:
reactions’, BBC News, 3 September 2001, accessed 12 March 2015.
[58]. A Downer
(Minister for Foreign Affairs) and D Williams (Attorney-General), Australia
welcomes conclusion of World Conference against Racism, media
release, 10 September 2001, accessed 12 March 2015; for the final communiqué
issued from the 2001 Durban Conference see World Conference against Racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance: declaration,
8 September 2001, accessed 12 March 2015.
[59]. S Smith
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Answer
to a Question without notice: Durban Review Conference’, [Questioner: J
Bishop], House of Representatives, Debates, 12 March 2009, p. 2533, accessed
12 March 2015.
[60]. S Smith
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), Durban
Review Conference, media release, 19 April 2009, accessed 12
March 2015. The following countries boycotted the Durban Review Conference: Australia,
Canada, Germany, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, United
States. For information on what occurred at the Durban Review Conference see ‘Ahmadinejad
prompts walkout from UN racism summit’, Reuters, 20 April 2009,
accessed 12 March 2015; ‘UN meeting on
racism adopts final declaration’, AFP, 20 April 2009, accessed 12
March 2015; S Shamir and N Mozgoyvaya, ‘US
to boycott Durban 2 conference on racism’, Haaretz, 27 February
2009, accessed 12 March 2015.
[61]. ‘Australia
withdraws from Durban III over Israel-bashing fears’, JewishJournal.com,
23 August 2011, accessed 12 March 2015.
[62]. For more on
the December 2008–January 2009 conflict in Gaza see S Jones, Gaza: the conflict
between Israel and Hamas, Standard Note SN/IA/04946, House of
Commons Library, London, 22 January 2009, accessed 12 March 2015.
[63]. J Gillard
(Acting Prime Minister), Transcript
of interview with Marius Benson— ABC News Radio, media release,
5 January 2009, accessed 12 March 2015.
[64]. See, for
example, B Zwartz, ‘Muslims
furious at Gaza “bias”’, The Age, 7 February 2009, p. 11,
accessed 12 March 2015; J Drape, ‘Gillard
refuses to chide Israel’, Sunday Tasmanian, 4 January 2009, accessed
12 March 2015; N Levin, ‘Australia
remains in Israel’s corner’, Australian Jewish News, 16 January
2009, accessed 12 March 2015; B Brown (Leader of the Australian Greens), Israeli
attack on the United Nations, media release, 16 January 2009,
accessed 12 March 2015.
[65]. The original
12 January 2009 decision by the UN Human Rights Council sought to investigate
violations of international law by ‘the occupying Power, Israel, against the
Palestinian people ... in the occupied Gaza Strip’, meaning there would be no
investigation of possible violations by Hamas. The final mandate, agreed on 3
April 2009, did not single out Israel, implying, but not stating explicitly,
that Hamas and other Palestinian groups would be investigated as well. See United
Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), Report
of the Human Rights Council on its ninth special session, 27
February 2009, accessed 12 March 2015.
[66]. UNHRC, Human Rights in Palestine and
other occupied Arab territories: report of the United Nations fact finding
mission on the Gaza conflict (Goldstone Report), 15
September 2009, accessed 12 March 2015.
[67]. For
perspectives on the debate surrounding the Goldstone Report, see B Plett, ‘Legal row over Gaza
report intensifies’, BBC News, 6 November 2009, accessed 12 March
2015; State of Israel, Initial
response to report of the fact finding mission on Gaza established pursuant of
Resolution S–9/1 of the Human Rights Council, 24 September 2009,
p. 1, accessed 12 March 2015; B Ravid, ‘Netanyahu
asks world to reject Goldstone findings’, Haaretz, 5 November 2009,
accessed 12 March 2015; A Hass, ‘Gazans: IDF used us as
“human shields” during offensive’, Haaretz, 26 October 2009,
accessed 12 March 2015; N MacFarquhar, ‘Inquiry
finds Gaza war crimes from both sides’, International New York Times,
(online edition), 15 September 2009, accessed 12 March 2015; Human Rights
Watch, Israel/Gaza:
implement Goldstone recommendations on Gaza, media release, 16
September 2009, accessed 12 March 2015.
[68]. UN General
Assembly, A/RES/64/10:
Follow-up to the report of the United Nations fact-finding mission on the Gaza
Conflict, 4 November 2009, accessed 12 March 2015.
[69]. UNGA, Sixty-fourth
session: 39th plenary meeting, 5 November 2009, accessed 12 March 2015.
[70]. J Gillard
(Deputy Prime Minister), Speech
to the Australia Israel Leadership Forum, media release, 6
December 2009, accessed 12 March 2015.
[71]. For
information on the assassination and Australia’s response, see ‘“Mossad”
hit snares Australians’, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 February 2010,
accessed 12 March 2015; R Bergman, ‘The
Dubai job’, GQ, January 2011, accessed 12 March 2015; and J Stewart,
‘Israeli-Australia
relations cool over passports affair’, Lateline, transcript, 24 May
2010, accessed 12 March 2015.
[72]. S Smith
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Ministerial
Statement: Foreign Affairs: Australian passports’, House of
Representatives, Debates, 25 February 2010, pp. 1857–8, accessed 12
March 2015.
[73]. S Smith
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), Discussion
about the abuse of three Australian passports in Dubai, media release,
25 February 2010, accessed 12 March 2015.
[74]. ‘Britain expels Israeli
diplomat over Dubai passport row’, BBC News, 23 March 2010, accessed
12 March 2015.
[75]. S Smith
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), Interview
with ABC World Today, media release, 24 March 2011, accessed 12 March
2015.
[76]. S Smith
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), ‘Ministerial
Statement: national security’, House of Representatives, Debates, 24
May 2010, pp. 3653–4, accessed 12 March 2015.
[77]. D Speers, ‘Interview
with Foreign Minister Stephen Smith’, Sky News, transcript, 25 May
2010, accessed 12 March 2015.
[78]. I Black, ‘Ireland
orders Israeli diplomat out of embassy over forged passports’, The
Guardian, (online edition), 15 June 2010, accessed 12 March 2015.
[79]. BDS Movement,
Palestinian civil society calls
for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions against Israel until it complies with
international law and universal principles of human rights, media
release, 9 July 2005, accessed 27 November 2014.
[80]. For a
selection of these arguments and detailed criticism of the BDS movement see ‘Boycotting Israel: the new pariah
on the block,’ The Economist, 13 September 2007, accessed 27
November 2014; N Guttman, ‘Want
to delegitimize Israel? Be careful who you mess with,’ Haaretz, 13
April 2010, accessed 27 November 2014; H Brackman, Boycott,
Divestment and Sanctions (BBS) against Israel: an anti-Semitic, anti-peace
poison pill, Simon Wiesenthal Center, March 2013, accessed 12
March 2015; E Higgins and C Kerr, ‘Jihad
Sheila link to anti-Jewish posts,’ The Australian, 3 May 2013,
p. 1, accessed 27 November 2014; C Kerr, ‘Julia
Gillard denounces activists as anti-Israel protest turns anti-Semitic,’
30 April 2013, accessed 27 November 2014; CB Glick, ‘Column
One: Delegitimizing the delegitimizers,’ The Jerusalem Post, 11
April 2011, accessed 27 November 2014.
[81]. For examples
of these arguments and detail of the pro-BDS position see J Haber, ‘What’s
so wrong with BDS,’ The Daily Beast, 7 February 2013, accessed 27
November 2014; J Michaelson, ‘The
wrong way to fight BDS,’ The Jewish Daily Forward, 21 February 2013,
accessed 27 November 2014; G Levy, ‘The Israeli patriot’s
final refuge: boycott,’ Haaretz, 14 July 2013, accessed 27 November
2014; O Barghouti, Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: the global struggle for
Palestinian rights, Haymarket Books, Chicago and New York, 2011.
[82]. R Friedman, ‘Strauss
reposts IDF-support on website,’ Jerusalem Post, 14 December 2010,
accessed 27 November 2014.
[83]. D Flitton, ‘Citizen
Rudd’s sweet spot for café,’ The Age, 15 July 2011, accessed 27
November 2014.
[84]. J Bishop
(Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs), Carr
provides support for BDS campaign against Israel, media release,
12 September 2012, accessed 28 November 2014; see also E Abetz (Leader of the
Opposition in the Senate), Senate
condemns Labor, Greens and unions over BDS campaign, media
release, 11 May 2013, accessed 28 November 2014, and J Bishop (Shadow Minister
for Foreign Affairs), Labor
supports Marrickville Council’s campaign against Israel, media
release, 2 June 2011, accessed 28 November 2014.
[85]. B Carr
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), Boycott,
divestment and sanctions, media release, 13 September 2012,
accessed 28 November 2014.
[86]. ‘Julia Gillard denounces activists as anti-Israel protest
turns anti-Semitic’, op. cit.
[87]. The 1967
borders refer to the ‘Green Line’, the demarcation lines set out in the
armistice agreements between Israel and its neighbours following the 1948
Arab-Israeli war. This line represented Israel’s de facto borders up until the
Six Day War in June 1967, when it captured the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan
Heights and Sinai Peninsula. Israel has long argued that, from a strategic
standpoint, it would be impossible for it to withdraw completely to the 1967
borders. For example, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Ebban told the UNGA in 1969
that ‘for us, this is a matter of security and of principles. The June [1967] map
is for us equivalent to insecurity and danger.’ Similarly, Israeli Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin said in 1995: ‘the borders of the State of Israel,
during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before
the Six-Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines’. Quoted in Frank
Dimant, ‘The
1967 lines are “Auschwitz borders”,’ The Algemeiner, 20 January
2014, accessed 12 March 2015.
[88]. K Rudd
(Minister for Foreign Affairs), Australian
foreign policy and recent developments in the Middle East: speech at the Foundation
for Economic and Industrial Research, Athens, media release, 2
February 2011, accessed 12 March 2015; Rudd made a similar reference to the
1967 borders during his address to the UN General Assembly in September 2011: K
Rudd (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Australian
Statement to the UN General Assembly, media release, 22
September 2011, accessed 12 March 2015.
[89]. P Hasluck (Minister
for External Affairs), ‘Ministerial
statement: international affairs’, House of Representatives, Debates,
17 August 1967, pp. 209–210, accessed 12 March 2015.
[90]. B Obama (US
President), Remarks
by the President on the Middle East and North Africa, media
release, 19 May 2011, accessed 12 March 2015.
For copyright reasons some linked items are only available to members of Parliament.
© Commonwealth of Australia
Creative Commons
In essence, you are free to copy and communicate this work in its current form for all non-commercial purposes, as long as you attribute the work to the author and abide by the other licence terms. The work cannot be adapted or modified in any way. Content from this publication should be attributed in the following way: Author(s), Title of publication, Series Name and No, Publisher, Date.
To the extent that copyright subsists in third party quotes it remains with the original owner and permission may be required to reuse the material.
Inquiries regarding the licence and any use of the publication are welcome to webmanager@aph.gov.au.
This work has been prepared to support the work of the Australian Parliament using information available at the time of production. The views expressed do not reflect an official position of the Parliamentary Library, nor do they constitute professional legal opinion.
Any concerns or complaints should be directed to the Parliamentary Librarian. Parliamentary Library staff are available to discuss the contents of publications with Senators and Members and their staff. To access this service, clients may contact the author or the Library‘s Central Entry Point for referral.