Research Paper no.20 2001-2002
India-US Relations in a Changing Strategic Environment
Dr Ravi Tomar
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
25 June 2002
List of Maps
Map 1: India and its Neighbours
Map 2: India's Borders with Pakistan
Map 3: IndiaPakistan Border: Kashmir
Map 4: Kashmir Region
5: India, Burma and China
Map 6: Andaman and Nicobar Islands
Map 7: Andaman Islands, the Straits of Malacca and
The Early Years
Post 1962: After the IndiaChina
Post 1971: In the Aftermath of the
Post 1998: The Clinton Visit
2001: The Bush Administration
Post September 2001
India-US Military Cooperation
Impact of India's Neighbours on IndiaUS
IndiaUS Relations, the Cold War and Pakistan's Influence on
China's Influence on IndiaUS Relations
India and China's Relations with Burma: Implications for IndiaUS
IndiaEast Asian Relations
IndiaUS Relations: Implications for
Appendix A: Chronology
Appendix B: IndiaUS Military Cooperation:
Post September 2001
Appendix C: Pakistan's Influence on IndiaUS
Appendix D: China's Influence on IndiaUS
Appendix E: India and China's Relations
with Burma: Implications for IndiaUS Relations:
Significant improvements in IndiaUS relations
have gone relatively unnoticed. However, after the events of
September 2001 and US operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, this
relationship has assumed a degree of significance that, it is
argued, will have an impact on the future strategic environment in
the AsiaPacific region.
India's perception of itself has been of a
country destined to achieve major power status. This was evident in
the global vision of its first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru,
the architect of India's post-independence foreign policy. This
pursuit of non-alignment was not so much as 'aligning' India with
the Soviet Union as an attempt not to enter the Western alliance
system. Hence India, along with other like-minded newly independent
countries pursued a policy of not aligning themselves with either
power bloc. Countries in this loose knit grouping eventually formed
the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), which formally met for the first
time in 1961.
While this gave India a high profile
internationally, it was not backed by military and economic
strength. The policy was tested in the conflict with China (1962)
and found to be severely deficient. A decade later, India's victory
in the 1971 war with Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh
indicated a shift in India's foreign policy: its security goals now
On the issue of nuclear weapons, while India
consistently championed the cause of nuclear disarmament there
would appear to be a tacit acknowledgment that such a goal was
unattainable. Realising the status that nuclear weapons accorded to
the major powers, it demonstrated its nuclear capability by
exploding a nuclear device in 1974. It could be argued that the
1998 nuclear tests were carried out to establish India as a nuclear
power before the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) came into
force. The refusal of the Bush administration to ratify the CTBT
does not detract from the fact that India is now a de-facto nuclear
Paradoxically, the acknowledgment of India as an
influential player in the Indian Ocean region has not been matched
by its economic performance which has stalled after a promising
start in the 1990s. Nonetheless, its economic potential cannot be
IndiaUS relations have had a turbulent past. The
bilateral relationship has a history of being influenced by US
policies towards India's neighbours and India's policy of
non-alignment and its relations with the erstwhile Soviet Union.
Add to this the politics of the Cold War and it becomes easy to
understand why relations between the two democracies were often
based on mutual mistrust and misperceptions. While the end of the
Cold War led to a gradual improvement in IndiaUS relations, these
shifts came to a halt in May 1998 when India (followed by Pakistan)
conducted nuclear tests and the US imposed wide ranging
Less than two years later, in March 2000
President Clinton visited India, the first visit by a US president
in over 20 years. Since then IndiaUS relations have developed at an
unprecedented pace, especially in the politico-military sphere. The
terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001 further galvanised
the growing closeness. The terrorist attack on the Indian
Parliament in December 2001 and the operations in Afghanistan were
further evidence that the two countries faced similar threats to
their security. The result has been an unprecedented cooperation on
security issues and indications are that this is going to intensify
further. Despite the recent increase in tension between India and
Pakistan, IndiaUS relations continue on a 'business as usual'
basis. This is proof of the fact that the engagement is bilateral
and not influenced by other factors.
As far as Australia-India relations are
concerned, while economic relations continue to develop, a lot of
work needs to be done on the politico-strategic side of the
The US sees its relations with India as central
to maintaining long-term stability in Asia and in fighting
terrorism. The transformation of our military relationship is
essential to achieving these goals(1)
US interest in India was evident as early as
1942 (Appendix A provides a chronology of key dates), five years
before independence when President Franklin D. Roosevelt suggested
to Winston Churchill that he supported India's independence
movement. This support soon evaporated after the Indian National
Congress decided not to support the war effort and launch the Quit
India movement.(2) This move was not critical to the
independence movement since its lobbying efforts were directed at
the British government. In any event contacts between Indian
leaders and the United States had been minimal and most of them
(including Mahatma Gandhi and the future Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru) had been educated in Britain.
Independent India, under Prime Minister Nehru
(who was the primary architect of India's foreign policy), was
determined to keep away from the Cold War. Nehru chose a middle
path, which subsequently came to be known as non-alignment. As
early as 1947, in a note to India's Ambassador designate to China,
K. P. S. Menon, he wrote:(3)
Our general policy is to avoid entanglement in
power politics and not join any group of powers as against any
other group. The two leading groups today are the Russian bloc and
the Anglo-American bloc. We must be friendly to both and yet not
join either. Both America and Russia are extraordinarily suspicious
of each other as well as of other countries. This makes our path
difficult and we may well be suspected by each of learning towards
the other. This cannot be helped.
The Soviet Union, being our neighbour, we shall
inevitably develop close relations with it. We cannot afford to
antagonise Russia merely because we think that this may irritate
someone else. Nor indeed can we antagonise the USA.
Consequently, India under Nehru pursued a
globally oriented foreign policy while trying to maintain a careful
distance between the power blocs of the East and West. Its stand on
disarmament, anti-colonialism and world peace won for India the
respect of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa,
gratified that one of them could speak on equal terms with the two
great powers. It was also a source of satisfaction for Indian
nationalists who viewed it as final proof that Independence had
truly been won.
However, India's policy of non-alignment
suffered from two inherent weaknesses. While the policy of
globalism and Asianism (a vision of United Asia) secured for India
a politically high profile in spite of its military and economic
weakness, success was dependent on the requirements (of the great
powers) of the support and goodwill of the newly emerging nations
which India claimed to have influence over. Secondly, Nehru ignored
the need to evolve a concept of regional security. Political
influence at the global level was considered to more than offset
the need for diplomacy and military power to protect Indian
interests (including territorial integrity) in South Asia. This
policy was finally tested in the IndiaChina border conflict in 1962
and found to be seriously deficient.
It is against this background that this paper
traces the development of IndiaUS relations, a relationship that
had a shaky start, a history of disagreements over a wide range of
issues, and instances of cooperation, albeit rare. The bilateral
relationship had also been influenced by Pakistan and China's
relations with the US. The result was a prismatic nature of IndiaUS
relations which tended to be affected by the dynamics of US ties
with India's neighbours. The end of the Cold War and the collapse
of the Soviet Union accompanied by India's economic reforms
initiated a process of gradual shift in the way the two countries
perceived each other. This gradual process of the warming up of
bilateral relations came to an abrupt halt after India's nuclear
tests in May 1998. The freeze did not last very long and
improvement in relations was evident in the visit of President
Clinton to India in March 2000, the first presidential visit in
over 20 years. Since then relations between the two countries have
swiftly evolved into what has been termed as a policy of
comprehensive engagement. The paper concludes with an assessment of
the implications of these changes in the politico-strategic
landscape for the region in general and Australia in particular.
(It should be emphasised that this paper discusses the Kashmir
dispute between India and Pakistan only in passing. The issue is
dealt with in an e-brief 'India-Pakistan:
Tensions over Kashmir',(4) published on 12 June
As has been observed, after the end of the
Second World War there existed in the US 'a profound ignorance of
Asia in general and India in particular. Secretary of State Dean
Acheson's illusion that 'if the world is round, the Indians must be
standing on their heads' represented the vagueness prevailing even
among educated Americans'.(5) Neither the Truman nor the
Eisenhower administrations had people who were familiar with India.
Eisenhower, despite being the first President to visit India still
viewed Asia in terms of a power vacuum ripe for communist
expansion. The Korean War (195053) would certainly have reinforced
his conviction. India's actions during and after the war were also
a demonstration of its policy of non-alignment. As a member of the
UN Commission on Korea and a non-permanent member of the Security
Council, India voted for the 25 June 1950 resolution naming North
Korea as aggressor and calling for the withdrawal of its troops to
the 38th parallel. It opposed or abstained from voting for
subsequent US sponsored resolutions including one naming China as
the aggressor and the Uniting for Peace resolution of September
1950. It also established an informal grouping of Asian and Arab
delegations for purposes of mediation. It was the Indian draft
resolution on the question of repatriation of prisoners of war that
was ultimately passed. The five-nation Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission subsequently established had India's General K. S.
Thimmaiya as chairman. While India had established its non-aligned
credentials by balancing US interests with those of the Soviet
Union and China, the US was not only unhappy with the loss of
support but also perceived India as moving away from the west but
not from the communist countries. Another question on which India
and the US consistently disagreed was that of China's membership of
the United Nations.(6)
India also opposed US acts of establishing bases
in Asia as part of its containment policy as well as its military
aid to Pakistan from 1954 onwards while denying such assistance to
India. Also, it was with US support that Pakistan could raise the
Kashmir issue in the Security Council (1957, 1962 and 1964). In
terms of perception, while India's world-view was that of members
of military alliances and non-aligned nations, the US perception
was that of allies and others.
These differences did not preclude occasional
cooperation between the two countries when their interests
converged. This was evident in Indian participation in the UN
backed solution of the Suez crisis (1956), the agreement on the
neutralisation of Laos (1962) and the UN operations in Congo after
Economic relations between the two countries
provided an interesting contrast to their political relations.
American investment in India was substantial compared to that by
other countries. The US aid program has been described as having
'motivations ranging from pure humanitarianism to crass
materialism'.(7) Between 1950 and 1965 the US provided
50 per cent of foreign aid received by India. However, more than
half of this was in the form of food aid under Public Law 480
(1954). For the US it was a politically convenient way of disposing
its food surplus. In 1957 the US established a Development Loan
Fund to provide loans to enable India to procure capital goods from
the former. It was also on a US initiative that the World Bank
established an Aid-India Consortium which provided substantial
funds to India's Third Five Year Plan. An agreement on the
construction of nuclear power plants was signed in 1963 beginning
with the one at Tarapur near Bombay. A contentious aspect of
economic relations was that with very few exceptions, the US
declined to invest in or assist Indian heavy industry. This could
be perceived as an attempt to prevent India from achieving self
sufficiency in this sector as well as to ensure a market for US
products. For this, as well as the supply of military equipment,
India turned to the Soviet Union.
In the aftermath of the IndiaChina border
conflict of 1962, India requested, and received, military
assistance not only from the Soviet Union but also from the US and
Britain. Although much has been made of this gesture by the latter
two countries, circumstances soon allowed the reduction of this
commitment. There are two points to be made in this context.
Firstly, only a small amount of 'emergency' assistance was actually
committed. There was no offer of long term military aid. Secondly,
the US-UK offer was conditional on the successful resolution of the
Kashmir dispute in which India was expected to make substantial
concessions. USUK brokered negotiations did take place in 196263
but were unsuccessful.(8) Also, US military aid was
provided on the condition that it 'would in no circumstances be
used against any adversaries but China'.(9) This was in
total contrast to the unconditional military assistance by the US
to Pakistan. According to the then US Ambassador to India, Chester
Bowles, it also led 'the Indians to conclude that we attribute to
the Peoples Republic of China lion-like qualities in Southeast Asia
and sheep-like qualities along India's 2200 mile
border'.(10) In any event the very limited military
assistance came to an end in September 1965 when Pakistan attacked
India across the ceasefire line in Kashmir and India retaliated by
attacking Pakistan across the border in Punjab. India was also less
than impressed by the relatively less critical reaction by the US
(and UK) to Pakistan's attack than to India's counter attack as
well as the use of US supplied military hardware by Pakistan.
(India's earlier concerns are discussed later in the paper.)
The war also revealed a new correlation of
forces in the region. China openly supported Pakistan while the
Soviet Union was somewhat more neutral as compared to its earlier
partisan support of India. Presumably with the tacit agreement of
the US, the Soviet Union played a mediatory role at the Tashkent
talks between India and Pakistan and, for a while seemed to emerge
as a security manager for the subcontinent. It even provided
limited military supplies to Pakistan (already receiving arms from
the US and China) between 196769, a move which angered India but
had little effect, considering India's dependence on the Soviet
Union for military and economic assistance.
Also during this period India was undergoing an
economic and food crisis and the newly elected Prime Minister, Mrs
Indira Gandhi, was discovering the limitations that dependence
imposed on India's desire for autonomy. The issue was micro-managed
and ineptly handled by President Johnson. The US pressured India
into devaluing the Rupee in 1966 and, during the food crisis, used
supply pressures in order to have India relent on international
issues, especially Vietnam.(11) According to the then US
Ambassador to India:(12)
Cables from Washington burned with comments
about 'those ungrateful Indians', and the shipments of wheat were
further delayed. Our official logic in regard to India seemed to
run as follows if India cannot support US policy, it should at
least refrain from criticising it, or accept the consequences.
This spirit at its worst was reflected in a
remark a White House official made to me Mrs Gandhi, I asserted,
was only saying what [UN Secretary General] U Thant and the Pope
had said over and over again. 'But', replied the official, 'the
Pope and U Thant don't need our wheat'.
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's mistrust of US
policies in later years probably had its origin in these series of
humiliations and, while India refused to compromise, the Prime
Minister reportedly determined never again to be put in such a
India-US relations further deteriorated after
Richard Nixon assumed the presidency and moved towards a
rapprochement with China, thereby eliminating the last
argument in favour of support for India as part of a policy of
containing China. Brought about with the help of Pakistan, the
establishment of US-China relations resulted in what was a
convergence of USPakistanChina interests, a move that could not but
be perceived by India to be threatening. The crisis in East
Pakistan (later Bangladesh) that led to a war in 1971 resulted in
the first steps towards what would emerge as an Indo-centric power
structure in South Asia. India decided to defy the US and its
'tilt' towards Pakistan and signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship
and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, thereby assuring India of
material and diplomatic support in case of a war with Pakistan
which, by then, seemed inevitable. (These issues are discussed
later in the paper.)
India's victory in the 1971 war with Pakistan
and the creation of Bangladesh owed their success to Prime Minister
Gandhi's primary policy objective: that India's security goals
ranked foremost in its foreign policy. (It was also an indication
as to how far India's foreign policy goals had changed since the
days of her father, Prime Minister Nehru.) India had now emerged as
South Asia's pre-eminent regional power. This was further
demonstrated by the fact that the Simla Agreement (July 1972) with
Pakistan was arrived at without the involvement of any external
powers. Further, the two countries agreed to resolve any future
problems bilaterally and work towards the development of friendly
relations. This trend towards bilateralism became fairly well
entrenched in the 1970s. As an analyst has
From the Bangladesh war of 1971 till the Iranian
Revolution of 1979 and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan later
that year, the development of IndoPakistani relations had been to a
large extent been insulated from the course of superpower rivalry.
Trends and events that helped or hindered the evolution of a
regional détente in South Asia were largely, if not
exclusively subcontinental in origin
Indeed, US attitudes towards the region had
changed. US policy on the eve of the Soviet intervention did
'recognise as a fact of life that no matter what measuring stick
one uses', as State Department South Asian expert Howard Schaffer
explained, 'India is the most important power in the
region'.(15) This was not a realisation that came about
spontaneously. In May 1974, India had demonstrated its capabilities
by testing a nuclear device. In 1976 it initiated a move towards
normalisation of relations with China and worked towards a
rapprochement with the United States. But it should be
emphasised that despite these moves towards diversification of its
relations, India maintained close relations with the Soviet
In 1975, President Ford lifted the embargo on
arms sales to India and Pakistan. In theory both countries could
seek to buy arms which would be considered on a case-by-case basis.
During the subsequent Carter Administration India did enter into
negotiations with the US for the purchase of TOW anti-tank missiles
and light howitzers. The US agreed to sell anti-tank missiles worth
$32 million (all figures are dollars US unless otherwise mentioned)
in 1980 but the deal fell through because the US would not allow
their manufacture under licence in India. The howitzer deal also
failed to materialise on the issues of licence manufacture, supply
of spares and ammunition with the US refusing to guarantee more
than a twenty day supply of ammunition at a time.(16)
India clearly did not want to be put in a situation where its
military capabilities would be reliant on US policies. On the
nuclear front, while the US had imposed sanctions on the transfer
of nuclear technology after the 1974 test, it had continued to
supply fuel for the Tarapur nuclear plant. In March 1978 US
Congress passed an act, with a two-year grace period, that
prohibited nuclear exports to countries that did not accept
safeguards. In 1980 President Carter approved a temporary waiver
that allowed the export of 32 tons of fuel and in 1982 an agreement
allowed France to supply fuel in return for India's acceptance of
safeguards for the facility. With the advent of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987, India also faced
embargoes on missile related technology. In 199294 the United
States allowed India to buy a cryogenic rocket engine from Russia
but blocked the transfer of related technology.(17)
The 1980s also witnessed a gradual acceptance of
India's growing pre-eminence in the region. This was reflected in
India's (albeit unsuccessful) peacekeeping efforts in Sri Lanka
despite India's earlier involvement with the Tamil separatists, and
during India's intervention in a coup attempt in the Maldives. In a
letter to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, President Reagan not only
extended his 'appreciation' but was also 'impressed by your
willingness to restore order without unnecessary bloodshed. I have
no doubt that your action will be remembered as a valuable
contribution to regional stability' (emphasis
added).(18) Economic and trade relationships improved.
Cooperation in the fields of defence and technology transfer also
increased. Symbolic of this was the visit to the US by Defence
Minister K. C. Pant in July 1989, the first visit by an Indian
Defence Minister in over 25 years. This followed the visit of the
US Secretary of State Caspar Weinburger in 1987 followed by his
successor Frank Carlucci in 1988. President Reagan also issued a
directive (1984) instructing government agencies to seek improved
relations with India and accommodate its requests for dual-use
technology. In 1986 the US agreed to supply a number of General
Electric F404 engines and avionics for India's Light Combat
Aircraft (LCA) then under development (it still is). Later, the US
also agreed to sell a Cray XMP14 supercomputer, the first such sale
to a country outside the western alliance.(19)
After the end of the cold war, IndiaUS relations
in the first half of the 1990s have been described as one of
'missed opportunities and contradictory policies'.(20)
This could be attributed to a slow acknowledgment of the changed
international order both at the political and bureaucratic levels.
India and the US continued to have differences on various issues
including the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Another action that caused
friction between India and the US was the passage through Congress
of the Brown Amendment (November 1995) which allowed the US to
supply Pakistan with military equipment worth $658 million and
included maritime reconnaissance aircraft and missiles. President
Clinton supported this move on the grounds that Pakistan had
already paid for the equipment but refused to release the 26 F16s.
As has been observed:(21)
Indian policymakers responded as much to the
symbolism as the substance of the decision. Above all, the
Brown Amendment indicated that the United States did not have an
India policy but rather a South Asia policy, and that Congress and
the president would continue to equate India and Pakistan
The situation was further complicated when it
was revealed that China had supplied M11 missiles to Pakistan and
the US did not apply sanctions on China for violating the MTCR. On
the other hand, there was a degree of IndiaUS military cooperation.
In 1991, US Airforce General Claude M. Kickleighter visited India
and proposed extensive training and exchanges between the two
militaries. The government's view of these exchanges was
articulated by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao who 'noted how the
professional-to-professional relations had achieved much more than
politicians had been able to do in decades'.(22) In the
1990s, especially after India's declared policy of economic
liberalisation, it came to be viewed as an attractive market for US
business. Despite the lack of an overall policy framework, security
cooperation also increased during this period. During the Gulf War,
the Indian Government granted refuelling rights to US military
aircraft en route from the Pacific to the Middle East. In 1996 and
1997, the Indian and US navies held joint exercises (the Malabar
series) in the Indian Ocean.(23) A Defence Policy Group
was established in the mid-1990s. Its activities included
high-level exchanges, periodic policy reviews and reciprocal visits
by senior commanders.(24)
India's nuclear tests in May 1998 brought this
cooperation to a complete halt as the US also withheld spares for
the Indian Navy's Sea King helicopters and Sea Harrier aircraft
then undergoing repairs and overhaul in the UK.
It has been observed by some that President
Clinton's India visit was recognition of India's new-found status
after its nuclear tests, that is, India was a now a major power
because of its nuclear capability. A more plausible explanation is
that it was a consequence of the realisation that India's nuclear
capability could not be reversed. The US is India's largest market
and its largest foreign investor. As Karl Inderfurth, Assistant
Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs,
This trip should have taken place almost three
years ago, in 1997 At the time of the 50th anniversary (of India's
independence) when Clinton was going to go, the government fell.
Shortly after that, there were the nuclear tests. Then we started
thinking again about going. The government fell. So it has been a
combination of domestic politics and world events that has delayed
this. It's long overdue.
That there were going to be no surprises was
made clear by statements by senior officials in the US in the days
preceding the visit. Speaking at the US Institute of Peace on 9
March 2000, Karl Inderfurth said that US-India relations would not
be hostage to US relations with any other country and that India
was viewed as a 'key player in global affairs in the 21st century,
and as a vital contributor to overall Asian regional peace and
stability'.(26) A few days later Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright in her remarks to the Asia Society in New York
also referred to the fact that, while there were differing views
between India and the US on nuclear and other strategic issues,
they would not be allowed to stand in the way of the development of
the overall bilateral relationship.(27)
Subsequently, during his visit to India,
President Clinton and India's Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee
on 21 March 2000 resolved to 'create a closer and qualitatively new
relationship between the United States and India' and signed a
joint statement on bilateral relations entitled USIndia
Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century, which stated
The United States believes India should forego
nuclear weapons. India believes that it needs to maintain a
credible minimum nuclear deterrent in keeping with its own
assessment of its security needs. Nonetheless, India and the U.S.
are prepared to work together to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. To this end, we will
persist with and build upon the productive bilateral dialogue
The 'agreed principles' on institutional
- regular IndiaUS 'summit' meetings
- an annual foreign policy dialogue between the Secretary of
State and the Minister for External Affairs
- the continuation of the ongoing Dialogue on Security and
Non-Proliferation between the Deputy Secretary of State and the
External Affairs Minister
- the Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism would continue to
- the institutionalisation of a bilateral economic dialogue
- the creation of a Joint Consultative Group on Clean Energy and
Environment and the setting up of the USIndia Science and
Technology Forum to promote research and development and the
transfer of technology.
Prime Minister Vajpayee also accepted President
Clinton's invitation to visit Washington later that year.
In his address to the joint sitting of the
Indian Parliament on 22 March, President Clinton spoke of the
commitment by both countries to forego nuclear testing and said
that India could pursue defence policies in keeping with its
commitment not to pursue a nuclear or missile arms race 'which the
Prime Minister has forcefully reaffirmed just in these last couple
of days'. On the question of IndiaPakistan relations, he praised
the Prime Minister for 'his courageous journey to Lahore'. He made
it clear that he had not come to South Asia to mediate the dispute
over Kashmir, and that this was a matter for resolution between
This was reflected in an interview with the
American ABC on 21 March, President Clinton enunciated US policy on
the Kashmir dispute: respect for the line of control, resumption of
dialogue between India and Pakistan and renunciation of violence as
a means of solving the dispute (the three Rs). He further went on
to add that he believed that there were 'elements within the
Pakistani government that have supported those who engaged in
violence in Kashmir'. However, he also maintained that there was no
military solution to Kashmir's problems by India either, and that
they 'deserve to have their own concerns addressed on the
Nonetheless, his remarks were significant from
the Indian perspective. At a joint press conference earlier that
day, Prime Minister Vajpayee had said that if Pakistan reaffirmed
the principles of the Lahore Declaration, respected the Line of
Control (the Simla Agreement of 1972 renamed the 1948 ceasefire
line as Line of Control, LoC) and did not promote or support
violence across it, he thought a dialogue could be
Despite the similarity of views between the two
countries on the Kashmir problem, Pakistan's role and preconditions
for peace in the region, President Clinton was reminded of his
'dangerous place' comment at the state dinner in New Delhi. During
the exchange of toasts, Indian President Narayanan
It has been suggested that the Indian
subcontinent is the most dangerous place in the world today, and
Kashmir is a nuclear flashpoint. These alarmist descriptions will
only encourage those who want to break the peace and indulge in
terrorism and violence. The danger is not from us who have declared
solemnly that we will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but
rather it is from those who refuse to make any such commitment.
This latter was a pointed comment aimed at
Pakistan, which has refused to give such an undertaking.
The trade part of the visit went off
successfully with some US$2 billion worth of commercial agreements
and US$1 billion in US Export Import financing being finalised.
Most of the agreements related to the information technology sector
in which India's exports were growing at a rate of 50 per cent a
year, with about two-thirds of them going to the US.
In all, this was probably the most extensive and
successful visit to India by a US President, made more so by a
decision by both sides to avoid the proliferation roadblock and
concentrate on the expansion of the broader relationship. Even on
proliferation issues the US appeared convinced by India's
commitment to no more tests, no first use of nuclear weapons, and
controls on the transfer of sensitive technology. In the words of
Secretary Albright 'it was the beginning of a new
chapter'(33) or, as a senior administration official put
it 'what we've heard this week is the sound of ice meltinga
relationship that for 50 years was frozen in the contours of the
Under the new Bush administration Indo-US
relations have developed at a pace that few could have foreseen. In
his confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, the then Secretary of State designate Colin Powell
stated ' India has the potential to help keep the peace in the
vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery. We need to work harder
and more consistently to help them in this endeavor '
(emphasis added).(35) During a visit to Washington by
the Indian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence, Jaswant Singh
in April, his meeting with the National Security Adviser,
Condoleezza Rice, was 'interrupted' by President Bush who then
proceeded to have a 40 minute ostensibly unscheduled private
dialogue with him.(36)
It was a reflection of the improvement in
bilateral relations under the new US administration that India was
one of the few countries that were informed of President Bush's
forthcoming speech on his proposals regarding Nuclear Missile
Defence (NMD). A day before, Condoleezza Rice phoned Jaswant Singh
to advise him about the policy statement.
India's swift albeit carefully ambiguous
response to the proposals was followed by a visit of the US Deputy
of State Richard Armitage to New Delhi on 11 May 2001. This
appeared to have been successful, with the Indian Government
appreciating his presentation and looking forward to 'further
exchanges'.(37) He also carried a letter from President
Bush in which he accepted an invitation to visit India.
These moves are part of evolving Indo-US
relations. In a wide-ranging interview in May 2001 the Indian
Ambassador to Washington, Lalit Mansingh, made the following
points.(38) Firstly, the nuclear genie could not be put
back in the bottle, the two countries had to 'go beyond and look at
common strategic interests'. Secondly, contrary to the perception
that the missile plan would impel China to expand its nuclear
missile stockpiles, at present India did not fear such an outcome,
but he refused to say whether growing cooperation was aimed at
The appointment of Dr Robert Blackwill, 'a
confidante of the President and his National Security Adviser, Dr
Condoleezza Rice',(39) as US ambassador to India is an
indicator of the importance that the Bush administration has placed
on its relations with India.
However, it should be pointed out that while
politico-military ties have continued to grow, the trade and
investment relationship, despite its enormous potential, has
continued to flounder if not stagnate. India, after successfully
implementing its first round of economic reforms in the early 1990s
failed to maintain the momentum. Many bureaucratic hurdles remain
and progress on privatisation has slowed. Structural reforms appear
to have stalled and the economy is now in its fourth year of
slowdown.(40) As the US Trade Representative Robert B.
Zoellick has pointed out, India's tariffs and regulatory barriers
remain high. Although the average tariff rate has fallen to about
30 per cent, it is still twice as high as China's average rate and
10 times as high as that of the United States.(41)
Consequently, while India's exports to the
United States have steadily expanded since the mid-1990s (from $5.7
billion in 1995 to $10.7 billion in 2000), US trade flows to India
since 1995 have stagnated, averaging $3.5 billion during the same
period. US investment in India has not had a very successful track
record either. Ambassador Blackwill, in a speech delivered to the
Indo-American Chamber of Commerce on 28 January 2002
current performance is disheartening. In the
calender year 1995, US investment in India was $192 million; in
1996, $255 million; in 1997, $737 million; in 1998, 347 million; in
1998, $347 million; in 1999, $431 million; and in 2000, US
investment in India totalled $336 million. Perhaps even more
telling is that US firms ended up investing only 38 per cent of
that approved by the Government of India.
In certain quarters there still seems to be an
elemental distrust of foreign investment.
(This is in sharp contrast to US investment in
China which amounted to $4.4 billion in 2000.)(43)
However, attempts are underway to improve
IndiaUS business links. The two countries have initiated a dialogue
in economics (with the full participation of the private sector)
and in the areas of trade, finance, environment, energy security
and power. Additionally specific fields including information
technology, agricultural biotechnology and medical technology and
pharmaceuticals have been identified as having significant
potential for future business ties.(44)
While the IndiaUS engagement had been proceeding
at a fairly fast pace right from the beginning of the Bush
administration, it gained a new sense of immediacy after September
2001. In a speech delivered in New Delhi on 2 September (soon after
he had presented his credentials), the US Ambassador to India,
Robert Blackwill, reiterated the earlier US position saying that
'President Bush has a global approach to USIndia relations,
consistent with the rise of India as a world power' adding that
this was 'because no nation can promote its values and advance its
interests without the help of allies and
In a Presidential Determination signed on 22
September, President George W. Bush waived all nuclear related
sanctions on India and Pakistan. These included those under the
Glenn Amendment which bars licences for items on the US Munitions
list and prohibits defence sales under Foreign Military Sales and
Foreign Military Financing.(46) It was also revealed
that the Commerce Department's 'Entity List' (which deals with the
transfer/sale of dual-use technologies) continued to be
In a Joint Statement issued during Prime
Minister Vajpayee's visit to Washington in November 2001, the two
- reaffirmed the enduring ties between the two countries and the
importance of further transforming the relationship
- noted that both countries were targets of terrorism 'as seen in
the barbaric attacks' on 11 September in the US and on 1 October in
Kashmir. (This point is significant in that it equated the events
in the US to the attack Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly
building in Srinagar, allegedly by Pakistan-based terrorists)
- expressed satisfaction with the progress made in India-US
cooperation on counter-terrorism
- announced the establishment of a Joint Cyber-Terrorism
- agreed to begin a dialogue 'between the two governments with a
view towards evaluating the processes by which we transfer dual-use
and military items, with a view towards greater transparency and
- agreed to initiate discussions on civil space cooperation.
The intensity of IndiaUS engagement can also be
gauged from the fact that in the month of January 2002 alone
Secretary of State Powell, Environmental Protection Agency Director
Governor Christine Todd Whitman, FBI Director Robert Mueller,
Defence Intelligence Agency head Admiral Thomas Wilson, and the
State Department's Counter-Terrorism chief Francis Taylor visited
New Delhi. In turn, Defence Minister George Fernandes and Home
Minister Lal Krishna Advani travelled to Washington.(48)
In addition, in late April the Assistant Secretary of State for
Political Military Affairs Lincoln Bloomfield Jr. visited India for
the first IndoUS Political Military Dialogue 'to set the stage for
a closer and even more productive bilateral security relationship',
and in May the Indo-US Cyber Security Forum was also launched to
discuss Critical Infrastructure Protection
Following the events of September 2001but
probably reflecting the strategic realities of the post Cold War
world and America's increasing appreciation of the part India must
play in the regional balancethere has been a substantial change in
US military cooperation with India in recent months. At a meeting
of the USIndia Defence Policy Group (DPG) in December 2001, the two
sides committed themselves to substantially increase the pace of
high-level policy dialogue, military-to-military exchanges and
other joint activities (details of these activities can be found at
As part of the growing India-US military links,
the Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes visited Washington in
January 2002 and held substantial talks with Defence Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice.
Issues covered included terrorism as well as sharing of military
intelligence.(50) Defence Minister Fernandes took the
opportunity to reassure the US that India's military standoff with
Pakistan could be resolved, easing concerns that the situation
could escalate into a major war. The two sides also signed a
General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) which
essentially guarantees that they would protect any classified
technology shared between them. It also paves the way for the
future sale of US weapons to India.(51)
Clearly the events of September changed the
dynamics of USIndia defence relations.(52) This was
reflected in an interview with The Hindu newspaper on 3
May by the US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage who once
again emphasised the growing defence relationship saying that India
had 'been very helpful' in assisting with 'logistics and flights'
and what was significant was this relationship was now
'astronomically different' from what it had been a year ago. 'We
love the idea of being able to call on occasion on Indian ports,
naval ships we hope it will be good for US-India
relations'.(53) On the other hand, allaying
apprehensions from some sections of Indian politicians, Ambassador
Blackwill has made it clear that the US has no intention of
stationing US troops permanently in India. Regarding Indian
military acquisitions from Russia, the US attitude is that India
was a free country and as such it was free to acquire defence
systems from any country. Further, given the changed international
situation, good relations between India and Russia were now in the
interests of the US.(54) This statement indeed is a
measure of the changed quality of US-India relations.
In a move likely to cause concern in Pakistan
and China, joint exercises involving specialised mountain warfare
troops are scheduled to take place in Alaska in September
2002.(55) These exercises would be of mutual benefit
given the Indian army's combat experience in the Siachin glacier
and the Kargil sector in Kashmir combined with the US army's
superior equipment (Map 3). (In a parallel move, India and the UK
intend holding a joint amphibious exercise at an unspecified date.
Britain will also send an expert on improvised explosives devices
to help India's efforts in combating terrorism.)(56)
The USIndia DPG met between 2023 May 2002 and
agreed to further cooperation agenda (details at Appendix B) and is
scheduled to meet again in New Delhi in February 2003. It should be
pointed out that the May DPG meeting took place at a time when
tensions between India and Pakistan were very high. As the
Times of India observed, '(i)n what may count as one of
the more remarkable chapters in the checkered history of IndoUS
relations, New Delhi and Washington are engaged in a serious
long-term military tie-up in the shadow of an immediate war in the
sub-continent that the Bush administration is trying to prevent'.
(57)(This issue is discussed in Appendix C.)
A major hurdle in the development of India-US
relations in the past has been what could be termed the 'third
country prism'. For a long time USPakistan relations had an adverse
effect on US-India relations. Development of USChina relations had
the same impact. Until recently, conventional wisdom had it that
the rapid growth in China-Burma relations would be inimical to
India's security in its northeast region. The following paragraphs
briefly discuss developments in these three-way relationships.
For almost half a decade, India's relations with
the US were heavily influenced by the politics of the Cold War,
India's policy of non-alignment as well as US perception that
Pakistan was a trusted ally in its fight to contain communism. At
no time was this more evident than during the period of Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan when Pakistan became a front line state
in the war against communism as well as a conduit for the supply of
arms and other support to the Afghan resistance. Enthusiastic
support by the US declined after the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan and the refusal of President Bush Sr. to certify that
Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons (1990). Subsequent cooling
of USPakistan relations have ensured that Pakistan is no longer a
major factor in the improvement of IndiaUS relations. (Detailed
analysis is at Appendix C.)
China became a factor in IndiaUS relations
following the normalisation of its ties with the US in 1971 and the
subsequent 'tilt' by both countries towards Pakistan during its war
with India that year. It is only during the last decade or so that
IndiaUS relations have not been influenced by relations with China
and have developed a synergy of their own. (For detailed analysis,
see Appendix D.)
It has been argued by some that the developing
closeness of China's relations with Burma would be inimical to the
strategic stability of the region as China seeks overland access to
Burma's ports in the Bay of Bengal as a means of sidestepping
potential containment by the US (Map 5). The US has taken no
official position on the growing closer relationship between China
and Burma. What has escaped the attention of most observers is that
both India and China are of the view that their bilateral relations
and their relations with Burma are not mutually exclusive. In fact,
it can be said that there is an element of cooperation that would
be of benefit to all three countries. India's developing closeness
with Burma in no way contradicts the US view that India is a
responsible player in the region. (See Appendix E.)
Not only is India the largest power in the ocean
named after it, it also has the largest navy and coast guard of any
state between the two most commercial straits in the world- Hormuz
and Malacca. In addition, not only are the Straits of Malacca and
the Strait of Lombok acknowledged to be two of the most crucial
strategic straits in the world, more than half of the world's
maritime trade passes through them (Map 7). In this region, more
than a thousand miles from India's mainland lie its Andaman and
Nicobar group of islands (Map 6) the southmost of which is barely
90 nautical miles from the troubled Indonesian province of Aceh. Of
the 600-island cluster, over 300 are inhabited and are suspected of
being used as transit points by gun runners, smugglers (including
drug smugglers) and poachers. The region is also notorious for acts
of piracy. Recognising this, in 1985 India established a
joint-services base at Port Blair (FORTAN, Fortress Andaman and
Nicobar Islands). India's action initially caused a certain degree
of disquiet among its ASEAN neighbours because of the size of its
navy and its perceived closeness to the Soviet Union. But this
reaction was short lived as India became more open about its
motives and the Indian Navy was soon paying port calls to and
conducting exercises with the navies of Indonesia, Singapore,
Malaysia and Thailand.(58)
The end of the Cold War also removed any
remaining hurdles to close IndiaASEAN cooperation. During the
1990s, IndiaASEAN relations improved steadily. India became a
sectoral dialogue partner in 1992, full dialogue partner in 1995,
and joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996. The first
IndiaASEAN summit is scheduled to take place in Cambodia (November
In August 2001, India decided to upgrade its
presence in the Andamans and set up its first tri-services command,
the Far Eastern Strategic Command. Its military presence already
includes air force helicopters, three naval Fast Attack Craft (FAC)
and offshore patrol vessels. Eventually, India is expected to have
a full strength army component and an air base in the Andamans.
This will give India strategic depth to compliment its ability to
protect maritime traffic bound for the South China Sea and
Australia. An instance of this is the escort provided to a US
vessel recently. Reaction to this activity has been favourable. For
example Malaysia's Defence Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak said
'We also conduct monitoring in our waters in the Straits and will
offer assistance to anyone. They (users of the Straits) need not
rely on the patrolling team only'. He went on to say that any
nation had the right to escort their ships to ensure security
without the need to seek permission from Malaysia or Indonesia as
this did not violate international law.(59)
India has not only been coordinating its efforts
to combat maritime threats with countries in the region but with
countries as far away as Japan. A joint IndiaJapan Coast Guard
Exercise took place for the first time in Indian waters in November
2000 and a second joint exercise was conducted off the coast of
Japan in 2001. A strategic dialogue took place earlier this year.
In an interview with The Hindu newspaper, Japan's
Ambassador to India Hiroshi Hirabayshi stated that Japan welcomed
the new security arrangement between India and the US that would
make shipping through the Malacca Straits safer. He added that
IndiaJapan relations were poised for a quantum leap in the
security, economic and political spheres.(60) In the
past there had been no systematic security dialogue between India
and Japan although there had been informal contacts between
military officials of the two countries.(61) The first
India-Japan Security Dialogue took place earlier this year.
During a visit to Singapore in April this year,
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee spoke of India's interest in
the region. Delivering the Annual Singapore Lecture 2002, he
We have crucial stakes in protecting our common
sea lanes, combating piracy, choking off narco-trade and curbing
gunrunning. We need to tackle this jointly in a determined manner,
through regular exchange of experiences, information and
He once again emphasised India's interest in the
wider AsiaPacific region:
India has to be integral to any regional
process pertaining to the Asia Pacific. We have a constructive
and multi-faceted relationship with every major country of the
region. This is also true of India's relations with ASEAN's
East Asian neighbours (emphasis added).
Consequently, it can be argued that given its
historical military relations with Vietnam and its growing
strategic ties with Japan, India will have a role in the evolving
security structure in the wider AsiaPacific region. This trend
would be underscored by the growing strategic and military ties
with the US Pacific Command. (It is an historical anomaly that
India is within the geographical area covered by the US Pacific
Command while Pakistan comes under the jurisdiction of the US
While this paper has focused primarily on
IndiaUS relations, the enhanced relationship between the two also
has implications for Australia as part of the Asia Pacific region.
US acceptance of India as a responsible player in the region
implies that Australia needs to expand it strategic outlook to
include India and the Eastern Indian Ocean region. There are
indications that this is happening, but clearly more work needs to
Sporadic attempts by Australian governments to
generate interest in an Indian Ocean policy have met with mixed
success. The most recent attempt was made in August 1994 when the
then Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans and the then Minister
for Trade, Senator Bob McMullan announced that the Cabinet had
adopted a 'Look West' strategy.(63) Consequently,
Australia's relations with India remained friendly but distant till
the 1990s despite their involvement in the Commonwealth and the
Colombo Plan, not to mention cricket. India perceived Australia as
part of the western alliance while its own policy of non-alignment
was viewed as having a pro-Soviet orientation.(64)
The strengthening of AustraliaIndia relations in
the 1990s included establishment of the AustraliaIndia Council in
1992 followed by the Indian Government's establishment of the
IndiaAustralia Council in 1995. There were also a series of high
level bilateral visits, including a visit by the then
Vice-President (now President) K. R. Narayanan in 1994 (the most
senior Indian official to visit Australia), Senator Bob McMullan,
then Minister for Trade, leading the largest Australian business
mission to visit India in 1995 and, in late 1996, Australia held a
major promotion in India called AustraliaIndia New Horizons with
the aim of promoting a broader image of Australia. In July 1997 the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, visited India. A
number of Indian ministers visited Australia the same year,
including the Ministers for Commerce, Food Processing Industries,
Petroleum and Natural Gas, and Railways.
A setback came with India's nuclear tests in May
1998 and Australia's strong and unequivocal response compared to
President Clinton's reaction when he said that he was 'deeply
disturbed' and 'strongly' opposed any new tests. On 13 May, after
India had conducted two rounds of nuclear tests, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer said:(65)
India clearly pays no heed to the world opinion
in this matter or to the hopes of people everywhere (sic) for a
world free of nuclear testing. I strongly urge India to cease
immediately all further testing.
On 14 May, Mr Downer announced suspension of
bilateral defence relations with India, including the withdrawal of
Australia's Defence Adviser stationed in New Delhi, the
cancellation of ship and aircraft visits, officer exchanges and
other defence-related visits. Australian Defence Force personnel
currently training in India were to be withdrawn and Australia
would request the immediate departure of three Indian defence
personnel currently at defence colleges in Australia. Australia
would also suspend non-humanitarian aid and Ministerial and Senior
Official visits. (66)
The reaction of the Government of India was
equally forthright. A Press Release issued by the High
Commission of India in Canberra opining:(67)
The comments of the representatives of the
Australian Government have not only trivialised India's legitimate
security concerns and misrepresented the compelling reasons for
India to undertake these tests but are also innocent of any
understanding of the security environment in Southern Asia.
Among other measures India decided to decline
the invitation extended to the Indian Defence Secretary to visit
Australia, to suspend all proposals for bilateral military
cooperation, to deny Australian naval ships permission to visit
Indian ports or operate in Indian territorial waters and to deny
overflight facilities to Australian military aircraft.
Australia's reaction to India's nuclear tests
was significant in terms of the defence and political relations,
but not, however, materially. With a total country program aid
allocation of $A16.7 million in 1998 99, or 1.1 per cent of
the total aid budget, the suspension of non-humanitarian assistance
was symbolic. The Australian reaction had no evident effect on
bilateral trade and investment relations. By 1997, India was
Australia's 17th largest trading partner and bilateral trade
between the two countries had grown at an annual rate of 15 per
cent between 199297. In 1997, Australia had a trade surplus with
India of $A1.06 billion.(68) Speaking at the Australia
Summit conference in June 1998, the Indian High Commissioner, G.
Parthasarthy, said that activities of banks and other business
institutions remain unaffected 'despite the policy differences that
we have with the Australian Government on issues like the
dependence on foreign nuclear deterrents and nuclear
The policy of suspension of high level contacts
did not last very long. In December 1998 Australia decided to lift
its ban on visits by ministers and senior officials, reportedly
days after the US decided to lift certain economic and military aid
sanctions.(70) The Health Minister, Dr Michael
Wooldridge, was expected to visit India the same month but the trip
was cancelled due to parliamentary business.(71)
Eventually, the then Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister for
Trade, Tim Fischer, visited New Delhi on 27 February 1999. His
comments indicated a toning down of the strong rhetoric emanating
from Australia so far, including (according to Indian officials)
the 'personally offensive' remarks made by
Mr Downer.(72) Implying sensitivity to India's
security concerns, Mr. Fischer was quoted as
If you are an island continent you tend to think
about border security differently than if you are a country
adjoining major and minor powers, and which, since World War II,
you have been at war with that would sear the minds of many quite
On the nuclear question however, he added: 'I
stand by exactly what Australia did on this issue last year.' Mr.
Fischer's visit was also different because he did not include a
visit to Pakistan: traditionally, visits by Australian ministers to
the subcontinent have included both India and Pakistan. In spite of
being the first high level contact between the two countries, there
was no change in Australia's policy towards India. In June 1999, a
spokesman was quoted as saying 'We do not believe conditions
justify lifting sanctions at present. We want to see concrete steps
by India and Pakistan towards signing the Comprehensive Test Ban
The next official contact was at the ASEAN
meeting in Singapore in July 1999 where Mr Downer met his
Indian counterpart Mr Jaswant Singh. The two ministers exchanged
invitations to visit each other's country and it was decided that
the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Dr
Ashton Calvert, would go to India for a senior officials'
meeting.(75) This meeting took place on 2223 February
2000 and was reported to have 're-energised a multi-faceted
On 2124 March 2000, Mr Downer visited India, the
first ministerial-level visit since Mr Fischer's and his
second since July 1997. Before his departure Mr Downer
Australia continues to have concerns about the
implications of India's nuclear tests, and we continue to strongly
encourage India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. However,
the bilateral relationship is broader than this one set of issues,
and I would like to use my visit to re-energise the relationship
between our two countries.
Although overshadowed by President Clinton's
visit, Mr Downer's visit appears to have involved a change from the
strong rhetoric that followed the 1998 nuclear tests. In an
interview with Delhi-based Australian journalists, Mr Downer stated
that 'what the international community can say is that it's not
obviously going to get the Indian Government to abandon its nuclear
capability'.(78) The Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant
Singh, was invited to visit Australia. The two sides agreed not
only to resume defence ties but also to ensure that 'there was a
steady flow of high level contacts.' The Indian Minister for
Commerce and Industry, Murasoli Maran consequently visited
Australia in mid-April and an Australian parliamentary delegation
visited India later in 2000.
Full normalisation of relations was symbolised
by the visit of Prime Minister Howard in July 2000.
Another important milestone in the development
of bilateral relations was achieved by the visit of the Indian
Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, in June 2001. During
his visit it was agreed that the two countries would initiate a
strategic dialogue at senior officer level. The first
India-Australia Strategic Dialogue was held in New Delhi on
30 August 2001. The talks were 'open, constructive and wide
ranging, and demonstrated shared perspectives and common interests
on a number of issues, including in the AsiaPacific and Indian
Ocean regions. The delegates agreed that both countries were
factors for stability in these regions'.(79) The agenda
included regional security issues including 'particular security
situations in the broad AsiaPacific region' (emphasis
added), and maritime security. A significant feature of these talks
was that as well as foreign affairs officials, each delegation also
included a senior armed forces officer.
Foreign Minister Downer visited New Delhi
between 2123 April 2002 for the second round of the Australia-India
Foreign Ministers' Framework Dialogue. According to the Media
Release,(80) the talks focussed on the need to
strengthen the strategic aspects of the bilateral relationship and
that the two countries were working towards holding direct
military-to-military talks towards the end of 2002.
These developments, combined with the closeness
of IndiaASEAN relations give rise to the question: is there any
potential for India ASEAN Australia cooperation? Traditionally,
Australia's foreign policy focus has been on 'Asia', a region
stretching from Japan at one end and Thailand at the other. India
has been relegated to a separate 'box' and relations with it
treated as such. Nowhere was this more obvious than in Australia's
1997 foreign policy white paper In the National Interest
which stated that 'India will become more important as its links
with East Asia and the rest of the world deepen, as they are
likely to over the next fifteen years' (emphasis
added).(81) This observation came at a time when India's
engagement with ASEAN was already well underway. As has been
mentioned earlier India became a full dialogue partner in 1995 and
joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996. The Department of
Defence released Australia's Strategic Policy the same
year. The review was more realistic and the contrast could not have
been sharper. In a remarkably perceptive observation, it stated,
India in particular, is assuming a
growing strategic and economic importance in global and regional
affairs. In the short term, however, it is unlikely that either
India or Pakistanwith their largely sub-regional focus and
their own internal security problemswill have a major impact on the
East Asian security environment. Nonetheless, given the longer-term
potential for these countries, particularly India, to play a more
prominent role in the strategic affairs of the Asia-Pacific region,
we will continue to work to develop a strategic dialogue with it.
More specifically, we will encourage India to play a constructive
role within the ASEAN Regional Forum.
This point was reiterated in the defence white
paper, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force released in
There are, therefore, some signs of change in
Australia's perception of the strategic importance of India but
with no indication of an integrated regional security perspective
on Australia's part, so far. Greater naval cooperation with India
would be a good starting point, given that a sizeable proportion of
Australia's maritime trade towards the west passes through the
Strait of Lombok and then through the Malacca Straits. A case could
also be made for the establishment of an Australian coast guard,
which could eventually become part of a network of regional
coastguards policing non-military threats. Greater recognition
could also be given to the fact that the threats in the region are
largely non-militarypiracy, drugs, arms and people smuggling to
name a few, threats that India and Australia share in common. In
this context, it is relevant to note that the first meeting between
ASEAN and the European Union Experts Group held in Manila recently
proposed the formation of a 'neutral flag patrol fleet' that would
be allowed to pursue pirates beyond a country's territorial waters.
While IndiaUS relations floundered for nearly
half a century, the recent pace of development of these ties have
taken many observers by surprise. 'India watchers these days are
suffering from a bad case of whiplash'.(85) This comment
by a respected 'India watcher' aptly sums up the speed at which the
IndiaUS strategic relationship has developed over the last few
years. Instead of the gradual evolution that had characterised the
bilateral relationship over a period of more than two decades,
President Clinton's visit galvanised the pace at which it was
proceeding. Whether it was a consequence of a tacit acknowledgement
by the US of India's 'unofficial' nuclear status, its economic
reforms, its acceptance as a pre-eminent regional power and a
source of stability in the Indian Ocean region, or a reflection of
a changed mind set of decision-makers on both sides in a post-cold
war environment, the fact remains that these developments could not
have been foreseen by any observer in 1998, the year India tested
its nuclear devices.
The US no longer appears to view its
relationship with India primarily through the prism of its
relations with other countries in the region, or indeed with Cold
War blinkers. This process started, albeit haltingly, with the end
of the Cold War. Given the improvement in USRussia relations, the
US now appears to have no objections to Russia being India's
largest supplier of military hardware. On the contrary, the US
itself is in the process of becoming one of the major suppliers
(along with Israel and South Africa). Moreover, despite its own,
sometimes volatile, political relationship with China, there is no
indication that it views the improvement in IndiaChina relations
with any degree of concern. In other words, the US, finally, is
acknowledging the legitimacy of India's pursuit of an independent
foreign policy; while there will be close
politico-strategic-military ties between India and the US, there
will be no 'alliance' relationship. It can be argued that India is
well aware of the fact that (as has been observed in the context of
Australia relations) 'you only have to think like a deputy to look
like a deputy, and look like a deputy long enough and one day
they'll pin a badge on you and tell you to shut up and do as you're
Perhaps the most significant development in the
strategic relationship is that it has finally been decoupled from
US relations with Pakistan. In the past this had been a major
hurdle preventing any significant improvement in IndiaUS relations.
This was most vividly demonstrated after the events of September
2001 when the US launched military operations in Afghanistan. While
Pakistan provided bases and other support to the US and its forces,
the US still unequivocally reminded Pakistan that it had to stop
terrorist organisations operating from within its borders. This was
clearly aimed at addressing Indian concerns at Pakistan's support
of terrorists operating in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir.
While General Musharraf attempted to take advantage of US
appreciation of Pakistan's help in its operations in Afghanistan by
asking the US to take an active part in resolving the Kashmir
dispute, the latter's response was clear. Apart from encouraging
the two sides to continue bilateral dialogue, the US had no role to
play. India's mobilisation of its troops after the terrorist attack
on the Indian Parliament and its refusal to resume talks with
Pakistan until there was evidence that cross-border terrorism had
stopped, drew no criticism from the US apart from the standard
comment that the dispute should be resolved through dialogue.
Meanwhile, as demonstrated by recent events, as
far as the IndiaUS politico-strategic-military relationship is
concerned, it has been business as usual. High level contacts, arms
sales and military exercises have continued as planned months ago.
Firm plans have been developed for closer engagement in the future.
This is the surest indication yet that IndiaUS relations are
developing with a long-term perspective in mind and that the recent
USPakistan re-engagement has had no discernible impact.
So far as India-Australia relations are
concerned, a strong case exists for a change in Australia's
strategic outlook to include the South Asian region in its
definition of 'Asia'. A case can also be made for better
coordination of defence and foreign policies. Given the recent
developments between India and the US, Australia's major ally, the
forthcoming foreign policy white paper should address this
As part of its struggle to gain independence
from Great Britain, Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian National Congress
launch the Quit India Movement.
India and Pakistan gain independence.
India and Pakistan fight their first war over
India, as member of the Security Council, votes
for a resolution naming North Korea as aggressor. It however
abstains or votes against subsequent resolutions naming China as an
aggressor and the Uniting for Peace Resolution.
US and Pakistan sign an aide-memoire under which
the US agrees to a comprehensive military aid program ostensibly
designed to help contain communism.
USPakistan grants the US a ten year lease to set
up a 'communications facility' near Peshawar, the capital of the
Northwest Frontier Province. It also agrees that the US can use
Peshawar airport for flights over the Soviet Union by its U2 spy
India participates in UN Peacekeeping Operations
The Nonaligned Movement which had evolved as an
informal grouping in the 1950s holds its first Summit Conference in
IndiaChina border conflict. In the aftermath, US
and the UK offer limited military assistance conditional on the
resolution of the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. USUK brokered
IndiaPakistan conflict over Kashmir.
Taking advantage of India's food crisis US
pressures India into devaluing the Rupee and uses food aid as an
instrument to try to change India's stance on international issues
India and the Soviet Union sign a Friendship
IndiaPakistan war resulting in the creation of
Normalisation of USChina relations.
IndiaPakistan sign the Simla Agreement. Agree to
resolve any future problems bilaterally. Ceasefire line in Kashmir
renamed Line of Control.
India tests a nuclear device.
India and China re-exchange ambassadors after a
lapse of fifteen years.
Soviet Union intervenes in Afghanistan. As a
consequence US agrees to provide Pakistan with a $3.2 billion in
military and economic assistance.
President Reagan issues a directive instructing
government agencies to seek improvement with relations and
accommodated its requests for dual-use technology.
India establishes a joint-services base at Port
Blair (FORTAN, Fortress Andaman and Nicobar Islands).
Indian defence minister visits the US, the first
such visit in 25 years.
US agrees to provide Pakistan with a further $4
billion in military and economic assistance.
A Joint Working Group (JWG) consisting of
diplomatic and military experts is constituted by India and
China cracks down on student activists at
Tiananmen Square in Beijing.
During the Gulf War, the Indian government
grants refuelling rights to US military aircraft en route from the
Pacific to the Middle East.
President Bush Snr. refuses to certify that
Pakistan does not possess nuclear weapons resulting in cessation of
military assistance and imposition of sanctions.
US Airforce General Claude M. Kickleighter
visits India and proposes extensive training and exchanges between
the two militaries.
US allows India to buy a cryogenic rocket engine
for its space program from Russia but blocks the transfer of
Foreign Minister Senator Gareth Evans and
Minister for Trade, Bob McMullan announce that Cabinet has adopted
a 'Look West' strategy.
AustraliaIndia Council is established.
Australia holds a major promotion in India
called AustraliaIndia New Horizons.
Indian and US navies hold joint exercises in the
India and Pakistan conduct nuclear tests.
Australia announces suspension of defence relations and
non-humanitarian aid. Bilateral trade and investment not
In December Australia lifts its ban on visits by
ministers and senior officials to India.
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade,
Tim Fischer visits India.
Foreign Minister Downer meets his Indian
counterpart at an ASEAN meeting in Singapore.
Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh visits China. The
two sides agree to initiate talks on the demarcation of the Line of
Actual Control as well begin a security dialogue.
Pakistan's elected government led by Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif overthrown by General Musharraf in a military
President Clinton visits India and reiterates
the US position that it would not mediate between India and
Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute.
Foreign Minister Downer visits India and states
that Australia must aim to build a very strong relationship with
Prime Minister Howard visits India.
Indian President K. R. Narayanan visits
The new Bush administration makes it clear that
India has the potential to keep the peace in the Indian Ocean and
that it would help India in this endeavour.
In September President Bush waives all nuclear
related sanctions on India and Pakistan.
The USIndia Defence Policy Group meets in
December. The two sides commit themselves to substantially increase
the pace of high level policy dialogue, military-to-military
exchanges and other joint activities.
India upgrades its presence in the Andaman
Islands and sets up its first tri-services command, the Far Eastern
Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant
Singh visits Australia in June. The first IndiaAustralia Strategic
Dialogue is held in New Delhi in August.
Following a terrorist attack on the Indian
Parliament in December 2001 India deploys troops along the border
with Pakistan. Tensions rise following further terrorist attacks
prompting successful US attempts (so far) to defuse the
India provides naval escorts to US ships
supporting US operations in Afghanistan.
Special forces from the US and paracommandos
from the Indian army conducts joint exercises.
Delivering the Annual Singapore Lecture 2002
Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee states that India has to be
integral to any regional process pertaining to the Asia
Foreign Minister Downer visits New Dehli for the
second round of the AustraliaIndia Foreign Ministers' Framework
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongi visits India.
Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh visits China and
Burma. India and China agree to strengthen Confidence Building
Measures (CBMs) and then deal with the border question.
India, Burma and Thailand agree to create a
transport corridor linking the three countries and develop other
At the December 2001 meeting of the Defence
Policy Group (DPG) it was decided that the DPG would next 'convene
on an accelerated schedule in May 2002, preceded by a meeting of
the Military Cooperation Group'. Military-to-military cooperation
would include combined special operations training, combined
training exercises between US Marines and corresponding Indian
forces as well as small unit ground/air exercises. It was also
- to establish a separate Security Cooperation Group to manage
the defence supply relationship between the US and India. This
would meet in FebruaryMarch 2002
- the Joint Technical Group under the DPG would meet at the same
time to discuss the promotion of bilateral ties in the field of
defence production and research
- the US Joint Staff and the Indian Chief of Integrated Defence
Staff would meet in the spring of 2002 and regularly thereafter to
discuss tri-service institutions, military planning and tri-service
A new structured dialogue would be initiated
between the US Defence Department's Office of Net Assessment and
its 'Indian counterpart'.
On 1718 February 2002, General Richard B. Myers,
Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff visited India as part of
the ongoing process to enhance IndiaUS military cooperation. (This
was a second visit by a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
within eight months). His visit had been preceded by a series of
talks held by the Army and Navy Steering Groups (ESG) which
resulted in the expansion of militarymilitary cooperation to
'levels unprecedented in the history of the bilateral
- Navy-to-Navy Cooperation: A three-year program
of substantive exercises, combined operations, port visits and
conferences. These activities would include search and rescue
operations, anti-submarine warfare, maritime surveillance as well
as the continuation of the Malabar series of naval exercises.
Detailed discussions regarding joint usage of training sites,
logistics support, airspace control, personnel exchanges and plans
to combat terrorism and piracy were also held
- Army-to-Army Cooperation: A specific security
cooperation program for 2002 and a framework for activities for
2003 and 2004. These include high altitude and other joint
training, disaster management, expert and military school
- Air Force-to Air Force Cooperation: This would
cover topics such as search and rescue and support requirements for
- Defence Sales and Military Training:
International Military Education and Training (IMET) for India
would double in 2002 to $1 million and India would also receive
funding to enhance its peacekeeping training facilities. India
would also be purchase AN/TPQ37 Weapon Locating Radars, the first
major Government-to-Government purchase from the United States.
Purchases of other types of military equipment were expected to
In March 2002 the US-India Joint Technical Group
(JTG) was revived and several areas of cooperation begun before the
1998 sanctions were renewed and it was decided to explore
opportunities for joint research, development and production of
military systems. Later that month the Security Cooperation Group
met in Washington to address future military sales and address
export licensing procedures as well as an Acquisition and
Cross-Servicing Agreement to enhance US-India military
In a speech delivered on 26 February 2002,
Ambassador Blackwill provided an update on the progress of
bilateral military cooperation since the December 2001 DPG
- there had been the largest number of US general officer visits
to India ever
- the US Navy had already conducted five port calls and a search
and rescue exercise in the past 15 months. The two navies would
undertake a variety of activities at least once a month over the
next two years
- the two armies had agreed to expand counter terrorism
cooperation and training and to extend participation in national,
bilateral and multinational exercises
- the air force agenda had a similarly ambitious schedule of
- to date, the US Government had received applications for 81
items on the Munitions List. None so far had been denied. Of these,
20 had been approved and were in various stages of notification to
Congress. These included applications for components for satellite
launchers, helicopter spare parts, micro detonators and the
AN/TPQ37 artillery locating radar. A variety of other high priority
items including F404GEF2J3 engines and advanced avionics for the
LCA, undersea remotely operating vehicles, submarine combat
systems, P3C maritime reconnaissance aircraft, satellite launch
vehicle technical data, and ground sensors and electronic fencing
for combating terrorism were in various stages of Congressional
The AN/TPQ37 deal worth $146 million was finally
signed on 18 April 2002. This is the largest single purchase of
military equipment from the US ever.(90) The sale was
supported on the grounds that it would help 'improve the security
of a country which has been and continues to be an important force
for political stability and economic progress in South
Asia'.(91) It has also been reported that India is
exploring the possibility of acquiring Sikorsky-supplied
helicopters to replace the navy's ageing Sea King fleet, and AGM84
Harpoon anti-ship missiles.(92) In mid-May a first-ever
Indian industry delegation with focus on the defence sector visited
the US to explore opportunities for joint ventures and technology
On 15 April 2002, US Assistant Secretary of
State for South Asian Affairs Christina Rocca on a visit to New
Delhi praised India's cooperation in the war on terrorism,
specifically its agreement in principle to monitor the Malacca
Strait in cooperation with the United States. It was also implied
that the US was having discussions with Indonesia and Malaysia on
the issue.(94) (Map 7)
Later that week it was reported that an Indian
Navy offshore patrol vessel (OPV) had already escorted a 'high
value goods' US merchant ship through the Malacca Straits from
Singapore. (It was INS SHARDA that relieved the guided missile
destroyer USS COWPENS of escort duties on 13 April. Since early
March, the latter had been serving as a military escort to ships
providing 'logistical support for the campaign against global
terrorism.)(95) It was also reported that this would now
be a matter of routine and for the operational turn around for the
naval ships, regional maritime nations were being consulted to
enable the ships to dock and replenish supplies.(96)
Ships from the Seventh Fleet would approach the area from the other
side and the patrols would be jointly monitored by the Indian
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff and the Commander of the Seventh
Paracommandos from the Indian Army and some 200
soldiers of Special Forces Group and supporting units from the US
Pacific Command held joint exercises in India between 726 May 2002.
Code-named 'Balance Iroquois' the exercise was backed by elements
of the Indian and the US Air Forces.(98) As a senior
Indian officer is reported to have commented, '(i)t is unknown in
military circles for a country to carry out joint exercises and an
intense military relationship with two countries (India and
Pakistan) who are on the brink of war'.(99)
It has also been reported that later during the
year joint army counter-insurgency and jungle warfare exercises
would be conducted at the Counter Insurgency Jungle Warfare School
in northeastern India. Access to India's High-Altitude Warfare
School in the state of Jammu and Kashmir is also under
consideration and the Indian and US navies will conduct Exercise
'Malabar IV', the fourth in a series of naval exercises in the
Arabian Sea in December 2002. The US Air Force (USAF) is also
seeking enhanced ties with its Indian counterpart in an attempt to
earmark Indian airbases for the support of future US anti-terrorist
operations and humanitarian relief missions. According to USAF Gen.
William Begert, Commander Pacific Air Forces, India represents a
'key piece of geography' in the region and to use it as a staging
base for tankers or for airlift can provide greater flexibility
than has been available to the US in the past.(100)
A News Release issued after the DPG
meeting in May 2002, listed the outcomes:(101)
- India and the US had participated in a Ballistic Missile
Defence (BMD) Workshop in Colorado Springs, Colorado The Indian
delegation had accepted invitations to the June 2002 BMD Conference
to be held in Texas and the June 2003 Roving Sands BMD exercise.
The two sides agreed to hold a future missile defence workshop in
New Delhi and 'agreed on the value of pursuing a missile
defense requirements analysis for India (emphasis added)
- significantly, the two sides 'reaffirmed their commitment to
work together to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems (and) agreed to hold further
consultations in the coming weeks on the threat such proliferation
poses to their common security interests'
- schedules for specialised military training programs and joint
exercises for 20022003 were finalised.
- the US agreed to address counter-terrorism equipment
requirements for India's special operations forces.
- the need to develop a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and
speedier approval process for export licences in the US. (It has
been reported that the State Department has put a restricted
interpretation of the relaxed sanctions legislation that requires
it to approve export licences on a case by case basis while the
Pentagon is not averse to a broader reading)(102)
- in the context of UN peacekeeping operations, the two sides
agreed on the 'serious inadequacies' of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) and 'underlined the importance of cooperation between
the U.S. and India to oppose its applicability to non-parties, as
such applicability would be an assertion of jurisdiction beyond the
limits of international law'.
In October 1954 the US and Pakistan signed an
aide-memoire under which the US agreed to a comprehensive
military aid program. This was ostensibly designed to help build
Pakistan as a bulwark against southward expansion of the Soviet
Union, As a result the capability of Pakistan's armed forces were
boosted considerably as they received modern artillery, Patton
tanks, howitzers, transports and other state-of-the-art equipment.
The air force received modern F86 jet fighters and B57 bombers. US
military teams improved Pakistan's military training. The US in
turn also benefited. In 1959 it was announced that the US had been
granted a ten-year lease to set up a 'communications facility' near
Peshawar, the capital of the Northwest Frontier Province. This was
in fact one of a chain of electronic intelligence gathering
stations that the US had set up to spy on the Soviet Union.
Pakistan also agreed that the CIA could use Peshawar airport for
flights over the Soviet Union by its U2 spy
It can be argued that the development of US
relations with Pakistan was a result of the US reaction to India's
policy of non-alignment. This policy not only placed an obstacle in
US attempts to 'contain' communism, but was also viewed as being
objectionable because it attempted to create an additional force,
based not on military capabilities but on a political mobilisation
of Afro-Asian nations. Consequently, India viewed US military aid
to Pakistan in the 1950s as directed against India rather than
against communism. Moreover, the type of weapons provided to
Pakistan appeared to suggest their target. When the Indian
Government brought this to the attention of the US, there was no
response. According to the former US ambassador to India, Chester
The Indian Government pointed out that the
military equipment we were giving to Pakistan had no relevance to
our alleged military objectives. If the Pakistan Army was actually
designed to become part of a US-sponsored defence system to
discourage a Soviet or Chinese military movement through the
Himalayas or the Hindu Kush mountains, it would be seeking
equipment suitable for fighting in the mountain areas. However, the
equipment we supplied Pakistan was suitable for use on a relatively
flat terrain, in other words, on the plains of North India.
Moreover, from the outset, the Pakistan Government had itself made
it clear that it had no quarrel with either the USSR or China and
privately admitted that its military build-up was, in fact,
directed against India.
It was also in 1959 that Pakistan expressed its
interest in demarcating the several hundred km long border between
its part of Kashmir and China, evoking a luke-warm response from
the latter. After Pakistan changed its vote on the question of
China's representation at the UN in 1961, the latter agreed to
commence bilateral talks about a territory that India claimed as
its own.(105) The Chinese government rejected Indian
objections to the negotiations, asserting that the talks for a
provisional boundary agreement did 'not at all involve the question
of the ownership of Kashmir' and that the agreement made it clear
that after the settlement of the dispute between India and
Pakistan, the sovereign authorities concerned should reopen
negotiations with the Chinese government on the question of
concluding a formal boundary treaty. Negotiations between China and
Pakistan opened in October 1962,(106) (the same month
India and China fought a short but bitter border conflict which
resulted in China occupying large tracts of Indian territory) and
an agreement was finally signed in March 1963.(107) (Map
In the aftermath of the India-China conflict the
US (along with the UK) approved a modest 'emergency' military aid
package for India but baulked at any large-scale supply of arms.
Less than half of the military aid promised had actually been
delivered before an arms embargo was imposed on both India and
Pakistan after the two countries fought a brief war in 1965.
Political alignments had also started to change even before the
conflict. Pakistan had moved closer to China, signing a trade and
civil aviation agreement. India for its part had signed an
agreement with the Soviet Union for the supply and eventual
manufacture of MiG21 aircraft. The Soviet Union also helped broker
the Tashkent Agreement under which both India and Pakistan agreed
to withdraw to their pre-conflict boundaries. Also, as a result of
the embargo by the West, the Soviet Union and China emerged as
major suppliers of military equipment to India and Pakistan
respectively. In 1967 the US lifted the ban on supply of
'non-lethal' spares, a decision that primarily benefited Pakistan
as, till then, most of its equipment was of US origin. As is
discussed below Pakistan was also a beneficiary of a US 'tilt' in
its favour during the 1971 war with India which led to the creation
After the 1971 war India emerged as the
pre-eminent power in the region. This was further demonstrated by
the fact that the Simla Agreement (July 1972) with Pakistan was
arrived at without the involvement of any external power. The two
countries agreed to resolve any future problems bilaterally and
work towards the development of friendly relations. This trend
towards bilateralism was fairly well entrenched until the Iranian
Revolution of 1979 and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in
December that year.
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the
subsequent decision by the US to supply arms to Pakistan evoked a
mixed reaction from India. Initial ambivalence soon gave way to
muted opposition as India realised that the Soviet Union had no
exit strategy. In 1980, the Soviet Union was told about India's
inability to support Soviet actions and reminded of India's
position that relationships in the region should be based on
non-interference and peaceful coexistence.(108) While
the Soviet action was opposed in principle there was a greater
suspicion on the part of India vis-à-vis the US naval build
up in the Indian Ocean and the change in its Pakistan policy. The
latter moves were viewed as a reaction to the earlier overthrow of
the Shah of Iran which had indicated the vulnerability of US
regional policy; it was suspected that Pakistan was being groomed
as the regional proxy.
Under the Reagan Administration, the US agreed
to provide Pakistan with a US$3.2 billion multi-year aid package
equally divided between military and economic assistance. By 1982,
Pakistan was receiving US$600 million a year in assistance
including 40 advanced F16 aircraft. In return, the US with help
from Pakistan and matching funds from Saudi Arabia, was helping
fund resistance against the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan.(109) The military aid package provoked
criticism from India, aware that the arms would only be used in the
event of a conflict against India.
While the US had concerns about Pakistan
developing nuclear weapons, in 1981 it waived the Glenn amendment
that prohibited aid to countries suspected of doing so. The
Pressler Amendment passed in the mid-1980s required the President
to provide an annual certification that Pakistan did not possess a
nuclear device. In April 1989 a new agreement provided for $4
billion in economic assistance and purchases of military equipment.
In 1989 a $1.4 billion agreement was signed for the purchase of
military equipment including a further 60 F16 aircraft. According
to a declassified State Department document, as far back as 1983,
the US had 'unambiguous evidence' that Pakistan was 'actively
pursuing a nuclear weapons development program'.(110)
Despite this, certification that Pakistan did not possess nuclear
weapons was provided till 1990 when the elder President Bush
refused to do so.(111) This move had serious
consequences for Pakistan's military preparedness although some
spares were permitted to be sold on a commercial basis. It also
affected the economy as economic assistance dried up. However, the
Brown amendment (1995) permitted the resumption of economic
Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998 and General
Musharraf's overthrow of the Nawaz Sharif government in October
1999 saw the full range of sanctions being reimposed.
After the events of September 2001, Pakistan
again emerged as a frontline state when the US began operations in
Afghanistan. In spite of divided domestic public opinion it offered
bases and other assistance to US forces. In return, the US lifted a
wide range of sanctions, offered a generous economic assistance
package(112) and limited military assistance in the form
of provision of spares and training as well as sensors for border
surveillance and a few helicopters for the same
purpose.(113) At this stage, India, for its part, does
not appear to be unduly concerned. This appears to be for a number
of reasons including the speed, range and depth of strategic
convergence with the United States, the type of US military aid
being provided does not threaten India, and the crackdown on
terrorists operating out of Afghanistan would have a beneficial
impact on the level of terrorist activities in Kashmir.
In 2002, the US has also played a key role in
reducing tensions between India and Pakistan. After a terrorist
attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001, which India
maintained was carried out by Pakistan based terrorist groups,
India moved a substantial number of troops to its border with
Pakistan provoking a similar response from the latter. In an
attempt to reduce tensions Secretary Powell visited South Asia in
January 2002. The US, however, has been urging both sides to reduce
tensions while continuing to maintain that it would play no role in
the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. According to Deputy
Secretary of State Armitage, the US has had discussions with India
'about the need to be balanced and measured.' USPakistan
discussions focussed 'additionally on the need to stop
cross-border terrorism.'(emphasis added).(114) This
view has also been echoed by National Security Adviser Condoleezza
Rice. In an interview in May she said 'we've been very clear with
Musharraf that we expect to see actions to follow up on his 12
January speech that said Pakistan will end any support to
extremists we are working very closely with Pakistan and we want to
work very closely with India because we have a larger future
with India (emphasis added)'. Dr Rice also had a cautionary
note for Pakistan, adding that 'we have made very clear to
President Musharraf that we expect that he will carry through on
his promise to hold parliamentary elections in October that are
consistent with international standards and we've made very clear
that the parliamentary elections are not the end but the beginning
of putting Pakistan back on the democratic
Unsurprisingly, the US remains sceptical about
General Musharraf's intentions to contain terrorism given
Pakistan's past support to the Taliban. This was reflected in the
State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001
report released on 21 May 2002. It states, 'Questions remain,
however, whether Musharraf's "get tough" policy with local
militants and his stated pledge to oppose terrorism anywhere will
be fully implemented and sustained'.(116)
In an attempt to reduce tension between India
and Pakistan, Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca visited
the two countries in midMay. Addressing an audience in New Delhi
she said that India and the US were 'natural partners' on a range
of issues, including the war against terrorism, national defence
and nonproliferation.(117) Unfortunately her visit
coincided with an attack by Pakistan-based terrorists in Jammu
which resulted in 34 deaths, mostly women and children. On 18 May
the Indian Government demanded the recall of Pakistan's High
Commissioner to India with immediate effect.(118) On 20
May, a State Department spokesman stated that, following the 14 May
attack, the US was 'strongly concerned' about the increased
potential for an India-Pakistan conflict.(119) Two days
later, the US called upon Pakistan 'to do all it can' to end the
infiltration of terrorists into Kashmir.(120)
Tensions increased further in the last week of
May when Pakistan conducted a series of three missile tests.
Secretary of State Colin Powell responded by saying that the tests
were not 'a terribly useful thing to do right now We were
disappointed that the Pakistanis took this time to perform routine
tests, which, if they were routine, could have been performed some
other time.' He went on to add:(121)
We do expect (Pakistani) President Musharaff to
stick with the commitments that he has publicly made. He began
making them very publicly in his 12 January speech, to stop
cross-border activity. That is very destabilising and is a source
of tension and has contributed to the situation we find ourselves
In the past India viewed the normalisation of
USChina relations in 1971 with grave misgivings. This was the
result of a secret trip by Henry Kissinger to China which had been
facilitated by Pakistan. On 15 July 1971, President Nixon announced
details of the trip and his own planned visit
there.(122) This was, from an Indian point of view, a
clear convergence of US, China and Pakistan interests. Perhaps
foreseeing the eventuality of the convergence of USChina interests
vis-a vis the Soviet Union and the inevitability of the war in East
Pakistan, India signed the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty on 9
Soon after the outbreak of the Indo Pakistan war
on 4 December 1971, which eventually led to the creation of
Bangladesh, details were revealed of a US 'tilt' towards Pakistan.
The US believed that the Soviet Union would come to the aid of
India and that the war would lead to the dismemberment of Pakistan.
Kissinger, mistakenly as it turned out, believed that the Chinese
would come to Pakistan's help by putting pressure on India's
northern borders and indicated to the Chinese that if they were
threatened by the Soviets, the US would not stand idly
by.(123) In the event China did nothing of this sort.
President Nixon on the other hand, authorised the dispatch of a
task force of eight ships including the aircraft carrier
Enterprise from off the coast of Vietnam to the Bay of
Bengal.(124) By the time the task force reached its
destination, Pakistan's forces in erstwhile East Pakistan had
already surrendered and the two countries had agreed to a
India's problems were thus compounded by the US
changing its policy from one of non-recognition of China to one of
giving it great power status in its own strategic considerations.
Further, China gained a permanent seat in the Security Council.
India's threat perceptions were also guided by the apprehension of
a possible strategic understanding between the US and China. The
visit of US Defence Secretary Harold Brown in 1980 and Secretary of
State Alexander Haig a year later caused concern, raising
apprehensions that the US would help in the modernisation of
China's armed forces at the same time as it was helping
Pakistan.(125) China did look to the US for some weapons
technology including a military aircraft modernisation program and
equipment for munitions production.
After China's Tiananmen crackdown on student
activists in June 1989, the US imposed sanctions that included a
suspension of arms sales. 'The rationale for USPRC cooperation
during the Reagan Administration stemmed from the Cold War, the end
of which in 1991 removed the strategic basis for US arms sales to
China'.(126) Since then the political relationship
between the US and China has been marked by periods of tension
especially over the Taiwan issue and US allegations that China is
exporting missiles and related technology to Pakistan, Iran and
North Korea although economic relations have flourished.
China has been an important factor in India's
foreign policy since independence. Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru's belief in a 'resurgent Asia' envisaged friendship between
the two giants of Asia. It was Nehru and the Chinese Foreign
Minister Zhou Enlai who, in 1954, first drafted the policy of
panchshila embodying the five principles of peaceful
coexistence: mutual respect for each other's integrity and
sovereignty, non-aggression, non interference in each other's
internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful
coexistence. India and China also share one of the longest
undemarcated and disputed borders in the world. This was the cause
of a short border war in 1962.
Subsequently, Sino-Indian hostility deepened as
India moved closer to the Soviet Union and China became Pakistan's
main arms supplier and diplomatic supporter. The signing of the
Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty in 1971, the US-China rapprochement
and their 'tilt' towards Pakistan during the war that followed did
not help matters. However, China, while providing diplomatic
support did not intervene militarily in the war. Also, Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi had 'consistently declared that India's
doors were open for normal peaceful relations with China, and in
1976 ambassadors were re-exchanged after a lapse of fifteen
years'.(127) In February 1979, the then Indian Foreign
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China, the first high-level
visit by either side since 1962. High level contact continued to be
maintained over the years and in 1989 a Joint Working Group (JWG)
consisting of diplomatic and military experts was constituted. It
was regular meetings of the JWG that resulted in two confidence
building agreements: the Agreement on Maintaining Peace and
Tranquility in the Border Areas along the Line of Actual Control
(1993) and the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the
Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China
Nonetheless, there have been irritants in the
bilateral relationship. India has continued to express its
opposition to China supplying Pakistan with missiles and related
technology. China expressed its 'strong condemnation' of India's
nuclear tests in May 1998 maintaining that these would make China a
nuclear target. On Pakistan's tests it expressed 'deep regret'
implying they were inevitable. As has been observed, 'the Chinese
governmenttried to balance outright condemnation with insistence
that the Indian government maintain stable relations with
China'.(128) India also took umbrage at a Joint
Communique issued by the Foreign Ministers of the five permanent
members (P5) of the Security Council on 4 June, 1998, maintaining
that the 'clandestine transfer of nuclear weapons technology and
fissile material is well known. Nevertheless the P5 have declined
to take any action to address a serious violation of a Treaty
provision to which all of them were party'.(129)
It was in 1999 that the bilateral relationship
began to return to the pre-nuclear tests level. The postponed JWG
meeting was held March 1999 followed by Foreign Minister Jaswant
Singh's visit to China in June. During the visit the two sides
agreed to initiate talks on the demarcation of the Line of Actual
Control (LAC) as well as begin a security dialogue, the first
meeting of which took place in March 2000. The Indian President K.
R. Narayanan visited China two months later.(130)
Bilateral relations were also helped as a result of India's conduct
during the conflict with Pakistan in the Kargil sector of Kashmir
as a result of an attempted invasion by Pakistan-backed Islamist
guerrillas. India refused to cross the LoC, and China, being
increasingly concerned by the growth of political Islam in its west
distanced itself from Pakistan. India's strategy led to rapid
improvements in relations with the US and China. During his March
2000 visit to India, President Clinton 'responded positively to
Indian aspirations for an expanded UN Security Council. While in
Beijing, Narayanan sounded out China on the same possibility and
received similarly positive indications'.(131)
Since then, relations both at the political and
economic level have continued to make progress. In November 2000,
the Experts Group (EG) of the two sides exchanged sample maps of
the Central Sector (which is essentially non-contentious) This was
followed by the visit of the second most senior figure in China's
Communist Party, Li Peng, the chairman of China's National People's
Congress (NPC) to India in January 2001. The Chinese Premier Zhu
Rongi visited India in January 2002. This can be perceived as a
reappraisal by the two countries of the changed international
situation which rendered traditional responses irrelevant. China
could no longer consider India as a peripheral 'nuisance', as its
rising influence would have a direct impact on China's
interests.(132) China's traditionally ally Pakistan, had
become politically isolated and unstable. The US was seeking
rapprochement with India and had recognised it as a country that
was capable of making a contribution to the future stability in the
Indian Ocean region. The fact that China has distanced itself from
supporting Pakistan in its dispute with India was noted as recently
as April by Secretary of State Colin Powell when he praised China's
role in reducing IndoPakistan tensions.(133)
This latter point was emphasised in a speech
delivered by External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh to the
Shanghai Institute for International Studies during his visit to
China in MarchApril 2002.(It was also symbolised by the fact that
he chose to go to Beijing on the inaugural China Airlines flight to
Beijing, the first direct air link it in the history of bilateral
relations). In reply to a question, he stated:(134)
India and China have only one future, and it is
up to the two governments to realise it-the future is positive We
have our differences. But we cannot define our relations by our
differences. You asked about military relations. Yes, we can have
them. We need to have trust
He went on to add,
We have witnessed the emergence of the United
States as the pre-eminent global power. This is the reality. In
that reality, we believe that the reality of power is the
understanding the limits to power. Our new engagement with the US
began in 1998. Earlier, our relations were tense, divided,
prescriptive. We continued to engage with the US. There has been a
movement to correct our relations in both countries. Our
relations must never be seen through any prism or angle of any
third country relations It is an error to view our relations with
the US, Russia or China through the refracting vision of any third
country (emphasis added).
A few days earlier, after meeting his Chinese
counterpart, Tang Jiaxuan and other senior officials, Jaswant Singh
had briefed journalists in Beijing on a calendar of meetings which
depicted the 'establishment of a very comprehensive dialogue
process between the two countries and at various levels'. This
- the first bilateral dialogue on counter-terrorism would be held
in New Delhi on 23 April 2002
- next meeting of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to be held in
Beijing in May2002
- during the 12th meeting of the Expert Group (EG), to be held in
June 2002, the two sides would exchange sample maps of the Western
sector and attempt to complete the process by the end of the year.
Exchange of sample maps in the Eastern sector would begin in early
- the 3rd bilateral Security Dialogue would be held in JulyAugust
2002 in Beijing
- the 14th meeting of the JWG was scheduled for August 2002 in
- China had expressed satisfaction with the military exchanges
between the two countries and welcomed the proposal for a visit by
the Indian Defence Minister at a mutually convenient date
- Prime Minister Vajpayee would be visiting China later in
The reason for listing the high-level security
meetings is to emphasise the fact that not only are they scheduled
to take place on almost a monthly basis but also underline the
comprehensiveness of the process. Foreign Minister Singh also
outlined the route this process would take. The two sides would
first define the existing differences on the LAC, strengthen
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and then deal with the border
The second point that needs to be highlighted is
the fact that this process is taking place at the same time that
the IndiaUS strategic dialogue and moves to substantially increase
military cooperation is proceeding apace. US Ambassador Blackwill
perhaps had China in mind when, at a speech delivered in Mumbai in
September 2001, he said, 'USIndia relations will stand on their own
during the Bush Administration. They will not be directed
against any third party'. (emphasis added).(136)
Finally, it is a telling indication of the change in China's policy
towards India that at a time of heightened military tension between
India and Pakistan in MayJune 2002, a Chinese Foreign Ministry
spokesman stated 'It is known to all that China, as a friendly and
close neighbour of India and Pakistan, China is concerned over the
tension between New Delhi and Islamabad'.(137)
Bilateral trade and economic relations between
India and China have also grown rapidly after a slow start in the
1980s and 1990s. The value of bilateral trade grew from US$1.16
billion in 1995 to US$3.5 billion in 2001. Over the years, three
border trade centres have been established on the IndoTibetan
border. Additionally, the last few years have seen an increasing
amount of investment in joint ventures by businesses in both
countries and the potential remains large, especially after China's
accession to the WTO.(138) India has also been granted
Approved Destination Status for Chinese tourists. As Foreign
Minister Jaswant Singh stated during his visit to China that he
agreed with Primier Zhu Rongji that 'very determined action' should
be taken to improve bilateral trade and what the two countries
needed was a 'comprehensive knowledge of each
US relations with Burma have been virtually
non-existent since the current military regime came to power in
1988. At the same time, Burmese relations with China have improved
dramatically. Until its collapse in 1989, the Communist Party of
Burma had enjoyed China's support in its insurgency against the
Burmese government resulting in strained relations between the two
countries. It was therefore a major shift in policy when Burma
opened up towards China. The reasons were threefold. After its
suppression of the democracy movement in 1988, Burma was, with the
exception of a few Southeast Asian countries, largely isolated from
the rest of the world. Major donors announced that they would
suspend all aid programs and would not support its requests for
loans from the international financial institutions. Politically,
the regime was criticised by all international organisations
including the United Nations and the European Union. Secondly, the
Burmese armed forces needed a reliable supplier of weapons to
enable it to fight insurgencies in various parts of the country as
well as maintain its grip on power. Finally, its economy was in
dire straits as a result of the cessation of external finance.
Over the years China has become the major
supplier of armaments to Burma not only to the army but also to the
navy and air force. It has also provided concessional finance and
investment in various projects in the country. By 2001 China had
become Burma's third largest trading partner, after Singapore and
Thailand.(140) China is also in the process of helping
Burma develop a transport corridor which would give its landlocked
states like Yunnan access to Burmese port facilities thereby
accelerating their economic development. A road from Kunming to
Ruili on the Chinese border with Burma already exists and this will
be extended to Bhamo, located on the Irrawady river with Rangoon
being 1300 km downstream, allowing China trade access to the Bay of
Bengal and the Indian Ocean. (Map 5)
The swiftness and depth of the development of
Burma-China relations also resulted in the latter's emergence as a
strategic player in the region and, at least till a few years ago,
caused some disquiet among its neighbours, notably India. Until
1993, when the Indian Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit visited
Rangoon, Indian policy had been critical of the Burmese regime's
suppression of democracy in the country and had been supportive of
dissident groups. India had also been concerned about reports of
Chinese intelligence gathering facilities on Hainggyi and Great
Coco Islands as well as possible access to Burmese ports by the
Chinese navy. Dixit was reported to have been reassured that
reports of Chinese bases on Burmese soil were without
Since then there has been a steady improvement
in IndiaBurma relations. Armies of the two sides are now
cooperating in controlling insurgencies on both sides of the
India-Burma border which itself has been opened for cross-border
trade. More significantly, in 2001 India completed rebuilding the
road from Tamu on the border with Burma, to Kalewa near Mandalay
(the old Mandalay road).
A recent development that will have a
significant economic and strategic impact on the region was an
agreement (April 2002) between India, Burma and Thailand to create
a transport corridor linking the three countries and develop other
infrastructure projects. The 1,400 km corridor will run from Moreh
in India through Bagan in central Burma and connect to Mae Sot in
Thailand and is expected to be completed in about two years. Many
stretches of the proposed corridor already exist, some need to be
strengthened and some new stretches of road to be built, mostly in
Burma. According to the Foreign Minister of Thailand, Surakiart
Sathirathai, there would be little difficulty in raising finances
for the project despite the poor condition of the Burmese
economy.(142) If the Thai proposal for a highway
connecting Thailand to Vietnam via Laos comes to fruition, this
could give India road access to Vietnam. It was also agreed to
promote a highway from Kanchanabun in Thailand to the Dawer deep
sea port in Burma and shipping links to ports in India.
The advantages to Burma are fairly clear. It
would benefit from the development of its transport and ancillary
infrastructure as well as increased economic investment and trade.
It also enhances its strategic significance in the region, sharing
borders with both India and China. However, this latter factor
should not be overemphasised. It is a fact of geography that the
country has, for most of its past, been inward-looking with hardly
any economic interaction with its two larger neighbours. The
changed situation is likely to bring economic benefits. The
traditional notion of IndiaChina rivalry and their 'attempts' to
expand their influence over Burma can risk being exaggerated.
The Hindu newspaper, citing official Indian sources stated
that neither India nor China could wish away the interests of the
other. 'India and China will be running in the same fields of
South-East Asia for a long time to come, and it would be unwise to
see Sino-Indian relations in terms of political rivalry.' This
position was reinforced by Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh who,
referring to his recent successful visit to China said 'India's
relations with Myanmar [Burma] should not be seen through the prism
of any third party'.(143)
For India, the benefits are clearly economic
and, to an extent, political. Not only would the land corridor help
reduce the costs of trade with countries in Southeast Asia but, in
the medium term, the possibility of trade with the landlocked
states of Southern China using the Burmese transport infrastructure
is in the realm of possibility. This would give an added impetus to
the growing India-China economic relations. As was argued in the
Beijing Review recently, the construction of a road and
then a railway line linking India and China through Burma 'will not
only greatly contribute to the friendly cooperation of the Chinese
and Indians, but will also benefit other Asians'.(144)
It would also help in the infrastructure and economic development
of India's northeastern states which are now connected to the
mainland by a narrow corridor north of Bangladesh making
transportation costly and time consuming. Bangladesh has so far
refused to give transit facilities. Finally, natural-gas fields in
Burma could become part of a network supplying Indian industry
while Bangladesh refuses to do so.
It is not clear whether the recent (6 May 2002)
release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest will reduce Burma's
international isolation. Whether the diversification of Burma's
international relations in this event would have any impact on
BurmaChina, BurmaIndia relationships remains to be seen.
- United States Information Service, USIndia Military
Cooperation Fact Sheet, US Embassy, New Delhi, 18 February
- This was a movement led by Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress
Party to gain independence for India from British rule.
- Quoted in K.P.S. Menon 'India and the Soviet Union' in B. R.
Nanda ed., Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years,. Vikas,
Delhi, 1976, pp. 134135.
- Nanda, op. cit., p. 155.
- ibid., pp. 162163.
- ibid., p. 168.
- For details see, Timothy Wallace Crawford, 'Playing the Pivot
in South Asia: Kennedy's Attempt to Broker Peace in Kashmir,
19621963', Brookings Working Paper, 10 July 2001, The
- Cable from US Ambassador Bowles to Secretary of State Rusk,
quoted in Surjit Mansingh, India's Search for Power, Sage
Publications, New Delhi, 1984, p. 77.
- ibid., p. 78.
- Zareer Masani, Indira Gandhi: A Biography, Hamish
Hamilton, London, 1975, pp. 158162.
- Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep: My years in Public Life
19411969, Harper & Row, New York, 1971, p. 526.
- Zareer Masani, Indira Gandhi: A Biography, op.
cit., p. 164.
- Mohammed Ayoob, 'India, Pakistan and Superpower Rivalry',
World Today, vol. 38, no. 5, May 1982, p. 194.
- Quoted in Stanley Wolpert, Roots of Confrontation in South
Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the Superpowers, Oxford
University Press, New York and Oxford, 1982, pp. 186 187.
- Surjit Mansingh, India's Search for Power, loc. cit.,
- Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power, Brookings
Institution Press, Washington D.C, pp. 280281.
- Text reproduced in Asian Defence Journal, December
1988, p. 131.
- Mohammed Ayoob, India and Southeast Asia: Indian
Perceptions and Policies, Routledge, London, 1990, p. 80.
- For a detailed analysis see Arthur G. Rubinoff, 'Missed
Opportunities and Contradictory Policies: Indo-American Relations
in the Clinton Rao Years', Pacific Affairs, vol. 69, no.
4, Winter 19961997, pp. 499517.
- Francine R. Frankel, 'Indo-US relations: The Future is now',
Washington Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 4, Autumn 1996, pp.
- Shekhar Gupta, 'India Redefines its Role', Adelphi
Paper 293, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 5960.
- Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 March 2000. p. 22.
- Janes Defence Weekly, 17 November 1999.
- New Partnership with India to be Focus of Clinton South Asia
Trip, Washington File, 16 March 2000.
- The President's Trip to South Asia: An Overview, Washington
File. 9 March 2000.
- Remarks to the Asia Society, Washington D.C., 14 March, 2000,
US Department of State.
- Text, Washington File, 21 May 2000.
- Text: President Clinton's Address to India's Parliament,
Washington File, 22 March 2000.
- Text: Clinton Interview with ABC World News in New Delhi,
Washington File, 22 March 2000.
- Text: Clinton and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's Press
Conference, Washington File, 21 March 2000.
- Transcript: Exchange of Toasts Between Presidents of US and
India, Washington File, 21 March 2000.
- Transcript: Albright Press Briefing in New Delhi,
Washington File, 21 March 2000.
- Transcript: Background Briefing by Senior Official,
Washington File, 24 March 2000.
- Washington File, 17 January 2001.
- The Hindu, 15 April 2001.
- ibid., 13 May 2001.
- Washington Times, 3 May 2001.
- Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Christina
B. Rocca in a speech to the Indian American Friendship Council,
Washington File, 18 July 2001.
- For a recent assessment refer, 'India: Budgets becoming a PR
exercise', Oxford Analytica, 11 March 2002.
- USTR's Zoellick's August 8 Speech in New Delhi, Washington
File, 9 August 2001.
- Text, Washington File, 29 January 2002.
- China Country Commercial Guide FY 2002, US Department
of State, 2001.
- Text: State's Larson Sees High Tech Future in US-India Business
Ties, Washington File, 17 April 2002.
- Text: Blackwill on USIndia Collaboration on International
Issues, Washington File, 4 September 2001.
- Fact Sheet: Sanctions on India and Pakistan, Washington
File, 28 September 2001.
- Text, Washington File, 9 November 2001.
- Washington File, 29 January 2002.
- In recognition of Indian expertise he added that the US team
was the 'most comprehensive and senior delegation we have ever
assembled for a bilateral CIP with any country'. Transcript: US,
India Launch Cyber Security Forum, Washington File, 2 May
- The Hindu, 11 January 2002.
- Washington Post, 18 January 2002.
- 'Post September 11, there has been a sea change in our
relationship with the United States, and things have changed,' the
Indian Defence Minister was reported to have said in an interview,
'You wouldn't have thought about it earlier', Washington
Times, 19 April 2002.
- 6 May 2002.
- Times of India, 6 February 2002.
- Indian Express, 17 May 2002.
- Asian Defence Journal, 4/2002, p. 76.
- 23 May 2002.
- Sandy Gordon, 'India and Southeast Asia: A Renaissance in
Relations?', in Sandy Gordon and Stephen Henningham eds., India
Looks East: An Emerging Power and its Asia Pacific Neighbours.
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National
University, Canberra, 1995, pp. 219220.
- Bernama News Agency, 21 April 2002.
- 28 April 2002.
- Satu P. Limaye, 'Sushi and Samosas: Indo-Japanese Relations
After The Cold War', in Sandy Gordon et. al., India Looks
East, loc. cit., p. 183.
- Text. Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 9 April 2002.
- For details see David Goldsworthy, 'Looking West: DFAT (re)
discovers the Indian Ocean', in Richard Leaver and David Cox eds,
Middling, Meddling, Muddling: Issues in Australian Foreign
Policy, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1997, pp. 202214.
- For an analysis of the history of Australia's relations with
India see T. B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War,
Australian National University Press, 1991, pp. 254263.
- Media Release, 13 May 1988.
- Media Release, 14 May 1998.
- 29 May 1998.
- For details see Composition of Trade: Australia,
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, May 1995, p. 170, and
ibid., May 1998, p. 182.
- The Indian Economy TodayChallenges and Opportunities,
Speech delivered at the Australia Summit, 16 June, 1998, p. 5.
- Sydney Morning Herald, 11 February 1999.
- ibid., 26 February 1999.
- ibid., 26 February 1999.
- Sunday Age, 28 February 1999.
- Australian Financial Review, 18 June 1999.
- ibid., 30 July 1999.
- ibid., 25 February 2000.
- Media Release, 17 March 2000.
- Transcript, 23 March 2000. Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade.
- News Release, Australian High Commission, New Delhi,
released jointly with the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 20
- 23 April 2002.
- In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade
Policy: White Paper, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
1997, p. 29.
- Australia's Strategic Policy, Department of Defence,
1997, p. 24.
- Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Department of
Defence, 2000, p.19.
- Asian Defence Journal, April 2002, p. 73.
- Teresita C. Schaffer, 'Building a New Partnership with India',
The Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 4, Spring 2002, p.
- Don Watson, 'Rabbit Syndrome: Australia and America',
Quarterly Essay, 4/2001, p. 25.
- Text: Joint Statement of the USIndia Defense Policy Group,
Washington File, 5 December 2001.
- United States Information Service, USIndia Military
Cooperation Fact Sheet, US Embassy, New Delhi, 18 February
- Text: Transformation of USIndia Relations 'Picking up
Speed', Washington File, 26 February 2002.
- Times of India, 19 April 2002.
- Defense Security Cooperation Agency, News Release, 25
- Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 February 2002.
- The Hindu, 12 May 2002.
- Transcript: State Department Says US-India Relationship Solid,
Washington File, 17 April 2002.
- USIS Press Release, 19 April 2002, US embassy, New
- Indian Express, 19 April 2002.
- The Hindu, 20 April 2002.
- ibid, 6 May 2002, also Indian Express, 13 May 2002 and
The Pioneer, 17 May 2002.
- Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 May 2002.
- Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 May 2002.
- Text: US, India Achieve Results in Defense Cooperation,
Washington File, 23 May 2002.
- Times of India, 22 May 2002.
- Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000:
Disenchanted Allies, The Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore, 2001, pp. 9192.
- Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep, op. cit., p. 480.
- Denis Kux, loc cit., pp. 113, 126.
- Keesing's Contemporary Archives 19631964, p. 19208.
- ibid., p. 19427.
- Surjit Mansingh, India's Search for Power, op. cit.,
- Denis Kux, loc. cit., p. 267.
- 'The Pakistani Nuclear Program', Department of State,
23 June 1983.
- Denis Kux, loc. cit., p. 277.
- Excerpt: State's Boucher Says Pakistan to Receive Billions in
Assistance, Washington File, 30 October 2001.
- Defense News, 17 April 2002.
- The Hindu, 6 May 2002.
- ibid., 3 May 2002.
- South Asia Overview in Washington File, 22 May 2002.
- Rocca Says US and India are 'Natural Partners', Washington
File, 14 May 2002.
- India/Pakistan: War momentum may be unstoppable, Oxford
Analytica, 20 May 2002.
- Excerpt: US 'Strongly concerned' over India-Pakistan Tensions,
Washington File, 20 May 2002.
- Excerpt: US Calls for Restraint by India, Pakistan,
Washington File, 22 May 2002.
- Excerpt: Powell Expresses Disappointment in Pakistan Missile
Test, Washington File, 25 May 2002.
- Denis Kux, loc. cit, p. 192.
- ibid., p. 202.
- The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, Macmillan Australia,
1978, p. 528.
- Surjit Mansingh, India's Search for Power, loc. cit.,
- Shirley A. Kan, et al., China's Foreign Conventional Arms
Acquisitions: Background and Analysis, Congressional Research
Service, October 2000.
- Surjit Mansingh, India's Search for Power, loc. cit.,
- For details see, Joseph Cirincione, China's Changing
Nuclear Posture: Reactions to the South Asian Nuclear Tests,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999, pp. 2532.
- Press Release, Ministry of External Affairs, New
Delhi, 5 June 1998.
- W. P. S. Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, 'Resolving the Sino-Indian
Border Dispute: Building Confidence through Cooperative
Monitoring,' Asian Survey, vol. 41, no. 2, March/April
2001, p. 358.
- 'India/China: Strategic rivals attempt cooperation,' Oxford
Analytica, 7 June 2000.
- 'India: Warmer China ties may soon be put to test,' Oxford
Analytica, 21 June 2001.
- Times of India, 26 April 2002.
- Transcript, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 1
- Transcript, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi,
29 March 2002.
- Text, Washington File, 6 September 2001.
- The Hindu, 22 May 2002.
- Wang Hongwei, 'Sino-Indian Economic and Scientific Cooperation
Promising', Beijing Review, 7 March 2002, pp. 711.
- Transcript, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi,
30 March 2002.
- China Trying to Keep Hold Over Myanmar, Stratfor.com,
17 December 2001.
- For a detailed analysis see, Andrew Selth, 'The
China-Burma-India 'Triangle'', in Sandy Gordon et. al., India
Looks East, loc. cit., pp. 185206.
- The Hindu, 7 April 2002.
- 7 March 2002.