Professor Brian Galligan
Politics and Public Administration Group
26 June 2001
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Vision in Hindsight
Vision in Hindsight is a Department of the
Parliamentary Library (DPL) project for the Centenary of
Federation.
The Vision in Hindsight: Parliament and the
Constitution will be a collection of essays each of which
tells the story of how Parliament has fashioned and reworked the
intentions of those who crafted the Constitution. The unifying
theme is the importance of identifying Parliament's central role in
the development of the constitution. In the first stage, essays are
being commissioned and will be published, as IRS Research Papers,
of which this paper is the twelfth.
Stage two will involve the selection of eight to ten of the
papers for inclusion in the final volume, to be launched in
conjunction with a seminar, in November 2001.
A Steering Committee comprising Professor Geoffrey Lindell
(Chair), the Hon. Peter Durack, the Hon. John Bannon and Dr John
Uhr assist DPL with the management of the project.
Centenary of Federation 1901-2001
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Contents
Major
Issues
Introduction
The Original Vision
Parliament as a Federal
Institution
Dispelling Myths of
Federalism
Which
Federal Features Really Matter?
The Changing Role of the
Senate
Fighting the
Fight
Federalism
and Race
Federalism
and Finance
Federalism and
Globalisation
The
Vision in Hindsight
Endnotes
Vision in Hindsight: Parliament and the Constitution
Series
Major
Issues
Through a century of nationhood Australia has
developed and been consolidated as a federal commonwealth within
its original constitutional framework, but in ways that were not
foreseen by the founders. Commentators like Quick and Garran who
saw the Senate as a States' House and the House of Representatives
as representing national interests have been largely confounded.
Some saw responsible government as extinguishing federalism but
they too were somewhat wide of the mark.
A century on, both Houses-not just the
Senate-remain federal in character notwithstanding various efforts
to submerge federalism beneath a preoccupation with party politics
and responsible government. While responsible government shaped by
party discipline and Executive dominance are core features of the
Australian polity, the federal and republican parts of the
Constitution are, if anything, more important.
The Parliament sits at the heart of Australian
federalism and remains a dominant player in national political
deliberation although it does not have the field entirely to
itself. In turn Parliament as an institution has continued to be
shaped by the wider forces that have shaped Australian
federalism.
Borrowing largely from the American model, the
founders adopted a federal system that divided the powers of
government between the national or Commonwealth sphere, and the
sub-national or State sphere. The National Government was given
defined powers-either exclusive or concurrent-whereas the States
retained the residual. Where there is overlap, Commonwealth laws
prevail to the extent of any inconsistency. By adopting a written
Constitution, notions of parliamentary sovereignty were confined by
the terms of the Constitution itself. Unlike Westminster, the
Commonwealth Parliament is not supreme. Rather the people have
sovereign authority over the constitutional system and participate
as citizens in two spheres of government. One sphere is national
and the other State-based.
Support for a federal rather than a unitary
constitution was unanimous amongst the delegates to the 1891 and
1897-1898 Conventions. Labor provided some support for a unitary
model but the party itself was not sufficiently established as a
force at the national level to influence either the Convention
Debates or to shape the federal model in the very early years of
the Commonwealth. The appeal of the federal model was that it
enabled the creation of a new sphere of national governance while
preserving the established colonial systems of self-government
including local government.
The growth in federal power has been played out
of two sets of issues-Commonwealth versus States powers, and
responsible government versus the Senate.
In relation to the first set of issues, those
arguing for a strong national government-the likes of Alfred
Deakin, H. B. Higgins and Isaac Isaacs-ultimately won out. The
reach of Commonwealth power was consolidated through the decades of
the 1940s and 1970s prompted initially by the dictates of national
defence and subsequently by postwar reconstruction and nation
building. The Commonwealth Parliament, encouraged by long periods
of liberal interpretation of Commonwealth legislative and executive
powers by the High Court of Australia, widened its influence,
sometimes at the expense of the States.
According to its critics, Australian federalism
has undergone such a sustained process of centralisation that it
can scarcely be called a federal system any more. The growth in
federal dominance in federal state financial relations is
frequently cited disapprovingly as, more recently, has been the
High Court's expansive interpretation of the external affairs power
during the 1980s and early 1990s. Such developments however, are a
consequence of the design that the founders put in place quite
deliberately. This entailed leaving key issues such as long-term
provisions for taxation and fiscal sharing to future Parliaments to
determine. Politics, including inter-governmental politics of
competition and cooperation with the States, would decide future
policies and hence the shape of federalism. Thus we can conclude
that fiscal centralisation, for instance, was neither intended not
precluded by the founders and the design of the Constitution.
At the close of the first 100 years of
federalism, intense globalisation has introduced a major new
dimension to the development of Australian federalism with the
Commonwealth's own independence being increasingly constrained as
it becomes party to more international organisations and
agreements. On the other hand, globalisation provides Parliament
with the opportunity of expanding its legislative power in areas of
State jurisdiction through, for example, increased use of the
external affairs, taxation, trade and commerce and corporations
powers.
The continuing contest between federalism and
responsible government-the concept that governments rise and fall
according to their support in the popularly elected Lower House-has
been shaped by many influences.
The House of Representatives and the Senate have
developed quasi-independent roles that are partly national and
partly federal. Accordingly, Parliament, and its component parts,
can at times be more or less nationally focused, federally
co-operative or antagonistic towards the States in the complex
politics of federalism.
The Constitution provides for a strong Senate
elected under a democratic franchise, albeit one which is
structured in a federal way. Thus while not primarily a States'
House, the Senate does provide an avenue for enhanced
representation from the smaller States in the Federal Parliament
and in national decision-making. Giving voice to particular State
interests may not always produce beneficial outcomes as was the
case when the Parliament passed the first federal franchise that
perpetuated the worst State practice of excluding Aboriginal people
from the electoral roll.
The Senate does not have power to initiate or
amend money bills-proposed laws raising taxes or appropriating
money to be expended by the Commonwealth-but it has the power to
reject such laws outright and press the House of Representatives
for changes by requesting changes. The Senate also may amend, fail
to pass or reject all other proposed laws emanating from the House
of Representatives. These powers combined with the Constitution's
inadequate deadlock provisions-especially where the two House are
at odds over the fate of financial bills-produced the 1975 crisis.
They have modified to an extent, but not subverted responsible
government.
As Deakin in particular anticipated, party
interests have been strongly reflected in both Houses rather than
interests arising out of residence in one State or another.
In particular, the performance of the Australian
Senate has been most markedly affected by the ebb and flow of party
control of that Chamber. With the Australian Labor Party's growing
electoral success, culminating in its winning office in 1910, and
the fusion of the first non-Labor parties, disciplined party
politics tightened their grip on Parliament. Party discipline
controlled the Senate and was directed with varying degrees of
success by party leaders in the House of Representatives. From 1902
to 1948 this tendency was reinforced by methods for election to the
Senate that often produced markedly lopsided results.
Most significant for re-establishing the status
of the Senate was the introduction of proportional representation
(PR) in 1948. This change has fed (and fed on) the fragmentation of
major party control of the Parliament and been the wellspring of
significant reforms in the way that the Senate (and the Parliament
as a whole) operated. From the 1970s the Senate has extended its
legislative review function whilst making government actions more
transparent and government itself more accountable. In the process,
the Senate's independence has been enhanced and the Parliament to
some degree revitalised.
Healthy institutions can be expected to pursue
with some vigour their own self-interest through maintaining,
expanding and consolidating their own domain. At the end of the
their first century, the Australian Parliament and Australian
federalism have each developed in ways that the founders might
neither have desired nor expected. This is not to suggest fault or
lay blame. In formulating their Vision for the Parliament and
federalism the founders were not overly prescriptive nor was the
model they devised impervious to change. The future of Australian
federalism remains an open question. Much will depend on the way in
which Parliament develops and how it carries out the democratic and
national aspirations of the Australian people.
Introduction
Both Parliament and federalism are core features
of the Australian Constitution, the purpose of which, as the
preamble to the Westminster enabling act so eloquently expressed
it, was to create an 'indissoluble Federal Commonwealth' based upon
the consent of the people of the Australian colonies. Through a
century of nationhood Australia has developed and been consolidated
as a Federal Commonwealth within its original constitutional
framework, but in ways that were not envisaged by the founders. The
institutional framework of the Federal Commonwealth was set out in
the constitutional text, the first and most significant chapter of
which deals with the Parliament. According to s. 1, the
legislative power of the Commonwealth is vested in 'a Federal
Parliament' consisting of the Queen, a Senate and a House of
Representatives, and which is to be called simply 'The Parliament'
or 'The Parliament of the Commonwealth'. While the term 'Federal
Parliament' dominates popular and political discourse, the federal
character of the Parliament has been less well articulated in
official commentary and scholarship.
This has been due at least in part to focusing
on parliamentary responsible government that, with the rise of
disciplined political parties in the decade after Federation, had
become in practice party responsible government. According
to various proponents, political parties ruled, the Executive
dominated Parliament, Parliament was sovereign, and democracy was
ensured through electoral politics. There was sufficient partial
truth in all of these propositions to lead generations of
commentators and analysts into a political discourse that ignored
or down played federalism. But as I have argued elsewhere, the
federal and republican parts of the Australian Constitution are, if
anything, more important than the responsible government
parts.(1) In any case, they make up the larger
constitutional whole, of which parties, the Executive, Parliament
and periodic elections are part. My purpose in this paper is to
explore the federal character of Parliament within the
larger constitutional system.
Other studies of Parliament have focused mainly
on its internal operations-most notably Reid and Forrest's
outstanding Bicentenary study on the 'trinitarian struggle' between
the Executive, the House of Representatives and the
Senate.(2) The canvas has been broadened in John Uhr's
study of the changing place of Parliament from a deliberative
democracy perspective that re-conceptualises Australian democracy
in a sophisticated republican way while incorporating the robust
tradition of Australian parliamentary democracy.(3) My
concern is with Parliament's functioning as a federal institution,
and with locating Parliament within the federal constitutional
system. This complements Dr Uhr's account by showing how Parliament
is an integral part of the institutional architecture of Australian
federal democracy and has become the dominant player in the ongoing
process of national political deliberation.
There is an important methodological point to be
made at the beginning: we are not simply concerned with what
Parliament has done in developing federalism but also what it is as
a federal institution. This distinction between being and doing
enables us to grasp the dual way in which Parliament has been
significant. The action paradigm of what Parliament has done over
the course of the twentieth century in shaping and developing
federalism is obviously an important part of the story. But if
Parliament is itself a federal institution, its own operation and
functioning have been as a federal institution and this accounts
for much of the development of Australian Federalism. Thus, a major
part of the story of Parliament's development of federalism is the
development of Parliament itself as a federal institution,
including through the changing balance of power among all of its
parts. An additional part of the story is Parliament's interactions
with the other main institutional parts of the system, most notably
the High Court and the States.
The Original Vision
The founders' design and intentions are evident
in their constitutional handiwork, as we have seen, and were
articulated and discussed at length in the Federation debates. In
designing the Australian Constitution the founders embraced and
reworked the federal model, copied mainly from the American
Constitution. They combined this with the institutions of
Parliament and responsible government familiar from British and
colonial practice, producing a hybrid of parliamentary and Federal
Government. Federation in Australia was a timely extension of
self-governance to the national sphere. It preserved the colonies
as States along with their established systems of local government,
and continued Australia's membership of the British Empire. Local
government was not mentioned in the Constitution because it came
within State jurisdiction-a fact that some would like to have
reversed through constitutional recognition. Imperial membership
coloured the way in which the Executive was structured in formal
monarchic terms with a vice-regal surrogate, making the task of
modern republicanism technically complex. It also affected the way
in which the Executive's power over foreign affairs and treaties
was left unconstrained because it was to be exercised by the
British Imperial government, as was the case until the 1940s.
Within the continuing traditions and
arrangements of Australian colonial governance, Federation was a
process of nation building on a federal basis. The federal system
adopted by the founders divided the powers of government between
the federal or national (in Australia called 'Commonwealth') sphere
and the sub-national or provincial sphere (in Australia called
'State'). Federalism requires a controlling constitutional document
specifying the institutional framework and the division of powers,
and usually a superior court to adjudicate jurisdictional disputes
and make authoritative rulings about the meaning and extent of the
specified powers. Federalism is antithetical to notions of
parliamentary sovereignty, or to one sphere of government having
primacy over the other. That is because both Commonwealth and State
legislatures have limited jurisdictions set by the Constitution. In
a federal democracy such as that of Australia, the people have
sovereign authority over the constitutional system and participate
as citizens in the two spheres of government. This federal duality
is itself only part of a more complex set of citizenship
associations that include local and global (British Imperial at
Federation).(4)
That Australia would have a federal constitution
had overwhelming support throughout the federation period and
unanimous support within the 1891 and 1897-98 Conventions. The
preliminary Melbourne Conference of 1890 resolved to support a
National Australasian Convention 'empowered to consider and report
on an adequate scheme for a Federal Constitution'.(5)
The remainder of the decade was dedicated to that purpose. Henry
Parkes' framework resolutions introduced at the beginning of the
1891 Convention were 'to establish and secure an enduring
foundation for the structure of a Federal Government'. Parkes'
first resolution was a classic federal proposition:
That the powers and privileges and territorial
rights of the several existing colonies shall remain intact, except
in respect to such surrenders as may be agreed upon as necessary
and incidental to the power and authority of the National Federal
Government.(6)
At the 1890 Melbourne Conference, Parkes had
also insisted that 'the Federal Government must be a government of
power'. It would need to be 'armed with plenary power for the
defence of the country'; 'plenary power for the performance of all
other functions pertaining to a National Government' including 'the
carrying out of many works in the industrial world which may be
necessary for the advancement of a nation'.(7) Parkes
also suggested a 'third way' of operating federal systems: through
shared or concurrent jurisdictions and effective inter-governmental
relations. 'It may possibly be a very wise thing indeed that some
of these powers should come into force with the concurrence of the
State Legislatures or the Provincial Legislatures', Parkes
suggested.(8)
The Australian founders grappled with these
three options for allocating powers-leaving them with the States,
giving them to the new national government, or making them
concurrent. They plumped mainly for the concurrent option, but also
gave the Commonwealth a crisp power of override in the case of
conflict. This is formulated in s. 109:
When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law
of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former
shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.
The override power was limited, however, because
the Commonwealth was not given the authoritative power of deciding
the limits of its own powers and determining conflicts. That was
given quite deliberately to the High Court.(9)
The point to be emphasised is that federalism
was the foundational institution of the Australian Constitution and
the nation it created. Adapting it for Australian purposes in ways
that elites could agree upon and the people support was the
challenge of the 1890s. The 1891 draft Bill failed because of
insufficient political momentum and the federal cause was revived
through people's conventions and renewed political leadership.
Barton's resolutions that began the Adelaide session of the 1897-98
Convention were similar to those of Parkes in proposing a system of
'Federal Government' with a 'Federal Parliament'.(10)
The crucial difference between the 1897-98 Convention and
successful adoption of its draft constitution in contrast to the
1891 Convention and its abortive efforts was popular input, but in
a federal form. Delegates to the 1897-98 Convention were elected by
the people of the Colonies, except for those from Western Australia
who were selected by the colonial Parliament. Most significantly,
the draft constitution was approved in popular referendums in the
Colonies. Despite the limited franchises of the colonies, most of
which excluded women and Aboriginal people, this made the
Australian constitutional process one of the most radically
democratic that had ever been attempted. Moreover, the draft
included a Senate directly elected by the people of the States and
a referendum process entailing approval of constitutional changes,
at the very least, by a double majority of the people overall and
in a majority of States. Australia's Constitution was fundamentally
democratic as well as federal.
An alternative system of unitary government and
a sovereign national Parliament was championed by some of the
rising Labor Party leaders and would become prominent when Labor
established itself as a major political force by 1910. Labor had no
say in the founding conventions, however, and little influence over
the making of the Constitution. The federal model seemed
tailor-made to most Australians at the time because it enabled the
establishment of a new sphere of national governance while
preserving the established colonial systems of self-government
including local government. Federation was an extension of
democratic governance that accommodated existing Colonies of
similar political culture and structure, but unequal size. Another
possibility would have been for the colonies to remain as separate
quasi-independent states and join an imperial federation that some
were championing at the time. But this had little public or popular
support in Australia or, indeed, within the British Empire.
Parliament as a Federal Institution
The founding consensus about federal
arrangements masked sharp differences over key aspects of
institutional design concerning the Federal Parliament. The first
was what powers Parliament should be given vis-a-vis the States,
and the second was how a traditional responsible government
executive would fit with a Federal Parliament. Both issues were
crucial for determining the shape and relative strength of the new
Parliament. If it had greater or more broadly defined powers, the
Commonwealth Parliament would be potentially stronger with respect
to the States. And if the Senate were modified to fit more readily
with responsible government based in the House of Representatives,
the new Parliament would more closely resemble a Westminster
Parliament than a federal legislature of coequal Houses, and that
would facilitate more centralised government. The founders achieved
sufficient consensus and compromise on both issues to reach
agreement on the constitutional structures. The playing out of
these two sets of issues-Commonwealth versus State powers, and
responsible government versus the Senate-accounts for much of the
story of the development of the Commonwealth Parliament and
Australian Federalism.
Among the founders, there were differences of
opinion on both issues with the balance of consensus shifting
between 1891 and 1897-98. Sir Samuel Griffith of Queensland, the
leader of the 1891 Convention after old man Parkes had proposed the
framework principles and taken a back seat, was a strong federalist
on both issues. The 'essential condition' for federation, Griffith
insisted, was 'that the separate states are to continue as
autonomous bodies, surrendering only so much of their powers as is
necessary to the establishment of a general government to do for
them collectively what they cannot do individually for themselves,
and which they cannot do as a collective body for
themselves'.(11) This double test was a strong one that
led to a restrictive allocation of basic federal powers such as
defence, customs and excise, external trade and commerce and the
post office. Griffith also favoured a strong Senate at the expense
of responsible government, with the latter being unspecified in the
Constitution and left to be adapted in practice to fit the federal
bicameral legislature. Griffith's views dominated the 1891
convention and were reflected in the 1891 draft Constitution that
did not require a responsible government executive. Griffith's
characterisation of the legislative process-
that every law submitted to the Federal
Parliament shall receive the assent of the majority of the people,
and also the assent of the majority of the
states(12)-
was a rather extreme federalist one. This too
was reflected in the 1891 draft document that had the Senate made
up of delegates appointed by the States.
By the 1897-98 Convention, elite opinion had
firmed in favour of a responsible government executive and a
somewhat stronger national government. Convention leader Edmund
Barton of New South Wales was quite blunt about affirming a strong
preference for responsible government.(13) This view
prevailed despite arguments from the likes of Richard Baker (SA)
and J. W. Hackett (WA) that responsible government was incompatible
with a strong Senate and would 'kill federalism'.(14)
Alfred Deakin, H. B. Higgins and Isaac Isaacs from Victoria led the
nationalist cause, arguing for a strong national government with
flexible powers and rejecting as bogus the institutional logic of
those who championed a strong Senate as the protector of States'
rights.(15) The States were adequately protected through
constitutional entrenchment in their own right, through the
limitation on federal powers, and by judicial review by the High
Court. Numerous speakers correctly pointed out, developing the
earlier insights of Macrossan from Queensland and others, that
Senate politics would not be about State representation but party
government concerned with the national issues of the day. Macrossan
was particularly concerned about a national immigration and racial
policy that would put an end to the importation of Kanaka labourers
into tropical Queensland. This was summed up by Deakin as
follows:
We shall have party government and party
contests in which the alliances will be among men of similar
opinions, and will be in no way influenced by their residence in
one State or another.(16)
Even if party and national issues rather than
states' rights were to dominate Senate politics, combining
responsible government with a strong Senate remained problematical.
Such an unlikely combination was 'the Scylla and Charybdis of this
federal enterprise', according to George Reid of New South Wales,
and it was addressed in the specific issue of the Senate's powers
over money Bills. As Reid put it:
this federation will become an accomplished fact
if we can hit upon a solution of the difficulties as to executive
responsibility and the difficulties as to the rights of the two
Houses over Money Bills.(17)
If anything, institutional incompatibility was
exacerbated by recognising and partially entrenching responsible
government in the Constitution, albeit in the opaque way of
requiring ministers to be or become members of one or other House
of Parliament, and having the Senate directly elected by the
people. A number of measures were adopted that partly alleviated
the problem of conflict between the two Houses. One was
reaffirmation of the key 'compromise' that the Senate be precluded
from amending as well as initiating money Bills. According to
Convention delegates Barton(18) and Richard
O'Connor(19) of New South Wales, that protected
responsible government by ensuring that ministers remained
'responsible to the people through the House of Representatives',
and the Senate could not 'amend and amend, and amend, without
taking the responsibility of rejection'. Provisions for dialogue
between the Houses (s. 53) and for banning the tacking of
extraneous matters to money Bills (ss. 54 and 55) were added.
These were in addition to the cumbersome s. 57 mechanism for
breaking deadlocks that entails an interval of at least three
months, dissolution of both Houses, and a joint sitting if
necessary. None of these are fail-safe mechanisms for ensuring
harmony, however, and the s. 57 mechanism is not adequate for
financial deadlocks that require more timely resolution.
Nevertheless, the dominant view of the Convention was that the
resolution of differences between the Houses should be left to
political compromise and the good sense of political leaders,
rather than to some 'mechanical' provision regarding possible
deadlocks.
Combining federalism with responsible government
had other incompatibilities that critics amongst the founders like
Richard Baker and John Hackett may have only dimly foreseen.
Federalism that divides government between separate spheres,
especially when such division is heavily concurrent as in the
Australian case, requires extensive inter-governmental relations
and arrangements. The resultant system of 'executive federalism'
entails dealings between the Commonwealth and State Government in
ministerial councils and agreements that are beyond parliamentary
scrutiny and responsibility.
Such difficulties aside, we can identify the
main institutional arrangements whose interactive development are
central to Parliament's evolution as a federal institution and its
role in the larger federal system. One is the internal dynamic of
relations between responsible government and the Senate that we
have been discussing. The other is Parliament's utilisation of its
powers vis a vis the states, and the High Court's exercise of
judicial review in cases of conflicts. These two institutional
dynamics are played out within the larger arena of domestic
politics and international affairs.
As pointed out earlier in discussing Parkes'
propositions, powers can be reserved to the States, or allocated to
the Commonwealth on an exclusive or concurrent basis. The
Australian Constitution did all of these things: moderate
articulation of Commonwealth powers; with most of these being
concurrent but with a Commonwealth power to override the states and
monopolise the field; and residual powers reserved for the states.
As well, there is the consensual option of referral of powers
provided for by s. 51(xxxvii) of the Constitution. In
utilising its powers, the Commonwealth has the option of going it
alone and occupying the field, if necessary overriding State
legislation in the area-the 'monopoly' option. Alternatively, the
Commonwealth can share power in its areas of jurisdiction with the
States and engage in inter-governmental relations to facilitate
cooperation and sort out conflicts-the 'concurrent' option.
Parliament's role in this Commonwealth-State domain constitutes a
major part of its effect on federal development.
A second dimension of federal development
involves the High Court when a centralising Commonwealth goes too
far and the exercise of its power is challenged by the States. The
High Court's views of federalism and the extent of Commonwealth
powers will then be decisive, at least formally. We need to add
this proviso because even if it wins the jurisdictional battle, the
Commonwealth might be further constrained by political pressures or
presumptions from utilising its powers. This was the case during
the 1920s when the conservative Bruce-Page government did not
exploit the potentially enormous jurisdictional scope for expanding
Commonwealth powers that the Engineers
decision(20) of 1920 had opened up. It has also been the
case in recent decades when the Commonwealth has been constrained
in using its acknowledged powers to regulate environmental issues
in which the States have a major stake. The High Court role adds an
additional dimension to federal development, but its practical
effects cannot be divorced from the political dynamic of
inter-governmental relations.
Dispelling Myths of Federalism
An obvious place to begin dispelling historic
myths about Parliament's federal capacities is with the
Constitution's own specification of Parliament as 'a Federal
Parliament'. This has often gone unnoticed and been under theorised
because of a common misunderstanding that the Senate is the federal
part of the Parliament and the House of Representatives the
national part. We need to confront this doctrine at its source, in
Quick and Garran's otherwise authoritative commentary published in
1901, if we are to give a proper account of Parliament as a federal
institution.
According to Quick and Garran, 'The national
part of the Parliament is the House of Representatives-the organ of
the nation. The federal part of the Parliament is the Senate-the
organ of the States, the visible representative of the continuity,
independence, and reserved autonomy of the States
...'.(21) Quick and Garran also promoted the House of
Representatives as the 'democratic chamber' and the arena of
'national progress', as opposed to the Senate where 'moderating,
restraining, conserving and provincial elements of the community
are represented'.(22) Their evidence for treating the
Parliament in this dichotomous way was flimsy, as they
admitted:
This characteristic is not founded on any
difference in the franchise of the House of Representatives from
that of the Senate, because both franchises are the same; it arises
from the fact that, by the Constitution it is expressly intended to
be such a House, and that by its organisation and functions it is
best fitted to be the arena in which national progress will find
room for development.(23)
Quick and Garran's typecasting of the Senate as
a States' House and the House of Representatives as the democratic
organ of the nation has been music to the ears of successive
generations of commentators who do not understand or like
Australia's federal constitution. Instead of the bicameral
legislature of Houses with virtually equal powers, the critics
typically prefer a Westminster style Parliament where one House is
democratic and dominant. Their purpose in such a reinterpretation
of the constitutional system is to better accommodate responsible
government, to restrict the Senate's powers to its supposed federal
role of being a States' House, or to facilitate more majoritarian
democracy.(24) Prime Minister Paul Keating's denial that
Australia needed a Senate and his denigration of Senators as
'unrepresentative swill' represents one prominent face of this
position in populist Labor culture.(25)
But is the House of Representatives, as opposed
to the Senate, 'expressly intended' by the Constitution to be the
democratic chamber and the arena of national progress, as Quick and
Garran claim? And is the House, as opposed to the Senate, best
fitted 'by its organisation and functions' to have such a role? We
can answer these questions first by reference to the constitutional
text itself, and secondly by reference to the founders' design and
intentions.
The Constitution is quite clear in its opening
s. 1 of chapter 1 which specifies that the legislative power
of the Commonwealth is vested in 'a Federal Parliament' consisting
of the Queen, Senate and House of Representatives. The chapter on
Parliament is the longest and most important of the Constitution's
eight chapters. Chapter 1 on the Parliament consists of five parts
and has 60 of the Constitution's 128 sections. The parts of chapter
1 deals with respectively the role of the Queen and her surrogate
the Governor-General, the structure of the Senate, the structure of
the House of Representatives, provisions governing both Houses of
Parliament, and the powers of Parliament. The federal character of
the Parliament is most apparent in its powers that are spelt out in
the fifth part, particularly the long s. 51 that enumerates 39
concurrent heads of power and s. 52 that spells out three
additional exclusive heads of power.
Chapter 1 as a whole and Parliament's enumerated
powers in s. 51 need to be read in conjunction with the other
parts of the Constitution dealing with the States and the High
Court. Chapter 5 of the Constitution and ss. 106 and 107 in
particular guarantee the continuation of the States with their own
constitutions and powers except in so far as these have been
altered or withdrawn by the rest of the Constitution. In other
words, we have in Australia's case a classic federal constitution
modelled on the American prototype: the institutions of the new
federal or national level of government along with its powers are
specified in detail, whereas the existing states are preserved with
the residual powers not given to the new Federal Commonwealth.
Given the neatness and clarity of the model, it
is surprising that commentators have seized upon the Senate as the
federal part of the Parliament while overlooking the fact that
Parliament itself is a federal institution. The Constitution is
quite categorical: it does not say that the Senate is the federal
part of the Parliament; rather, it says that the Parliament is 'a
Federal Parliament'. Nor is there a sound basis for claiming that
the House of Representatives is the democratic chamber. Both Houses
of Parliament have the same franchise, as Quick and Garran admit,
so the Senate is just as democratic as the House of
Representatives. That is, provided we do not assume, as many of the
critics do, that democratic always equates to the majoritarian
arrangement of equating the value of each vote. Obviously, having
equality of representation for the people of each State does not do
that if the States are unequal in population size, as they are. Put
another way, the Senate's democratic franchise-being 'directly
chosen by the people of the State' (s. 7)-is structured in a
federal way, but that does not make it undemocratic.
Rather, the two Houses of Parliament are
integral parts of the Federal Parliament. The House of
Representatives and the Senate each have quasi-independent roles
that are partly national and partly federal. Their dynamic
interaction within the larger organisational entity of the Federal
Parliament gives that body a complex character and role that are
also partly national and partly Federal. Parliament, and its
component parts, can at times be more or less nationally focused,
federally cooperative or antagonistic towards the states in the
complex politics of federalism. Furthermore, having a 'national'
perspective is not necessarily the preserve of the Commonwealth as
the State premiers established in the reform of inter-governmental
arrangements during the 1990s.(26) At times the States
can be better champions of the national interest and more
progressive than the Commonwealth, as during the mid-1990s when
Prime Minister Keating stalled the federalism/micro economic reform
process that his predecessor, Prime Minister Hawke had initiated in
conjunction with State premiers. In a federal constitutional system
like that of Australia, the national interest is not the preserve
of any single institution but is pursued through a complex federal
system that established a number of key institutional players that
have a voice and a role in the process. The Parliament is the main
one of these, but not the only one.
Which Federal Features Really Matter?
The Australian Constitution established an
institutional framework that structures the governmental process.
Although liberal democratic values and assumptions about good
governance are presupposed and implicit in the institutions
specified, the Constitution is basically a document governing
structures and processes. Outcomes are determined by the political
process. That is particularly the case in Australia where there is
no bill of rights with Parliaments, at Commonwealth and State
level, determining many fundamental rights issues. Moreover,
constitutional structures and politics are to an extent
interactive. Politics is structured by the constitutional system,
and the political process in turn has the effect of reinforcing the
constitutional system through crystallising popular sentiment,
interests, parties and leadership around the existing structures.
At the same time, the constitutional system is developed and
modified through political practice. In the following analysis and
examples, we examine some of the ways in which Parliament has
carried out its role as a Federal Parliament and played a part in
shaping the overall federal system. Obviously, because of the scope
and complexity of the topic, coverage is selective and partial.
At the beginning, it is perhaps worth
emphasising the character of Parliament's federal role and the kind
of institutional behaviour we should expect, given the way both
Parliament and the Constitution are structured. In this way we
might avoid the common error of looking for the wrong things, and
finding fault with Parliament for being different from what we
uncritically expected. Healthy institutions can be expected to
pursue with some vigour their own self interest through
maintaining, consolidating and expanding their own domain. It is
hardly surprising that a Federal Parliament would use its powers to
the full and, when the opportunity arose, increase its sphere of
activity subject to the checking and balancing of other rival and
moderating institutions. That has typically been the case under
centralising Labor governments. On the other hand, depending on
political circumstances, Parliament might be moderate and
constrained, as was the conservative Bruce-Page Government in the
1920s. Parliament's role is to pursue the national interest as it
sees it at the time, and to act either on its own or in conjunction
with the states. The latter will frequently be the case because
federalism and the constitutional division of powers ensure that
Parliament is not sovereign and that its powers are limited. Most
major policy issues, such as the environment, public health and
economic development, are large and complex and require or invite
the attention of both spheres of government.
Since the Parliament is bicameral with the
Executive located primarily in one of its chambers, its role and
pattern of development are more complicated and in part shaped by
the propensities and inter-actions of the parts. Those who
mistakenly view the Senate as a States' House will expect that
State interests should be represented within Parliament and that
legislative outcomes should be a blend of national and State
interests. This does not usually happen, and nor should we expect
it given the constitutional design and intentions of the founders
analysed above. Rather, the Senate is a democratically elected
national chamber organised on the basis of equality of State
electorates (leaving aside the position of the two internal
Territories of the Commonwealth). That weights representation in
favour of smaller States whose smaller electorates elect the same
number of Senators as larger states. Because of this, the Senate
does have a certain federal character and role: not to represent
State interests per se, but to over-represent smaller State
populations in national decision making. While the Senate voting
system of proportional representation facilitates minor party
representation, most notably of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) in
the 1960s and the Australian Democrats in recent decades, such
parties have not been State oriented or geographically
concentrated. The Country/National Party that has so often been the
Coalition king-maker in the House of Representatives is
geographically concentred in, and concerned with, promoting the
interests of rural Australia but not in an overtly state-focused
way.
State and regional interests are also well
represented both within the House of Representatives and the
Executive because all members are from electorates based in the
states, and small numbers of seats can often determine who forms
government. The One Nation Party's current significance at the
federal level is through its ability to influence outcomes in
contests between the major parties in regional and rural
electorates.
What is the point of over-representing smaller
States in the Senate if the Senate does not usually represent State
interests? The answer has a number of parts. First, weighting
Senate representation in this way ensures a somewhat different
composition of national representation in one chamber of Federal
Parliament. The consequence should be some refinement of national
interest and outcomes through sifting and reviewing since two
differently constituted popular Houses have to agree. The
importance of a non-majoritarian weighting in the Senate has extra
significance because of the location of the Executive primarily in
the House of Representatives. Secondly, even if parliamentary
government becomes mainly party government, the presence of extra
smaller-State Senators in party caucuses, committees and probably
also ministries, makes some considerable difference. If the issue
is one of national interest, the national view will be weighted in
favour of smaller State public and party opinion. That view might
well be the same as in larger states, but the federal weighting is
still significant for boosting the importance and relative power of
the smaller State populations. If there are aspects of the national
policy that affect smaller states, then those interests can be more
readily factored in. Thus the Senate weighting has both refining
and federalising effects upon the national legislative process.
Nevertheless, Parliament and its parts including the Senate make up
a national institution with a primarily national role as opposed to
a states' one. As Deakin pointed out would be the case, looking
after State interests is the role of the States themselves.
The Changing Role
of the Senate
With the Australian Labor Party's growing
electoral success, culminating in its winning office in its own
right in 1910 and the fusion of the first non-Labour parties,
disciplined party politics tightened their grip on Parliament.
Party discipline controlled the Senate and was directed by party
leaders in the House of Representatives. The tightening of party
control in the Senate was helped by the first two voting methods
used in Senate elections. Both the block method (1902-19) and
preferential voting (1919-48) tended to produce 'grotesque'
results, in which the dominant party tended to win the available
Senate seats in each State in a 'windscreen-wiper effect'-in 1943,
Labor won all 19 seats being contested. Inevitably, party control
ensured that the Senate was an unduly tame institution on those
occasions when the same party or coalition controlled both Houses.
Reid and Forrest sum up the period between approximately 1910 and
1960 as 'years of dependence', noting that the upper House 'did
little to enhance its reputation for proving an effective scrutiny
of proposed laws, or of the activities of the Executive
Government'. In such a situation, it was inevitable that the
bicameral vigour of the Federal Parliament was undermined. Despite
this dominant party effect, the Senate retained something of its
independence, because its State electoral base and staggered terms
ensured that the government party did not always have the majority
of Senators. One major innovation that enhances the Senate's role
was the establishment in 1932 of the Regulations and Ordinances
Committee to review 'delegated legislation' in the form of
statutory rules and orders. Its purpose was to ensure that these do
not exceed powers given to the Executive under the relevant statute
or trespass unduly on individual rights and liberties.
More significant in re-establishing the status
of the Senate was the introduction of proportional representation
(PR) in 1948, although it was not until the 1960s that minor
parties and independents began taking a more independent line.
Ironically, the change was made by the Chifley Labor Government
that had strong majorities in both Houses of Parliament at the
time. While PR had a long gestation period(27), its
introduction in 1948 was made without careful calculation of the
consequences. While Labor retained control of the Senate-despite
losing government in the subsequent general election held in
December 1949-since the 1951 double dissolution it has not had a
Senate majority. Moreover, after the Party split in the mid-1950s,
the splinter DLP used its Senate representation to support the
Menzies Liberal Coalition Government. According to the late
Professor L. F. Crisp, Labor gave little thought to the
contradiction between its traditional commitment to majoritarian
democracy and the primacy of responsible government on the one
hand, and bolstering the independence of the Senate and its
propensity to serve minority interests on the
other.(28)
Since the 1960s a quiet revolution in the
internal working of Parliament has occurred based upon Senate PR
and the consequent influence of minor parties and independent
Senators. Holding the balance of power as they invariably do means
that neither the government of the day nor the opposition control
the Senate through party means. That ensures a Senate of enhanced
power and independence, and entails a substantial curb on Executive
dominance of Parliament. Since the government of the day needs the
support of the controlling minority party or independent Senators
to have its legislation passed, it has to engage in negotiation and
compromise. An example of how this has changed the approach of the
major parties could be seen in a 1993 reference to native title by
Gareth Evans (Labor, Vic.) then Government Leader in the Senate.
Noting the great many difficulties involved in the question of
compensation for original landowners, Evans assured fellow Senators
that many of the issues:
will be perfectly capable of being responded to
when the detailed legislation is before the chamber because they go
to questions of precise definition, layout and, clause by clause,
processes and procedures. The time to deal with that is at the
committee stage of the debate in this place and we will be fully
and amply willing to do so at that time.(29)
The point to be emphasised for our purposes is
that this major reform that enhanced the independence of the Senate
and, to an extent, revitalised Parliament was a by-product of party
and executive government. Its effect has been to re-balance the
trinitarian parts of Parliament and enhance its national
legislative role through broadening inputs into, and providing
greater scrutiny of, the legislative process. The Senate's enhanced
legislative role is apparent in its effect on most major national
legislation ranging from native title to the exemption of food from
the new Goods and Services Tax (GST) to annual Budgets.
As well, the Senate has extended its legislative
review function. Since the 1970s, under one guise or another, the
Senate's legislative and general purpose committees have reinforced
the Chamber's standing by acting as a democratic check on
government generally. Estimates hearings twice-yearly examine the
annual Budgets of Commonwealth agencies and scrutinise the means by
which the Executive spends monies appropriated by the
Parliament.(30) In 1982 the Standing Committee for the
Scrutiny of Bills was established to ensure that primary
legislation does not inappropriately delegate the Parliament's
legislative powers or place individual rights at risk from the
unconstrained exercise of administrative discretion. Operating from
1990, the Senate Selection of Bills Committee refers a substantial
proportion of government Bills to the array of Senate standing or
select committees for detailed consideration. The record of Senate
and other parliamentary committees, particularly that of joint and
statutory committees such as the Parliamentary Joint Statutory
Committee of Public Accounts and Audit is by and large an
impressive one. House of Representatives Committees, although
somewhat constrained in their operation, have (like their less
inhibited counterparts in the Senate) extended the Commonwealth
Parliament's purview into areas that might otherwise been the sole
preserve of the Executive Government or the States.
While parliamentary committees(31)
serve party purposes of embarrassing the government and delaying
its legislative program, they also help to expose ministerial and
bureaucratic weaknesses and improve legislative outcomes. John
Uhr's legislative scorecard shows that 25 per cent of Bills
passed by the Senate have undergone prior committee examination,
and that 30 per cent of amendments made are aired or
considered in committees. As Dr Uhr concludes, 'the emerging
legislative process is an improvement on the traditional modes of
party government and shows encouraging signs of a capacity to
measure up to effective deliberative standards'.(32)
As another academic commentator, Ian Marsh, has
argued most eloquently the traditional two party system of
adversarial politics that characterises traditional parliamentary
life is inadequate for representing the diversity of modern life
and new social movements. In his view, effective public policy and
problem solving require a wider and more diverse process that
incorporates multiple interests and produces more consensual
outcomes. The Senate, underpinned by PR and its committee
structure, provides something of that in Australian
politics.(33)
The fragmentation of party control and
development of a complex committee system have enhanced the
Senate's independence from Executive dominance and its legislative
review function. During a century of Federation and through various
phases-of independence during the early period, party domination
from 1910 until the 1960s and more deliberative legislative process
in recent decades-the Senate has not been a States' House. Its
representative character has changed over time, but not from or in
the direction of representing the States. To a greater or lesser
extent it has enhanced the national legislative role of Parliament
and been more or less independent of Executive dominance. It has
weighted national representation in favour of smaller State
populations, and provided a forum for injecting particular State
interests into national consideration. Its significance as a
federal chamber is as part of the Federal Parliament, not
representing the States but on the contrary contributing to
national legislation and pursuing national purposes. For the most
part, the States are represented by themselves and protected by the
federal constitutional system.
The overall interest of the nation and the
development of the federal system are products of the interaction
of the two levels of government, both pursuing their interests and
using their constitutional powers to the full. At times and in
certain policy areas there will be cooperation and at other times
or other policy areas conflict.(34) The dynamic
interaction of Parliament's own 'trinitarian parts' will also
affect how it develops and acts.
Fighting the
Fight
Clearly since Federation many acts of the
Commonwealth have had a significant impact upon the development of
Australian federalism. Some have been detrimental, others not.
Senators and Members have rarely stood silently by as this
occurred. Hansard is full of occasions when the critics have used
the parliamentary forum to express their concern over changes to
the federal system, very often as they have had an impact on their
home State or region. Liberal Coalition parliamentarians in
Opposition have often been critics of centralisation attempts by
Labor governments. Robert Menzies (Liberal, Kooyong, Vic.) used
Parliament very effectively to criticise the Curtin and Chifley
Labor Governments, as did Malcolm Fraser (Liberal, Wannon, Vic.)
and Doug Anthony (Country Party, Richmond, NSW) in criticising the
Whitlam Government.
Parliamentarians from the smaller states have
often had the most to say about central government's 'intrusion'
into State matters. In the 100 years, two of the most persistent
cases have been Western Australia and Tasmania. From the earliest
days of the new federal system, Western Australians were to be
heard lamenting their treatment by successive Commonwealth
Governments. It was claimed repeatedly that the Commonwealth had no
real appreciation of the particular needs and problems of the State
with the largest land area. Some problems, such as the tariff were
major; some, like lighthouses, seemed relatively minor. Large
problem or small, the Commonwealth's handling of a great many
antagonised people in the West, many of whom had been lukewarm
about coming into the Australian Federation in 1901. Their views
were often heard on the floor of the Commonwealth Parliament:
The administration from Melbourne of the
lighthouses on the northwest coast of Western Australia is an
absolute farce, and there has been no real effort made to improve
the lighting of that coast. If the administration of the
lighthouses and the expenditure on them had been left to the
states, they could have agreed on some uniform system, and given a
far better service as far as the ports and harbours of Australia
are concerned. Honourable members may accuse me of being a
states-righter, but that does not deter me. The position of Western
Australia is different from that of other states, because it is far
removed from the seat of the Federal Government.(35)
Such views eventually saw Western Australians
vote solidly in favour of secession in a referendum held in 1933
that was ignored both in Canberra and in Westminster. Western
Australian Parliamentarians have persisted with their complaints in
modern times:
Western Australia, which produces nearly 30 per
cent of national export income and yet pays $1.5 billion more in
taxes annually than it receives, has every reason to resent at
times its treatment by the increasingly centralist governments of
Canberra ... . It should never be forgotten that it was the states
which created the federation. Yet the federal child is dictating to
the parental states in an increasingly worrying manner, by
controlling the purse strings which were in the possession of the
six self-governing states 96 years ago.(36)
Tasmania had been an enthusiastic supporter of
federation, but many of its representatives became disillusioned
with the island State's treatment after 1901. The inability to
survive financially, that caused a resented dependence upon
Commonwealth support, its difficulties under the Navigation Act
1912 (Cwlth), and its resentments whenever the Senate seemed
threatened by Labor-sponsored constitutional amendments, were just
a few of the grievances aired by its parliamentary representatives.
For many, the final straw seemed to come in early 1983 when the
Hawke Government moved to stop the building of a dam in a World
Heritage-listed area in Tasmania's South-West. The Liberal Member
for Franklin, Bruce Goodluck, believed he spoke for many fellow
islanders-who had just defeated all Labor candidates in the five
Tasmanian House of Representatives seats:
Honourable members may laugh, but the five of us
came back from Tasmania ... .We all came back to fight for the
people of Tasmania ... .We have come here with a mandate from the
people to defend the rights of Tasmania, and we do not intend to
move one inch ... .We want what the people of Tasmania want: To be
left alone. Our Tasmanian Government made a decision [to build the
dam] and that is what we want. We shall not move one inch on this
subject.(37)
Views such as these will not always influence
parliamentary debates, but on such occasions the Commonwealth
Parliament acts as an important national forum for them to be
expressed.
The rest of this paper examines three select
cases or areas of development from a century of practice that
illustrate how Parliament has evolved as a federal institution and
the role it has played in shaping the federal system. The three
examples are drawn from Australia's experience in the early, middle
and late periods of the twentieth century respectively. The
selected cases are supplemented by brief reference to related
issues and trends from other periods to facilitate the
analysis:
-
- the first concerns the role of the Senate in the internal
trinitarian dynamic of Parliament and begins with an examination of
federalism and race as illustrated in debate over the passage of
the first Electoral Franchise Act 1902 (Cwlth), and
-
- the second focuses on the dualistic dynamic between the
Commonwealth and states, and in particular the 'ever increasing
centralisation' of fiscal federal relations in the postwar
decades.
The third shifts focus to Parliament's role in mediating
globalisation in the external trinitarian dynamic between
international and federal-Commonwealth and states-that is shaping
modern Australian federalism today.
Federalism and
Race
The Constitution did not define citizenship
rights and entitlements but left that mainly for the Parliaments of
the Commonwealth and States to determine. This was in accord with
traditional parliamentary practice, and for the good democratic
reason of having been elected parliaments set the franchise and
specify other citizenship rights in ways that reflected the will of
the people and was flexible over time. On the negative side,
however, and this was openly acknowledged by the founders,
Parliaments would be free to discriminate against minorities as
they saw fit. Certain Colonies already discriminated against racial
groups such as the Chinese; there were varying forms of exclusion
of Aboriginal people; and women had the franchise in only two
Colonies at Federation. Thus Colonial discriminatory regimes were
left in place and translated into State discriminatory regimes
allowed under the Constitution, while the Commonwealth Parliament
was left free to pass its own discriminatory legislation.
One of the first acts of the new Parliament was
to put in place a national franchise. Until this came into effect,
the Constitution specified that State laws would apply in
determining who could vote (ss. 10, 30, 31). The
Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 was universal in giving
women as well as men the vote, but not universal in denying the
vote to Aboriginal people, or 'natives of Australia' as they were
called. In so doing, the Commonwealth adopted best State practice
with respect to women, that of South Australia and Western
Australia where women had received the vote in 1894 and 1898
respectively. In barring Aboriginal natives, however, the
Commonwealth picked up the worst State practice followed only by
Western Australia and Queensland. The other States had restrictions
on Aborigines' voting, but did not ban them outright. Thus
Australia, along with New Zealand, led the world in enfranchising
women, but in the very same Act imposed discrimination against
Aboriginal people that persisted until the 1960s.
This is a notable instance in which national and
State interests were blended to produce a very mixed outcome. The
Commonwealth Parliament controlled the national franchise, but also
had a powerful influence on State practice. Within a decade all the
States had adopted women's franchise in their own electoral
systems, but those denying Aborigines the franchise were reinforced
in their discrimination for generations. Such discriminatory
practice was doubly extended by Parliament's legislation-to the
national franchise and to the Northern Territory when the
Commonwealth took over its administration from South Australia in
1911. Excluding Aboriginal people from voting was proposed by
Senators from Queensland and Western Australia who championed their
States' racist practices in the Senate.
Why go out of the way in our federal legislation
to give rights to aboriginals which they do not possess to-day in
certain of the states?
asked Senator Matheson (Free Trade, WA). He
answered his own question by asserting that such a step would be
'absolutely repugnant to the greater number of the people of the
Commonwealth' because Aboriginals were 'horrible, degraded, dirty'
creatures.(38) The contrary view was put by the
government Senate leader, Richard O'Connor (Protectionist, NSW),
who pointed out that in four of the six States Aboriginals had the
right to vote, and even in Western Australia and Queensland those
who held property of a certain value were not excluded. The
explanation given for such inclusion by O'Connor was as
follows:
But I think it occurred to those who were
framing these laws in the states, that it would be a monstrous
thing, an unheard piece of savagery on our part, to treat the
aboriginals, whose land we were occupying, in such a manner as to
deprive them absolutely of any right to vote in their own country,
simply on the ground of their colour, and because they were
aboriginals.(39)
O'Connor initially managed to hold the line in
the Senate by having 'Australia' deleted from the amending clause
that precluded aboriginal natives of 'Australia Asia Africa or the
Islands of the Pacific except New Zealand' from voting. But that
was reversed in the House of Representatives, accepted by the
Barton Government and the Senate, and finally passed into law.
Ironically, it was H. B. Higgins, the Victorian radical liberal and
nationalist, who moved the amendment in the House of
Representatives to reinstate exclusion of Aboriginal people from
voting. They should be sheltered from political life, Higgins
claimed, and in any case there was no constitutional obligation to
provide for a uniform franchise for Aborigines.(40) As
Reid and Forrest conclude:
O'Connor's philosophy of using Commonwealth
legislation to build upon an existing law of a State towards a
national uniformity was acceptable to the House in the case of
white women, but not for Aborigines-men or
women.(41)
They would be subject to a patchwork of more or
less discriminatory practices that differed among the States and
between States and the Commonwealth.
The above example from the early Parliament
shows how the Senate could be used in advancing the preferences of
less populous States-in this instance to inject their
discriminatory practice into national legislation. But such an
outcome was not initially successful in the Senate, and required
the concurrence of the House of Representatives in reinstating the
exclusion of Australian Aboriginal natives.
The example shows that parliamentary
bicameralism and the representation of diverse interests in the two
Houses, including State interests in the Senate, need not work to
improve legislation but that the two Houses could consort in
perpetuating discrimination. The Senate did not act as a State's
House but provided a forum for Senators from two of the States to
advance their racist cause. The Senate's subsequent adoption of the
discriminatory legislation brought it into line with the House of
Representatives. How well the resultant patchwork of discriminatory
regimes reflected public opinion nationally and in the various
States is unclear, but we can conclude that the national
legislation implemented minority State practice as well as
extending and reinforcing discriminatory laws. It was a case of the
Parliament, not the Senate, adopting a discriminatory position
consistent with that of two less populous States with higher
numbers of Aboriginal citizens. Subsequent Parliaments replicated
this formulaic exclusion of 'Aboriginal natives of Australia' from
other social rights and entitlements including maternity benefits,
disability pensions and the basic wage. The effect was to make
Aboriginal people 'citizens without rights' in their own land for
more than half a century.(42) This example aside, the
Senate played a significant role in shaping the legislation of the
first Parliament and establishing its own procedures that insulated
it from Executive dominance.(43)
Federalism and Finance
According to critics, Australian federalism has
undergone such a sustained process of centralisation that it can
scarcely be called a federal system at all. Richard Court, when
Western Australian Premier, charged that the 'centralisation of
power and control in Canberra' was the worst development in
Australian federalism and posed the greatest threat to the liberty
and independence of all Australians. He blamed the High Court's for
'this reversal from a federal to a centralised system of
government', especially through its expansive interpretation of the
external affairs power:
The resulting increase in the range and scope of
the Commonwealth Parliament's powers has enabled Commonwealth
legislation to govern and regulate almost all aspects of Australian
life.(44)
Aspects of this will be considered in the next
section on Parliament's mediation of globalisation. In this section
we are concerned with the other 'more startling' reason that
Premier Court gave for centralisation-the Commonwealth's financial
dominance that also depended on the High Court's generous
interpretations of Commonwealth taxing and spending powers.
In contrast to the previous example where the
first electoral franchise was primarily a Commonwealth matter
shaped by the internal dynamics within Parliament, this case
involved the Commonwealth Executive and Parliament besting the
States. Australia's extreme 'vertical fiscal imbalance', whereby
the Commonwealth raises the lion's share of revenue, is due mainly
to the Commonwealth's monopoly over income tax and excise duties.
The former was established as a wartime measure in 1942 and upheld
by the High Court on grounds other than the defence power in the
first Uniform Tax case.(45) The latter is
constitutionally grounded in one of the few exclusive powers given
to the Commonwealth, but has been interpreted broadly by the Court
to include any tax on the production or sale of goods.
The Commonwealth income tax monopoly was imposed
by the centralist Chifley Labor Government and a supporting
Parliament in time of war, and extended to the subsequent period of
postwar reconstruction. As Leader of the Opposition and newly
constituted Liberal Party, Menzies opposed such centralisation and,
after winning office at the end of 1949, proposed that taxing
powers be returned to the States. This was opposed by a number of
the Premiers, however, and over time the Menzies Liberal Coalition
Government consolidated the Commonwealth's uniform tax regime as a
permanent feature of Australian fiscal federalism. Parliament's
effective power to monopolise income taxation during peacetime was
confirmed by the High Court in the Second Uniform Tax case
in 1957, although a requirement for payment of Commonwealth taxes
before State taxes was struck down.(46) This was not
enough to cripple the scheme. The Commonwealth's income tax
monopoly was achieved and has persisted because of a combination of
political will on the Commonwealth's part, complicity by the States
and selective sanctioning by the High Court. While the Fraser
Liberal Coalition Government allowed the States some leeway through
a mechanism for imposing an income tax surcharge, or rebate, as
part of its 'new federalism' from 1977 to 1983, it provided no 'tax
room'. The initiative was rejected by aggressive State premiers as
a double taxing arrangement, with Queensland National Party Premier
Bjelke-Petersen insisting that the only good tax was a Commonwealth
tax!
The second revenue pillar of the Commonwealth's
fiscal dominance is the preclusion of the States from levying taxes
on the sale of goods that are a standard and significant source of
revenue for sub-national governments in most other federations.
This exclusion is based on the High Court's exaggerated
interpretation of its power over 'excise duties' that is one of the
few exclusive powers allocated to the Commonwealth by the
Constitution (s. 90). Levying customs and excise duties was
made an exclusive Commonwealth power in order to ensure a national
economic market free of State border taxes and equivalent internal
impositions on trade. This constitutional structure and broad
interpretation by the High Court explain why the Howard
Government's GST was imposed by Commonwealth legislation even
though the entire amount collected is to be handed over to the
States.
The centralisation of revenue raising in
Australia was justified on grounds of national defence and national
interest, considerations of more efficient economic management and
greater facility in providing social welfare policies. According to
the Constitution, income tax is an area of concurrent jurisdiction.
It was primarily the domain of the states until the First World
War, and was shared by the Commonwealth and the States until the
Second World War. Labor's proposed tax monopoly was rejected
outright by the States when Treasurer Chifley first proposed it at
an inter-governmental conference. It was then legislated by
Parliament as necessary for the more efficient prosecution of the
Second World War at a time of national emergency when Australia was
threatened by Japanese invasion. It was a heavy-handed measure that
entailed taking over the State taxation offices, imposing a uniform
high national income tax, requiring the payment of Commonwealth
income tax before any State income tax, and imposing prohibitive
penalties on the States by way of loss of tax reimbursement grants
to keep them from reinstating State income taxes.
The States challenged the measure in the High
Court, arguing that this was a scheme that took away an essential
State function-the ability to raise their own taxes. In one of its
most centralising decisions, the High Court refused to consider the
overall uniform scheme, holding that each of the discrete Acts,
including the seizure of State tax offices under the Defence power,
was a legitimate exercise of the Commonwealth Parliament's powers.
Whether Parliament should exercise its legislative powers in this
way was, according to Chief Justice Latham, a matter of politics:
'We have nothing to do with wisdom or expediency of legislation.
Such questions are for Parliament and the people.'(47)
Latham admitted that the Commonwealth Parliament could use the
strategy of the uniform tax scheme, including tying restrictive
policy conditions to grants using s. 96, to make the States
completely dependent:
Thus, if the Commonwealth Parliament were
prepared to pass such legislation, all State powers would be
controlled by the Commonwealth-a result which would mean the end of
the political independence of the state.(48)
Against the States' wishes, Chifley extended the
uniform tax scheme in 1945 to apply to peacetime. In 1957, when
Victoria and New South Wales belatedly challenged the uniform
scheme during peacetime as an unwarranted interference with the
States, a differently constituted High Court again upheld the
Commonwealth. As the new Chief Justice Owen Dixon observed, the
whole plan of uniform taxation had become 'very much a recognised
part of the Australian fiscal system' in the intervening 15 years
and should not be lightly overruled.(49) The High Court
confirmed the Commonwealth's broad powers that could be used to
achieve a monopoly, and otherwise left their use to politics.
The expenditure side of fiscal centralism was
just as important a part of the Commonwealth's postwar dominance.
Not only were the States made dependent upon the Commonwealth for
much of their revenue (approaching half before the GST), but the
Commonwealth had abundant resources for expanding its policy
jurisdiction. This could be done through ambitious spending
programs relying upon its own jurisdictional powers. Since
Engineers in 1920, Commonwealth powers had been
expansively interpreted, while the successful 1946 social services
amendment provided a constitutional basis for the postwar welfare
state. The other method of Commonwealth expansion was to tie policy
terms and conditions to a large proportion of grants to the States
using s. 96 of the Constitution. The Commonwealth used tied
grants to shape large areas of education, health and infrastructure
provision, especially roads. According to one of its greatest
proponents, Gough Whitlam, s. 96 was Labor's 'charter of
public enterprise' because it enabled the Commonwealth to use its
fiscal dominance to invade major policy areas of State
jurisdiction.(50)
Our concern is not with the detail of fiscal
centralisation(51) and its sanctioning where necessary
by the High Court, but with what this tells us about Parliament's
development of Australian federalism. From the brief outline
presented above, we can see that the expansion of the
Commonwealth's effective powers can be achieved by vigorous and
creative use of its enumerated powers, plus the legitimating
endorsement of a sympathetic High Court. The main restraints on
Parliament's expansion of its powers and their use at the expense
of the States are political. This allows developments in the shape
and practice of Australian federalism that the founders did not
envisage and probably would not have liked. However, such
developments are a consequence of the design that they put in place
quite deliberately. This entailed leaving key issues such as
long-term provisions for taxation and fiscal sharing to future
Parliaments to decide. Politics, including inter-governmental
politics of competition and cooperation with the States, would
decide future policies and hence the shape of federalism. Thus we
can conclude that fiscal centralisation was neither intended nor
precluded by the founders and the design of the
Constitution.(52)
In any case, there are qualifications to be made
to the thesis of ever increasing centralisation. Fiscal centralism
has not spelt the end of the States. Indeed they have learnt to
manipulate the system in ways that help retain aspects of State
power. To an extent the States collude in the ongoing fiscal
arrangements that deliver them large grants of money for which they
have no responsibility for collecting as taxes. They reap the
political benefits of spending money without attracting the odium
of raising it which makes a certain political sense even if it
offends good public finance principles. In addition, part of the
excess revenues collected by the Commonwealth goes to fund fiscal
equalisation that benefits the smaller States. For a mix of these
reasons, the States have been less than single minded in trying to
reverse fiscal centralisation. How the GST that came into effect on
1 July 2000 will affect vertical fiscal imbalance remains to
be seen: it is a Commonwealth imposed tax but the full benefits go
to the States. It will be a political issue as to whether the
Commonwealth acts only in accord with State views in varying the
tax rate.
The final point concerns the propriety of the
Commonwealth Parliament's exercising its powers in ways that give
it dominance over, and are at the expense of, the States. There are
several parts to the answer: one, constitutional legitimacy; two,
federal propriety; and three, the politics of particular instances.
As pointed out above, the Commonwealth Parliament has the
constitutional power for acting in such ways. One might quibble
with the interpretive method of the High Court, but the expansive
constitutional jurisprudence of Engineers has been applied
fairly consistently since 1920.(53) The federal
propriety of the Commonwealth pursuing its own purposes as fully
and vigorously as it sees fit has already been discussed and
affirmed. The federal system consists of two spheres of government
each pursuing their interests and purposes within the established
framework of institutions and powers. The common good is served and
is in effect the product of their actions and interactions. In
exercising its powers the Commonwealth plays a significant role,
and has a legitimate purpose, in shaping the federal system.
Incentives and constraints depend on the politics of the period and
change over time. Centralisation and the assertion of national
policy making by the Commonwealth during the Second World War and
subsequent decades achieved and mirrored the consolidation of
Australian nationhood. National defence and subsequently national
economic management and welfare policies seemed to require it.
Whether centralisation remains a likely scenario for the twenty
first century is taken up in the final case that considers
Parliament's mediation of modern globalisation.
Federalism
and Globalisation
While Australia has been shaped and affected by
global forces since the beginning of European settlement, for much
of that time it enjoyed the protective buffer of the British
Empire. When the Commonwealth Constitution was framed, for example,
the crucial areas of foreign affairs and decisions about war and
peace were left with Britain. In addition, Australia followed a
policy of national protection, using State instrumentalities and
policies to protect the domestic economy and cushion the impact of
international forces. In modern times there has been an
intensification of globalisation, through changes in technology,
communications, finance and trade. At the same time, Australia has
deregulated its economy and exposed its domestic industry to
international market pressures. Moreover, since the decline of
Britain and its joining the European Union, and the end of the Cold
War and a strong American security alignment, Australia has become
more independent but also vulnerable as a smallish 'middle power'
in a volatile part of the world. Australia has become a member of,
and participant in, United Nations human rights organisations and
accords as well as peacekeeping activities. The United Nations,
however, is a relatively weak and diffuse international
organisation, and Australia's commitment especially to its human
rights monitoring system is currently under review by the Howard
Government.
Our purpose here is not with the complex issues
of globalisation, nor with the intricacies of the Commonwealth's
external affairs power and treaty making and implementation. There
are extensive literatures on both,(54) and aspects of
the latter are covered in other contributions to this collection.
Our concern is with the ways in which the new dynamic between
international and federal-Commonwealth and States-is shaping modern
Australian federalism. In particular, it is with the Parliament's
role in mediating globalisation and the way that is affecting
Australia's federal system. In the space available we can only make
a series of indicative points.
First, as was the case in our second example of
postwar centralisation in domestic affairs, Parliament's role in
developing federalism during the modern period of more intense
globalisation is, for the most part, in concert with the Federal
Executive. That is broadly what we would expect given the
government's dominance in electoral politics and public affairs and
its stranglehold over the House of Representatives. Because of the
Senate's somewhat more independent role due to minor parties and
independents holding the balance of power, however, Parliament was
able to play a significant scrutiny and reform function in the lead
up to the 1996 overhaul of the treaty making process.
The previous Labor Government and its forceful
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Gareth Evans, had used the
untrammelled treaty making power with little concern for
parliamentary scrutiny or public accountability. The practice of
bulk tabling of treaties in Parliament at six-monthly intervals in
batches of between 30 and 50 treaties had developed. In about
two-thirds of the cases, Australia had already ratified or acceded
to the treaties before tabling and was obliged to comply under
international law.(55) Such contempt for Parliament,
combined with concern about the High Court's open-ended
interpretation of the external affairs power that favoured the
Commonwealth over the states, caused a political backlash. A Senate
committee investigated the matter and called for greater public
scrutiny and public accountability.(56) Its
recommendations were adopted by the incoming Howard Coalition
Government in 1996. The 1996 overhaul of the treaty making process,
included: mandatory tabling of a treaty 15 sitting days before the
government takes action to bring a treaty into force; provision of
an accompanying National Interest Analysis explaining the reasons
for Australia's becoming a party; scrutiny by a Parliamentary Joint
Standing Committee on Treaties; establishment of a Treaties Council
under the auspices of Council of Australian Government; and public
access to treaty making information via the
Internet.(57) While the Council of Australian Government
Treaties Council has yet to prove itself, other parts of the new
policy are operating to give greater scrutiny.
In this instance Parliament was instrumental in
triggering the reform of the treaty process, but not solely
responsible. Its proposals had to be picked up by one of the major
party groups and made part of its winning electoral program.
Moreover, in pursuing reform in this area, the Senate sought to
achieve mainly a national democratic purpose of public
accountability, and only incidentally the States' complaint of
being left out of the process when vital State interests were at
issue. It has been up to the States to adopt their own monitoring
process, as the Victorian Parliament has done.(58) While
some have recommended that Parliament have a more independent role
in treaty making and responsibility for representing States'
interests, that is unlikely given the constitutional structure and
political dynamics of the present system. The Executive inherited
largely unconstrained powers over foreign affairs and treaty making
from the British Imperial government, so there is nothing
comparable to American-style Senate ratification. And, as argued
above, the Commonwealth, including Parliament, can be expected to
pursue vigorously the national interest as it sees fit, leaving the
States to look after their own interests as best they can.
Some have claimed that the Commonwealth's
expansive use of its external affairs power in the 1980s and 1990s
has been instrumental in transforming Australia from a federal to a
centralised system of government. Others are concerned with the
loss of sovereignty and the undermining of national government by
globalisation.(59) While those who are alarmed at
centralisation might applaud such a process, nationalists call for
the bolstering and enhancement of national power to deal with
globalisation. How are we to understand this complex set of
relations and contentions? What is the likely impact of
globalisation on Australian federalism?
The first point to be made is that globalisation
is providing the Commonwealth with greater scope for expanding its
role by means of its external affairs power. As key policy areas
such as human rights and the environment become internationalised
and the Australian government enters into treaties and
international accords for setting standards, Parliament's power is
expanded. Indeed, on one view, following the logic of the High
Court in Engineers, there is no limit to the extent to
which Commonwealth jurisdiction can expand into otherwise State
areas of policy as they become internationalised in this
way.(60) The power of the Commonwealth waxes and that of
the States wanes, as approving High Court judges have
affirmed.(61) Depending on the politics of the issue
including the stance of the States, the Federal Government and
Parliament may realise that power. Thus globalisation has provided
Parliament with the opportunity for expanding its legislative power
into areas of State jurisdiction and, if it chooses, doing so at
the expense of the States.
There are other aspects of globalisation,
however, that tend to restrict and undermine Commonwealth power. By
becoming party to international agreements and standard setting and
enforcement, the Commonwealth is restricting its own independence
and autonomy. Hence, in this two-level game, the Commonwealth might
gain power at the expense of the States within the domestic arena
while at the same time losing sovereignty in the international
arena.(62) Nor do the gains and losses balance out as in
a zero sum game. In the economic area, deregulation of markets,
including currency markets and the winding back of tariff
protection, has reduced the Commonwealth's effective power. So has
the growth in non-government organisations and issue movements that
have proliferated in international as well as national areas of
social and humanitarian policy. In certain areas, national
governments and parliaments will be bypassed. The overall effect on
the nation State is contested with some predicting the end of the
sovereign nation State and the beginning of a new post-national
era. While nation states will no doubt continue, their power and
independence is being reduced as they become party to regional and
international arrangements.
Arguably, globalisation is antithetical to the
fundamental idea of a sovereign nation State but not a federal
system. Federalism is essentially a system of multiple governments,
divided sovereignty, overlapping and shared jurisdictions, and dual
citizenship within domestic governance. These aspects of federalism
make it congenial with an emerging international/national order in
which transnational associations and international centres of
policy-making and rule setting overlie and intrude into aspects of
domestic governance. Likewise, a diffusion of power centres and a
variety of institutional systems, each of which has jurisdiction
over some matters but none of which is absolute over all the
others, are characteristic of both federalism and the emerging
international order.(63) In addition there is potential
for greater State activity within the umbrella of transnational
associations and constrained national government. So the likely
outcome from increased globalisation might well be a reduced role
for the Commonwealth Parliament compared with its dominance in the
postwar decades of centralisation. Much will depend on the complex
politics of this new tripartite system, and the ways in which the
Commonwealth Parliament mediates globalisation or is simply
bypassed in direct global/local interactions.
The Vision in Hindsight
Parliament's development of federalism is quite
different in kind from that of the High Court. Whereas the High
Court sits in judgment over jurisdictional disputes between the
Commonwealth and the States, the Federal Parliament is a major
institutional player on the Commonwealth side. Its role is not to
develop federalism through impartial adjudication of disputes
between the two spheres of government and authoritative
interpretation of the federal division of powers. Rather
Parliament's role is to represent and give legislative effect to
those areas of power and policy that come within its domain. In so
doing it defines and pursues the national interest as it sees fit,
at times overriding the States and at times competing or
cooperating with them.
The story of Parliament's development of
federalism is therefore in part the story of Parliament's own
development as a federal institution, and the dynamic interaction
between its bicameral parts and the Executive that is based
primarily in the House of Representatives. The Senate is an
important part of Parliament with the same federal or national role
as Parliament itself, but with a different electoral base weighted
in favour of smaller State populations. While not primarily a
States' House, it does provide an avenue for enhanced
representation from smaller States in the Federal Parliament and
national decision-making. Giving voice to particular State
interests may not produce beneficial outcomes, as was the case when
Parliament passed the first federal franchise that adopted and
perpetuated worst State practice, followed by Queensland and
Western Australia, of excluding Aboriginal people.
A second major way in which Parliament develops
federalism is through changing the relative balance of power in
Commonwealth-State relations. Particularly during the period
between the 1940s through to the early 1980s, Parliament has
expanded its legislative domain, often at the expense of the
States. During the two world wars the Commonwealth Parliament
worked in tandem with the government of the day, passing National
Security legislation that allowed virtually complete concentration
of power in the Federal Executive for purposes of war. As the
veteran Judge Rich, who sat on the High Court during both world
wars, put it: national survival required 'an effective dictatorship
with power to do anything that contributed to
defence'.(64)
During the decades from postwar reconstruction
in the late 1940s until the early 1980s, Parliament consolidated
and expanded central power in a range of national, economic and
social areas that favoured the Commonwealth over the states and
skewed the federal system in the Commonwealth's favour. These
included: protective policies of high tariffs and national
marketing schemes for agriculture, large migration programs to
boost population and the workforce in manufacturing industries,
huge development projects like the Snowy Hydro scheme, Keynesian
economic management of the national economy, expansion of the
welfare state, national wage fixing that increasingly usurped the
States' role in industrial relations, building up the Commonwealth
public service and Canberra, and conducting Australia's foreign
affairs that had been largely left with Britain until the Second
World War. Fiscal centralisation funded this expansion. Parliament
was not the sole agent of centralisation but rather the compliant
creature of political parties and governments that pursued
centralism. Nevertheless it was an integral and necessary part of
the overall expansion of the Commonwealth or federal part of
Australian government.
Intense globalisation in recent decades has
introduced a major new dimension to the development of Australian
federalism-increasing enmeshment in international associations and
agreements-that complicates the picture. The Commonwealth's role,
including that of its Parliament, is enhanced with respect to the
States through the increasing internationalisation of policy areas
and the Commonwealth's power over foreign affairs. At the same
time, however, the Commonwealth's independence is being undermined
as it becomes party to more international organisations and
agreements. Thus Parliament's role in mediating globalisation cuts
both ways, both increasing and undermining the Commonwealth's
relative power. In addition, Parliament can be bypassed by direct
global influences and international-local interactions that more
readily come within the domain of the States.
The future pattern of Parliament's development
of federalism will be a combination of all three types but with
different relative weights than in the past. The third
globalisation scenario that reduces Parliament's strong
centralising role apparent in the second phase is likely to become
more predominant. If this is the case, the predominance of the
Commonwealth Government and Parliament apparent in the second phase
is likely to decrease and the 'ever increasing centralisation' of
Australian federalism to be wound back. Much will depend on the way
in which Parliament develops and how it carries out the democratic
and nationalist aspirations of the Australian people.
Endnotes
-
- B. Galligan, A Federal Republic: Australia's Constitutional
System of Government, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1995.
- G. S. Reid and M. Forrest, Australia's Commonwealth
Parliament 1901-1988: Ten Perspectives, Melbourne University
Press, Melbourne, 1989.
- J. Uhr, Deliberative Democracy in Australia: The Changing
Place of Parliament, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1998.
- B. Galligan, W. Roberts and G. Trifiletti, Globalisation
and Australian Citizenship, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, forthcoming.
- Official Record of the Proceedings and Debates of the
Australasian Federation Conference, 1890, Government Printer,
Melbourne 1890, p. 261, (hereafter Melbourne Conference, Debates,
1890).
- Convention Debates, Sydney, 1891, 4 March 1891, p. 23.
The Convention Debates referred to in this paper
will be cited as follows:
Official Record of the Proceedings and Debates
of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney, 2 March to
9 April 1891, Government Printer, Sydney, 1891, cited as
Convention Debates, Sydney, 1891.
Official Report of the National Australasian
Convention Debates, Adelaide, 22 March to 5 May 1897,
Government Printer, Adelaide, 1897, cited as Convention Debates,
Adelaide, 1897.
Official Record of the Debates of the
Australasian Federal Convention, Sydney, 2 September to
24 September 1897, Government Printer, Sydney, 1897, cited as
Convention Debates, Sydney, 1897.
- Melbourne Conference, Debates, 1890, pp. 46-47.
- ibid.
- See B. Galligan, Politics of the High Court,
University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, Queensland, 1985,
chapter 2; and 'The Australian High Court's Role in Institutional
Maintenance and Development', in C. Sampford and K. Preston, eds,
Interpreting Constitutions: Theories, Principles and
Institutions, Federation Press, Sydney, 1996, chapter 7.
- Convention Debates, Adelaide, 1897, 23 March 1897, p.17.
- Convention Debates, Sydney, 1891, 4 March 1891, p. 31.
- ibid.
- Convention Debates, Adelaide, 1897, 23 March 1897, p. 24.
- Convention Debates, Sydney, 1891, 12 March 1891, p. 280; and
Convention Debates, Adelaide, 1897, 23 March 1897, p. 28.
- B. Galligan and J. Warden, 'The Senate', in G Craven, ed.,
The Convention Debates 1891-1898: Commentaries, Indices and
Guide, Legal Books, Sydney, 1986, pp. 98 ff.
- Convention Debates, Adelaide, 1897, 30 March 1897, p. 297-98.
- ibid., p. 273.
- ibid., 14 April 1897, pp. 554-5.
- ibid., 13 April 1897, p. 500.
- Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co
Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129. Overruled the inter-governmental
immunities doctrine that (broadly read) had provided that the laws
of the States could not bind the Commonwealth and that those of the
Commonwealth could not bind the States. While there remain limits
on the scope of Commonwealth power to affect the functioning of the
States, the net effect of the decision was to extend the scope of
Commonwealth power.
- J. Quick and R. Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the
Australian Commonwealth, Sydney Angus and Robertson, 1901, p.
414.
- ibid., pp. 448, 450.
- ibid., p. 450.
- C. Howard, Australian Federal Constitutional Law, 3rd
ed., Law Book Company, Sydney, 1985, pp. 96-97; C. Sampford,
'Reconciling Responsible Government and Federalism', in M. P.
Ellinghaus, A. J. Bradbrook and A. J. Duggan, eds, The
Emergence of Australian Law, Law Book Company, Sydney, 1989;
and D. Wood, 'The Senate, federalism and democracy', Melbourne
University Law Review, vol. 17, no. 2, 1989, pp. 304-5.
- House of Representatives, Debates, 4 November 1992, p.
2549; Senate, Debates, 14 Sept 1992, pp. 744-70, 13 May
1993, pp. 587-606, 17 March 1994, pp. 1859-87.
- See M. Painter, Collaborative Federalism: Economic Reform
in Australia in the 1990s, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1998.
- J Uhr, 'Why We Chose Proportional Representation', Paper
presented to 50th anniversary Conference on PR in the Senate,
Papers on Parliament, no. 34, December 1999, pp. 13-40
- L. F. Crisp, The Australian Federal Labour Party
1901-51, 2nd ed., Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1978, pp.
219-20.
- Senate, Debates, 20 October 1993, p. 2216.
- For a full account, see Odgers' Australian Senate
Practice, 9th ed., H. Evans, ed., Dept. of the Senate,
Canberra, 1999, chapter 16.
- Primarily Senate Committees, but not infrequently the statutory
joint committees.
- Uhr, Deliberative Democracy in Australia, op. cit., p.
150.
- I. Marsh, Beyond the Two Party System: Political
Representation, Economic Representation and Australian
Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995.
- See B. Galligan, O. Hughes and C. Walsh, eds,
Inter-governmental Relations and Public Policy, Allen
& Unwin, Sydney, 1991, chapter 1.
- Albert Green (Labor, Kalgoorlie, WA), Senate and House of
Representatives, Debates, 22 July 1926, p. 4521.
- Senator Ross Lightfoot (Liberal, WA), Senate, Debates,
1 October 1997, p. 7372.
- House of Representatives, Debates, 3 May 1983, p. 125.
- Senate and House of Representatives, Debates, 10 April
1902, pp. 11 580-1.
- ibid., p. 11 584.
- Senate and House of Representatives, Debates, 24 April
1902, pp. 11 977-80.
- Reid and Forrest, op. cit., pp. 97-98.
- J. Chesterman and B. Galligan, Citizens Without Rights:
Aborigines and Australian Citizenship, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1997.
- Reid and Forrest, op. cit., pp. 168 ff.
- C. Court, 'Federal strength can't flow from weak states:
Excessive centralisation is bad for our Constitution', The
Australian, 7 July 2000, p. 18.
- South Australia v Commonwealth (1942) 65 CLR 373.
- Victoria v Commonwealth (1957) 99 CLR 575.
- South Australia v Commonwealth [Uniform Tax Case (no.
1)] (1942) 65 CLR 373 at 409.
- ibid., p. 429.
- Victoria v Commonwealth [Uniform Tax Case (no. 2)]
(1957) 99 CLR 575 at 601.
- E. G. Whitlam, On Australia's Constitution, Widescope,
Camberwell, Victoria, 1977, pp. 65-70.
- See R. Mathews and B. Grewell, 'Fiscal Federalism in Australia:
from Whitlam to Keating', CSES working paper, no. 1,
Centre for Strategic Economic Studies, Victoria University,
Melbourne, 1995.
- For a fuller discussion, see Galligan, A Federal
Republic, op. cit., chapter 9.
- See R. Menzies, Central Power in the Australian
Commonwealth, Cassell, London1967.
- Australian Citizenship Council, Australian Citizenship for
a New Century, Australian Government Printer, Canberra, 2000,
p. 6; J. Carens, Culture, Citizenship and Community: A
contextual exploration of justice as evenhandedness, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. 2-3; Recent books include P.
Alston and M. Chaim, eds, Treaty making and Australia:
globalisation versus sovereignty?, Federation Press, Sydney,
1995; B. Opeskin and D. Rothwell, eds, International Law and
Australian Federalism, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne,
1997; R. Catley, Globalising Australian Capitalism,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996; L. Weiss, The Myth
of the Powerless State: governing the economy in a global era,
Policy Press, Cambridge, 1998; A. Capling, M. Considine and M.
Crozier, Australian Politics in a Global Era, Addison
Wesley, Longman, 1998; and J. Wiseman, Global Nation? Australia
and the Politics of Globalisation, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1998.
- A. Twomey, 'Procedure and Practice of Entering and Implementing
Treaties', Background Paper no. 27, Department of
Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 1995, p. 8.
- Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Trick
or Treaty? Commonwealth Power to Make and Implement Treaties,
AGPS, Canberra, 1995.
- Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon. A. Downer MP, Press
Release 2 May 1996; DFAT Web Site, summarising main changes and
Speech, House of Representatives, Debates, 2 May 1996, pp.
231-235.
- Parliament of Victoria, Federal-State Relations Committee,
International Treaty Making and the Role of the States,
Government Printer, Melbourne, 1997.
- For a robust discussion of the ways of dealing with the
challenge, see M. Latham, Civilising Global Capital: new
thinking for Australian Labor, Allen & Unwin, Sydney,
1998.
- Although relatively recently the High Court has placed clearer
limits on the use of the external affair's power: Victoria v
Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416.
- For example Justice Brennan in the Tasmanian Dam Case,
Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1.
- For discussion of two-level games, see R. Putnam, P. Evans and
H. Jacobson, Double-Edged Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The
Logic of Two Level Games, University of California Press,
Berkeley, 1993.
- See B. Galligan, W. Roberts and G. Trifiletti,
Globalisation and Australian Citizenship, op.cit.,; also
J. Wiseman, Global Nation? Australia and the Politics of
Globalisation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.
- In Dawson v Commonwealth (1946) 73 CLR 157 at
177.
Vision in Hindsight: Parliament and
the Constitution Series
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1.
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Federal Parliament's Changing Role in Treaty Making and
External Affairs Research Paper no. 15, 1999-2000, by
Anne Twomey
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7 March 2000
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2.
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Federal-State Financial Relations: The Deakin
Prophecy Research Paper no. 17, 1999-2000, by Denis
James
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4 April 2000
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3.
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Government Business Enterprises and Public Accountability
through Parliament Research Paper no. 18, 1999-2000, by
Stephen Bottomley
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11 April 2000
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4.
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Australian Parliamentary Democracy After a Century: What
Gains, What Losses? Research Paper no. 23, 1999-2000, by
Elaine Thompson
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6 June 2000
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5.
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Rules for Representation: Parliament and the Design of the
Australian Electoral System Research Paper no. 29,
1999-2000, by Dr John Uhr
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27 June 2000
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6.
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Parliamentary Privileges Research Paper no. 1,
2000-01, by Professor Enid Campbell
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27 July 2000
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7.
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The Parliament as Partner: A Century of Constitutional
Review Research Paper no. 3, 2000-01, by Professor
Cheryl Saunders
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15 August 2000
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8.
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Executive and Hight Court Appointments Research
Paper no. 7, 2000-01, by Dr Max Spry
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10 October 2000
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9.
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Resolving Deadlocks in the Australian Parliament
Research Paper no. 9, 2000-01, by Professor Jack Richardson
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31 October 2000
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10.
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The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia and
Indigenous Peoples
1901-1967 Research Paper no. 10, 2000-01, by John
Summers
|
31 October 2000
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11.
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Parliament and Administrative Law Research Paper
no. 13, 2000-01, by John McMillan
|
7 November 2000
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12.
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Power: Relations Between the Parliament and the
Executive Research Paper no. 14, 2000-01, by Jim
Chalmers and Dr Glyn Davis
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7 November 2000
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13.
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Parliament's Development of Federalism
Research Paper no. 26, 2000-01, by Professor Brian Galligan
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26 June 2001
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