Research Paper no. 19 2007–08
Political change in North Korea
Jeffrey
Robertson
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security Section
23 January 2008
- The prospect of political change in North Korea is a recurring
question, buoyed by media speculation regarding the health of the
current leader, Kim Jong-Il, the dearth of information about his
succession and concern for the potential instability that could
occur.
- Australian interest stems from the possibility that political
change in North Korea could potentially affect the economic
viability of the region, which contains Australia s three largest
export markets of China, South Korea and Japan. Political change in
North Korea could potentially require Australian assistance in
humanitarian and/or military operations.
- There are four scenarios for political change in North Korea.
These are: hereditary or other familial succession, a smooth
transferral of power to another centre of power, such as the
military, forced political change through coup or revolution, and
the disintegration of the state and its ultimate absorption by
South Korea. Each scenario has specific warning signs that are yet
to appear.
- The key determinants of political change in North Korea are
likely to be the military, external powers and the economy. Each of
these determinants plays a central role in the political viability
of the current North Korean leadership. There are several triggers
of political change in North Korea, one of which is the
deterioration in the health of current leader, Kim Jong-Il.
- Given the potential economic and security impact, the issue of
political change in North Korea is something that Australia and the
region should be prepared to address.
|
Contents
Executive summary
Introduction
North Korea background
Economy and politics
Nuclear issues
Inter-Korean relations
The implications of political change in North
Korea
Australian interest
Scenarios for political
change
Kim dynastic succession
Smooth transfer of power centre
Forced political change
Regime weaknesses
Change in economic conditions
Increased information flows
Weakening political control
Regime strengths
Disintegration
Determinants and triggers of
political change
Military
External powers
Economy
Triggers
Conclusion
Introduction
Political change in the
Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK), hereafter referred to
as North Korea, represents a wild card in the strategic future of
East Asia. To borrow the words of former United States Secretary of
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, political change in North Korea is a
known unknown . Inevitably, the leadership of Kim Jong-Il will one
day come to an end but how this will affect the North Korean state
and society, its relations with neighbouring states and ultimately
the security of the East Asian region, remains unknown.
There are no overt signs that North Korea is about to undergo
political change. Indeed, over the last decade North Korea has
defied predictions that this would occur. It has survived economic
collapse and a devastating famine triggered by the disintegration
of its Cold War patron, the Soviet Union; it has reduced the
politico-military threat posed by its former Cold War nemesis,
South Korea, through diplomacy and reconciliation; and it has
arguably, outmanoeuvred the United States and China to emerge as
the region s newest nuclear power.
Neither are there any overt signs that Kim Jong-Il is about to
relinquish political control. Both genetics and political precedent
suggest that at age 65, Kim Jong-Il could continue leading North
Korea for a substantial period. Kim Il-Sung, North Korea s first
leader and father of Kim Jong-Il, led the state until his death at
the age of 82 in 1994.
However, political change is likely to occur in the medium-term
and indications of how it will occur should appear in the
short-term.[1] Kim
Jong-Il was groomed for succession by his father from the age of 31
(when Kim Il-Sung was 61). This occurred through promotion to a
series of prominent party and state positions, a concerted
propaganda campaign and through the removal of potential
rivals.
While analysts have repeatedly been proven wrong, there is no
way of knowing how far off the mark predictions of political change
have been. The scarcity of reliable information makes it impossible
to determine. One study puts forward the question of North Korea s
survival in a comparison familiar to Australians:
is the North Korean state s recent survival a
modern-day variant of the Gallipoli phenomenon in other words, a
case of imminent but averted collapse?[2]
This paper seeks to summarise and recount the debate on
political change in North Korea. The paper commences with an
introduction to North Korea and proceeds to demonstrate the
importance of stability on the Korean peninsula to Australian
national interests. It then presents the generally accepted
scenarios for political change in North Korea. Finally, the paper
looks at the triggers and determinants of political change in North
Korea.
North
Korea background
North Korea invokes an array of contradictions. It is described
as both the most militarised country in the world [3], but also as a relatively
powerless nation .[4]
It has been described as pursuing a policy of international
military extortion [5], but also seeking to come in from the cold .[6] Arguably, it is above all
a lack of knowledge that pervades English language discussion and
debate on North Korea, summed up succinctly by the historian Bruce
Cummings when he states that North Korea has evolved into a
singular and puzzling nation that resists easy description
.[7]
At the closing stages of the Second World War the Soviet Union
and the United States agreed that their respective forces would
occupy the Korean peninsula divided by the 38th parallel just north
of the capital, Seoul. With the rapid emergence of the Cold War,
efforts to unify the peninsula under a single government failed. A
pro-Soviet regime, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
was installed in the North under Kim Il-Sung, an anti-Japanese
resistance fighter who had fled to Soviet territory during the
Japanese occupation. In the South, a pro-American regime, the
Republic of Korea (ROK), was established, led by an American exile,
Syngman Rhee.
North Korea emerged rapidly from the devastation of the Korean
War (1950-1953). It installed a centralised economic system
allowing for rapid industrialisation and economic growth. Focus was
on heavy industry with a lower priority given to light industry and
agriculture. During the 1960s, to avoid becoming overly reliant
upon the Soviet Union and China, North Korea implemented a
development strategy based on the concept of juche, or
self reliance.[8]
Juche entered all walks of life, most notably the
military and the economy. Military expenditure in the 1960s rose
from six per cent of GDP to approximately 30 per cent. Eventually
stabilising at this level in the 1970s, it effectively neglected
other sectors of the economy, creating the basis for future
economic failures.
From the 1970s, North Korea began to retreat deeper into
isolation. US-China detente and US-Soviet detente led to greater
international acceptance of a divided Korean peninsula, leaving
only North Korea to pursue its aim of unification by military
means. The failure to repay international debt due to poor economic
planning isolated North Korea from investment and trade. North
Korea was further isolated by its continuing erratic militancy,
losing the brief support it gained from the non-aligned movement.
In 1983, the death of 17 ministers and officials in a failed
assassination attempt on South Korean president Chun Doo-Hwan in
Burma by North Korean agents and the 1987 bombing of a Korean Air
Lines plane, resulting in 115 deaths, confirmed the international
community s perception of North Korea as a pariah state .
In 1994, national founder and President, Kim Il-Sung died. This
led to speculation that political change could occur as the son of
Kim Il-Sung and heir apparent, Kim Jong-Il, attempted to
consolidate his succession. With the destitute state of the
economy, its failing political institutions and an increasing
inability to feed its population, the end of the regime seemed not
only probable, but imminent. The collapse of the Soviet Union and
the subsequent collapse of its autocratic satellites had cast a
long shadow over the future of North Korea.
Despite expectations to the contrary, North Korea continued to
survive and between 1995 and 1998 Kim Jong-Il consolidated his
position. A new policy known as songun, or military first
politics, was put in place, which raised the profile of the
military in the leadership structure. Limited and reactive economic
reform as well as substantial international aid enabled the regime
to survive. Writing in 1997, economist and North Korea analyst,
Marcus Noland, stated that North Korea could muddle through for
years before turning toward reform or chaos .[9]
A recent study by the South Korea based Korea Institute for
National Unification (KINU), based upon interviews and surveys of
North Korean defectors and refugees, found that the regime of Kim
Jong-Il, while not in a stable position, survives through a
precarious balance between the power of dissatisfaction and the
power of regulation .[10] The power of regulation has to date dominated that of
dissatisfaction, and the authors note that predictions of regime
collapse in North Korea should not be made lightly.[11]
In 1974, North Korea officially joined the International Atomic
Energy Agency and in 1977 signed a Type 66 Safeguards Agreement. In
1985, it signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Seven
years later, in 1992, North Korea submitted its initial report to
the IAEA under the Safeguards Agreement. The IAEA found
inconsistencies in the initial report, suggesting the existence of
undeclared plutonium. A request for further information and IAEA
access to two sites related to the storage of nuclear waste was
denied which ultimately resulted in a North Korean announcement
that it would withdraw from the NPT, the widening of non-compliant
activities and a (later suspended) withdrawal from the IAEA.
The possibility that North Korea was, or could be in possession
of a nuclear weapons program raised international concern. Military
tensions on the Korean peninsula rose significantly as the
potential for a United States pre-emptive strike to destroy any
North Korean nuclear facilities increased. However, the nuclear
issue was defused abruptly by a June 1994 summit meeting between
former US President Jimmy Carter and North Korean leader Kim
Il-Sung. At the summit meeting an agreement was reached that
provided for the temporary freezing of the North Korean nuclear
program while negotiations towards a final solution took place in
Geneva. On 21 October 1994, the Agreed Framework (described below)
was signed, providing a basis for the long term resolution of the
nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.
Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea was to stop and
eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons related programs. It was
also to account for and resolve past discrepancies in its
safeguards program. These actions would be reciprocated by the
provision of alternative fuel sources Initially heavy fuel oil for
electricity production would be provided. Later, two proliferation
resistant light water reactors (LWR) were to be constructed. Each
step in the elimination of the North Korean nuclear weapons program
was to be matched by both a verification process and a
corresponding incentive.
In October 2002, during a visit to the North Korean capital,
Pyongyang, by US Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly, the
United States alleged North Korea had admitted to a nuclear-weapons
program.[12] This claim set in motion a series
of events that in a short timeframe, resulted in a substantial
deterioration in the regional security environment.
In November 2002, heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea as
part of the Agreed Framework were suspended. On 13 December 2002,
North Korea announced that it would lift the freeze on its nuclear
facilities and on 22 December it began cutting seals and removing
surveillance cameras installed by the IAEA. Five days later, IAEA
inspectors were ordered to leave North Korea.
On 10 January 2003, North Korea announced its decision to
withdraw from the NPT, effective immediately, stating the required
three month notice period to be unnecessary due to its withdrawal
being only suspended in 1993. On 26 February 2003, North Korea
restarted the mothballed nuclear reactor, arguing it was necessary
because of its ongoing energy crisis.
In August 2003, the First Round of Six-Party Talks between North
Korea, United States, Russia, Japan, South Korea and China, were
held in Beijing. The Six Party Talks continued intermittently with
limited progress until a breakthrough at the Fourth Round on 19
September 2005. At that time a Joint
Statement was issued. The Statement called for the disablement
of North Korea s nuclear programs, access for IAEA inspectors and a
return to the NPT in exchange for a comprehensive aid program, this
included:
- economic, energy and humanitarian assistance
- negotiations towards removal of North Korea from the
state-sponsors-of-terrorism list
- diplomatic normalisation with the United States and Japan
- settlement of outstanding issues.
Diplomatic efforts faltered soon after the Joint Statement was
issued. The United States expressed concerns regarding sequencing
detailed in the Joint Statement with particular reference to North
Korea s Light Water Reactors (LWR). North Korea subsequently issued
a statement suggesting that it may not be able to meet its
disarmament obligations.[13] Progress was further complicated in late September
2005, when the United States Treasury Department designated North
Korean financial assets in a Macau bank account as a money
laundering concern , effectively placing a freeze on the
assets.
On 3 October 2006, North Korea announced its intention to
conduct a nuclear test which it did six days later, on 9 October
2006. As a result, the UN Security Council imposed weapons and
financial sanctions.
The Six Party Talks resumed in December 2006 and on 13 February
2007, an agreement was reached on the implementation of the
September 2005 Joint Statement. The 13 February Agreement was
hailed as a diplomatic success despite opposition within the United
States that compared it to the 1994 Agreed Framework. However,
there are subtle differences between the 1994 Agreed Framework and
the February 2007 Agreement. Whereas the 1994 Agreed Framework
required the freezing, sealing and monitoring of nuclear programs,
the February 2007 Agreement requires disablement steps that would
make it considerably more difficult to restart such programs. As
noted in a recent United States Institute of Peace report:
the disablement of a facility has come to mean a
deliberate, mutually agreed action or set of actions taken to make
it relatively more difficult and time-consuming to restart a
facility after it is shut down. Disablement actions go beyond
simply shutting down, sealing, and monitoring a facility. Although
disablement steps can be reversed and the facility restarted, it
would take an extended period of time to do so.[14]
Implementation of the Agreement continues despite numerous
setbacks. On 31 December, North Korea missed a deadline to provide
a complete and accountable declaration of its nuclear activities.
The United States understands that the Agreement, and subsequent
discussions in the Six-Party working group on denuclearisation,
require a complete and accountable declaration on North Korean
fissile material, as well as accounting for the alleged Highly
Enriched Uranium (HEU) program.[15] As of 15 January 2008, North Korea has not
provided a declaration of its nuclear activities. If undertaken,
this would demonstrate a political and strategic decision by North
Korea to continue cooperation towards the eventual dismantlement of
its nuclear weapons program.
The Korean War (1950-53), was a particularly vicious fratricidal
war, which resulted in the division of the Korean peninsula along
the De-Militarised Zone (DMZ). Relations between these two states
were based on irreconcilable ideological differences, marked by
intermittent hostility and confrontation, until the advent of the
Sunshine Policy of reconciliation in South Korea.
The Sunshine Policy, instigated by Kim Dae-Jung in 1998, sought
to end hostility that existed between South and North Korea. The
policy effectively sought peaceful co-existence, as opposed to the
absorption or defeat of North Korea that had previously driven
South Korean policy.[16]
In June 2000, the leaders of North and South Korea held a
meeting for the first time since the division of the peninsula. The
meeting was greeted with elation in South Korea, giving hope for
the first time that peaceful unification may be possible. This was
followed by events such as the joint march around the stadium under
the unification flag by athletes at the opening ceremony of the
Sydney 2000 Olympics and increased working contacts on issues such
as displaced families reunions, trade and investment.
Despite the success of the Leaders Summit, subsequent progress
was sporadic. Kim Jong-Il failed to make a return visit to Seoul
and no progress was made on military confidence building measures.
Controversy also erupted when it was learnt that Kim Dae-Jung made
illegal financial payments to North Korea to arrange the historic
Summit.
In 2003, when Roh Moo-Hyun became President of South Korea, the
Sunshine Policy was continued under a new banner of Policy for
Peace and Prosperity . Substantial attempts to further cooperation,
particularly in the economic sphere, have achieved limited success
due to ongoing international pressure over North Korea s nuclear
program.
In October 2007, Roh Moo-Hyun visited Pyongyang for a second
inter-Korean leaders summit. The visit resulted in an ambitious
eight point Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean
Relations, Peace and Prosperity that if fulfilled, could
substantially improve inter-Korean cooperation. However, a
significant degree of cynicism surrounded the visit, based upon the
failure to implement agreements made at the June 2000 Leaders
Summit and speculation that the October 2007 summit was coordinated
to bolster support for the liberal camp in the lead up to
Presidential elections in December 2007.
In part, policies supporting reconciliation with North Korea are
an existential expression of the fear that South Korea has
regarding the possible collapse of North Korea. Reconciliation and
strengthening the North Korean economy, despite the country s human
rights situation and unique challenges to international order,
delay and hopefully soften the economic burden that unification
could present.
Political change in North Korea could result in substantial
refugee flows into the neighbouring countries of South Korea, China
and Japan.[17] It
could also result in factional conflict within North Korea and
possibly require the intervention of external powers to control
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and to address the humanitarian
situation. Needless to say, political change in North Korea could
have a significant impact on the regional economy.
Academics have also questioned whether political change in North
Korea will result in a positive outcome. Konstantin Asmolov, an
analyst at the Korea Studies Centre of the Russian Academy of
Sciences questions whether a successor would have enough
legitimacy, leadership, and management talents to rule the country
.[18] North Korea currently presents a
difficult diplomatic relationship. There are ongoing concerns over
potential nuclear proliferation and there is also the intermittent
necessity of providing humanitarian aid to a regime that is accused
of gross human rights abuses. However, the political and strategic
direction of the current North Korean regime remains relatively
predictable. Political change in North Korea could result in a
greater degree of unpredictability.
Regimes which succeed dictatorships are often prone to further
instability.[19] The lack of established
institutions, the dynamics of evolving power relationships and the
exacerbation of instability by external powers seeking to exert
influence can lead to an undermining of successor regimes.
Accordingly, political change in North Korea could result in a
prolonged period of instability in the Northeast Asian region,
unless such potential threats are avoided.
Stability in the East Asian region is vital to Australia. In
2006, East Asia included Australia s top three merchandise export
destinations of Japan, China and South Korea.[20] Further,
Australia s fourth largest export destination and principal
security partner, the United States, is deeply involved in the
region. As noted by then Foreign Minister Alexander Downer on 30
January 2004:
any deterioration in the security situation on the
Korean peninsula would have disastrous consequences for Australia's
economy, and cause a tremendous loss of jobs and obviously add to
instability in the region.[21]
South Korea, Australia s third largest export market and now the
world s eleventh largest economy would be most affected by
political change in North Korea. Given the example of German
reunification, it could be expected that the South Korean economy
would be affected for a substantial period of time after
unification with the North. It is estimated that Korean
unification, should it occur through South Korean absorption of the
North would impose tremendous economic burdens on South Korea
.[22] South Korea
experienced substantial economic upheaval in the 1997 Asian
Financial Crisis and is aware that political change in North Korea
could result in greater economic pressures.
Political change in North Korea could negatively affect the
Australian economy in the short-term as the South Korean import
demand dampens. However, in the medium-term as North Korean
infrastructure and industrialisation increases, demand for
Australian raw materials could actually achieve much stronger
levels. Resource projects in the North could also offer
opportunities for Australian companies. South Korea is already
Australia s second largest export destination for crude petroleum,
aluminium and other ores, and Australia s third largest export
destination for coal, iron ore and beef.[23] The medium term development of the
North Korean economy under South Korean leadership could prove
advantageous to Australia.
Potentially, political change in North Korea could also require
more active Australian participation in humanitarian relief
operations, assistance in the placement of refugees or even a
direct military role, should political change in North Korea result
in a threat to regional security. Military intervention could be
justified, given the importance of stability in the region to
Australian national security and Australia s role as an ally of the
United States. Australia is a signatory to the Joint Declaration on
the Korean Armistice (1953), which confirmed the resolve of
signatories to the defence of South Korea. The Joint Declaration on
the Korean Armistice does not commit Australia to the defence of
South Korea, but could strengthen justification for Australian
involvement.
Given the fact that North Korea does not present a direct threat
to Australia, achieving stability by encouraging the current regime
to reform could be considered a desirable option. Stronger economic
cooperation between South and North Korea and reconciliation
through policies emulating the Sunshine Policy could provide both
stability in the region and ultimately increased demand for
Australian natural resources as the North Korean economy is
gradually transformed. However, support for policies that promote
reconciliation must be weighed against wider Australian interests
in nuclear non-proliferation and human rights.
Regardless of whether it is seen as positive or negative,
political change in North Korea and its implications for regional
security are issues that Australia and other regional players will
inevitably have to address.
There are four possible broad and overlapping models of how
political change in North Korea could occur: a continuation of the
current Kim dynasty through hereditary or other familial
succession, a smooth transfer of power to another political force,
forced political change or disintegration of the state.
Kim dynastic succession
There are three known potential male heirs to Kim Jong-Il.
Although Kim Jong-Il is known to have several daughters as well,
the patriarchal nature of Korean society makes their inheritance of
the leadership unlikely. It is important to note that while female
inheritance of a leadership position may seem unlikely in
North Korea due to the militarised nature of the society and its
neo-Confucian heritage, there are no indigenous Korean cultural
barriers to a woman assuming a leadership role. There are notable
examples of women undertaking leadership roles in Korean history,
despite the dominant neo-Confucian culture. In the context of North
Korea, Kim Jong-Sook, the mother of Kim Jong-Il was posthumously
heralded as a revolutionary leadership figure (in order to lend
support to Kim Jong-Il s rise to power) and Kim Ok, the current
partner of Kim Jong-Il, is often cited as wielding significant
influence.
Little is known about Kim Jong-Il s three sons Kim Jong-Nam
(32), Kim Jong-Chul (26) and Kim Jong-Un (24). Most information is
based on sensationalist media reports in South Korea and Japan
regarding their potential to succeed Kim Jong-Il.[24]
The majority of these articles point to the youngest son being
the likely successor. However, these articles are also notoriously
speculative, sensationalist and based upon questionable sources.
Kim Jong-Nam has been ruled out due to his arrest in Japan for
travelling on a fake Dominican passport during a trip to Disneyland
in May 2001. In a perfect example of the speculative and
sensationalist reporting, second son, Kim Jong-Chul, has allegedly
been ruled out due to the excessive secretion of a female sex
hormone .[25] Other
reports claim that third son, Kim Jong-Un, has been ruled out
because he suffers from epilepsy. The only conclusion one can draw
from the numerous reports is that speculation about the Kim family
makes for interesting reading in South Korea and Japan.
There are other Kim family figures that could make a bid for the
leadership if they were to gain support from political forces
within the country or externally. These include Kim Yong-Pil (half
brother of Kim Jong-Il and currently Ambassador in Poland), Kim Ok
(long-time secretary and current partner of Kim Jong-Il) and Jang
Song-Taek (Kim Jong-Il s brother-in-law, long-time confidant and
current First Deputy Chief of Public Labour).
However, the likelihood of a Kim dynasty succession is in no way
certain. Furthermore, current available information suggests that
it may not be as smooth as Kim Jong-Il s own succession.
Firstly, there is a distinct lack of preparation. As noted, Kim
Jong-Il was groomed for succession by his father from the age of
31. This was 20 years before he came to power on the death of his
father. Unless a long-term succession plan is in place, the
legitimacy of a hereditary succession from Kim Jong-Il to his
children could be challenged.
Confucian values play a large role in North Korean society.
Confucian political governance is an extension of the Confucian
notion of the ideal family life: Just as there is the natural
authority of the parent, so there is the natural authority of the
president based on the twin virtues of filial piety and loyalty
.[26] There has to
date been no attempt to strengthen the image of the family of Kim
Jong-Il as occurred with Kim Jong-Il s mother Kim Jong-Sook. During
the campaign to strengthen Kim Jong-Il s legitimacy as the
hereditary successor to Kim Il-Sung, his mother Kim Jong-Sook
became known as one of the three generals alongside Kim Il-Sung and
Kim Jong-Il. Importantly, the ability to stage such a campaign is
also made more difficult by Kim Jong-Il s blended family his eldest
son, Kim Jong-Nam was born out of wedlock to Song Hye-Rim and Kim
Jong-Chul and Kim Jong-Un were born to Kim Jong-Il s second
official wife, Ko Yong-Hui.
Secondly, the potential heirs have a distinct lack of military
experience. Kim Jong-Nam is known to have served in the domestic
security service, but was reportedly out of the country between
2001 and 2007. It is not known whether Kim Jong-Chul and Kim
Jong-Un have any military experience. While this may not restrain
their ability to obtain military backing, it could conceivably
restrain their ability to exert influence over their backers.
Finally, a substantial generational difference exists between
that of Kim Jong-Il and his children. Kim Jong-Il s formative
experiences were highly influenced by the generation that preceded
it. Kim Il-Sung, and those of his generation, were accorded status
according to their exploits in the anti-colonial struggle against
Japan, the Korean War (1950-53) and the struggle to help the young
fledgling nation survive and prosper. Beyond this influence, many
of Kim Jong-Il s generation actively participated in the struggle
against their perceived enemies through participation in the
Vietnam War, covert or overt infiltration activities against South
Korea or through participation in the state security apparatus.
Accordingly, it could be expected that they maintain a sense of
devotion to the ideological goals of espoused by the North Korean
state..
In comparison, the generation of Kim Jong-Il s children have not
experienced, even indirectly, revolutionary struggle or hardship.
Their exposure to activities directed against perceived enemies has
been greatly reduced since the end of the Cold War, and rather than
serving in the state security apparatus, many have lived and
studied abroad. According to defector accounts as well as anecdotal
evidence from press reports, the children of the ruling party s
cadres have lived a closeted existence, shielded from the hardships
of contemporary North Korean life. In comparison to Kim Jong-Il s
generation, which maintains a sense of devotion to the goals of the
revolution, the generation of his children have been brought up in
a period in which the ideological goals of the revolution have been
superseded by the political goal of regime survival.
For a dynastic succession to proceed smoothly there are certain
conditions that must be met the candidate must gain the support of
the military and/or the support of external backers, notably,
China.
Indicators of a dynastic succession could include growth in the
public profile of a potential candidate. From time to time media
reports have speculated that such a campaign is beginning. These
reports generally focus on a brief series of North Korean People s
Army articles published in 2002 that extolled the virtues of Ko
Young-Hee (the mother of Kim Jong-Chul and Kim Jong-Un) and the
reported meeting between Kim Jong-Chul and Hu Jintao during the
latter s state visit in 2002. Yet to date, nothing has come
remotely close to the three generals campaign that accompanied Kim
Jong-Il s rise to power.
Another scenario for political change in North Korea is the
smooth transfer of power to another political force, of which the
military would be the prime contender.
North Korea has always been a highly militarised society.
Indeed, the national character was cast in guerrilla campaigns
against the Japanese in Manchuria towards the end of World
War II and forged in the fratricidal conflict of the Korean
War (1950-53). Maintaining a militarised society has been central
to regime stability, both as a bulwark against perceived external
threats and as an instrument of internal security.[27]
Since the late 1990s, North Korean political ideology has
demonstrated an even greater emphasis on the role of the military
in North Korea. The state ideology has effectively transformed from
juche ( self-reliance ) politics to one of songun
( military first ) politics. The concept of songun is
derived from the notion that the failure of communist states at the
end of the Cold War was the result of their emphasis on relieving
the economic hardship of the people rather than defending the
state. Instead of an economy first, military next policy,
songun politics advocate the opposite, a military first,
economy next policy. Its central principle is epitomised by an
editorial in the Kim Il-Sung University Campus Newspaper:
to argue that the working class should become the
mainstay of revolution at any time and at any place is logically
incorrect and is a dogmatic viewpoint of defunct theories the
People s Army is the nucleus leading our Socialist
development.[28]
Songun politics has inevitably led to a rise in the
status of the military in North Korea. North Korea s media has paid
greater attention to the military, Kim Jong-Il s public appearances
have increasingly been centred on military activities and the
political leadership is increasingly filled with those from a
military background.[29] Effectively, the military plays the central role in the
political, economic and social fabric of the North Korean
state.
Currently, North Korea s military leaders are closely connected
to the Kim family. During the late 1990s, as Kim Jong-Il
consolidated his position, a number of changes were made that
reinforced this connection. Given the close connection between the
ruling elite and the military in North Korea, political change to a
power centre in the military may not necessarily indicate a regime
change . It may instead be considered a form of succession.
The key indicators of a smooth transferral of power could
include increased propaganda supporting the role of the military in
the maintenance of the state, an increase in the position of the
military within the ruling elite, the possible jockeying for
position amongst leadership candidates and military commands, and
ultimately, the emergence of a clearly defined military figure in a
prominent leadership position.
Forced political change remains a possibility in North Korea.
This could occur through a coup d tat, a popular uprising, external
intervention or any combination of these.
Despite the maintenance of authoritarian rule for over 50 years,
there have been several attempts to remove both Kim Il-Sung and Kim
Jong-Il from office. Given the socio-cultural characteristics of
Korean society, it can be assumed that factions based upon regional
affiliations, university education alumnae and military service
graduating class exist within the North Korean political
milieu.
Regional affiliations, university education and military service
graduating class alumnae have served as dividing lines between
political factions in South Korea. These have had a substantial
impact on political events. The 1961 coup d tat, for example, which
brought Park Chung-Hee to power was undertaken with the support of
fellow graduates from the Eighth Class (1946) of the Korean
Military Academy. Each member of the Eighth Class went on to
powerful positions within the Park Chung-Hee government.[30] Similarly, after the
assassination of Park Chung-Hee in 1979, and the subsequent period
of confusion, authoritarian rule was restored by Chun Doo-Hwan and
Roh Tae-Woo with support from members of what became known as the
Hanahoe society. Literally meaning group of one , this
society centred around alumnae from the Korean Military Academy
originating from North Kyongsung Province.[31]
For the last decade, analysts have been pointing out that
conditions amenable to forced political change exist in North
Korea. Arguably, these conditions could be exploited by political
factions within North Korea. These conditions include the
following.
The collapse of the economy after the withdrawal
of Soviet and later Russian aid in the mid 1990s and the ensuing
famine created new centres of economic power in North Korea.
Privileged access to state rations became less important as the
public distribution system slowly ground to a halt. Instead, those
with the access and capability to operate in black markets, and
those with access to hard currency, (such as through border trade),
gained economic power. Noted Koreas analyst, Dr Andrei Lankov, has
gone so far as to say that a second economy has emerged, leading to
a greater degree of individual autonomy.[32]
The state has attempted to control this
re-emergence of capitalist activity by taking the lead in market
reforms. It has undertaken wage and price reforms, lifted certain
investment restrictions, eased internal travel restrictions,
allowed the emergence of limited private markets and retail
networks and allowed farmers to establish local garden markets. But
in doing so, it has ceded certain economic freedoms to individuals.
As noted by Professor Gary Marks of the University of North
Carolina, a key indicator of democratic transition is when a ruling
regime begins to modify its own rules in the direction of providing
more secure guarantees for the rights of individuals and groups
.[33] Perhaps
reflecting this, the North Korean Government has undertaken steps
to control, and in certain cases, wind back economic reform.
Further improvements in economic conditions could
in fact precipitate forced political change. Political change in
Romania and Albania following the collapse of communism did not
occur until after economic conditions improved. Essentially, a
population that is more concerned with securing the next meal is in
no condition to plot the overthrow of government. The experience of
these two countries suggests that when economic conditions improve,
sections of the population react to the increased autonomy and seek
or support political change.
The changes in economic conditions that have
already occurred in North Korea have also resulted in an increase
in individual mobility. This first became necessary in order to
procure food during periods of food shortage.
More recently, it has become easier to obtain
travel passes as corruption becomes more common in the cash
economy. Information flows have also increased as a result of
greater trade with China. Chinese traders and investors are more
trusted in North Korea than South Korean or other interested
nationals and consequently achieve greater access.[34] Due to payment risks associated
with trade with North Korea, much of this trade has been limited to
small companies and entrepreneurs, often undertaking barter
exchange. The satiated Chinese domestic market, resulting in
oversupply in the light manufacturing and household domestic
appliance sectors, coupled with high demand in North Korea, has
resulted in an inflow of potentially information rich goods such as
radios, mobile phones, VCRs and DVD players.[35]
Economic conditions could also affect state
control. Some analysts have argued that changed economic
circumstances directly threaten the ability of the ruling hierarchy
to curry favour with centres of power that maintain the rigid state
structure. Chung Min Lee argues that what holds together the North
Korean elite is not their unconditional loyalty or even blind
homage to Kim Jong-Il, but the dividends and incredibly scarce
incentives if Kim Jong-Il is unable to guarantee and generate these
loyalty payments , his succession plans could go awry, the Korean
People s Army could turn against him and his family, and
alternative leadership schemes could be hatched .[36]
Despite these pre-revolutionary conditions , analysts predicting
the coming collapse of North Korea have repeatedly been proved
wrong. Despite its apparent weaknesses, the regime is very
resilient. Strengths of the regime that would seem to resist forced
political change include:
- Alternative centres of power. There are no
viable alternative centres of power in North Korea. At the height
of the military dictatorship in South Korea there were still
alternative centres of power, albeit suffering varying forms of
persecution. These included student, labour and church groups as
well as other democracy campaigners. These groups had clearly
identified leaders, some on the run, others in prison and still
others in exile but they existed and inspired future democracy
campaigners. In North Korea there is no known opposition.
- External support. Despite the rhetoric, there
is little external support for groups opposed to the North Korean
regime. There are several notable NGO and church-based advocacy
groups in South Korea and Japan that persist in drawing public
attention to human rights issues in North Korea. However, these are
more than balanced by a general public ambivalence and the recently
more vocal campaigning of groups in support of reconciliation.
- In particular, there appears to be little tolerance of such
activity in South Korea and China. Both governments are firmly
opposed to upsetting the apparent delicate political balance in
North Korea. This even extends to the forced return of refugees by
China and a less than concerted effort by South Korea to ensure
refugee safety.[37]
- Military autonomy. There are
limitations on the ability of the military to play an autonomous
role in North Korea. These include an overlapping command
structure, surveillance of key military personnel by the state
security services and strong informal ties between those holding
key military positions and Kim Jong-Il.[38] It can be assumed that these
strategies ensure the military is kept under constant check by Kim
Jong-Il.
For analysts of North Korea, forced political change is a
difficult scenario to predict, given the limitations on reliable
political, economic and military sources. Firstly,, indicators that
forced political change is about to occur have short time frames.
Secondly, these indicators are easily confused with the constant
tinkering that the ruling regime must undertake as it adjusts to
the fluid political and economic environment that has marked North
Korea since the withdrawal of Soviet aid in the 1990s.
The final scenario for political change is the disintegration of
the state. This is a remote, but harrowing possibility. It is
remote due to the strong desire of regional states for this not to
occur. However, there are limitations on the ability of regional
states to influence events within North Korea. The considerable
humanitarian, political and economic impact that disintegration
could have on the region substantially increases the political and
strategic risk that this scenario represents. Disintegration of the
state could include some or all of the elements listed below:
- Refugee flows into North-Eastern
China, the Russian Far
East and
Japan. There are already more
than 10 000 refugees in China, many more in the Russian Far East
and a steady trickle of refugees seeking asylum in foreign
consulates in both regions. There are others making the long
journey through China to third countries such as Burma and Thailand
and still others travelling by boat to Japan. Disintegration of the
North Korean state could result in this trickle becoming a flood,
with an associated humanitarian impact comparable only to the
Korean War.
- Factional conflict within the North
Korean military. Attempts by the North Korean military to
secure the state could result in internal conflict if factions
within the military and security services are opposed. This could
result in internal conflict, which in turn would exacerbate the
humanitarian situation, resulting in both increased refugee flows
and increased calls for external intervention.
- Intervention by external
powers. Disintegration of the state would more than likely
draw in external powers to secure nuclear and other WMD facilities
and to minimise the humanitarian impact that disintegration could
wreak. Depending on the timing and method of intervention, it could
be opposed by the North Korean population and/or elements within
the military and security forces.
Further, while it could be expected that China,
Russia, South Korea, Japan and the United States each have
contingency plans to deal with the disintegration of the North
Korean state, it could also be assumed that the strategic aims of
these states are not identical. Accordingly, intervention runs the
risk of external powers disagreeing and supporting alternative
factions within North Korea. This could exacerbate and prolong any
potential conflict.
The resultant effects could range from the optimistic view of an
operation completed within months to a pessimistic view of
widespread humanitarian crisis accompanied by long-term economic
challenge.
Disintegration of the North Korean state could also ultimately
result in the unification of the Korean peninsula. In 1999, the
best estimates of the cost of funding unification varied from
US$260 billion to US$3.2 trillion.[39] A recent South Korean National
Assembly Special Committee on Budget and Accounts has estimated
that unification could cost around US$1 trillion. The report
notes the difference in cost with respect to timing. If unification
occurred in 2015, it could cost around US$858 billion over ten
years to absorb the North. If unification occurred in 2030, it
could cost US$1.32 trillion.[40]
Despite the considerable advances in inter-Korean economic
cooperation, the fundamental differences between North and South
Korea have not disappeared. As demonstrated by German
reunification, absorption of North Korea would present a
substantial financial burden on the South Korean economy for at
least twenty years. Further, the example of German reunification
would suggest that the social costs of unification could be
significantly more burdensome. Needless to say, this would have a
substantial impact on South Korea, its trading partners and the
region.
Unification of the peninsula could also result in a period of
geo-strategic uncertainty as the region adjusts to a united, more
powerful Korea of some 74 million Koreans.[41] Would a unified Korean state lean
towards China or would there be a US influenced state sharing a
land border with China which has easy access to its industrial and
political heart? How would a unified Korea handle territorial
disputes with both China and Japan, particularly in regards to the
resurgent nationalism that is typical of politically divided states
after unification? Therefore, we should not be surprised if states
in the region demonstrate a strong interest in ensuring that the
North Korean state does not disintegrate.
Given the likely desire of external powers to avoid all the
uncertainties that disintegration would bring, it could be expected
that substantial effort would be made to avoid it in the first
place. External states have already gone to great lengths to avert
collapse of the North Korean state. Indeed, as noted by a Korean
analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, Nicholas Eberstadt,
even the United States under the purportedly hostile aegis of the
George W. Bush administration transferred nearly US$350 million in
aid between 2001 and 2002.[42] During the years 1996-2002, the United States provided
North Korea with over US$1 billion in food aid, energy aid and
medical supplies.[43] While aid payments could be considered an inducement
for North Korea to behave responsibly, particularly with regards to
nuclear proliferation, there is no question that it has also
assisted in the maintenance of the current North Korean regime.
South Korean assistance to the North is considerably larger and
did not stop with the current nuclear issue. In addition to
budgeted direct aid there is also trade and investment on
non-commercial terms. There are no exact figures for the assistance
South Korea has provided to the North. Further, illegal direct
payments to North Korea have also been made, which inevitably raise
suspicions that further information on payments may only surface
with the passage of time. In June 2000, the inter-Korea Leaders
Summit was arranged through an illegal direct payment of US$500
million to North Korea, which included US$100 million from public
finances that is yet to appear on official economic cooperation
statistics. Eberstadt states that South Korea is far less open in
sharing the details of its inter-Korean trade with the outside
world than one might expect .[44]
It is clear from this that regional states will go to great
lengths to to avoid the disintegration of the North Korean state.
China, South Korea, Russia and the United States all have a vested
interest in the maintenance of stability on the peninsula albeit on
more amenable terms.
One of the key indicators of disintegration could include
increases in the number, social status and organisation of
defectors. During the Cold War, the majority of defectors were of
high social status. In the post-Cold War period of hardship, a
greater number of economic refugees have defected. An increased
number of defectors from a higher social status would indicate that
despite their relatively better social position, security concerns
regarding the viability of the state have forced them to seek an
alternative.
There are three inter-related determinants in each scenario the
role of the military, the role of external powers and the role of
the economy. Each of these forces could play a key role in
determining when and how political change will occur.
The military already plays a central role in North Korean
society and its members hold a particularly privileged position in
the allocation of scarce state resources. Although publicly
perceived as a destabilising and potentially disruptive force, the
North Korean military has a vested interest in a smooth transfer of
political power.
Indeed, its position has improved under the leadership of Kim
Jong-Il because the balance of power between the Korean Workers
Party (KWP and the Korean People s Army (KPA) has gradually shifted
to the latter.
Changes made to the North Korean constitution in 1998 have
effectively positioned the military as a potential successor to Kim
Jong-Il. Amendments to the North Korean Constitution placed power
in the hands of the Chairman of the National Defence Commission
(NDC), rather than the Presidency. The current NDC consists of Kim
Jong-Il as Chairman, Jo Myong-Rok as First Vice Chairman, two vice
chairmen (Ri Yong-Mu and Kim Yong-Chun) and two other members (Jon
Pyong-Ho and Kim Il-Chol). Importantly, with the exception of Kim
Jong-Il, all members are appointed for five year terms and are all
currently over the age of 72.
The military has played a large role in the economy as a result
of its influence over labor supply, resource distribution and
communications. Given the poor state of infrastructure and the lack
of economic incentive, the military has recently played an
important role in securing increased trade with China. Certain
analysts believe that the younger generation of military leaders,
with a more remote connection to the revolutionary era and a
greater knowledge of successful reforms in China, could be
attracted to capitalism.[45]
In any economic transformation, the military could reap
substantial benefit. As occurred in China s economic modernisation
during the 1980s, military-run enterprises start with a significant
head-start in market transformation. However, economic reform is a
double-edged sword for the current regime. Economic reform would
increase the autonomy of the military, which research has shown to
be a key factor in the transition from dictatorial rule, but a more
powerful military may in turn instigate conflict between factions
seeking greater power.[46] While the military is currently viewed as cohesive
under the rule of Kim Jong-Il, his sudden removal from power could
disrupt this unity.
External powers can potentially seek to influence political
change through directly or indirectly strengthening the capacity of
alternative political forces within North Korea. External influence
can vary from the direct financial and material support of
alternative political forces to the more mundane diplomatic
expression of displeasure at the regime s ability to govern.
The most influential external power is China, which has strong
economic and traditional military links with North Korea. China
shares an approximately 1000 kilometre long border with North
Korea, across which a considerable amount of border trade occurs.
According to South Korean figures, China accounts for more than
half of North Korea s total trade.[47] More recently, Chinese investment has
also increased, as economic growth spurs high demand for North
Korean mineral resources.
Relatively speaking, there is also a historical and traditional
trust of Chinese intentions that continues to the present day. In
comparison to Russia, Japan and the United States, China is
considered in North Korea to be a benign major power. China
maintains the relationship through careful support in multilateral
forums, mediation with the United States and economic support.
China is regarded by many as one of the isolated country s few
remaining allies.[48]
However, this historical trust has its limits. North Korea
throughout its history has been very careful to avoid over reliance
on any one external supporter. In situations where a dictatorship
is overly reliant on an external supporter, it is at risk of a
managed transition of power where an external power exerts
influence on a dictatorship to step down to promote its interests
in a smooth transfer of power.[49]
Reports, particularly from the Japanese media, indicate that Kim
Jong-Il s eldest son, Kim Jong-Nam spent much of the period 2001 to
July 2007 in Beijing and Macao, aided by the Chinese Government.
According to Korea s prevalent Confucian cultural traditions, the
eldest son, has significant legitimacy in terms of political
succession. If these reports are true, China, with its strong
economic and military links, may hold a particularly strong
influence over one of the key candidates to succeed Kim
Jong-Il.
China s primary national interest concerning the Korean
peninsula is the maintenance of stability. Stability is vital to
wider Chinese strategic interests of strengthening the national
economy, thereby facilitating a peaceful rise . This could mean
intervention in North Korea would be acceptable if conditions in
the state threatened to affect the regional economy.
Russia was historically as influential, if not more so, than
China in steering North Korea s fortunes. North Korea received
substantial economic, scientific and military aid from the former
Soviet Union and also inherited Soviet-style political,
administrative and economic structures. However, today, Russian
influence and, most importantly, interest in North Korea is
limited.
The United States, South Korea and Japan have only limited known
influence in North Korea. Their influence is constrained by an
inability to engage the North as a result of historical distrust
and domestic political hurdles. The South Korean Sunshine Policy of
engagement, in its various guises, has sought to remove these
constraints and allow for greater influence, as economic and
diplomatic engagement continues.
Since the 1990s there have been several studies on the North
Korean economy. However, sources of information are both unreliable
and more often there is a dearth of information. As noted by
Eberstadt, North Korea s release of statistics is entirely episodic
and absolutely minimal, and has been for over four decades
.[50] Inevitably,
studies on the North Korean economy contain a large degree of
speculation.
The majority of studies contend that North Korea has been on the
brink of collapse since the early 1990s. While the economy had been
in long-term decline since the early 1970s, the collapse of the
Soviet Union set in motion a chain of events that resulted in a
severe downturn. Soviet and Eastern European trade assistance and
concessions disappeared. China, no longer competing with the Soviet
Union for influence in North Korea, also curtailed assistance. The
ultimate result was a collapse of the state-run economy and
purportedly in combination with severe weather conditions, a famine
that resulted in an horrendous death toll. Estimates of
famine-related deaths range from 220 000 by the North Korean
Government to 2.5 million by the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID).[51]
The effect of economic decline on the current regime has been
twofold. Firstly, it has reduced the capacity of the regime to
maintain the loyalty of the ruling elite. Several commentators have
noted the almost feudal like system of payments and gifts that are
distributed amongst key socio-political groups in order to maintain
their loyalty to Kim Jong-Il and the ruling circle.[52] As the economy has
declined, maintaining these payments has become more difficult.
Secondly, economic decline has reduced the reliance of the wider
population on the state. In 1997-98 when the ration distribution
system collapsed, the population was forced to fend for itself.
This resulted in black markets and sanctioned market activity
flourishing and a breakdown of the state s ability to enforce
regulations as corruption became a primary source of alternative
income for officials.
Both these changes have effectively reduced the dependence of
the common people and the ruling elite on the current regime.
Economic decline has forced a greater level of independence on all
sectors of society. Even if the state is able to regain control
over the economy, the population would be unlikely to give up the
level of independence it currently enjoys.
In historical cases of transition from
dictatorial rule the three determinants discussed above have played
a central role. Another important factor is the existence of a
trigger that sparks political change. Possible triggers in the
contemporary context of North Korea include attempts by the
leadership to undertake substantial economic reform, attempts by
the leadership to reduce the role of the military in the state,
increased border clashes or military provocations or even a natural
disaster resulting in further economic dislocation.
However, the most obvious trigger would be a
sudden deterioration in the health of Kim Jong-Il.
Kim Jong-Il is reported to suffer from diabetes
and high blood pressure, which can lead to kidney and heart
complications. Unlike his father, Kim Jong-Il has not been hardened
by years spent surviving as a freedom fighter against an occupying
force, but instead has led a closeted and protected existence. In
May 2007, it was reported in the South Korean press that the South
Korean National Intelligence Service was looking into rumours,
traced to Kim Jong-Il s close aides, that the North Korean leader s
health was declining.[53] It was later reported that Kim Jong-Il underwent heart
by-pass surgery in May 2007.[54]
Throughout late July and early August 2007, Kim
Jong-Il made several notable consecutive visits to military
installations and factories. South Korean media speculated that the
aims of these visits were to quash rumours of his failing health
that had circulated during June 2007.[55]
During the October 2007 South-North Korean
Summit, the South Korean media observed that Kim Jong-Il was senile
and weak , old and haggard and tilted toward the right .[56] Media sources also
drew unfavourable contrasts between Kim Jong-Il s and South Korean
President Roh Moo-Hyun s appearance, as well as between Kim Jong-Il
s lethargic behaviour and his more enthusiastic and energetic
behaviour when meeting Kim Dae Jung at the first South-North Summit
in June 2000.
Perhaps reflecting the incessant speculation on
his health, Kim Jong-Il also made comments addressing the issue.
During the first meeting session between Kim Jong-Il and Roh
Moo-Hyun, Kim was heard stating As I am not a patient, I don t have
to stay at home , after Roh expressed his thanks for an unscheduled
welcome by Kim on the previous day. Later that same day, Kim
stated:
There are reports suggesting I have diabetes and
even heart trouble, but nothing can be further from the truth they
are making a big fuss over each and every move I make, and it s as
if they were not reporters but novelists.[57]
Information on Kim Jong-Il s health is both scant
and unreliable, but is nevertheless a recurring feature of media
reports on North Korea. Reports on Kim Jong Il s health can be
readily compared to other examples of Cold War speculation when
analysts studied the distance of figures from Soviet leaders during
the annual May Day military parades to determine their position in
the Soviet hierarchy. A similar lack of information has led to
analyses of Kim Jong-Il s health based upon his media appearances.
Rumours of ill health will likely continue to persist during the
rule of Kim Jong-Il and reflect the international community s
uncertainty regarding both North Korea s current status and its
future without Kim Jong-Il.
There are currently no signs to indicate that North Korea is any
closer to undergoing political change than at any time in the last
ten years. Indeed, it has been able to survive conditions more
adverse than its current position. However, this should not
engender complacency in policy makers.
The substantial impact that political change in North Korea
could potentially have on the East Asian region requires the
attention of policy makers. Political change in North Korea
requires careful consideration of both the potential short-term
humanitarian situation and the longer-term strategic impact on
interests in the region.
Until greater openness allows a better understanding of the
domestic political and economic situation in North Korea, the
potential for political change in North Korea remains the greatest
known unknown of East Asian security and Australian national
interest.