5.
THE COMMITTEE'S CONSIDERATION OF THE OPTIONS
5.1
During the course of the Committee's examination a number of options were considered in relation to both appropriations and staffing. The results of this consideration are detailed below.
Appropriations
5.2 The
Committee recognises that the present
constitutional arrangements place financial initiative firmly in the hands of the Executive. Section 53 of the Constitution provides that proposed laws appropriating revenue
or moneys shall not originate
in the Senate and section 56 provides
that such proposed laws shall not be passed unless the
Governor-General has recommended the purpose of the appropriation by message.
5.3
The
Committee accepts that this is a proper arrangement for Government appropriations but not for Parliamentary appropriations. The arrangement which best
recognises the relationship between the Parliament and the Executive is for the appropriations for each House to be contained
in a separate amendable Bill which would not
require a Governor-General's message and which would
be capable of introduction in either House. This arrangement would serve to underpin the independence of the Parliament and yet would still
allow the Executive the opportunity to influence
each House's appropriations on the floor of the respective
Chambers.
5.4 The Committee is not, of course, suggesting that the machinery to so amend the
Constitution be put in motion at this stage, however
a proposal to seek such an amendment could well be added to other proposals
when the occasion
next arises.
5.5 In the meantime, and within the limitations imposed
by the Constitution, it is still
possible to make new arrangements to achieve a desirable measure
of autonomy for the
Parliament.
5.6
In
Chapter 4, the Committee has outlined the procedure which now applies
to the preparation, review
and approval of the estimates
for the Parliament prior to their inclusion in the Appropriation Bills by the Minister for Finance. This arrangement, whilst an advance on that which operated
prior to 1976, is still
not satisfactory. In the words of
the Speaker of the House of Representatives '. . . it involves
Parliament making 'bids'
about which the Executive may apply a qualitative judgement and thereby restrict
the
ability of the Legislature to discharge its constitutional duties.
The purpose of the Westminster system
is to enable the Parliament to overview the Executive, not the
other way around'.[1]
5.7
Another arrangement suggested to the Committee,
as an alternative to a separate Bill for the Parliament, is
for the inclusion
of the Parliament's appropriations, without modification by the Government, in the normal Appropriation Bill. Even
if the Government was prepared to accept
this
procedure, it is still not a satisfactory solution for the Parliament as it perpetuates the classification of the Parliament as an ordinary annual service
of the Government. Clearly, this is not the case. As pointed out in the 1967 Report of the Committee appointed
by Government Senators,
the Parliament may be ordinary; it may be annual; it may even be regarded as a service; but it is not a service of the Government. It is therefore
inconsistent with the concept
of
the separation
of
powers and the supremacy of Parliament to treat the
provisions made for the Parliament as being an ordinary
annual service of the Government.
5.8
Within the limits currently imposed by the Constitution, the Committee is confident that the arrangement which best recognises
the proper relationship between Parliament and the Executive
is for the appropriations for each House
of the Parliament to be included
in
a separate Appropriation Bill. And, if to this arrangement is added
a Committee for each House,
with provision for representation of the Executive, charged with the task of examining the parliamentary estimates and agreeing to them with or
without modification prior to their inclusion in the Parliamentary Appropriation Bill,
not only is a desirable
level of autonomy
achieved for the Parliament,
but
also the Government's examination from the standpoint of its budgetary policy
is preserved.
Staffing
5.9 The formal provisions
relating to parliamentary staffing as detailed
earlier in Chapter 4 give the impression that staff are not subject to Executive
influence and control.
Section 9 of the Public
Service Act provides
that staff are subject only to the control of the President in relation to the Senate,
the Speaker in relation to the House of
Representatives or both in relation
to the Parliamentary Library, the Parliamentary
Reporting Staff and the Joint House Department. However, all appointments and promotions of parliamentary staff and the creation and abolition of offices require the approval
of the Governor-General in Council.
The administrative procedure
imposed by Government has meant that, without the agreement of the Public Service Board,
a proposal has virtually no chance of approval by the Executive
Council. And the history of the debate surrounding this matter shows that the Senate, in particular, believes
that the Board is not qualified in matters concerning staffing of the Parliament to be given what virtually amounts to a power of veto over the Parliament's
proposals. This, of course, is quite apart from the proprieties of a proper relationship between
Parliament and the Executive.
5.10 It was partly
with the problems
of staffing the Parliamentary
departments in mind that the Royal Commission on Government Administration developed proposals for the enactment of common legislation to cover Commonwealth employment generally.
The Report of the Commission goes on to say that the '. . . concept
of this legislation is that it will enable the relevant
management groups to draw on the main streams of legislated conditions of service, for example, for leave, superannuation and compensation, while leaving
each group to develop its own distinctive patterns of service. One advantage of these provisions
is that they would simplify and encourage the movement of staff within
the total field of Commonwealth employment and might therefore benefit the parliamentary departments, by offering
them the capacity to
engage staff for relatively short periods if this is thought to be desirable
in some areas of their activities'.[2]
5.11 The
Commission further stated
that it had in mind that Parliament might con sider the appropriateness of taking advantage
of the provisions it had proposed so that
the two Houses could apply the main features of Commonwealth employment to the parliamentary service,
while reserving, for special determination by the designated authority within the Parliament power to develop
particular features for the Parliamentary Service. One feature
of the new legislation would be to provide that Parliament (and its officers) would have access
to the Public Service Board for advice wherever that was considered desirable or necessary by the Presiding
Officer (compare with paragraph 5.13 (c)).
5.12 The Committee
finds itself very much attracted to the Royal Commission's concept and agrees that, whilst
some work remains to be done to refine the plan, it might
well be of benefit to the Parliament. However, in the meantime, other arrangements
can be made to achieve
a desirable level of autonomy
for the Parliament in relation to
its staffing.
5.13
The Public Service Board's
submission to the Committee concluded
with a list of features that a possible revision of Parliament's control
of its own staffing might include. The main features were:
(a) appointment powers vested
in the Presiding Officers,
separately or jointly
as the case may be (instead
of the Governor-General in Council
at present), with power
of delegation (e.g. to Permanent
Heads);
(b) promotions power vested in the Presiding Officers, separately or jointly
as the case may be (instead
of the Governor-General in Council
at present) on the recommendation of the appropriate Permanent
Head, or with the Permanent
Head subject (where appropriate) to the approval,
of the Presiding Officer/s (similar
arrangements to be made in relation to transfers); and
(c) rates of pay and terms and conditions of service to be determined by the Presiding Officers, separately or jointly as the case may be, 'subject to their obtaining and considering the advice of the Public Service
Board on such matters'[3] (com pare with paragraph 5.11).
5.14
The Committee agrees with the proposals in relation to promotions and appointments and would also treat in a similar
way powers in relation to the creation, abolition and reclassification of offices. However,
the Board's proposal in paragraph (c) that it be
mandatory for the Presiding Officers
to obtain and consider the advice of the Public Service Board shows that it still does not understand its position in relation to the Parliament. In the words of the Royal
Commission on Government Administration given emphasis by the Committee in paragraph 5.11 above, the Parliament
should have access to the Public Service
Board for advice
wherever that was considered desirable or necessary '. . by the Presiding Officer'.
5.15 Subject to the modifications concerning the creation,
etc. of offices
and the Board's advisory
role, the proposals
of the Board cited above are sound and would only
require a simple amendment to section 9 of the Public Service
Act 1922 to be implemented.
5.16 If, in addition to this arrangement, the Committees of each House as
proposed in paragraph 5.8 in relation
to the Parliament's appropriations were also charged
with an advisory role in relation to staffing
proposals, once again not only is a desirable level
of autonomy achieved for the Parliament, but also the Government's examination from the standpoint of its manpower
policy is preserved.
Notes and references
[1] Evidence, p. 311.
[2] Australian Government Administration, Report
of the Royal Commission, Canberra,
1977, p. 263.
[3] Evidence, p. 126.
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