Chapter 2 2007 election overview and key issues
Background
2.1
The 2007 federal election was announced by the Prime Minister the Hon
John Howard MP on Sunday 14 October 2007. Writs for the election were issued on
Wednesday 17 October for the House of Representatives election and a
half-Senate election.[1]
2.2
Once the writs are issued, a timetable is specified in the Commonwealth
Electoral Act 1918 for a range of tasks and events including the close of the
electoral rolls, the nomination of candidates, the declaration of nominations
and polling day. The date of other events associated with the election,
including the return of the writs, flow on from these events (table 2.1).
2.3
Following amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act in 2006, the
close of rolls period changed from seven days after the issue of the writ to
8pm on the day the writs for the election are issued for a person enrolling for
the first time or re-enrolling after having been removed from the roll.
2.4
The close of roll amendments also provided for a period of three
‘working days’ after the writs are issued for people to complete and submit a
proof of identity compliant enrolment form in limited circumstances:
n if a person is 17
years of age, but will turn 18 between the day after the issue of the writs and
election day (inclusive);
n if a person will
become an Australian citizen between the day after the issue of the writs and
the day before election day (inclusive); or
n if a person is on the
roll, but with an out of date address or name details.[2]
2.5
As a public holiday fell on Friday 19 October 2007 (Show Day on Flinders
Island, Tasmania), that day was not a ‘working day’ within the meaning of the
Commonwealth Electoral Act, extending the close of rolls deadline to Tuesday 23
October 2007 for those people meeting the circumstances as outlined above.[3]
Table 2.1 2007 federal election timetable
Event |
Date |
Election announced |
Sunday 14 October 2007 |
Issue of writ |
6pm Wednesday 17 October 2007 |
Close of rolls
Deadline for new enrolments
Deadline for changes to
enrolments |
8pm Wednesday 17 October 2007
8pm Tuesday 23 October 2007 |
Close of nominations |
12pm Thursday 1 November |
Declaration of nominations |
12pm Friday 2 November |
Polling day |
Saturday 24 November 2007 |
Return of writs |
|
Senate writ for Tasmania |
Friday 14 December 2007 |
Senate writ for NSW |
Wednesday 19 December 2007 |
Senate writ for Queensland |
Wednesday 19 December 2007 |
Senate writ for WA |
Wednesday 19 December 2007 |
Senate writ for SA |
Thursday 20 December 2007 |
Senate writ for Victoria |
Friday 21 December 2007 |
Senate writs for the ACT and NT |
Friday 21 December 2007 |
House of Representative writs
for all States and Territories |
Friday 21 December 2007 |
Closing date for the lodgement of petitions to the Court
of Disputed Returns |
Wednesday 30 January 2008 |
Source Australian
Electoral Commission, submission 169, p 5.
2.6
At the close of nominations on Thursday 1 November, 1,054 candidates were nominated to contest the 150 House of Representatives seats and
367 candidates had nominated for the 40 vacant seats in the
half-Senate election.[4]
2.7
Polling day, which must be held on a Saturday and at least 33 days after
the issue of the writs, was held on Saturday 24 November 2007.[5]
The time between the issue of the writs and polling day was 39 days, slightly
longer than most Federal elections since 1993 but one day less than the 2004
election (table 2.2).
Table 2.2 Time between the issue of the writs and polling
day, 1993 to 2007 elections
|
1993 |
1996 |
1998 |
2001 |
2004 |
2007 |
Issue of writs |
8 Feb |
29 Jan |
31 Aug |
8 Oct |
31 Aug |
17 Oct |
Polling day |
13 Mar |
2 Mar |
3 Oct |
10 Nov |
9 Oct |
24 Nov |
Total days |
34 days |
34 days |
34 days |
33 days |
40 days |
39 days |
Source Australian
Electoral Commission, submission 169, p. 5; Joint Standing Committee on
Electoral Matters, Report on the 2004 federal election: Report of the inquiry
into the conduct of the 2004 federal election and matters related thereto (2005),
Commonwealth of Australia, p 2.
Administration of the 2007 election
2.8
Aside from necessary changes arising from legislative adjustments, the Australian
Electoral Commission (AEC) implemented a number of administrative changes for
the 2007 election. Some of these arose from issues raised in the former Joint
Standing Committee on Electoral Matters’ review of the 2004 election and the
AEC’s own internal review of the conduct of the 2004 election. Feedback provided
to the committee by major political parties during the inquiry indicated that
they were generally satisfied with the administration of the election by the
AEC.
2004 election issues
Postal voting improvements
2.9
At the 2004 federal election there were significant problems experienced
with the administration of postal voting, particularly in regional Queensland.
Major issues caused by, or related to, the use of the AEC’s automated postal vote
issuing system (APVIS) included:
n non-receipt or the
delayed receipt of postal votes by those who had lodged postal vote
applications or were registered as general postal voters (GPVs);
n receipt of postal
votes by one member of a family but not another, when those postal vote applications
(PVAs) had been submitted together at the same time;
n inadequate and
inconsistent responses by the AEC to electors, Members of Parliament and their
staff, who were enquiring about the whereabouts of postal votes;
n lack of timely and
accurate advice to stakeholders about postal voting problems;
n incorrect ballot papers sent to some postal voters;
n incorrect postal voting material sent to some postal voters;
n inadequate awareness
of geography and distance issues by AEC call centre staff when dealing with
electors’ enquiries relating to postal voting;
n inadequate contractual arrangements for the provision of postal voting services;
n inadequate planning
and project management of the postal voting process by the AEC, in the lead up to and during the election period;
n inadequate quality assurance procedures for the production and regeneration of postal voting material; and
n inadequate tracking
and reporting mechanisms for postal vote production.
2.10
So acute were these problems that the Governor-General issued a
proclamation the day before the election to extend the time during which
affected postal voters could vote and return their ballot papers to the AEC.[6]
2.11
Following the 2004 election, postal voting arrangements were placed
under the microscope by the then Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters
and by consultants Minter Ellison, and a number of administrative changes were
made to ensure that there would be no repeat of these experiences. Action taken
by the AEC involved:
n a new tender process
was initiated, resulting in the selection of a new postal vote production
contractor for the 2007 election;
n there was an
increased focus on detailed functional requirement specifications in the
contract;
n considerable emphasis
was placed on contract management processes to ensure the timely and effective
delivery of postal voting services;
n three separate trial
production runs were undertaken in the lead-up to the 2007 election to test and
improve processes;
n the AEC and Australia Post entered into a Memorandum of Understanding related to postal voting
delivery arrangements;
n the AEC engaged the services of mail house experts to assist with the tender evaluation, quality
assurance during trial productions, and live production;
n a range of enhancements
were made to APVIS to ensure best use of Australia Post delivery data; and
n the PVA was revised in a number of ways. Important elements of this revision included providing
applicants with information about alternative early voting options, obtaining
the applicant’s contact information in circumstances where an elector required
postal voting materials by a specific date, and obtaining information from the
elector about preferred alternative delivery methods (where post was not
viable).[7]
2.12
The AEC told the committee that the major issues from 2004 in relation
to the performance of the postal voting central production contractor were
‘predominantly attributable to slow production exacerbated by management
problems and slow correction of errors in the production process’.[8]
In order to remedy this, the contract for the production of the 2007 election postal
voting pack (PVP) contained specific production requirements, including the
production of up to 500,000 PVPs by 6 November 2007, and up to 100,000
PVPs each working day after 6 November 2007.
2.13
The AEC advised that the specified production arrangements were met on
every occasion for the 2007 election. This resulted in a marked improvement in
the production output of PVPs when compared to the 2004 election, with
significantly higher numbers of PVPs lodged earlier in the election period at
the 2007 election (figure 2.1). In relation to the quality of the production
process, the AEC specified a service level standard for PVPs damaged in the
production process (0.004 per cent of all production), which was met on all
occasions.[9]
Figure 2.1 Postal voting pack lodgement, 2004 and 2007
federal elections
Source Australian
Electoral Commission, submission 169, p 33.
2.14
In addition to these improvements in the production system for PVPs, the
AEC noted that the 2007 election also saw the introduction of Australia Post
delivery information into the postal voting management system, which was used
to determine the method of production that would ensure the best possible
chance of a PVP reaching the applicant in time to complete and return his or
her vote.[10] The AEC outlined how
this system worked to improve the likelihood a PVP would be dispatched and
received as quickly as possible using the postal voting management system (APVIS):
In 2007, the AEC used three postal vote production methods:
central print, local print and hybrid print. Central printing takes place at
the premises of the APVIS contractor which could be in a different state to the
elector; local printing takes place at the AEC divisional office in which the
details of the application are entered into the system; and hybrid printing
takes place at another AEC office. APVIS guides the person inputting the PVA
details as to which is the most appropriate production method, taking into
account the postal vote delivery destination and the proximity to polling day,
based on Australia Post mail delivery information.
The initial batches of postal votes were produced by central
print and were produced and dispatched by the AEC contractor, SEMAGROUP, in
Melbourne. Central print is the default method for producing postal votes when
delivery times are sufficient to allow timely delivery by Australia Post’s
published delivery standards.
For local print, the PVP was produced and dispatched by the
divisional office that received the PVA. Initially this occurred where the
postal vote was destined for an overseas address or where the applicant had
indicated urgent delivery or delivery by particular means other than Australia
Post. In the later stage of the postal voting period, after the date on which
Australia Post delivery standards could ensure delivery from the central print
site in Melbourne to around Australia, local print became the default.
Where the postcode area of the PVA destination was listed by
Australia Post as having irregular mail deliveries (i.e. one or two deliveries
per week), special consideration was given to the most reasonable and practical
means of delivery. In these cases, hybrid print was often used. This meant that
APVIS directed production of the postal vote to the AEC divisional office best
placed to arrange the most reasonable and practicable delivery of the postal vote
(not necessarily the PVA’s ‘home’ division).[11]
2.15
The committee recognises the work of the AEC to improve the receipt and
dispatch processes for postal vote applications.
2.16
That said, there remain areas of concern around the timely return of
postal votes that are beyond the control of the AEC which resulted in around 3,000 votes
that were signed and posted before polling day being excluded from the count
because they were postmarked after polling day.[12]
This issue is examined in detail in chapter 3.
Greater access to pre-poll
facilities
2.17
In its 2004 election report, the then Joint Standing Committee on
Electoral Matters expressed concern about the location of pre-poll facilities,
especially given the difficulties experienced in administering postal voting in
regional Queensland. That committee recommended that the AEC should review its pre-polling arrangements with a view to ensuring that, wherever practical,
pre-poll centres are located at appropriate Commonwealth, State or Territory
government, or local government, agencies in regional areas.[13]
2.18
The then government supported the recommendation, indicating that for
the next election, the AEC would trial the use of state government agencies to
issue pre-poll votes in rural and regional areas of Queensland.
2.19
As a result, there were over 100 additional pre-poll voting centres
in Queensland at the 2007 election, with the AEC utilising courthouses,
Queensland Government Agencies and other locations throughout rural and
regional Queensland.[14]
2.20
There is likely to be continued pressure on the AEC to meet the rising
demand and expectation of convenient access to early voting. This issue is
examined in chapter 7.
Electronic voting trials
2.21
Two trials of electronic voting methods were conducted at the election.
The first trial provided electronically assisted voting for electors who are
blind or have low vision at 29 metropolitan and regional pre-poll voting
centres. The second trial provided for defence personnel in four locations
overseas to cast a remote electronic vote using the Department of Defence’s
secure intranet.
2.22
An earlier separate report by the committee on the electronic voting
trials recommended that they be discontinued. The committee recognised the work
of the AEC and its partners in delivering the trials, including the Department
of Defence and non-government organisations representing or providing services
to people who are blind or have low vision. The committee also recognised the
sustained effort over a relatively short period to develop solutions to a
number of technical, logistical, administrative and legislative issues.[15]
2.23
The trial of assisted electronic voting for electors who are blind or
vision impaired saw a lower-than-expected 850 votes cast across 29 metropolitan
and regional locations. The average cost per vote cast was $2,597. This
compares to an average cost per elector of $8.36 at the 2007 federal election.[16]
2.24
The committee concluded that the high cost of improving the quality of
the voting experience for a limited number of voters was unsustainable given
the low number of votes cast and limited opportunities to lift participation.
In coming to this conclusion, the committee was mindful that these electors
will not be disenfranchised by discontinuing electronically assisted voting,
with existing provisions in the Commonwealth Electoral Act facilitating assisted
voting where required.[17]
2.25
The trial of remote electronic voting for selected Australian Defence
Force personnel serving overseas saw 2,012 personnel registered to participate
in four areas of operation — Afghanistan, Iraq, the Solomon Islands and
Timor-Leste. Of these, 1,511 personnel cast their votes electronically at an
average cost of $1,159.[18]
2.26
The committee noted that while defence force personnel should be
provided with every possible opportunity to vote at federal elections, remote
electronic voting imposed a significant additional burden on personnel in
operational areas. In its place, the committee considered that an alternative
model, jointly endorsed by the Department of Defence and the AEC, and involving
AEC-trained defence personnel issuing pre-poll and postal votes, should be used
at future federal elections. [19]
2.27
In making these recommendations the committee does not consider it has
closed the door on electronic voting. Changed circumstances including,
improvements in technology and higher levels of demand may lead to electronic
voting or other alternatives being reconsidered at some time in the future. A
subsequent proposal raised by the AEC is discussed in chapter 11.
Comments on the conduct of the 2007
election
2.28
Overall, feedback received by the committee from inquiry participants
recognised the good job that the AEC had done in managing the 2007 election.
With over 13 million electors and over 1,421 candidates participating
in the election the committee recognises that the AEC will be unable to satisfy
all of the demands placed on it to everyone’s satisfaction.
2.29
Some of the issues raised by participants where there was a perception
that the conduct of the AEC and/or election officials did not meet expectations
(rather than policy‑related issues that were outside the AEC’s control)
included:
n the conduct of
assisted voting and distribution of how-to-vote material in remote South
Australia;[20]
n counting procedures
used by a polling official at the Epping West booth in the division of
Bennelong;[21] and
n the opening times and
polling arrangements at Australia House in London and the need for greater
promotion of overseas voting arrangements by the AEC prior to departure in
Australia.[22]
2.30
The committee does not see its role as examining each individual
instance where inquiry participants raise concerns about the conduct and
management of the election by the AEC. Unless an issue appears to point to
systemic problems — such as the problems experienced by postal voters in
regional Queensland at the 2004 election — the committee does not examine each
issue presented to it. That said, it is important that these issues are raised
with the committee so that the AEC is made aware of concerns in a transparent
way so that the AEC can investigate these matters and respond appropriately.
2.31
In relation to the conduct of assisted voting in remote South Australia,
the AEC advised the committee that the comments made in the submission by Mr
Rowan Ramsay MP did not refer to AEC staff.[23]
2.32
Feedback from the major political parties suggests that overall the
election was well managed by the AEC. The Liberal Party of Australia told the
committee that:
The Liberal Party commends the AEC on its administration of
the 2007 election. While we have a number of comments and suggestions to make,
it is our view that overall the operation of the election was well managed.
It clearly built on the experience and feedback of previous
campaigns. We are particularly pleased with the increased liaison between the AEC and key stakeholders including, in particular, the political parties since the 2004 election.
It is clear this feedback led directly to improvements in the administration of
the election and we commend the Commission for its approach and willingness to
engage with the Parties.[24]
2.33
The Federal Director of The Nationals, Mr Brad Henderson also commented
positively on the AEC’s conduct of the election:
I would first like to record the Nationals’ appreciation of
the efforts of the AEC in administering the 2007 federal election. I would like
to recognise gains made in addressing some of the problems that the Nationals
identified in our submission to this committee’s inquiry into the 2004 federal
election. We have also appreciated the very active efforts made by the AEC under the former commissioner, Mr Campbell, to engage in active consultation regarding
continuous improvement in the administration of federal elections.[25]
2.34
As always, it is important that the AEC review and improve on its
processes to ensure that the next election is also well managed. The committee
has noted that there may be a number of issues to be addressed regarding the
funding position of the AEC and whether the business model adopted by the AEC,
which is largely driven by processes imposed by the Commonwealth Electoral Act,
needs some attention (chapter 9).
The multiple voting myth
2.35
Unsurprisingly, allegations of multiple voting and enrolment fraud were again
raised with the committee during the course of its inquiry.[26]
2.36
Allegations of multiple voting at federal elections are not new and have
been used over the years as something of a ‘bogeyman’ to support the supposed need
for a significant tightening of laws covering enrolment and voting processes.
Recent amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act, discussed later in this
chapter, were largely based on the premise that action needed to be taken to
address the ‘integrity’ of the electoral roll. Introducing amendments to the
Act in 2004, the then Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance and
Administration stated that:
The government remains committed to preserving and enhancing
the integrity of the electoral roll and believes the introduction of new
arrangements for proof of identity and address at the point of enrolment will
significantly enhance roll integrity and reduce electoral fraud.[27]
2.37
It is noteworthy that when the Court of Disputed Returns was considering
its decision in relation to the division of McEwen, much was made by the media
and others of eight cases of apparent multiple voting and the possible
implications of this on the election outcome, including the possibility that
the result could be declared void and a fresh election required.[28]
2.38
When the Hon Fran Bailey MP, the Member for McEwen, appeared before the
committee in November 2008, the eight cases of apparent multiple voting and
another case of alleged multiple voting were raised.[29]
Ms Bailey told the committee that a constituent, Reverend Ivor Jones, had voted
at a pre-poll centre in the division of McEwen and yet his name and address had
been provided at five different places throughout the electorate.[30]
Ms Bailey contended that the eight instances of apparent multiple voting and this
additional case supported the need to adopt a system to check a voter’s
identity at a polling place.[31]
2.39
In October 2008, the AEC had already been able, through its review
processes to determine that the eight cases of apparent multiple voting in the
division of McEwen were almost all the result of confusion on the part of
electors, telling a Senate estimates committee that:
In relation to McEwen, in the court case eight dual voters
were mentioned. Those eight were referred to the Australian electoral officer.
I have reviewed them, and we have one of those where there is some evidence to
support a matter, is likely that it will not be sent to the AFP and the person
will be issued with a warning letter. The other matters were either people who
were confused or people who were aged and their families et cetera had assisted
them in voting.[32]
2.40
In relation to the allegations concerning Reverend Ivor Jones, the AEC
conducted an investigation that did not find any evidence to support the claims
made by Ms Bailey:
AEC records indicate that no electors in the division of
McEwen voted more than twice. The AEC can confirm that a letter was sent to
Reverend Jones indicating that according to AEC records, it appeared he may
have voted twice, and seeking his clarification on the matter. Reverend Jones’
response made it clear that he had voted only once, through an early
declaration vote.
At around the same time, the AEC sent a letter to the elector
appearing immediately above Reverend Jones on the certified list, indicating that
according to AEC records that elector had not voted, and seeking clarification
on the matter. The response from the elector indicated that the person had cast
a vote at the same polling booth where AEC records indicated Reverend Jones had
voted. The responses of both Reverend Jones and the elector immediately above
Reverend Jones on the certified list led the Divisional Returning Officer for
McEwen to conclude that a polling official error had ocurred. No further action
was taken in either case.[33]
2.41
Information from the AEC shows that the number of incidents investigated
by the AEC is relatively small and although the initial number of apparent
multiple voters starts out at a relatively high number, on further detailed
investigation by the AEC, relatively few cases are found to reflect deliberate
attempts to vote on multiple occasions and are referred to the Australian
Federal Police (table 2.3).
Table 2.3 Multiple voting statistics, 1998 to 2007
elections
|
1998 |
2001 |
2004 |
2007 |
Number of apparent multiple
voters letters sent |
na |
16,949 |
14,402 |
20,633 |
Number of responses
indicating no further action required (% of letters sent) |
na |
14,903 (88%) |
12,082 (84%) |
18,037 (87%) |
Number of
non-responses/return undelivered (% of letters sent) |
na |
921 (5%) |
913 (6%) |
1,282 (6%) |
Number of admissions of
multiple voting |
na |
896 |
1,046 |
1,167 |
Of admissions: number due
to confusion, poor comprehension, aged (a) (% of total admissions) |
na |
739 (82%) |
835 (80%) |
955 (82%) |
Number referred to AFP |
263 |
138 (c) |
64 (b) |
10 |
Number of prosecutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Note na
Not available. (a) Of the admissions/aged category 98 per cent were 70 or over.
(b) Of the 64 cases referred, 25 were subsequently investigated by the AFP in a
day of action approach. The AFP made referrals to the DPP, but no cases were
prosecuted. (c) Of these 130 referrals, five were accepted for investigation.
Source Australian
Electoral Commission, submission 169.15, p 5; submission 203 to the Joint
Standing Committee on Electoral Matters Inquiry into the 2001 election,
p 5.
2.42
Expressed as a proportion of electors on the electoral roll, apparent
multiple voting, admissions of multiple voting and referrals to the AFP are
extremely small (table 2.4). There has been no clear upward or downward trend
in apparent multiple voting rates at the past three elections, except for a
continuing increase in admissions due to confusion, poor comprehension and age.
Table 2.4 Multiple voting rates, 2001 to 2007 elections
(per cent)
|
2001 |
2004 |
2007 |
Number of apparent multiple
voters letters sent as a proportion of total electors (%) |
0.1334 |
0.1100 |
0.1512 |
Number of responses
indicating no further action required as a proportion of total electors (%) |
0.1173 |
0.0922 |
0.1322 |
Number of admissions of
multiple voting as a proportion of total electors (%) |
0.0071 |
0.0080 |
0.0086 |
No of admissions due to confusion,
poor comprehension, aged as a proportion of total electors (%) |
0.0058 |
0.0064 |
0.0070 |
Number referred to AFP as a
proportion of total electors (%) |
0.0011 |
0.0005 |
0.0001 |
Source Australian
Electoral Commission, submission 169.15, p 5; 2007 Electoral pocketbook: election
2007 (2009), p 46.
2.43
Electoral authorities need to be vigilant to ensure that multiple voting
is discouraged and, if detected, that those responsible are identified and
appropriate action taken. There are two separate offences for multiple voting.
The penalty for voting more than once in the same election is 10 penalty
units ($1,100). The penalty for intentionally voting more than once in the same
election is 60 penalty units ($6,600) or 12 months imprisonment, or both.[34]
2.44
The AEC employs a number of approaches to detect multiple voting
including scanning certified lists following an election to identify electors
who have been marked more than once, and investigating allegations of multiple
voting arising from incident reports reported by AEC election officials and
those reported in the media and/or parliament on a case by case basis.
2.45
Investigation by the AEC is a multi-stage process that can take up to
two years to complete following an election. The process involves a check of
the scanned certified lists from polling places and sorting through the scanned
lists to detect accidental contamination of the lists and polling official
errors. The AEC then examines the apparent cases of multiple voting that remain
after the administrative eliminations and writes to each elector against whose
name more than one mark is shown, or no mark at all is shown, to seek details
from the elector of whether, when and where they voted.[35]
2.46
After the 2007 election, the AEC sent 20,633 letters to electors who,
based on AEC records, appeared to have voted more than once. Of these, the AEC
indicated that no further action was required, due to either an admission of
multiple voting (1,167) or the response indicated that no further action was
required (18,037). Common examples given by the AEC where a person may have
voted more than once but the AEC took no further action include where the:
n elector casts a
pre-poll vote and an ordinary vote but stated that they had only cast an
ordinary vote on polling day (frequently aged/culturally and linguistically
diverse electors);
n elector casts a
postal vote following receipt of a political party PVA but appears to have no
understanding that they have done so, then casts an ordinary vote on polling
day (there were quite a few examples of this, particularly with culturally and
linguistically diverse electors);
n elector applies for
and completes a postal vote and then thinks it has been misplaced so votes
again but then discovers another family member had posted it;
n elector from culturally
and linguistically diverse background casts a declaration vote in a division
outside their home division and then due to confusion or concern that their
vote may be misplaced or they have not complied with requirements properly,
votes again in their home division;
n elector is marked off
as an ordinary voter at two polling places, denies voting more than once, and
there is no match with an apparent non-voter; and
n elector demonstrates
confusion with State/local government events when replying.
2.47
It is revealing that of those electors who had admitted to multiple
voting, 82 per cent cited confusion, poor comprehension or were aged — of
those in the aged category 98 per cent were aged 70 or over.[36]
2.48
Of those who had not responded to the AEC or where letters had been
returned as undelivered (1,282), the AEC conducted a follow up involving
approximately 900 electors in late December 2008 and mid-January 2009. The
AEC advised the committee that as at 11 March 2009, approximately 300 replies
had been received. While 16 responses contained admissions of multiple voting,
the multiple voting was not intentional, but rather resulted from either
confusion or poor comprehension on the part of the elector, with a number of
these cases involving elderly electors and electors from non-English speaking
backgrounds.[37]
2.49
Of the remaining responses, approximately 125 have been recorded as polling
official error (including matches with apparent non-voters), 40 letters
were returned undelivered and the remaining approximately 120 responses
fall into a variety of categories including elector denial and evidence
inconclusive.[38]
2.50
Of the 10 cases of apparent multiple voting referred to the AFP,
eight cases were from NSW and two were from Victoria. The AEC told the
committee that it has been advised by the AFP that it did not have the
resources to investigate these, therefore no further action was taken.[39]
2.51
The AEC advised the committee that it wrote to the AFP in February 2009
to explore a replacement service agreement but that it was ‘satisfied that the
current process enables it to identify the possibility of any potential serious
multiple voting issues in relation to close seats in sufficient time to lodge a
petition with the Court of Disputed Returns, should it be deemed necessary’.[40]
2.52
The committee noted that the AEC intends to conduct an internal review
of non-voter (and multiple voter) legislation, policy and procedures in the
near future with a view to identifying any gaps or deficiencies in current
processes.[41] The AEC indicated that
when the review was finalised that it would report to the committee on the
outcomes, including any recommendations for legislative change.[42]
Committee conclusion
2.53
There is no evidence that the outcome of the 2007 election, or previous
federal elections, suffered from or are associated with systemic multiple
voting problems.
2.54
Alleged cases of multiple voting raised following the 2007 election are
illustrative of an unfounded fear of the effects of multiple voting that are
inevitably raised following an election but, when subject to close examination,
do not stand up to scrutiny.
2.55
It is surprising that, despite the recent legislative changes being
imposed for reasons of ‘integrity’, there was an overall increase in apparent
multiple voting rates at the 2007 election, as evidenced by the statistics
reported to the committee by the AEC.
2.56
It is important that the AEC continue to improve its processes to follow
up on allegations of multiple voting and its administrative arrangements to
identify instances of apparent multiple voting. The AEC have identified that
they will further review arrangements to improve multiple voter follow up processes.
2.57
That said, it needs to be more widely recognised that fears about the
effects of multiple voting are, and have been, overstated and should not be
used to deny eligible electors the opportunity to meaningfully participate in
the democratic process.
2.58
The restriction of the franchise prior to the 2007 election, largely
through the introduction of a proof of identity regime for enrolment and
provisional voting, was largely based on a view that such changes would
‘strengthen’ integrity. The AEC’s evidence on multiple voting does not support
any claim of systemic and organised voting fraud at the 2007 election, nor
previous federal elections.
2.59
The simple effect of these changes was to disenfranchise hundreds of
thousands of eligible electors without any noticeable improvement in integrity.
Election context and major issues
2.60
Every election is a unique event, influenced by a range of specific
factors as well as underlying changes in our society, culture and technology.
Preceding the 2007 election were a number of legislative changes that
significantly affected processes for applying to be on the electoral roll,
updating enrolment details and voting. Some of the major issues examined by the
committee are related to these legislative changes. Other important issues
include fallout from the court challenge over the election result in the
division of McEwen and strategies to deal with underlying changes in our
democratic system. The committee has identified a number of questions that it
has sought to answer in relation to these issues.
Enfranchisement of eligible
electors
2.61
The Commonwealth Electoral Act imposes obligations on all eligible
electors to maintain the currency of their enrolment and vote at federal
elections and referenda.[43]
2.62
Despite this obligation, there are large numbers of eligible electors
who, for a number of reasons, are not able to have their say on who they would
like to represent them in the federal parliament and form government. This
includes eligible electors who:
n are not on the
electoral roll;
n participate in an
election but find that they are not enrolled when they turn up to vote on
polling day; and
n cast a vote only to
have their vote excluded from the count because their vote was recorded as
being too late to accept into the count or they were unable, or found it
inconvenient, to prove their identity after casting their vote on polling day.
2.63
A key consideration for the committee is the extent of
disenfranchisement and whether some of the barriers to disenfranchisement can
be addressed. Participation in the electoral system by some groups of people in
the community is lower than that of the population generally. The committee
examines participation by Indigenous electors and homeless electors in chapter
6.
2.64
There are a number of different markers of the extent of under
participation in the electoral system across the general population. The
committee has noted a number of outcomes relating to the 2007 election and some
that have become evident following the election that it intends to examine
throughout this report including:
n the
estimated 1.2 million eligible electors as at March 2009 who are not on
the electoral roll and therefore unable to exercise the franchise (chapters 3
and 4);[44]
n the
estimated 1.1 million eligible electors who were not on the electoral roll
for the 2007 election (chapters 3 and 4);[45]
n the
198,742 electors, other than provisional electors, whose declaration votes
were rejected from the count because the elector was not on the roll (chapter
4);[46]
n the
100,370 electors who missed out on the close of rolls and could not, as a
result, enrol or update their enrolment details (chapter 4);[47]
n the
143,470 electors who cast a provisional vote but had their vote rejected
at the preliminary scrutiny compared to the 90,366 electors whose votes
were rejected at the 2004 election,[48] including
§
27,529 electors at the 2007 election who did not satisfy the
proof of identity requirements that they present identification at the time of
voting or at an AEC office by the Friday following polling day in order to have
their vote included in the count (chapter 3);[49]
n the
23,600 electors who applied for a postal vote but did not vote by post or
other means (chapter 3);[50] and
n the
91,354 electors who appeared to make a genuine attempt to vote in the
House of Representatives election but whose votes were ruled informal because
they made a mistake in numbering the ballot paper (chapter 8).[51]
Legislative changes between the
2004 and 2007 federal elections
2.65
A number of significant changes were made to the Commonwealth Electoral
Act and the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1984 between the 2004
and 2007 federal elections, including altered enrolment requirements for new
enrolees and those updating their enrolment details, and the introduction of
identity requirements for electors casting provisional votes.
2.66
The Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Electoral Integrity and Other
Measures) Act 2006 made a number of significant amendments to the
Commonwealth Electoral Act commencing on 22 June 2006, including:
n Introduction of proof
of identity for enrolment — From 16 April 2007, people were required to provide evidence of identity when enrolling or updating their enrolment. People
enrolling or updating their enrolment from within Australia are required to
provide their driver’s licence number on their enrolment application. If people
do not have a driver’s licence, then they are required to show a specified type
of document, for example an Australian passport or birth certificate, to an
elector in a specified class, for example an accountant or medical
practitioner. If they do not have a driver’s licence or do not possess one of the
prescribed documents, they are required to have their application countersigned
by two electors who have known the applicant for at least one month and who can
confirm the applicant’s name.
n Reduced close of
rolls period — The close of rolls period changed from a period seven days after
the issue of the writ to close at 8 pm on the third working day after the date
of the writ. There are two different deadlines for enrolling:
§
The deadline for the AEC to receive a correctly completed proof
of identity compliant enrolment form is 8 pm on the same day the writs for the
election are issued if a person is enrolling for the first time or is
re-enrolling to get back on the roll after having been removed for any reason;
§
The deadline for the AEC to receive a correctly completed proof
of identity compliant enrolment form is 8 pm three working days after the day
the writs are issued if a person is 17 years of age, but will turn 18 between
the day after the issue of the writs and election day (inclusive); or will
become an Australian citizen between the day after the issue of the writs and
the day before election day (inclusive); or is on the roll, but with an
out-of-date address or name details.
n Provisional voting —
Voters casting a provisional vote were required to provide evidence of identity
at the time of casting the vote or to the AEC by the following Friday;
n Removal from the roll
by objection on the grounds of non-residence — Prior to this amendment, if an
elector was mistakenly removed from the electoral roll by objection on the
ground of non-residence, his or her declaration vote would be admitted to the
count.
n Funding and
disclosure arrangements:
§
All disclosure thresholds for political donations and receipts
were increased to amounts above $10,000, and are adjusted annually for
inflation ($10,900 for the period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009);
§
Third parties (persons other than parties, candidates and groups,
members of Parliament and Commonwealth departments and agencies) that incur
expenditure for a political purpose in excess of the disclosure threshold, or
if they receive gifts that are used for such expenditure, are now required to
complete annual disclosure returns. Previously, they were required to do so
only for election periods;
§
The definition of ‘associated entity’ was extended to include
entities with financial membership of, or voting rights in, a registered
political party, and entities on whose behalf a person exercises such
membership or voting rights; and
§
Broadcasters and publishers are no longer required to lodge
disclosure returns on electoral advertisements broadcast or published during
election periods.
2.67
Further amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act were made by the Electoral
and Referendum Legislation Amendment Act 2007 commencing on 15 March 2007
including:
n General postal voting
status for certain electors — Members of the Australian Defence Force and
Australian Federal Police personnel serving outside of Australia, and persons
registered as eligible overseas electors, may apply for registration as general
postal voters;
n Postal voting
arrangements — A number of amendments relating to the receipt of applications
for a postal vote and the dispatch of postal vote certificates including:
§
The deadline for receipt of postal vote applications is 6 pm on
the Thursday two days prior to election day. While not required to post or
deliver postal voting material to those electors whose postal vote applications
are received after this time, the AEC is to make reasonable efforts to contact
applicants whose postal vote applications are received after the deadline to
advise them of the need to vote by other means.
§
Postal vote applications received by the AEC up to and including
6 pm on the Friday eight days before election day will be delivered to the
applicant by post or other appropriate means (not being electronic means). For
applications received within this time, the applicant may also request on the
application form that a means of delivery other than post (not being electronic
means) be used. If the alternative means is considered to be reasonable and
practicable, then the AEC will deliver the postal voting material by that
means.
§
For postal vote applications received after 6 pm on the Friday
eight days before election day and up to and including 6 pm on the Thursday two
days before election day, the AEC will deliver the postal voting material to
the applicant by the most reasonable and practicable means (not being
electronic means).
§
If a completed postal vote certificate (if posted or delivered
before the close of the poll) would be unlikely to reach the appropriate
Divisional Returning Officer (DRO) within 13 days after election day, the range
of AEC officers who can receive such an envelope (on or before the close of the
poll) has been expanded to include electoral visitors at hospitals and prisons,
mobile team leaders, certain office holders and on-going employees at the AEC’s capital city offices.
2.68
A key consideration for the committee in this report is to examine the
impact of these legislative changes on the 2007 election.
2.69
Where possible, the committee has sought to determine the direct and
indirect impact of these changes and has made appropriate recommendations regarding
their continuing operation. The impact of legislative changes on the electoral
roll is examined in chapters 3 and 4.
McEwen recount and Henderson review
2.70
Following the election, a petition was filed with the Court of Disputed
Returns on 25 January 2008, relating to the conduct of the recount in the
division of McEwen.
2.71
The initial count in the division of McEwen had found that candidate Mr Rob
Mitchell (Australian Labor Party) had won the election by a margin of six
votes. Following a recount, candidate Ms Fran Bailey (Liberal Party of
Australia) was found to have won the election by a margin of 12 votes.[52]
2.72
The basis of the petition before the court was that at least 40 of the
643 reserved ballot-papers had been wrongly rejected by the Australian
Electoral Officer and that those ballot-papers each indicated a preference, by
the elector, for the petitioner ahead of the first respondent. In one instance
it was alleged that a ballot-paper which recorded a preference for the first
respondent ahead of the petitioner had been wrongly admitted to the count.[53]
2.73
The final decision by the court was made on 2 July 2008, with the court
ruling that the final margin in favour of Ms Fran Bailey was 27 votes.[54]
2.74
In coming to this view, the court conducted a review of 643 reserved
ballot papers that had been set aside during the initial count when scrutineers
challenged the decision of the Divisional Returning Officer. As a result of the
court’s review of these ballot papers, the Court reversed 154 of the decisions
made by the Australian Electoral Officer during the recount in respect of the
463 ballot papers on which it ruled.[55]
2.75
The court also made a number of important observations in respect of the
issues associated with ruling on the formality of ballot papers and developed a
set of ‘principles’ (the first two ‘cardinal’ principles and the second three ‘subordinate’
principles) that reflected past AEC practice in ruling on formality and various
judgements by courts on these matters:
n That the ballot,
being a means of protecting the franchise, should not be made an instrument to
defeat it;
n Doubtful questions of
form should be resolved in favour of the franchise where there is no doubt as
to the real intention of the voter;
n When seeking to
determine the voter’s intention resort must be had, exclusively, to what the
voter has written on the ballot paper;
n The ballot paper
should be read and construed as a whole; and
n A voter’s intention
will not be expressed with the necessary clarity unless the intention is
unmistakeable and can be ascertained with certainty.[56]
2.76
Following the court’s decision, the AEC commissioned a recently retired
senior public servant, Mr Alan Henderson PSM, to examine the implications of
the decision by the Court of Disputed Returns on disputed ballot papers. The
terms of reference for the review stated that:
The review is to identify action that should be taken by the
AEC to ensure that processes and procedures are in place for future elections
to address the matters identified in the Court's decision. The review will
culminate in the provision of a report to the Electoral Commissioner that sets
out findings and recommendations and presents a way forward on dealing with
these matters.
In conducting the review, the reviewer will:
n consider the specific
ballot-papers and the Court's decision in Mitchell and any implications in the
way in which electoral officials are supported by AEC policies, guidelines,
procedures, manuals, and training in making decisions about the formality of
ballot-papers;
n consult with key
stakeholders about the impact of the Court's decision on the scrutiny process
for electoral events;
n identify measures to
improve the quality, consistency, transparency and accountability of
decision-making by electoral officials on the formality of ballot-papers; and
n identify any
necessary changes to the existing policies, guidelines, procedures, manuals and
training produced by the AEC on the formality of ballot-papers.[57]
2.77
The Court of Disputed Returns’ decision on the McEwen petition, the findings
of the Henderson review and the AEC’s proposed response has important
implications for the conduct of future elections, including interpretation of formality
by electoral officials.
2.78
Some of the key formality issues addressed by the committee include:
n
What changes, if any, are required in legislation, policy and
practice as a result of the court’s judgement and the Henderson review? (chapter
8)
n
Should there be a change in the process for recount procedures so
that more than one individual is responsible for deciding on the formality of
ballot papers? (chapter 8)
n
What are the major factors that contribute to informality at
federal elections? (chapter 8)
n
What measures, if any, can be taken to include votes in the
election count where a clear preference has been expressed but a genuine
mistake has been made in completing the ballot paper? (chapter 8)
Electoral roll
2.79
To be eligible to vote, electors who have changed their address for
which they are enrolled or are not enrolled, must be proactive in completing a
proof of identity compliant enrolment form prior to the close of rolls. At the
close of rolls on 23 October 2007 (or 17 October for new enrolments),
13,645,073 people were enrolled, an increase of 623,843 electors
(4.8 per cent) compared to the 2004 election (table 2.5).
Table 2.5 Electors enrolled at close of rolls, by
jurisdiction, 1998 to 2007 elections
Jurisdiction |
1998 |
2001 |
2004 |
2007 |
2004–2007
% change |
NSW |
4,031,749 |
4,204,383 |
4,302,122 |
4,495,336 |
4.49 |
VIC |
3,056,887 |
3,218,746 |
3,292,409 |
3,442,096 |
4.55 |
QLD |
2,177,556 |
2,319,481 |
2,463,402 |
2,612,300 |
6.04 |
WA |
1,140,845 |
1,200,438 |
1,237,349 |
1,312,942 |
6.11 |
SA |
1,006,398 |
1,034,377 |
1,049,814 |
1,075,968 |
2.49 |
TAS |
329,751 |
328,829 |
339,589 |
349,788 |
3.00 |
ACT |
208,684 |
219,876 |
224,896 |
238,742 |
6.16 |
NT |
104,755 |
110,501 |
111,649 |
117,901 |
5.60 |
Australia |
12,056,625 |
12,636,631 |
13,021,230 |
13,645,073 |
4.79 |
Source Australian
Electoral Commission, submission 169, p 7.
2.80
Differences in population growth and the effectiveness of efforts to get
people on the electoral roll influence the growth of the electoral roll across
jurisdictions. The Australian Electoral Commission estimated that at the close
of rolls for the 2007 election, 92.3 per cent of eligible electors were
enrolled to vote. This was an increase of 0.8 percentage points compared
to the close of rolls at the 2004 election.[58]
2.81
Since the election, the number of electors on the roll has dropped
alarmingly. The AEC recently told the committee that an estimated
1.2 million electors were not on the electoral roll, and that to achieve the
2007 election participation rate of 92.3 per cent, an additional
300,000 electors would need to be placed on the electoral roll.[59]
2.82
It is important to maintain the integrity of the electoral roll and
ensure that it remains as accurate as possible but also that there are no unreasonable
barriers to enrolling and maintaining enrolment. Some of the key issues
relating to the electoral roll considered by the committee include:
n How
did the legislative changes enacted between the 2004 and 2007 election affect
eligible electors’ ability to maintain their enrolment, or get on the roll, and
successfully record a vote at the 2007 election? (chapters 3 and 4)
n What
was the effectiveness of strategies used by the AEC to ensure that eligible
electors were on the roll both before and following the election? (chapter 4)
n What
changes, if any, could be made to make it easier for electors to update and
maintain their enrolment whilst not reducing the integrity of the electoral
roll? (chapters 3 and 4)
Voter turnout and votes issued
2.83
A total of 13,364,359 people sought to cast a vote at the 2007 federal
election. Voter turnout, calculated as the number of votes counted divided by
the total number of electors on the roll for the election varied across
jurisdictions and for the House of Representatives and the Senate (table 2.6).
Table 2.6 Voter
turnout, House of Representatives and Senate, by jurisdiction, 2007 election (per cent)
Jurisdiction |
House
of Representatives |
Senate |
|
Turnout
2007
election (%) |
2004-2007
percentage point change |
Turnout
2007
election (%) |
2004-2007
percentage point change |
New South Wales |
94.99 |
+0.29 |
95.40 |
+0.29 |
Victoria |
95.17 |
+0.30 |
95.60 |
+0.17 |
Queensland |
94.41 |
+0.67 |
94.81 |
+0.68 |
Western Australia |
93.26 |
+0.47 |
93.86 |
+0.20 |
South Australia |
95.42 |
+0.63 |
95.83 |
+0.47 |
Tasmania |
95.76 |
+0.11 |
95.98 |
+0.08 |
Australian Capital
Territory |
95.85 |
+0.90 |
96.00 |
+0.79 |
Northern Territory |
86.53 |
+2.28 |
86.88 |
+2.47 |
Australia |
94.76 |
+0.44 |
95.17 |
+0.35 |
Source Australian
Electoral Commission, Virtual Tally Room, accessed on 3 September 2008 at http://results.aec.gov.au/13745/Website/HouseTurnoutByState-13745.htm
and http://results.aec.gov.au/13745/Website/SenateTurnoutByState-13745.htm.
2.84
Around 4 in 5 people nationally casting a vote at the 2007 Federal
election did so in person, attending one of the 7,723 polling places operating
on election day (table 2.7). The upward trend towards an increase in people
seeking to utilise ’early voting’ (pre-poll and postal voting) continued, with
more than 1.1 million electors (8.3 per cent) casting a pre-poll vote
at one of the 426 centres operating over the three weeks to polling day
and more than 833 000 voters (6.2 per cent) casting a postal
vote.[60]
Table 2.7 Votes counted by type, Senate, by jurisdiction,
1998 to 2007 elections
|
1998 |
2001 |
2004 |
2007 |
|
Number |
% |
Number |
% |
Number |
% |
Number |
% |
Ordinary |
9,513,300 |
82.1 |
10,172,617 |
84.1 |
10,195,459 |
82.1 |
10,396,694 |
80.0 |
Provisional |
116,158 |
1.9 |
107,396 |
0.9 |
112,560 |
0.9 |
42,162 |
0.3 |
Absent |
776,859 |
6.7 |
780,961 |
6.5 |
771,332 |
6.2 |
771,065 |
5.9 |
Pre-poll |
692,377 |
6.0 |
585,616 |
4.8 |
726,797 |
5.9 |
1,073,330 |
8.3 |
Postal |
488,671 |
4.2 |
451,900 |
3.7 |
613,871 |
4.9 |
704,563 |
5.4 |
Total |
11,587,365 |
100 |
12,098,490 |
100 |
12,420,019 |
100 |
12,987,814 |
100 |
Source Appendix
C, table C.2.
2.85
Of those votes issued, not all are necessarily included in the election
count, with some votes rejected on the basis of an elector being ineligible to
vote. At the 2007 election there was a marked decline in the proportion of
provisional votes admitted to the count, with less than 15 per cent of
provisional votes for the House of Representatives being admitted to the count,
compared to an average of nearly 50 per cent over the previous five
federal elections.[61]
2.86
While early voting is clearly an important service provided to many
electors, administration of early voting places a higher workload on the AEC
than ordinary voting and can have the effect of slowing down the counting of
votes. Early voting also has implications for the way that the AEC administers
the election and the campaign activities of political parties.
2.87
The reliance on the postal network for a timely return of postal votes is
an issue for many electors, particularly those in rural and remote areas. At
the 2007 election, some of the difference between the number of postal votes
issued (833,178) and postal votes received (749,566) may reflect an inability
of electors to meet the timelines for the return of postal votes, despite their
best efforts to do so.
2.88
It is important that the act of voting is as accessible as possible
whilst maintaining the integrity of the election count. Some of the key issues
addressed by the committee include:
n How
did the legislative changes enacted between the 2004 and 2007 election affect
the likelihood of provisional and other declaration votes being included in the
election count? (chapter 4)
n What
groups of electors, if any, are disadvantaged by current arrangements? What can
be done to encourage greater participation by these groups in the electoral
system? (chapter 6)
n What
is the impact of the longer-term trend to more people voting before polling day
through postal voting and pre-poll voting? What changes, if any, should be made
in response to this trend? (chapter 7)
n How
can postal voting arrangements be improved to better facilitate participation
by electors, particularly those living in rural and remote areas? (chapter 3)
Informal voting
2.89
A small minority of people apparently intentionally seek to make an
informal vote. However, the AEC and other researchers have found that the
reason why many votes are ruled informal reflects a number of factors including
low levels of literacy, English language competence and the complexity arising
from different voting systems, rather than a lack of political interest.[62]
Statistical studies of informality at previous federal elections have linked
informality rates with levels of eduction and proficiency in English, the number
of candidates on the ballot paper, proximity to other election events and
different voting systems for state and territory elections.[63]
2.90
The rate of informal voting at the 2007 Federal election declined across
all jurisdictions for both the House of Representatives and the Senate compared
to the 2004 election (table 2.8). This was the first decline in the national
rate of informal voting since the 1993 election.[64]
Table 2.8 Informal
voting, House of Representatives and Senate, by jurisdiction, 2004 and 2007
elections (per cent)
Jurisdiction |
House
of Representatives |
Senate |
|
Informal
votes (%) |
2004–2007
percentage point change |
Informal
votes (%) |
2004–2007
percentage point change |
New South Wales |
4.95 |
-1.17 |
2.24 |
-1.23 |
Victoria |
3.26 |
-0.84 |
3.28 |
-1.85 |
Queensland |
3.56 |
-1.60 |
2.34 |
-0.45 |
Western Australia |
3.85 |
-1.47 |
2.42 |
-1.12 |
South Australia |
3.78 |
-1.78 |
2.38 |
-1.15 |
Tasmania |
2.92 |
-0.67 |
2.63 |
-0.74 |
Australian Capital
Territory |
2.31 |
-1.13 |
1.70 |
-0.76 |
Northern Territory |
3.85 |
-0.60 |
1.94 |
-1.18 |
National |
3.95 |
-1.23 |
2.55 |
-1.20 |
Source Australian
Electoral Commission, submission 169, pp 62–63.
2.91
Analysis of informal ballot papers by the AEC revealed that almost three
quarters of the decline in informality at a national level for the House of Representatives
was due to a reduction of almost 46,000 ballot papers that were marked
with a ‘1 only’ and a 26,000 reduction in the number of ‘blank’ ballot
papers.[65]
2.92
Some of the key findings of the AEC’s analysis of informal ballot papers
were that:
n divisions with the
highest percentage of informal votes in 2004 continued to have the highest
levels in 2007;
n the ten divisions
with the highest percentage of informal votes were all located in Western
Sydney. They were: Blaxland, Watson, Chifley, Prospect, Fowler, Reid,
Parramatta, Banks, Werriwa and Bennelong;
n in 2007 five of the
top six divisions with the highest rates of informality were also the five
electorates with the highest proportion of people from a non-English speaking
background;
n the decrease in informal
voting across the past two federal elections coincided with a decrease in the
average number of candidates (7.27 in 2004 to 6.66 in 2007);
n NSW and QLD state
electoral legislation provides for optional preferential voting at state
elections. Both states continue to record the highest proportion of informal
votes in federal elections due to electors casting number ‘1 only’ and
‘incomplete’ ballots.[66]
2.93
It is important that where voters go to the effort of casting an
informed and valid vote that their intentions are reflected in the way a formal
vote is interpreted and counted. Some of the key issues relating to informal
voting examined by the committee include:
n What
were the factors that contributed to the improved overall informality result
for both the Senate and House of Representatives? (chapter 8)
n What
groups of electors and electorates, if any, are more likely to record an
informal vote? What strategies should be pursued to improve an elector’s
ability to cast a valid vote? (chapter 8)
n What
are the options for counting systems to be ‘inclusive’ and for the elector’s
intent to be determined thereby keeping votes otherwise ruled informal in the
count for as long as possible? (chapter 8)
Election costs
2.94
The AEC estimate that the cost of the 2007 federal election was $113 million
(excluding $49 million in public funding provided to election candidates),
with most of the election related to staffing costs, although advertising and
promotion expenses were also significant.[67]
2.95
A key additional cost for the 2007 election was a $24.4 million advertising
campaign, consisting of $14.9 million for pre-election enrolment
advertising leading up to the announcement of the election and
$9.5 million for advertising after the announcement of the election.[68]
The cost of advertising for the 2007 election was $29.5 million in total,
up from $10.2 million for the 2004 election.[69]
2.96
The cost of running elections has been steadily rising. In real terms,
the cost per elector (excluding public funding) has risen by 22 per cent
since 1996, with all of the increase occurring between the 2004 and 2007 elections
(figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2 Election costs, 1996 to 2007 elections ($ per
elector)
Source Australian
Electoral Commission, Electoral pocketbook: election 2007 (2009), p 73.
2.97
A key driver of the higher cost of the 2007 election was the increased
spending on advertising. The committee calculates that if the additional
$19.3 million spend on advertising was excluded, the cost per elector for
the 2007 election would have been around $6.95, representing an 8.9 per
cent real increase in the cost of the 2007 election compared to the 2004
election. The AEC was required to fund this increased advertising expenditure
by drawing on its accumulated cash reserves, running operating losses over the
financial years 2006-07 and 2007-08.[70] Such a strategy to lift
enrolment is obviously unsustainable over the longer term.
2.98
The AEC have pointed to a range of cost pressures, the implementation of
an additional efficiency dividend and structural rigidities in some of their
organisational areas, as creating a situation that may not allow future
operations to continue on a sustainable basis.
2.99
It is important that the AEC is appropriately funded and managed so that
it can conduct the essential operations required for the conduct of elections.
Some of the key issued addressed by the committee include:
n What
was the relative effectiveness and sustainability of the cost of advertising
for the 2007 election? (chapter 4)
n What
is the impact on the AEC of external budget factors and cost pressures in its
areas of operation? (chapter 9)
n To
what extent does the Commonwealth Electoral Act impose specific operational
requirements and structures on the AEC? (chapter 9)
n Is
the current business model of the AEC sustainable, and, does it encourage
innovation given technological developments and the demands of electors?
(chapter 9)