Bills Digest no. 96 2015–16
PDF version [708KB]
WARNING: This Digest was prepared for debate. It reflects the legislation as introduced and does not canvass subsequent amendments. This Digest does not have any official legal status. Other sources should be consulted to determine the subsequent official status of the Bill.
Damon Muller
Politics and Public Administration Section
1 March 2016
Contents
The
Bills Digest at a glance
Purpose of the Bill
Structure of the Bill
Background
Committee consideration
Policy position of non-government parties/independents
Position of major interest groups
Financial implications
Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights
Key issues and provisions
Other provisions
Concluding comments
Date introduced: 22
February 2016
House: House of
Representatives
Portfolio: Finance
Commencement: The
day after Royal Assent.
Links: The links to the Bill,
its Explanatory Memorandum and second reading speech can be found on the
Bill’s home page, or through the Australian
Parliament website.
When Bills have been passed and have received Royal Assent, they
become Acts, which can be found at the ComLaw
website.
The Commonwealth Electoral Amendment
Bill 2016 (the Bill) constitutes the first response of the Government to the
reports of the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters from its inquiry
into the 2013 Federal Election, particularly in regards to the recommendations
to change the Senate voting system. The recommended changes to the Senate
electoral system by the Committee followed the election of senators on the
basis of very small primary votes, and a perception that the group voting
ticket system was being manipulated by some parties to direct preferences in a
way that was not consistent with voter expectations.
The Committee recommended that the Senate voting system be
changed to allow voters to allocate as many preferences as they desired either
above or below the line.
The Bill has three Parts. Part 1 seeks to abolish
group voting tickets and replace above the line voting with a requirement that
voters allocate at least six preferences above the line. The voters’
preferences will then only be counted against the candidates in the groups that
received their preferences, and will not flow to any other parties on the
ballot paper. The Bill has a savings provision that allow voters who allocate
at least one vote above the line to have their ballot paper count as formal and
the preferences counted.
Below the line voting will remain full preferential under
the Bill, however the Bill does increase the allowed number of below the line
numbering errors from three to five.
Part 2 of the Bill will prohibit an individual
being the registered officer of more than one political party simultaneously.
This will prevent a single individual forming multiple political parties in
order to direct preferences of voters to those parties.
Part 3 of the Bill will allow parties to submit a
party logo to the AEC to be added to their party registration, and for that
logo to be printed in black and white on Senate and House of Representatives
ballot papers.
Many electoral experts and commentators on the Bill agree
that the above the line optional preferential voting provisions would improve
the translation of the expression of the voters’ will into the election of
candidates, and that it would prevent the election of candidates on very small
primary votes. Many also express the view that the retention of compulsory full
preferencing below the line is contrary to the Committee’s recommendations, will
create undesirable inconsistencies in the Senate electoral system, and is
generally inexplicable from a policy perspective. At least one electoral expert
and one cross bench Senator have called into question the constitutionality of
the Bill.
Support for the main change proposed by the Bill, optional
preferential voting above the line, is split along party lines. The Coalition
and the Greens support the Bill, and the ALP and most of the Crossbench
Senators oppose the Bill. Opposition to the Bill appears due to the expected
electoral effects of the changes for the results of future election, the rushed
passage of the Bill, and the effects of the changes on the diversity of
representation in the Senate.
The AEC has publically stated that it will be able to
conduct an election under the provisions of the Bill provided they have at
least three months in which to implement the changes, however caution that any
large change to the electoral system, particularly in the lead up to an
election, creates risks. The number of ballot papers that must have multiple
preferences counted will increase considerably under the voting system changes,
which will have implications for the cost of the election. These additional
costs have not yet been made public.
The purpose of the Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill
2016 (the Bill) is to amend the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (the
Act) to change the method of electing senators by introducing a form of
optional preferential voting to the Senate ballot paper.
The Bill amends the Act to:
- abolish
the use of group voting tickets (GVTs) that allow parties and groups in Senate
elections to nominate the preferences to be followed by ‘above the line’ (ATL)
votes for their group
- change
the Senate ballot paper to instruct voters who vote above the line to nominate
a minimum of six preferences if they vote above the line on their ballot paper
and how that translates into preferences for candidates
- expand
the allowed number of sequencing errors allowed on formal ballot papers for
below the line votes
- remove
the ability for one individual to be the registered officer for more than one
registered political party concurrently and
- allow
for political parties to nominate that logos be printed on both the Senate and the
House of Representatives ballot papers alongside the party names.
The Bill is divided into three parts:
- Part
1 enacts the changes to the Senate ballot paper structure and changes a
number of ballot paper handing instructions and procedures
- Part
2 implements the changes to registered officers and deputy registered
officers of political parties
- Part
3 sets out the requirements for the registration of party logos with the Australian
Electoral Commission (AEC).
The ballot paper currently used in the election of
Senators in each state to the Senate was created by the Commonwealth
Electoral Legislation Amendment Act 1983. The legislation followed a
recommendation from the 1983 report of the Joint Select Committee on Electoral
Reform (JSCER)[1]
and was designed to address the high percentage of informal voting (that is,
votes that do not correctly follow the prescribed numbering rules and cannot be
admitted into the count) in the Senate, which had reached 12.31 per cent by the
1974 Senate election.[2]
The Committee reported that in the 1977 and 1983 Senate
elections over 75 per cent of informal votes were due to unintentional error,
such as a square left unnumbered or a number repeated. [3]
The resulting amendment did not fundamentally change the way that the Senate
vote was counted, but substantially changed the way that the voters completed
the ballot paper by allowing the voter to vote ‘above the line’ for their
preferred party or group.
The method by which the Senate ballot paper was changed
sought to formalise the common practice of voters voting according to the How
To Vote (HTV) material of their preferred party.[4]
Each party could submit up to three different group voting tickets (GVTs) to
the AEC, each of which provided a full preference distribution for all of the
candidates on the ballot paper. By placing a 1 vote above the line, the voter’s
preferences would be distributed according to the GVT submitted by the party.
If the group submits two group voting tickets, their above
the line votes are divided into two halves and half of the above the line votes
following one group voting ticket and the other half follow the other group
voting ticket. If the group submits three group voting tickets, their votes are
divided in three and one third of the votes each follow one of the three group
voting tickets. Each group voting ticket must have the candidates in their own
group listed first, in the order in which they occur on the ballot paper, but
after the candidates in the group it is impossible for the voter to know which
of the group’s tickets their vote will follow, and therefore where their
preferences will flow.
The new Senate ballot paper arguably worked well for a
number of years, with above the line voting quickly became the most popular way
of completing a Senate ballot paper and informality dropping to 2.96 per cent.[5]
By the 2013 federal election, only 3.5 per cent of voters were completing their
own preferences.[6]
The electoral system used to elect senators is a variant
of proportional representation through single transferable vote (STV). The
intention of the system is that members are elected to multi-member districts
(six, in the case of a normal half-Senate election in a state) roughly in
proportion to the share of vote their party receives. There are limitations to
how proportional the system can be (six vacancies cannot accommodate ten
candidates all of whom win ten per cent of the vote, for example), however in
being both proportional and preferential, in general the system should return a
result broadly consistent with the will of the electorate.
The results of the 2013 Senate election caused
considerable surprise amongst the media and the general public. A number of
unusual results had occurred:
In five out of the six States, a candidate was elected from a
party which had never previously been represented in the federal Parliament.
For the first time ever, the seats in one State, South
Australia, were divided between five different parties.
In Victoria, a minor party candidate was elected after having
polled only 0.5 per cent of the first preference votes cast in the State.[7]
While the result from the 2013 Senate election was
sufficiently against expectation that the Parliament was roused into action, it
was not the first Senate election in which a result inconsistent with the
principles of proportional representation occurred. In the 2004 Victorian
Senate election a candidate was elected on a first preference vote of 0.13
quotas, or 1.85 per cent of the total vote,[8]
and in the 2010 Victorian Senate election a candidate was elected on 0.16
quotas or 2.33 per cent of the total vote.[9]
To put this into context, a Senator is declared elected in a normal half Senate
election when they have gained one full quota, or 14.3 per cent of the vote,
either as first preferences, or through transfers from other candidates.
A comprehensive examination of the issues that emerged
from the 2013 Senate election has been provided by the JSCEM in its Interim
Report, and will not be repeated here.[10]
The Interim Report made six recommendations.
Recommendations 1 and 2 recommended abolishing group voting tickets in the Senate
and allowing optional preferential voting both above and below the line on the
Senate ballot paper. Recommendation 3 was that the AEC be adequately resourced
to provide a voter education campaign to explain the changes. Recommendation 4
related to increasing the requirements to register a political party, and
recommendation 5 was that these new requirements apply to all new parties immediately
and all existing parties within 12 months. Recommendation 6 related to
candidates being resident in the state in which they were applying for
election.
In his forward to the May 2014 report, the then Chair Tony
Smith, the member for Casey, stated:
This report has been produced at this time to not only
provide the Parliament with the time to legislate change, but to enable
thorough and adequate information, education and explanation of the
improvements to the voting public well in advance of the next election.
It is critically important that the Parliament considers
these recommendations for reform – and legislation to enshrine them into
electoral law – as a very high priority.[11]
The government has not yet tabled a formal response to the
Interim Report, however the Second Reading Speech states that the Bill responds
to key elements of the report.
Joint Standing Committee on
Electoral Matters
The Bill has been referred to the Joint Standing Committee
for Electoral Matters (JSCEM) for inquiry and report by 2 March 2016. Details
of the inquiry are at the inquiry
homepage.[12]
Australian Labor Party
In May 2014 when the Interim Report of the Joint
Standing Committee on Electoral Matters was released, proposing moving to
optional preferential voting in the Senate, it was with the support of the
Labor members of the Committee. The deputy chair of the Committee, Alan
Griffin, member for Bruce, stated at the time that he believed that above the
line voting was not operating as had been intended.[13]
Shadow Special Minister of State Gary Gray stated that the ‘changes will make
the Senate voting system more transparent and will mean a full translation of
voter intention to the electoral outcome’.[14]
Within 12 months of the publication of the report, the media
reported Labor opposition to the reforms:
The Senate Opposition Leader, Penny Wong, and her deputy,
Stephen Conroy, strongly backed by powerbroker Sam Dastyari, have told Bill
Shorten they will not support changes recommended by an all-party committee
last year that would eliminate group ticket voting and introduce optional
preferential voting above the line in Senate elections.
It has created a clear divide between them and their lower
house colleagues who remain strongly supportive of the changes recommended in
the highly regarded report of the committee chaired by government backbencher
Tony Smith released a year ago.[15]
Senator Dastyari stated that the changes would ‘risk forever
preventing a progressive Senate’.[16]
More recent media reports suggest that the opposition of some in the ALP is due
to the potential to reduce party factional control over Senate places, however
it is not clear how this might occur.[17]
Statements surrounding the introduction of the Bill indicate
that the ALP, whilst internally divided, officially opposes the Bill. Mr Gray informed
the Chamber:
I lost the argument in my party room on Senate reform, so
Labor will oppose the substantive reforms that are enshrined in this bill. I
think that is sad, but it is a reality. My party has moved that it will be opposing
this bill and therefore I oppose this bill.[18]
Australian Greens
The Australian Greens have supported changes to the Senate
voting system since 2004. The 2004 election to the Senate of Family First
Senator Steve Fielding over the Greens candidate was a ‘perverse result’
according to Greens Senator Bob Brown and ‘outrageous’.[19]
According to a media interview with the unsuccessful Greens candidate, Mr David
Risstrom:
“The Senate election system needs to be reformed to allow
people to vote with their preference above the line,”
Such a proposal would allow voters to ignore the deals
parties have done between themselves, something that can already be achieved by
voting below the line.[20]
In December 2004 Senator Bob Brown introduced the Greens’ first
Senate voting reform bill, the Voter’s Choice (Preference Allocation) Bill 2004.
In introducing the Bill, Senator Brown specifically cited again the ‘perverse’
outcome in the 2004 election. The Bill, which was not passed, would have required
voters to number all of the squares above the line, consistent with the full
compulsory preferencing on the House of Representatives ballot paper.[21]
The Greens introduced a similar Bill in 2008, the
Commonwealth Electoral (Above-the-line Voting) Amendment Bill 2008. The 2008
Bill, which did not proceed and lapsed at the end of the 42nd Parliament, would
have required the voter to allocate at least four preferences above the line.[22]
Following the 2013 federal election, the Greens once again
called for senate electoral reform, noting wins in the Senate election of two
Senate candidates who polled less than one per cent of the vote.[23]
At the time of the release of the JSCEM’s Interim Report,
Greens Senator and democracy spokesperson Senator Lee Rhiannon, expressed
strong support for the reforms to the voting system. According to Senator Rhiannon,
‘the recommendation on voters determining their own preferences is consistent
with the model that Greens have been calling for many years.’[24]
The Greens continue to indicate their support for the
reforms to the Senate voting system, but have stated that their support for the
Bill is contingent on the existing the party registration requirements for
small parties are not changing. [25]
The Greens have made no specific comment on the provision of the Bill to not
allow an individual to be the registered officer of more than one party
simultaneously, suggesting that the Greens do not consider the changes to
requirements for registered officers to make it harder for small parties to
gain registration.
On 25 February 2016 the Greens voted with the government in
the Senate to defeat a motion that would have referred the Bill to the Finance
and Public Administration Legislation Committee to report by 12 May 2016.[26]
This reference would have made it unlikely that the Bill be debated before the
Budget on 10 May 2016.
Minor Parties and Independents
Senator Nick Xenophon is the sole non-Greens crossbench
Senators to have expressed strong support for the reforms. It was reported
before the Bill had been introduced that the Government had secured Senator
Xenophon’s support to pass it through the Senate.[27]
In late 2015 Senator Xenophon had expressed support for
reform to Senate voting which would require votes to number three squares above
the line and 12 below the line.[28]
Senator Xenophon had introduced a private member’s bill,
the Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Above the Line Voting) Bill in November
2013, which would have required at least one above the line vote and at least
as many below the line votes as there were vacancies, similar to the full
recommendation of the JSCEM.[29]
Other crossbench Senators have generally decried the
changes. South Australian Family First Senator Bob Day stated that the Senate
reform would ‘get rid’ of Family First and the Liberal Democrat Party and he had
flagged a constitutional challenge to the laws.[30]
Senator Day’s submission to the JSCEM Inquiry into the Bill again highlighted
constitutional issues, the rushed treatment of the Bill in Parliament, and
stated his preference for optional preferential voting below the line, with
group voting tickets retained above the line.[31]
Liberal Democrat Senator David Leyonhjelm has stated that
he is less likely to support the government’s legislative agenda due to the
Senate reforms.[32]
The Liberal Democrats’ submission to the JSCEM Inquiry into the Bill states
that the provisions of the Bill are ‘an attack on the integrity of
representative democracy in our federal parliament’. They notes a concern with
high levels of vote exhaustion under the proposed voting system, that it will
advantage the major political parties, and that removal of group voting tickets
removes power from electors.[33]
The Australian Motoring Enthusiast Party Submission to the
Inquiry states that they believe the changes will benefit the major parties and
that the current Senate voting system continues to work well. They call for an ‘Independent
Inquiry into the value of diversity in the Senate’.
Neither Senator Lambie nor Senator Lazarus have released
public statements in relation to the changes nor provided submissions to the
Inquiry into the Bill. Tasmanian Senator Jacqui Lambie appears to support the
requirements to allocate six preferences above the line.[34]
Senator Lazarus is cited in relation to the changes as stating that the government
is pushing for greater control of the Senate.[35]
The Palmer United Party also did not make a submission into the Inquiry.
Senator Wang has called for the government to call a double dissolution
election, but does not appear to have publically commented on the Bill or the
proposed changes.[36]
Support for the reforms from electoral experts has been
widespread, although not unanimous. Much of the debate focuses on the merits of
implementing optional preferential voting for the Senate, as opposed to other
approaches to Senate reform such as implementing a threshold vote in order to
be elected, which was played out through submissions and subsequent hearings
for the JSCEM’s 2013 election inquiry.
In discussions since the introduction of the Bill, there
has been general dissatisfaction by electoral experts with retaining the
requirement to complete all preferences when voting below the line.[37]
An objection to the retention of full compulsory below the line voting is also
highlighted in many of the submissions to the JSCEM’s Inquiry into the Bill.[38]
Prior to being removed in a government amendment, the
proposal to not count Senate votes on election night was subject to criticism
by ABC election analyst Antony Green.[39]
Veteran psephologist Malcolm Mackerras is the only high
profile Australian electoral expert who has publically expressed general
opposition to the reforms.[40]
Mackerras suggest that the proposal is ‘designed to intimidate people into
voting above the line and it’s also particularly designed to stop people
messing about with the order the parties have [for their own candidates].’
Mackerras’ main objection to the changes proposed by the
Bill appears to be that he believes it turns the Senate electoral system into
effectively a party list system (a form of proportional representation that is
common in European electoral systems and is proportional but not preferential),
and he believes list systems are unconstitutional. Furthermore he believes the
current group voting ticket system is also unconstitutional as it does not
allow for Senators to be ‘directly chosen’ by the people of the state, as is
required by Section 7 of the Constitution.[41]
Representatives of small parties provided submissions to
the inquiry opposing the changes that would be enacted by the Bill, either
entirely[42]
or in part[43].
Where the small parties tended to support the Bill it was in relation to the
provisions such as logos on ballot papers and restrictions on registered
officers. The small parties that agreed with some of the provisions of the Bill
however objected to the optional preferential voting above the line provisions.
In the months and weeks leading up to the introduction of
the Bill there had been considerable speculation in the media as to the form
that the reforms would take, however the exact changes were not revealed until
the Bill was introduced into Parliament on 22 February 2016. As the government
has been dependent on the Senate crossbench (whose re-election might be
affected by Senate reform) to pass any of its broader legislative agenda
opposed by the ALP and the Greens, it was speculated that the government would
wait until the last possible time to introduce the Senate reform legislation.
This delay and absence of certainty led to some
commentators arguing that there would be insufficient time for Parliament and
the public to understand and debate the changes. According to political
commentator Michelle Grattan:
the many issues – especially but not only technical ones –
that are involved add up to a strong case for not rushing this change. If it
was so urgent, the government should have been brave earlier.[44]
However given the Committee’s report was released almost
two years before the Bill was introduced, and that some acknowledgement of the
need to reform the Senate voting system has been actively discussed since at
least 2004,[45]
it could be argued that the discussion has been ongoing, regardless of the
interest the media.
The Explanatory Memorandum notes that it will be necessary
for the AEC to upgrade the its electronic systems that are used to count Senate
ballot papers and for the AEC to run an education and awareness campaign to
inform voters of the change. The Second Reading speech notes that the AEC will
be provided with additional resources and ‘minor’ new funding to undertake
these changes.
There is no indication as yet how much additional funding
will be made available to the AEC for these changes. Given that an election is
due in 2016, it is likely that the additional funding will be included in the
AEC’s 2016-17 Budget.
In its initial form, Item 29 of the Bill would have
required that, instead of Senate ballot papers being counted at polling places
at the close of the polls, only the number of Senate ballot papers should be ascertained.
The ballot papers would then transmitted to the Divisional Returning Officer,
who again records the number of ballot papers before transmitting the ballot
papers to the Australian Electoral Officer for the state, who will undertake
the scrutiny of the ballot papers. The government has denied suggestions that
this might be a savings measure.[46]
This requirement has since been subject to an amendment, which would require
that an initial first preference count be carried out before the ballot papers
are dispatched, allowing some indication of the results of the Senate election
on election night.
In addition to the education campaign and changes to the
counting computer system, the requirement to nominate multiple preferences
above the line will substantially increase the ballot paper data entry
requirements for the AEC. In the 2013 Senate election 96.5 per cent of the
Senate ballot papers had an above the line vote. A total of 471,030 ballot
papers were marked below the line, and required preference data to be entered
into the AEC’s counting system (the AEC has each ballot paper data entered
twice by different operators in order to avoid errors)[47].
Had the 2013 Senate election been run under the provisions
of the Bill, and each above the line vote contained multiple preferences, an
additional 12,941,989 ballot papers would have required data entry.[48]
The additional data entry and paper handling will impose costs on the AEC that
appear not to have been publically enumerated at this point. One of the
submissions to the JSCEM Inquiry into the Bill from an electoral administrator
experienced with the NSW ballot paper data entry costs estimated that the data
entry would cost the AEC approximately $30 million in staff costs.[49]
As required under Part 3 of the Human Rights
(Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth), the Government has assessed the
Bill’s compatibility with the human rights and freedoms recognised or declared
in the international instruments listed in section 3 of that Act. The
Government considers that the Bill is compatible.[50]
Optional preferential voting above
the line
The headline provision of the Bill is the implementation of
optional preferential voting above the line on the Senate ballot paper.
Recommendation 1 of the Interim Report of the JSCEM states:
The Committee recommends that section 273 and other sections
relevant to Senate voting of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 be amended to
allow for:
optional preferential above the line voting; and
‘partial’ optional preferential voting below the line with a
minimum sequential number of preferences to be completed equal to the number of
vacancies:
⇒six for a
half-Senate election;
⇒twelve for a double
dissolution; or
⇒two for any
territory Senate election. The Committee further recommends that appropriate
formality and savings provisions continue in order to support voter intent
within the new system.[51]
Item 20 of the Bill seeks to repeal subsections 239(2)
and (3) and insert a new subsection 239(2) prescribing that a ballot
paper may be marked above the line by writing at least the numbers 1 to 6 in
the squares above the line in accordance with the voters’ preferences (or as
many preferences as there are squares if there are fewer than six squares). Item
41 replaces Form E, and is a template of the proposed ballot paper. The
form provides instructions for voting above the line ‘By numbering at least 6
of these boxes in the order of your choice (with number 1 as your first
choice)’.
The repealed subsection 239(3) allows for single ticks
and crosses to be counted as a 1, and in the Bill this provision will be moved
to a new subsection 269(1), which deals with above the line vote
formality.
Item 23 of the Bill seeks to repeal subsection
269(1) and to replace it with a new 269(1) that explicitly states
that, provided the ballot paper is marked with at least the number 1 (or a tick
or a cross) above the line, the vote will be counted as formal. That is, while
the ballot paper will instruct the voter to mark at least six preferences above
the line, the amended Act will require no more than one preference above the
line.
The Second Reading Speech of the Bill indicates that the
formality rules implement a savings provision so as not to render informal the
votes of voters who continue to vote 1 above the line. However it is of note
that while the reform is being framed in terms of multiple above the line
preferences, in effect the formality rules mean that it is actually
implementing the above the line optional preferential voting system recommended
by the JSCEM.
Item 28 of the Bill seeks to replace Section 272
of the Act, which deals with how the preferences of above the line votes are
effected though group voting tickets, with a considerably simpler explanation
of how above the line votes will now be counted.
Items 2–4 seek to amend Subsection 169(4) to
make it consistent with the new above the line measures. The amended subsection
will continue to allow multiple parties to group their candidates into the one
group on the ballot paper under a composite name, such as the ‘Liberal &
Nationals’ group on the 2013 NSW Senate ballot paper that contained four
Liberal and two Nationals candidates. A Submission to the JSCEM Inquiry into
the Bill from the Australian Independent and Minor Parties Association,
however, notes that it would be impractical for more than two parties to group
together under this provision.[52]
Despite the potential expectation of a voter that they are voting
for a party in the Senate, both the proposed repealed and new sections 272
reveal that the Senate voting system is still a candidate-based system. In both
cases only the votes below the line are counted, and the above the line vote acts
as a ‘shortcut’ as to what below the line preference distribution the voter is
expressing.
Under the proposed amendments in the Bill, preferences above
the line are treated as preferences for those members of those groups below the
line, and only those groups. The first above the line preference will be
treated as a 1 vote for the first candidate in that group, followed by a second
preference for the next candidate in the group, and so on through to the last
candidate in the group. If there are additional preferences above the line,
these will be treated as preferences for the candidates in those other groups,
in the order in which they are listed in the group on the ballot paper.
The Bill contains a number of items intended to make the
language throughout the Act consistent with the new above the line provisions,
and removing language that refers to group voting tickets.
The remaining items in Part 1 of the Bill are what the
Second Reading Speech refers to as ‘technical amendments to the scrutiny and
count process to enable the AEC to improve and centralise the count of Senate
ballot papers’. These items largely seek to amend ballot paper handling
procedures and the secure transmission of ballot papers to the point where the
scrutiny is undertaken.
Although not provided for in the Act, the practice of the
AEC has been to conduct a count of the first preference votes on Senate ballot
papers at the polling place on election night after the House of Representative
ballot papers are counted. This is only an indicative count, and does not
constitute part of the scrutiny, as defined in Part XVIII of the Act.
According to the AEC’s Scrutineer’s Handbook:
It is only possible to get a general impression of the Senate
results on election night. This is because Senate results cannot be calculated
until the state or territory wide total of votes used to determine the quota
(the proportion of votes required by a candidate to be elected) is known.
The Senate count on election night may begin at the same time
as the two candidate-preferred count for the House of Representatives depending
on the number of staff in the polling place. Results from the Senate count are
telephoned through to the DRO [Divisional Returning Officer], and group totals
and ungrouped results are entered into the Election Management System in the
same way as House of Representatives votes.
On election night, the only figures released for the Senate
are the first preference votes for groups and ungrouped candidates.[53]
The technical amendments to the ballot paper handling
processes in Item 29 would define a set of steps through which ballot
papers are removed from the ballot boxes and delivered to the Australian
Electoral Officer for the state, who is responsible for the scrutiny (the
counting of the vote). At the polling place the initial preferences of the
Senate ballot papers would be recorded, as well as the number and condition of
the ballot papers. The ballot papers will then be transmitted to the Divisional
Returning Officer (DRO) of the division who checks this information and then
batches up all of the division’s ballot papers to be sent to the AEO for
counting.
In the initial form in which the Bill was introduced, there
was no provision under the proposed amendments for any determination of the
results or examination of ballot papers for formality before the ballot papers
arrived in the custody of the AEO. This would have led to a substantial change
from normal election night commentary as to the success of parties in the
Senate election. While the Second Reading Speech states that due to the
multiple preferences on ballot papers that ‘preference counts at polling booths
will no longer be possible’, under the proposed system, a first preference
count of the ballot papers under the amended Act will not be substantially less
indicative of the final result than the existing Senate ballot papers.
Government amendments were proposed to the Bill in the House
of Representatives that would reinstate the count of first preferences prior to
the ballot papers being packaged and sent to the DRO. There is no provision in
either the Bill or the Act for this first preference count to have any standing
as to the election of candidates—it can serve only as an early indicator to the
direction of the results.
The amended form of the Bill retains the proposal that the
determination of the formality of ballot papers is solely the responsibility of
the AEO, and neither polling place officials nor DROs would have a role in
excluding ballot papers from the count due to informality. The proposed subsection
273(4)(c) requires the AEO to keep a record of the preferences of all
ballot papers, including informal ballot papers. The likely implication of this
provision is that all ballot papers, including informal ballot papers, will be
data entered for computerised counting, and it follows that the determination
of formality will likely be made by the counting software.
In addition to systematising the process of determining
informality, this full preference data will give the AEC and other interested
parties a comprehensive corpus of information on how well voters have adapted
to the new system and the sorts of errors voters make in numbering preferences.
Regardless of the occurrence of a first preference count on
the night, reducing ballot paper handling and increasing the security of ballot
paper transport are entirely consistent with the recommendations of the Keelty
report into the missing 2013 Western Australian ballot papers, which were
accepted by the AEC.[54]
During his appearance at the JSCEM on 4 March 2015, the
Electoral Commissioner noted that there were substantial workforce issues in
counting Senate ballot papers on the night of the election. He indicated that the
Keelty report acknowledged the pressure that the requirement to report Senate
results on the night created on the AEC. The Commissioner stated:
We do have a workload issue on the night in the polling
place, with the rise in pre-poll voting, the expansion in the size of the
Senate paper and a range of other issues. If I confined my answer to a
technical answer—I am being very careful here—doing work around saving the
Senate ballot paper until a later date I think would save a significant amount
of work for our staff on the night and probably aid accuracy.[55]
Below the line voting
Despite the recommendations from the JSCEM’s Interim
report, the Bill does not seek to implement a form of partial optional
preferential voting below the line on the Senate ballot paper.[56]
The only changes that the Bill proposes for below the line
voting is in Item 27, to expand the number of errors that voter may make
in numbering before the ballot paper becomes informal. In the Act subparagraph
270(1)(b)(i) states that provided the voter has numbered at least 90 per
cent of the squares below the line, and that the ‘numbers that with changes to
no more than 3 of them would be in such a sequence’, the vote would be counted
as formal. The Bill would change the three allowed errors to five. The
government has provided no information as to the number of additional otherwise
informal votes this change would allow into the count.
The effect of not implementing optional preferential voting
for below the line voting means that it will still be necessary for voters who
elect not to vote above the line to allocate a preference to every candidate on
the ballot paper (with the allowance for some errors, as noted above). Thus
there will still be a significant barrier to voters adopting this option, both
due to the potentially daunting exercise of filling in all of the squares and
the risk of informal voting.
The Second Reading Speech notes that one of the purposes of
the Bill is to ‘improve the ability of the voters to express their voting
intent’, however this improvement does not apply to below the line voters. In
effect, the Bill would make it easier for the voter to restrict the flow of
preferences beyond the desired groups, however it will not make it easier for
the voter to vote for members of a party other than in the order they appear on
the ballot paper.
Under the changes proposed by the Bill, it would be possible
and formal for a voter to vote 1 above the line for a group that consists of
two candidates, meaning their effective vote as counted would be a 1 for the
group’s first candidate, and 2 for the group’s second candidate, and no
preferences for any other candidate. However by retaining the existing full
preferencing below the line it would be impossible for them to cast the exact
same vote by voting below the line.
It would also be impossible for the voter to cast a vote for
the group’s second candidate as their first preference, and the first candidate
as their second preference, and no further. If the voter does not want to
preference the candidates in the group in a different order to the order in which
they are listed in the group’s column on the ballot paper, the voter must also
allocate a preference to every candidate on the ballot paper in order for their
vote to be counted. If there is a group on the ballot paper that the voter does
not want to allocate any preferences to, the voter cannot vote below the line.
Under the existing system, while there is a substantial
difference in the appearance of an above the line and a below the line vote on
the ballot paper from the perspective of the voter, from the perspective of the
count both options express a preference for every candidate on the ballot paper.
The above the line voter does this via the party’s group voting ticket and the
below the line voter by their manually entered preferences. While retaining the
existing below the line option largely intact might appear to be the
conservative option, combined with the change to the treatment of above the
line preferences this actually constitutes a fairly fundamental change in the
nature of the electoral system.
The original recommendation of the JSCEM suggested that
below the line voting require a minimum number of preferences, equal to the
number of vacancies to be filled (i.e., six for a normal state half-Senate
election). Whilst this would have still treated above and below the line votes
differently (depending on the specifics of the formality requirement—a detail
that the Committee did not go into), it would have substantially reduced the
burden for below the line voters.
The government has not made any comment on why it elected to
follow the JSCEM’s recommendation to allow OVP above the line but did not
follow its recommendation to similarly allow OPV below the line. There appear
to be no electoral system design principles that would require this approach.
The only public speculation as to the reason behind the change by an electoral
systems expert comes from Mr Antony Green, who speculates that the current
below the line method was retained as an additional control over preferences by
the party:
As I can think of no other reason why you would retain full
preferential voting below the line, I can only presume that while the parties
have been happy to put control of preferences between parties into the hands of
voters, they are not at all happy about potentially delivering control of
preferences between candidates into the hands of voters.[57]
One effect of allowing optional preferences above the line
and requiring full preferences below the line is that it in effect creates two
classes of votes, each of which has different requirements for preferences and
different formality rules. This is unprecedented in Australian federal
elections and the full consequences of it are difficult to anticipate. It is
not prima facie unconstitutional, however if there were a High Court challenge
to the amended Act it would likely be in relation to this different treatment
of above and below the line votes.[58]
Whilst the JSCEM recommendation in its original form also
might have had this issue, it could have been addressed through formality
requirements. The NSW Legislative Council ballot paper operates in a similar
way above the line to that proposed by the Bill, without the instruction to
complete multiple preferences. The voting system for Legislative Council
elections is entrenched in the NSW Constitution, as is the requirement that
voters express at least 15 preferences on the ballot paper for their vote to be
formal.[59]
The NSW Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Act 1912 subsection
81C(1A) requires a group to contain at least 15 candidates in order to have a
square above the line. As such, a 1 vote above the line will express 15
effective preferences, and therefore also fulfil the below the line formality
requirements.
A similar approach could have been taken with below the
line voting in the Senate. If a party were required to nominate at least as
many candidates as there were below the line preference required (the
Committee’s recommendation was for this to be the number of vacancies to be
filled), a 1 vote above the line would also be formal if the voter expressed
the exact same vote below the line.
Electoral expert Michael Maley makes the point that a
fundamental problem of the current system of below the line voting is that
voters are required to assign preferences to many candidates they have never
heard of before they received the ballot paper. It is impossible for the voter
to have a preference for an unknown candidate, however the voter is required to
express a preference for those candidates in order to cast a formal below the
line vote. He argues that the resulting ballot paper does not express the
genuinely held belief of that voter as to their preference ordering of the
candidates.[60]
By leaving below the line voting untouched, the Bill does nothing to address
this issue. The ease of allocating preferences above the line may mean that
fewer voters will choose to vote below the line, ultimately meaning fewer
preferences in the count and more exhausted votes.
Counting the votes
The provisions relating to the counting of Senate ballot
papers, the scrutiny, make up Sections 273 and 273A of the Act. Beyond
the aforementioned changes to ballot paper handling (Items 29 through 40),
and removal of definitions that are defined elsewhere, the Bill proposes no
fundamental changes to the actual process of counting the vote.
One potential outcome of the changed ballot paper is that
many voters will continue to vote 1 above the line and that as a result there
will be limited transfer of preferences between groups. This may lead to
potentially large numbers of votes exhausting, where a ballot paper should be
transferred but there are no continuing candidates for which that ballot paper
expresses a preference. These exhausted votes do occur under the current
system, but due to compulsory full preferences they generally only occur in
small numbers (1,918 of the 4,376,143 votes cast in the 2013 NSW Senate
election exhausted, for example)[61].
While large numbers of exhausting votes would be a new
occurrence for Senate election, vote exhaustion is not in itself problematic.
Exhaustion does not disenfranchise the voter when it is a direct result of the
voter’s informed choice. If the intent of the Bill is to allow the voter
greater control over their preferences, it is arguably appropriate that if
there are no continuing candidates for which the voter has a preference, that
the vote be set aside as exhausted. This outcome would be anticipated by the
voters who have experience voting in NSW and Queensland, and now the Northern
Territory—elections were optional preferential voting is in use.
It is possible, and in fact likely under the proposed
amendments, that after all possible votes have been distributed there are still
one or more vacancies unfilled and no continuing candidates who have achieved a
quota. The existing Act makes provisions under Subsection 273(17) and
273(18) for the election of candidates who have not received a full quota
of votes but are the remaining continuing candidates at the end of the count,
where there are still vacancies to fill. Subsection 273(17) requires
that the continuing candidate with the most remaining votes be elected, and if
the candidates have equal numbers of votes the AEO has the casting vote. Subsection
273(18) allows this procedure to operate regardless of the number of
unfilled vacancies.
Registered officers of political
parties
Part 2 of the Bill proposed amendments to the
operation of registered officers of political parties. This is in response to
Recommendation 4 from the JSCEM’s Interim Report:
The Committee recommends that sections 126, 132, 134 and any
other relevant section of Part XI of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 be
amended to provide for stronger requirements for party registration, including:
an increase in party membership requirements to a minimum 1
500 unique members who are not relied upon for any other party in order for a
federally registered party to field candidates nationally;
the provision to register a federal party, that can only run
in a nominated state or territory, with a suitable lower membership number
residing in that state or territory, as provided on a proportionate population
or electorate number basis;
the provision of a compliant party constitution that sets out
the party rules and membership process;
a membership verification process;
the conduct of compliance and membership audits each
electoral cycle; and
restriction to unique registered officers for a federally
registered party.
The Committee further recommends that the Government adequately
resource the Australian Electoral Commission to undertake the above activities.[62]
Notably, the Bill only seeks to implement the last point of
this recommendation, for which the government provides no further explanation. The
Australian Greens have stated that they do not support ‘changes to party
membership that makes it harder for small and emerging parties to obtain
registration’, and as such this might reflect negotiations by the government to
secure Greens’ support for the Bill.[63]
The registered officer of a political party is the
representative of the party for the purposes of the Act, and is responsible for
interacting with the AEC on behalf of the party for activities such as
nominating candidates to stand for the party.
Item 52 would insert subsection 126(2B) which
states that a person must not be the registered officer or deputy registered
officer of one or more registered political parties. However it does not
prevent them from being the registered officer (or deputy) of a political party
registered for federal elections and simultaneously the registered officer (or
deputy) of a political party registered for a state or territory elections or for
a state branch of a political party.
Item 56 adds a person being the registered officer of
more than one political party as one of the valid reasons for the Electoral
Commissioner giving notice to a party that the Electoral Commissioner is
considering deregistering the party. Item 57 makes it clear that
existing political parties have 90 days after the amendments come into effect
in which to correct any issues in relation to having a registered officer who
is also the registered officer of another party before it risks being
deregistered, and that a party will not be deregistered under these provisions
during an election.
These proposed amendments relating to registered officers
are designed to prevent a single individual registering a number of political
parties. One effect of the changes is that one individual creating a number of
parties for the purpose of directing preferences among the parties will no
longer be possible, however such a strategy is unlikely to be effective with
the changes to above the line voting. It also does not prevent a group of
people working in concert registering a number of political parties.
Antony Green reported that at the time of the 2013 federal
election Senator Leyonhjelm was the registered officer of both the Liberal
Democrats and Stop the Greens Outdoor Registration Party,[64]
however this is no longer the case and it is not known whether any currently
registered political parties will be affected by this amendment. Apart from the
small number of submissions to the JSCEM Inquiry into the Bill that objected to
every part of the Bill, there has been no real commentary on the effects or
operation of this provision.
Party logos on ballot papers
Part 3 of the Bill would allow registered political
parties to submit a logo of their party to be entered into the Register of
political parties. The logo, if present, will be printed on the ballot paper in
black ink by the relevant party’s square on the ballot paper. The Bill provides
provisions for the logo to be printed on both the House of Representatives and
Senate ballot papers.
The amendments in the Bill essentially mirror the existing
provisions in the Act for the registration of political party names,
particularly in terms of how to register the logo, what is forbidden, and avenues
of appeal.
The Bill seeks to amend the Act to prevent elections being
declared void on the basis of an error in printing party logos on ballot
papers, adding to an existing requirement that errors in names and
abbreviations of parties will also not cause an election to be void (Item 90).
It also to protect the Commonwealth and its employees from action, suit or
proceedings in relation to a logo of a party (Item 91).
Item 63 specifies the grounds upon which the
Electoral Commissioner would be able to refuse to register a logo, such as the
logo being obscene, or resembles or is likely to be confused with another
party’s logo.
Item 61 gives the Electoral Commissioner some
discretion as to the requirements for logos. It would insert subsection
162(2AB) that states, ‘For the purpose of paragraph (2AA)(b), the
Electoral Commissioner may, by legislative instrument, determine requirements
in relation to setting out a logo in an application.’ Paragraph (2AA)(b)
notes that the logos must meet any other requirements determined under subsection
(2AB). Neither the Bill nor the Explanatory Memorandum explain this item in
any further detail, however given that Item 63 specifies characteristics
of logos that must not be entered in the Register, Item 61 may refer to
requirements such as electronic file formats in which the logos can be
submitted to the AEC.
The Interim Report of the JSCEM makes no
recommendations in relation to logos on ballot papers, but does note that
printing logos on ballot papers was one of a variety of suggestions raised in
relation to concerns that some voters might have confused the Liberal Democrats
on the NSW Senate ballot paper with the Liberals and Nationals, and
inadvertently voted against their intention.[65]
The Liberal Democrats won the first column on the Senate ballot paper in NSW
whereas the Liberals and Nationals were in Column Y, and the Liberal Democrats received
roughly three times in the Senate vote in NSW as they did in any other state.
This suggests that at least some voters who had intended to vote Liberal saw ’Liberal
Democrats’ on the ballot paper and looked no further. Whilst it is unknown how
familiar most voters are with party logos, it seems likely that this change
will aid at least some voters in correctly marking their desired party.
How well the ballot paper logos will operate in practice
remains to be seen. The Bill requires the logos be printed above the voting
square on the Senate ballot paper (Item 41) and to the left of the
voting square on the House of Representatives ballot paper (Item 42).
Both ballot papers are size constrained and it is unlikely that the logo could
be printed any larger than 2cm square. In absolving the AEC of any legal
responsibility for the execution of the logos, the Bill places the onus on the
parties to ensure that their artwork will be comprehensible at this size and in
black and white. As with the provisions for optional preferential above the
line voting, it make take several elections for the exact impacts of these
changes to be completely understood.
The Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill 2016 is
explicitly framed as a response to some of the recommendation from the reports
into the 2013 federal election, particularly the Interim Report and its
recommendation to change the Senate voting system. Both the JSCEM reports and
the Bill’s Second Reading Speech express the view that Senate candidates being
elected on very small votes is an undesirable effect of the current Senate
electoral system, and a primary purpose of the Bill is to prevent this
occurring in the future.
It is likely that the amendments to the Act contained within
the Bill will be successful at eliminating candidates being elected on the
basis of very small above the line votes. While not substantially changing the
requirements for registering political parties, it will likely remove the
incentive for the registration of many small political parties and reduce the
size of the ballot paper. Whether this results in a unwarranted reduction in
the diversity of representation in the Senate, or prevents unpredictable
results and ‘gaming’ of the system, is a matter of opinion.
The proximity of the introduction of the Bill to the 2016
Federal Election, which must be held by 14 January 2017,[66]
and the fact that it take effect on Royal Assent, creates a substantial burden
on the Australian Electoral Commission. However, the Electoral Commissioner
noted in his submission to the JSCEM inquiry, that ‘the AEC is ready to deliver
a federal election in line with the legislation in force at the time the
election is called’. However:
The AEC advised the Department of Finance that a minimum
three month lead time would allow for the necessary system development and
implementation to occur before Senate counting could commence. This would allow
for testing and independent certification processes required for stakeholder
assurance around the counting methodology.[67]
The failure of the 2013 Western Australian Senate election
resulted in the resignation of the then Electoral Commissioner, and led the AEC
to implement a program of reform, particularly targeting ballot paper handling
and security. An Australian National Audit Office report from November 2015
into the AEC stated:
Informed by various reviews and inquiries undertaken into the
conduct of the 2013 election, the AEC has since commenced an extensive reform
programme. The aim of the reform programme is to deliver long-term changes in
culture and improvements in the AEC’s policies and procedures. Some changes are
expected to be in place prior to the next federal election, but full
implementation of measures currently being planned or actioned is not expected
until the following federal election. These timeframes reflect the extensive
body of reform work that is being undertaken in parallel with the AEC’s normal
business-as-usual activities.[68]
The ANAO’s conclusions raise questions about the AEC’s
ability to successfully implement the changes required in the Bill to both its
IT systems and its policies and procedures around ballot paper handling, and
the requisite changes in training to polling place staff, given the projected
timeframes for their current reform process. As noted above, the AEC has been
reported as stating that it requires at least three months to implement the
changes in the legislation.[69]
However in June 2015 media reports stated that the Electoral Commission had
told the JSCEM that it would have difficulty implementing the changes before
Christmas.[70]
In a submission to the JSCEM Inquiry into the Bill, the Electoral Commissioner
notes ‘the level of risk inherent in implementing changes to electoral
processes increases significantly with any compression of the timeframe between
a Government announcement, subsequent legislative change and the announcement
of the federal election’, however states that he believes that the AEC could
still return the writ in the timeframe allowed by the Act.[71]
The time to implement the changes takes particular
significance in light of recent media speculation of a 2 July 2016 double
dissolution election that may be called on 11 May 2016.[72] A combination of the
Constitution and the Act require that the writs be returned (that is, the
election counting be completed and the results declared) within 110 days of the
dissolution of Parliament.[73]
For an 11 May election announcement, the writs must therefore be returned by
Monday 29 August 2016. This leaves the AEC 59 days in which to data-enter up to
15 million ballot papers and run the count. For comparison, data-entering the
471,030 below the line ballot papers for the 2013 election (excluding the WA
recount), was completed within 31 days of the election.
The alternative to data entry is a manual count of the
Senate ballot papers, a process which has not been undertaken by the AEC since
the introduction of computerised counting in 1998, and which the Electoral
Commissioner has stated that he would like to avoid if possible.[74]
In his submission to the Inquiry into the Act the Electoral Commissioner states
that the AEC has evaluated ‘the feasibility of conducting a manual Senate count
and the current assessment is that it would carry such complexity and inherent
risk or error that it would not be practicable’.[75]
The amended formality rules for below the line votes make a manual count
particularly problematic, as establishing a consistent numbering sequence with
up to five breaks across potentially 100 or more preferences will be both
time-consuming and error-prone.
Finally, the prevailing debate appears focused on which
political parties stand to gain electorally from the changes in the Bill. Differing
analyses, can be found that purport to ‘prove’ that the changes would both
entrench Coalition dominance of the Senate,[76]
and conversely give the Greens and the ALP a blocking majority[77]
in the Senate.
The history of electoral reform in Australia since
Federation is replete with accusations that any given reform is motivated by
partisan political advantage. In their canonical book on Australian electoral
systems, political scientists David Farrell and Ian McAllister write:
In 1918, with the introduction of the alternative vote (AV)
for elections to the House of Representatives, Australia became the first
country to adopt preferential voting at the national level. Thirty years later,
when the single transferable vote (STV) was introduced for Senate elections,
the shift to preferential voting was complete. At the time, these reforms were
seen as nothing more than short-term political fixes by politicians anxious to
cling onto power. In 1918, the essence of the ‘Flinders deal’ was an attempt by
the Hughes government to prevent the right-of-centre parties from splitting
their support to the benefit of the Labor party. In 1948, it was the turn of
the Chifley Labor government to replace the Senate’s preferential block system
with STV, in a manoeuver to diminish the expected electoral gains of the new
Liberal leader, Robert Menzies.[78]
So far as it can be predicted, the actual likely effect of
the reforms on electoral outcomes is that the system will continue to elect
members of the parties roughly in proportion to the share of the first
preference vote they receive, without the last seat in a state being allocated
to an essentially random candidate on the basis of negotiated preference
exchanges. Major parties will continue to gain control of the Senate where they
receive the majority of the votes, while minor parties will likely find less electoral
success through establishing preferencing deals with each other. Most voters
will continue to not understand how the Senate electoral system works, however
will likely be less surprised when the results are announced.
Members, Senators and Parliamentary staff can obtain
further information from the Parliamentary Library on (02) 6277 2500.
[1]. Joint
Select Committee on Electoral Reform (JSCER), First
Report, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, September
1983.
[2]. M
Maley, ‘Senate
electoral reform’, Australian Public Law Blog, 29 September 2015.
[3]. JSCER,
op. cit., p. 62.
[4]. Maley,
op. cit.
[5]. Australian
Electoral Commission, ‘Senate:
Informal votes by state’, Virtual Tally Room – 2013 Federal Election,
1 November 2013.
[6]. Australian
Electoral Commission, ‘Senate
group voting ticket usage’, Virtual Tally Room – 2013 Federal Election,
1 November 2013.
[7]. Maley,
op. cit.
[8]. Australian
Electoral Commission, ‘First
preferences by candidate – Vic’, Virtual Tally Room – 2004 Federal
Election, 9 November 2005.
[9]. Australian
Electoral Commission, ‘First
preferences by candidate – Vic’, Virtual Tally Room – 2010 Federal
Election, 15 September 2010.
[10]. Joint
Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Interim
report on the inquiry into the conduct of the 2013 federal election: Senate
voting practices, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, May 2014.
[11]. Ibid.,
p. vii.
[12]. Joint
Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, ‘Commonwealth
Electoral Amendment Bill 2016’, Parliament of Australia website, updated
1 March 2016.
[13]. M
Grattan, ‘Proposed
Senate voting reforms would curb micro parties’, The Conversation,
12 May 2014.
[14]. G
Gray, ‘Gary
Gray endorses optional preferential voting in the Senate’, media release, 9
May 2014.
[15]. N
Savva, ‘Conroy
and Wong lead the charge as Labor goes to war with itself’, The Australian,
25 May 2015, p. 12.
[16]. Ibid
[17]. L
Tingle, ‘Happy
Defence paper cools down hot Senate week’, Australian Financial Review,
26 February 2016, p. 39.
[18]. G
Gray, ‘Second
reading speech: Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill 2016’, House of
Representatives, Debates, (proof), 24 February 2016,
p. 33.
[19]. B
Brown, ‘Outrageous
Senate outcome – Brown’, media release, 3 November 2004.
[20]. E
Colman, ‘Green
with frustration over secret preference deals’, Weekend Australian,
6 November 2004, p. 21.
[21]. B
Brown, ‘Second
reading speech: Senate Voters’ Choice (Preference Allocation) Bill 2004’,
Senate, Debates, 9 December 2004, p. 4.
[22]. Explanatory
Memorandum, Commonwealth Electoral (Above-the-line Voting) Amendment Bill
2008.
[23]. L
Rhiannon, ‘Senate
outcome highlights need for reform – voter control of preference flows’,
media release, 10 September 2013.
[24]. L
Rhiannon, ‘End
to backroom preference deals - widespread backing for Senate voting reform’,
media release, 9 May 2014.
[25]. Australian
Greens, ‘Senate
voting reform – Greens plan to protect small parties, voters’ to decide
preferences’, media release, 12 February 2016.
[26]. ‘Selection
of Bills Committee’, Senate, Debates, (proof), 25 February 2016, p.
22.
[27]. L
Taylor, ‘Senate
voting changes: Coalition wins over Nick Xenophon and Greens’, Guardian
Australia, 12 February 2016.
[28]. P
Hudson, ‘Xenophon
gives the main parties a Senate solution’, The Australian, 5 October
2015.
[29]. Explanatory
Memorandum, Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Above the Line Voting) Bill
2013.
[30]. B
Day, ‘Senate
minnows the Uber disrupters of politics’, Australian Financial Review,
25 February 2016; D Hurst, ‘Senate
voting changes likely to stand up to high court challenge, experts say’, Guardian
Australia, 23 February 2016.
[31]. B
Day, Submission
52, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Inquiry into the
Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill 2016, 29 February 2016.
[32]. P
Jean, ‘Libs
cross line in Senate deal with Mr X, Greens’, Advertiser, 24
February 2016.
[33]. GJ
Bukley, Submission
100, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Inquiry into the
Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill 2016, 29 February 2016.
[34]. J
Massola and A Gartrell, ‘Senate
crossbench revolt over voting reform looms’, Canberra Times, 23
February 2016, p. 4.
[35]. S
Martin & P Hudson, ‘Coalition
allies pull support in Senate’, The Australian, 24 February 2016, p.
1.
[36]. ‘Call
a double dissolution, urges Palmer United senator’, The Age, 24
February 2016, p. 4.
[37]. B
Raue, ‘How hard is it to go your
own way voting in the Senate’, The Tally Room: Elections and politics in
Australia and around the world, blog, 19 February 2016; A Green, ‘Senate
reform - why bother forcing below-the-line votes to be full preferential?’,
Antony Green’s Election Blog, 25 February 2016; K Bonham, ‘Senate
reform: it’s finally on!’, Dr Kevin Bonham, 22 February 2016.
[38]. See,
for example, M Maley, Submission
3, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Inquiry into the
Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill 2016, 29 February 2016; P Brent, Submission
13, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Inquiry into the
Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill 2016, 29 February 2016; G Williams, Submission
18, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Inquiry into the
Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill 2016; 26 February 2016; K Bonham, Submission
31, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Inquiry into the
Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill 2016, 29 February 2016.
[39]. A
Green, ‘Senate
electoral reform bill abandons election night Senate counting’, Antony
Green’s Election Blog, 22 February 2016.
[40]. ‘Senate
voting changes likely to stand up to high court challenge, experts say’, op.
cit.
[41]. M
Mackerras, Submission
206, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Inquiry into the
Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill 2016, 29 February 2016.
[42]. For
example, The Renewable Energy Party, Submission
7, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Inquiry into the
Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill 2016, 29 February 2016; J Flanagan, Submission
11, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Inquiry into the
Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill 2016, 29 February 2016.
[43]. B
Gaynor, Submission
5, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Inquiry into the
Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill 2016, 29 February 2016; Sustainable
Australia, Submission
15, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Inquiry into the
Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill 2016, 29 February 2016.
[44]. M
Grattan, ‘Changes
to Senate voting may be needed but should not be rushed’, The
Conversation, 16 February 2016.
[45]. A
Green, ‘Reform
is needed of the Senate voting system run by party bosses’, Sydney
Morning Herald, 29 October 2004.
[46]. M
Cormann, ‘Double
dissolution election is ‘still a live option’ says finance minister’, 7.30,
transcript, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), 22 February 2016.
[47]. Australian
Electoral Commission, Submission
to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Inquiry into the conduct
of the 2013 federal election and matters related thereto, 11 April 2014, p. 8.
[48]. Australian
Electoral Commission, ‘Senate
Group Voting Ticket Usage’, Election 2013 Virtual Tally Room: The official
election results, 1 November 2013.
[49]. I
Brightwell, Submission
26, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Inquiry into the
Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill 2016, 29 February 2016.
[50]. The
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[51]. JSCEM
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[52]. M
Poole, Submission
27, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Inquiry into the
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[53]. Australian
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[54]. MJ
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[55]. T
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of the 2013 federal election and matters related thereto, 4 March 2015.
[56]. Joint
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voting practices, Canberra, May 2014, Recommendation 1.
[57]. A
Green, ‘Senate
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[58]. G
Williams, Submission
18, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Inquiry into the
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[59]. NSW,
Constitution
Act 1902, Schedule 6, 1(2).
[60]. Maley,
op. cit.
[61]. Australian
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2013 Federal Election – Half Senate, p. 224.
[62]. JSCEM
op. cit., p. xviii.
[63]. The
Australian Greens, ‘Senate
voting reform – Greens plan to protect small parties, voters’ to decide
preferences’, media release, 12 February 2016.
[64]. A
Green, ‘The
growth in the number of registered political parties’, Antony Green’s
Election Blog, 16 December 2013.
[65]. JSCEM
op. cit., p. 2–3.
[66]. Australian
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[67]. T
Rogers, Submission
31, Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Inquiry into the
Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill 2016, 28 February 2016.
[68]. Australian
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Commission's Preparation for and Conduct of Federal Elections, 4 November
2015.
[69]. D
Hurst and L Taylor, ‘Labor
to oppose Turnbull's move to overhaul Senate voting system before election’,
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[70]. P
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25 June 2015, p. 7.
[71]. Submission
31, op. cit.
[72]. See,
for example, D Shanahan, ‘Turnbull
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February 2016, p. 17.
[73]. Electoral
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[74]. T
Rogers (Electoral Commissioner), Finance and Public Administration Legislation
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committee Hansard, 9 February 2016, p. 35.
[75]. Submission
31, op. cit.
[76]. H
Aston, ‘Coalition
could clean up in Senate if vote reform deal is finalised’, The Sydney
Morning Herald, 17 February 2016, which was refuted by analysis in A Green,
‘Would
electoral reform deliver the coalition a Senate majority at a double
dissolution election’, Antony Green’s Election Blog, 17 February
2016.
[77]. D
Harrison, ‘Labor
and Greens would control Senate under proposed reforms, research finds’, The
Sydney Morning Herald, 24 June 2015.
[78]. DM
Farrell and I McAllister, The
Australian electoral system: Origins, variations and consequences,
Sydney, UNSW Press, 2006, p. 21.
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