Bills Digest no. 111 2006–07
Wheat Marketing Amendment Bill 2006
WARNING:
This Digest was prepared for debate. It reflects the legislation as
introduced and does not canvass subsequent amendments. This Digest
does not have any official legal status. Other sources should be
consulted to determine the subsequent official status of the
Bill.
CONTENTS
Passage History
Purpose
Background
Financial implications
Main Provisions
Concluding Comments
Endnotes
Contact Officer & Copyright Details
Passage History
Wheat Marketing
Amendment Bill 2006
Date introduced:
6 December 2006
House: Senate
Portfolio: Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
Commencement:
On Royal Assent
The Wheat Marketing Amendment Bill 2006
proposes amendments to the Wheat Marketing Act 1989 with a
view to transferring the right to veto certain export applications
from AWB (International) Limited to the Minister for Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry. The proposed measure is temporary and
effective until 30 June 2007.
In this Digest:
-
AWB refers to the former statutory Australian
Wheat Board
-
AWB Ltd refers to the publicly listed company
and
-
AWB(I) refers to AWB International which is a
subsidiary of AWB Ltd and currently the entity which holds the
mandate for the export single operation including the power to veto
other exports of bulk wheat.
This Bill was introduced on 6 December 2006,
passed Parliament on 7 December 2006, and came into force on 9
December 2006.
Monopoly selling of wheat underpinned by
statutory arrangements has been a feature of Australian
agricultural policy for generations. Indeed, the agricultural
policy landscape at both the state and Federal level was once well
populated by statutory trading monopolies and other legislated
arrangements for the marketing of a range of farm products.
Reforms in both agricultural policy and the
broader economic agenda over the last couple of decades have
transformed agricultural marketing in Australia to the point where
the monopoly over wheat exports is the only remaining such
arrangement effective at the national level. The other long-term
bastions of monopoly commodity marketing, namely the sugar and rice
industries, have had their statutory underpinnings
removed.(1)
The Volker report into
the UN Oil-for-food program and the subsequent Cole inquiry have triggered extensive
public debate as to what, if any, changes should be made to
Australia s wheat marketing arrangements.
The last formal review of Australia s wheat
marketing policy was a national competition policy (NCP) review in
2000. The next NCP review is scheduled for 2010. However, early in
the Cole inquiry process there was a strong indication that changes
would be made to Australia s wheat export marketing arrangements.
In March 2006, the Prime Minister advised Parliament:
The situation is that pending the outcome of the
Cole inquiry which obviously will bear on the future of AWB Ltd and
not automatically in any way on the future of the single desk
policy the single desk policy must be looked at separately from the
future of AWB.(2)
More recently, he stated In the light of the
Cole inquiry, the status quo cannot remain. (3)
During the course of the Cole Inquiry the
Iraqi Government announced it would not conduct business with AWB
Ltd but that other suppliers of Australian wheat could bid for
contracts. Wheat Australia, a consortium of other Australian grain
companies was established to make sales to Iraq and their export
applications were not vetoed by AWB(I).
One of the companies involved in the
consortium, CBH from Western Australia (WA), subsequently sought to
export bulk wheat to other destinations and offered WA farmers a
premium over prices being paid by AWB Ltd. AWB(I) s veto of CBH s
application has been heavily criticised and led to something of a
stalemate with reports of WA wheat farmers boycotting AWB Ltd and
warehousing their grain.(4)
In addition to the general debate of the
future of single desk selling post Cole, it was largely the
circumstances in Western Australia which led to the Government
announcing the temporary transfer of veto power proposed by the
Wheat Marketing Amendment Bill 2006. This was acknowledged by the
Prime Minister in his comment:
It [the veto transfer] recognises the reality
that in all of the circumstances to leave the veto power with AWBI,
particularly in relation to this year s crop, was not
tenable.
Hence the Minister s comment in the Second
Reading Speech:
the vesting of the veto transfer from AWBI to
the minister is in response to the particular set of circumstances
that confront the wheat industry and therefore the
government.
The Federal Government's first involvement in
Australia's wheat industry occurred during World War I when
temporary war-time measures were instituted. These included
establishment of the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) in 1915. Similar
measures were implemented during World War II.
The war-time measures were attractive to
producers because they were freed from the dominance of wheat
merchants. Several Government inquiries in the early part of last
century refer to the existence and impact of price and shipping
cartels whose collusive actions depressed prices and controlled
transport. This exploitation of farmers was facilitated partly by
difficulties experienced with storage and transport arrangements
during a period of rapid expansion and technological
advancement.
The Great Depression severely impacted on
Australia's external trading position. In 1930, the Commonwealth
Government sought to overcome these economic difficulties through
an expansion in primary production, especially wheat-growing. Early
in 1930, Australian wheat growers were urged to grow more wheat.
The appeal was instigated and supported at the highest levels of
Government. This was the first time that political factors directly
influenced farmers production decisions.
The 'grow more wheat' campaign was accompanied
by obvious patriotic overtones and included the particularly
attractive offer of a price guarantee of 4 shillings per bushel.
Political leaders were unable to keep their end of the bargain with
the Senate rejecting Australia's first Wheat Marketing Bill on July
4, 1930.
During 1930, however, world wheat prices
declined significantly and, with most producers in the eastern
States already in a financially weakened condition, the industry
entered a severe economic slump. Several other legislative
initiatives providing for assistance to the wheat industry were
attempted during 1930 and 1931. The role and powers of the States
were significant issues in the failure of most of these
proposals.
Wheat-growers finally received their first
Federal assistance following passage of the Wheat Bounty (No.
2) Act. This Act was assented to on November 25, 1931. It
provided a bounty of 4 pence per bushel on all wheat marketed in
1931-32. Further bounty and debt relief measures were provided by
the Commonwealth Government during the 1930s. The States also
became financially involved with direct and indirect measures to
assist wheat-growers.
Comprehensive wheat marketing arrangements
were first brought together in the Wheat Industry Stabilisation
Act 1948. This Act embodied four main features arising from
concepts of price stabilisation and orderly marketing (the removal
of producer competition in the output market)
These remained fundamental objectives of most
subsequent legislation.
In all, eight fairly similar wheat marketing
plans were enacted from World War II to 1984, with each enacted in
time to give continuity of the major provisions. All plans shared
some common features such as granting the AWB sole receival and
marketing powers for virtually all wheat grown in Australia;
discriminatory pricing of wheat sold domestically (resulting in
domestic consumers paying more than overseas customers); pooling of
sales revenue and marketing costs and assistance provisions which
transfer some (if not all) of the risk of adverse (downward) price
movements to the Commonwealth Government.
The momentum for major changes to wheat
marketing arrangements appears to have been well established prior
to the 1984 legislation with several important High Court rulings
in the late 1970s; a highly critical report in 1979 from the Senate
Standing Committee on Finance and Government Operations questioning
the AWB's competence and accountability; adverse reports by the
Auditor General's Office; a 1981 report which was highly scathing
of grain handling in NSW; and, the Industries Assistance
Commission's (IAC) 1978 and 1983 reports on the wheat industry.
The Wheat Marketing Act 1984 was the
first of three wheat marketing plans instituted under the then
Labor Government. It was developed at a time of great financial
pressures in the industry following, firstly, a severe drought over
much of Eastern Australia in 1982 which caused production to
plummet and the importation of wheat into Victoria from Western
Australia, and secondly, in the 1983 season, heavy rains at harvest
time in many areas causing a marked deterioration in crop
quality.
Key changes introduced in 1984 were:
-
a system of permits for direct trade between
producers and consumers of stockfeed wheat
-
alterations to the Guaranteed Minimum Price
arrangements which sent increased market signals to producers,
and
-
price underwriting for five categories of wheat
(one previously) to reduce cross subsidisation.
Prior to the next wheat package there were two
significant reports which served as catalysts for debate concerning
the wheat industry.
This landmark inquiry commenced in late 1986
and continued through 1987 with its report published in 1988. It
was required to advise on the most efficient and cost-effective
integrated grain distribution system for Australia's future needs
and to make recommendations about implementing such a system.
The inquiry focused on the legislative and
administrative arrangements within which grain distribution
services were being provided. It found that, for the most part, the
system of grain distribution did not meet the criteria of economic
efficiency, cost effectiveness and integration. A quantitative
evaluation suggested that cost savings of approximately $10 per
tonne could be achieved nationally by adopting a system which
provided for the greatest choice and flexibility in all aspects of
the grain distribution system.
The Royal Commission's key recommendations
were:
-
marketing authorities to deal with a
deregulated distribution system and being specifically required to
minimise storage, handling and transport costs
-
abolition of sole receival rights for State
storage and handling agencies allowing marketing authorities to
utilise those agencies providing services at least cost
-
removal of all restrictions and impediments to
the transport of grain by road, and
-
dissagregation of charges for port and shipping
services to more closely reflect actual costs incurred.
In February 1988, the IAC completed its third
review of the wheat industry.(5) The focus of its
investigations was on whether future assistance should be provided
to the wheat industry and, if so, the nature, duration and extent
of such assistance.
The IAC made sixteen specific recommendations
as well as commenting on other matters associated with Australia's
wheat marketing arrangements. It outlined a preferred course of
action:
...designed to improve the wheat industry's
competitiveness by removing those regulations which impede growers
and buyers of Australian wheat from responding flexibly to market
developments.(6)
The major recommendations were:
-
limiting the AWB's power to control exports to
prescribed markets
-
extending the grower-to-buyer and permit
arrangements to export sales
-
extending permit arrangements from feed wheat
to all domestic sales and with no restraints on reselling in the
domestic market
-
removing the AWB's obligation to supply the
domestic market, and
-
discontinuation of domestic pricing and
underwriting
Debate during 1988-89 over the future of wheat
marketing was possibly the most controversial in fifty years and
generated considerable hostility both within industry ranks and
between the industry and the Government. The resultant legislative
package probably contained the most significant changes ever made
to Australian wheat marketing arrangements to that point and
included:
-
deregulation the domestic wheat market
-
termination of administered domestic pricing
arrangements
-
introduction of a fixed government guarantee on
AWB borrowings
-
removal of the requirement for a majority of
growers among Board members
-
establishment of a Wheat Industry Fund (WIF),
funded principally from a minimum 2 per cent grower levy, to
generate a capital base for financing the AWB's marketing
activities, and
-
the AWB objective of maximising net returns to
producers by minimising storage, handling and transport costs with
costs to be passed back to be borne by individual growers wherever
possible.
In addition, the AWB was permitted to trade in
grains other than wheat, the composition of the Board changed from
primarily growers to persons with relevant commercial expertise and
there was no sunset provision on the life of the AWB.
Amendments in 1992 extended until 31 June 1999
the Commonwealth guarantee of AWB borrowings at a rate of 85% of
estimated net pool returns; continued accumulation of the WIF; and
established an AWB subsidiary for the provision of grains based
value adding services.
Moves towards a substantially new structure
for the AWB had their origins in 1989 when the peak grower
organisation the Grains Council of Australia (GCA) initiated the
Grains 2000 project. This was in recognition of the need for
strategic planning for the future of the grains industry.
At the Grains 2000 Conference in 1991, it was
recognised that the AWB needed much greater flexibility to be
successful in the medium to longer term given the changes occurring
both internationally and domestically. In late 1993 the grains
industry established the National Grain Marketing Strategic
Planning Unit which drew membership from nine industry and
government organisations. This exercise included consideration of
the AWB's structure.
In February 1994, consultants began a study
designed to culminate in a strategic plan for the Australian
milling wheat industry. Their report was published in January 1995.
Later that year the GCA issued a discussion paper and instigated an
extensive schedule of grower meetings in September/October 1995.
The main options canvassed were re-regulation, deregulation,
maintaining the current structure, corporatisation with retention
of single desk and privatisation with retention of the single
desk.
The GCA subsequently identified key objectives
for any AWB restructure, including:
-
retention of single desk selling for
exports
-
grower control/ownership
-
an adequate capital base to maintain the
existing level of harvest payments
-
increased commercial flexibility, and
-
industry self determination.
It also expressed support for a structure
based on a statutory authority and a wholly owned subsidiary
company.
The next part of the process was a working
group comprising GCA, AWB and Commonwealth Department of Primary
Industries and Energy representatives to investigate options and
make recommendations for the restructure of AWB. The Working Group
appointed independent financial and legal advisers to advise on the
appropriate corporate and financial structure for the AWB in line
with the GCA objectives. Other possible corporate/financial models,
including the dual class and grower corporate models were later
added to the advisers' brief.
After much deliberation and newspaper
headlines using terms such as 'impasse' and 'crisis', the working
group finally agreed to recommend the grower corporate model to the
Minister for Primary Industries and Energy and this was essentially
the structure announced by the incoming Minister Hon John Anderson
on 17 April 1997.
Finalisation of a preferred option by the
working group proved an extremely difficult task due in part to
differences between the AWB and the GCA but also to lack of
unanimity amongst the GCA's state affiliates. The most vocal
internal GCA critic was the Western Australian Farmers Federation
(WAFF) who considered in particular that they would be
disadvantaged by the proposed share voting system which was based
on 'one grower, one vote'. In the end, a last minute substantial
compromise within the GCA resulted in shares being allocated on a
delivery basis.(7)
In June 1997, the Government introduced
legislation representing the first of a two-stage process of
providing the framework for the restructure of Australia's wheat
marketing arrangements. The Wheat Marketing Amendment Act
1997 received Royal Assent in December 1997 and its main
features were:
-
retention of AWB s control of export wheat and
overseas marketing function
-
establishment of AWB Limited under Corporations
Law and its two wholly owned subsidiaries to which its wheat
marketing and financing functions would be transferred, and
-
termination on 30 June 1999 of the WIF
component of the levy on wheat sales.
The corporatised AWB entities commenced
operations on 1 June 1998. The second stage of the privatisation
process was effected by the Wheat Marketing Legislation
Amendment Act 1998 (1998 Act). This provided for the statutory
AWB to continue as a legal entity renamed as the Wheat Export
Authority (WEA) which has the following main statutory
functions:
-
to control the export of wheat from Australia,
and
-
to monitor AWB(I) s performance in relation to
the export of wheat and to examine and report on the benefits to
growers that result from that performance.(8)
The 1998 Act conferred single desk status on
AWB(I) by empowering it to:
-
export wheat without WEA s consent, and
-
veto any application to export bulk wheat made
to the WEA by another party.
AWB Limited became fully privatised on 1 July
1999 and in August 2001 it was publicly floated with B-Class shares
listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. These developments did not
affect the single desk arrangements.
In April 2000 the Government announced a
review of the Wheat Marketing Act 1989 (the WMA) would be
conducted in accordance with National Competition Policy (NCP). The
Report, which was published in December 2000, amounted to a
review of the single desk arrangements.
Amongst other things the review was to:
analyse and quantify the benefits, costs and
overall effects on businesses involved in the Australian wheat
industry and/or the community generally (the public benefits test),
of the existing WMA arrangements.(9)
In order to undertake this assessment the
Committee sought tangible evidence on the magnitude of such
benefits, costs and overall effects.
The Committee s conclusion in relation to the
public benefits test was:
Regarding the public benefits test, the
Committee was not presented with, nor could it find, clear,
credible, and unambiguous evidence that the current arrangements
for the marketing of export wheat are of net benefit to the
Australian community. As the NCP guidelines place the burden of
proving that the current system delivers demonstrable net benefits
to the Australian community on those arguing for the retention of
the legislation, this suggests that the WMA should now be modified,
or repealed.(10)
Further pertinent comments made by review
include:
On the single desk price premiums claimed to be
earned by AWBI, conflicting evidence was presented to the
Committee. Despite some claims that substantial premiums are being
earned, most of the evidence the Committee was able to obtain
supported the view that, averaged across all markets, such price
premiums were likely to be small.(11)
The Committee s view was that:
on average, the single desk price premium which
Australian single seller of bulk wheat was able to obtain from
export markets in the period 1997 to 1999 markets was relatively
small (of the order of US$1 per tonne).(12)
At the same time, the Committee received convincing evidence
that the WMA s restrictions on competition have had an inhibiting
effect on innovation in marketing, the identification of new
marketing opportunities including small, niche, or specialised
export markets, and ongoing development of existing markets for
Australian wheat.
Furthermore, considerable evidence was provided that the single
desk has had an anti-competitive effect on the grain supply chain,
constraining vertical integration and impeding the realisation of
least cost grain paths and potential cost savings in grain
receival, storage, handling and transport. Again, however, various
submissions made assertions that were
conflicting.(13)
The NCP Committee noted that
considerable progress has been made in recent
years toward putting export wheat marketing on a more commercial
basis. Australia no longer has a statutory marketer for wheat
exports, and Australian wheat growers receive negligible government
support. Hence, while the Committee believes that the introduction
of more competition would most likely deliver additional net
benefits to growers and the wider community, it does acknowledge
the possibility that the new more commercial arrangements for wheat
marketing might achieve more clearly demonstrable net benefits than
was evident during this review. Partly for this reason, and partly
because of residual uncertainty about whether the WMA does or does
not pass the net public benefits test, the Committee believes that
it would be premature to recommend the repeal of WMA prior to a
further relatively short evaluation period.(14)
The recommendation which resulted from the
Committee s deliberation was this:
The Committee recommends that the single desk be
retained until the scheduled review in 2004 by the Wheat Export
Authority (WEA) of AWBI s operation of the single desk . However,
the main purpose and implementation of this scheduled review should
be changed so that it provides one final opportunity for a
compelling case to be compiled that the single desk delivers a net
benefit to the Australian community. In particular:
-
the WEA review would allow further information
to be gathered about the level of single desk price premiums and
about the ability of AWBI to achieve significant and sustainable
cost savings in the supply chain for the benefit of growers;
and
-
if no compelling case can be made by the time of
the 2004 review that there is a net public benefit, then the single
desk should be discontinued; but
-
if a compelling case can be made by the time of
the 2004 review that there is a net public benefit, then the single
desk should continue with ongoing regular WEA reviews of AWBI s
performance in managing the single desk , and if necessary, a
further NCP review in 2010.(15)
The 2004 Wheat Marketing Review (the
Review) was a provision of the amended Wheat Marketing Act
1989, however, its terms of reference as subsequently
announced by the Government specifically excluded consideration of
retention of the single desk. This was despite the NCP review
recommending it be used to further evaluate the claim that the
single desk delivers net benefits to the Australian community.
Rather, the main focus of this review was AWB(I) s performance as
commercial manager of the single desk.
Table 1 shows the number of applications to
export bulk wheat received and rejected annually by the WEA up to
2004-05. All rejections by the WEA are due to applications being
vetoed by AWB(I).
Table
1: Applications to WEA export
bulk
| |
Received
|
Vetoed
|
| 1998-991 |
1
|
0
|
| 1999-00 |
26
|
26
|
| 2000-01 |
9
|
9
|
| 2001-02 |
2
|
2
|
| 2002-03 |
4
|
4
|
| 2003-04 |
3
|
3
|
| 2004-05 |
0
|
0
|
-
Covers July to Sep 99 only.
Source: Wheat Export Authority Annual
Reports
Prior to the special arrangements instituted
for wheat sales to Iraq in 2006 the only approval granted by AWB(I)
was in July 1999 and this is believed to have been the result of an
administrative error.(16).
A contrast can be made regarding the role of
other exporters since AWB(I) gained veto power with the situation
in earlier times. It was previously common for private grain
traders to export Australian wheat with AWB approval. For example,
in 1987-88 almost 40% of Australian wheat was marketed using what
were referred to as Recognised Exporters . This was in accordance
with the AWB s policy:
of utilizing to full advantage the skills and
capabilities of grain traders where they are able to provide a
service or buy Australian wheat at a price which provides the
highest return to growers.(17)
The Explanatory Memorandum states that the
Bill will have no financial impact on the Commonwealth
Government.
The proposed amendments will:
-
be effective for a temporary period the last
day being 30 June 2007
-
suspend AWBI's right of veto over other
companies bulk wheat export applications
-
transfer the right of veto to the Minister for
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (the Minister).
-
give the Minister the additional power to
direct the WEA to make decisions, and
-
require the Minister to base the discretionary
decision to exercise the right of veto and to give a direction on
public interest considerations.
The proposed amendments will not change the
present export consent system for the export of wheat in bags and
containers.(18)
Item 2 introduces
proposed Part 5 into the Wheat Marketing Act
1989 (the WMA). This Part will make specific rules with
respect to the application of Part 4 of the WMA during the
so-called temporary period. The term temporary period is
defined in new section 65 to mean the period
beginning with the law s commencement day, that is the day after
the legislation received Royal Assent, and ending at the end of 30
June 2007.
Under new subsections 60(1)
and (2), the Minister may agree in writing with
the decision of the WEA to give or refuse bulk-export consent (as
the case may be). Conversely, the Minister may refuse to agree with
the WEA s decision. This power is often referred to as a right of
veto.(19) However, a literal reading of new
subsections 60(1) and (2) suggests that
the Minister s power is determinative and more akin to a
condition precedent.(20) On this
interpretation, the WEA will not be able to make a decision unless
the Minister has exercised his or her power. It is likely that the
proposed provision was drafted to overcome an ambiguity in the
current legislation that had been identified (without resolving the
issue) by Justices McHugh, Gummow and Callinan in NEAT Domestic
Trading Pty Ltd v AWB Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 179 at p.
192.(21)
New subsection 60(3) applies
this ministerial right to agree to both decisions of the WEA in
relation to applications that have been lodged prior to the
commencement of this legislation as well as those lodged
subsequently.
New section 61 will suspend
the operation of subsection 57(3B) of the WMA. This section
currently restricts the Authority s ability to give bulk-export
consent without the prior approval given by AWBI.
New section 62 will give the
Minister an additional power to give directions to the WEA. The
Minister may direct the WEA to give or refuse bulk-export consent
to an applicant (new paragraphs 62(1)(a) and
(b)). Under new paragraph 62(2),
the Authority is under an obligation to follow the direction. To
shield the Authority from any possible claims that it violated its
objectives as stipulated in section 5A of the WMA, new
subsection 62(3) prescribes that new section 62 will
override all other provisions of the WMA. (22)The power
to give directions to the authority applies to both applications
which have been lodged with the Authority prior to the amendment s
commencement date and those lodged thereafter (new
subsection 62(4)).
In exercising both the right to veto under
new section 60 as well as the power to direct the
WEA under new section 62, the Minister is required
to have regard to the public interest. Further guidance is
not provided as part of the proposed amendments, although the
Minister remarked in his Second Reading speech that he would:
naturally hav[e] in mind obligations under the
World Trade Organisation, the WTO, in exercising these
powers.(23)
The concept of public interest is
very broad and accepted to be almost undefinable.(24) As
Justice Lockhart noticed:
The public interest is a concept of wide meaning
and not readily limited by precise boundaries. Opinions have
differed, do differ and doubtless always will differ as to what is
or is not in the public interest.(25)
In August 1999, the Senate Select
Committee on the Socio-Economic Consequences of the National
Competition Policy highlighted that the application of this
test can be confusing and possibly lacks
transparency.(26) New section 64 will
clarify that the amendments of proposed Part 5 will not have any
bearing on decisions made by the WEA prior to the commencement of
the amendments.
New section 65 provides definitions for the
terms bulk-export consent, commencement day and,
importantly, temporary period.
Along with the temporary transfer of veto
power the Government has also announced a three month consultation
around a range of options about future marketing arrangements
.(27) This will occur during the six months of the
temporary transfer of veto power and the Government expects during
this time to have determined its longer term approach to wheat
marketing.(28)
Given all the indications that there will be
changes to the long term arrangements Parliament seems likely to
deal with more wheat marketing legislation before the middle of
2007.
Endnotes
- Even though the marketing arrangements for
sugar and rice were the responsibility of the Queensland and NSW
governments respectively, they were national in effect because of
the industries being concentrated within those states.
- Questions without notice , House of
Representatives, Debates, 1 March 2006, p 77.
- Transcript of The World Today 29/11/06
http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2006/s1800224.htm.
Accessed 6/12/06.
- C. Bolt and S. Wright, Farmers in limbo as
AWB loses veto , The West Australian, 6 December 2006
- Industries Assistance Commission, The Wheat
Industry, Report No. 411, 25 February 1988.
- ibid., p. 19.
- Wheat growers resolve industry split, The
Australian Financial Review, 3 September 1997.
- It is important to note that: i) WEA only
controls non-AWB(I) exports and permits exports where this is
complimentary to the national pool and allows for niche and other
export opportunities and ii) in monitoring and reporting on AWB(I)
s performance, the WEA is not making recommendations to AWB(I). The
manner in which AWB(I) conducts its business resides with the Board
of AWB(I) and is governed by AWB(I) s constitution and an
established corporate governance framework.
- Irving, Arnery and Lindner 2000, National
Competition Policy Review of the Wheat Marketing Act 1989 ,
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests, p. viii.
- ibid., p. 6.
- ibid.
- ibid., p. 120.
- ibid., p. 6.
- ibid., p. 7.
- ibid., p. 8.
- J. Freed Secondary players now have a chance
to score , The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 February
2006
- Australian Wheat Board, Annual Report
1987-88, p13
- The Explanatory Memorandum to the Wheat
Marketing Amendment Bill 2006 states that this is to secure the
ability of wheat traders to continue to develop niche and other
markets within the single desk framework for the benefits of
growers and the industry. Explanatory Memorandum to the Wheat
Marketing Amendment Bill 2006, p. 2.
- See, for example, P. McGauran, Minister for
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Wheat Market Amendment Bill
2006, 2nd reading speech, House of Representatives,
Debates, 7 December 2006, p. 61.
- See the discussions in relation to the power
contained in section 57(3B) of the WEA in Neat Domestic Trading
Pty Ltd v AWB Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 179, pp. 187 (per Gleeson
CJ), 192 (per Mc Hugh, Hayne, Callinan JJ).
- Their Honours noted with respect to the
powers held by AWBI that: If AWBI gave its approval to the
authority giving a bulk-export consent it may not be entirely clear
whether the authority had a discretion to refuse consent. For
present purposes, it is convenient to consider both possible
constructions. On one construction of the 1989 Act the authority
would retain no discretion to refuse a consent once AWBI had given
its approval in writing. If that were so, it would be evident that
AWBI's decision to give, or not give, approval would be
determinative. The competing view is that the authority retained a
discretion to refuse a bulk-export consent, even if AWBI had given
its approval to it. On that view AWBI's role might better be
described as exercising a power of veto.
- Section 5A of the WMA relevantly states that
the Authority must seek to complement any objective of AWBI to
maximise net returns for pools operated by that company
- P. McGauran, Minister for Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry, Wheat Market Amendment Bill 2006, 2nd
reading speech, House of Representatives, Debates, 7
December 2006, p. 61.
- C. Wheeler, The public interest we know it is
important, but do we know what it means? , (2006) 48 AIAL
Forum, p. 24.
- Right to Life Association (NSW) lnc v
Secretary, Department of Human Services and Health (1995) 128
ALR 238
- Senate Select Committee on the Socio-Economic
Consequences of the National Competition Policy - Terms of
Reference and Executive Summary from the Interim Report:
Competition Policy: Friend or Foe - Economic Surplus, Social
Deficit? , August 1999; Appendix 11.
- Transcript of the Prime Minister The Hon.
John Howard MP joint press conference with the Hon. Mark Vaile MP,
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transport and Regional
Services, Parliament House, Canberra, 5 December, 2006
- ibid
Peter Hicks
Economics Section
Thomas John
Law and Bills Digest Section
14 March 2007
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