Bills Digest No. 186 2004–05
Trade Practices Amendment (National Access Regime)
Bill 2005
WARNING:
This Digest was prepared for debate. It reflects the legislation as
introduced and does not canvass subsequent amendments. This Digest
does not have any official legal status. Other sources should be
consulted to determine the subsequent official status of the
Bill.
CONTENTS
Passage History
Purpose
Background
Main Provisions
Concluding Comments
Endnotes
Contact Officer & Copyright Details
Passage History
Trade
Practices Amendment (National Access Regime) Bill
2005
Date
Introduced: 2 June
2005
House: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Treasury
Commencement:
A date to be fixed by
proclamation or if 6 months after Royal Assent any provisions have
not commenced the day after that 6 month period.
The Bill amends
Part IIIA of the (TPA) to implement many of the recommendations
that were made by the Productivity Commission in its 2001 Review of
the National Access Regime.(1)
One of the purposes of the TPA is to promote competition in
markets. The TPA contains a number of parts that are designed to
achieve this end, including Part IIIA. Part IIIA of the TPA puts in
place a legal regime to facilitate user access to services provided
by essential facilities that operate as natural monopolies such as
rail lines, gas pipelines, electricity and water infrastructure. A
separate regime, in Part XIC, applies to the telecommunications
sector.
Part IIIA was inserted into the TPA in 1995 following
recommendations contained within the Report on National Competition
Policy (Hilmer Report). The Hilmer Report made broad, and
highly influential recommendations regarding national competition
policy. Chapter 11 of the Hilmer Report considered the issue of
access to essential services and contained the following
discussion:
Some economic activities exhibit natural monopoly
characteristics, in the sense that they cannot be duplicated
economically. While it is difficult to define precisely the term
natural monopoly , electricity transmission grids,
telecommunication networks, rail tracks, major pipelines, ports and
airports are often given as examples. Some facilities that exhibit
these characteristics occupy strategic positions in an industry,
and are thus essential facilities in the sense that access to the
facility is required if a business is to be able to compete
effectively in upstream or downstream markets. For example,
competition in electricity generation and in the provision of rail
services requires access to transmission grids and rail tracks
respectively.
Where the owner of the essential facility is not
competing in upstream or downstream markets, the owner of the
facility will usually have little incentive to deny access, for
maximising competition in vertically related markets maximises its
own profits. Like other monopolists, however, the owner of the
facility is able to use its monopoly position to charge higher
prices and derives monopoly profits at the expense of consumers and
economic efficiency. In these circumstances, the question of access
pricing is substantially similar to other monopoly pricing issues,
and may be subject where appropriate, to the prices monitoring or
surveillance process outlined in Chapter 12.
Where the owner of the essential facility is
vertically-integrated with potentially competitive activities in
upstream or downstream markets as is commonly the case with
traditional public monopolies such as telecommunications,
electricity and rail the potential to charge monopoly prices may be
combined with an incentive to inhibit competitors access to the
facility. For example, a business that owned an electricity
transmission grid and was also participating in the electricity
generation market could restrict access to the grid to prevent or
limit competition in the generation market. Even the prospect of
such behaviour may be sufficient to deter entry to, or limit
vigorous competition in, markets that are dependent on access to an
essential facility.(2)
In summary, the Hilmer Report identified two aspects to the
essential facilities issue. The first relates to obtaining access
to essential facilities and the second relates to the terms and
conditions of access and, particularly, access pricing.
The Hilmer Report proceeded to consider possible paths to
reform. It noted the following:
As discussed in Chapter Ten, the preferred
response to this concern is usually to ensure that natural monopoly
elements are fully separated from potentially competitive elements
through appropriate structural reforms. In this regard it is
important to stress that mere accounting separation will not be
sufficient to remove the incentives for misuse of control over
access to an essential facility. Full separation of ownership or
control is required. In fact, failure to make such separation
despite deregulation and privatisation is seen as a major reason
why infrastructure reform in the UK has been disappointing.
Where such structural reforms have not occurred,
the challenge from a competition policy perspective is to provide a
mechanism that will support competitive market outcomes by
protecting the interests of potential new entrants while ensuring
the owner of the natural monopoly element is not unduly
disadvantaged. A mechanism of this kind seems likely to pay a
pivotal role in a national competition policy as competition is
introduced to areas previously reserved to public
monopolies.(3)
The Hilmer Report recommended that:
11.1 Concerns over access to essential facilities
be dealt with under a national competition policy by a new legal
regime that creates a right of access in prescribed
circumstances.(4)
Following the Hilmer Report s recommendations, the Commonwealth
and state and territory governments proceeded to implement the
reform measures. The Commonwealth and states and territories all
became signatories to the Competition Principles Agreement and the
Commonwealth inserted Part IIIA into the TPA.
Clause 6 of the Competition Principles Agreement (CPA) sets down
the principles for the national access regime. It specifies for the
Commonwealth to establish a generic access regime. Part IIIA of the
TPA puts this generic access regime in place. It also makes
provision for state and territory access regimes to operate
alongside the Commonwealth regime so that where a state or
territory access regime has been certified as operating in
accordance with the principles in clause 6 of the CPA, access to
this regime cannot be sought under Part IIIA of the TPA.
It is important to keep in mind that the national access regime
is designed to supplement the process of commercial negotiation.
Therefore, where, through normal commercial negotiations, facility
owners and access seekers fail to reach agreement on access to
essential facilities, the access seeker can use an access regime to
negotiate access to the services provided by that facility.
As already noted, access regimes operate at both the
Commonwealth and at the state and territory level. Therefore,
depending on the regime, access seekers may either have to rely on
accessing the facility:
-
under Part IIIA of the TPA,
-
through a state or territory based industry scheme (which may or
may not have the support of legislation), or
-
through a Commonwealth scheme that falls outside the scope of
Part IIIA of the TPA such as the telecommunications scheme in Part
XIC of the TPA, or the airports scheme in the Airports Act
1996.
The amendments contained within this Bill relate
to Part IIIA of the TPA.
Part IIIA gives individuals and businesses the opportunity to
seek access to services supplied by certain publicly and privately
owned infrastructure facilities on reasonable terms and conditions
and fair prices.
Part IIIA provides three paths to gaining access to an eligible
infrastructure service:
-
Having a service declared(5)
-
Using an existing access regime which has been deemed to be
effective
-
Seeking access under the terms and conditions specified in an
undertaking given by the service provider and accepted by the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(ACCC)(6)
Where an individual or business has been denied access to
a facility, they can apply to have the National Competition Council
(NCC) declare the service. The NCC makes a recommendation to
the Minister on whether or not the service should be declared.
In making its recommendation the NCC must consider whether it
would be economical for anyone to develop another facility that
could provide part of the service.(7)
The NCC must not recommend declaration of a service
unless(8):
- access (or increased access) to the service would promote
competition in at least one market (whether or not in Australia),
other than the market for the service;
-
it would be uneconomical for anyone to develop another facility
to provide the service;
-
the facility is of national significance, having regard to:
-
access to the service can be provided without undue risk to
human health or safety;
-
access to the service is not already the subject of an effective
access regime;
-
access (or increased access) to the service would not be
contrary to the public interest.
Once the NCC has made a recommendation to the Minister regarding
the declaration, the Minister must then make a decision on whether
the infrastructure should be declared (however, the Minister does
not need to follow the recommendation of the NCC). When making the
decision the Minister must consider the same factors (set out
above) that the NCC was required to consider.(9) The
Minister must make and publish that decision within 60 days of
receiving the NCC s recommendation.(10) At the same
time, the Minister must notify the applicant and the infrastructure
owner of the decision and provide both parties with a statement of
reasons.(11)
The applicant or infrastructure owner can appeal to the
Australian Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) for review of the
Minister s decision.(12) The Tribunal is required to
reconsider whether or not the service should be declared, rather
than review the decision making process of the
Minister.(13) Matters of law raised in the Tribunal
judgements are subject to judicial review.(14)
There have been only two declarations to date, both covering
cargo handling services at Sydney and Melbourne airports. The
Productivity Commission report notes that, even though there have
been few declarations, the threat of declaration has helped shape
the access regime at the State and Territory level.
Once a declaration has been made, the applicant who has applied
for access has a legal right to negotiate on the terms and
conditions of access and if those negotiations are unsuccessful the
parties can seek to have the matter arbitrated by the
ACCC.(15)
The ACCC is required to make a written determination
setting out;
-
whether the third party should have access to the facility,
-
if access is granted, the terms and conditions of that access,
and
- other matters such as the cost to the applicant of access and
whether the provider should extend the
facility.(16)
In the course of making the determination the ACCC is required
to take into account the following factors(17):
-
The legitimate business interests of the provider, and the
provider s investment in the facility
-
The public interest, including the public interest in having
competition in a market (whether or not in Australia)
-
The interests of all persons who have rights to use the
service
-
The direct costs of providing access to the service
-
The value to the provider of extensions whose cost is borne by
someone else
-
The operational and technical requirements necessary for the
safe and reliable operation of the facility, and
-
The economically efficient operation of the facility
Parties to the determination may apply to the Tribunal for a
review of the determination.(18) The Tribunal is
required to reconsider the determination, rather than review the
decision making process of the ACCC.(19) Parties may
appeal to the Federal Court on questions of law that arise in the
course of the Tribunal s decision making
process.(20)
Once a determination has been made, the parties to the
determination are bound by the determination. If either party fails
to comply with its provisions, application may be made to the
Federal Court for injunctive relief, compensation and other orders
that are appropriate.(21)
Rather than having the ACCC arbitrate on a matter, parties may
choose to negotiate a private contract which will set out the terms
and conditions of access to the declared service. The parties can
apply to the ACCC to have this contract registered. When deciding
whether to register a privately negotiated contract the ACCC must
consider(22):
-
The public interest, including the public interest in having
competition in markets (whether or not in Australia), and
-
The interests of all persons who have rights to use the
service to which the contract relates.
If registered, the contract is treated as if it were a
determination of the ACCC and the parties are subject to the same
rights and liabilities and enforcement procedures that attach to a
determination.(23) If the contract is not registered, it
is subject to the ordinary principles of contract law.
Section 44M-44Q of the TPA sets out a process whereby an access
regime can be certified as an effective access regime. A party
cannot seek access to a facility through Part IIIA if the facility
is an effective access regime. The only regimes that can be
certified as effective are state and territory government access
regimes. The TPA does not provide a certification process for
Commonwealth government and non-government access regimes.
To be certified, the Minister in the responsible state or
territory must apply to the NCC for a recommendation about
whether the regime is effective. For an access regime to be
certified effective it must conform to the principles in clause
6(2)-(4) of the Competition Principles Agreement. Clause 6 of the
Competition Principles Agreement is reproduced in the appendix. The
NCC must make a recommendation to the designated Commonwealth
Minister. Section 44M provides that the Minister must then decide
whether to certify the state or territory access regime as
effective. The Minister must take the requirements in clause
6(2)-(4) of the Competition Principles Agreement into account when
making this decision.(24) The Minister s certification
decision is reviewable by the National Competition
Tribunal.(25)
If a facility has been certified effective , the party seeking
access to the facility must use the state or territory
access regime. If the facility has not been certified effective ,
the access seeker may either rely upon the state or territory
access regime or apply for the facility to be declared and access
negotiated under Part IIIA.
Certification provides all parties with certainty about how
access will be regulated. While this benefits access seekers, it is
also crucial for infrastructure operators and developers,
particularly in relation to new investment.(26) It is
noteworthy that certification can only be used by state and
territory governments. Other entities wishing to achieve certainty
in the status of their access regime must lodge an undertaking with
the ACCC.
As noted above (page 7), one of the matters that must be taken
into account by the NCC and the Minister during the declaration
process is whether access to the service is already the subject of
an effective access regime. In making this decision, it is not
necessary that the access regime be one in which the Minister has
made a section 44M certification. Rather the NCC or the Minister
can apply the principles set out in clause 6(2)-(4) of the CPA to
determine if a state or territory regime is effective. If a section
44M certification has been made this decision is however binding on
the NCC and the Minister (subject to limited exceptions).
A facility owner may lodge a written undertaking with the ACCC
setting out the terms and conditions on which it is prepared to
provide access. If the ACCC accepts the undertaking, access seekers
can only access the facility on the terms and conditions set out in
the undertaking. If an undertaking is in place, access seekers
cannot apply to have the facility declared and a determination
made.
The ACCC may accept the undertaking if it thinks it is
appropriate to do so after considering the following
factors(27):
-
The legitimate business interests of the provider
-
The public interest, including the public interest in having
competition in markets (whether or not in Australia)
-
The interests of persons who might want access to the
service
-
Whether access to the service is already the subject of an
access regime
-
Whether the undertaking is in accordance with an access code
that applies to the service, and
-
Any other matters that the ACCC consider are relevant
The ACCC is required to conduct public consultation before
accepting the undertaking unless the undertaking complies with an
access code which has been accepted by the ACCC.(28)
Parties who own an essential facility may wish to lodge an
undertaking so that they can get some degree of certainty about
access arrangements and avoid disputes regarding the declaration of
a service. The only undertaking that has to date been accepted by
the ACCC has been for the National Electricity
Code.(29)
The Bill amends Part IIIA of the TPA to implement many of the
recommendations that were made by the Productivity Commission in
its 2001 Review of the National Access Regime.(30) The
majority of the amendments are procedural in nature. Only a small
number of the amendments implement new policy.
The Bill makes the following key changes to Part IIIA of the
TPA.
Item 5, proposed new section
44A inserts an objects clause into Part IIIA of the TPA.
The clause provides that the object of Part IIIA is to:
Promote the economically efficient operation of,
use of and investment in the infrastructure by which services are
provided, thereby promoting effective competition in upstream and
downstream markets; and
Provide a framework and guiding principles to
encourage a consistent approach to access regulation in each
industry.
The Bill specifies that the objects of Part IIIA must be taken
into account by the NCC, the Minister and the Tribunal in regard to
declaring a service, certifying that a regime is effective,
approving access undertakings and accepting access codes.
As noted above, declaration of a service cannot be made unless
access to the service would promote competition in at least one
market, other than the market for the service. The Bill
proposes to amend this requirement so that the declaration may be
made only if access to the service will result in a material
increase in competition. The explanatory memorandum states that
this change will ensure access declarations are only sought where
increases in competition are not trivial .(31) This is
how the Australian Competition Tribunal has interpreted the current
requirement in the legislation and hence this amendment is not a
shift in policy.(32)
In regard to the declaration criteria, it is noteworthy that the
Exports and Infrastructure Taskforce, established by the Prime
Minister on 18 March 2005, in its report (Export Infrastructure
Report), commented that:
Set against this background, the taskforce has
concerns that the current provisions of Part IIIA of the Trade
Practices Act, which define the economy-wide access regime, may
cast the regulatory net too wide. More specifically, a service can
be declared (that is, subjected to a regulated access regime) if
doing so will promote competition in a market (other than the
market in which the service itself is provided). In practice, this
means that a facility may be subjected to a regulated access
regime, with access made available on regulated terms to third
parties, if the services it provides facilitate competition in some
downstream market for example, if access to a rail link will
promote competition in the provision of transport services.
There are two difficulties with this test. To
begin with, the market in which competition is promoted need not be
in Australia. As a result, even if the entire impact of declaration
is to provide gains to foreign buyers (at the expense of Australian
producers), the regulatory apparatus can be brought into play.
Second, promoting competition does not necessarily
equate to increasing efficiency. For example, third party access to
a vertically integrated, tightly managed, logistics chain may
promote competition, but undermine the efficiency with which that
chain is operated and managed.
Currently, there is no clear mechanism allowing an
efficiency override for applications for declaration of export
related facilities under Part IIIA or its associated
regimes.(33)
In the case of a determination, the ACCC will be required
to arbitrate on the price that access seekers must pay for access
to a service and in relation to an access undertaking,
approve the pricing arrangements set out in the access undertaking.
Currently the legislation contains only very broad principles that
the ACCC must consider when determining conditions of access
including price (section 44X and subsection 44ZZA(3)). These
criteria are very general in nature and do not relate
specifically to the issue of price. Therefore access seekers,
service providers and the ACCC have very little guidance on what
the access price should or may be.
In its submission to the Productivity Commission inquiry, the
NCC argued that:
This has far reaching effects:
-
It makes it difficult, in the context of a declaration decision,
to determine the consequences of declaration, as so much latitude
exists as to the terms and conditions of access;
-
It likely reduces the willingness of the parties to achieve
commercial settlement, as they have little basis for determining
the likely outcomes of arbitration; and
-
It hinders the task of arbitrators and encourages appeals from
arbitral decisions.(34)
The Productivity Commission considered that pricing principles
were warranted and argued that they would provide better guidance
on how the broad objectives of access regime should be applied,
providing certainty and help to address concerns that a regulator s
own values will unduly influence decisions relating to the terms
and conditions of access.(35)
Accordingly the Bill proposes to amend the TPA to provide that
the ACCC will be required to consider pricing principles
when arbitrating access disputes and considering access
undertakings. The pricing principles will operate as a legislative
instrument(36) and hence will be subject to disallowance
by Parliament. It is expected that they will be the same as the
pricing principles set out in the Government s response to the
Productivity Commission Report and which are as follows:
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(ACCC) must have regard to the following principles:
(a) that regulated access prices should:
(i) be set so as to generate expected revenue for
a regulated service or services that is at least sufficient to meet
the efficient costs of providing access to the regulated
service or services; and
(ii) include a return on investment commensurate
with the regulatory and commercial risks involved.
(b) that the access price structures should:
(i) allow multi-part pricing and price
discrimination when it aids efficiency; and
(ii) not allow a vertically integrated access
provider to set terms and conditions that discriminate in favour of
its downstream operations, except to the extent that the cost of
providing access to other operators is higher.
(c) that access pricing regimes should provide
incentives to reduce costs or otherwise improve productivity.
(37)
Commonwealth facilities that have been constructed and operated
by private enterprise as a result of a competitive tendering
process will be exempt from being declared (proposed
subsection 44H(3)). The ACCC will determine whether a
Commonwealth facility is exempt and can only make the determination
if it concludes that reasonable terms and conditions of access to
the services provided by the facility will be the result of the
competitive tender process. (proposed section
44PA).
The Bill imposes timeframes on the National Competition Council,
the Minister, the Competition Tribunal and the ACCC when making
access decisions. The time frames range from 60 days up to 6 months
and they may be extended subject to specific conditions set out in
the Bill (proposed section 44GA, 44JA, 44NC, 44ND, 44PD,
44XA and 44ZZO). It would appear that these amendments,
will be greatly welcomed, particularly considering the Export
Infrastructure Report s criticism of the lack of timeliness in
access decision making.(38)
The Bill proposes that the NCC can seek public comment before
making a recommendation regarding a declaration and the ACCC can
seek public comment in regard to access undertakings, access codes
and deeming a Commonwealth tendering process to be a competitive
tender process.
The Bill increases scrutiny of the decision making process by
requiring that all decisions be published - proposed
section 44GC, 44HA, 44NG, 44PFand 44ZZBE.
The Bill also requires that the Commission make publicly available
a written report on the final determination it makes on a declared
service (proposed section 44ZNB).
Avenues of appeal are increased in the Bill so that decisions
regarding an effective access regime (proposed subsection
44O(1), access undertakings and access codes can be
subject to merit review by the Australian Competition Tribunal
(proposed section 44ZZOA).
The Bill also improves decision making processes by giving the
Commission powers to make interim determinations for declared
services (item 68).
The Bill makes some changes to the regulatory arrangements for
access undertakings. In particular, service providers will be able
to lodge an access undertaking even if a service has been declared
(item 107) and the ACCC will have the power to
extend access undertakings and access codes (item
108).
Concluding Comments
Broadly speaking, it would appear that
the Bill will improve the operation of the national access
regime. Whilst many of the amendments are procedural in nature they
have scope to make the decision making process more efficient and
effective. Many of the procedures will bring greater certainty to
both access seekers and access providers, especially those
initiatives dealing with the determination of access prices.
Opportunities for delaying access through regulatory gaming (for
example, by using stalling techniques) will also be curtailed by,
for instance, the imposition of time limits on certain
decisions.
Whilst the Bill does put in place pricing principles, it is not
clear whether these principles will adequately address the
difficult question of achieving a balance in pricing. There is no
doubt that a failure to get the price to access to facilities
correct may be a major deterrent to investment. Low access prices
may have damaging effects on investment in infrastructure by
infrastructure owners who may not be able to attract sufficient
investment funds. Furthermore, low access prices may discourage
investment by other market participants for whom accessing existing
facilities may be a lower cost alternative to investment in new
facilities. On the other hand, high access prices may discourage or
prevent access seekers entry into downstream markets or, at least,
make it difficult for them to build businesses profitable enough to
justify investment in alternative infrastructure. Access prices
that are too high may also discourage access seekers from using the
facility which may impact on the profitability of facilities owners
and hence their capacity and incentive to invest in
infrastructure.
In relation to regulators there has been a suggestion that
regulators appear to favour users rather than facility providers in
their access decision making. (39)
The Export Infrastructure Report noted that:
There are conflicting views on how well regulators
have performed their role. The regulators, and the firms that have
benefited from lower price access to infrastructure, have strongly
defended the regulatory system s performance to date. The regulated
firms, on the other hand, have put the view that Australian
regulators have focused too heavily on the quest to eliminate
monopoly rents, in practice giving inadequate weight to the
importance of ensuring that needed infrastructure will be
available.(40)
Arguably this is an area that needs to be monitored and explored
further.
Closely linked to this issue is the fact that there have been
suggestions that under the national access regime, competition may
be being promoted over efficiency and investment and that the
Productivity Commission Report and the Bill do not address this
issue.(41)
In relation to an appropriate policy response to some of these
issues, Henry Ergas suggested possible steps to solving these
problems when he wrote that:
It is finally being recognised that substantial
parts of our infrastructure industries face serious capacity
constraints. The factors behind this are complex. There are no
magical solutions to which the Commonwealth and State governments
can turn. But first do no harm seems a reasonable starting point.
Australian governments can at least ensure that serious obstacles
to infrastructure development created by regulation are addressed.
.
A good place to start would be for the government
to implement in full the recommendations of the Productivity
Commission s review of the National Access Regime and of the Gas
Code.
Additionally the Government, together with COAG
counterparts, needs to act to more clearly separate regulatory
policy from the administration of regulation ..
The time has now come for policy responsibility,
and the substantial resources used by regulators for policy
development, to be shifted back to government. Investors in and
users of regulated infrastructure are entitled to clear,
transparent and unambiguous formulations of policy in key areas
such as the valuation of infrastructure assets and the setting of
allowed rates of return.(42)
In a recent article in the Australian newspaper the Federal
Member of the Australian Labor Party, Mr Lindsay Tanner, MP also
commented on regulatory and policy arrangements where he wrote that
there:
.is a general lack of data and objective analysis,
which clouds debate about infrastructure. Governments dabble in
fast-train projects, canals and unviable rail lines without
comprehensive independent scrutiny.
The recent experience of the West Australian canal
proposal shows that it is wise to constrain the ability of
governments to borrow. The way to do this while facilitating
borrowing for infrastructure investment is to create an
infrastructure commission to scrutinise projects and financing
proposal, publish comprehensive data on infrastructure needs and
performance and develop regulatory codes. Rather than an advisory
council, which may be dominated by sectoral interests, an
independent commission would profoundly influence public
debate.(43)
Despite these criticisms, the proposed Bill does appear to put
in place sensible measures to enhance the operational aspects of
the national access regime and has been supported by industry
groups.
-
Productivity Commission, Inquiry Report: Review of the National
Access Regime; Report No. 17, 28 September 2001 (PC Report).
-
Independent Committee of Inquiry into National Competition
Policy, National Competition Policy Report by the Independent
Committee of Inquiry, Australian Government Publishing
Service, Canberra, 1993, pp. 240-241.
-
ibid., p. 241.
-
ibid. p. 266.
-
Division 3 of Part IIIA of the TPA.
-
Division 6 of Part IIIA of the TPA.
-
Sub-section 44F(4) of the TPA.
-
Sub-section 44G(2) of the TPA.
-
Sub-section 44H(2) and 44H(4) of the TPA.
-
Sub-section 44H(9) of the TPA.
-
Sub-section 44H(7) of the TPA.
-
Section 44K of the TPA.
-
Sub-section 44K(4).
-
PC report, page 18.
-
Division 3, Subdivision C of Part IIIA of the TPA.
-
Sub-section 44V(2) of the TPA.
-
Section 44X of the TPA.
-
Section 44ZP of the TPA.
-
Sub-section 44ZP(3) of the TPA.
-
Section 44ZR of the TPA.
-
Section 44ZZD of the TPA.
-
Sub-section 44ZW(2) of the TPA.
-
Sub-section 44ZY of the TPA.
-
Division 2, Sub-division C, Part III of the TPA.
-
Section 44(O) of the TPA.
-
National Competition Council, The National Access Regime: A
Guide to Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act Part C Certification
of Access Regimes, December 2002, p. 6.
-
Sub-section 44ZZA(3) of the TPA.
-
Sub-section 44ZZA(4A) and section 44ZZAA.
-
[http://www.neca.com.au/],
[accessed 21 June 2005].
-
PC Report.
-
Explanatory Memorandum Trade Practices Amendment (National
Access Regime) Bill 2005, p.25.
-
Sydney International Airport [2000] ACompT 1 (1 March
2000), Duke Easter Gas Pipeline Pty Ltd [2001 ACompT 2 (4
May 2001).
-
Australia s Export Infrastructure Report to the Prime Minister
by the Exports and Infrastructure Taskforce, May 2005, p. 39.
-
Productivity Commission, Inquiry Report: Review of the National
Access Regime, Report No. 17 28 September 2001, p. 138.
-
Productivity Commission, Inquiry Report: Review of the National
Access Regime, Report No. 17 28 September 2001, p. 143.
-
And hence subject to the Legislative Instruments Act
2003.
-
Government Response to the Productivity Commission Review of the
National Access Regime
-
Australia s Export Infrastructure Report to the Prime Minister
by the Exports and Infrastructure Taskforce, May 2005, p. 37.
-
Louis Thomson and Simon Writer, Access to Services , Trade
Practices Law Journal, volume 11 2003, p. 97.
-
Australia s Export Infrastructure Report to the Prime Minister
by the Exports and Infrastructure Taskforce, May 2005, p. 41.
-
Louis Thomson and Simon Writer, Access to Services , Trade
Practices Law Journal, volume 11 2003, p. 97.
-
Henry Ergas, ACCC takes nation to point of no return ,
Australian Financial Review, 8 March 2005.
-
Mr Lindsay Tanner, MP. We must invest in renewal
Australian, 22 March 2005, p. 13
Susan Dudley
21 June 2005
Bills Digest Service
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ISSN 1328-8091
© Commonwealth of Australia 2005
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