WARNING:
This Digest is prepared for debate. It reflects the legislation as
introduced and does not canvass subsequent amendments.
This Digest was available from 7 May 1996
CONTENTS
Date introduced:2 May 1996
House: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Communications and the Arts
Commencement: On the day on which the Act receives
the Royal Assent. The Repeal of Part 3 (directions by the Minister)
of the Telstra Corporation Act 1991 commences when a person other
than the Commonwealth becomes the legal owner of voting shares in
Telstra.
The Purpose of the Bill is to facilitate the sale of up to one
third of the Commonwealth equity in Telstra Corporation Limited
(Telstra).
The Government's Election Policy
The Liberal and National Parties 1996 Election Policy contained
a commitment to partially privatise Telstra. The major features of
the policy were as follows:
- One-third of the Commonwealth's equity to be made available
through a share float, sixty-five per cent of which would be
reserved for Australian investors as A class shares.
- Foreign investors only to be allowed to subscribe to thirty
five per cent of the float and to be issued with B class shares. No
foreign investor to be allowed to acquire more than five per cent
of the one-third float.
- Incentives to be provided to Australian citizens and Telstra
employees to encourage participation in the float.
- Telstra not to be broken up.
- Telstra to remain incorporated in Australia with an Australian
citizen as Chairman of the Board, of which a majority will also be
Australians.
- Government to reserve right to veto any excessive management
remuneration.
- The Community Service Obligations (CSOs) of telecommunication
carriers to be maintained, along with the requirement for such
carriers to contribute to a Universal Service Levy to meet the cost
of the CSOs.
- The existing right to untimed local telephone calls to be
maintained and guaranteed by legislation.
- All existing price caps to be maintained and the price controls
outlined in the Labor Government's August 1995 statement to be
adhered to.
- A new legislated Customer Service Guarantee to be met by all
telephone companies.
- Competition regulation to be administered by a specialist
branch of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.
(1)
The Policy estimated that the partial privatisation would
generate around $8 billion. Mr Howard has stated that $7 billion
will be used to retire debt, with the remaining $1 billion
providing initial funding for a Commonwealth Trust Fund to be known
as the Natural Heritage Trust of Australia. The Trust will be
devoted to capital projects to "maintain and replenish the
environmental infrastructure".(2) The Policy lists five capital
projects to be funded over the first five years. It is planned that
at the end of the five-year program around $300 million will remain
in perpetuity in the Fund, with all interest earned to be devoted
to environmental projects.
The Universal Service Obligation
Section 288 of the Telecommunications Act 1991 defines
the universal service obligation (USO) as the obligation:
(a) to ensure that the standard
telephone service is reasonably accessible to all people in
Australia on an equitable basis, wherever they reside or carry on
business; and
(b) to supply the standard telephone service to people in
Australia; and
(c) to ensure that payphones are reasonably accessible to all
people in Australia on an equitable basis, wherever they reside or
carry on business; and
(d) to supply, install and maintain payphones in Australia.
It is the responsibility of the universal service carrier to
meet the USO. While the Act allows for more than one universal
service carrier, at the moment Telstra is the sole such carrier for
Australia. Telstra's performance in meeting the USO is monitored by
the Australian Telecommunications Authority (AUSTEL). AUSTEL also
publishes a much more detailed description of its requirements for
Telstra's fulfilment of the USO, including such matters as:
- the definition of a standard
telephone service
- installation times
- definition of 'equitable basis' for the provision of payphone
services.
This document (titled AUSTEL'S Views of Telstra's Universal
Service Obligation) provides the basis upon which AUSTEL
reports to the Minister on Telstra's performance in meeting the
USO. AUSTEL has the power to investigate complaints regarding the
USO and to direct a carrier to comply with the obligation.
The 1991 Act requires AUSTEL to assess the cost of the USO and
to share that cost across carriers in proportion to each carrier's
timed traffic (referred to as the USO levy). The calculation of the
cost of the USO (called the Net Universal Service Cost or NUSC) has
been a matter of some controversy. In June 1994 AUSTEL published
its assessment for 1992-93 at $149.17m. Assessments for subsequent
years have not yet been published because of concerns over
methodology and the treatment of certain revenue and expenditure
items. The distribution of the NUSC between States is shown in the
table below.
Net Universal Service Cost 1992-93(3)
| State |
$m |
Per cent |
| NSW/ACT |
46.3 |
31 |
| QLD |
40.2 |
27 |
| VIC |
24.4 |
16 |
| WA |
19.7 |
13 |
| SA/NT |
8.7 |
6 |
| TAS |
8.2 |
6 |
| Other costs |
1.6 |
1 |
| Total |
149.2 |
100 |
It is likely that the NUSC for more recent years is considerably
higher than the figures given above. A recent article in
Australian Communications (February 1996, p.53) gave a
figure of $235m for 1994-95. This figure appears to have been
derived from AUSTEL's published figures on the cost of Telstra's
loss-making exchanges. These are calculated by deducting the
revenue returned by an exchange from the cost of providing services
to that exchange. In 1994-95 the total losses from loss-making
exchanges was $235.8m. While this figure is not equivalent to the
NUSC, it does provide an indication of the scale of costs. It is
possible that these costs will further increase if the USO is
broadened. Under the previous Government's Telecommunications
Policy Principles: Post 1997 consideration was to be given to
upgrading the standard telephone service to a 'standard
telecommunications service' capable of supporting fax and data as
well as telephony. The new Government is also committed to
examining whether the definition of a standard telephone service
should be upgraded. Section 5 of the Telecommunications
Act allows for the definition of a standard telephone service
to be changed by regulations to include telecommunications
services.
The likelihood of an extensive broadening of the USO could have
a significant effect on the privatisation of Telstra. It would
reduce the profitability of the organisation (particularly if price
capping continues) and this presumably would lower the price of its
stock.
Price Capping, Untimed Local Calls and Targeted
Assistance
As well as the USO, Telstra is also subject to other Ministerial
directives with social implications. To ensure that the carrier
does not exploit its monopolistic position, Telstra is subject to a
price controls on its basic services. In 1994-95 these controls
effectively required Telstra to reduce its retail prices for basic
services, according to revenue weight, by at least 4.5 per cent in
real terms.
In its Telecommunications Policy Principles: Post 1997
the previous Government acknowledged that social policy
considerations (as well as questions of market power) lay behind
the application of price controls over Telstra. It stated that
these controls were necessary to ensure that prices remain
affordable in loss-making universal service areas. The Policy
Principles announced in August 1995 also included price control
arrangements for 1996 to 1998. They set a price cap of the CPI
minus 7.5% on Telstra's charges for a revenue weighted basket of
main services (connections, line rentals, local, trunk and
international calls, cellular mobile telephone services and leased
lines). It also set individual caps of CPI minus 1% for the stand
alone charges for certain residential services (connection, line
rentals, trunk and international calls). The standard local call
charge of 25 cents and public payphone prices were also capped for
the three years. The Policy Principles also stipulated
that all carriers offering local call services to residential
customers continue to be required to offer these customers the
option of access to untimed local calls.
The new Government's election policy included the maintenance of
both the price cap regime and untimed local calls. It stated that
Telstra would continue to be subject to the 'existing and announced
price cap arrangements' and that the price cap regime would be
expanded to include ISDN from 1 July 1996. The major difference
between the parties concerns the post-1997 regime. The previous
Government's Policy Principles stated that price caps on
Telstra should be determined periodically with regard to 'existing
market power, forecast market developments and social policy
considerations'. Under the Coalition policy, wholesale pricing
would be subject to Ministerial guidelines while the retail market
would be monitored by the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC) to ensure that there was no anti-competitive
behaviour. The ACCC would have the power to impose and/or disallow
tariffs. The policy does not refer to social policy considerations
in connection with price regulation, but deals with the issue in
terms of market power/competition policy.
The policies of both the Coalition and the previous Government
support the continuation of targeted assistance for low-income
earners and those with special telecommunications needs. Such
assistance is determined as part of the normal Budget processes and
is provided by the relevant portfolios. Such an approach is
considered more equitable and efficient because the costs of the
programs remains transparent and is not concealed within the
operating expenses of the carriers. This also means that the future
of such programs is completely independent of the ownership of
Telstra.
Benefits of Privatisation
The Government has argued that the community (and consumers)
will benefit in general from the privatisation. These benefits will
include:
- better quality services and lower prices
- the maximisation of economic efficiency consistent with the
CSOs
- the avoidance of the conflict of interest that occurs when the
Government sets the competitive framework for an industry while
owning one of the major players
- economic benefits associated with the reduction of government
debt and associated interest payments.
Some commentators have questioned the extent of these
benefits.(4) A recent article by Allan Brown on the economics of
the Telstra privatisation argued that:
The empirical evidence strongly
suggests that historically private firms have outperformed
public firms. This is not surprising considering that traditionally
GBEs have had multiple objectives among which have been profit
making, but usually not profit maximising. Corporatisation has
addressed many of the apparent causes of public sector
inefficiency, and there is evidence from both Australia and the UK
that the productive efficiency of GBEs has greatly improved since
the early 1980s. It is still not clear, however, whether it has
achieved the level of the private sector, or, indeed whether it
ever will. Thus the fundamental question as to whether or not
private firms are inherently superior to public
enterprises in terms of productive efficiency is yet to be
conclusively answered. If, in time, it is found that they are, it
is likely that the difference between their levels of productive
efficiency will be less than traditionally assumed.(5)
Brown concluded that the balance of economic costs and benefits
of the privatisation of Telstra depends largely upon the company's
potential for further efficiency gains, the achievable net sale
proceeds, the level of foreign ownership and the implications for
the regulation of the telecommunications industry.
Whatever its merits, the case for the privatisation of public
telecommunications carriers has been accepted by many governments.
Countries which have privatised their carriers (either whole or in
part) or plan to do so include the UK, NZ, Germany, France,
Holland, Italy, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Indonesia, Singapore,
Japan, Canada, Chile, Argentina, Malaysia, Mexico, Venezuela,
Hungary and Latvia.
Social Impact of the Privatisation
The Government's Election Policy was constructed to counter
claims that the privatisation would have an adverse social impact.
Only one third of the carrier would be sold and there would be no
further privatisation before the next election. It also committed
itself to legislate a framework of consumer safeguards that would
include:
- the requirement that all carriers contribute to the Universal
Service Levy
- the requirement that a Standard Telephone Service be offered to
all Australians (with an immediate review to determine if the
Standard Telephone Service should be upgraded to accommodate new
technologies)
- the maintenance of the right to untimed local calls for
residential and business customers
- maintenance of the price cap regime
- continuation of targeted assistance
- acceleration of network modernisation and provision of digital
services.
It has also been argued that so long as community service
obligations are entrenched as the responsibility of carriers (both
private and public) in the legislation establishing the regulatory
environment for telecommunications, then the standard argument that
such obligations necessitate public ownership of the national
carrier no longer applies.(6)
Opponents of the privatisation argue that (regardless of any
immediate safeguards) it would not be possible to maintain the
current community service obligations with private carriers
competing in a deregulated environment. In the long term, it is
argued, private carriers will not be able to sustain the
cross-subsidisation that enables the current provision of standard
services throughout the country. Without the USO, provincial and
rural users would be forced to pay substantially more for a
standard telephone service and the availability of pay telephones
in low-income areas would decline. According to newspaper reports,
Telstra has already indicated to the previous Government that it
should not be required to provide unprofitable services while both
the Bureau of Industry Economics and the Industry Commission have
called for the replacement of cross-subsidies in telecommunications
with some other means of delivering community service
obligations.(7)
It has also been argued that the existing USO is inadequate and
should be expanded to cover other services, but that such an
expansion of definition would become increasingly unlikely if the
privatisation were to proceed. AUSTEL reported in December 1993
that there was increasing pressure, particularly from consumers in
rural and remote areas, for the definition of a standard telephone
service to be broadened to include data transmission facilities.
The Consumers' Telecommunications Network has argued that the
geographical definition of universal service is inadequate. It has
proposed that it should be extended to include universal
accessibility and affordability, as well as a universal
technological standard, universal telecommunications and
participation in society. In November 1995 the Senate Economics
References Committee recommended that if the definition is expanded
to cover telecommunications, it should also allow for
radiocommunications (because services are not confined to cable
transmissions). Both Government and Opposition have indicated their
support for a review of the definition of the standard telephone
service.
Opponents of the privatisation could also argue that it will
occur at a critical time in the development of communications in
Australia. Telstra is currently engaged in a rollout of fibre-optic
cable network that will become the vehicle for the delivery of
broadband services in the next century. Telstra believes 80 per
cent of urban homes will be passed by the network by the end of the
decade. The development of this new communications infrastructure
itself raises difficult issues concerning equity and democracy.
Helen Mills, former director of the Sydney-based Communications Law
Centre, has described the problem as follows:
As information, and access to it, the
ability to manipulate it and tailor it to individual purposes,
becomes more and more the currency of effective participation in
society, we will have to confront inequalities of opportunity based
on capacity to pay and personal abilities to deal with technology,
which will be extremely difficult to solve using traditional means
... As broadband networks are developed, an increasing proportion
of the population could be in the position of subsidising the
installation of capacity to deliver services which they will not be
able to use: the information have-nots could thus be doubly
disadvantaged.(8)
Because of the huge cost of the network, it is unlikely that
rural communities and remote households will be serviced with cable
and, accordingly, geographical inequities in communications will be
increased. In these circumstances it is important that universal
service obligations protecting rural and remote households be
strengthened rather than threatened. A privatised Telstra would not
only be disinclined to cross-subsidise the cable rollout to rural
areas, but the cost of the project will also put pressure on the
less profitable aspects of the standard telephone network. A recent
report (Australian Financial Review, 9 April 1996) stated
that some brokers have estimated that the 'cable war' with Optus
will reduce Telstra's profits by more than $2 billion over the next
five to six years.
The costs of the cable rollout have also been used as a
justification for privatisation. It is argued that the huge
financial risks involved should be borne by shareholders, rather
than taxpayers (the vast majority of whom will not be connected to
the broadband network in the short to medium term). The alternative
view is that the network will be an essential infrastructure for
development in the 'information age' that will provide long-term
benefits for the entire community and the economy.
Telstra's Performance
In March 1995 the Bureau of Industry Economics published a
detailed comparison of Telstra's performance with overseas
carriers. It concluded that:
Since the introduction of competition
in telecommunications Australia has moved ahead with the leading
pack, but it is at the back of the leading group rather than the
front. Relaxing the pace of reform would see Australia fall back
into the trailing group of also-rans. Renewed effort is required to
lift Australia towards international best practice.(9)
Some of the individual indicators are given in the table
below:
| Indicator |
Year |
Australia's Rank |
| Business Fixed Charges |
1993 |
18th of 28 |
| Long Distance Call Charges |
1993 |
16th of 26 |
| National Basket of Prices |
1994 |
14th of 23 |
| International Call Basket of Prices |
1994 |
1st of 24 |
| Fault Clearance |
1992 |
15th of 19 |
| Revenue per Employee |
1993 |
19th of 27 |
| Lines per Employee |
1993 |
26th of 30 |
| Revenue per Line |
1993 |
7th of 28 |
| Multifactor Productivity |
1992 |
8th of 11 |
It has been argued that privatisation is necessary to further
improve Telstra's operating efficiency as it is difficult for a
Government-owned organisation to undertake the restructuring
required. However, the current proposal will not meet these
conditions, as the Government will retain control and many of the
"constraints" on the organisation (USOs, price caps etc.) will
remain.(10)
Readers Note: All of the
proposed amendments contained in the Telstra (Dilution of Public
Ownership) Bill 1996 are included in a schedule to the Bill. The
terminology to be used therefore is 'item ' in the schedule in lieu
of the more usual form of 'clauses' in a Bill.
Legislation dealing with the related issue of the
natural heritage trust is to be covered in the Natural Heritage
Trust of Australia Bill 1996, which, at the time of writing this
Bills Digest, is yet be tabled.
Schedule 1 - Amendments
Items 1 to 19 deal with amendments to the
Telecommunications Act 1991. The
Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill groups the items under topics
rather than in numerical order. Items 1 to 5 will
introduce amendments to section 38 of the Telecommunications
Act 1991 to enable AUSTEL to develop broader indicative
performance standards about billing matters. AUSTEL's
responsibilities include reviewing and reporting to the Minister on
telecommunications carrier performance.
Item 6 simply inserts recognition of the
Minister's power to direct AUSTEL about customer service guarantee
under the new section 87P (see Item 11).
Comment: There is a
minor error in the Explanatory Memorandum on page 15
- Item 6. The related reference should read Item 11 not Item
12.
Item 11 inserts a new Division 6 - Customer
service guarantee which contains proposed new sections 87D to
87Q. Customers may be awarded damages (not exceeding $3000) for a
breach of performance standards by a carrier. The Minister may
issue directions to AUSTEL about how AUSTEL is to exercise its
powers under this Division. The direction may be disallowed by
Parliament.
Item 19 operates with Items 9 and
10 to extend to all customers the right to have the option
of continued access to untimed local calls. Previously, the
definition in section 73 of the Telecommunications Act
1991, was capable of excluding businesses.
Items 20 to 27 deal with proposed amendments to
the Telstra Corporation Act 1991. Telstra
Corporation Limited is a company registered under the
Corporations Law. The Telstra Corporation Act
1991 in its existing form obliges the Commonwealth to retain
ownership of all voting shares in Telstra (section 8).
Items 20 to 23 are minor legislative
amendments.
Item 24 is a key provision and it repeals the
existing Part 2 (fully Commonwealth owned) and replaces it with a
Part 2 which varies that legislative obligation to majority
Commonwealth ownership of Telstra. A proposed new section 8AB
requires the Commonwealth and Telstra to retain at least two-thirds
of the total voting rights of shares in Telstra. There is a further
provision to expressly require compliance by Telstra (proposed
section 8AC).
The proposed legislative obligations, which are imposed on the
Board of Telstra include informing the Minister of significant
company events such as forming a subsidiary, acquiring another
company or involvement in a joint venture. The Board of Telstra is
also required to provide the Minister with a Corporate Plan
containing specified details. The Minister may direct Telstra to
provide specified financial statements.
Comment: The
legislation contains a protective exemption for directors of
Telstra to ensure that any disclosure by them of confidential
company information pursuant to a Ministerial direction does not
contravene the
Corporations Law or any rule of common law
(see proposed new section 8AI). Likewise, the use by the
Commonwealth of that information to facilitate the Telstra sale
scheme does not contravene the provisions of the
Corporations
Law or common law (see proposed new section 8AW).
Apart from these special provisions, the partial sale of Telstra
will impose the requirements already specified in the
Corporations Law for continuous disclosure by the company
to the public of any event likely to materially affect the price of
the company's shares. The Minister's requirements for information
are, of course, likely to cover additional matters and to be more
detailed than that which is usually released under the continuous
disclosure regime.
One residual issue is that the Commonwealth, as majority
shareholder, will obtain information which may not necessarily be
made available to other share holders. Without over stating the
issue this might give rise to assertions that the Commonwealth is
in a position to have an advantage over other shareholders.
Proposed Division 4 of new Part 2 contains the sections which
will govern the sale by the Commonwealth of its shares in Telstra.
These proposed sections commence at section 8AJ (page 17 of the
Bill). These sections include an 'open-ended' appropriation at
proposed section 8AL to cover costs incurred in connection with the
sale of Telstra shares. The Consolidated Revenue Fund is also
appropriated to allow the Treasurer to authorise the payment of any
agreement entered into to satisfy any relevant financial
obligations of Telstra or its subsidiaries (see proposed sections
8AM and 8AO).
Another appropriation is specified in proposed section 8AS to
cover any reimbursement of expenses incurred by Telstra or its
Board in connection with assisting the Commonwealth for the
purposes of the Telstra sale scheme.
Comment: These
'open-ended' appropriations, in the context of Commonwealth
guarantees for potential liabilities, have been used in other asset
sales legislation such as the Commonwealth Bank and the ANL sale
legislation.
The Explanatory Memorandum to this Bill advises that no limit
has been set as this may signal the Government's view of the extent
of reasonable expenses. For this reason, no estimate of costs is
provided (see pages 4 and 5 of the Explanatory Memorandum).
A proposed new section 8AT binds the Commonwealth to comply with
Chapter 7 of the Corporations Law (where relevant) in
relation to the sale of Telstra shares. Chapter 7 of the
Corporations Law deals with securities (e.g. shares) and
the issue of an investment prospectus to the public.
A further appropriation is specified in proposed section 8BA
(see also, proposed new section 8BZ) to cover any issue which may
arise from constitutional protections which apply to prevent the
Commonwealth from compulsorily acquiring property from a person
otherwise than on just terms.
Comment: This is a
protective measure which may not be invoked. It is there to remove
any doubt should a claim be made that this commercial activity by
the Commonwealth has resulted in an adverse impact on the property
rights of any person. The relevant protective provision is found at
paragraph 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. It is suggested that it is
unlikely that the proposed new section 8BA will need to be invoked.
One issue which may need to be addressed is the transfer of
property rights held by the Commonwealth (such as fixtures on
subscribers' land eg. poles or towers) to a part commercial
operator. Land owners may wish to rent that infrastructure to other
carriers.
Proposed new Part 2A deals with restrictions on the ownership of
Telstra. A proposed section 8BF expressly extends the operation of
relevant provisions to acts or matters outside Australia. This will
enable action to be taken against a person who, say, breached the
foreign investment limits and the actual transaction took place in
another country.
Comment: Laws that
have extra-territorial effect may sometimes present enforcement
problems.
The proposed new Part 2A sets foreign investment limits under
terms such as unacceptable foreign-ownership situation.
Under proposed section 8BG, aggregate foreign ownership is limited
to 11.6667% with individual foreign ownership limited to 1.6667%.
These percentages, of course, apply to the public float of
one-third of the shares in Telstra. Another way of expressing it is
to say that foreign investment may constitute 35% of the one-third
of the shares issued to the public. These percentage limits can be
varied by Regulation where the float is split over two or more
releases ("tranches") - see proposed new section 8BK.
Proposed new section 8BH makes it an offence for a relevant
person to acquire more than the permissible percentage available to
foreign investors. The legislation also authorises Telstra or the
Minister to apply to the Federal Court to obtain a range of orders
(e.g. to order divesture of shares in an unacceptable foreign
ownership situation - see proposed new section 8BJ).
Comment: As a
generalisation, the Bill goes a little further than some previous
asset sales legislation in relation to express provisions in the
context of foreign ownership limits, in that it provides
anti-avoidance procedures to assist in monitoring and obtaining
specific information. There can be practical difficulties at times
in monitoring just who has acquired shares (see proposed new
sections 8BM to 8BP). This legislative development is a useful
initiative.
Division 8 within the proposed new Part 2A contains the
provisions which specify that Telstra's head office, base of
operations and incorporation must be in Australia (proposed
sections 8BQ to 8BS). Division 9 stipulates that the
Chair of Telstra must be
an Australian citizen and that the
majority of directors must be Australian
citizens.
Comment: As a side
issue, Australia recognises dual citizenship in certain specified
circumstances.
Proposed new Part 2B deals with powers available to the Minister
to restrain contraventions of the legislation (see proposed new
sections 8CD to 8CL).
Proposed new Part 2C is the Commonwealth's
re-affirmation of universal service obligation by
telecommunications carriers (see proposed new sections 8CM). It is
a re-affirmation consequent upon the partial privatisation of
Telstra.
Comment: The wording
in proposed section 8CM raises two possible issues. The first is
that the universal service obligation is tied to what '...should be
fulfilled as
efficiently and economically as possible'.
Essentially, this appears to qualify the obligation so that
excessive cost (say, in a remote area) may be a ground for
suspending the obligation.
The other issue is the wording '...that the losses that
result from supplying loss- making services ...should be shared
among carriers on an equitable basis...' is supplemented by a
provision to enable information to be obtained on how those
'losses' were determined. It is suggested, that there may
also be a category of information that should also be made
available to the public to ascertain the basis for
estimated losses which may have led to a
decision not to adhere to the universal service obligation.
Item 27 inserts a comprehensive set of
definitions (in the form of a further schedule) to be used when
dealing with terms used in Part 2A - Restrictions on ownership of
Telstra.
(1) Better Communications Liberal & National Parties
Policy 1996.
(2) Liberal and National Party Policy, Saving our Natural
Heritage, p.9.
(3) D. Dawson, C. Jones & W. Duncan, Telecommunications
Universal Service Obligation, AUSTEL Occasional Paper (1994),
p.33.
(4) See the Consumers Telecommunications Network, Selling
off the (Telstra) farm: Do consumers benefit? CTN Discussion
Paper, April 1996.
(5) Allan Brown, Should Telstra be Privatised? School
of Economics, Griffith University, Working Paper No.8 (February
1996), pp.11-12.
(6) ibid., p.36
(7) ibid..
(8) Helen Mills, 'Access Issues in the New Communications
Environment', Telecommunications Journal of Australia,
Vol.44, No.3 (1994), p.9.
(9) Bureau of Industry Economics, International Performance
Indicators Telecommunications 1995 (March 1995), p.150.
(10) See Ian Martin,'Telstra needs to be fully private to
compete', Communications Update (March 1996), pp.6-8.
Dr Kim Jackson (Background)
Ph. 06 277 2416
Brendan Bailey (Main Provisions)
Ph. 06 277 2434
Elizabeth Williams (Additional Information)
Ph. 06 277 2477
Bills Digest Service
Parliamentary Research Service
This Digest does not have any official legal status. Other sources
should be consulted to determine whether the Bill has been enacted
and, if so, whether the subsequent Act reflects further
amendments.
PRS staff are available to discuss the paper's contents
with Senators and Members and their staff but not with members of
the public.
ISSN 1323-9032
Commonwealth of Australia 1995
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Published by the Department of the Parliamentary Library,
1995.
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Last updated: 8 May 1996
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