Research Paper no. 35 2008–09
Parties and elections in Indonesia 2009: the consolidation of
democracy
Dr Stephen Sherlock
Consultant, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security Section
16 June 2009
Contents
Executive Summary
- Indonesia is holding its third democratic elections since the
fall of Suharto. Parliamentary elections took place on 9 April.
First round presidential elections will occur on 8 July, with a
run-off on 8 September if no candidate wins a majority. Elections
in Indonesia are now fairly routine and the country has become the
most robust democracy in Southeast Asia.
- In the parliamentary election on 9 April, 38 parties contested
but only 9 won seats. Parties in Indonesia are generally classified
as being secular (“nationalist”) parties or Islamic
parties. The Islamic parties appeal to either the
“traditionalist” stream of Islam, which has
incorporated elements of pre-Islamic and Hindu practice and tends
to be more tolerant in outlook, or to the stricter more Middle
Eastern-influenced “modernist” Islam.
- Democrat Party, led by incumbent Susilo Bambang Yudhyono
(widely known as SBY) emerged as the largest party, with 21 per
cent of the vote. Democrat was formed by SBY to be his vehicle for
election to the presidency in the elections of 2004. While
generally regarded as a secular party, Democrat’s philosophy
is very vague and attempts to be “all things to all
people”. Its main strength is the figure of SBY himself.
- Golkar was the official party of the Suharto regime, but has
remade itself in the democratic environment and has benefited from
its inherited organisational network. Golkar is a secular party,
but has strong Islamic factions, including that of the current Vice
President Jusuf Kalla. Golkar’s vote declined in the last two
elections and it lost a large number of secular voters to
SBY’s Democrat Party. It won 14.5 per cent of the vote in
2009.
- Indonesian Democratic Party—Struggle (PDIP) is led by
former President Megawati Sukarnoputri. The party sees itself as
the inheritor of the legacy of Indonesia’s first president
Sukarno (Megawati’s father) and defender of the
underprivileged and ethnic minorities. The party achieved a very
good result in the first post-Suharto democratic elections in 1999,
but Megawati’s poor performance as President and her refusal
to relinquish leadership cost the party badly at the polls. It
received 14 per cent, less than half its 1999 vote.
- Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) is a “modernist”
Islamic party that rose to prominence in the 2004 election. It is
well-organised and led by former Islamic student leaders and
espouses a strict and puritanical version of Islam. Despite efforts
to win support outside the “modernist” constituency, it
failed to convince voters that it did not have a “hidden
agenda” of an Islamic state. It received the same vote as in
2004 (just under 8 per cent), but this was a disappointment to a
party that expected to maintain growth.
- National Mandate Party (PAN) is an Islamic party founded by
Amien Rais, the leader of the “modernist” Islamic
organisation, Muhammadiyah. Rais had a high profile in the 1998
pro-democracy movement, but largely failed to broaden his appeal to
secular voters. The party lost its initial momentum from 1998 and
its vote has fallen to 6 per cent.
- United Development Party (PPP) was the sole officially
sanctioned Islamic party under the Suharto regime and it has
struggled to maintain relevance in the democratic era. Under a
divided and lacklustre leadership, it won only 5.3 per cent.
- National Awakening Party (PKB) was formed by former President
Abdurrahman Wahid, leader of the mass Islamic
“traditionalist” organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). An
Islamic party whose tolerant approach has allowed it to often work
with secular organisations, PKB had a strong voter base in East and
Central Java. But internal factional splits have torn the party
apart since 2001 and its vote collapsed to 5 per cent.
- Greater Indonesia Movement (Gerindra) was formed in 2008 by
ex-General Prabowo, former head of the special forces unit, to
enable him to contest the presidential election. Despite spending
huge amounts of money on advertising, Gerindra won only 4.5 per
cent, partly because of Prabowo’s association with human
rights abuses under Suharto.
- People’s Conscience Party (Hanura) was established by
ex-General Wiranto for his 2009 presidential bid. With less money
behind him and the same reputation for Suharto-era excesses,
Wiranto’s party was able to win just 3.8 per cent.
- Democrat’s win was a personal triumph for SBY, a strong
endorsement of his presidency and reinforced the probability of his
presidential victory. Democrat gains for particularly costly for
the other two main secular parties, Golkar and PDIP.
- The Islamic parties suffered big losses, with the combined
Islamic vote falling to its lowest ever level. The losses are
partly attributable to each of the parties’ internal
problems, but there is a clear trend of declining support for
Islamic parties. Although Islamic observance is more popular then
ever, most voters do not seem to want an overt political role for
Islam.
- The poor showing of the generals’ parties showed that the
popular appeal that military figures used to enjoy is rapidly
disappearing.
- Although Democrat is the largest party in parliament, it is
well short of a majority. But this does not necessarily mean that a
new SBY administration will have major problems having its
legislation passed, because the parliament does not operate by
simple majority vote but through a complex and opaque system of
“consensus” decision-making.
- SBY will probably be returned to office in the presidential
election on 8 July. There will be three pairs of candidates
contesting.
- SBY—Boediono. SBY was being able to pick his own
vice-presidential candidate because Democrat was the only party
that crossed the threshold of the 20 per cent parliamentary vote
necessary to stand a candidate. SBY opted for an independent
technocrat, Boediono, because it gives him a freer political hand,
including when naming his cabinet. Boediono is a well-respected
economist and former cabinet minister in both the Megawati and SBY
administration, with a reputation for honesty and effectiveness. He
has become the target of criticism for his
“neo-liberal” views and for the fact that his
partnership with SBY does not represent the usual balance of
Javanese/non-Javanese and secular/Islamic figures such as was seen
in the SBY – Kalla partnership.
- Megawati – Prabowo. PDIP has pursued a strategy of being
an “opposition” party, but it has not succeeded in
undermining SBY’s popular standing. Unwilling to form a joint
ticket with Golkar, and with the four Islamic parties loosely
backing SBY, PDIP’s only option was to join with one of the
ex-general’s parties. Megawati negotiated a partnership with
Prabowo that will bring his financial resources behind her
campaign.
- Kalla – Wiranto. This partnership was also the result of
Golkar being left with few options. Kalla had overplayed his hand
in negotiations with SBY and Golkar’s poor showing in the
parliamentary elections left Kalla isolated. His only option was to
join with the less well-resourced ex-general Wiranto.
- SBY will probably win a second term in office because:
- He has the advantage of incumbency and a record of effective if
unspectacular governance. SBY has a reputation for slow
decision-making, but responded well to the tsunami crisis in
December 2004 and reached a resolution of the long-running conflict
in Aceh.
- The fall in world oil prices was a piece of good fortune for
SBY. His approval rating had been falling as a result of the need
to reduce subsidies on the price of domestic oil, a move that
brought increases in the cost of basic commodities. The fall in
world prices enabled the government to partially restore the
subsidy and reduce domestic fuel costs.
- The SBY administration also introduced a policy of cash
hand-outs to low income earners to compensate for the effect of the
oil subsidy increase. This policy was very popular and appeared to
restore SBY’s electoral support, but will perhaps create a
trend towards populist policies that divert resources away from
development spending.
- SBY’s commitment to fight corruption and his support of
the work of the Anti-Corruption Commission has contributed to his
public standing, although this is an issue that is more important
for foreign investors than for the electorate.
- SBY does not have a credible opponent in the upcoming election.
Megawati is encumbered by the image of being a failed president and
an aloof figure. Kalla seemed competent as part of SBY’s
first administration, but he has little personal following.The
ex-generals are sullied by their association with the abuses of the
Suharto regime.
- The probable re-election of the SBY administration is an
invitation to Australia to rethink its tendency to see Indonesia as
a foreign policy “problem”. The smooth transition from
one government to another is a signal that Indonesia democracy is
healthy and that the policies that helped stabilise the
relationship during the last five years will continue.
- Boediono as SBY’s running mate is a signal that the
policies of gradual restructuring of the Indonesian economy that
have provided new opportunities for Australian trade and investment
will continue and possibly accelerate.
- The parliamentary election results reduced SBY’s
dependence on the support of other parties and will provide his
administration with greater freedom of movement if he decides to
take it. The return of a more confident SBY administration will be
conducive to the strengthening of Indonesia—Australia
relations.
- But a democratically elected Indonesian government is also
subject to pressures from a populist media that sometimes voices
anti-Australian sentiment. A particular challenge will come from
the politically fragmented parliament where criticisms of Australia
are occasionally expressed, especially in the influential foreign
affairs committee.
|
About the author
Dr Stephen Sherlock is a political analyst and development
consultant who specialises in governance and political change in
the Asia-Pacific region. He holds a Masters degree and Doctorate in
Asian Politics and History from the University of Sydney. As an
independent consultant since 2001, Dr Sherlock has worked for a
wide range of Australian and international organisations on
projects involving research and analysis, training and seminars,
project appraisal, development, implementation and assessment. He
has expertise in political systems, political parties, electoral
systems, public sector reform, legislative strengthening and
anti-corruption. He has published widely on Indonesian politics and
governance.
Introduction
Indonesia is in the midst of a year of electioneering. Not only
were there elections for the national parliament (known as the
People s Representative Council or DPR) on 9 April, on the same day
there were also elections for the second chamber (the Regional
Representative Council or DPD) and for legislatures in the
provinces and districts. On 8 July the first round of the
presidential election will be held and if no candidate receives a
majority of votes there will be a second round run-off election on
8 September.[1]
These are now the third democratic elections since the fall of
the Suharto regime in 1998. During the previous two elections, in
1999 and 2004, international observers tended to focus on questions
of democratic principle such as: would the elections be free and
fair and conducted without violence?; what would be the attitude of
the military?; would the losers accept the decision of the
electorate? There were also questions about whether election
administrators could deal with the logistical problems of a huge
and geographically dispersed country like Indonesia.
These questions have now largely been answered in a positive
way. Despite widespread criticism that the current elections have
been poorly run in administrative terms, Indonesia now has a
functioning and tested system of electing and changing governments
by popular choice. Ten years ago Indonesia was run by an entrenched
military dictatorship, but today it stands out as a successful
example of democratic transformation in Southeast Asia. Unlike
neighbouring Thailand for example, Indonesia has not been affected
by the democratic rollback that has struck some newly democratising
countries.[2] On the
contrary, it has consolidated democratic institutions and
practices.
This paper provides an introduction to the way the Indonesian
elections of 2009 are being run, the main parties and leaders, the
results so far and the implications for developments in Indonesia
and in Australia-Indonesia relations. It outlines the
following:
- Details of the electoral cycle, including the national and
regional legislative elections and presidential elections
- The nine major parties, their origins and political outlook and
their major leaders
- Results of the national parliamentary election and what they
mean for current and future trends in politics, particularly
relations between the parliament and the presidency
- The rise to parliamentary dominance of the party of incumbent
President Susilo Bambang Yudhyono (or SBY, as he is known) and the
decline of Islamic parties
- The candidates for the presidential election in July and the
strong prospects for a return of the SBY administration
- Implications for Australia-Indonesia relations of a returned
SBY government.
Since 2004 there have been separate
elections for the parliament and president, providing the clear
separation of powers between the legislature and executive
government typical of a presidential system.[3] Elections for four different
legislative institutions took place on 9 April. These were the
560-seat national parliament (House of People s Representatives
(DPR)) and for the 128-seat second national chamber (House of
Regional Representatives (DPD)), as well as for provincial
parliaments and district parliaments. Thus voters had to mark four
separate ballot papers in the elections of 9 April.
On 8 July there will be the first round of presidential
elections. Candidates must stand on a joint Presidential-Vice
Presidential ticket and receive more than fifty per cent of the
votes, as well as more than twenty per cent of the votes in more
than half the provinces. If no candidate meets this requirement
there must be a second round election. If necessary, that election
will take place on 8 September.
The new DPR, DPD and the legislatures in each province and
district, will be sworn in during October. The Members of the DPR
and DPD then meet together to form the People s Consultative
Council (MPR), whose function is to swear in the new
President.[4] Thus
the existing legislative assemblies and President continue to
operate during the election cycle and are not replaced until
October. The elections take place over a fixed five-year cycle, so
that the next election year will be 2014.
Figure 1: 2009 2014 electoral cycle
There were 38 parties registered to compete in the DPR
elections, but only nine warrant further attention. The parties
have been able to build allegiances amongst the various religious,
class and regional groupings in Indonesian society, but they have
done very little to develop policies related to the interests of
the groups that support them. Thus it is not possible to describe a
range of party policies because, for the most part, the parties do
not have them.
Nevertheless, the parties can be identified as standing in one
of a number of political traditions that have characterised
Indonesian politics over the last century. Conventionally,
Indonesian parties are viewed as attracting support from various
aliran or streams of political and religious
thinking.There are differing opinions about how meaningful these
distinctions have become in recent years, especially with
increasing urbanisation.[5] But Indonesian parties are usually classified as being
either secular nationalist, Islamic or Christian. Within the
Islamic tradition there is also an historically strong division
between traditionalism (which retains influences from Hindu and
Buddhist practices) and the stricter Middle Eastern-influenced
modernism .
The Democrat Party (PD) is a new type of party in Indonesian
politics. It was formed in 2001 by current President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono (SBY) as a vehicle for his election as President.
According to the electoral rules, it is necessary to have party
sponsorship to stand for President and, rather than be beholden to
one of the existing parties, SBY established his own. A former
military officer, SBY was closely associated with reformist
elements in the army and supported ending the military s
involvement in politics. He was first Minister for Mines and Energy
and then Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security in the
Abdurrahman Wahid administration (1999 2001).
SBY has always been identified as a secular nationalist, in both
his military and political careers, and the Democrat Party is
generally seen as a non-religious party. But its ideological
outlook is probably the vaguest of all Indonesia s parties and it
makes a great effort to be all things to all people : hence its
official label as a national-religious party. Notwithstanding SBY s
Javanese background and style, the party s electoral support is
spread across most provinces. Many of the original leaders and
activists in PD were from a Golkar background. With SBY as
President, the party has attracted a range of young and ambitious
politicians since 2004 and, as discussed below, it has emerged as a
leading electoral force.
Golkar was the political machine of the Suharto regime,[6] a channel of
communication and control between the government and the
population, as well as an instrument for distributing patronage and
developmental resources. It was the largest of the three parties
allowed to contest in the stage-managed elections that took place
every five years under Suharto. The end of the Suharto regime in
1998 created a crisis of existence for Golkar. Many leading figures
deserted the party and in the 1999 elections it retained barely a
third of the votes it had received in Suharto-era elections. But
the party managed to survive and prosper because it had a
country-wide organisational network and a reputation for delivering
concrete benefits.
Golkar is a secular party in the sense that it does not base
itself on a particular religion. But it has a number of Islamist
elements and many of its factional divisions relate to differences
in interpretation of the role of Islam in politics. Some Golkar
leaders with a military background retain a suspicion of Islamic
politics and the party emphasises its support for religious
tolerance and inclusiveness. It could be said that Golkar s core
ideological position is pembangunan or development,
emphasising its past success in bringing economic and social
progress. Golkar is a nation-wide party, but its greatest
concentrations of support are in the islands outside Java,
especially in the east. Its most prominent leaders are the
incumbent Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, and the DPR Speaker, Agung
Laksono, although neither figure has a strong popular profile.
The Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle (PDIP) has perhaps the
longest pedigree in Indonesian politics, dating back to the
Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) formed by the leader of the
independence struggle and Indonesia s first President, Sukarno.
During the Suharto regime, from the 1970s to 1990s, the party
operated under close government scrutiny as one of the three legal
parties. But by the mid-1990s Suharto became concerned that, under
the leadership of Sukarno s daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri, the
party was becoming a rallying point for resistance to the regime
and, in 1996, Megawati was forced out of the leadership.
Following the fall of Suharto in 1998, Megawati s supporters
formed PDIP and in the 1999 elections it emerged as the largest
party. The poor showing of Megawati as President from 2001 to 2004,
however, combined with internal factionalism and allegations of
corruption, caused the party to suffer a catastrophic loss in
support in the 2004 elections, falling from 34 per cent in 1999 to
19 per cent in 2004.
PDIP portrays itself as the true upholder of Sukarno s legacy
and the leading advocate of secular nationalism. PDIP s ideological
outlook emphasises three main points: defence of the unity and
integrity of Indonesia against internal and foreign threats;
religious tolerance and cultural inclusiveness; and fighting for
the interests of the common people. These are not expressed in
clear policy terms, but can be seen in its response to sensitive
issues that emerge from time to time. One example was a
controversial anti-pornography law, passed in 2008, which was
attacked by PDIP as an attempt to enforce a particular Islamist
view of morality of the rest of the community.[7]
PDIP receives support in most provinces, but is especially
popular in Java and Bali. Its most prominent leader continues to be
Megawati, who is both a strength and a liability for the party.
After SBY, Megawati is probably the most well-known figure in
Indonesian politics, but the memory of her time in office and her
reputation for lack of ideas and intelligence hampers the party s
growth and the emergence of a new generation of party leaders. Any
attempt to remove her would cause huge internal division and expose
its dearth of alternative leadership, but the party is unlikely to
recover its losses while Megawati remains in charge.
The Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) is an Islamic party that
has attracted a lot of attention because of its rapid rise from a
new party winning just 1.7 per cent in the 1999 election to 7.3 per
cent in 2004. The party is led by a highly motivated and
well-educated cadre of former leaders of Islamic student
organisations and successfully used organisational and campaigning
techniques introduced from Western democracies. And indeed worries
about being overtaken by PKS pushed many parties into re-examining
their traditional methods of operation. Many predictions were made
about its potential emergence as a leading political force.
Despite the newness of PKS, the party sees itself as standing in
the tradition of Islamic parties that existed before the Suharto
regime. But PKS has also made great efforts to downplay its Islamic
image. Much of its success in 2004 derived from a campaign to win
educated urban voters concerned about issues such as corruption and
clean and effective government. PKS has often been attacked by its
opponents as having a hidden agenda of imposing Islamic sharia
while posing as a tolerant and inclusive party.[8] The challenge it faces is to
maintain the support of its core constituency amongst more
ideologically-driven Islamic voters while expanding its support to
the wider community. Surveys have consistently shown that although
the vast majority of voters are Muslims, few are attracted to a
party because of its religious credentials but are primarily
concerned about issues such as jobs and the cost of living.
PKS leaders are not well-known amongst the electorate, as the
party has concentrated on building a network of activists rather
than promoting media-friendly national figures. Its most prominent
leader is Hidayat Nur Wahid, who holds the mostly powerless
position of Speaker of the Peoples Consultative Assembly (the body
that inaugurates the President, mentioned above).
The National Mandate Party (PAN) was formed in 1998 by Amien
Rais, the leader of the mass Islamic modernist organisation,
Muhammadiyah. As well as his Islamic credentials, Amien was one of
the promoters of the pro-democracy movement in 1998 and had
ambitions to attract a broader constituency, especially amongst the
more liberal and secular-minded urban middle class. Despite early
hopes, the party s electoral performance was mediocre, as was Amien
s personal vote in the 2004 presidential election. Amien wavered
uncertainly between appealing strongly to Islamic voters and trying
to build a wider electoral base. The party was caught within the
same limited constituency as PKS, but was less successful in wooing
that electoral base. The party is now led by the businessman,
Soetrisno Bachir. Under Soetrisno s leadership PAN has tried
strategies such as fielding celebrities as candidates, but it has
failed to regain the vigour and sense of direction that
characterised the party in its early years.
The National Awakening Party (PKB) was founded by former
President Abdurrahman Wahid (generally known as Gus Dur) in 1998.
Although created after the fall of Suharto, it is generally
regarded as the inheritor of the traditions of the Islamic
traditionalist organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which used to
directly participate in politics in the pre-Suharto era. Supporters
of NU, especially in East and Central Java, continue to be the
party s main support base. Despite its Islamic base, the party has
always strongly emphasised the importance of respect for religious
and cultural diversity and it has comfortably worked alongside
secular parties and organisations.
Although PKB had a firm electoral base in populous Java that
delivered good results in 1999, the party has slowly torn itself
apart in a series of bitter factional disputes that began in 2001
and have continued till today. The disputes have not been
ideological, but have revolved around personalities and struggles
for control of leading party positions. The splits even divided the
party s leading family, with Gus Dur losing control of the party to
a faction led by his nephew, Muhaimin Iskander, a Deputy Speaker of
parliament. The inevitable consequence has been the loss of many of
its most attractive candidates and a rapid decline in electoral
performance.
The United Development Party (PPP) was formed in 1973 as a
forced amalgam of Islamic parties created by the Suharto regime and
one of the three legal parties during the New Order. Some of its
leaders came from an Islamic traditionalist NU background and
others were from the Islamic modernist organisation Muhammadiyah.
In the post-Suharto era, many members left to join newly formed
parties, but others stayed on to campaign under the old party
banner. PPP has maintained a strongly Islamic image, with its party
symbol being the Kab ah shrine in Mecca. The party fared
relatively well in the 1999 election and its leader, Hamza Haz,
became Vice President in the Megawati administration. But the
lacklustre performance of that administration and of Hamza himself
(including comments in 1999 that a woman should not become
President in an Islamic country) could not overcome the reality
that the party lacked unity and direction in post-Suharto politics.
The current leader of the party is Suryadarma Ali, the current
Minister for Small Business and Cooperatives.
The Greater Indonesia Movement (Gerindra) was formed in 2008 by
former Lt General Subianto Prabowo as a vehicle for his
presidential campaign, just as SBY formed Democrat to back his bid
for the presidency in 2004. A very powerful figure before 1998,
Probowo was Suharto s son-in-law and he rose quickly through the
ranks to become the youngest Lt General and chief of the special
forces, Koppasus. Tainted with a reputation for human
rights abuses under Suharto, he lived abroad for a number of years
after 1998, but has now re-established his position in the country
as a businessman. Prabowo s campaign is also backed by his very
wealthy brother. With this financial support, Gerindra launched a
major series of very effective media advertisements that
established a profile for Prabowo and his party.
The People s Conscience Party (Hanura) is another party formed
by an ex-general aiming for the presidency: General Wiranto, former
chief of the military and Minister for Defence under both Suharto
and Abdurrahman Wahid. Wiranto was a bitter rival of Prabowo in the
final years of the Suharto regime and he is also under the shadow
of accusations of human rights abuses. Wiranto does not have the
same financial backing as Prabowo, but he has an extensive network
of connections amongst retired and serving officers and with
civilian organisations and business people. Hanura attempted to
stand candidates with some local profile rather than spending vast
sums on media advertisements.
The final results of the DPR election were announced on 9 May.
The table below shows the percentage of votes and number of seats
won by each of the parties that have gained DPR representation. The
figures for the 2004 election show the dramatic change in the
fortune of many parties since the last election.
Table 1: DPR election results (per
cent vote & seats for 2009 & 2004 elections)
| |
2009
|
2004
|
|
Votes
|
Seats
|
Votes
|
Seats
|
|
Democrat
|
20.8
|
148
|
7.5
|
57
|
|
Golkar
|
14.5
|
108
|
21.6
|
128
|
|
PDIP
|
14.0
|
93
|
18.5
|
109
|
|
PKS
|
7.9
|
59
|
7.3
|
45
|
|
PAN
|
6.0
|
42
|
6.4
|
52
|
|
PPP
|
5.3
|
39
|
8.2
|
58
|
|
PKB
|
5.0
|
26
|
10.6
|
52
|
|
Gerindra
|
4.5
|
30
|
_
|
_
|
|
Hanura
|
3.8
|
15
|
_
|
_
|
Source: Indonesian
Elections Commission (KPU)
The most obvious feature of the results was the huge gains made
by the Democrat Party of President Yudhyono (SBY). The party almost
tripled its votes from 7.5 per cent in 2004 to 20.8 per cent in
2009, with a proportionate increase of from 57 to 148 seats in the
national parliament. Democrat has gone from being a relatively
small player in the DPR to being the leading party, although still
well short of a majority. This was a personal triumph for SBY
because the party has little or no identity beyond the figure of
the President. The result represented a strong popular endorsement
of the SBY administration and further reinforced the probability of
his victory in the July presidential election.
Voters moved to Democrat from across the spectrum of the
established parties. Almost all suffered a loss of support to
Democrat or did not increase their vote as they expected.
Two of the biggest losers were Golkar and Megawati s PDIP,
parties that had, until recently, dominated the political scene. In
the first free post-Suharto election in 1999, these two parties
together held nearly 60 per cent of DPR seats. PDIP, with a strong
base amongst rural small-holders and urban labourers and with the
legacy of Sukarno s nationalism behind it, appeared set to be the
dominant party in an emerging democratic Indonesia. Golkar s strong
organisational roots in the villages were also seen as a reliable
long-term source of support. Both parties lost support in the 2004
election, but they were still the biggest parties in the DPR and
together held by far the largest bloc of seats.
But in this election the two parties have gone into a major
decline. Golkar s vote fell by 7 per cent to 14.5, while PDIP lost
4.5 per cent to 14 per cent. Since most of their erstwhile
supporters came from a secular constituency, it was a fairly easy
for them to move to the non-religious based Democrat Party.
An interesting feature of the results was the major decline in
vote for the Islamic parties, which fell from a total of 32 per
cent in 2004 to 24 per cent this time. This is the lowest vote ever
cast for Islamic parties in a free election. There is some
disagreement about whether this represents a general
disillusionment with Islamic politics or can be better explained in
terms of the internal problems suffered by most Islamic
parties.[9]
- PKB, the party previously led by former President Abdurrahman
Wahid, has proved incapable of resolving internal differences and
has been punished by voters as a result
- PAN, the party of Amien Rais, is also riven by factionalism and
was only saved from greater losses by the appeal of a number of
celebrity candidates it fielded
- PPP, the old Suharto-era Islamic party, is becoming
increasingly marginalised because of its lacklustre leadership and
lack of direction
- PKS, the more hardline activist Islamic party, managed to
retain its support and appears to contradict the idea of a general
move away from Islamic politics. But with its record of previous
growth and much vaunted organisational and campaigning skills, the
party was expected to continue its upward trajectory. Indeed it had
set ambitious targets for this election and the result represents a
significant disappointment.
While it is true that the particular circumstances of each
Islamic party exacerbated their recent losses, there is a clear
historic trend of a declining Islamic vote. This vote was much
higher in the one free pre-Suharto election in 1955 and it has
fallen in every election since the fall of Suharto. There are
expectations that the Islamic vote will recover somewhat in 2014
(when SBY cannot stand because of a two-term limit), but a
long-term drift away from Islamic politics is unmistakeable.
A remarkable aspect of Indonesian society is that while Islamic
observance is more popular than ever, people are generally not
interested in imposing an overt role for Islam in politics.
Symbolic gestures such as beginning a political speech with pious
words are an everyday occurrence, but there are no signs of a
movement towards models such as Iran or Saudi Arabia, or even
towards influences closer to home in Malaysia or Brunei. The
relative failure of PKS shows that the constituency attracted to
puritanical brands of politicised Islam is quite limited. PKS
efforts to broaden its appeal were unconvincing to the wider
community.
The poor performance of the two ex-generals was a further
indication of the end of the military s role in Indonesian
politics. Wiranto s People s Conscience Party (Hanura) and Prabowo
s, Greater Indonesia Movement (Gerindra) received just 3.8 per cent
and 4.5 per cent respectively. This gave them enough votes to cross
the 2.5 per cent threshold required for parliamentary
representation under the proportional representation system, but
consigned them to a status of only minor parties in the DPR.
The formal role of the military in politics and government
administration is a thing of the past, but many former officers who
were powerful under the Suharto regime still see themselves as
having the right to positions of prominence. Their small vote is a
sign that the popular appeal that military figures used to enjoy is
disappearing. Moreover, the example of Prabowo shows that it is not
possible to win elections solely by spending money. The two
ex-generals have now turned their attention to the presidential
election, which was in fact the major reason for their contesting
the parliamentary poll in the first place (discussed below).
Although Democrat emerged as the largest party in the DPR, its
26 per cent of seats puts it a long way short of a majority. In the
outgoing chamber (which will still meet until October), Democrat
and Golkar have a working relationship, stemming from the party
affiliations of the president and the vice-president respectively.
But with the end of the SBY Yusuf Kalla partnership, this
arrangement will no longer apply. The new chamber will be
fragmented, with seats distributed across three major parties and
six smaller ones.
Under Indonesia s presidential system, executive government is
of course not formed in the legislature, but the President still
needs support in the parliament to have his legislation passed. For
this reason, SBY (if elected) will almost certainly form a cabinet
with representatives from one or more parties in the DPR besides
Democrat. The existing cabinet contains representatives from all
major parties except PDIP.
But Indonesia s parliament is not run by sheer numbers in the
way that most external observers would expect. Decisions in the DPR
are not made by voting but by a system of consensus
(mufakat) where unanimous decisions are considered to be
reached when no party expresses dissent. This can be a slow and
cumbersome process and is criticised for being non-transparent and
open to corruption,[10] but it does mean that an incumbent President does not
always need a numerical majority in order to pass bills. Decisions
on the passage are made in committees (not in the largely
ceremonial plenary sessions) and the decision to pass or amend a
bill is arrived at after complex negotiations between the committee
and executive government. Thus the lack of a Democrat parliamentary
majority will not necessarily hamper the work of an SBY
administration.
It seems almost certain that SBY will be returned to the
presidential palace in the election for president on 8 July. Until
recently, the main questions were who would be SBY s running mate
and who would form tickets to run against him. With the
announcement of three presidential-vice presidential pairs of
candidates in mid May, the main outstanding issue is whether SBY
will gain an absolute majority in the first round or whether it
will be necessary to go to the second round run-off between the two
highest scoring candidates.
Under the electoral law, all presidential candidates must be
supported by a party or group of parties with at least 20 per cent
of the seats in parliament or 25 per cent of the votes. No
independent candidates are allowed. Democrat was the only party
that crossed that threshold, so SBY was in the unique position of
being able to stand without the support of another party, while all
other prospective candidates had to seek an alliance with one or
more other parties.
Presented with the luxury of being able to take his pick, SBY
had two main alternatives: a party-based candidate or an
independent technocrat. A party figure would bring financial
backing for the campaign and the promise of parliamentary support
after the election. But the disadvantage was having to meet the
demands of the party and losing some freedom to chose the members
of his cabinet. A technocrat, on the other hand, would not bring
any financial or political resources but he/she would have the
advantage of not bringing any political baggage to the
partnership.
SBY opted to chose Boediono, a well-respected economist who
developed a reputation for clean and effective administration
during his time in leading economic ministries in both the Megawati
and SBY administrations and in his position as Governor of the
central bank, Bank Indonesia. He completed undergraduate and
postgraduate studies at the University of West Australia and
received his doctorate in the US. Such a choice strengthened SBY s
credentials amongst the domestic and international business and
financial community, without the problems of having to deal with a
politically ambitious figure such as his previous Vice President,
Jusuf Kalla.
SBY s choice is generally being seen as an expression of his
increasing self-confidence and independence from the power-brokers
that have dominated politics for so long. One of the main
criticisms of SBY as President has been that he has displayed a
certain diffidence and unwillingness to take decisions. He tends to
preside over meetings rather than lead them.[11] But his selection of Boediono
suggests that he may take a more assertive leadership role in his
second term.
There are some risks for SBY in a joint ticket with
Boediono.[12] In
fact, his running mate has become the only major target for SBY s
opponents.
- Boediono has been attacked by some Islamic figures,
particularly Amien Rais, as well as by some NGO activists, as being
the arch-representative of neo-liberalism , whose policies were
welcomed by foreign business but which ignored the interests of the
Indonesian poor. In fact his appointment triggered a debate in the
media and policy-making circles about neo-liberalism in Indonesian
economic policy[13]
- The partnership has been seen as unbalanced for having two
Javanese and no representative from non-Java areas. With JusufKalla
from South Sulawesi as Vice-President, there was a perception that
the interests of the whole country were better represented
- The ticket breaks the conventional view that there should be
secular figure and an Islamic figure in such a team, as was the
case with SBY-Kalla. This criticism can partially be met by the
fact that the four major Islamic parties have expressed support for
SBY as President, even though they clearly resented his failure to
choose one of their number for Vice-President.
But the fact that the criticisms are all aimed to Boediono shows
how unassailable SBY s position appears to be. The best that the
opposing parties can realistically hope for is to force SBY to a
second round. That might put them in a better position to bargain
for cabinet positions after the election.
PDIP under Megawati needed a vice-presidential running mate from
another party in order to meet the parliamentary threshold for
presidential candidacy. Despite pressures on Megawati to step aside
and allow for a new leadership of her party to come forward, she
continues to cherish the idea that she can and should be President.
Her influential husband, Taufik Kiemas, has been instrumental in
ensuring that her interests are pushed inside the party. PDIP has
been the only major party without a minister in the SBY cabinet.
The party has pursued a strategy of being the opposition party,
even though this concept is largely foreign to Indonesian political
culture and does not fit comfortably within a presidential system.
The strategy has not been followed with any success: Megawati for
example initially opposed SBY s program of cash assistance to the
poor to compensate for increased fuel prices in 2008, but had to
retreat from that position in the face of the obvious popularity of
the policy amongst a key PDIP constituency (see more detail on the
fuel price issue below).
Because the Islamic parties had decided to get behind the most
attractive candidate, SBY, PDIP was left with the option of putting
together a ticket with either Golkar or with the generals parties.
But since neither Megawati nor Yusuf Kalla of Golkar would agree to
the other being Vice-President, the only available choice was one
or both of the generals. And since egos are the prime motivators
for the generals, there was little chance that either would support
Megawati without being given the number two position, thus forcing
a choice between them. Both Prabowo and Wiranto were bitter enemies
of Megawati during the Suharto era, but the closed and collusive
nature of the Indonesian political elite means that even such old
foes are driven by the politics of immediate mutual advantage.
Megawati s decision in favour of Prabowo was the result of
closed-door bargaining with little rationale in policy or platform.
Both support a secular approach to politics, but Prabowo s most
attractive feature for Megawati is clearly the financial backing he
brings.
The creation of the partnership between Yusuf Kalla of Golkar
and Wiranto of Hanura was also largely the result of Golkar being
left with few options. Kalla had previously overplayed his hand
with SBY and did not come to a firm agreement before the election
on whether he would stand again with SBY. He was apparently banking
on Golkar improving its vote in the DPR election and thus putting
him in a strong bargaining position with SBY or some other
candidate. In the event, Golkar lost badly in the poll and SBY felt
no need to team up again with a losing and troublesome party
candidate. When Golkar approached SBY regarding a joint ticket, SBY
responded by asking the party to put forward three names a clear
slight to Kalla.
Golkar was therefore, like PDIP, in the position of having to
negotiate an alliance with one of the two ex-generals. As the
weaker and less wealthy of the two figures, Wiranto was apparently
not able to convince Megawati to accept him as a running mate and
was left with the aspiring president whose personal popularity was
even lower than Megawati s.
The probability of an SBY victory was strengthened by the good
showing of his party in the parliamentary election and has been
reinforced in recent polls that have put him well ahead of his
opponents. The factors behind his popularity with the electorate
seem fairly clear.
Presidential systems generally tend to give an advantage to
incumbents. This is partly why Indonesia decided to follow common
practice and introduce a two-term limit. But, of course, it only
helps a president to be well-known if he/she is perceived to have a
good record. In the case of SBY, he is generally regarded to have
been successful in office. He has not been wildly popular nor has
he attracted any kind of cult following, but he is seen as having
put Indonesia onto the road to economic recovery and democratic
consolidation. The economy has achieved steady if unspectacular
growth and there is a general feeling that progress is being
made.
In particular, his record stands in favourable contrast to the
two previous administrations. The Abdurraham Wahid government was
marked by administrative and political chaos, including a damaging
standoff between the presidency and the parliament that led to his
removal from office by the parliament. The Megawati administration
seemed incapable of dealing with the country s problems,
particularly those of the poor and unemployed and Megawati herself
was seen as aloof and barely engaged by the duties of her
office.
As mentioned above, SBY s biggest liability is that he has been
seen as slow and indecisive. His government has taken few major
policy initiatives and SBY has been seen to be seeking consensus
amongst the leading parties in cabinet and the parliament when he
should be taking the lead. On the other hand, his government
responded quickly and effectively to the humanitarian crisis
created by the 2004 tsunami and this action was important for
leading to what was probably SBY s greatest policy success, the
resolution of the conflict in Aceh. As mentioned, his choice of
Boediono has contributed to an impression that he is now acting
more confidently as a leader.
One piece of very good luck for the SBY administration was the
fall in the international price of oil since mid-2008. All
post-Suharto governments have been saddled with the inheritance of
a policy of subsidised domestic oil prices that were introduced
when Indonesia was a net oil exporter. With the steady fall in
Indonesia s oil production and the rising price of imported oil,
the subsidy was placing a huge burden on the state budget. At one
stage, almost one-third of government expenditure was allocated to
the subsidy.
Cheap oil benefited the owners of luxury cars as much as it did
the poor who relied on buses for commuting and for low-priced
kerosene for cooking and it diverted resources from education,
health and infrastructure. But SBY s policy of gradual reductions
in the subsidy was hugely unpopular and was used by forces in the
parliament to attack the government, even including parties with
seats in cabinet.[14] With world oil prices reaching unprecedented levels in
2007 and 2008, the government had little option but to continue
reducing the subsidy in order to protect the fiscal situation. The
resulting rise in the cost of living damaged SBY s popularity and
his ratings in opinion polls fell precipitously, while that of the
leading opponentof the policy, Megawati, underwent a rapid
increase.
From August 2008, however, world oil prices began falling again
and the massive pressure on the Indonesian state budget eased as a
result. The SBY government was therefore able to reverse some of
the reduction in the subsidy, a move which brought about an
immediate fall in the price of fuel at the pump and the price of
kerosene for cooking, with the reduction flowing through to the
price of public transport and to other commodities. The popularity
of the government as measured in opinion polls recovered throughout
2008. Thus the biggest single challenge to the popularity of the
SBY government was eliminated by a fortuitous change of the global
economic environment.
In addition to the luck of having world oil prices fall, the
recovery in the popular standing of the SBY administration can also
be attributed to the success of certain populist policies to
cushion the effects of the rising cost of fuel on low
income-earners. The government distributed close to $A2 billion in
direct cash hand-outs to the poor, together with a range of
small-scale credit schemes and funding assistance to schools that
reduced the need for parents to pay fees.
These measures, especially the cash grants, were predictably
popular with the electorate and were a major contributor to the
improvement in support for the president and his party. The policy
was criticised for having no long term effect on poverty, while
reducing the resources available for development spending, but its
political effectiveness can hardly be questioned. Some observers
have seen this policy as a possible precursor for the
Philippinisation or Thaksinisation of Indonesian politics, where
incumbent governments buy political support through populist
measures.[15]
The SBY administration has won support for having made progress
in the fight against the corruption and nepotism that pervades all
arms of government in Indonesia, including the civil service,
state-owned corporations, police, military, judiciary and
parliament. SBY came to power on an anti-corruption platform,
produced an action plan to eradicate corruption and appointed
individuals with a reputation for integrity to key positions such
as Attorney General and chief of police. The Anti-Corruption
Commission, although established in 2002 before SBY came to power,
has been given his support and has prosecuteda range of high
profile figures, including seven members of parliament. SBY gained
respect when he did not intervene to protect a close member of his
family by marriage who was charged with corruption.
Surveys indicate that most voters do not rate corruption as a
major factor in their choice of party and candidate compared to
basic economic issues such as jobs and the cost of living.[16] International
observers tend to over-emphasise the importance of corruption as an
issue because it strongly affects the prospects for foreign
investors. Nevertheless, resentment about corrupt office-holders,
extortion by traffic police and the payments that must be made to
obtain government services is palpable amongst the ordinary
Indonesian community. The apparent progress made in fighting
corruption, together with SBY s standing as a leader who personally
eschews corrupt practices, will be a factor in his likely return to
office.
The final factor that will contribute to SBY s probable victory
is the simple fact that he has no credible opponent.
- Megawati was a failure during her time in office and was
soundly defeated by SBY in the 2004 election. Her continuing
leadership of PDIP is seen as a symbol of the party s inability to
develop new policies and a new leadership. As the near-certainty of
her defeat looms, her daughter, Puan Maharani, and her brother,
Guntur Sukarnoputra, have become involved in public sparring about
their inheritance of the leadership of the party
- Jusuf Kalla was seen as a competent Vice President under SBY,
but he has very little independent profile and has achieved dismal
ratings as a potential presidential candidate in opinion polls over
the last five years
- Both candidates are paired with running mates who have little
popular respect and who are tarred with a record of human rights
abuses and the darker aspects of the old discredited regime.
The SBY administration has been unspectacular, but it has not
made any major stumbles, has avoided scandals and has guided the
country onto a path of stability and tranquillity after a dangerous
and uncertain time of transition. When the figures who oppose him
have so little to offer beyond what SBY continues to promise, the
great majority of Indonesian voters seem loath to make a
change.
The consolidation of democracy in Indonesia and the smooth
transition from one democratically elected parliament and
government to another is a further invitation to Australians to
re-examine their long-held views of the country. As MacIntyre and
Ramage expressed it in a recent major review of the
relationship:
Australia needs to update the way it thinks
about Indonesia. We need to start thinking of it as a normal
country, grappling with many of the same challenges as other large,
stable middle-income developing democracies such as India, Mexico
or Brazil.
Indonesia today is a stable, competitive
democracy, playing a constructive role in world affairs. It is no
longer in a state of profound flux and turmoil. Indeed, we now know
what Indonesia is probably going to look like over the next decade.
Indonesia will be a middle-income developing country making slow
headway in lifting living standards and consolidating democratic
governance.[17]
Ever since the foreign policy adventurism of Sukarno in the
early 1960s, through to the events in East Timor in the late 1990s,
Indonesia has been popularly regarded as some kind of vaguely
defined threat to Australia. At the policy-making level, thinking
has often been coloured by a presumption that relations with
Indonesia were a problem to be controlled rather than as an
opportunity to be explored.[18]
Following the turmoil of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the
downfall of Suharto in 1998, the 1999 East Timor referendum and
uncertain meanderings of the Wahid and Megawati administrations
from 1999 to 2004, the stable and tranquil leadership of the SBY
administration has been a welcome opportunity to place the
Indonesia-Australia relationship on a firmer footing.[19] For this reason alone,
the probable re-election of SBY as president is good news for
Australia. It is a further signal that Indonesia democracy is
healthy and that the policies that helped stabilise the
relationship during the last five years will continue.
In more specific terms, the naming of Boediono as SBY s running
mate is a signal that the policies of gradual restructuring of the
Indonesian economy that have provided new opportunities for
Australian trade and investment will continue and possibly
accelerate. Indonesian economic policy since the mid-1960s has been
a long drawn out contest between supporters of economic nationalism
and those advocating greater internationalisation of the economy.
Supporters of a controlled and protected economy have included
crony capitalists and Suharto family members dependent on the state
for their viability, but foreign corporations also have a long
history of taking advantage of special relationships with
well-placed special interests.
This continuing contention about the direction of economic
policy has been reflected in the composition of successive cabinets
and the mixture of technocratic and party political figures in the
current SBY cabinet is no exception. The movement of Boediono to
the potentially powerful position of Vice President, if it is
accompanied by the retention of reformers such as the Finance
Minister, Sri Mulyani and Trade Minister Mari Pengestu, will be a
clear signal that the SBY administration is committed to change.
Apart from the issue of opening the economy, the reformers in
cabinet are committed to the (probably more important) agenda of
reforming the structure of government to eliminate the networks of
patronage and corruption that have dominated policy-making and the
wider political culture.
The election result, which enabled SBY to contest the presidency
without depending on other parties, will provide his administration
with greater freedom of movement if he decides to take it. An issue
to watch after the formation of the new government will be the
extent to which SBY allows Boediono to take independent initiative.
The vice-presidential office was little more than a figurehead
under Suharto, but SBY gave Kalla considerable latitude during his
time in office and might be expected to follow this pattern with
Boediono. The policies that would follow from such an arrangement
are very likely to be welcomed in Australia because they would help
facilitate greater economic and political interchange.
But it also should not be forgotten that the leaders of
democratic Indonesia are also answerable to the range of pressures
from both popular and elite opinion that were muffled under the
during the Suharto autocracy. The readiness of populist media in
both countries to pander to mutual misunderstanding and stereotypes
will continue to have the potential to cause upsets over passing
matters such as the imprisonment of Australian nationals in
Indonesia, unrest in Papua or the arrival of asylum-seekers from or
through Indonesia.[20] Nevertheless, a more confident SBY administration, less
encumbered with the need to placate allies, will probably be better
placed to handle the upsets that inevitably accompany Indonesia
Australia relations.
In particular, the failure of the election to produce a clear
parliamentary majority will give rise to a legislature containing
forces who will compete to take the opportunity to attack Australia
if they see it as in their immediate political interests. The
parliament, particularly the powerful foreign affairs committee,
has for a number of years been used as a forum for voicing
anti-Australian sentiments. The fact that this criticism is often
ill-informed does not change the reality that it reflects the
underlying problem of a degree of mutual incomprehension between
the people of the two countries at both a popular and elite
level.The need to broaden the relationship beyond commercial and
security matters which has been understood for some time will
continue to be a major challenge under a new SBY
administration.
The parliamentary and presidential elections of 2009 represent a
consolidation of democratic institutions and democratic political
culture in Indonesia. The country is now well past the dangerous
period of transition and is firmly established as the world s third
largest democracy. As well as having the formal institutional
framework for democracy, with a system of genuine checks and
balances amongst the arms of government, the 2009 elections show
that the country also has a functioning party system. For all their
weakness in terms of policy development and internal
decision-making, Indonesian parties give expression to traditions
of political thinking and social attitudes that are rooted in the
country s history. Unlike some newly democratic countries, where
political parties are ephemeral labels for the personal ambitions
of single individuals, most Indonesian parties can trace a history
back to the beginning of independence in the 1940s and even
before.
The parliamentary elections saw considerable movement in voter
support amongst the different parties, but there were no dramatic
upsets that indicated that voters were angry or alienated from the
existing choices. There was no sign at all of any popular
attraction to extremism and the clear lesson for parties inclined
to Islamic politics was that voters were looking for solutions to
the basic material issues of life, such as prices, employment and
social services, not towards the imposition of moral and religious
values by the state.
The overall impression of continuity has been particularly
evident in the selection of tickets for the presidential election.
The incumbent President dominates the spectrum of choice for voters
and all the indications are that he will be returned handsomely.
Furthermore, SBY has achieved this status while maintaining a
cautious political approach that, while often slow or even
indecisive, has provided a background of stability for a country
that had had a number of years of upheaval.
In his second term, however, with his party s success in the
parliamentary election and his probable strong win in the
presidential election, SBY now has the opportunity to act more
independently. There is a huge agenda of developmental issues that
need to be tackled, especially to make up for lost time from the
five years of economic stagnation following the 1997 98 crisis. Low
growth rates have seen mounting youth unemployment, while social
and physical infrastructure in areas such as health, education,
transport, power, resource development and environmental protection
have been neglected. Moreover the tasks of reforming the structures
of government and the elimination of corruption are still only half
completed. From the point of view of the Indonesian people,
particularly those millions still in poverty, as well for the
international community and regional neighbours, the pressure will
now be on a new SBY administration to take bolder policy
initiatives and even to take some risks.
For copyright reasons some linked items are only
available to members of Parliament.