Immigration, Social Cohesion and National Identity


Research Paper No. 1 1997-98

Professor Robert Holton,
Consultant
Social Policy Group
1 September 1997

Contents

Major Issues Summary

Immigration and multiculturalism continue to be major issues for Australians concerned about the state of the nation and its future. Debate on these topics is however often heated and not well informed.

The paper sets out to clarify what Australians really think about a range of issues connected with immigration and multiculturalism, based on evidence collected from a variety of sources. Australian attitudes are related both to the characteristics of Government policies, and to popular perceptions of migrants and policy objectives. Attention is also given to the question of the future relevance of multicultural policies.

The findings clearly indicate consistent majority support for lower immigration levels, but a mixture of positives and negatives in relation to multiculturalism.

Australians generally support cultural tolerance and many find much of value in a culturally mixed society. Many however express significant concerns about the social cohesion of multicultural Australia. Many popular stereotypes about Asians living in Australia are not born out by the facts. There is no 'Asian' culture that is separate and alien from Australian culture. Asia involves a variety of cultural influences, some of which resonate with Australians, and some of which don't. Those of Asian background usually become citizens very quickly and a number marry those of Anglo-Australian background.

Multicultural policies have generated a mixed response. Publicly funded support for non-English speaking migrants is often supported when seen as part of a universal provision available to all Australians but criticised when seen as a special program for migrants only. Opponents of multiculturalism see it as unwarranted social engineering.

The paper adopts a broad focus in explaining popular attitudes. One element in this is the increased impact of economic globalisation and growing concern about unemployment and economic insecurity. Such anxieties underlie much concern about immigration intake and social cohesion. The groups most criticised are usually the recent arrivals who symbolise the unknown.

Different conceptions of Australian national identity also affect attitudes to cultural diversity. Many have an open conception of nationhood which has a place for migrants of diverse backgrounds provided they participate in Australian institutions. The majority believe you do not have to be born in Australia to be a true Australian. Openness does not however mean cosmopolitanism, in the sense of being a citizen of the world with no special links with Australia.

The paper concludes by suggesting that multicultural policies are in need of review and overhaul if they are to make a positive contribution to public policy in Australia. A number of issues are canvassed for further consideration.

One is the linking of multiculturalism with citizenship rights within the philosophy of public policy. This however, raises difficult questions of how the universal rights of all citizens as individuals are to be balanced with any kind of group rights of recognition accorded to culturally defined groups.

At a more practical level, several recommendations are made to improve the quality of democratic communication between policy-makers and the people in relation to policies of immigration and multiculturalism. One is a clearer communication of the universalistic rationale of policies that are wrongly perceived as sectional benefits unavailable to most Australians. Another is a far higher level of accounting information to citizens, as to how public funds are actually spent in these controversial areas.

The paper concludes that multicultural policies cannot continue in the old way. This is not because they are necessarily unpopular, but because they are widely misunderstood, and lack a clear rationale.

Introduction

As we enter the 21st century, the impact of immigration on Australian society continues to be a matter of public concern and political controversy. At a time when migrant intake levels have been cut back, and major criticisms about policies of multiculturalism have been voiced, it is timely to take stock of the social as well as economic effects of immigration on Australian society. While the economic impact of immigration in such areas as economic growth, productivity, and employment, has been widely canvassed, there has been less sustained analytical attention given to many of the social issues at the heart of public debate and anxiety.(1) Matters such as Asian immigration, racism, multiculturalism and social cohesion, have generated controversy and an abundance of rhetoric. Robust debate of this kind is certainly a healthy feature of political life in any democracy. Yet in current circumstances, a balanced appreciation of the viewpoints held by various sections of the community on such matters is in danger of becoming swamped by ideology, prejudice, and adversarial rhetoric.

What effects, for example, has immigration in general, and culturally diverse immigration in particular had on social cohesion in Australia? Is Australia fast becoming Asianised? And is it true that multicultural societies generally collapse into warring tribes? If so, how far is this because different cultures don't mix, and how far a result of public policies that are seen as unfair and discriminatory? Or has immigration-driven cultural diversity destabilised social cohesion in Australia in less dramatic ways, by inducing social change at a faster pace than communities can tolerate it? Or can national identity evolve in a manner capable of combining older national traditions with newer elements? Can Australia have both unity and cohesion as well as cultural difference and diversity? And is multiculturalism part of an evolutionary process that will lead to cohesion along with diversity, or is it an unpopular, divisive, and incoherent policy that is more of a hindrance than a help to Australia's social cohesion in the future?

A major part of this paper is directed to establishing what Australians think about such matters. How far, for example do Australians support or oppose current immigration levels, the cultural diversity that has been created by post-war immigration, and policies of multiculturalism? Is there a clear majority view on these matters around which community consensus has formed? Is opinion polarised between monoculturalists and multiculturalists, or do many Australians remain pragmatic and uncommitted? And whatever opinion is held, how important are such issues compared with other political questions of the day? Are immigration and multiculturalism at the forefront of public concerns, or are they matters of secondary importance compared with issues such as unemployment or taxation?

It is straightforward enough to address these questions from a purely Australian perspective. Yet to do so would omit the insights that derive from comparisons and contrasts with countries overseas. International comparisons allow us to establish how well Australia has managed the cultural diversity that has arisen from the immigration program.

Immigration and social cohesion: Australia's experience in comparative perspective

The contours of Australia's post-war immigration program are well-documented. Australia's intake of migrants has been proportionately greater per head of population than any other country bar Israel. Approximately 23% of the current population were born overseas.(2) In relation to composition, the predominantly Anglo-Celtic mix originally conceived has given way to successive components of Northern, Eastern and Southern Europeans, and from the late 1960s onwards, increasing numbers of Asians. The Australian Bureau of Statistics currently defines Asians as those from the Indian sub-continent, South-East Asian countries such as Vietnam and Malaysia, and North-East Asia including Hong Kong and China. While Asian-born, on this definition make up around 40% of the current intake, they comprise only about 5% of the total population.(3) If those from the Middle East including Lebanon and Turkey are also included the total of first generation Asians in Australia in 1996 rises to 5.6%. Assuming immigration levels set at a net increase of 70,000 per year, and no change in the composition by place of birth, the Asian-born would rise to between 7.5 and 8% by 2031.(4) It is hard to see these aggregate trends as 'swamping' the existing population, or amounting to the Asianisation of Australia.

Popular concerns about Asian immigration, are however, not simply based on perceptions about actual levels of intake. In addition, they draw on a sense of visible difference between 'Asians' and others, and upon beliefs about Asian social behaviour in Australia. Such beliefs include a sense of undue levels of Asian concentration in 'ghettoes', and upon the argument that Asians are socially exclusive and culturally alien. Such sentiments are typified in Pauline Hanson's first Parliamentary speech in which she argued that Asians 'have their own culture and religion, form ghettoes, and do not assimilate'.(5) In a 1994 poll conducted in Victoria for the Sunday Age, 53% of respondents also felt Asian migrants had not mixed well with the wider community.(6) The impact of immigration on Australian society is then not simply a matter of numbers, but also an issue of perceptions, community values and inter-cultural relations.

Debates about the social impact of immigration have often been conducted in terms of the idea of challenges to social cohesion. This is a concept that is hard to define in any precise sense. At its most general it refers to the ties that bind a society together and prevent it falling apart. The principles of social cohesion are easiest to determine when all citizens share the same values and standards, but far harder to identify when individuals interpret 'cohesion' and 'disorder' in different ways. For some, any kind of change, including a change in the cultural composition of the country they live in may seem like an unwanted threat, whereas for others change may be welcomed for the new opportunities or richer experiences it brings with it. In the former case Asian immigration is interpreted as a threat to social cohesion, whereas in the latter it appears as an enrichment of social life. In contemporary Australia, as we shall see below, both viewpoints are widely held, making it very hard to resolve debates about immigration and social cohesion to the satisfaction of all concerned.

It is also worth mentioning that social cohesion in a free society requires a degree of mutual accommodation, or 'give and take', between different social groups and individuals. Put another way, social cohesion within a liberal democratic society is a two-way street, rather than a one-way process of authoritarian control by a dominant group over others.

As we have seen, concerns over migrant ghetto formation are at the heart of many contemporary discussions of immigration and social cohesion. This concern arose in post-war Australia on the assumption that US patterns of social segregation, social division and racial violence would be replicated in Australia. In this respect, however, the Australian record is one of lower levels of ethnic and racial concentration, and lesser levels of overt collective violence than in the US.

Many of the reasons for this are to do with real differences in the history of the two countries.(7) The poor European migrants able to get to the US in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were part of a largely unplanned immigration process. Australia's migration process has by contrast been more highly regulated to avoid undue concentrations of particular groups, while distance and cost made it a less preferred destination for poorer Europeans prior to World War Two. The American inner city ghettoes also drew in poor Blacks for whom the historic experience of slavery and racism acted as major obstacles to social cohesion. In this way, the American ghettoes gained a reputation for extremes of poverty and social disorder, features which became linked to the ethnic and racial characteristics of the populations who lived in them, rather than to the low wages, unemployment and slums in which they lived.

Australia has never seen ghettoes in the strict American sense of the term, that is inner urban neighbourhoods dominated by particular ethnic or racial groups living in high levels of poverty and social pathology. Yet it has undoubtedly seen concentrations of migrant groups, whether English, southern European or Asian, in specific urban areas. These are often outer urban suburbs where housing is cheap and where industrial employment is available. Jupp and his associates in a 1990 study located around seventeen municipalities where non-English speakers exceeded one quarter of the population. These included Marrickville and Fairfield in Sydney, Footscray and Brunswick in Melbourne, and Thebarton in Adelaide.(8)

When such concentrations are looked at more closely, however, many turn out to have a mixed ethnic population, rather than one dominated by a single group. Thus Canterbury and Marrickville in Sydney and Footscray and Sunshine in Melbourne, contain concentrations of both Southern Europeans and South-East Asians. Such areas may be regarded as multicultural in a demographic sense rather than as ethnic ghettoes. Another issue, obscured when emphasis is placed on concentration alone, is that many ethnic group members, and sometimes the majority live outside major areas of concentration. This reflects availability of cheap land for much of the post-war period, and a degree of upward occupational mobility for many migrants.

The most controversial issues with regard to the debates about ghettoes concern Asian migrants. While it can be shown that few areas in Australia have high concentrations of migrants from a single background, among those that do the Cabramatta area of Fairfield looms large in many public perceptions as an area of Indo-Chinese concentration, unemployment and crime. In Fairfield, as a whole, for example, the concentration of South-East Asians has been around five times their proportion in the general population.

Whether Asians as a whole are more likely to form concentrations seems dubious. The evidence suggests that while the Vietnamese are most highly concentrated, others are far less so. The Indian, Sri Lankan and Philippine born, for example, are much more scattered, while the existence of Chinatowns in a number of cities is more to do with concentrations of business than residence. The Chinese-born are then widely spread, while 'Muslims in Sydney and Melbourne are more widely scattered than Jews'.(9) The scattering of Islamic populations is in part a reflection of their ethnic diversity, with origins primarily in Turkey, the Lebanon and the former Yugoslavia.

Concentration is one issue, but what are the consequences of concentration for social cohesion? This question may be pursued with respect to a number of issues, such as levels of violence and communal conflict, and levels of participation in Australian life.

In terms of overt violence, it is very clear that Australia has experienced far lower levels of conflict than the USA, the UK, and many other culturally diverse societies.(10) Research into the impact of Asian immigration on levels of collective violence in Australia, designed to test the theory of breakdown in social cohesion, found no discernible increase in the years of expanding Asian intake and recession in the early to mid 1980s.(11)

At the same time community relations between Anglo-Australians and various ethnic groups have not been entirely trouble free. The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Report on Racial Violence in Australia, for example, notes sporadic individual level violence against groups such as Indo-Chinese or Middle Eastern groups, especially at moments of increased social tension such as the Gulf War.(12) Other violent conflicts between ethnic groups have occurred at soccer matches, usually involving young people, but these have not in general spilled over into residential communities.

Concerns about Asianisation are not however easy to dispel with reference to social and demographic data of this kind. This is because it is perceptions and emotive symbols rather than research findings and facts that seem to count the most. As already pointed out, the existence and extent of social cohesion is a very difficult question to resolve. Some Australians feel a threat to social cohesion when hearing individuals speaking another unfamiliar language, or seeing them eating unfamiliar food. Incidents such as the outrage felt in a Melbourne suburb, when Vietnamese neighbours prepared to barbecue a dog, are symptomatic of these concerns.(13)

Negative perceptions may be especially acute for older Australians brought up in a primarily Anglo-Australian environment before and during the post-war waves of culturally diverse immigration. Geoffrey Blainey evokes such sentiments, in All for Australia, recalling the monocultural experience of being brought up in a part of Australia where cultural difference was absent.(14) Yet for others, including those who have themselves been migrants or worked overseas, change in the direction of greater cultural diversity may be seen as enriching and strengthening Australian life, rather than challenging its cohesion. Variety, it is said is 'the spice of life'. Consistent with this, opinion polls suggest a degree of tolerance of cultural difference. Australians then have had widely different levels of exposure to cultural diversity in the formative years of their lives, and also make very different interpretations of the level of social cohesion or division that exists around us. This makes it unlikely that complete consensus about immigration and social cohesion is achievable.

While debates about social cohesion are therefore hard to resolve in general terms, it is possible to say something about the accuracy of claims that certain ethnic groups such as 'Asians' do not assimilate. Three points may be made here. The first concerns the reasons why ethnic concentrations have formed among certain groups. How far do these represent a socially divisive preference to remain isolated from other Australians? There is no doubt that many new settlers, if given a choice, prefer to live amongst people with whom they have affinities of kinship, culture, and language. This applies as much to the English-speakers who settled in Para Hills, South Australia, as much as Vietnamese in Springvale, Victoria, though English-speaking concentrations are usually not seen as undesirable. The existence of ethnic concentrations is not solely a product of this kind of preference, however. Concentrations have often formed around the vicinity of the migrant hostels where groups first settled, where cheap affordable public housing was made available, or where suitable employment was more likely to be found. These factors, have little to do with cultural preference or refusal to mix, and a great deal to do with the realities of adapting to life in a new environment. And as already indicated, many migrants have moved out of initial concentrations of settlement as opportunities arose.

Two further points may be made about readiness to participate in Australian society. The first concerns preparedness to take out Australian citizenship. Here Asian groups such as Vietnamese (78%), and Chinese (75%), have higher than average uptake rates alongside Greeks (81%) and migrants from the former Yugoslavia (80%).(15) From these data it cannot be concluded that Asian migrants resist assimilation in a political sense, a point reinforced by recent electoral success for Chinese and Vietnamese candidates in a number of locations.

A second index of participation or mixing is provided by data on inter-marriage. The marriage patterns of first generation migrants are not all that useful as indicators of social participation because many were married prior to entry into Australia. A more helpful way of looking at the long term issue of social mixing is to consider the marriage patterns of second generation migrants. Based on 1991 census figures, there is no evidence that Asians as such are more likely to continue to marry within their own groups than those from other regions.(16) Nonetheless some individual Asian groups have very high in-marriage rates. Using those of British-origin as a standard, who marry others of the same origin at a rate of 18.2% for women and 18.9% for men, comparable rates for Asians range from high levels for Lebanese (72.5% and 52.0%) and Turks (66.2% and 41.9%), to low rates for Indians (5.2% and 5.4%) and Malaysians (5.5% and 9.6%). Chinese-born appear closer to the lower than the higher end of the spectrum at 21.9% and 28.4%, but these data under-estimate marriage between ethnic Chinese from different national backgrounds. Asians of different backgrounds vary considerably therefore in their marriage patterns. In this respect they exhibit the same patterns of divergence that Charles Price has found for European migrants.

The citizenship and inter-marriage data suggest that social and ethnic mixing varies considerably. While some groups mix or participate far more than others, there is no distinctively Asian pattern of separatism compared with other groups. This reflects the diversity of Asian immigration,(17) which comprises the highly educated as well as those of peasant background, those of middle class as well as working class background, English-speakers as well as non-English speakers, Catholics as well as Muslims and Buddhists, and those who play cricket and gamble on horses, as well as those adept at mah jong or kick boxing. There is no 'Asian' culture that is separate and alien from Australian culture, rather a variety of cultural influences involving a mix of ethnic, religious, secular, and class-based differences. Levels of difference, and levels of mixing, as measured by inter-marriage vary between groups. The stereotype of Asians as inherently different and by virtue of that threatening to the Australian way of life, appears to be grossly misleading.

This does not mean that every public anxiety about cultural practices labelled as 'Asian' is groundless. This point may be made with respect to the issue of criminality and, in particular organised crime. Asian-based organised crime certainly exists on both a local and global basis, but it is concentrated among particular groups. There is no evidence that Asian communities as a whole have higher levels of criminality than any other part of the Australian community.(18) Broad brush criticisms of Asians as such are therefore very misleading, and may contribute to social anxiety through exaggeration and unwarranted stigmatisation of law-abiding citizens.

Migration, Globalization and Australian Identity

We have analysed the issue of migration and social cohesion thus far in terms of the impact of immigration levels and ethnic composition upon Australian society. The problem of social cohesion does however raise even broader issues. Two particular questions stand out. The first of these is the connection between migration, globalization and social cohesion. The second is the cumulative impact made by all such trends upon the Australian identity.

Globalization has been defined as 'the intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural relations across borders.'(19) Instead of a world where nations conduct their own affairs, and regulate relations with other nations according to national objectives, globalization refers to a world where cross-border activities assume such a scale and intensity that nation-states cannot hope to regulate them fully. The migration of people occurs alongside movements of capital, finance, technology, information and cultural practices across political boundaries. To a significant extent, such movements involve formal institutions such as multi-national companies and trans-national regulatory bodies like the World Trade Organisation, and various UN agencies. But they also involve a myriad of more informal inter-personal electronic linkages between individuals, families, and friends, dependent on chain migration, international travel, the telephone, and the Internet.

Migration then is only one aspect of the far broader and more complex impact of globalization upon Australian society. Just as many Australians feel anxious about immigration and the cultural diversity it has engendered, so they also feel concern about other aspects of globalization, such as foreign ownership of economic resources and challenges to Australian sovereignty. Recent research by Clive Bean(20) has investigated the views of a sample of over 2000 Australians on both immigration and economic sovereignty. One of his main findings is that Australians are even more concerned about what they see as the negative impact of the world economy than that of immigration. Thus over 75% of the sample agreed with the view that Australia should limit the import of foreign products, as against 60% who supported cuts to current immigration levels.

We shall explore attitudes to immigration in more depth below, merely noting at this stage that his findings are consistent with the vast bulk of surveys conducted over the last 30 years. The matter of more immediate interest is the even greater negativity expressed towards the impact of the global economy. This is found not simply in relation to industry protection, but also high levels of support for the propositions that multi-nationals have too much power in Australia, and that foreigners should not be allowed to buy land. Concerns about these aspects of economic globalization generally correlate with concerns about the impact of immigration. And not surprisingly it is those who are Australian-born, older, and with lower incomes who are more likely to be concerned about economic globalization and immigration than those overseas-born and with higher incomes. Surprisingly levels of education have no independent effect on economic sovereignty issues, although the more highly educated are less likely to oppose immigration.

These data have interesting implications for the analysis of social cohesion in Australia. They suggest that certain aspects of the globalization process, such as foreign ownership and global penetration of Australian markets, are, along with immigration, especially worrying to many of those most vulnerable to economic change, and those whose formative experiences were set prior to the recently intensified cross-border processes of globalization. In this sense it may also be argued that it is globalization which represents the greatest challenge to social cohesion. If immigration is regarded as a sub-set of globalization, then resistance to immigration may have as much to do with economic insecurity in a world of permeable boundaries, than any immigration-specific cause.

Where then does globalization leave nation-states like Australia?(21)

Three main theoretical positions may be adopted on this question. The first is what might be termed the theory of sovereign complacency. This claims that globalization can be defied, to the extent that nations may claim absolute sovereignty over what goes on within their borders. Accordingly foreign investment, commodity imports, immigration, and global regulatory arrangements can all be ignored in pursuit of national interests. This approach relies on the formal legal sovereignty of nations to determine their own affairs. The difficulty with it is that national sovereignty in Australia and elsewhere has always been conditional on power relations and co-operative arrangements with other major players in the world arena, be they other Governments such as the UK or USA, or multi-national companies. For most if not all countries, the legal ideal of absolute sovereignty has never existed in practice. The recent intensification of globalization renders the ideal even more of a myth. The best that can be hoped for is to negotiate or bargain on the terms upon which dealings with others take place, whether in matters of trade, military security, or access to capital.

A second alternative theory of globalization claims that the nation-state is either dead or has become significantly weakened as a result of economic globalization. Stephen Castles and his associates have utilised what might be called the theory of the global Juggernaut, to claim that nationalism is thereby rendered outmoded.(22) While the nation-state may persist, the likely form of identity in a global world of cross-border movement will switch from nationalist to multicultural. Nationalism is therefore a mistaken identity.

This second theory has the virtue of drawing attention to global inequalities of power, and the potentially de-stabilising effects of economic globalization upon nations. Yet it is by no means clear that the global Juggernaut will sweep all before it. Multi-national companies need nation-states to provide economic and political stability where they operate, and governments are not without bargaining power in negotiating the terms upon which access to national markets is granted, as the Japanese example amongst others indicates. More relevant to the issue of immigration, is the persistence of nationalism and national identity around the world as well as in Australia. Rather than being rendered outmoded by globalization, the advent of an economic and technological world without borders seems to have stimulated a nationalist reaction. The appeal of Australian identity remains, even if it is re-cast and re-invented in each generation.

A third more pragmatic theoretical position would then see globalization and the nation-state as co-existent features of the contemporary world. This co-existence is not without tensions and conflicts. But it does equally mean the inter-dependency of nation-states as enduring entities rather than their erosion by trans-national movements. At the core of this inter-dependency are the benefits that come from cross-border exchange for nations and individuals. Just as no individual can meet all their needs from their immediate environment, leading in some cases to migration, so no nation can meet all its needs from within its own resources. This applies both to economic, technological and scientific needs, as well as cultural practices and resources.

These theoretical considerations may be linked in a very concrete way with questions about what it means to be an Australian. The nature of the Australian identity is too large and complex an issue to be fully canvassed here. It is a matter about how people act and what they do, as much as a question of attitudes that can be canvassed by social researchers. Song, literature, and poetry have from time to time been elements in the expression of Australian identity, but so have sport and recreation. The Australian identity also has a strong historical dimension to it, and has been subject to change over time.

It has sometimes been claimed that Australia's national identity is not as strong as the national identity of countries that have experienced the trauma of invasion and civil war. While it is true that events of this kind have often been major reference points in the consolidation of a sense of national identity, they are not by any means the only processes by which identity emerges. In the case of Australia, it has been argued that Australian national sentiment has formed as much around social and cultural(23) as political and military reference points. Gallipoli and the Anzac tradition occupy a central symbolic place,(24) but so too do popular commitments to egalitarian ideals and to a way of life free from the status pretensions of the Old World.

As matters stand today, there is no doubt that the Australian national identity continues to be a matter of great significance to the Australian population. While controversies rage over how past history is evaluated, it is clear that Australians retain a strong sense of what it means to be Australian. Neither immigration nor globalization seem to have created a rootless set of cosmopolitans for who nationhood means nothing. What has happened is a certain re-casting of what it means to be an Australian under the impact of immigration and increased cultural diversity.

Recent survey evidence from a study of over 2000 Australians, reported in Table 1, reflects this re-casting process. It lists in rank order those aspects of what it means to be an Australian about which respondents felt most strongly.

Table 1: Positive Identifications of What is Truly Australian(25)


Very Important Fairly Important
Feeling Australian
72%
23%
Respecting Australia's laws and political institutions
69%
26%
Having Australian citizenship
67%
23%
Being able to speak English
61%
27%
Having lived in Australia for most of one's life
27%
35%
Being born in Australia
29%
25%
Being a Christian
15%
17%

Source: Derived from the results of the National Social Science study reported in M.D.R. Evans, 'National Identity: What Does It Take To Be "Truly Australian" ', Worldwide Attitudes, 18 March 1996, pp. 1-8, and F.L. Jones, 'Ethnic Diversity, Social Distance and National Identity: Citizen Beliefs about Australian Institutions, 1996, passim.

One of the most interesting points here is that respondents are less likely to associate being truly Australian with being Australian-born than with other criteria based on personal feeling and political commitment. This provides some support for the existence among Australians of an open conception of nationhood that has come to terms with mass migration, and has a place for migrants. Nationhood here may not be defined in exclusive ethnic or racial terms, but it clearly does require a personal commitment at the level of feeling and public declaration through citizenship uptake, together with acceptance of English as the official language of Australia.

Further analysis of these data by Frank Jones,(26) identifies three broad categories of opinion. Nearly one quarter of respondents are labelled Nativists (akin to Blainey's 'Old Australians'), meaning Australians who believe that being Australian born is essential to being a true Australian. The remaining three-quarters are equally divided between Civic Nationalists, who retain a strong sense of national identity but are open to the inclusion of migrants of all backgrounds provided they are committed to Australia, and Moderate Pluralists, for whom acceptance of cultural diversity is even more important than a strong sense of national identity.

The evidence here suggests Australian national identity has not been eroded by any kind of global Juggernaut. The debate is rather about whether and how it should be re-cast, and in particular how open Australia's borders, and Australia's way of life should become. The majority of Australians are neither cosmopolitan in the sense of rejecting national identity, nor exclusionary in holding to strongly nativist conceptions of that identity.

These issues may be further elaborated through analysis of data on Australian attitudes to immigration and multiculturalism.

Australian Attitudes on Immigration and Multiculturalism

There is a fundamental contrast between what we know about Australian attitudes to immigration and what is known about attitudes to multiculturalism. In the former case, it is very clear that the majority of Australians have consistently felt since the early 1970s that existing immigration levels are too high and should be cut.(27) This attitude applies across gender, age, and occupational categories, although those over 50 and country voters tend to be more opposed to immigration than others, and those with higher incomes less opposed.

The reasons given are predominantly economic,(28) focussing on the perception that immigration increases or threatens to increase unemployment. Such perceptions exist even though economic research has failed to demonstrate any clear connection between immigration levels and unemployment levels. While economists tend to believe that immigrants create jobs as well as filling them, this story is simply not believed by most Australians. Their scepticism is an indicator of the extremely high levels of economic insecurity that currently exist in an era of consistently high unemployment, corporate downsizing, and greater exposure to the competitive pressures of the global economy.

The majority of those who have consistently opposed immigration levels, have opposed immigration from any source region. There has however been some increase over time in the proportion of those who have expressed specific concern about Asian immigration. This may possibly suggest a growth in racially targeted feeling on the immigration issue. When expressly asked about concern over regions from which too many migrants originate, respondents overwhelmingly cite Asia.(29) Nonetheless, when respondents are asked about the reasons for wanting immigration restriction the overwhelming reason given remains one of concern for employment levels. This is reflected in the relatively low salience of immigration compared with other policy areas of greater concern to the electorate. The Newspoll organisation, for example, over the period 1991 to 1996, found that unemployment and health consistently ranked first or second in the list of issues electors felt were most important in affecting their voting intentions. Immigration and Aboriginal issues always ranked last or second last out of a list of 14 issues.(30) In this sense we may say that immigration is an issue primarily because unemployment is an issue.

Attitudes to multiculturalism, by contrast, are far harder to interpret. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that confusion and contradiction reigns. Some polls appear to show support for multiculturalism, while others do not. The findings of the major 1988 study of multiculturalism commissioned by the then Office of Multicultural Affairs, have been interpreted both as evidence of support for multiculturalism, and as evidence of public hostility.(31) However, in the absence of any agreement about what the term means, it is very hard to know what exactly people mean when they are for or against it.

Part of the problem here is that the terms multicultural and multiculturalism have served both as a description for a culturally mixed population, and a label for certain kinds of Government policy involving migrants. Some may approve the former, while being sceptical about the latter. A useful starting point in clarifying attitudes to multiculturalism then is to distinguish between attitudes towards people and practices defined as multicultural, and attitudes towards multicultural policies.

Attitudes to the multicultural nature of the Australian population tend to focus on two main issues. The first involve community relations and social cohesion, the second concerns the multicultural contribution to Australian society. As far as community and cohesion are concerned, attitudes are very mixed. On the one hand, there is evidence to suggest that many Australians dislike the idea that sections of the population may live in different ways. A 1994 Saulwick poll, for example found that 61% of respondents felt that migrants 'should live like the majority', with only 35% supporting that we should 'respect different ways of living'.(32) This accords with the hostility to perceived ghetto formation and the Asian presence noted earlier. The same poll, however, found that the overwhelming majority (71.8%) believed Australia was a better place to live in 'now that people from so many countries live here', while a clear majority (61.4%), believed that 'if people from a particular ethnic background want to mix mainly with themselves, they should not be criticised for doing so'.

Is there a contradiction in attitudes here? Or does the wording of questions have a good deal to do with the way they are answered, as Murray Goot among others believes?(33) While both these possibilities have merit, it is also possible that contradictions of attitude are more apparent than real. In the case of the Saulwick poll, for example, it is possible that many would simultaneously oppose cultural separatism, and prefer greater levels of cultural mixing, while also resisting the idea of heavy-handed public criticism of groups who are prepared to mix a bit. In this way there is no real contradiction. What this means for attitudes to Australia as a multicultural society does however depend on how multiculturalism is defined. If it is taken to mean cultural separatism then it appears that most Australians are against it. Alternatively if it means tolerance of diversity, providing means for different groups to interact with the remainder of society, then the majority seem to be for it.

There are, nonetheless limits to tolerance, set by the distinctions many Australians make about the desirability of migrants from different backgrounds. Although we have argued that most opposition to immigration is based on employment concerns rather than racism, there is evidence that perceived Asian migrant levels and settlement patterns have been singled out as of particular concern to a significant number of Australians. This follows through into measures of feeling towards different groups reported in the major 1988 survey of several thousand Australians commissioned by the Office of Multicultural Affairs.(34) Whereas low levels of negative feelings were felt toward those of British (4.2%), Italian (6.7%), and Greek background (8.6%), much higher levels of negative feelings were expressed against the Vietnamese (32.2%), Muslim people (31.8%), and Lebanese (27.5%). Whether such varying levels of hostility are to be explained by racism as such is not altogether clear, since the groups most criticised are the more recent arrivals who symbolise the unknown, especially for elderly Australians and country people who are less likely to meet them or work alongside them. Having said this racism, in the sense of a belief in the cultural superiority of one group over another clearly exists, as does racial discrimination, and a certain level of racial violence and abuse. Around 15% of respondents to a recent survey admitted acting in a racist manner towards migrants.(35) In another poll, 18% of respondents felt Australian-born applicants for jobs should be given preferential treatment over migrants.(36)

Is Australia becoming more or less tolerant of cultural diversity? There is room for caution here to avoid over-estimating the significance of intolerance and hostility towards cultural diversity and especially Asian migration. Notwithstanding the recent upsurge in support for Pauline Hanson, there is evidence that Australia is becoming more tolerant. A Newspoll taken in early May 1997 indicated that an overwhelming majority of Australians (78%) felt that multiculturalism had been good for Australia.(37) This finding surprised some commentators, who may perhaps have missed a quieter trend towards tolerance, obscured by a focus on debates among politicians and ideologues. A shift toward tolerance has nonetheless been clearly identified by Mariah Evans, in a comparison of attitudes towards migrants of different backgrounds conducted in 1984 and again in 1995.(38) This research found a gradual shift towards warmer feelings and lower prejudice. Those with negative feelings toward Vietnamese, for example, declined from 48% to 31% over this 11 year period, while those willing to discriminate in favour of Australian-born and against migrants in job applications halved from 36% to 18% over the same period. These data suggest a growing tolerance towards migrants already here, even if a majority want fewer migrants to enter in the future.

If we turn from attitudes toward the people who make up the multicultural society to multiculturalism as public policy, a complex pattern of evidence is revealed. In the first place there is nowhere near the level of opposition to multicultural policy as there is to current immigration levels. Indeed 70% of Australians in an AGB-McNair poll of November 1996, opposed the abolition of multicultural policy, while agreeing with a short-term freeze on immigration, and a reduction in Asian immigration.(39) Multiculturalism is by no means as unpopular as many imagine, while certain aspects of multiculturalism have majority support.

Having said this Australians are more equivocal about multicultural policies, supporting some parts and opposing others. This emerges from a 1988 survey commissioned by the Office of Multicultural Affairs. The survey findings were announced by Senator Robert Ray, the then Minister for Immigration, in a news release declaring 'Australians support Multiculturalism'.(40) These findings were subsequently echoed in some academic commentary. Critics of multiculturalism, by contrast, found evidence within the survey to suggest that Australians dislike multicultural policies aimed at cultural pluralism, though there was a good deal of support for access and equity policy.(41) A more balanced commentary on the survey by Murray Goot, suggests that Australians like some parts of multicultural policy while being strongly opposed to others.(42)

As far as general policy directions are concerned the vast majority of respondents supported the propositions that 'no-one should be disadvantaged due to race, religion or culture' (95%), that 'Australians should be allowed to enjoy their own cultural heritage and share it with others' (91%), and that 'Government and community organisations need to take more account of the diversity of the Australian population' (90%). When translated into specific policies, however, the position was more mixed. A range of programs geared to assist migrants to function effectively in Australia were clearly supported, such as English courses for migrant children (91%), and adults (77%), information centres (93%), and interpreters in hospitals and courts (94%). On the other hand, a majority of respondents opposed programs which provided special assistance for ethnic organisations alone, such as 'money to ethnic organisations for cultural activities' (58%), or 'nursing homes specifically for aged immigrants speaking the same language' (56%).

A final aspect of multicultural policy development of concern to significant numbers of Australians is the process by which policy determination has taken place. In the focus group discussions, conducted by Mackay Research in 1994,(43) a number of respondents expressed the view that they had never been consulted about multiculturalism, and that critical voices have been ignored in its implementation. Typical statements include the following:-

'Nobody asked me whether I wanted a multicultural Australia.'

'You've got two classifications of people: those who make the rules and think they work-or just want them to work-and those who live with the situation and very often find that the rules don't work.'

Such comments relate as much to the quality of Australia's democratic processes and channels of communication between voters and politicians, as to the substance of multicultural policies.

Taken overall the findings reported here are very much a mixed bag. Australians support multicultural policy if it is seen as integrating migrants into Australian society, as a reflection of principles of equal opportunity for all. However they reject multiculturalism if it is seen as providing special privileges or programs for particular groups, not available to others. In addition, multiculturalism is not supported when the processes by which policy has been determined and implemented are remote from the mass of the Australian people.

Is there, then, any kind of consistent pattern in attitudes to multiculturalism? Is there, for example, a mainstream Australian position on multiculturalism, or is opinion divided into multiculturalists and monoculturalists? Or are Australians, as we have suggested, more pragmatic accepting some parts of multiculturalism, while criticising other parts? Murray Goot, who has re-analysed the 1988 survey data, concludes that 'Australians are neither pro-multicultural nor anti-multicultural' in any consistent sense.(44) To be sure, there is a large minority of consistent multiculturalists and a smaller minority of consistent monoculturalists, but neither of these predominate. Large numbers of Australians refuse to fit into either camp, seeing weaknesses as well as strengths within Government policies. This ambivalence needs to be recognised in public policy debates if multicultural policies are to have any kind of legitimate future.

The Future of Multiculturalism?

Australia's population is already culturally diverse, and in that sense multicultural. This is a fact. It will not go away if the term multicultural is abandoned by Governments, or removed from the political vocabulary. The more difficult question is to determine whether multicultural policies are necessary to the continuing social cohesion and achievement of equality of opportunity for all Australians. Is a strong public policy initiative necessary to produce a stable and prosperous future, or can we do without it?

In one sense, post-war Australia has achieved what few other nations have managed, namely the absorption of large numbers of culturally diverse migrants without overt social unrest or a major threat to the social fabric. This achievement has persisted even in the face of increased unemployment and growing economic uncertainty during the last two decades. Economic insecurity, fuelled by intensified processes of economic globalisation has nonetheless been the major reason for popular demands for a cut back in immigration. Even allowing for low immigration levels for the foreseeable future, Australia will still be a multicultural country, as a result of past decisions.

Multicultural policies, in the broadest sense, may be regarded as attempts to manage migrant settlement under conditions of cultural diversity. They are part of the set of social policies that countries like Australia have developed to deal with issues that cannot be resolved by the spontaneous operation of markets. If markets alone could guarantee social cohesion and equality of opportunity for different groups, then there would be no need for social policies, and no need for multiculturalism. The problem is that economic mechanisms cannot by themselves address all such objectives, and may sometimes make social cohesion and equality harder rather than easier to attain. The globalization of markets, has certainly increased social unease in Australia, and it is arguable that much of the opposition to immigration, including Asian immigration is a product of anxiety about Australia's capacity to determine its own future and protect the jobs of its people, in an increasingly uncertain world. 'Asians' are perceived by many to be different and hence symbolise the threat of the unknown, as well as an immediate threat to employment.

Multicultural policies have also arisen because of perceived deficiencies in earlier assimilationist policies. The justification for having multicultural policies over those of assimilation is partly symbolic, providing public recognition of the inclusion of many culturally diverse groups within the Australian community, and partly to do with universalising the outreach of equality of opportunity to all Australians, who may need access to assistance. The large numbers of Australians who support multiculturalism, would also appear to favour public support for tolerance, and to social policies that are perceived to be genuinely universalistic. If these policy goals are worth continuing, then multicultural policies are a publicly acceptable way of achieving them.

Yet there are also many problems with multicultural policies. One weakness is the misleading nature of the term 'multiculturalism' itself. Jerzy Zubrzycki, a strong advocate of multiculturalism for more than 20 years, refers to the term as a 'clumsy, pompous polysyllabic noun'.(45) It is relatively easy to grasp that Multiculturalism means many cultures, but far harder to discern what Multiculturalism has to say about the relationship between such cultures.(46) Does it mean cultural separatism, and policies that magnify social division, or does it mean inter-cultural tolerance within some set of general rights and obligations that apply to all groups? A second related weakness, identified by Zubrzycki, is that politicians of all parties have seen multicultural programs as a way of wooing the ethnic vote. This has helped to associate the policy with sectional advantage and social engineering.

Zubrzycki, now calls for a new way of framing the policy objectives of social cohesion-unity in difference-and equality of opportunity, in policy discourse. The implication here is that the cohesive egalitarian side of multiculturalism be retained, while other sectional themes be abandoned, along with the name. But what alternatives are there?

One of the difficulties faced by Western societies seeking to manage cultural diversity is the dilemma of difference.(47) This stems from an apparent tension between conventional liberal-democratic principles and principles that emphasise differences between citizens. The principles of democracy, the rule of law and egalitarianism, demand that all citizens be treated equally, in the sense of having the same rights and obligations to the national community. Yet individuals may find themselves in very different social situations often connected with membership of particular groups-men and women, black and white, Asian migrant and Anglo-Australian. The dilemma this creates is as follows. Social cohesion requires that all Australians are treated according to the same standards of fairness and equity, but the targeting of social justice and welfare policies to particular groups, serves to emphasise social difference, and raises the perception of different and therefore unfair treatment.

One way out of the dilemma is to argue that the dilemma is often apparent rather than real, a problem of mistaken perception rather than genuine inequity. It is perfectly possible to reconcile universal principles with differences in their application, for example, wherever members of different groups are disproportionately represented in the category of those entitled to universal benefits. To take the example of public health policy, few would want to argue that the disproportionate amount of services received by the elderly is unfair and a threat to social cohesion because they are being treated differently to other Australians. On the contrary the elderly would be seen as having different needs as a group and therefore different entitlements.

Applying the same logic to multiculturalism, it is possible to reconcile much though not all public spending on non-English speaking background migrants with universal principles, insofar as NESB migrants are on average disproportionately represented in certain categories, such as the unemployed. In cases such as this, the principles of equal rights and entitlement continue to apply, providing that individual cases are always scrutinised to determine whether the fall under the universal rights of entitlement. If this is all that is at stake, however, why do we still need multiculturalism? All that is required is a commitment to social citizenship rights for all.

The case for going further is built on the assumption that citizens are not just individual atoms, unconnected to each other, but live as part of groups, with group as well as individual needs. The need for recognition as a group may be especially important for minorities subject to discrimination on the basis of their ethnicity or race. But how far should this recognition go, beyond a general social commitment to tolerance and mutual respect?

An alternative approach, developed by Stephen Castles and others,(48) suggests that multiculturalism should be reformulated in terms of multicultural citizenship. The key to this idea is that citizens are not only equal individuals, but are also people with different needs and wants, and that these often arise as members of groups. The conventional citizenship rights of individuals should therefore be supplemented by recognition of group interests and mechanisms for group participation in the political process.

This model has not as yet been taken up as a serious option in Australian politics, and many questions about its viability remain unresolved. It is not clear, for example, exactly how the balance of individual and group rights would be struck. Nor is it apparent what forms group representation might take. Recent Australian political history has plenty of examples of interest groups and lobbies seeking to maximise public support for their particular activities, but few examples of political parties representing particular ethnic groups. The claims of would-be group leaders and organisations to represent large constituencies are also potentially problematic. Finally it seems unlikely that greater emphasis on groups would overcome problems of social division and lack of cohesion. For the moment then, the principles of multicultural citizenship remain untested.

Whether or not multiculturalism survives as a specific policy label, there are a number of other initiatives that might be adopted so as to maximise social cohesion by achieving a more effective dialogue between Australians, and by minimising public misperceptions and anxieties. Three issues may be identified here.

The first symbolic issue involves the way Australia's contemporary cultural diversity is linked with Australian history in the representation of Australia as a nation. One of the failures of existing multicultural policy-making is that the slogan 'Multiculturalism for all Australians' was grafted onto Australian life, with too little concern for prior traditions and experiences. A number of multiculturalists treated that prior history with disdain as if it were simply a matter of the racist White Australia policy and racist treatment of Aboriginal population. Such legacies are fundamental, but so are other traditions linked with egalitarianism, rejection of Old World status distinctions, and republicanism.(49)

If a multicultural element is to be included within the evolving conception of what it is to be an Australian, then a greater degree of dialogue between older traditions and newer developments is necessary.

Two further more practical issues concern measures to address misconceptions of multicultural policy to do with sectionalism and special advantages. The first of these concerns misperceptions of the true nature of public policies affecting migrants and ethnic groups. Much public disquiet exists when particular groups are perceived to get special privileges not available to others. Yet the programs concerned may often be on a par with funding available to other non-ethnic bodies, such as community organisations, educational bodies, or age care facilities. Greater public awareness of these matters would assist in sifting out particular applications of universalistic policies from more truly sectional policies. The rationale for such policies could then be scrutinised in a more fine-grained and better informed manner.

A second more practical issue concerns the cost of government programs and benefits to migrants and ethnic groups. One of the reasons for sometimes quite wild estimates of the sums involved is that very little digestible material is presented by governments to citizens on patterns of government expenditures. Shareholders in private businesses expect and generally get a far higher level of accounting information, than citizens of Australia get from any government. There seems no reason why this should continue especially where lack of information creates stresses on social cohesion that are avoidable.

Conclusion

Multiculturalism as public policy cannot go on in the old way if it is to be an effective source of social cohesion and equality of opportunity. This is not because public support has entirely disappeared. On the contrary, there are many aspects of multiculturalism that remain popular. The need for change stems rather from confusions about what multiculturalism is, and what multicultural policies actually do. Whether or not the term multiculturalism is a casualty of the need for change is immaterial, since the underlying issues that multicultural policies seek to address will not go away. Piety towards past policies and attitudes is no longer good enough. The underlying case for renewal in this area, is ultimately to do with upgrading the quality of Australian democracy, including the dialogue and co-operation between Australians of all backgrounds, as well as between Australians and government.

Endnotes

  1. M. Wooden, R. Holton, G. Hugo, and J. Sloan, Australian Immigration: A Survey of the Issues, revised edition (Canberra: AGPS 1994).
  2. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Migration, Cat. no. 3412.0, 1995-6.
  3. Ibid.
  4. These projections using ABS data were made in The Weekend Australian, 3-4 May 1997.
  5. P. Hanson, first speech, 10th September 1996, Hansard, House of Representatives, 1996.
  6. Saulwick poll for The Sunday Age, 13 November 1994.
  7. Comparisons between the USA and Australia are discussed in G. Freeman and J. Jupp, (eds.) Nations of Immigrants: Australia, the United States and International Migration, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1992, and in J. Jupp, A. McRobbie and B. York, 'Metropolitan Ghettoes and Ethnic Concentrations', Working Papers on Multiculturalism, no 1, Centre for Multicultural Studies, University of Wollongong, 1990, 2 vols. Much of the data on ghettoes reported here is drawn form the analyses of Jupp and his associates.
  8. Ibid.
  9. Ibid.
  10. The historical basis of this claim is based on T. Gurr, 'Comparative Study of Civic Strife', in H.D. Graham and T. Gurr (eds.), The History of Violence in America, New York: Praeger, 1969, and T. Gurr, P. Grabosky, and R. Hula (eds.), The Politics of Crime and Conflict, London: Sage, 1977.
  11. R. Holton, 'Public Disorder in Australia between 1985 and 1989 with particular reference to Immigration and Multiculturalism', unpublished report to the Office for Multicultural Affairs, Centre for Multicultural Studies, Flinders University of South Australia, 1990.
  12. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Racist Violence: Report of the National Inquiry into Racist Violence in Australia, Canberra: AGPS, 1991.
  13. Incident reported in The Age, 5 and 8 March 1983.
  14. G. Blainey, All for Australia, North Ryde: Methuen 1994.
  15. Citizenship rates reported in The Weekend Australian, 3-4 May 1991.
  16. The inter-marriage rates reported here derive from the 1991 census, as cited in The Weekend Australian, 3-4 May 1991. Price's analysis is available in C.A. Price, 'Ethnic Intermixture in Australia', People and Place, vol 1, no 6, pp. 6-8.
  17. R. Hassan and G. Tan, Asian Migrants in Australia, Discussion Paper no 12, Centre for Development Studies, Flinders University, 1986.
  18. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Queensland, The Social Characteristics of Immigrants in Australia, Bureau of Immigration and Population Research, 1994.
  19. H-H. Holm and G. Sorenson, 'Introduction', H-H. Holm and G. Sorenson (eds.) Whose World Order, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, p. 4.
  20. C. Bean, 'Open or Closed Boundaries: Attitudes Towards Sovereignty', paper prepared for a workshop on Immigration and Australia's Population in the 21st Century, Australian National University, 20-21 May 1996.
  21. For a more general discussion of these issues see R. Holton, 'Four Myths about Globalization' Flinders Journal of History and Politics, vol 19, 1997, pp. 141-156 and R. Holton, Globalization, Nation-State, and Ethnicity, London: MacMillan, 1997 (forthcoming).
  22. S. Castles, M. Kalantzis, B. Cope, and M. Morrissey, Mistaken Identity: Multiculturalism and the Demise of Nationalism in Australia, Sydney: Pluto Press, 1988.
  23. S. Alomes, A Nation At Last? The Changing Character of Australian Nationalism 1880-1988, North Ryde: Angus and Robertson, 1988.
  24. B. Kapferer, Legends of People: Myths of State, Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988.
  25. Derived from the results of the National Social Science study reported in M.D.R. Evans, 'National Identity: What Does It Take To Be "Truly Australian" ', Worldwide Attitudes, 18 March 1996, pp. 1-8, and F.L. Jones, 'Ethnic Diversity, Social Distance and National Identity: Citizen Beliefs about Australian Institutions, 1996, passim.
  26. F.L. Jones, 'National Identity and Ethnic Group Prejudice' paper presented to the Australian Sociological Association Conference, University of Tasmania, 1996.
  27. K. Betts, 'Immigration and Public Opinion in Australia', People and Place vol 4 no 3, 1996, pp. 9-20.
  28. See, for example, AGB-McNair poll, reported in The Age, 5 November 1996, and Bulletin Morgan poll, reported in The Bulletin, 28 November 1995.
  29. Ibid.
  30. Newspoll rankings reported, The Australian, 2 November 1996.
  31. They are discussed in M. Goot, 'Multiculturalists, Monoculturalists and the Many In Between: Attitudes to Cultural Diversity and their Correlates', Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, vol 29 no 2, 1993, pp. 226-253.
  32. .Saulwick poll for The Sydney Morning Herald, 7 June 1994.
  33. M. Goot, 'Question of words, not numbers', The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 November 1996.
  34. News Release, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Multicultural Affairs, 'Australians Support Multiculturalism', 19 April 1989.
  35. M.D.R. Evans, 'Ethnic Prejudice and Discriminatory Intent: Australia, 1984-1995', paper delivered to seminar on Citizens' beliefs and Attitudes, Australian National University, 12 December 1995.
  36. Saulwick poll for The Sunday Age, 13 November 1994.
  37. Newspoll survey for The Weekend Australian, 3 May 1997.
  38. M.D.R. Evans, op. cit.
  39. AGB-McNair poll, reported in The Age, 5 November 1996.
  40. News release, op. cit.
  41. K. Betts, 'Australia's Distorted Immigration Policy', in D. Goodman, D.J. O'Hearn and C. Wallace-Crabbe (eds.), Multicultural Australia: the Challenges of Change, Newham: Scribe, 1991.
  42. M. Goot, 'Multiculturalists...' op. cit.
  43. Mackay Research, The Mackay Report: Multiculturalism, Mackay Research Pty Ltd, 1995.
  44. M. Goot, op. cit. p. 251.
  45. J. Zubrzycki, 'Cynics Woo the Ethnic Vote', The Australian, 15 October 1996.
  46. This problem is raised in J. Hirst, 'Unity in a Tolerant Diversity', The Australian, 16 October 1996.
  47. This is used here in a somewhat different sense to that proposed in M. Minow, 'Learning to live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and Special Education' Law and Contemporary Problems, no. 48, (1985), pp. 157-211 and I.M. Young, 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship', Ethics, vol 99, (1989), pp. 157-211.
  48. S. Castles, 'Multicultural Citizenship', Parliamentary Research Service, Research Paper, no 16, Department of the Parliamentary Library, 1995-6.
  49. See, for example, R. Birrell, A Nation of Our Own: Citizenship and Nation-Building in Federation Australia, Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1995.

References

AGB-McNair poll, reported in The Age, 5 November 1996.

Alomes, S., A Nation At Last? The Changing Character of Australian Nationalism 1880-1988, North Ryde: Angus and Robertson, 1988.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, Migration, Cat. no. 3412:0.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, Queensland, The Social Characteristics of Immigrants in Australia, Bureau of Immigration and Population Research, 1994.

Bean, C., 'Open or Closed Boundaries: Attitudes Towards Sovereignty', paper prepared for a workshop on Immigration and Australia's Population in the 21st Century, Australian National University, 20-21 May 1996.

Betts, K., 'Australia's Distorted Immigration Policy', in D. Goodman, D.J. O'Hearn and C. Wallace-Crabbe (eds.) Multicultural Australia: the Challenges of Change, Newham: Scribe, 1991.

Betts, K., 'Immigration and Public Opinion in Australia', People and Place vol 4 no 3, 1996, pp. 9-20.

Birrell, R., A Nation of Our Own: Citizenship and Nation-Building in Federation Australia, Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1995.

Blainey, G., All for Australia, North Ryde: Methuen 1994.

Bulletin Morgan poll, reported in The Bulletin, 28 November 1995.

Castles, S., Kalantzis, M., Cope, B. and Morrissey, M., Mistaken Identity: Multiculturalism and the Demise of Nationalism in Australia, Sydney: Pluto Press, 1988.

Castles, S., 'Multicultural Citizenship', Parliamentary Research Service, Research Paper, no 16, Department of the Parliamentary Library, 1995-6.

Cope, B., Castles, S., and Kalantzis, M. Immigration, Ethnic Conflicts and Social Cohesion, Bureau for Immigration Research, AGPS 1991.

Evans, M.D.R., 'Ethnic Prejudice and Discriminatory Intent: Australia, 1984-1995', paper delivered to seminar on Citizens' beliefs and Attitudes, Australian National University, 12 December 1995.

Evans, M.D.R., 'National Identity: What Does It Take To Be "Truly Australian" ', Worldwide Attitudes, 18 March 1996, pp. 1-8.

Freeman, G., and Jupp, J., (eds.) Nations of Immigrants: Australia, the United States and International Migration, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Goot, M., 'Multiculturalists, Monoculturalists and the Many In Between: Attitudes to Cultural Diversity and their Correlates', Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, vol 29 no 2, 1993, pp. 226-253.

Goot, M., 'Question of words, not numbers', The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 November 1996.

Gurr, T., 'Comparative Study of Civic Strife', in H.D. Graham and T. Gurr (eds.), The History of Violence in America, New York: Praeger, 1969.

T. Gurr, P. Grabosky, and R. Hula, (eds.) The Politics of Crime and Conflict, London: Sage, 1977.

Hanson, P., first speech, 10th September 1996, Hansard, House of Representatives, 1996.

Hassan, R., and Tan, G., Asian Migrants in Australia, Discussion Paper no 12, Centre for Development Studies, Flinders University, 1986.

Hirst, J., 'Unity in a Tolerant Diversity', The Australian, 16 October 1996.

Holm, H-H., and Sorenson, G., 'Introduction', H-H. Holm and G. Sorenson (eds.) Whose World Order, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, pp. 1-18.

Holton, R., 'Public Disorder in Australia between 1985 and 1989 with particular reference to Immigration and multiculturalism', unpublished report to the Office for Multicultural Affairs, Centre for Multicultural Studies, Flinders University of South Australia, 1990.

Holton, R.J., 'Four Myths about Globalization', Flinders Journal of History and Politics, vol 19, 1997, pp. 141-156.

Holton, R.J., Globalization, Nation State and Ethnicity, London: MacMillan, forthcoming.

Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Racist Violence: Report of the National Inquiry into Racist Violence in Australia, Canberra: AGPS, 1991.

Jones, F.L., 'Ethnic Diversity, Social Distance and National Identity: Citizen Beliefs and Attitudes about Australian Institutions', paper presented at Turku University, Finland, 1996.

Jones, F.L., 'National Identity and Ethnic Group Prejudice', paper presented to the Australian Sociological Association Conference, University of Tasmania, 1996.

Jupp, J., McRobbie, A., and York, B., 'Metropolitan Ghettoes and Ethnic Concentrations', Working Papers on Multiculturalism, no 1, Centre for Multicultural Studies, University of Wollongong, 1990, 2 vols.

Kapferer, B., Legends of People: Myths of State, Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988,

McAllister, I., 'Public Opinion, Multiculturalism and Political Behaviour in Australia, in C. Kukathas (ed), Multicultural Citizens: The Philosophy and Politics of Identity, St Leonard: Centre for Independent Studies, 1993.

Mackay Research, The Mackay Report: Multiculturalism, Mackay Research Pty Ltd, 1995.

Minow, M., 'Learning to live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and Special Education', Law and Contemporary Problems, no. 48, (1985), pp. 157-211.

News Release, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Multicultural Affairs, 'Australians Support Multiculturalism', 19 April 1989.

Newspoll rankings reported, The Australian, 2 November 1996.

Newspoll survey for The Weekend Australian, 3 May 1997.

Price, C.A., 'Ethnic Intermixture in Australia', People and Place, vol 1, no 6, pp. 6-8.

Saulwick poll for The Sydney Morning Herald, 7 June 1994.

Saulwick poll for The Sunday Age, 13 November 1994.

Wooden, M., Holton, R., Hugo, G., and Sloan, J., Australian Immigration: A Survey of the Issues, revised edition (AGPS 1994).

Young, I.M., 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship', Ethics, vol 99, (1989), pp. 157-211.

Zubrzycki, J., 'Cynics woo the ethnic vote', The Australian, 15 October 1996.

 

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