Matthew L James
Science, Technology, Environment and Resources Group
Tables and figures
All transport activities involve some risk but while the
community may not know whether safety levels are acceptable or not,
governments are left to regulate against potentially dangerous
practices. Statistics do suggest that Australia's transport safety
standards and accident levels are reasonable although transport
accidents cost around $6.6 billion every year. Motor vehicle
accidents lead the rates found among transport modes and they also
contribute the greatest economic costs to the nation of around $6.1
billion annually.
Calculation of accident costs and safety benefits help to
identify relative risk management strategies for each mode of
transport. These assist decisions on relative safety and accident
hazard risk. However, common safety practice across all modes also
provides some useful insights as it is the cost, severity and
frequency of accidents that matter to travellers - not the mode. By
analysing all of these aspects, it is possible to assess acceptable
transport safety levels.
International air safety has greatly improved during this
century with advanced technology providing much assistance to
counter the main accident cause - human error. Australia has a
tripartite structure of Commonwealth agencies to manage air safety
matters but on the whole the industry has tended to lag behind
international practice. Keeping air safety investigation agencies
apart from regulatory agencies has been a key factor overseas,
while just as important here is the harmonious development of a
cooperative aviation industry.
Australia's major airlines such as Qantas and Ansett can
maintain their exemplary safety record with jet-powered aircraft.
The impact of government on air safety has been the subject of a
Parliamentary inquiry that may continue. This inquiry has not found
evidence of any deterioration in overall air safety, except for the
charter flights sector. In 1993, the latest year for which data is
available, the total community cost of 320 aviation accidents in
Australia was $76 million.
Road accidents remain a major costly problem to the whole
community accounting for about 15 per cent of years of productive
life losses. Australia's record could still improve although our
death rate per hundred-million vehicle kilometres of 1.4 is not far
behind the United States, Canada or Britain. Individual
responsibility for accident prevention is often lacking. Road
safety management remains divided between Federal, State and Local
Government agencies, with a new national strategy and plan offering
some coordination and goals. Their imposition of safety
restrictions on the driving community sometimes meets strong
resistance, suggesting that some innovative technological solutions
may be more effective.
Reflecting the scattered nature of rail operations in Australia,
rail safety has developed in an ad hoc manner, largely through the
application of industry standards. New State rail safety
regulations have received some national acceptance but there
remains no national rail safety agency. Given the Federal policy
for open access to rail infrastructure nationwide, there is a need
for more action towards achieving uniform national safety and
operating standards. Note that Australia averages around 100 rail
accidents annually that in turn average around $1 million each in
terms of cost to the community.
International shipping safety remains a problem due mainly to
commercial pressures on unregulated operators. Australia observes
international conventions directed towards improving sea safety and
has taken some action to ensure compliance by visiting ships.
Private small boat safety remains largely a State or local issue
without national coordination. Each year in Australia, some 1 000
marine accidents occur involving serious injury or death on board
boats or ships, costing the nation over $300 million.
Transportation safety investigation of accidents varies around
the world but recent American practice favours a joint transport
mode approach to the issue. Australia has instead pursued an ad hoc
approach involving separate safety agencies with no clear
separation between investigative and regulatory bodies. Combining
our agencies into one independent organisation may offer new
perspectives on and efficiencies in transport accident analysis.
Through the information that it provides, analysts will be better
able to determine for each mode just what are the levels of
acceptable transport safety.
Such an independent organisation of around 100 staff, with
annual funding of $9 million, would investigate around 1 300 air,
rail and sea accidents annually that cost the community $476
million in 1993. Including 90 road safety program staff with a
budget of $8 million plus program costs may provide cost
efficiencies in addressing the problem of an annual $6.1 billion in
road accident costs facing the Australian community. This seems to
be a very small price to pay towards helping to improve transport
safety in Australia but moreover would constitute a committed,
national approach to our accident problems.
When Australian entrepreneur Dick Smith promoted the term
"affordable safety" for airlines, many people in air transport
scoffed at the idea. Nonetheless, the concept of paying for air
safety is an issue. This extends to the wider transport sector too,
as in fact the community as a whole must bear the cost of road or
rail accidents, marine disasters and air crashes. Questions arise
as to what limit the community is prepared to accept such incidents
and whether it is possible to improve transport safety to higher
levels.
Almost all human activities involve some risk, so public
policies have to balance possible extra risks against ascertainable
benefits (Withers 1988, 4). This assessment may evaluate
expenditures on risk mitigation and whether certain activities
should occur or not. The concept of a risk threshold or "acceptable
risk" arises, based on the assumption that there is a non-zero
probability of occurrence below which the public is willing to
accept the risk.
Thus acceptable safety is a level where the advantages of
increased safety are not worth the extra costs of reducing risk. By
implication, this is also a level of affordable safety, although
this terminology implies a direct cost measure of risk management
actions. On the other hand, acceptable transport safety involves a
qualitative judgement of the community's willingness to accept a
certain level and consequence of accidents without any action. In
this sense, risk is a measure of both hazard level and public
outrage.
There is often not as much public concern about transport deaths
such as on the roads compared to those occurring at fixed
installations such as factories. This is possibly due to lack of a
geographical focal point with the former, a relatively low social
risk and general acceptance of road transport systems
particularly.
This paper examines the statistical and historical cost records
of accidents in each of the main transport modes in Australia and
contrasts them with some comparable countries. It outlines the
regulatory arrangements and policy options available for safety
programs. It concentrates on the matter of transportation safety
investigation and notes different possible arrangements. Finally,
the paper considers the establishment of a multi-modal
transportation safety investigation agency. With public acceptance
of such an agency, safety regulations would receive better
awareness, understanding and acceptance.
Accident statistics provide some information on safety but do
not directly measure it unless there is a statistical relationship
over time (HORSC 1995a, 30). The frequency of accidents is not by
itself a complete measure of safety, especially as the events that
safety management seeks to eliminate have already occurred in the
statistics. Also, the number of accidents is usually small compared
to total activity and is subject to fluctuations of chance. The
Reason Model of Systems Safety conceives of an organisational
accident in which latent failures, arising mainly in the managerial
and organisational spheres, combine adversely with local triggering
events (weather, location, etc), and with the active failures of
individuals at the sharp end (errors and procedural violations)
(HORSC 1995a, 71). Together, these all combine to cause accidents,
so safety becomes a complex matter.
It is possible to assess the adequacy of existing safety
standards in general terms by comparing the published requirements
and standards of the world's regulatory authorities. There are two
issues to consider in order to assess the adequacy of standards,
namely, whether existing standards are adequate or if the process
for establishing them is suitable (ibid, 91).
Australia follows accepted international standards for transport
safety. The responsibilities for compliance with legislation and
regulations rest with the transport industry and users.
The role of government regulation in transport safety has been
to guard against actions that are potentially detrimental to
society. Although commercial transport operations may ensure safe
operations in the long term, in the short term a sufficiently high
and consistent degree of safety may not prevail. Accident
statistics show that private operators may not maintain sufficient
safety standards despite their best intentions. Government
regulation protects the public and operators alike, but needs to
achieve a balance of acceptability.
The World Health Organisation (WHO) provides standardised
classifications for mortality and morbidity, the science of
nosology. The WHO International Classification of Diseases defines
a transport accident as 'any accident involving a device primarily
for, or being used at the time primarily for, conveying persons or
goods from one place to another' (BTCE 1992, 89). This provides a
basis for statistical analysis of transport accident records, but
before doing so, readers should take caution before drawing
immediate conclusions.
Different measures of risk can sometimes provide quite different
impressions. As an example, the number of accidental deaths per
million tons of coal mined in the United States has decreased
steadily over time, indicating a safer industry. However, the rate
of accidents per one thousand coal-mine employees has increased
over the same time (Mayo & Hollander 1991, 52). Mortality rates
also fail to reflect the fact that some hazards cause death at much
earlier ages than do others. In this regard, the fatality
statistics shown for a range of activities in Table 1 should not be
viewed as the last word. Nonetheless, they provide a guide to
relative risks, in this case in the United States. Another way of
viewing this matter is to calculate the average loss of life
expectancy due to the exposure to the hazard based on deaths
distributed as a function of age. Table 1 also shows these figures.
An indication of uncertainty in these assessments as well as the
costs and benefits of available options would be useful for more
balanced assessments. Nonetheless Table 1 holds few surprises.
Table 1. Mortality due to risk
in the United States
Risk category Fatality rate Days of life
per 100 000 people lost per person
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Motorcycling 2000
Aerial acrobatics 500
Smoking (all causes) 300 2250
Parachuting 200
Smoking (cancer) 120 980
Firefighting 80 300
Hang gliding 80
Coal mining 63 1100
Farming 36
Motor vehicle accident 24 207
Police work 22
Boating 5
Rodeo performer 3
Hunting 3
Fires 2.8
Marine accident 0.08
Aircraft accident 0.075
Floods 0.06
Lightning 0.05
Rail accident 0.051
Meteorite 0.000006
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources Mayo & Hollander 1991, p.53; Sabey & Taylor 1980.
While some accidents kill only one person at a time, others can
kill hundreds or more at once. In this sense, air crashes are
infrequent and high consequence events compared with frequent and
perceived lower consequence events in which single individuals die
each time. People may view infrequent hazards as unlikely but their
effects may be much more devastating. As an example, if a comet or
fragment hit the Earth, the immediate and long-term effects on the
planet would be extensive and immutable. Yet few people can
conceive of this event, despite the fact that just such an incident
apparently wiped out the dinosaurs in the past and is predicted to
occur again.
The social cost of transport accidents in Australia, including
road, rail, aviation and marine events, includes the costs of lost
earnings, foregone contributions, pain and suffering, property
damage, insurance administration, delays, medical and legal
expenses and accident investigation. A conservative estimate of the
cost to Australian society of transport accidents in 1988 was $6.6
billion (BTCE 1992, xiii). Of this, road accidents contributed $6.1
billion, aviation $64 million, rail $94 million and sea $264
million. The largest cost components were property damage of $2
billion, pain and suffering at $1.4 billion and lost earnings of $1
billion.
Table 2 provides the latest updates of these cost estimates
showing that both accident rates and costs have declined in all
categories except for marine accidents. Surface transport data
shows that, of the total domestic freight task of 266 billion tonne
kilometres, road takes 34 per cent, rail 29 per cent and sea 36 per
cent. Later discussion will consider each of these transport mode
categories in turn.
Table 2. Costs of Accidents in
Australia
Accident type Person
and year fatalities Person Injury (Numbers) Cost to the Community
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hospital Medical Minor Nominal($m) 1993($m)
--------------------------- ----------------------
1988 Air 70 44 55 461 64.0 80
1993 Air 67 57 64 438 76.0 76
1988 Rail 96 154 61 1111 94.5 120
1993 Rail 49 88 113 488 69.0 69
1988 Road 2875 25187 71760 83291 6100.0 7746
1993 Road 1732 17000+ 47000+ n.a. 6100.0+ 6100
1988 Sea 69 680 264.0 318
1993 Sea 73 901 316.0 316
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources BTCE 1994, 1995a, 1995c, 1995d.
A maximum value on safety expenditure may be equivalent to the
Value of Life (VoL) or the amount of money society is prepared to
spend to avoid a single fatality. British Rail (Railtrack)
currently places a value of $4 million on VoL while the United
Kingdom Department of Transport places a value of only $1.5 million
on VoL (ibid, 13). In considering remedial measures to improve
transport safety such agencies may also consider other risks such
as environmental effects, business success, economic changes and
political implications. Note that some people criticise the
valuation of life and injury done in this way.
The affordable safety argument concerns the appropriate
manufacturing standards for transport vehicles and the cost benefit
analysis of manufacture, operation and maintenance. If the costs of
imposing safety standards are too high, fewer people will travel
due to higher charges and more people may use less safe transport.
This is a matter of assessing the relative safety of some transport
vehicles compared to others, based on safety resource allocation.
The following section discusses cost benefit analysis before
turning to risk management practices that ensure a logical flow of
resources among modes and activities.
Cost benefit analysis (CBA) provides a framework in which risk
evaluators can make rational decisions about alternative options in
a consistent manner. CBA involves quantification and possible
valuation of the costs and benefits associated with various options
and the estimation of the present value of their net benefits
spread over time. The costs and benefits are those that society
bears and include time savings, safety and environmental effects
even though these may have no identifiable market price (Spiro
& Parfitt 1995, 215). CBA helps decision makers establish
whether the expected benefits of a scheme justify the costs and to
deploy resources in a way that maximises net benefits.
Public sector investment decisions often utilise CBA, such as in
road investments in which safety-related benefits and costs arise.
CBA has also arisen in road safety schemes such as the compulsory
wearing of seat-belts. However, other modes have not often utilised
such economic safety appraisal techniques although safety
authorities in the USA and Canada have used CBA. It provides better
definition of objectives, options, costs and benefits but involves
problems of estimating risks, the value of life, human and accident
factors (ibid, 217).
The costs of measures to prevent or ameliorate the consequences
of accidents include:
- Industry: capital equipment costs, operating costs, reduced
revenue, extra training and lost time; and
- Government: administrative costs, support equipment costs,
enforcement and research expenses.
The potential benefits from safety measures include (Spiro &
Parfitt 1995, 218):
- Individuals: reduction of risk (willingness-to-pay), savings in
expenses, health impacts, VoL;
- Property: reduction in unit loss and damage, avoidance of
damage to installations and cargo;
- Users: reduced delays, avoiding loss of commercial reputation
(plus national image); and
- Environmental: cleanup savings, damage repair, industry
effects, values placed on amenity, etc.
Arguments about safety are often actually about risk management.
Such a case arises in the study of simultaneous independent
operations on intersecting runways at Sydney Airport (SSC 1995,
E13). The study found that accidents arise under any airport
operating mode and so air traffic controllers must include safety
margins according to the chosen mode of operation. The real issue
is one of relative safety or hazard risk. Risk is the probability
or likelihood of a hazard accident event happening, multiplied by
its consequences. This is a measurable quantity when there are
numerous well-documented instances of the adverse consequences of
an event and with a well-defined exposed population. However, risk
is not so easily ascertained in the case of high consequence,
low-probability events where estimates become uncertain or
misunderstood by the public.
Risk management means considering the potential for accidents to
occur, as well as their individual cost and severity (Hyndman et
al. 1994, 133). It may be a set of formal methods and procedures
used to advance safety, through systematic analysis of occurrences
and their cause and effect relationships. Risk management provides
a framework for assessing large amounts of data and allocation of
limited resources for review (ibid, 42) by CBA methods. CBA
provides a range of outcomes within risk and sensitivity analysis
considerations. It may also be necessary to add the level of public
outrage to risk analyses.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment, also known as Quantified Risk
Assessment, is a tool used for measuring the relative degree of
safety risks resulting from a particular mode of activity or
operation within an industry. It involves risk analysis
(identification and probabilities), risk evaluation (impacts) and
risk control (measures). Risk analysis involves inspection,
brainstorming or more structured hazard identification techniques
(Atkinson & Hinds 1995, 7) such as safety audits. Risk
evaluation uses CBA and decision analysis to estimate expected
value of outcomes for further sensitivity analysis. Out of these
calculations arise risk control strategies that involve quality
assurance type practices.
Such risk management aims to reduce risks and increase safety at
a practical level, given the resources and constraints involved,
when balanced with the costs of accidents. Fundamental to safety
regulation is the principle that risks should be reduced "as low as
reasonably practicable" (ibid, 12). A risk reduction
measure that involves a grossly disproportionate expenditure in
relation to the risk is not reasonably practicable or for that
matter acceptable. Zero risk inferred by absolute safety is usually
not achievable or affordable. A practical guide to safety
management measures by mode is of interest here, especially as
public familiarity with transport systems directly influences their
operation.
A safety factor common to all transport modes is the danger of
collision with other vehicles. Each mode has traditionally adopted
different ways of dealing with this problem, but common approaches
may also be possible, as illustrated by a familiar example. While
there was a time when our roads carried generally courteous drivers
of predictable behaviour, these days it seems to be a general
free-for-all. Witness the ever present drag-off from the traffic
lights, between 'competing' cars, until they meet again at the next
light, for example, or the prevalence of impatient tail-gaters and
drivers who change lanes at every opportunity, in a ceaseless quest
to be in front of others.
One way to counter this aggressive, unsafe behaviour would be
for compulsory installation of collision avoidance equipment that
would require cars to keep a set distance behind each other
according to the 'two second' rule. This useful guide allows two
seconds to lapse between consecutive vehicles past a set point
regardless of the speed of vehicles. A two second period allows
sufficient time for following vehicles to stop behind leading ones.
Any collision avoidance equipment would require an advanced
computer control system in order to judge speeds, calculate
changing distances and monitor vehicle engines. It would have to
reject driver instructions to follow at closer distances and yet
maintain safety at the same time. Just such intelligent automatic
vehicle control systems are in development under advanced highway
management studies.
Traffic alert and collision avoidance systems are already used
by large jet aircraft to warn pilots of the threat of impending
collision with other planes. They utilise radar detectors and
speakers to alert pilots to the presence of approaching aircraft in
their vicinity. It is left to the pilot though to take corrective
action to avoid collision. Australia's air authorities have decided
that all aircraft with over 30 seats must have collision avoidance
units installed by 1999. Similar systems could just as well apply
to ships and small boats. Many ships utilise radars and collision
warning systems to help avert disasters but few boats have such
units. Given that the majority of maritime accidents involve small
boats possibly the installation of collision avoidance equipment is
a pressing necessity.
However, the installation of such equipment in transport
vehicles requires general community acceptance of the need and cost
of such measures, plus a willingness for government agencies to
regulate, monitor and enforce them for each mode. Such a change in
attitude came about when the compulsory wearing of vehicle
seatbelts began in response to road carnage. An interim step may be
for say a police crackdown on dangerous road behaviour or greater
supervised pilotage of vessels, but at a cost to the transport
system. The next few sections cover each of the transport modes in
turn. They provide a comparison of modal safety approaches used in
Australia, commencing with aviation.
Over the decades, the frequency and length of airline flights
has grown enormously while the fatalities per passenger kilometre
have dropped just as dramatically. Besides the strong industry
interest in fostering air safety are the structural conditions that
foster safety, such as the fact that political and financial elites
often fly, along with the importance of past experience (Perrow
1984, 127). With extensive experience and considerable government
support the industry has been able to maximise its approach to
safety. However this has not necessarily led to even safer
practices and noteworthy, horrific air crashes still occur.
More and more aircraft now fly faster than before often in poor
weather and with limited fuel, through the use of automated
systems. These have increased operational effectiveness but not
really reduced crew workloads. Human error remains the largest
problem while aviation equipment has built-in safety, redundancy
and sensitivity to human factors. Other aircraft movements compound
the complexity of aircraft operation. Air traffic control has to
judge proper separation sometimes without total information. This
ground control actually has two conflicting functions of assuring
safety and expediting passenger service.
There are several international practices which influence
transportation safety. These range from formal multilateral
conventions in the air and marine modes to bilateral or national
industry and government co-operation for specific sectors (Hyndman
et al. 1994, 12). The 1944 Chicago Convention recognises the
general principle that the regulation of air safety is the primary
responsibility of the country of registry. Current international
aircraft accident investigation regimes stem from Article 26 of the
Chicago Convention that establishes certain obligations on a
country, where an accident occurs, to analyse it. The 1951 Council
of International Civil Aviation Organisation issued an Annexe 13 to
the Convention to set out recommended procedures for investigating
aircraft accidents. Even so, the increasing complexity of the
industry challenges national regulators to keep pace.
In 1995, with an upward trend worldwide, there were just over 1
200 deaths in around 57 fatal major airline accidents globally. Of
these, 589 people died in nine fatal accidents on scheduled
jet-powered airline flights. There were 365 fatalities in nine
accidents involving non-scheduled passenger aircraft. Regional and
commuter airlines suffered 24 fatal accidents in which a total of
219 people died, while 15 accidents to cargo flights accounted for
42 aircrew deaths (Learmount 1996, 24). The majority of these
crashes resulted from aircrew error. Note that these figures
exclude greater numbers of general aviation accidents.
In Australia, 320 aviation accidents in 1993 cost the community
$76 million, or $237 500 per accident. Figure 1 shows our aviation
accidents over recent years. The average cost of the 36 major
airline and general aviation fatal accidents in 1993 was about $1.6
million, while the non fatal ones cost around $70 000 each (HORSC
1995a, 19). The total costs of fatal accidents of fare paying
passengers on low capacity regular airline and charter is estimated
as $8 million.
Figure 1. Australian Civil
Aircraft Accidents
Note: Civil Aircraft Accidents includes charter,
agricultural, training, survey, private, business and low capacity
regular public transport (airline) aviation incidents.
Source HORSC 1995a, p. 32.
Our relatively low accident rate reflects the relatively good
weather conditions, flat topography and uncongested air routes
found across Australia, when compared with northern nations.
However it could still improve as air accident rates are affected
by many factors including weather, equipment failure, system
failure, human error and failure of ground aids (CASA 1995, 16).
Accident rates and trends are a measure of the total system
performance including aircraft operators, maintenance,
manufacturers, airport operators, search and rescue, meteorology
services and private participants.
Many aviation industry players are active in air safety work.
These include airlines, aircraft operators, pilots and their
various associations. Also involved are manufacturers, aviation
maintenance agencies and the respective unions. It would seem that
the only level of acceptable air safety to them is for no accidents
to occur at all. In Australia until 1992, the Commonwealth directly
assumed financial responsibility for public interest air safety
regulation, but now the administrative arrangements and funding
have changed. A tripartite arrangement manages provision of safe
aviation services as now described.
The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has the mission to
maintain, enhance and promote the safety of civil aviation in
Australia, through effective safety regulation and by encouraging a
greater acceptance by industry of its obligation to maintain high
safety standards (CASA 1995, 5). It intends to achieve these goals
by means including:
- developing and promulgating appropriate, clear and concise
aviation safety standards;
- developing effective enforcement strategies to secure
compliance with aviation safety standards;
- issuing certificates, licences, registrations and permits;
- conducting comprehensive aviation industry surveillance,
particularly safety related matters; and
- conducting regular and timely assessment of international
safety developments.
The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI) is responsible for
investigating accidents and incidents involving civil aircraft
operations in Australia. BASI activities focus on promoting safe
aviation, with particular interest in fare-paying passenger
operations, by examining selected occurrences and safety
deficiencies (DOT 1995, 20). With an annual budget of $6.7 million,
BASI has 80 staff and publishes regular reports and
information.
The safety of air navigation is the most important consideration
of AirServices Australia (ASA). The principal activities of ASA
cover airspace management, air traffic control, traffic and flight
information, search and rescue, navigation services, aeronautical
information, rescue and firefighting, as well as environment
monitoring (ASA 1995, 4). A special ASA project is implementation
of The Australian Advanced Air Traffic System due for completion in
early 1998. The system will enable ASA to manage all enroute
services from two centres at Brisbane and Melbourne. ASA is
developing a risk analysis model to determine risk levels
associated with current and proposed methods of managing Australian
airspace, as part of its airway's safety work. It has a target to
reduce air traffic incidents per 100 000 aircraft movements from
over six in 1994/95 to below four in the short term, and
progressively decrease them to nil (ASA 1995, 69).
The mission of the Federal Airports Corporation (FAC) is to
provide world class airport services to Australia. The FAC owns 22
primary, regional and general aviation airports across Australia
but not all such facilities found here. In its operation of
airports, the FAC has a goal to have due regard for ensuring safe
practices in airports at all times.
In the United States a policy goal of zero aircraft accidents is
a shared responsibility of government, industry and labour
organisations as well as each individual member of the aviation
community (HORSC 1995a, 13). Despite airline deregulation the
aggregate safety performance of the industry has remained exemplary
although accident rates may rise with poor airline financial
performance (ibid, 54). Ongoing safety concerns arise from the
financial pressure on firms, new entrants, customer shifts and
congestion (Moses & Savage 1989, 6). The emergence of the hub
travel system that channels all flights through central hub
airports for passenger transport has offered cost economies to
airlines. Overall, people travel more safely now, although on
certain lower traffic routes safety has declined on small craft,
while hub congestion is also a concern (ibid, 310-3).
The case of Canada serves as an interesting counterpoint to
Australia's difficulties in air safety administration. Until 1989,
the Canadian Aviation Safety Board (CASB) continued to report to
Parliament through the Minister of Transport. Following a major air
crash in 1985, the "CASB's credibility was so seriously compromised
by internal disputes that it was effectively destroyed as a public
agency"(Hyndman et al. 1994, 5). New arrangements then prevailed in
much the same way that Australia now has two bodies CASA and
ASA.
In essence, where the investigative agency is part of the
regulatory authority or transport department, there is a potential
for conflict of interest that casts a shadow on credibility. In the
Canadian view, the most important element of a successful air
safety agency is not written in law or administrative structure but
is simply a desire for all parties to work together in a
professional manner with compromise and cooperation (ibid, 9). Such
a lesson is important for us to observe given our recent crisis in
air safety administration.
The impact of government on Australian air safety has been the
subject of a Parliamentary inquiry that may continue. This inquiry
has not found evidence of any deterioration in overall air safety,
except for the charter flights sector. The report proposes
mandatory reporting of charter airline safety records, noting that
major airline safety resource allocation in Australia exceeds the
standard requirements. The report does propose the following
characteristics of a world best practice regulator of aviation
safety (HORSC 1995a, 9):
- legislation that assists the regulator to perform its tasks
effectively;
- clear articulation of the objectives of regulation, strategies
and performance indicators;
- special emphasis on aviation safety indicators (currently
lacking here - HORSC 1995a, 125);
- adequate information and knowledge of the aviation industry and
especially safety aspects;
- processes that can develop a good working relationship within
the air transport industry;
- a cohesive organisation of adequately trained and skilled
personnel with effective leadership; and
- adequate processes and skills in developing effective safety
standards and ensuring compliance with an effective system of
accountability.
Aviation is a highly technical and regulated industry that tends
to seek out the leading advances in technological progress. With
the move towards automated air traffic control systems, collision
avoidance equipment, advanced meteorological and navigational
information systems and other innovations, safety levels should
improve further. However this still depends on proper training,
regulation and enforcement controls. All of the main regulatory
agencies must perform appropriate CBA and risk management
studies.
Safety improvements for the airline industry could possibly
include a range of measures. They might restrict private aircraft
operation in the vicinity of congested main hub airports or charge
landing, congestion and control fees because airports are scarce
economic resources. Further measures could include a ticket tax for
government investment in safety and an increase in the numbers and
training level of air traffic controllers (Moses & Savage 1989,
316-20). Other techniques might police the sale of second-hand
aircraft spare parts to ensure their quality and also install
collision avoidance warning systems on all aircraft. Overall it
appears that for aviation a suitable goal for acceptable safety is
for zero accidents, despite the costs involved. At least this is
the goal of most agencies involved in the aviation industry. Given
that this sector remains under tight national control such a goal
appears achievable. This is certainly not the case as yet for the
land transport sector.
People associate road accidents with a common activity that
almost everyone needs so their perception of risk is often not
recognised until they are personally affected (Sabey & Taylor
1980, 44). Accordingly, the concept of "acceptable risk" has not
applied globally to road safety so that formal target setting lacks
wide adoption. While we consider road safety risks mostly in
relation to the community as a whole, it is the risks as seen by
individuals which frequently determine the successful outcome of
countermeasures (ibid, 46). Compounding this problem is the
perceived low risk to individuals of accident and injury involved
while accidents present a major problem to the community as a
whole.
Road accidents remain a major cause of death in many countries,
with around 400 000 people dying from them around the world every
year (OECD 1994b, 9). The world's lowest death rates per
hundred-million vehicle kilometres are 1.2 in the United States and
1.1 in the United Kingdom, with Australia close by at about 1.4
(Winter 1996). Figure 2 shows world road accident trends per 100
000 population and suggests that Australia has a reasonable
ranking. Here, death rates are generally higher in rural areas,
although there is variation between states. In OECD countries,
about one to two per cent of gross national product is lost
annually due to road accidents (Zaal 1994, i). Road deaths account
for almost 15 per cent of years of productive life lost by all
causes, excluding disability injury, in Australia (FORS 1992, 1).
In Australia, for each road fatality there are over ten serious
injuries which means that every year some 20 000 people require
hospitalisation (ibid, 7).
Figure 2. Road Accident
Fatalities per 100 000 Population in Selected
Countries
Source Winter 1996, p.1 (per FORS).
Factors contributing to road accidents comes mainly from the
user, secondly from the road environment and finally from the
vehicle. The road user factors contributing to accidents arise
chiefly from poor execution (speed, following distance, behaviour),
perceptual errors (judgement), impairment or lack of skill. Adverse
environment features include poor road design, conditions, bad
markings or obstructions. Vehicle factors primarily relate to
tyres, brakes, steering or lights (Sabey & Taylor 1980, 51-53).
The risk of injury stems from inadequate vehicle occupant
protection and absence of protection for pedestrians and cyclists.
Road safety targets assist agencies to achieve realistic programs,
usually involving a small percentage reduction in accident fatality
or casualty rates over several years. Agencies use prevention
strategies of environment or engineering solutions, education and
enforcement.
While road traffic accidents have to an extent been acceptable
to the community in the past there are signs that unrestricted
vehicle usage is no longer an end in itself, partly for social
reasons. A trend of generally decreasing road accident rates over
recent decades has now begun to stall. It is becoming increasingly
difficult to further reduce the number of fatalities and casualties
in highly motorised countries (OECD 1994b, 9). In the twelve months
to June 1994, the Australian road toll was 6.5% higher than for the
same period in 1993 (NRTAC 1995, 5). The 1995 national toll was 4%
higher than in 1994 (FORS 1996).
In Australia, road safety administration falls under the
province of many agencies. The Federal Office of Road Safety (FORS)
and State traffic authorities have planning responsibility linked
to the National Road Trauma Advisory Council and the Road Safety
Council. FORS guides the development of measures to reduce the
incidence and severity of road crashes and maintains an extensive
accident database. It develops standards, policies and road safety
public education programs to improve the safety of road users and
administers motor vehicle standards for safety, emissions and noise
levels (DOT 1995, 35). FORS has around 90 staff and an annual
budget of $7.7 million plus safety program running costs. Among
other organisations interested in road safety are motoring bodies,
police, vehicle manufacturers, community groups and commercial
transport operators.
The 1992 National Road Safety Strategy and 1994 National Road
Safety Action Plan are a package of measures that provides a
framework for local plans and ongoing monitoring. The Strategy is
the first national approach by all levels of government as well as
industry and community groups to reduce the road toll. The Strategy
involves agency coordination, commitment, cost-effective
prioritisation plus research and development (FORS 1992, 1).
Victoria and New South Wales have already formally set respective
goals for 30 per cent and 25 per cent reductions in the road toll
by the year 2000. The National Strategy aims to reduce annual road
deaths per 100 000 people to below 10 by the year 2001. Key
priorities include alcohol and drug abuse, speeding, vehicle
occupant protection, driver fatigue, road hazards, heavy vehicles,
novice drivers and riders, plus improved trauma management. The
Action Plan involves development of codes of safety, road audits,
alcohol and drug use programs, driver education and training
measures involving police, schools and traffic agencies. Safety
audits have resulted in changes to road design standards and
processes.
Separate national road safety programs include the National
Bicycle Strategy and the Black Spots Program. The latter $270
million Program operated from 1990-91 to 1992-93 and involved 3 176
sites. The decrease in injury crashes at sample Program sites was
over two-and-a-half times similar locations, with fatalities
falling by one-third (BTCE 1995b, xix). A Program CBA estimate of
3.9 for the overall schedule of acceptable treatments, shows a
level of good targeted returns. The Bicycle Strategy is under
implementation. Other road safety policy recommendations include
(Moses & Savage 1989, 327-9):
- through inspections, identify hazardous zones and time periods
to enable road improvements;
- establish a central computer inventory of accidents, safety
violations and property damage; and
- evaluate speed limit monitoring programs and impose better law
enforcement and penalties.
It appears that traffic law enforcement requires increased
surveillance levels and penalties. Automated enforcement devices
provide the most cost-effective means (Zaal 1994, ii) and include
speed cameras, red light cameras plus vehicle alcohol and seat belt
use detectors. However, more work could be performed in the area of
risk management and CBA.
Various user, vehicle and road programs can help to reduce road
accidents and injuries. Authorities can impose regulations on users
such as drinking restrictions, speed limits and can apply more
enforcement, public education, training and legislation.
Requirements for vehicle maintenance, tyre and brake standards are
feasible. Road geometry, surfaces, lighting and traffic management
may also assist, especially with a community expectation of traffic
calming and public transport measures along with integrated
transport and land use planning strategies. It is not clear where
limits apply; for instance, if a speed limit of 40 kilometres per
hour applied in cities, fewer people would die, but traffic delays
and public outrage would grow. Again, restricting car use to people
over 25 years old may lower the road toll substantially but
alienate part of the community.
How safe is safe enough is a very real question though and
challenges attitudes to risk. There may exist a tendency, at
political levels or by ordinary road users to put forward attitude
problems as the underlying reason for accident occurrence (OECD
1994a, 11). This may neglect the appropriate remedies of an often
complicated or expensive nature or that require full responsibility
be taken by individual road users. Motivating road users as well as
long term behavioural work is important. More draconian measures,
such as fixing transponders on all cars to monitor their routes and
speeds, requires wide public debate. The community recognises
speed, alcohol use and driver fatigue as major safety concerns.
New programs combining ergonomic and engineering approaches are
attempting to improve road safety, transport efficiency and
environmental quality. Accepting the reality of human factor
accident causation, this approach emphasises prevention or
reduction in injuries, while not restraining personal freedom.
Intelligent Transport Systems and automatic traffic control systems
may affect this freedom by providing driver information and
monitoring their performance. Such systems support may assist
driver detection and assessment of road hazards and provide
guidance to deal with specific hazards (Brookhuis & Brown 1992,
38). However, anyone who goes driving must accept that they face a
risk of death higher than by taking a plane, bus, train or even
walking instead.
Unlike the road sector, rail transport involves both public and
private operators providing the basic infrastructure and transport
units. An Intergovernmental Agreement on Rail Safety between the
Commonwealth and all States and Territories came into effect in
1995. It aims to establish a nationally consistent approach to rail
safety including the accreditation of rail owners and operators,
development of uniform technical and operating standards, together
with greater accountability and safety. In the event of a serious
accident, the owner or operator may request the appointment of an
independent investigator for a formal Board of Inquiry, independent
of any Coronial Inquiry or operator investigation. Given the open
access now available to rail infrastructure, nothing less than a
national approach to rail safety is adequate to ensure seamless
utilisation across States.
A significant new operator, the National Rail Corporation
Limited (NRC) has a mission to provide competitive, profitable and
commercially sustainable rail freight transport services in
Australia. A principal aim in establishing NRC in 1991/92 was to
reform the interstate rail freight business to provide world-class
levels of customer services and eliminate publicly funded losses
(NRC 1995, 16). A new organisation, Track Australia, should have
responsibility for providing interstate rail infrastructure access,
maintenance and control. Both organisations coexist with state and
private rail authorities with a mission to increase rail freight
usage. If rail captured the entire intercity freight growth by
2016, the road toll would drop by only 0.3 per cent (NTPT 1994,
27). Rail accidents average 100 annually.
An executive-level Risk and Safety Committee began in 1995 to
assist in giving direction to the management of safety for NRC. The
requirement for safety accreditation is a condition for operations
in a number of States. An independent standards organisation
performed a safety audit of NRC in 1995 to determine that its
operations were safe. The recent completion of the new
Inter-governmental Agreement on Rail Safety accreditation, together
with supporting Australian standards for rail equipment and
operations, should establish a framework for mutual recognition of
accreditation between states (NRC 1995, 21). There is no
international, national or uniform State based reporting system for
railway accidents so rail bodies generally compile data for their
own purposes (BTCE 1992, 51).
Proper risk management focuses on safety risk rather than
monitoring incidents. Railways tend to follow a set of recommended
practices governing design and maintenance of equipment. However,
new rail safety regulations in New South Wales took effect in late
1993 and have received wide acceptance by other State and Federal
rail authorities. The regulations cover matters of operations,
rolling stock, the environment, infrastructure and administration.
Rail authorities perform hazard safety audits and risk analysis. It
would seem then that they believe that no accidents are acceptable
in their industry, regardless of the cost and, given the low
prevailing rate of incidents, such a goal is not unreasonable.
Marine accidents include collisions, groundings and explosions
and have not decreased in recent times. New technology has raised
production pressures to increase efficiency but not safety (Perrow
1984, 171). Much of the marine system is of low status, unorganised
and unregulated so that improvements are slow. Maritime accidents
and injuries span a wide variety of vessel types and situations
ranging from ship sinkings to small dinghy damage. Most events
arise from operator error, particularly by the captain, production
pressures and nature itself. While incidents are common,
manoeuvring to avoid accident is usually possible. Nationwide,
there is an annual average of around 1 000 marine accidents
involving serious injury or death on boats or ships. Worldwide, in
1994 some 118 ships and 1478 lives were lost at sea (HORSC 1995b,
2) as shown in Figure 3. Figure 4 presents figures for Australia
that also include small craft accidents and show a growing
trend.
Australia has had problems with safety levels on foreign ships
calling here. Some vessels, particularly bulk carriers, have sunk
in our waters and/or have damaged our environment. Some ships are
actually unseaworthy, others have poorly trained and managed crews
and many have poor safety equipment or standards (HORSC 1992, ix).
The major factor affecting this state of affairs is commercial
pressure on ship operations and ships' masters, smaller crews,
ageing vessels and multi-national crewing practices. This requires
international pressure and cooperation to remedy, especially given
the peculiar nature of an industry that has its operators subject
directly to market forces around the world.
Through the operation of worldwide conventions, the
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) influences the
construction and operation of vessels, but the enforcement of
operating standards rests generally with the flag state. The IMO
International Safety Management Code requires shipowners to
establish and operate a safety management system. The International
Labour Organisation has various conventions for preventing
shipboard accidents and encouraging occupational health and safety.
The Organisation's Convention 147 came into force in 1981 to
require signatories to establish laws setting minimal international
crew standards.
Figure 3. Total Shipping
Casualties and Incidents 1990-1994
Source AMSA 1995, p. 5; HORSC 1995b, p.2.
Figure 4. Australian Maritime
Accident Casualties 1988 & 1993
Source BTCE 1995d.
The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) is a mainly
self-funded safety agency with the charter of enhancing efficiency
in the delivery of safety and other services to the maritime
industry sector. AMSA has six key areas of operation (AMSA 1995,
6):
- Navigational Services: provision of marine navigation aids
network and navigation safety policy;
- Ship and Personnel Safety Services: survey and certification of
ships, safety standards, inspection of foreign ships, safe handling
of seaborne cargo and qualification of seafarers;
- Maritime Safety Services: coordination of marine search and
rescue through the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, operation
of the Australian Ship Reporting System, operation of the
"COSPAS/SARSAT" satellite ship distress system and safety
communications;
- Marine Environment Protection Services: provision of planning
and response capability appropriate to the threat of marine
pollution from shipping in the Australian region;
- Strategic Development: corporate and strategic planning, the
secretariat for Australia's involvement in world maritime forums,
legal, public relation or sea safety marketing; and
- Corporate and Commercial Services: provision of financial
management, staff resources, information technology systems,
property services, ship registration and crew employment services,
to support all of the above.
AMSA's role is crucial in conducting port inspections and
promoting ship safety at an international level. Lack of compliance
with international convention requirements by some flag states is a
major ship safety problem (HORSC 1994, ix). In 1994, AMSA detained
some 123 ships following inspections for rectification of mainly
minor but important safety problems. Technical support for sea
safety, such as collision avoidance systems, would seem to play a
secondary role to human and administrative factors.
The Department of Transport and Regional Development Marine
Incident Investigation Unit (MIIU) investigates marine incidents as
defined by the Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations.
These include injury or death aboard ships, ship loss, fires,
collisions, groundings or disabling, ship damage and serious damage
to the environment. Headed by the Inspector of Marine Accidents,
the MIIU publishes reports of its investigations to determine risk
factors, effective procedures and proper management for the future.
The MIIU has five staff and may convene a Board of Marine Inquiry
or special investigation. In 1994-95, the MIIU investigated and
reported on 12 marine accidents (DOT 1995, 52).
Appropriate risk management is the task of vessel owners and
operators in conjunction with maritime safety authorities. AMSA
itself is completing a risk management manual but it is not clear
as to what extent the organisation can encourage similar work among
ship operators. There are no direct safety parameters listed among
AMSA's performance indicators. Therefore it appears that the
shipping industry accepts losses to a certain extent and operates
accordingly (HORSC 1995b, vii). Until greater regulatory and
insurance pressures prevail on the maritime industry the level of
acceptable safety is not very high.
In one sense, safety is an economic and social good involving
the use of scarce resources, so that higher safety levels are only
achievable through additional expenditures. Optimal allocation of
the safety resource involves a balance between the level of desired
safety and the means to achieve it at minimum social and economic
cost (BTCE 1992, 71). Government involvement in safety provision
and regulation can potentially improve social welfare but questions
remain of resource allocation, modal share, balancing fatalities to
serious injuries and so forth. A means to improve government action
in risk management and prevention is to improve its involvement in
transport accident study and reporting.
An examination of overseas practice is instructive in this
regard and in particular the administrative structures for
independent examination of accidents for all transport modes. An
ad-hoc arrangement for safety investigation between transport modes
has prevailed in Australia, as previously described, in contrast to
Canada and the United States where unified multi-modal transport
safety agencies investigate all types of accidents, except road,
under the one administrative structure. Australia has followed
British practice instead, as outlined below.
In the above countries, road accident investigation tends to
remain with local authorities or police, rather than having a
coordinated national analytical effort towards determining trends.
Note too that in some countries, pipeline safety comes under the
jurisdiction of transportation safety agencies. In Australia, the
Pipeline Authority constructs and maintains major installations
with a view to creating a national integrated system. As a
commercial enterprise, its role includes securing the safety,
health and welfare of persons engaged in operations. The Authority
reports to the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy and the
Minister for Resources and Energy. Many other pipeline
installations are not subject to such controls but they often do
have harmonised standards and practices.
The Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and
Safety Board Act of 1990 established an independent
multi-modal agency known as the Transportation Safety Board of
Canada (TSBC). Reporting annually to Parliament the TSBC acts to
advance transportation safety by conducting independent
investigation and studies in order to publicly identify safety
deficiencies. As an independent agency, the TSBC has a different
perspective from the regulatory agencies such as Transport Canada,
the National Transportation Agency and the National Energy Board.
They were formerly responsible for accident investigation in the
marine, rail and commodity pipeline modes of transport.
The TSBC has a Board, Executive Director, Corporate Services
Branch, a Safety Analysis and Communications Directorate and an
Investigations Operations Directorate. The latter has Branches to
investigate marine, air, rail and commodity pipeline incidents. It
also has engineering and medicine sections. The other Directorate
handles accident prevention, statistics, human performance and
communications. The TSBC provides safety recommendations, advice
and information letters. The TSBC has an annual budget of around
A$27 million and some 300 staff. The TSBC has adopted most of the
Canadian Aviation Safety Board (CASB) structure and processes for
its new organisation. Staff from other modal safety agencies
essentially shifted into a new administrative structure identical
to the CASB, though not without difficulties (Hyndman et al. 1994,
132). While the Canadian accident rates for marine, air, pipe and
rail generally declined from 1990, they rose slightly in 1994 to
reach 3 849 occurrences (TSBC 1994, 5).
A Review Commission of the TSBC confirmed the validity of
Canada's approach to ensuring sound accident investigation based on
the existence of an independent and multi-modal accident
investigation agency. The merit of this approach to accident
investigation was subject to long debate as such an integrated
approach is not universally accepted (ibid, 4). Professionals
working with specific modes tend to regard their perspective as
unique and resist the notion of integrated accident research. The
Canadian Parliament foresaw modal integration as a way to recognise
that all modes deserve equal treatment and shared technical
resources. However, the Review Commission notes with concern that
the TSBC still lacks the power to investigate highway and boating
accidents (ibid, xv-xvi).
In France, two separate agencies handle marine and air accident
investigations. For marine matters, the Secretariat d'Etat de la
Mer (SEM) is the responsible agency, while for aviation incidents,
the Bureau Enquetes-Accidents (BEA) is the relevant body.
The Transport Accident Investigation Commission determines the
circumstances and causes of accidents and incidents to help avoid
similar future occurrences. It has existed within the Ministry of
Transport since 1990 with annual funding of about NZ$1.3 million.
The separate Land Transport Safety Authority has since 1993 been
the chief adviser on road and rail safety, but also, among its many
activities, issues driver and operator licences and sets road and
rail safety standards. It has around 230 staff and an annual budget
allocation of about NZ$19 million, excluding funding for land
transport initiatives.
In Sweden, the Statens Haveri Kommission (SHK) investigates
accident matters for all modes including road if the nature of the
occurrence warrants it. All investigations and files are open to
the public although there is no provision for public inquiry.
Safety investigation in the United Kingdom resembles Australian
practice. Within the Department of Transport separate Directorates
administer mode policies. The Railways Directorate includes a
Safety Division and the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority. The Road
and Vehicle Safety Directorate has a Road Safety Division. The
Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) is responsible for
investigating accidents involving British ships, passengers and
crews worldwide, and other ships in local waters. The separate
Marine Safety Agency manages the implementation of marine safety
strategy and the prevention of ship pollution. The Air Accidents
Investigation Branch (AAIB) examines civil aviation incidents and
provides technical assistance to the Ministry of Defence.
The United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
exists to improve safety by investigating accidents, whether
aviation, highway, railroad, marine or pipeline in order to
determine the probable and contributing causes. It does not
establish legal blame. Established in 1975, the NTSB issues
advisory reports and safety recommendations as a completely
independent government agency. However, regulations prohibit its
intervention into airport and airline security matters, to the
chagrin of some observers (Nader & Smith 1994, 15). The United
States has a separate Office of Pipeline Safety and a
Transportation Safety Institute for education, training and
technical assistance. The NTSB operates through a Managing Director
and Offices of Aviation Safety, Surface Transportation Safety,
Administration as well as Research and Engineering.
Table 3 summarises the major characteristics of accident
investigation institutions in the countries previously mentioned.
Canada, the United States and Sweden have single investigative
agencies that deal with air and marine and other modes. The United
States and Swedish bodies also investigate highway safety. Both the
Canadian and United States agencies submit their reports to bodies
other than the transportation regulator and have separate funding
(Hyndman et al. 1994, 14).
Table 3. Accident investigation
in selected countries
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Australia Canada France Sweden U.K. U.S.A.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agency Title* M:MIIU TSBC M:SEM SHK M:MAIB NTSB
(refer text) A:BASI A:BEA A:AAIB
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Factor
------
Jurisdiction Modal Multi Modal Multi Modal Multi
Autonomous No Yes No Yes No Yes
Full-time Board No Yes No No No Yes
Board Members ad hoc 5 ad hoc none ad hoc 5
Public Inquiries No Yes No No No Yes
Authoriser Minister Board Minister n.a. Secretary Board
Mandatory Report No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Hyndman et al. 1994, 16-17.
* Note: M - marine, A - aviation.
The United Kingdom, Australia and France have developed
mode-specific investigatory institutions that closely link to the
transportation regulator. In a reversal of the Canadian situation
the Australian accident investigators report directly to the
Minister for Transport while the civil aviation authority regulator
is autonomous. Between the North American concept of independence
and the less autonomous operations in other countries is the United
Kingdom where accident reports for both air and marine modes go to
the Secretary of State for decision on whether to make them
public.
Accident investigation authorities in Canada, Sweden, the
Netherlands and the United States have recently concluded an
agreement to share and exchange transportation safety information
under the aegis of the new International Transportation Safety
Association. The European Community has taken the first steps
towards establishing a trans-national accident investigation
entity, while France has studied Canada's TSBC. Australia does not
appear to have a role and involvement in these international
arrangements.
Combining BASI, MIIU, pipeline and rail investigators into one
agency would involve creating an independent Australian
Transportation Safety Board (ATSB). This would unite 100 staff,
excluding efficiencies, with an annual budget of about $9 million
to investigate some 1 300 incidents annually. This compares to the
300 staff and $27 million annual cost of Canada's TSBC that handles
some 3 900 cases each year. Given the annual cost of our air, sea
and rail accidents of around $476 million in 1993, a $9 million
outlay does not seem to be an excessive investment for better
safety. While the TSBC does not undertake road safety investigation
work this could be a task of an ATSB if it incorporated FORS as
well. This would involve absorbing FORS 90 staff and its annual
funding of $8 million.
Australia's overall transport safety standards appear reasonable
but they could still improve. The decline in road accident rates in
particular appears to be stalling, suggesting a need for more
innovative and perhaps even technical programs to help identify and
remedy problem areas. They also suggest a need for wider national
accident investigation strategies utilising risk management
techniques. However, transport modes currently have separate safety
agencies responsible for assessing accident trends and advising on
precautions. These may perform well but it may be possible to
improve their standards still further.
The question remains as to whether existing Australian safety
investigation organisations are effective or not and whether their
outputs are useful. BASI, MIIU and rail investigations vary widely
in their resources, approaches and published reports. Given that
accident rates for their modes have not dramatically improved and
that air and sea safety practices remain of concern to the
community, perhaps a new approach is required. Through the
operation of an efficient multi-modal transport safety agency a
more acceptable level of transport safety may be possible. It would
certainly bear more study.
Australia should consider adoption of its own national transport
safety agency to coordinate independent safety investigations into
all modes of transport. This would help to overcome the current
legacy of competing interests, separate bureaucracies and agencies
serving different modes without overall coordination. An Australian
Transportation Safety Board (ATSB) could also link to similar
multi-modal organisations now emerging in other nations around the
world. A multi-modal approach offers advantages of pooling
specialised resources in areas such as engineering, medicine and
psychology. An ATSB could share the experiences of each transport
mode to increase the effectiveness of investigation and
analysis.
Management of all transport modes together can increase public
confidence that a broad range of skills and experience can be
brought to enhance safety. Integration allows the most efficient
use of limited resources to deal with those safety deficiencies
having the highest risk potential. It is the cost, severity and
frequency of risk exposure that matters to travellers, bystanders
and the industry and not the transport mode involved. Through a
common, consistent approach, evaluation of acceptable transport
safety should become possible and available to the wider
community.
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- AAIB
- Air Accidents Investigation Branch (United Kingdom)
- AMSA
- Australian Maritime Safety Authority
- ASA
- AirServices Australia
- ATSB
- Australian Transportation Safety Board
- BASI
- Bureau of Air Safety Investigation
- BEA
- Bureau Enquetes-Accidents (France)
- CASA
- Civil Aviation Safety Authority
- CASB
- Canadian Aviation Safety Board (Canada)
- CBA
- cost benefit analysis
- FAC
- Federal Airports Corporation
- FORS
- Federal Office of Road Safety
- IMO
- International Maritime Organisation
- MAIB
- Marine Accident Investigation Branch (United Kingdom)
- MIIU
- Marine Incident Investigation Unit
- NRC
- National Rail Corporation Limited
- NTSB
- National Transportation Safety Board (United States)
- SEM
- Secretariat d'Etat de la Mer (France)
- SHK
- Statens Haveri Kommission (Sweden)
- TSBC
- Transportation Safety Board of Canada
- VoL
- Value of Life
- WHO
- World Health Organisation
Acknowledgments
This is to acknowledge the assistance of John Prytz for seeking
out relevant references and the help of Paul Kay for preparing
suitable graphics. Thanks are also due to draft readers Tim Winn,
Geoff Winter, Rod Panter, Dennis James, Ian Ireland, Gary Brown and
Greg Baker for their comments and ideas.
Comments to: web.library@aph.gov.au
Last reviewed 19 July, 2004
by the Parliamentary Library Web Manager
© Commonwealth of Australia