Dr Ravi Tomar
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
Changes in DIFF Rules
The DIFF Debate
Nature of DIFF Allocations
Effectiveness of DIFF
The Cancellation of DIFF
The Development Import Finance Facility (DIFF) has proved to be
one of the most controversial elements of the Australian aid
program, attracting strong criticism and equally strong support. It
is a 'mixed credit' or 'associated financing' scheme which enables
Australian companies to tender competitive contracts for the supply
of Australian goods and services for projects in developing
countries. The DIFF grant, usually equal to 35 per cent of the
value of a contract, is combined with export credit from the Export
Finance Insurance Commission (EFIC) of Austrade to provide a
concessional loan to recipient country.
The DIFF scheme was cancelled following the change of government
in March. Although no formal announcement appears to have been
made, its cancellation was foreshadowed in a pre-election media
release by the then Shadow Treasurer, Peter Costello.(1) Reaction
from various groups with an interest in the aid budget, including
the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA),(2) has been
largely negative. Given the concern that has been generated by the
discontinuation of DIFF, it is likely to remain an issue for some
It can be seen from table one that there has been a steady
decline in Australia's Official Development Assistance (ODA) over
the last decade and that it is currently below the United Nations
target of 0.7 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
In 1995-96, Australia's aid expenditure is forecast to be
$1563.2 million, an increase of about $83 million over the 1994-95
outlay. In real terms this represents a growth of 1.8 per cent or
$28 million. However, due to the growth of the Australian economy,
the ratio of the volume of Official Development Assistance to the
Gross National Product (the ODA/GNP ratio) will actually decline
from 0.34 per cent in 1994-95 to 0.33 in 1995-96. While Australia's
GNP per capita in real terms has increased from $19 800 in 1983-84
to an expected $25 500 in 1995-96, aid expenditure over the same
period has declined from $99 to about $82 per capita.(3)
In 1988-89 there was a one-off
forward of multilateral development bank (MDB) payments. This had
the effect of increasing 1988-89 expenditure but decreasing 1989-90
Source: Australia's Overseas aid Program 1995-96, Budget Related
Paper No. 2.
The decline in the aid budget has also had an impact on its
commercial aspects. According to ACFOA:(4)
The Government defends the increasing
commercial elements in the program by pointing to the declining
political commitment to aid and arguing that a broader base of
support needs to be developed for the aid program.
Nonetheless, Australia's contribution at over $1.56 billion is
by no means among the lowest in the donors list. It ranks 9th in
terms of ODA/GNP ratio among the 21 countries that form the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In contrast, Japan,
which has an aid budget of over $15 billion, ranks 16th.(5)
The Australian budget is split into country (bilateral) programs
and global programs which include funding for international
organisations, (multilateral aid), emergencies, aid to Non
Government Organisations (NGOs) and for commercial activity. In
1995-96, country programs accounted for about 56 per cent of the
total budget while 35 per cent was allocated to global programs.
Other development activities absorb about 3 per cent and the
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR)
receives another 3 per cent.
In what could be described as a tacit spheres-of-influence
arrangement among Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors,
Australia has for long had a regional focus on its aid program.
This concentration makes for greater cost-effectiveness and impact
per aid dollar by reducing the administrative overheads of a wider
spread. As a relatively small donor, Australia, for example, leaves
Africa and Latin America largely to the big donors with traditional
interests in those areas.
In 1995-96, more than 77 per cent of the expenditure will be
directed towards Southeast Asia and the Pacific. While at first
glance this figure might look impressive, it is also deceptive. Of
the total country program budget of nearly $876 million, Papua New
Guinea alone receives over $312 million, or over 35 per cent.
Countries in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific account for 29
per cent and 13 per cent of the country program budget
respectively. Some $38.5 million, or less than 5 per cent of the
program development aid, is destined for Africa although the
continent remains a major recipient of Australia's humanitarian
The contribution of NGOs was also recognised in this year's
budget. Total funding for NGOs is expected to be over $100 million
compared to about $97.6 million in 1994-95. The outlay for
humanitarian assistance too has been increased by $10.5 million to
By contrast the expenditure of DIFF would have been reduced to
$120 million from $130 million in 1994-95.
The decision to introduce DIFF was taken in 1980, with the first
project being approved in 1982, as a response to the mixed credit
programs of other OECD donors. These programs had been initiated by
many countries in the late 1960s, and by 1982 they accounted for
about 6 per cent of total OECD bilateral Overseas Development
Assistance. Initially, the Australian scheme was directed at ASEAN
countries and was to be used to support those industries which were
already internationally competitive. The main objective was to
match concessional financing being provided by other countries and
thus to help Australian firms compete for aid projects.
A secondary objective was to help develop new markets for
Australian exporters. While the original intention was not to
subsidise manufacturers, benefits to Australian industry being seen
as ancillary to this objective, there was a concern that Australia
aid would be good for Australia too. For example, where Australian
goods and services could be used in Australian aid projects, they
should be used for this purpose as long as the result was not to
reduce their quality as good aid. Some questions about this
remaining the case, however, emerged with the changes in the
administration of DIFF which could be seen to have resulted in the
commercial aspects rivalling the development intent.
Source: AIDAB/AusAID, Australia's Overseas Aid Program:
Statistical Summary, 1989/90 to 1994/95 (various issues).
The first DIFF project was approved in 1982 and, during the same
year, the eligibility criteria was broadened from just the ASEAN
region to all countries receiving Australian aid. In 1983, the
conditions attached to DIFF grants were relaxed further. The
requirement for applicants to demonstrate aid-supported competition
for specific projects was dropped; all that was now required was
sufficient evidence of foreign donor competition in the country
concerned. By 1987 it had been decided that the DIFF/EFIC financing
package could be tailored to suit the needs of the recipients.
Also, Burma, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan,
Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand were declared by AIDAB to be
'spoiled markets'. (The markets were considered to be 'spoiled' by
the volume of aid-supported financial packages available from other
donors). This meant that DIFF was available without the need of
evidence of aid-supported competition for capital goods. Such
evidence was, however, required for services and non-capital
Another review in 1989 led to further changes with the aim of
increasing the effectiveness of the scheme. Feasibility studies had
to be carried out, which were then appraised by AusAID using the
same criteria as that used for bilateral grant aid projects. DIFF
funding could be denied in cases where assistance had been provided
in the same sector and, in some cases, the same region of a
recipient country. Further, 90 per cent of each year's funding
would be used to support activities in Australia's region with a
maximum of 40 per cent of DIFF funds to be allocated to any one
In February 1992, a new set of international guidelines
established by the OECD, the 'Helsinki rules' came into effect. The
aim of these guidelines was to direct mixed credit financing away
from commercially viable projects toward projects and countries
that had little chance of access to private funds. The guidelines
also have a provision that allows any OECD member to call for
consultations and 'challenge' another member to prove that their
project conforms to the revised rules. The effectiveness of these
rules is apparent by the fact that by June 1994, about 20 per cent
of the total notifications regarding mixed credit financing to the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD had resulted in
Under current Australian guidelines, to be eligible for DIFF
funding, a project must:(6)
- be accorded priority under the recipient government's
- demonstrably contribute to the recipient government's economic
and social development objectives
- be consistent with Australia's development assistance
objectives, including environmental, social, cultural and gender
- be financially and economically viable
- goods and services being provided must be wholly or mainly of
In addition, funding must be proven to be necessary and
justifiable to match officially aid-supported competition and for
projects involving mainly services.
On the other hand, DIFF grants are not available for projects
where DIFF has previously provided assistance in the same sector of
a recipient country. Grants are also not available for:
- defence equipment or defence related projects
- luxury goods
- consumer durables; and
- raw bulk commodities.
Interestingly, the new guidelines did not reduce the popularity
of the DIFF scheme despite the fact that about 50 per cent of the
proposed projects in the energy sector and 60 per cent of
telecommunication projects seeking funding were found to be
commercially viable, and therefore ineligible. In 1994-95, DIFF
funds were oversubscribed by a factor of thirteen, with projects
worth over $1.7 billion seeking DIFF grants worth $123 million. The
1995-96 figure was over $2 billion.
As a result of the changes, the main focus of DIFF funding over
the past few years has been on infrastructure projects such as
education, water supply and treatment, waste disposal, transport,
and rural telecommunications and power. In the 1994-95 budget the
Government introduced a new Green DIFF initiative to
'provide expanded opportunities for Australian business to supply
developmentally important goods and services with an environmental
focus to developing countries'. The objective of the Green
DIFF is to transfer 'environmentally friendly technology and
the provision of vital environmental infrastructure...'(7) This
initiative could perhaps be viewed as a response to an earlier
recommendation by the ACFOA, a critic of the DIFF program, to phase
out the DIFF component of aid and establish a Green Technology
Transfer Fund (GTTF).(8)
It can be argued that the early years of the DIFF program were
thus not just an exercise in helping Australian industry find new
export markets; DIFF funds were used to develop the export
capability of a select few Australian manufacturers. For example,
of a total of some $118.5 million in DIFF grants provided between
1982-83 and 1988-89, almost all were for projects in Indonesia and
China. During this period, one company alone, Transfield
Construction, was provided with DIFF funds amounting to $64.6
million for the Steel Bridges Projects No I and II in Indonesia.(9)
Transfield is also a company that did extremely well out of the
scheme in its early years between 1984 and 1993 receiving $153.4
million in DIFF funds, or nearly 30 per cent of all DIFF
expenditure during this period (see Appendix). By 1991-92 as well,
DIFF expenditure in Indonesia exceeded project aid expenditure and
in 1992-93 it was about $50 million. Over the period 1982-83 to
1992-93, about 46 per cent of total DIFF expenditure was in
These apparent distortions or imbalances contributed to the
questioning of DIFF as 'good aid'. While that questioning often
neglected to take account of both the enormous developmental needs
of Indonesia and China and their significance to Australia in the
region, AusAID's own review has questioned the viability and
developmental relevance of the early programs (especially in
Indonesia): 'concerns were expressed both about the lack of
scrutiny applied to DIFF proposals and the developmental
effectiveness of some of the activities supported.'(11)
These criticisms were more valid for the first few years after
its inception when projects in sectors such as manufacturing and
mining absorbed a considerable amount of DIFF outlay. Also, as
AusAID has argued in its Review,(12) it was not until 1992 that the
effect of the changes made in 1989 became obvious. The reason for
the delay was a substantial backlog of projects which had been
approved under the old guidelines, an indication of the popularity
of the scheme among Australian businesses during a period when
oversight was lax and there was little competition for available
As DIFF has developed, however, with a tightening of the rules
and greater scrutiny, the original objectives are more likely to be
Throughout its life, the DIFF program has come under sustained
criticism, especially from the NGOs. The linkages between aid and
Australian business were seen as simply a subsidy for Australian
business It was argued that mixed credit schemes distort
development cooperation. Debate has also continued over whether
DIFF is developmental or commercial by nature. Critics have argued
- DIFF diverts scarce aid resources to better off countries which
have access to commercial funding. This is done at the expense of
projects which would directly assist the poor and
- It is a trade promotion subsidy for Australian industry; that
if this is the aim then the funds would be better used in other,
more cost-effective trade and industry promotion programs.
- DIFF distorts the domestic economy and has an adverse impact on
exporters by creating a dependency effect
In defence of the DIFF program, it is maintained that:
- The restrictions introduced under the Helsinki rules have
effectively directed mixed credits towards projects and countries
which have little or no access to market financing. Since these
restrictions do not apply to countries recognised as 'least
developed' by the UN, mixed credits are now more freely available
to such recipients than to relatively more developed ones. In the
Australian context, the two largest recipients of DIFF grants,
Indonesia and China, are also, with the exception of PNG, the two
largest recipients of bilateral aid. Also, sustainable development,
the primary objective of Australia's aid, requires a long-term
perspective rather than an attempt to meet the immediate needs of
the poor. Hence, investments in areas such as water supply,
sanitation and communication facilities can play a significant role
in addressing the causes of poverty.
- If DIFF were a trade subsidy, then other elements of the aid
program could also be classified as such. Food aid would have to be
considered to be a very inefficient subsidy as it is provided on a
100 per cent grant basis, compared to the 35 per cent AusAID
contributes to DIFF project costs. The latter not only provides a
mechanism for stretching the aid dollar but also encourages the
involvement of the private sector in the Australian aid
- With a DIFF expenditure of about $120 million or about 0.03 per
cent of GNP, any distortion effects are likely to be rather small
and, compared to exports, not measurable. A similar rationale
applies to the dependency argument. DIFF is too small to have any
significant effect on the industry sector.
As funding for the DIFF scheme has grown rapidly over the past
decade, it has developed into a well focused program. From $12.5
million in 1984-85, outlays on DIFF have grown to $130 million in
1994-95, about 8 per cent of the aid budget. As figure one shows,
over this period, Indonesia and China have been the main recipients
of DIFF grants, accounting for 46 per cent and 30 per cent of the
expenditure respectively. The 9 per cent of total DIFF
disbursements of $61.5 million to India are for the only DIFF
related project in the country, the Piparwar Coal Mining project.
These three countries thus account for 85 per cent of the total
However, from the scheme's inception until June 1994, 90
projects with a total value of $643 million were undertaken in 15
countries. Another $123 million was committed on 13 projects during
In terms of the sectoral allocation of DIFF grants, most of the
funding has been to the transport (46 per cent) and communication
(11 per cent) sectors.
A report on a review of the DIFF program carried out by AusAID,
(A Review of the Effectiveness of the Development
Import Finance Facility, January 1996) concluded
47 of the 51 projects surveyed had
been effective in delivering the specific development benefits
which had been intended. Overall, two-thirds of the project were
rated as having delivered 75 per cent or more of their intended
The report also concluded that substantial benefits had been
generated for Australia. Involving $285 million of AusAID funds,
the 51 projects initiated between 1988 and 1993, generated $709
million expenditure on goods and services in Australia. Follow-on
business directly related to these DIFF projects already realised
by companies was estimated at $263 million and it was anticipated
that another $397 million worth of follow-on business was likely to
be achieved. Thus, excluding the follow-on business, it has been
estimated that $1 of DIFF expenditure generated about $3.50 of
business for Australia. Table three illustrates the direct
commercial benefits from DIFF by country and region.
The highest rate of commercial returns from DIFF projects by
table four includes the communication, manufacturing and
agriculture sectors. However, it must be pointed out that several
of the agricultural projects were in fact processing activities
which could be classified as manufacturing.
Other benefits identified in the review include:
- companies achieving economies of scale with repeat orders
making them more competitive on a commercial basis for further work
of a similar type. This is especially true in the field of high
- companies gained practical experience in working overseas and
establishing contacts. For example, Transfield Construction changed
from a company with less than 5 per cent of its total income
derived from international activities in the mid-1980s to one where
about 26 per cent of its income is now derived from its overseas
operations. It won $4 million worth of bridge work in Laos without
aid support. In China, Thailand and Taiwan it had, by the mid
1990s, won $100 million worth of business 'not involving Australian
aid, but which was partially linked to the original AIDAB (as
AusAID then was) support in Indonesia'.(16) Amongst the
participating companies there also developed a greater awareness
about overseas market opportunities, as is shown in table
- a number of companies said that during the time the Australian
economy was in recession (which included the period covered by the
survey), they might not have remained viable. Some stated that they
would have gone out of business. Westinghouse Brake and Signal, for
example, reported that had it not been for the DIFF financed Rail
Signalling project in Thailand in 1989, it would have been forced
to substantially reduce its numbers.(17)
- while it was difficult for the AusAID review team to arrive at
an accurate assessment of the impact of DIFF-supported activities
on employment, a conservative estimate of the employment generated
by DIFF financed contracts and direct follow-on business, was of
the order of 1500 staff years for the prime contractors only. This
figure does not take into account employment generated through
sub-contractors or for any multiplier effect. To cite Transfield's
experience again, as a result of the Steel Bridges Project, it
invested $15 million in its Seven Hills fabrication facility, which
would otherwise have closed down, and created an extra 350 to 450
jobs. BHP which supplied the steel for the project, was estimated
to have created about 500 extra jobs.(18)
According to AusAID, 'It is fair, therefore, to conclude that
DIFF helped in a modest way to ameliorate the adverse employment
effects of the recession.'(19)
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the review was based
on an analysis of the DIFF scheme as it was (1988-89 to 1992-93),
rather than it is today. In other words, the review covered
projects approved before the revised Helsinki guidelines of the
OECD took effect. Some of the projects would not be approved under
current guidelines. This is especially true of the mining and
manufacturing sectors. Public sector infrastructure projects in the
water supply, sanitation and transport sectors, energy and
telecommunication projects in remote areas would still be
When the cancellation of the DIFF scheme was announced,
according to media estimates, there were about 52 projects with a
combined value of around $1.2 billion in the pipeline. Australian
companies are reported to have spent about $70 million on their
development. They range from large firms like Transfield aiming for
a $60 million contract to provide search and rescue vessels to the
Philippines(20) to various high-tech small businesses aiming to
enter the Asian market.
Internationally, it was expected that the revised Helsinki
guidelines might lead to a reduction in mixed credit financing.
This appears not to have been the case. Notifications of Helsinki
type mixed credits rose from about $5.92 billion in 1993 to $7.14
billion in 1994. $4.2 billion of projects were notified in the
first half of 1995.
Pending a review, the DIFF scheme was cancelled in April 1996.
The scrapping of the scheme has also been the subject of criticism
from various quarters, including some of the recipient
The former head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Richard Woolcott, urged the Government to reverse its election
commitment to abolish the DIFF because it contradicted the
Government's larger commitment of making closer ties to the region
a foreign policy priority. In a confidential letter to Andrew
Thomson, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Foreign Minister,
leaked to the Australian, he said:(21)
As things stand, Mr Howard's and Mr
Downer's rhetoric about closer engagement with Asia has been eroded
by this action and our credibility and reputation for reliability
in the region will suffer, especially in the Philippines, following
understandings reached during President Ramos's visit last
...I am sorry to have to write in these terms, especially as I
have done my best to assist the new Government establish its
credentials in Malaysia and in Indonesia and in a series of
meetings with other ASEAN ambassadors in Canberra, but I believe
this decision really will damage Australia's wider national
interests in Asia.
Interestingly, given its earlier position, ACFOA issued a
statement saying that the decision would 'send all the wrong
signals to Asian neighbours and, in the end, act against
Australia's national interest'.(22)
One of the largest recipient of DIFF-supported projects, China,
also expressed concern about the decision to abolish the scheme.
Some 19 projects worth about $140 million are said to be involved.
The Chinese Ambassador to Australia, Hua Junduo said in a
Should those projects be scrapped
off, it would not only cause financial losses on the Chinese side,
but also do no good to the Australian side in terms of its
credibility and business interests in China...
...We hope that the Australian Government will follow
internationally accepted practices and continue to support the
projects in the pipeline and implement these projects on time.
The Philippines Ambassador to Australia, Delia Domingo-Albert,
was also critical of the decision to abolish DIFF. Appearing in the
Nine Network's Nightline program, she said:(24)
It is a business transaction where
there is a lot of competition, so if you are not in the market,
then someone else will come in.
There will be a feeling in the region that Australia is not
serious in promoting its capabilities in terms of its products in
the market. Other countries support their companies in making an
inroad into markets, and the DIFF scheme is definitely a way to
help Australian companies into the market.
On 26 June, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer
informed Parliament that he had received written or oral
representations at the ministerial level from Indonesia, China and
the Philippines regarding the cancellation of DIFF.(25)
The Queensland Minister for Economic Development and Trade, Don
Slack and the Victorian Premier, Jeff Kennett had also written to
the Government about the adverse effects of this decision.(26)
Nonetheless the decision to abolish DIFF continues to be
defended as one of those regrettable decisions required to bring
the budget into surplus. The Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Alexander Downer, replying to a question in Parliament on 17 June
The fact is that if we did not
abolish this program we would otherwise have to reduce spending on
humanitarian programs within the aid budget...we were not prepared
to do that. If we had to make a reduction in the aid budget, we
were prepared to do that in the area of business subsidies.
A day later, on 18 June 1996, the Parliamentary Secretary to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrew Thomson indicated that the
cancellation of DIFF may not be permanent. Speaking during a debate
on DIFF he said:(28)
....if there is room and if budgetary
circumstances permit....down the track, in the financial year after
next, we may be able to reintroduce a form of mixed credit scheme
and resume some of the projects that were in the pipeline. If it
was the case that after the election we had been left with a budget
that was in a reasonable shape, I have no doubt that there would be
no abolition of a scheme like DIFF.
The Development Import Finance Facility (DIFF), a mixed credit
funding scheme, has had its share of controversy. Supporters
maintain that it provides them with a level playing field in the
growing markets of Asia where other countries have traditionally
provided such funding to their exporters. Critics maintain that the
scheme distorts aid priorities and is a trade promotion subsidy for
From its inception in the early 1980s to its demise in 1996,
DIFF has been the subject of many reviews, revisions and changes in
guidelines. The 1990s saw the program deliver what it was designed
to do - development projects in recipient countries while helping
Australian industry develop an export outlook.
It should perhaps be noted that aid, by definition as an
operation in underdeveloped, overseas environments, is difficult.
If it were not, it can be argued that the private sector rather
than the government, would do it. Reviews of forms of aid have been
an ongoing part of the international aid debate since aid became a
significant aspect of international relations with the
de-colonisation process that followed World War II and this will
quite probably continue to be the case. DIFF has been no exception.
But, as only 8 per cent of the total aid budget as at 1994-95, and
moreover that part of the budget particularly encouraging the
involvement of the private sector, it is paradoxical that it has
been unilaterally rejected by a Coalition Government which has
stated its intention to involve the private sector in its aid
While the DIFF scheme in its present incarnation appears to be
dead, there may be a distinct possibility that the program could be
revived. Sections of the Australian business community and other
organisations involved in the aid program have strongly defended
the scheme. Currently, a review of the aid program is being
conducted by Paul Simons, former Executive Chairman of Woolworths.
The report is due by the beginning of 1997. It is possible that the
findings of this review might lead to the reincarnation of a mixed
credit scheme in 1997-98.
- Meeting Our Commitments, Media Release, 15 February
- Financial Review, 12 May 1996.
- Australia's Overseas Aid Program 1995-96. Budget
Related Paper No, 2, p. 15.
- Actionaid, The Reality of Aid 94, London, May 1994, p.
- OECD, Development Assistance Committee Report 1995,
Paris, 1996, p. 92.
- AIDAB, Development Import Finance Facility: Explanatory
Brochure, Canberra, 1994.
- Australian Development Cooperation Program 1994-95,
Budget Related Paper No. 2, p. 48.
- Australian Council for Overseas Aid, Aid For Change,
May 1992, p. 91-92.
- AusAID, Commercial Benefits from Development Cooperation
with Indonesia, Canberra, 1995, p. 136-137.
- ibid. p 27.
- ibid. p. 31.
- A Review of the Effectiveness of the Development Import
Finance Facility, loc cit. p. 16.
- See for example Actionaid, The Reality of Aid 94,
London, May 1994, p. 25, 37. 'Corporate Hijacking of Australian
aid' AidWatch No. 6, June 1995, p. 8-9, Australian Council
for Overseas Aid, Aid For Change, May 1992, p. 90-91.
- Minister for Development Cooperation, Media Release,
21 July 1995.
- A Review of the Effectiveness of the Development Import
Finance Facility, op cit., p.7.
- Commercial Benefits from Development Cooperation with
Indonesia, op.cit., p.137.
- Vivienne Filling, 'The Role of DIFF in Industry Strategies' in
AIDAB, Development with a DIFFerence, 1993, p.102.
- AIDAB, Focus, June 1992, p.26.
- A Review of the Effectiveness of the Development Import
Finance Facility, op cit.,p. 37
- Financial Review, 15 May 1996.
- 14 June 1996.
- News Fax 16 May 1996.
- Financial Review, 17 May 1996.
- Current House Hansard, 26 June 1996, p. 2777.
- Financial Review, 17 May 1996, also 6 June 1996.
- Current House Hansard, 17 June 1996, p.1956.
- Current House Hansard, 18 June 1996, p.2076.
Top 10 Development Import Finance Facility Contractors 1984-85
Company and Project DIFF Grant ($m)
Transfield Construction Pty Ltd
Steel Bridges Project I (Indonesia) 21.7
Steel Bridges Project II 42.9
Steel Bridges Project III 67.6
Steel Bridges Project IV 10.1
Sarawak Transmission Grid (Malaysia) 11.1
Westinghouse Brake and Signal Co
Cirebon-Kroya-Jogjakarta Rail Signal Project (Indonesia) 40.4
Tasikmalaya-Kroya Rail Signal Project (Indonesia) 24.5
Rail Signalling Equipment (Thailand) 18.4
White Industries Ltd
Piparwar Coal Mining Project (India) 61.5
GEC Alsthom Australia Ltd
Jakarta Electricity Substations (Indonesia) 24.3
Bekasi-Bandung Railway Signal Project (Indonesia) 27.5
Penang Port Commission Project (Malaysia) 9.3
Xian-Chendu-Zengshou Telecommunications Project (China) 10.6
Lanxin Rail Communications Project (China) 7.3
Lanzhow-Urumqi Telecommunications Project (China) 25
Outer Islands Telecom Project (Cook Islands) 0.1
Energy Equipment PtyLtd/CMPS & F
Henan Coal Gasification Project (China) 29.9
Luoyang Mining Machinery Plant (China) 2.6
John Holland Construction Pty Ltd
Main Line South Railway Upgrade Project (Philippines) 18.1
Aircraft Hangar Complex (Bangladesh) 11.5
Gansu, Ningxia, Tibet Rural Telecommunications Project ( 21.2
Qinghai Telecommunications Project (China) 5.1
Digital Telephone Exchanges (PNG) 1.4
ABB/EPT Pty Ltd
Jakarta Powerline Upgrade (Indonesia) 20.1
Kirby Engineering Pty Ltd
Refrigerator Compressor Plant (China) 16.4
Vehicle Body Plastic Tooling (China) 3
Note: While facts on the recipients of DIFF grants are available in AusAID
publications, the dispersed nature of the information meant that this table
had to be compiled from various sources.
Sources: AusAID, Commercial Benefits from Development Cooperation with Indonesia,
AusAID, Business Participation in AusAID's Aid Programs 1994-95,
AIDAB, Business Participation in AIDAB's Aid Programs 1993-94,