

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS
IN THE ASIAN-PACIFIC REGION

Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs
and Defence

1984

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Australia's defence co-operation with its neighbours in the Asian-Pacific region, with particular reference to the present scope, purpose, effectiveness and flexibility of such co-operation.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On 15 October 1981 the Senate referred to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence for inquiry and report the reference:

Australia's defence co-operation with its neighbours in the Asian-Pacific region, with particular reference to the present scope, purpose, effectiveness and flexibility of such co-operation.

The Committee advertised for written submissions in November 1981, but shortly afterwards the inquiry was deferred while a reference on East Timor was examined.

In June 1983, towards the end of the East Timor inquiry, the defence co-operation reference was re-advertised.

The Committee's report on 'Human Rights and Conditions of the People of East Timor' was presented to Parliament on 8 September 1983.

Public hearings began on the defence co-operation reference towards the end of the Parliamentary Summer Recess. Public hearings were conducted on 23 February, 9 March and 6 April 1984.

Purpose of the Inquiry

It is apparent to the Committee that there is only minimal awareness within Australia of Australia's defence co-operation policies and programs with countries in the Asian-Pacific region. Public discussion of defence co-operation policy and program content has been non-existent, nor has much been written directly on the subject of defence co-operation.

The Committee felt that it was necessary for the public to be made aware that a Defence Co-operation Program existed and to give Departments concerned the opportunity to put on the public record the purpose, objectives, policies, management and achievements of Defence Co-operation Programs (DCPs).

Approach Taken

The inquiry covers the geographical area comprising the countries of South East Asia and the South West Pacific, including Papua New Guinea. The South West Pacific is bounded to the north and east by Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Western Samoa and Tonga.

The Committee believes that there is little value in examining defence co-operation arrangements without placing them within the context of the security of the region.

It is for this reason that the report considers the main influences on regional security, including the role of external countries.

Organisation of the Report

The Report is organised into seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the topic and explains how this Report has been produced. Chapter 2 examines the Purpose of the Defence

Co-operation Program. Chapter 3 studies the Defence Forces of South East Asia. Chapter 4 is an Overview of Security in the South Pacific. Chapter 5 covers the Defence Forces in the South Pacific. Chapter 6 examines the history of Australia's Defence Co-operation Program, and looks at each of the countries concerned with the program. Chapter 7 views the issues of contention within the Defence Co-operation Program.

Evidence Received

In gathering information about the Defence Co-operation Program the Committee was assisted by those who presented written submissions and gave oral evidence (see Appendices 7 and 8).

The Committee received a wide range of evidence covering a number of areas that were not within our terms of reference. These included human rights in recipient countries, a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific and the possibility of providing military assistance to small island states in the Indian Ocean. Thus while the Committee acknowledges the importance and complexity of these issues and makes some preliminary remarks on them in the report, it has not examined them in detail. The Committee nevertheless appreciates the amount of work which has gone into the preparation of these submissions.

CHAPTER 2

THE PURPOSE OF THE DEFENCE CO-OPERATION PROGRAM

The area of focus of this inquiry, South East Asia and South West Pacific, is Australia's primary area of strategic concern. It is fundamental to Australia's interest that there be stability in both of these regions and that the countries of these regions are capable of acting together to preserve their own security.

With the scaling down of direct Australian military involvement in South East Asia in the early 1970s and a complete British withdrawal from Malaysia in 1971, successive Australian Governments have turned to the Defence Co-operation Program (DCP) to assist in fulfilling our role of maintaining and furthering Australia's defence interest in South East Asia.¹

As the Foreign Minister (Mr Hayden) has said,

Developments in Asia are going to determine the future of Australia ... if we encourage, where we can, stability, harmony, co-operation ... then we are going to get much greater stability in the region and much greater security for our nation than any piece of paper can guarantee.²

In line with this perception, the Defence Co-operation Program is intended 'to promote the national independence of participating countries'. It is also seen as a 'practical expression of our interest in regional security ...'³ which we share with these countries. By contributing to the security of the region, we are also enhancing our own security.

However, there are a number of other purposes of the Defence Co-operation Program over and above the purely military:

- (i) to round out and advance bilateral relationships in which defence links form a part of the friendly and co-operative association with other countries;
- (ii) to promote political stability and economic growth in the region through civil aid projects where they take place under the program;
- (iii) to foster friendly attitudes towards Australia on a popular level.⁴

Clearly then, the program can embrace a wide spectrum of activity, ranging from Australia's considerable defence commitments with Papua New Guinea to the more modest programs with some of the small island states of the South Pacific, which could in many cases be better described as civil rather than defence aid.

It appears from the evidence received that the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs would not disagree on what are broadly the purposes of Australian participation in Defence Co-operation Programs. They agree on the primary aim of the program - the promotion of national independence of participating countries. However, they give different emphasis to the relative importance of the other purposes of the Defence Co-operation Program.

The Department of Foreign Affairs is particularly conscious that defence co-operation activities serve a number of useful purposes over and above the purely military. These activities complement those in the political, economic and cultural fields which are designed to encourage friendly and

co-operative bilateral relationships with our near neighbours, serving both their interests and those of Australia.⁵ It may be that these additional benefits are more important than the strictly military benefits which flow from the program, particularly in the case of the ASEAN countries, where the Defence Co-operation Program is a relatively minor contribution to their defence budgets. Defence Co-operation Programs, according to Defence, are (1) not intended to draw neighbouring countries into our alliance commitments, or (2) to signify Australian endorsement of their policies.⁶

In addition to the value of these activities in developing closer links between Australia and the countries concerned, Foreign Affairs believes they also play a useful role in furthering regional confidence and cohesion by strengthening the self-defence capabilities of most of the partner countries.

This chapter will explore the four purposes in a general way on the evidence received. The later chapters will explore the role of the program in a regional context.

National Security Interests

Perhaps predictably the Defence Department believes the objective of our participation in defence co-operation with others is not primarily to contribute to economic development with partner countries, or to generate goodwill in support of foreign policy objectives; though they acknowledge that such benefits generally flow from effective collaboration to meet practical needs. As previously mentioned, the Department of Defence states in evidence to the Committee that the broad objective of participation in Defence Co-operation Programs is to promote the national independence of participating countries. They believe the programs represent a practical expression of our interest in regional security and promote contacts with the

governments and defence forces of countries with which we have shared strategic interests. Defence goes on to say that by contributing to security in our neighbouring regions, these programs strengthen Australia's own security and thus constitute part of our national defence effort.⁷ This defence co-operation relationship, according to the Defence Department, relies less on formal treaties and arrangements and more on practical contacts .⁸

The Defence Co-operation Program allows Australia to attempt to support states which are strategically significant to Australia and relevant to Australia's overall security⁹ and particularly in the South West Pacific, assists 'all to participate in some degree of regional insurance policy'.¹⁰

Round out and Advance Bilateral Relationships in which Defence Links form a Part of Friendly and Co-operative Association with other Countries

The Department of Foreign Affairs believes that the Defence Co-operation Program can play a useful role in enabling Australia to further its major foreign policy objective of developing and maintaining close and co-operative relations with regions of South East Asia and the South West Pacific.

'Co-operation or exchanges in the defence field' are seen 'as one facet of a healthy and co-operative relationship between two countries which have some measure of shared interests'.¹¹

The absence of any defence related links, while working to develop political, economic, cultural and other areas of a relationship, would mean that relationship would be lacking in one important respect.¹²

The Defence Co-operation Program with its emphasis on the region of primary strategic importance to Australia, is seen to contribute both to the strategic stability and self confidence of that region and to an acceptance of Australia's place in it. In that way it complements a range of foreign policy goals.¹³

To Promote Political Stability and Economic Growth in the Region through Civil Aid Projects where they take place under the Defence Co-operation Program

There are two separate areas in terms of the type of assistance Australia provides under defence co-operation projects. Defence co-operation to South East Asian countries, including ASEAN, has a military focus, whereas many of the defence co-operation projects undertaken in the South Pacific have little or no military focus and are distinguished from all other development assistance activities only by the involvement of Australian Defence Force resources.¹⁴ The use of the Defence Forces in this role merely reflects the availability of expertise and the logistical advantages which the use of the forces represents.

A number of witnesses suggested that the use of defence forces in this way is unwise and counter-productive. The involvement of the Defence Forces in Development Co-operation Programs, no matter what the intended motivation, would result in the general public in the donor and recipient communities seeing the project as having ulterior defence motives.¹⁵

The Committee does not believe that Australia's use of the Defence Forces in this way is having the results suggested. The Committee will comment further on this in Chapter 7, The Defence Co-operation Program and Civil Projects.

Foster Friendly Attitudes Towards Australia

There are seen to be three aspects to fostering attitudes towards Australia at a popular level.

First, in the South West Pacific and in Papua New Guinea the type of assistance provided is much more clearly and demonstrably directed to people. There is, according to the Department of Defence, a clear feeling of good-will towards Australia and an appreciation of the contribution that Australia has been able to make to assist those countries in a variety of ways through the Program.

Second, in the ASEAN countries the situation differs depending upon the role of the defence organisation in these countries. The Department of Defence said that:

In Malaysia we have a very close and friendly relationship with a professional military organisation which has a clear and positive role in Malaysian society. I believe that role is clearly accepted by the Government of Malaysia. I think you would realise it is very difficult to assess down to the grass roots but certainly from our point of view our assistance to Malaysia is greatly appreciated, as is our assistance to Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines.

In continuation, Defence stated that:

where our projects and activities bring us in contact with the people of the country we have found that all of them have reflected well on Australia.¹⁶

Thirdly, the Defence Language School at Point Cook, Victoria, provides overseas Defence personnel with an opportunity to live and work in Australia, gaining an understanding of Australian society. Those who pass through

Point Cook do not necessarily remain in the defence organisations of their own countries. They emerge again 'as businessmen, school teachers, and cultural and civic leaders', all of them, according to Defence, with a very warm understanding and feeling towards Australia. (See Appendix 5 for the number of trainees and study visitors to Australia under the Defence Co-operation Program since 1963.)

ENDNOTES

1. See Department of Defence Annual Reports, in particular 1973, 1975 and the Government White Paper on Australian Defence, 1976.
2. Submission, (Foreign Affairs), p. S133.
3. Submission, (Defence), p. S8.
4. Submission, (Foreign Affairs), p. S131.
5. Submission, (Foreign Affairs), p. S130.
6. Submission, (Defence), p. S8.
7. Submission, (Defence), p. S8.
8. Evidence, (23 February 1984, Defence), p. 4.
9. Evidence, (23 February 1984, Defence), p. 5.
10. Evidence, (23 February 1984, Defence), p. 42.
11. Evidence, (23 February 1984, Foreign Affairs), p. 47.
12. Evidence, (23 February 1984, Foreign Affairs), p. 47.
13. Evidence, (23 February 1984, Foreign Affairs), p. 50.
14. Submission, (Foreign Affairs), p. S132.
15. Submission, (Australian Council for Overseas Aid), p. S190.
16. Evidence, (23 February 1984, Defence), p. 12.

CHAPTER 3

DEFENCE FORCES OF SOUTH EAST ASIA

The defence force structure of any nation ought to be determined by the current strategic environment. For countries within South East Asia, this means that the force structure will be a balance between that which can meet an external threat and a defence force that can also deal with insurgency operations. The emphasis that is given to one or the other varies from country to country: from the Philippines which still operates a mainly counter-insurgency defence force to the Malaysian armed forces which are structured primarily for conventional warfare. Generally though, it is a matter of emphasis as all forces are, by necessity, multi-role because of the wide range of demands made on them.

The principles involved in meeting an external threat and dealing with counter-insurgency activity are markedly different. For insurgency operations, small lightly equipped and mobile units are required. The navy will consist of small patrol craft while the air force will have aircraft that are most effective in the ground attack role and possess a good surveillance capacity.

A conventional force will have in its order of battle, field tanks, heavy artillery, mortars and surface to air missiles. The navy will possess corvettes or frigates and missile equipped patrol craft. The air force will be equipped with air to air fighter aircraft (for South East Asian countries this means F-5E aircraft) and fighter-bombers (A-4 Skyhawks).

Force Structure Requirements

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an outline of the force structure of countries in South East Asia. In assessing the structure of the defence forces, it should be realised that there are many capabilities that are common to either role. Thus, it is a matter of the emphasis which is placed on particular equipments, doctrines and tactics. It should be noted that changes in defence capabilities generally lag behind changes in national policy because of the long lead times that are involved in the acquisition of equipment and the retraining of personnel. The Defence Co-operation Program is required to adapt to these shifting emphases within recipient forces.

Strategic Context

The strategic environment in South East Asia is dominated by Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea. The Vietnamese military forces have maintained a substantial presence in Kampuchea and the possible Vietnamese withdrawal of its forces and an early cessation of fighting seem unlikely. Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge, in coalition with the Khmer Peoples National Liberation Front and the Armee Nationale Sihanoukee, continues to conduct a guerilla campaign against the Vietnamese supported Heng Samrin forces.

The situation in Kampuchea is seen to be strategically critical for Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. The position is particularly sensitive for Thailand as Kampuchean resistance is supported by Chinese military aid which is supplied from Thailand. Assistance is also provided by Singapore and Malaysia. If Vietnam sees it as necessary to completely halt military aid from flowing into Kampuchea, then the minor incursions by the Vietnamese into Thailand, which currently occur, could become

both more frequent and larger in scale. In that event support for Thailand from the United States could be justified through the South East Asian Collective Defence Treaty (commonly referred to as the Manila Pact). While Australia is also a signatory to this Treaty, in its submission to the Committee, the Department of Foreign Affairs argued that while any obligations within the Treaty 'continue formally to apply, the Treaty does not now have credibility as a collective security framework ... For Australia the Treaty has ceased to have any significant impact on defence and foreign policy formulation.'¹

The tension in the region has been heightened further by China's unilateral declaration of support for Thailand and its open support for the Khmer Rouge. The Soviet Union continues to be the major ally of Vietnam. As well as creating divisions within ASEAN, the Sino-Soviet confrontation has meant that the region has once again become polarised.

Malaysia and Singapore do not face the same threat to their security as Thailand, nevertheless, their defence awareness has been heightened as a result of the Kampuchean conflict. Currently relations between Malaysia and Singapore are good and this is reflected in the level of defence co-operation between the two countries; though the two countries only engage in joint exercises with other ASEAN members. There are standing agreements between the two sides on search and rescue operations and joint defence activities through the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). There is a belief in both Governments today that in the event of an external threat, the defence of Malaysia and Singapore is indivisible.²

Insurgency Groups

An important development that has emerged from the third Indochinese war affecting stability in the region has been the courting of ASEAN support for the actions of both the Soviet-backed Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea and the opposing Chinese-supported forces operating in Kampuchea, and increasing border active between Kampuchea and Thailand.

The ASEAN states claim that the reason for the decline in insurgent activity in the region is attributable to their counter-insurgency measures, however a major contributory factor appears to be the efforts by both China and Russia/Vietnam to win support for their activities from the ASEAN states. To win such support, these countries have reduced their support for communist parties operating in ASEAN states. Accordingly, since 1979 modernisation of the ASEAN defence forces has been concentrated on developing the conventional arm of their forces rather than those aspects that enhance their ability to deal specifically with insurgency activities.

This is not to deny that difficulties do not exist within each of the ASEAN states. The communist party remain a substantial force and all ASEAN states, with the exception of Singapore, have ethnic and/or regional minorities, some of which are actively hostile to the central government especially in Indonesia and the Philippines.

Military Capabilities of Countries in South East Asia

1. Brunei: The small Islamic sultanate of Brunei lies on the North coast of Borneo Island. Its only borders are with Malaysia, with which it has always had good relations. The country is rich in oil and natural gas and has foreign reserves of about \$US20 billion (1981). The average per capita income is one of the highest in the world at \$A20 340 in 1982. In comparison, the figure for Japan is \$A8820.

Brunei gained independence on 31 December 1983, and the British, at the request of the Sultan, agreed to leave a British army Gurkha battalion (600 personnel) stationed in Brunei. The Government of Brunei is responsible for the cost of the Gurkhas. The government also continues to provide jungle training facilities at Temburong to the British armed forces (as well as the Singapore armed forces).

The major problems facing Brunei are economic rather than defence questions. Because the economy of Brunei depends on oil and natural gas which are capital intensive, there is little opportunity for expansion of employment. Currently, the government is embarking on a large capital works program including the building of a series of new towns, each housing about 65 000 people.

The main internal threat could arise from the native Malay population or the local Chinese whose rights are very restricted.

Despite being surrounded by friendly nations (Brunei joined ASEAN on 9 January 1984), the government spends 34% of its annual budget or 5.5% of its GNP on defence. As a result, the military forces (3650 personnel) are extremely well equipped with Scorpion tanks, Rapier missiles and patrol boats with Exocet missiles. While the forces have most of the equipment that they need, there is still a gap in training, especially in the maintenance and service of sophisticated weaponry.

The United States will commence a military training program worth \$30 000 in 1985.

2. Indonesia: With an armed force of 281 000 and a defence budget of \$US84.309 billion, the Indonesian armed forces are the largest within ASEAN. On a per capita basis however,

defence expenditure as a proportion of GNP is one of the lowest in the ASEAN group. There is substantial integration of the military forces with civilian infrastructure, from government and parliament downwards. It has been estimated that as much as half of the army's manpower is engaged in what is called dwi-fungsi (dual function) activity. It is not surprising then that the armed forces possess a combination of conventional and counter-insurgency capabilities and in addition considerable manpower and resources devoted to areas which would normally be considered to be civilian matters.

Indonesia requires mobility in its defence structure because of its archipelagic nature. The structure of the army emphasises this mobility, comprising light armoured vehicles and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs). There are few heavy artillery pieces. Much emphasis is placed on airborne and special forces capabilities, which consist of 3 transport squadrons - these support 6 airborne battalions, 3 amphibious battalions and 2 infantry marine regiments.

The airforce is equipped with fighter/ground attack aircraft (Skyhawks), 2 interceptor squadrons (F-5's) and a squadron of OV-10F Bronco's, an aircraft designed specifically for counter-insurgency operations. The airforce also has on order extra helicopters, C-130 transports and 3 Boeing 737 AWACS.

The navy has 2 type 209 submarines and 9 frigates (3 with Exocet missiles) and 29 patrol craft (4 with Exocets) of which 8 are coastal craft. The structure of the navy indicates that greatest emphasis is being placed on securing Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and defending the archipelago from either internal or external threats.

The emphasis of defence spending in the immediate future will be on re-equipping and modernising the army. Because of budgetary difficulties (oil exports have been reduced since the oil glut in 1982), General Benny Murdani, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, is quoted as saying that routine expenditure would be cut by 50%, operating costs by 10%, maintenance by 10% and investment by 30%. Only 20 battalions would be fully equipped for combat readiness as it is believed that Indonesia is in no danger of war.³

Indonesia receives defence assistance from New Zealand and the United States as well as Australia. The United States is providing military aid worth \$47.5m in 1984 and \$42.7m in 1985. United States aid consists of FMS (Foreign Military Sales) assistance and military education and assistance, both in the United States and Indonesia (See Table 1).

New Zealand aid is also directed to training and assisting the Indonesian defence forces in their upgrading of defence force facilities. These have included assisting the development of the Indonesian Defence Dental Institute and the Air Force Medical School. Indonesian officers regularly attend courses in New Zealand.

3. Malaysia: The Malaysian armed forces are the best example of the impact that the changing strategic environment can have on the structure of a defence force. Until 1979, the primary role of the defence forces was to deal with counter-insurgency (COIN). However, with the eruption of the third Indo-Chinese war and the not coincidental reduction in activity by the Communist Party of Malaysia the role of the armed forces has shifted to conventional warfare.

In the years immediately following the invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnam, there was a rapid growth in the size and equipment of the armed forces. In 1975, Malaysia spent 4% of its GNP on defence. By 1981 this had increased to 8.3%.

This increase in funding has been used to purchase major pieces of new equipment for the armed forces and to provide for a dramatic increase in manpower. In 1978 there were 64 500 in the armed forces. In 1981 this had increased to 102 000. The army has purchased new rifles, 105 mm Howitzers, fire support vehicles, light tanks and APCs. The APCs and the light tanks can also be used for counter-insurgency operations.

The airforce has recently purchased jet trainers which can be used also in a light strike role and 40 A-40 fighter-bombers to supplement its 12 F-5E's. A new airbase to be built at Gong Kedak, in Northern Malaysia, has been suspended as a cost-saving measure. The air force is also considering the purchase of a E2C Hawkeye airborne warning system (AWAC).⁴

The navy has 2 frigates and 2 corvettes on order from West Germany. There are 16 fast attack craft (8 with Exocet missiles), a large supply vessel and many small patrol craft. They also have on order 4 minehunters.⁵ However, with Malaysia in 1983 facing a foreign debt of \$US7.600 million (an increase of 365% since 1980), defence cutbacks have occurred.⁶

Areas that are believed to be in need of improvement are training standards, combat proficiency and administrative efficiency.⁷

United States military assistance to Malaysia is dominated by the FMS credit program which reflects Malaysia's shift from a counter-insurgency to a conventional warfare orientation. The United States also has a training and study visits program with Malaysia which, in 1983, was significantly increased after a request from the Malaysian Prime Minister. In 1983 53 personnel were training in the United States. By 1985 it is proposed that this number be increased to 101 (see Table 1).

New Zealand assistance to Malaysia involves joint exercises and support in the development of a battle field simulation system. Malaysian defence personnel regularly attend a variety of training courses in New Zealand and New Zealand army officers also provide specialised instruction in Malaysia.

4. Philippines: While the armed forces of the other ASEAN states have redefined the role of their defence forces, the Philippine government continues to place greatest emphasis on enhancing its counter-insurgency capabilities, which it sees as the major problem facing the country. The Philippines relies almost entirely on the US presence to deter potential enemies. There are US military facilities at Subic Bay (U.S. Naval Support Base) and Angeles City (Clark Air Base).

The Philippine army is based on light armour with Scorpion light tanks, APCs and 105mm and 155mm howitzers. There is a special warfare brigade too.

The navy also is relatively lightly armed, consisting of 7 ex-US frigates, and 10 Corvettes, 3 fast patrol boats with Exocet missiles and 16 large patrol craft. The air force, significantly, has 3 COIN squadrons, one helicopter squadron of UH-1Hs with another 35 helicopters on order. There is also a squadron of ground attack aircraft (F-8H) and 5 transport squadrons including a squadron of 12 Nomads.

The United States has had a defence treaty with the Philippines since 1952 and has had military bases in the Philippines since 1947. In 1979, President Carter pledged \$500 million of 'security assistance' for the financial years 1980-1984. This is used to assist 'the Philippines to meet its own defence needs, which include the threat of a slowly growing

insurgency, and to advance toward its goal of military modernization'.⁸ The main forms of the assistance are FMS credits and training and study visits (see Table 1).

New Zealand involvement is limited to taking part in joint exercises involving the Philippine armed forces.

5. Singapore: Since the withdrawal of the British military presence in the late 1960's, the Singapore armed forces have expanded rapidly. While there was no sudden increase in defence expenditure in 1979 which occurred in most other ASEAN states, expenditure still continued to rise.

The army is oriented towards countering external threats, being equipped with AMX-13 tanks, M-113 APCs and Commando APCs. The army is both heavily armoured and highly mobile. The navy and air force are also well equipped. The navy has 9 missile equipped patrol boats with 3 more on order. The air force is the strongest in the region with eight squadrons of Skyhawk A-4's and one squadron of F-5E and F-5F fighters. There are also 4 surface to air missile squadrons.

While the armed forces of Singapore are well equipped with technically sophisticated equipment, the forces are without combat experience of any sort. Thus the major priority of the forces is in improving training. New Zealand provides assistance to Singapore by way of training assistance in both New Zealand and Singapore. New Zealand and Singapore regularly take part in joint exercises.

The United States commenced a modest training program (\$50 000) with Singapore in 1982 (see Table 1). The program is used to train professional officers from all three services.

6. Thailand: The structure of the Thai armed forces has been determined by a number of diverse factors. Under the total force concept, the military forces in Thailand are deeply involved in civil activity, building roads, bridges, irrigation channels, providing medical care etc. Rice and fertilizer banks have even been established by the army.⁹

While the outlawed Communist Party of Thailand has become less active in recent years, Thailand's border with Kampuchea has meant that it has needed to develop its conventional warfare capabilities against a possible Vietnamese invasion. As a result of the war in Kampuchea, there is also the problem with controlling the flow of refugees. The main areas of insurgency activity are at two extremes of Thailand - in the south on the border with Malaysia and in the west on the Kampuchean border.

The structure of the armed forces reflect these different force requirements. The army has significant heavy artillery, mortars and armour with 55 M-48 and 200 M-41 tanks. They also have on order a further 100 M-48 and 16 M-60 tanks.

While the navy has 6 frigates and 6 missile equipped patrol crafts, the emphasis is one of coastal patrol with 23 large patrol craft, 27 patrol craft and 40 river patrol craft. The air force has 3 squadron of F-5E aircraft but their air defence capability is largely untested. The main focus of the Thai air force is with the 10 counter-insurgency squadrons (2 of which are Nomad N-22B). There are a further 18 Nomads on order.

The Thai forces have been able to take advantage of the United States' FMS Credits to develop a sophisticated defence force.

Thailand is assisted in the development of its armed forces by military assistance from the United States (see Table 1), New Zealand and Australia. American concern is two fold: as a front-line state (with Kampuchea) and as the country in South East Asia that has borne the heaviest burden of refugees; Thailand is also seen as a key member of ASEAN which the United States Government believes deserves their full support.

The New Zealand Government provides training for Thai officers (22 in 1983) and study visits by Thai officers.

TABLE I

UNITED STATES MILITARY AID TO ASEAN COUNTRIES
(In millions of dollars)

Country	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984 (Esti- mated)	1985 (Pro- posed)
Indonesia	58.1	34.8	33.1	32.2	42.2	27.3	47.5	42.7
Malaysia	17.1	8.0	7.3	10.3	10.5	4.6	10.9	11.0
Philippines	37.3	31.7	75.5	75.6	51.1	101.4	101.3	182.0
Thailand	38.6	32.1	37.4	54.6	80.7	101.7	106.2	110.4
Singapore	-	-	-	-	0.048	.050	.050	.050

Source: Foreign Assistance and Related Programs: Appropriations Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives 1982-84 Washington, D.C.

ENDNOTES

1. Submission, (Foreign Affairs), p. S64.
2. Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 August 1984.
3. Sydney Morning Herald, 14 October, 1983.
4. Huxley Tim, 'Recent Military Developments in Southeast Asia: Their Implications for Australia's Security', Basic Paper No. 2 1983, Legislative Research Service, Canberra, 1983, pp. 19-21. See also Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 October 1983, pp. 48-50.
5. Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 October 1983, p. 50.
6. Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 October 1983, p. 5.
7. Huxley, op.cit, p. 21.
8. United States Department of State Bulletin, 1983, p. 42.
9. Pacific Defence Reporter, September 1983, p. 27.

CHAPTER 4

OVERVIEW OF SECURITY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

Australia's principal strategic interest in the South Pacific is to ensure that our sea communications with Japan and the Americas remain open. It is argued that instability in the South Pacific could endanger these sea approaches. Australia is also concerned that the Soviet presence in the region is kept to a minimum, diplomatically and militarily.

For the Pacific nations security has broader parameters involving the absence of all super-power rivalry from the region, no external domination of regional forums such as the South Pacific Forum, and the absence of 'Metropolitan Capitals' administering Pacific territories. More importantly, they also see regional security in an economic sense - free from external exploitation of their resources. In the main, the culprits in such regional militarism, as the Pacific nations see it, are the United States, France, Japan, Australia and the Soviet Union.

Of these countries, the Soviet Union has been the least successful in establishing a presence in the region, having accreditation only in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Western Samoa. However, there are no Soviet diplomats resident in the area. These countries are serviced from Wellington, Canberra and Jakarta. As Paul Dibb has observed,

There are probably few areas of the world, with the possible exception of Antarctica, that are of lower priority strategically for Moscow than the Southwest Pacific. Other than Australia, this region contains no strategically or politically significant

countries or militarily important targets and it offers only modest economic, and probably few political, opportunities for the USSR.

This is not to say that the Southwest Pacific is irrelevant to the Soviet Union's global interests or that the USSR will not probe for gains there. It merely suggests that Moscow is unlikely to put a great deal of effort into this part of the region.¹

Perhaps reflecting the change in approach by the Western powers towards China, that country has been able to establish embassies in Port Moresby (as of July 1983), Suva and Apia and to provide a small amount of assistance to them. Australia has diplomatic representation in Fiji, Nauru, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa.

As part of Australia's and the Pacific Islands' effort to exclude super-power rivalry in the region, there has been considerable effort given to establishing a nuclear-free zone in the region.

A Nuclear-Free Zone in the South Pacific

While there is general regional agreement opposing the dumping of nuclear wastes and nuclear testing in the Pacific, on the issue of the passage of nuclear-armed ships through the Pacific only Vanuatu and, recently, New Zealand do not allow visits by such ships to their countries. There is concern amongst the Pacific nations that by banning such visits they will close off the option of protection that may be required in some future circumstances. The belief in 'no access, no protection' has meant that no consensus has been reached within the region. For example, Papua New Guinea is a strong advocate for a nuclear-free Pacific, nonetheless it aligns with the Solomon Islands in allowing nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed vessels to visit its ports. It has been clear for some time that

the only way to reach agreement on a nuclear-free zone declaration would be to accept the passage of nuclear-armed and nuclear-propelled ships through the region.

At the 14th meeting of the South Pacific Forum held in Canberra in August 1983, the possibility of a nuclear-free zone was again canvassed. The motion was moved by the Australian Government. Once again the divisions amongst Pacific nations outlined above emerged and the motion failed to receive endorsement. Further discussion took place at the meeting of the Forum at Tuvalu in August 1984. At this meeting the Forum agreed on the desirability of establishing a nuclear-free zone, and to this end established a working party. While there appears to be no chance of having testing banned in the region, on the issue of nuclear dumping and the storage of nuclear waste, both the Japanese and American governments have been forced to reconsider their plans in response to strong opposition.

Access to Regional Resources

Of particular concern to all of the Pacific island states is economic security which involves both access to the resources within their own region and a collective self-reliance.

The establishment of 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones highlights the difficulty that Pacific island nations face in attempting to protect their own interests. Effective policing of these EEZ's is beyond the resources of the nations themselves and it is highly unlikely that any proposal to involve Australia and New Zealand in providing patrols in the region would be either acceptable or practicable.

With regard to the issue of resource exploitation in the region, it appears that those islands further to the east in the Pacific are more prepared to compromise in their approach to the utilisation of the region's resources and are more willing to accommodate the United States interests in the area.

As a result of this difference of emphasis within the Pacific group, the region has developed a sub-regional agreement. The Nauru Agreement was signed in February 1982 by Papua New Guinea, the Solomons, Palau, Nauru, Kiribati, the Marshalls and Micronesia after intransigence was shown by a number of other Pacific nations on the issue of fishing rights.

Nonetheless, there is agreement among the Pacific states that the exploitation of their fisheries by external powers, in particular the United States, is seen to be the only visible threat to the security of their natural resources. The United States has not signed the Law of the Sea Convention covering the right of jurisdiction over natural resources. There has been a history of boats from the United States fishing the waters of the Island states without always paying their licensing fees. Recent examples include the impounding of the United States registered fishing trawler 'Danika' by the Papua New Guinea Government in 1982 and the seizing by the Solomon Islands of the United States registered trawler, the 'Jeanette Diana' on 28 June 1984.

Accordingly, it is the security of natural resources in particular to which the Australian Government should address itself if it wishes to ensure the security of small island States in the South Pacific. This will involve providing assistance with the equipment and training necessary for the policing of fishing zones of small island States. Equally important, the Australian Government should be active diplomatically, supporting these small States to ensure that

their sovereignty is respected. Without diplomatic support the effectiveness of assistance through such projects as the provision of patrol boats will be reduced.

Collective Self-Reliance

The desire of the Pacific nations is for the development of mutual support and dependence thus lessening reliance on the outside world. According to Fry, 'this has been pursued in a variety of ways: the sharing of services; experts and training facilities, ...; a regional shipping line and a regional university; the promotion of an intra-regional trade; joint approaches to production and marketing problems; and the sharing of information and research'.²

However, as Fry then notes, this co-operation has only been marginally successful. He sees two reasons for this: firstly, the economic basis is not there - the islands are receiving a great deal of assistance from major powers in the region, especially Australia and the United States, (as well as some assistance from powers outside the region such as the EEC); and secondly the political will is absent.

The major theme underpinning all of the objectives of the Pacific countries is the exclusion of super-power rivalry from the region which they believe will reduce the threat of intervention in their affairs. It is important that Australia accept that the South Pacific nations wish to pursue independent foreign policies which allow them to determine their own interests. It is clear that the Pacific nations still believe that their interests are best served by looking to the ANZUS countries for security, support and ultimate protection. Indeed, Fry says that a few island countries have even sounded out the possibility of formal inclusion in the ANZUS treaty.

ENDNOTES

1. Dobb, Paul, 'The Interests of the Soviet Union in the Region: Implications for Regional Security' in International Security in the Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific Region, (ed), T.B. Miller, University of Queensland Press, 1983.
2. Submission, (Greg Fry), p. S168.

CHAPTER 5

DEFENCE FORCES IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

The South Pacific is the most stable region in the world. The area is free of super-power rivalry and faces no significant external threats either at present or in the foreseeable future. However, there are a number of strategic concerns that face the Pacific island states, and these concerns are reflected in the force structure of these island states.

Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea is the only country in the South Pacific which shares a common border with another country.

In April 1974 the Papua New Guinea Minister for Defence made a statement in the House of Assembly on planning and preparations to take over defence functions from the Australian Government on independence. He outlined the three broad responsibilities of the Papua New Guinea Force after independence:

- . to be able to defend the nation against external attack;
- . to be able to assist the police in the maintenance of public order and security if the police could not reasonably be expected to handle a particular situation, and
- . to contribute as required to economic development and the promotion of national administration and unity.¹

In a joint statement issued in Port Moresby on 11 February 1977 the Prime Ministers of Papua New Guinea and Australia the Rt. Hon. Michael Somare, MP, and the Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser, CH, MP, affirmed that the two Governments attached high importance to continuing the close co-operation between their two countries in defence matters. They acknowledged their Governments' desire to contribute to the strengthening of peace and stability in their common region. They declared that it was their Governments' intention to consult, at the request of either, about matters affecting their common security interests and about other aspects of their defence relationship (see Appendix 4).

Papua New Guinea maintains the largest defence force in the South Pacific with a strength of 3250 personnel. It is the only country in the region that has the three elements of a defence force - army, navy and air force. The largest element of the forces is the army, comprising two infantry battalions, an engineering battalion, a signal squadron and a support unit. The only heavy weapons in its inventory are 81mm field mortars. The air force possesses six DC3's and three Nomad aircraft, all of which were supplied under the Defence Co-operation Program. The maritime element of the Papua New Guinea forces has also been entirely sourced from the Defence Co-operation Program, with five ex-RAN Attack class patrol boats and two ex-RAN heavy landing craft.

A small number of Papua New Guinea defence personnel attend courses in New Zealand and New Zealand instructors are attached to the Papua New Guinea Defence Academy at Lae. The United States also has a small assistance program with Papua New Guinea with a budget of \$US20 000 in 1984 in the area of technical training and coastal surveillance courses. At present training only takes place in Papua New Guinea.

Fiji

The Royal Fiji Military Forces (2600 personnel) consist of three infantry battalions, an engineers company and three ex-USN mine sweepers, now used for fishery patrol. Other than the mine sweepers, the forces have no major pieces of equipment.

Fiji is the largest recipient of defence assistance from New Zealand. There is a substantial on-the-job training program in New Zealand. There are also a large number of New Zealand training teams in Fiji. The New Zealand armed forces regularly undertake training exercises in Fiji and are involved in reconstruction and rural development projects. The United States Government in 1983 provided \$55 000 for military education and training for Fiji. The assistance was intended to assist the Fijian forces in developing the skills needed to expand their own defence capability, especially in maintaining their role in the international peace-keeping forces in the Lebanon and the Sinai.

New Caledonia

France's military operations in the South Pacific are co-ordinated from New Caledonia. New Caledonia has no local military force of any significance, however at any one time about 2500 French troops are stationed in New Caledonia and facilities exist to provide for a considerably larger force.

Vanuatu

Vanuatu does not maintain military forces. However, there is a small mobile force of 300 personnel, which is developing a very limited defence capability. This force is responsible to the Commissioner of Police. The force consists of two rifle companies and a patrol vessel.

Tonga

Tonga maintains a small defence service (250 personnel) and has two patrol vessels and a landing craft. The defence service was established by New Zealand officers in 1954, and still receives considerable assistance from New Zealand mainly in the area of coastal navigation and seamanship courses. New Zealand forces also assist in reconstruction works after natural disasters, such as occurred when Hurricane Isaac struck Tonga in 1983. Tonga also receives modest training assistance from the United States. In 1984, \$30 000 was provided.

Solomon Islands

The Solomon Islands maintains a small police force of approximately 500 personnel and it is intended to upgrade their military skills in the near future. In 1985 the United States will commence a small training program worth \$30 000 to assist in this program.

Other South Pacific Countries

New Zealand provides military assistance to the Cook Islands (reef blasting) and Niue (rock blasting), countries with which Australia does not maintain a Defence Co-operation Program.

No other state in the South Pacific has any military capabilities beyond a local constabulary. It is clear that all the countries of the South Pacific are heavily dependent on Australia and New Zealand for equipping and maintaining their defence forces. Fiji, for example, was only able to contribute to the peace-keeping force in the Lebanon after Australia supplied transport, ammunition and equipment to the Fijian defence forces. The level of defence capability of the states in

the region is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Nor is there likely to be pressure from the South Pacific states themselves to alter the type and direction of assistance that is provided under the Defence Co-operation Program.

ENDNOTE

1. Defence Report, 1974, p. 6.

CHAPTER 6

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION PROGRAM BY COUNTRIES

South East Asia

The cornerstone of our strategic interests in South East Asia is support for ASEAN, which has been highly effective in enhancing regional stability and prosperity. The continuance of this friendly environment is seen to be essential if we are to ensure that Australia remains secure over the longer term. Recognition of the strategic importance of ASEAN is manifested collectively through treaties, and individually through the Defence Co-operation Program which Australia has with ASEAN.

Responding to recent changes in the geo-political environment, the ASEAN nations have upgraded their defence capabilities. To assist in achieving this, these countries have turned to Australia for assistance in achieving their goal of defence self-reliance. 'This goal is consistent with Australia's own national interest in the region.'¹

Vietnam

During the 1960's Australia's regional activities were dominated by our commitment to maintaining military forces in Vietnam.

A new program of military aid to South Vietnam, which formed a part of the co-ordinated program of overall aid by Australia, was included in the Defence estimates for the first time in 1970/71. The program involved: an expansion of the already existing Australian military training and advisory role;

the establishment of an Australian-sponsored jungle warfare training centre at Nui Dat; the supply of military equipment for the South Vietnamese forces; and an expanded participation by military personnel in civil action and related activities including projects to provide housing for units of the South Vietnamese armed forces by Australian engineers and the Civil Affairs unit.²

On 18 August 1971, the Prime Minister announced that the Government intended to withdraw all remaining Australian combat forces from Vietnam, most of whom returned to Australia by Christmas, 1971. However, the Government at the same time increased its defence assistance to South Vietnam with a proposed aid package totalling \$25m for the period 1971-74. This included civil aid projects and defence aid. The defence part of the package took the form of military training of personnel of the Vietnamese armed forces in Australia and the provision of equipment for the South Vietnamese armed forces. An advisory and assistance group of some 140 Australian personnel remained to assist in the training of South Vietnam's armed forces.³

At the same time, assistance in the form of training and equipment was given to Cambodia (now also known as Kampuchea). The 'Australian Army Assistance Group Vietnam' contributed to a United States program of training Cambodian Army battalions brought into South Vietnam for that purpose. During this period, more than 70 Cambodian specialist officers and NCOs, both Army and Air Force, were in Australia as trainees.⁴

Immediately upon coming to office in December 1972 the new Labor Government brought to an end Australia's military involvement in Vietnam. The supply of Australian defence aid to South Vietnam and the program of military training for Cambodian personnel were terminated. Defence aid to South Vietnam totalled \$2.2m in 1970/71, \$3.280m in 1971/72 and \$0.482m in 1972/73 (out of a budgeted \$2.164m for 1972/73) (see Appendix 6).

Malaysia

Australia's defence co-operation with Malaysia originated in 1963. From 1963 to 1970, the main emphasis was on equipment, training of Malaysian personnel in Australia and the secondment of Australian defence personnel to Malaysia. In 1969 ten Sabre aircraft were transferred to the Royal Malaysian Air Force and RMAF personnel were trained in the operations of the Sabre by the RAAF. From a commitment of \$0.144m in 1963, Australian defence aid to Malaysia reached \$6.520m by 1969-70.

In part, Australia's commitment to Malaysia (including Singapore) during this period can be seen in the context of the withdrawal of British forces from the region. Rather than attempt to assume the role that the British forces had previously fulfilled, the Australian Government at the time, believed it would be more effective in the long term if an indigenous military force in the region was developed.

Thus, while Australia retained a military presence in Malaysia and Singapore (consisting of two squadrons of Mirages, one ship of the RAN and a ground force of 1200 men) until 1975, greater effort was put into developing a more organised Defence Co-operation Program that would contribute to the development of the defence forces of South East Asia.

In 1971, a three-year program of defence aid to Malaysia began. During this period, the program emphasised the provision of equipment, projects such as an armed forces manufacturing workshop, target ranges, a defence research centre and training in Australia.

In November 1971 the Five Power Defence Arrangements came into effect and replaced the arrangements of earlier years under the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. The Five Power

Arrangements provided that the Governments of Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, the United Kingdom and Australia, would co-operate in the field of defence, in accordance with their respective policies. In particular they undertook to assist in the development of the armed forces of Malaysia and Singapore. The agreement also provided that in the event of any form of armed attack externally organised or supported, or the threat of such attack, against Malaysia or Singapore, their Governments would immediately consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in relation to such an attack or threat. Australia's significant commitment to Malaysia (and Singapore) is still seen as part of Australia's undertaking to honour the terms of the Five Power Arrangements.

By 1975 a change in emphasis emerged with more consideration being given to advisory assistance, study visits, training and exercises rather than equipment oriented projects, which had previously dominated the program.

As was noted in Chapter 3, the main consideration in the development of the defence force structure of the ASEAN states, until the mid-1970's, was oriented towards counter-insurgency operations. However, with Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea in 1979, the emphasis of some regional defence forces changed from one of dealing with internal aggression to expanding and upgrading their defence forces to deal with an external aggressor. As a result of the sense of urgency that was expressed by all ASEAN nations, Australia's overall Defence Co-operation Program in 1980-81 increased by 25% over the previous year. For Malaysia the figure was 50%. The areas that were expanded were primarily in military training. Thus in 1979-80, 238 Malaysian personnel undertook training in, or made study visits to, Australia. In 1980-81 the number jumped to 521 (see Appendix 5).

Training still dominates the Program's expenditure on Malaysia, however the expansion of the Malaysian armed forces has meant that assistance is currently being sought to develop new capabilities and assisting in the establishment of new facilities. There are currently 15 Australian advisers on loan in Malaysia (see Appendix 3) - 12 of these advisers are involved in the establishment of an armoured/artillery centre and support facilities.

Singapore

Australia's Defence Co-operation Program with Singapore began in 1963 as part of Australia's program of defence aid to Malaysia. The 1966 Appropriation Bill No. 1 provided, for the first time, separate funding for defence aid to Singapore. Like Malaysia, funding initially concentrated on the provision of equipment for the Singaporean armed forces. Assistance included C130 flight simulators, microwave communication systems and Landrover ambulances (see Appendix 6).

The first trainees arrived in Australia in 1965. Since then some 470 Singaporean personnel have undertaken training in Australia under the Defence Co-operation Program. By the early 1970's training in Australia and the secondment of Australian service personnel were the main areas of co-operation with Singapore (see Appendix 5).

As a result of the heightened defence awareness that occurred in all ASEAN countries, expenditure on the Defence Co-operation Program with Singapore increased by some 43% in 1980-81 compared to the previous year (see Appendix 1). The main area of increase was in the number of trainees being brought to Australia. In 1979-80, there were 21 trainees, in 1980-81 there were 34 and by 1981-82 this had increased to 82. The number of

study visits requested by the Singapore Government also increased considerably. In 1979-80, there were 8 study visits, in 1980-81 these had increased to 60.

A further important development during 1982 was that for the first time Australian facilities were used by the Singapore armed forces for their own national training. In February 1982, six Singapore Air Force Skyhawk aircraft and a detachment of personnel began a training deployment for an indefinite period at RAAF Williamtown. The Singapore Army conducted a battalion group exercise in the Shoalwater Bay training area in Queensland in March and April 1982.⁵

Indonesia

Limited defence co-operation activity with Indonesia began in 1968. This mainly involved Indonesian defence personnel being trained in Australia. In June 1972 the Government announced Australia's first formal Defence Co-operation Program with Indonesia. \$20m was provided for the period July 1972 to June 1975. The program included the transfer of ex-RAAF Sabre jets (\$6.1m), mapping in Indonesia (\$2m), target ranges (\$0.870m) and training assistance. At the time it was seen as a model for future arrangements of its kind. Its guiding aims were to help develop self-reliance and the capability to resist external threats, through technical aid, training assistance, joint exercises and continuing consultations (Defence Report 1973:6). This was followed by a second three-year program from 1975-78 for which \$25m was committed.

By 1973, Indonesia had become the largest recipient of assistance under the Defence Co-operation Program, receiving more than all of the other ASEAN countries' combined (this continues to be the case today) (see Appendix 1).

The second three year program was dominated by the provision of Nomad aircraft, 16 metre craft, attack patrol boats and survey and mapping (see Appendix 6). Since then the program has been conducted on an annual basis.

In line with other ASEAN states, in 1981 Australia increased the number of trainees coming from Indonesia. Nonetheless, the number of trainees coming to Australia still has not returned to the level of the early 1970's. For example, in the period 1972 to 1975 there were 571 trainees from Indonesia who attended courses in Australia; for the period 1980 to 1983 the figure is 187. Indonesia was the only country receiving assistance under the Defence Co-operation Program to record a significant increase in project assistance in 1979 as a result of the Australian Government's reassessment of contact and co-operation with ASEAN countries. This increased level of assistance has remained constant since 1979. It should be noted that this reassessment of assistance to other countries in the ASEAN region resulted in an increase in funds for training and study visits rather than for project aid.

Philippines

Australia has maintained a Defence Co-operation Program with the Philippines since 1973. Until 1980, the program was dominated by the exchange of Defence personnel and Australian participation in joint army and naval exercises.

As with other ASEAN countries, Australia expanded the program with the Philippines significantly in 1980 in the area of training and by more direct involvement in project aid. Examples of such projects include the provision of an electronically controlled target range, assistance in the maintenance of 12 Nomad aircraft that the Philippine Air Force purchased in 1975 and the supply of medical kits (see Appendix 6).

Thailand

Though Australia has had a Defence Co-operation Program with Thailand since 1972-73, the level of involvement remained limited until the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam and the emergence of the refugee problem. Until 1980 defence co-operation with Thailand was dominated by training and study visitors. However, more attention is now directed toward providing project aid, mainly in the areas of new equipment for training schools, provision for the refurbishing of tracker aircraft and assistance in the maintenance of Nomad aircraft in service with by the Thai Air Force (see Appendix 6).

Because of Thailand's proximity to areas of instability in South East Asia, it is anticipated that Thailand will receive increasing support from Australia through the Defence Co-operation Program. Australian aid increased from \$0.65m in 1980-81 (ranking 8 in the level of assistance received), to \$5.09m in 1983-84. It is now ranked third in terms of the level of assistance provided (see Appendix 1).

Papua New Guinea

Like other nations of South East Asia and the South Pacific, the maintenance of Papua New Guinea's independence, territorial integrity and stability is in the best interests of Australia. However, the historically close and unique relationship that Australia has had with Papua New Guinea makes our commitment to Papua New Guinea special. This is reflected in the joint statement issued in 1977 by the Prime Ministers of Australia and Papua New Guinea on the future defence relationship between the two countries.

The joint statement said that both governments will 'consult, at the request of either, about matters affecting their common security interests and about other aspects of their

defence relationship' (see Appendix 4). This statement remains the basis of Australia's defence relationship with Papua New Guinea, including the Defence Co-operation Program. While the joint statement affirmed the importance that both Governments attach to continuing close co-operation in defence matters⁷ it falls short of a formal defence treaty.

Faced with limited budgetary resources, Australia's Defence Co-operation Program with Papua New Guinea is particularly important if that country is to become militarily self-reliant.

During the 1960's and early 1970's before independence, Australian defence forces were involved in the establishment of a Papua New Guinea division of the Navy and the development of the Pacific Islands regiment which, by 1975, consisted of 2 infantry battalions and support units.

Since attaining independence in 1975, Papua New Guinea has been the main recipient of Defence Co-operation Program funds. At the time of independence, some \$70m worth of Australian defence assets that were in Papua New Guinea were handed over to the Papua New Guinean defence forces. A further \$4m worth of assets were transferred to Papua New Guinea in 1975-76.

From the commencement of a program with Papua New Guinea an important element of the program has been the provision of Australian servicemen to assist in the functioning of the Papua New Guinea defence force. At the time of independence, there were some 679 Australian defence force personnel in Papua New Guinea. Since then the Australian defence force presence has gradually been reduced to 146 (as at 31 March 1983). The cost of loan personnel remains the most significant single cost in the program in 1983-84.

Papua New Guinea's main requirement for defence assistance continues to be for skilled manpower. This can be seen both in the number of defence personnel from Australia that are still on loan in Papua New Guinea and the numbers involved in training and study visits in Australia. One hundred and ninety-seven (197) Papua New Guinean defence personnel visited Australia in 1982-83, second in the number to those from Malaysia that trained in Australia in 1982-83 (see Appendix 5).

There is a growing use of short-term consultative visits to provide expertise not available from within Papua New Guinea's present defence resources. In 1982, for example, visits of this kind were made by Australian Defence personnel, including: a RAN and Defence Science and Technology Organisation team to study future requirements of the Papua New Guinea defence force maritime element; a combined Australian services team to assist in planning and running a command post exercise; and by Australian defence officers to study management and financial systems.

Major project assistance to Papua New Guinea has been of increasing significance since 1979. This has included provisions and maintenance of 6 Nomad aircraft and provisions for engineer advisers, improvement of a PABX telephone system, 6 Dakota aircraft, and assistance in survey work (see Appendix 6).

South Pacific

The island states have always had an important place in Australian strategic planning. All of the states are close to Australia and lie across our main lines of communication in the Pacific, from Japan in the north to the Americas in the east. Australia also has significant economic and commercial interests in the region.

Australia's interests are best served by ensuring security and stability in the region. Many of the countries are newly independent and politically fragile and, as the Jackson Committee noted, some face a difficult future. It is important that these states remain cohesive and independent and that the region generally be free of super-power rivalry.

Too much emphasis should not be placed on Australia's defence program with the South Pacific. Many of the countries have minimal or no defence force structure. In such cases it is argued that the Defence Co-operation Program is being used as an adjunct with other bilateral programs between Australia and the South Pacific. As the Department of Foreign Affairs says:

In enabling small island countries to draw on the considerable expertise available in the Australian Defence Forces (e.g. in the engineering, surveying, medical and music fields), which would otherwise be unavailable to them, the defence cooperation programs are often able to make a very effective contribution to general economic and social development.

Many of the defence cooperation projects undertaken in the South Pacific accordingly have little or no military focus and are distinguished from our other development assistance activities only by the involvement of Australian Defence Force resources.⁸

Fiji

Australia has maintained a modest Defence Co-operation Program with Fiji since 1972 (see Appendix 2). Until 1978, assistance was in the areas of training and advisory support.

In 1978 a decision was made to expand defence assistance with islands of the South Pacific. For Fiji, this involved project assistance, survey and mapping activities and

the supply of rifles and ammunition to equip the Fiji peace-keeping force in the Lebanon. Most of the assistance has been of a civil rather than a military nature.

Solomon Islands

A Defence Co-operation Program with the Solomon Islands has been in operation since 1978 (see Appendix 2). From 1978-83, 43 defence personnel trained in Australia under the Defence Co-operation Program (see Appendix 5). Projects and activities have been of a civil nature involving channel clearance, hydrographic survey work, police communications and malaria control. Australia also provided a 16 metre patrol boat for surveillance work in 1979 and Australian advisers have included three Army bandsmen who provided instruction for the Solomon Islands Police Band (see Appendix 6).

Tonga

A Defence Co-operation Program with Tonga was initiated in 1978. Since then, there has been a steady increase in the number of trainees attending courses in Australia. Australian advisers, vehicles and an ex-Army landing craft have been provided (see Appendix 6).

Vanuatu

The lack of a defence force in Vanuatu is reflected in Australia's program with this country. Australia has provided a bandmaster to train a police band, an adviser and equipment to develop catering skills in the police force and equipment and specialist training for the newly established police mobile force. Australian defence personnel also have been involved in the production of maps, a malaria control program and a rural water supply project (see Appendix 6).

Kiribati

Australia's Defence Co-operation Program with Kiribati is typical of Australia's defence assistance with other South Pacific nations where there is no military force. Assistance is of a civil nature involving channel clearance work and survey work for their Exclusive Economic Zone (see Appendix 6).

Western Samoa

An example of how defence assistance can cover all areas is seen in Western Samoa. In 1983 Australian army catering experts assisted in the catering for the South Pacific Games. There was also preliminary work undertaken to provide search and rescue equipment to the Police. Assistance to Western Samoa commenced in 1982/83 (see Appendix 6).

Other countries (other than the South Pacific and ASEAN)

Since 1976 Australia has provided modest funds under the Defence Co-operation Program to allow training and study visits by defence personnel from countries beyond Australia's primary areas of strategic concern. Countries that have been involved include India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, South Korea, Nigeria, Burma and the Seychelles.

ENDNOTES

1. Submission, (Foreign Affairs), p. S134.
2. Defence Report, 1970, p. 5.
3. Defence Report, 1972, p. 5.
4. Defence Report, 1972, p. 5.
5. Defence Report, 1981-82, p. 5.
6. Defence Report, 1973, p. 5.
7. Submission, (Defence), p. S54.
8. Submission, (Foreign Affairs), p. S132.

CHAPTER 7

THE DEFENCE CO-OPERATION PROGRAM - ISSUES OF CONTENTION

Purposes and Objectives

There is only minimal awareness within Australia of Australia's defence co-operation policies and programs with countries in the Asian-Pacific region.

Detailed information on the Defence Co-operation Program is not easily obtained. An air of secrecy surrounds the program, apparently partly because of security concerns (real or unreal) and partly because of commercial interest involved.¹

The Committee saw the inquiry as an opportunity for the Departments involved with the Defence Co-operation Program to put on the public record the purpose, objectives, policies, management and achievements of Defence Co-operation Programs.

This opportunity was not grasped fully by the respective Departments. Evidence presented to the Committee often was inadequate. For instance, the Department of Defence, in reply to a question on monitoring the success of Defence Co-operation Program's stated:

The Department itself also monitors the program in terms of its own criteria for effectiveness. Those criteria relate to achieving the objectives that we have established for the program of developing effective capabilities in regional countries and of achieving co-operative activities which are common and agreed between the

countries concerned. Those objectives are regularly assessed against each program in the course of developing the activities.²

From this explanation at least two statements of some substance can be extracted: namely that the criteria relate to (i) developing effective capabilities in regional countries and (ii) achieving co-operative activities which are common and agreed between the countries concerned. However, no hard information was offered to the Committee by the Department of Defence to elucidate this statement.

The use of terminology by the Departments such as 'criteria', 'achieving the objectives', 'developing effective capabilities', 'achieving co-operative activities' and 'objectives regularly assessed against each program', fail to establish what the true criteria and objectives are.

This feeling of events occurring in a policy vacuum was felt by others. Hawker Pacific, in its submission to the Committee stated that they had to base their comments on a number of assumptions about the Defence Co-operation Program 'As the exact terms of reference under which the Divisions controlling Defence Co-operative Programmes [operate] are not known to us ...'.³ The stated long term objective of the program - security (from Australia's perspective) is hardly an adequate criterion for assessing individual programs and the needs of individual countries, and provides no specific guidance for the development of useful programs.

The Australian Council for Overseas Aid pointed out in their submission, that the promotion of 'national independence of participating countries' is usually the first line of any statement of objectives of the Defence Co-operation Program. This presumes that the possession of a defence force or more particularly that the degree of defence capability Australia is able to promote through Defence Co-operation Programs is a relevant factor determining a nations' independence.⁴

The Committee cautions the over-dependence of the use of the simplistic objective of 'national independence' as the guiding principle in determining Australia's Defence Co-operation Program.

South West Pacific Islands like Vanuatu and Tuvalu have no defence capability as we understand it and yet they are independent. With no industrial base and small export earnings assistance to develop a defence capability will build up a dependence on imported technology, equipment parts, organisation and structure and skills. Such a dependence will mean increased budgetary costs for the island states.

In addition as Arthur Schlesinger Jr said, 'self-determination was attractive as long as national independence seemed a way of assuring democratic decencies. But, as General Idi Amin has been only the most recent tyrant to demonstrate, states may meet all the criteria of national self-determination and still be blots on the planet'.⁵

Regional Progress and Australia's Strategic Interests

During the course of the inquiry, the Committee received evidence on the internal political situation in some of the countries with which Australia has a Defence Co-operation Program. In particular, the abuse of human rights in these countries was a major concern of a number of witnesses. It was argued that Australia should not maintain a Defence Co-operation Program with any country whose human rights record is not good. As a recent British survey identified only one country in the Asian region (Japan) as not being involved in the violation of internationally accepted human rights, the implications are clear.⁶

Implicit in the above argument by witnesses linking the Defence Co-operation Program with human rights is that the provision of military assistance implies a pledge by the Australian Government of uncritical support of a regime or, potentially, actual assistance in the repression of a community. The Department of Foreign Affairs argues that it is possible for military assistance to be provided while '... stopping short of any involvement which might be construed as support of particular regimes'.⁷ The Department of Defence also argued that 'Defence Co-operation Programs are not intended to draw neighbouring countries into our alliance commitments, or to signify Australian endorsement of their policies'.⁸

Elsewhere, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs is less circumspect. They maintain that:

the Defence Co-operation Program

'... can also serve as a valuable statement of support, falling somewhat short of a formal security alliance';⁹

it has

'a symbolic importance ... as a natural part of a friendly bilateral relationship' ¹⁰ and;

the decisions to offer military assistance 'are based on principles within which human rights considerations are implicit ...'.¹¹

The Committee does not believe that these observations by Foreign Affairs fit comfortably together with the initial statement by Foreign Affairs and Defence that the Defence Co-operation Program does not involve support for a particular regime. If Human Rights considerations are implicit in providing a program, then the provision of such a program must imply some form of endorsement for particular regimes. Indeed, if nothing else, this simply highlights the degree of uncertainty and

confusion that exists within and between departments on what may be the long-term implications of a co-operation program with a particular country, both for Australia and the recipient.

The aims of the Defence Co-operation Programs are specifically to assist recipient nations develop their defence capacity and, more generally, to foster good relations with the Government and peoples of the recipient countries. It is incumbent on the Australian Government to consider whether a particular program is, in fact, achieving these objectives rather than being continued merely out of habit. A number of witnesses to this inquiry argued that the continued provision of aid to regimes which are engaged in suppression by force of internal opposition may represent a failure of the Defence Co-operation Program.

In practical terms, providing equipment to a government whose principal military concern is the repression of internal opposition will not enhance its defence capability in the sense of contributing to regional stability. Explicit military support for such regimes may, despite the low level of that support, result in Australia being identified with transient and unpopular regimes and thus weaken our standing within the recipient country and throughout the region.

Obviously the decision to provide a program will involve value judgments which will be political in nature and must be assessed against other policy considerations. Nonetheless, if Australia is to be sincere in its concern for human rights it must be prepared to exhibit that concern in its own region and if necessary accept some short term hostility from individual governments as a result.

Our standing in the international community is very good. This is exemplified in Australia's recent election as a

member of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. As Mr Hayden said, '... (this) result reflected widespread international recognition of Australia's commitment to constructive international action to promote the realisation of human rights and to combat gross violations of human rights wherever they might occur'.¹²

Moral judgments are difficult to make in the provision of the Defence Co-operation Program, nonetheless the Committee is of the opinion that human rights considerations can be a valid criterion in the assessment of a particular program and that this consideration should be explicit rather than implicit.

The Defence Co-operation Program and Civil Projects

Not all the projects under the Defence Co-operation Program can be described as military assistance. In 1983-84 some 16% of the program was of a civil nature.¹³

Australia's use of the Defence Co-operation Program for assistance in civil aid activities is apparent in the South Pacific. Except for some minor assistance to Fiji, the remainder of the \$3.395m that was allocated to the South Pacific in 1982/83 was for projects of a non-military type.

The Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) recommends that the Defence Co-operation Program should not seek to achieve development goals. ACFOA believes that as the Australian Development Assistance Bureau (ADAB) is the section of the Government charged with assisting development in Third World countries, ADAB is better placed than the Defence Department to assess needs and develop appropriate policies.¹⁴

It has also been argued that the use of Australian service personnel on civil projects confuses the legitimate role of defence with that of development assistance. The Committee

found no suggestion of this and notes that regional defence forces are already used on civil projects in their own countries.

The Committee was informed that there is a regular exchange at a day-to-day desk level between Defence and ADAB where the Defence Co-operation Program is of a civil nature. What was not determined was whether projects under the Defence Co-operation Program received the same scrutiny for priority, cost effectiveness and management that they would receive if they were to be provided under ADAB.

In the hearings, officers associated with the program and ADAB were not able to explain cogently to the Committee the methods for ensuring the daily co-operation between the two agencies. This lack of explanation leaves the Committee with some doubts as to the effectiveness of their operation.

The Committee has no objection to the provision of what amounts to civil aid to the Pacific Islands involving military personnel. It accepts that defence personnel may be the most appropriate to carry out particular projects of a civil nature at a project level. However, the Committee lacks sufficient evidence to recommend one way or other whether the Department of Defence or ADAB should have overriding responsibility for civil projects involving defence personnel. The Committee was not presented with any evidence to indicate which was the most cost-effective way of controlling such projects.

Aid and Trade

It was argued before the Committee that the Defence Co-operation Program provides Australian industry with opportunities to develop an export market and 'helps develop bonds that are advantageous to Australia's defence industry effort'.¹⁵

Many countries take advantage of defence assistance to promote the sale of their own defence equipment. In hearings before the Committee on Appropriations in the United States House of Representatives, the Government said that 'the net effect of these programs (of military assistance) and agreements should be to enhance the sale by private US firms of both military and commercial equipment'.¹⁶ However, the policy of the Australian Government always has been of untied bilateral aid in both the civil and military areas. It is Australian Government policy that recipient countries decide their own priorities and requests for assistance comes through Australian High Commissions and Embassies.

There is a desire in some quarters for the notion of 'aid and trade' to be more closely linked. One witness said that Australia is seen as naive as no other country in the world is so generous with its aid. 'If the equipment is good enough to give them and to be accepted and put into service, I believe it should be good enough to be standardised so that further supplies and support come from Australian industry.'¹⁷

The Department of Defence Support argues that this is already occurring; 'that the recipient countries tend to 'lock in' to our goods and services when they are eventually in a position to buy these'.¹⁸

This 'lock-in' occurs because:

- (a) 'There develops a 'broad' familiarity with the users. If the equipment is of high quality and suited to the contracted country's needs, then Australia's image of a supplier is enhanced;
- (b) There is a continuing liaison between Australia as a supplier and the recipient country through service and maintenance agreements ...;

- (c) There is an increased possibility that the recipient of defence goods would deal preferentially with Australia as a future customer - because of technological compatibility ...'19

Yet the only evidence that the Committee received contradicted this assertion. There are very few examples where sales of equipment followed the supply of equipment under the Defence Co-operation Program. In the case of Nomads, for example, Australia has been singularly unsuccessful in the sale of Nomad aircraft to Indonesia and Papua New Guinea even though both countries have received significant numbers of Nomad aircraft under the Defence Co-operation Program. Indeed, elsewhere in their submission, the Department of Defence Support states that 'Australia's experience to date as an exporter of defence related products has been disappointing', with price, delivery, scheduling and quality being seen as the factors acting against Australia (Submission: 7).

With regard to the program in the South Pacific, two points can be made: firstly, the sale of defence equipment to countries in the South Pacific is extremely limited given the small scale of the defence forces in the South Pacific and secondly; the Defence Co-operation Program in the South Pacific is primarily of a civil nature, therefore the 'lock-in' factor will be very slight. Indeed any attempt to develop the South Pacific as a market for defence equipment would be at the least irresponsible given the lack of military tension within the area.

The Committee believes that the Defence Co-operation Program is not a suitable means of promoting defence industries and notes the failure to achieve this in the past.

What Type of Defence Assistance?

What type of assistance should Australia be providing to countries in South East Asia and the South Pacific? Because of the lack of evidence and the inability of the Committee to question recipient countries directly, the Committee can only make some general observations.

The focus of Australia's defence assistance is directed mainly toward the transfer of skills and technology and of equipment which is supportive in nature rather than that which may directly enhance the defence capabilities ('the sharp end') of particular countries.²¹ While such a distinction may at times become blurred, the Committee supports such a policy but emphasises that ongoing evaluation of each program is the only way of ensuring that any equipment does not become used in an overtly aggressive manner.

Australia should assist recipients in measures which the latter see as improving national security but should ensure that such assistance does not provoke long-term budgetary problems among recipients. The provision of patrol boats to some of the South Pacific states seems likely to pose the latter danger. Few have the infrastructure that is necessary to support the operation of such craft, and Australia should be careful to ensure that in 'donating' such items, undue pressure is not placed on the recipient country in its attempt to maintain and crew the boats.

In the provision of military assistance, care must be taken to ensure that the aid does not build into the economies of these small island states further commitments which they may be unable to meet in the long term.

Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Program

A Departmental officer, during evidence to the Committee, was asked a question on monitoring the effectiveness of the program. He replied to the Committee 'you would be aware of the regular Senate Estimates Committee consideration of the estimates and in particular the opportunity senators have to question the program in some detail'.²²

However, that same officer, when asked in the Senate Additional Estimates Committee hearings in May 1984, for detailed information relating to proposed Defence Co-operation Program expenditure replied by referring the Estimates Committee to his Department's submission and evidence given to this Committee. This, he said, contained the information being sought. But in fact the Department's submission and evidence to the inquiry on Defence Co-operation Programs did not contain all the required information.

The Committee during the course of its inquiry examined the Explanatory Notes of the Estimates of the Department of Defence since 1970 to seek extra information on the Defence Co-operation Program. The exercise was frustrating as the notes vary in layout, sometimes significantly, year by year and the level of information in the notes is usually minimal. As an example, from 1971-73, projects provided under the Defence Co-operation Program for each country were under a one line heading - 'Projects'. From 1973-78/79, it was decided that 'Projects' would be itemised. Then in 1979, an arbitrary and regressive decision was made by the Department to return to a single line heading of 'Projects', thus deleting the extra information.

The Committee is concerned that there is a lack of information on the Defence Co-operation Program for scrutiny by the public and Parliament. One way of providing this would be for the Departmental explanatory notes on the Defence Co-operation Program to be more expansive so that there is a true opportunity for Senators to examine the program in detail. This would mean that there would need to be a clear policy decision on the objectives of the Defence Co-operation Program which the Committee believes is lacking at the moment. This lack of a clear statement of policy is severely hampering proper evaluation of the Defence Co-operation Program, especially in the Estimates hearings.

For this proper scrutiny to occur the Committee would like to see the explanatory notes reorganised in the following manner:

- . In the synopsis of Division 240 (DCP) there should be an explanation of the long term basis for the program.
- . For each country the purpose of the item of expenditure should be the justification of maintaining a program with that country. The current wording simply says 'This item covers payments in respect of the continuation of the Defence Co-operation Program ...' This tells the Parliament nothing of why Australia needs to maintain a program with these countries. The explanation should inform Parliament of the criteria that are used for individual programs which satisfy Australia's long term interest in the area.
- . For each project or category there should be:
 1. An explanation of what the project or category entails.

2. How it fits into the program's overall objectives
3. When the project commenced.
4. Estimated cost at the commencement of the project.
5. Expenditure on the project or category in the last financial year.
6. Estimated expenditure for this financial year.
7. Total expenditure on the project or category to date.
8. Total project cost.
9. Where civil aid costs are funded through the Defence Co-operation Program, the explanatory notes should identify how it fits into ADAB objectives.

Until this information is made available to Parliament, through the explanatory notes, and to the public, in the form of a booklet, public debate on the program will be ill-informed.

As an example of the danger of restricting information, ACFOA, in its monthly publication News, claimed that 'each year a portion of the Government's Defence Co-operation Program (DCP) is charged to the aid vote'.²³ While this is incorrect, the mistake is understandable.

The Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean is not within the Committee's terms of reference. Nonetheless, in the course of the inquiry the importance of the Indian Ocean was raised both in hearings and

in the public arena. As it appears that consideration is now being given to commencing a Defence Co-operation Program with Indian Ocean Island States, the Committee feels compelled to make some preliminary observations on such a possibility.

(i) Importance to Australia

On 17 January 1984 the Government announced that it had approved guidelines for a comprehensive and integrated policy approach to Indian Ocean issues. In making the announcement, the Foreign Minister, Mr Hayden, said that the guidelines were consistent with the Government's desire to focus Australia's foreign policy towards our region. If the Defence Co-operation Program is to serve Australia's national interest in its immediate region and strategic environment, the inclusion of the Indian Ocean island states in the scheme deserves close analysis in the context of greater recognition of the importance of the Indian Ocean region.

A number of factors lie behind the Government's interest in the Indian Ocean region. These include:

- . the responsibility of the Government to protect Australia's western coastline, our offshore resources, and territories (including Christmas Island and the Cocos Islands);
- . the need to ensure secure lines of communication for our trade and civil aviation traffic through the region - a concern shared by our allies and trading partners (22 per cent of our shipping crosses the Indian Ocean);
- . the instability created by conflicts on the littoral and in the hinterland of the region (including the Gulf War, the invasion of Afghanistan, conflict in the Horn

of Africa, instability in Southern Africa, the tension between India and Pakistan) - all of which have contributed to an increased naval and military presence by outside powers, including both super-powers;

- . appreciation that, in a conflict in the north west quadrant of the Indian Ocean, and more specifically, in the Persian Gulf area, the United States may take a westward route for its military forces to the area in a time of crisis, including use of the US base at Diego Garcia;
- . a need for humanitarian aid and development assistance in many of the poorer states on the littoral and in the Indian Ocean. There is a recognition that Australia could become increasingly important to the region as a source of aid, training, technology and investment;
- . the lack of cohesion and co-operation between island states of the Indian Ocean which inhibits their national development; and
- . the commitment of the Australian Government to the idea of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace while recognising that because of the conflict and instability in the region, this is not possible at the moment.

A reason often advanced for Australia's apparent lower level of interest in the Indian Ocean until recently is that most of our population live on the eastern seaboard and are therefore not aware of the problems to our west.

However, as the Committee to Review the Australian Overseas Aid Program (Jackson Committee) said:

Australia is a major littoral of the Indian Ocean. The small island states are of strategic importance to Australia given our continuing imports of Gulf oil and dependence on sea lines of communication with Western Europe. Australia has a favourable balance of trade with all four states. There are significant numbers of Indian Ocean islanders, especially Mauritians and Seychellois, living in Australia. There are historical links with Mauritius, and now regular air services. However, Australia's visibility in the Indian Ocean is not the same as in the South Pacific. For example, even though ties are growing, Australia does not have resident diplomatic representation in any of the four island states, although representation is to be established in Mauritius in 1984.²⁴

(ii) Recent Proposals to Promote Australian Interests

Under the guidelines released by the Australian Government, it was announced that Australia would:

- . recognise the importance of Australia's status as an independent but aligned Indian Ocean littoral state, both for the pursuance of our own interests and those of our allies;
- . continue to play an active role in the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean; maintain the goal of the resumption of United States/Soviet talks on arms limitation in the region; and support other arms limitation initiatives where these accord with Australia's assessment of its own interests and those of the region as a whole; and
- . seek to give greater attention to the development of relations with Indian Ocean island states; and to a lesser extent East African States, by broadening our

links with these countries through, for example, cultural exchanges and visits, and by the establishment of a regular pattern of naval visits.

In announcing the guidelines, Mr Hayden said that the Government sought to place greater emphasis on the pursuit of what Australia judged to be its interests and priorities in the region. At the same time, Australia would recognise that in pursuing its interests the Government would be seeking to give appropriate support to Western interests in the region.

The general thrust of the Government's new policy approach was consistent with the findings of the Jackson Committee in the context of its proposals for Australian priorities in giving aid.

The Jackson Report said, in relation to the Indian Ocean islands states:

These states face similar development constraints to those of the South Pacific, but they lack the subsistence affluence and cultural resilience which exists in the Pacific. They deserve special consideration within the Australian aid program.²⁵

In addition, in relation to the 'Eligibility Framework' for Australian aid, the Indian Ocean islands should be in the highest category:

This category is designed to respond to our special relationship with Papua New Guinea and concern for the problems of island developing countries, particularly in the South Pacific ... The only other states for which budget support should be considered are the smallest states in this category, and then only in exceptional circumstances.²⁶

The opening of a post in Mauritius in 1984 was a substantive expression of the increasing importance with which Australia is regarding the region.

(iii) The Department of Foreign Affairs Submission

The Department of Foreign Affairs opened its discussion of the Defence Co-operation Program in the context of Indian Ocean states as follows:

In the light of the current review of Australia's policy towards the Indian Ocean it may be desirable to explore the possibility of a small defence cooperation program to extend training and other practical assistance to selected Indian Ocean island states, stopping short of any involvement which might be construed as support of particular regimes.²⁷

As it was not within the Committee's terms of reference, the Department of Defence did not address the issue of extending the Defence Co-operation Program to include Indian Ocean island states in its submission to the Committee.

(iv) Other Parliamentary Committee Reports on the Indian Ocean

The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence tabled a report on 'Australia and the Indian Ocean Region' in November 1976. In that report the Committee noted the growing importance of the region to Australia, and made a number of recommendations relating to it. Some of the recommendations related to the need for naval and maritime surveillance and for the upgrading of defence facilities on our West Coast, matters which have now been addressed by the Government. The Committee made a number of observations about other matters which are not relevant to the issue of a possible Defence Co-operation Program in the island states.

Three reports of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence have made passing reference to the growing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean to Australia, especially in the wake of the Iraq-Iran War, the Ethiopian-Somali War of 1977 and its aftermath, and the naval build-up by the United States, the Soviet Union, and France in the northwest quadrant. The competition for port and air facilities between the super-powers is also referred to.²⁸

(v) Discussion

The proposal to include the Indian Ocean in the Defence Co-operation Program will depend on value judgements concerning the merit of the Defence Co-operation Program generally. To the extent that it has been easier to see tangible benefits flow from the Defence Co-operation Program in the island states of the Pacific than in South East Asia, an argument could be mounted that such a program could be equally successful in the Indian Ocean. It is among island states that the Defence Co-operation Program can contribute to ensuring territorial integrity and sovereignty, protection of fishing zones and EEZs, and contributing to civil economic development. The goodwill flowing therefrom, and the possibility of denying countries unfriendly to Australia a foothold in some of these countries may well be of advantage to us.

The Indian Ocean states are more remote from Australia than the Pacific Islands and this country does not have a tradition of involvement with them. They are culturally distinct and politically less stable. Thus the Department of Foreign Affairs proposal will need to be evaluated very carefully, especially since it means incurring more expenditure on a program, the rationale of, and the benefits from which, the Department of Defence has yet to satisfactorily explain.

General Conclusion

The Committee supports the concept of a Defence Co-operation Program where the emphasis is on support and training and where the aim is to transfer appropriate levels of technology to assist in the development of self-sufficiency.

However, the Committee has reservations regarding the functioning of the Defence Co-operation Program. The failure of the Departments involved (Defence, Foreign Affairs and Defence Support) to spell out clearly the objectives, purposes and criteria of the program raises questions about the clarity of those objectives and the effectiveness of the program in achieving them.

There is no doubt that the Defence Co-operation Program is expected to 'buy' something for Australia - an Australian presence in the region, regional security, closer links with the recipient country (in a political and economic sense)? Until the purpose of the program is more clearly established Australia's expectations will remain ill-defined.

The Committee accepts that it may be difficult to assess effectively some of the benefits of the program such as 'access to [recipients] strategic valuations ... to training and operational doctrines'.²⁹ Nonetheless, there appear to be no effective monitoring devices at various stages of Defence Co-operation Programs. The Committee is concerned that there are insufficient resources directed to program development, evaluation and monitoring.

The Committee believes that it is incumbent upon the Departments concerned to establish a more professional and consistent approach to the delivery of defence co-operation with our neighbours and to consult them frankly on their requirements.

The Committee believes that where a policy is vague there is often an inability to control it. With the lack of adequate guidelines it is not impossible for the program to get out of control.

Senator G.D. McIntosh
Chairman

October 1984

ENDNOTES

1. Submission, (Australian Council for Overseas Aid - ACFOA), p. S179.
2. Evidence, (23 February 1984, Defence), p. 7.
3. Submission, (Hawker Pacific Pty Limited), p. S310.
4. Submission, (ACFOA), p. S197.
5. Boston Globe, 13 March 1977, p. 171, 'Morality born again in U.S. Foreign Policy'.
6. C. Humana, World Human Rights Guide, Hutchison, London, 1983, p. 114.
7. Submission, (Foreign Affairs), p. S135.
8. Submission, (Defence), p. S3.
9. Submission, (Foreign Affairs) p. S135.
10. Submission, (Foreign Affairs), p. S135.
11. Submission, (Foreign Affairs), p. S138.
12. Australian Foreign Affairs Record, Volume 55, No. 7, July 1984, p. 713.
13. Report of the Committee to Review the Australian Overseas Aid Program, (Jackson Committee Report), March, 1984, p. 54.
14. Submission, (ACFOA), p. S189.
15. Submission, (Defence Support), p. S145.
16. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee of Appropriations House of Representatives, Ninety-eighty Congress, Second Session, p. 1430.
17. Evidence, (9 March, 1984, Hawker de Havilland Australia Pty Limited), p. 151.
18. Submission, (Defence Support), p. S143.
19. Submission, (Defence Support), pp. S143-144.
20. Submission, (Defence Support), p. S144.
21. Evidence, (23 February 1984, Defence) p. 8.
22. Evidence, (23 February 1984, Defence), p. 7.

23. ACFOA News, June 1984, p. 2.
24. Report of the Committee to Review the Australian overseas Aid Program, March 1984, p. 184.
25. op.cit., p. 186.
26. op.cit., p. 140.
27. Submission, (Foreign Affairs), p. S135.
28. See 'The Gulf and Australia', May, 1982, 'Some Observations on Australia's Diplomatic Representation in Africa and Adjacent Indian Ocean Island States', December, 1983, and 'Regional conflict and Super power rivalry in the Horn of Africa', April, 1984.
29. Evidence, (9 March 1984, Peter Hastings), p. 179.

DCP ASSISTANCE TO ASEAN COUNTRIES

	Malaysia	Singapore (A)	Indonesia (B)	Thailand (C)	Philippines (C)	Others (Asia/Africa)	Total
	\$M	\$M	\$M	\$M	\$M	\$M	\$M
1963/64	0.144	-	-	-	-	-	0.144
1964/65	3.376	-	-	-	-	-	3.376
1965/66	5.034	-	-	-	-	-	5.034
1966/67	7.563	0.473	-	-	-	-	8.036
1967/68	4.998	1.098	-	-	-	-	6.096
1968/69	4.620	1.623	-	-	-	-	6.243
1969/70	6.520	1.683	-	-	-	-	8.203
1970/71	3.540	1.453	-	-	-	-	4.993
1971/72	3.705	0.522	-	-	-	-	4.227
1972/73	5.523	0.917	3.763	0.006	0.022	0.072	10.303
1973/74	3.986	1.158	5.108	0.024	0.031	0.011	10.318
1974/75	3.931	1.262	5.565	0.032	0.031	0.006	10.827
1975/76	4.038	0.723	6.259	0.025	0.044	0.010	11.099
1976/77	3.892	0.699	6.596	0.031	0.077	0.034	11.329
1977/78	4.050	0.551	7.209	0.027	0.078	0.023	11.938
1978/79	3.963	0.394	7.183	0.053	0.090	0.048	11.731
1979/80	2.876	0.699	9.589	0.107	0.804	0.087	14.162
1980/81	3.909	1.175	11.935	0.650	1.161	0.247	19.077
1981/82	3.954	1.236	8.627	1.206	1.917	0.114	17.054
1982/83	4.859	1.594	10.184	3.839	1.520	0.412	22.408
Total	84.481	17.260	82.018	6.000	5.775	1.064	196.598

(A) Included in DCP with Malaysia until 1966/67

(B) Limited expenditure on Indonesia was included in the votes of the Defence and Service Departments 1968-72.

(C) Assistance to Thailand and Philippines charged to SEATO Aid under Department of Foreign Affairs funds prior to 1972/73.

SOURCE: Submission No. 25 - Department of Defence.

DGP ASSISTANCE TO PNG AND THE SOUTH WEST PACIFIC

APPENDIX 2

	PNG \$M	FIJI \$M	TONGA \$M	SOLOMON ISLANDS \$M	VANUATU \$M	KIRIBATI \$M	WESTERN SAMOA \$M	TOTAL \$M
1972/73	-	.003	-	-	-	-	-	.003
1973/74	-	.016	-	-	-	-	-	.016
1974/75	7.784*	.035	-	-	-	-	-	7.819
1975/76	15.684*	.061	-	-	-	-	-	15.745
1976/77	13.968	.071	-	-	-	-	-	14.039
1977/78	15.043	.300	.014	.006	-	-	-	15.363
1978/79	11.511	.553	.069	.700	-	-	-	12.833 ⁸
1979/80	14.178	.605	.221	.120	-	-	-	15.124
1980/81	15.240	.498	.416	.744	.893	-	-	17.791
1981/82	16.654	1.160	.748	.701	.282	.148	.003	19.696
1982/83	17.280	.981	.322	1.242	.546	.219	.031	20.621
TOTAL	127.342	4.283	1.790	3.513	1.721	.367	.034	139.050

* FY74/75 AND 1975/76 also saw the transfer of Australian defence assets (valued at \$74.0M) to PNG; and in 1975/76 an \$8.1M financial assistance grant to supplement the PNG budget allocation for Defence.

SOURCE: Submission No. 25 - Department of Defence.

AUSTRALIAN ADVISERS ON LOANS AS AT 31 MARCH 1983

Country	Civilian	Navy	Army	Air Force	Total
Malaysia	2	-	13	-	15
Indonesia	2	1	2	2	7
Papua New Guinea	3	18	65	22	*108
Thailand	3	-	-	-	3
Singapore	-	1	-	5	6
Fiji	-	2	1	-	3
Tonga	-	2	1	1	4
Solomon Islands	-	1		-	1
Vanuatu	-	1	4	-	5
Philippines	-	-	8	-	8
Sub Totals	10	26	94	30	160

* In addition to the above, there were personnel serving with Army Engineer and Survey units based in PNG, one Army Communications Officer with the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary and Australian Defence Force personnel undertaking administrative work connected with the DCP in the Australian High Commission, Port Moresby - a total of 41 at 31 March 1983.

SOURCE: Submission No. 25 - Department of Defence.

JOINT STATEMENT BY PRIME MINISTERS
ON THE DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PAPUA NEW GUINEA AND AUSTRALIA

The Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, the Rt. Hon. Michael Somare, MP, and the Prime Minister of Australia, the Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser, CH, MP, today issued a joint statement on the future defence relationship between Papua New Guinea and Australia.

The two Prime Ministers affirmed that both their Governments attached high importance to continuing the close co-operation between their two countries in defence matters. They acknowledged their Governments' desire to contribute to the strengthening of peace and stability in their common region. They declared that it was their Governments' intention to consult, at the request of either, about matters affecting their common security interests and about other aspects of their defence relationship.

Mr Fraser confirmed Australia's willingness to continue, at the request of the Papua New Guinea Government, to assist in the development of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, and in development projects carried out by Australian Service units in Papua New Guinea, through such arrangements as:

- the attachment of Australian servicemen to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force
- the location in Papua New Guinea of formed units of the Australian Services
- the provision of military training, both in Australia and Papua New Guinea
- the undertaking of joint projects which will develop particular Papua New Guinea Defence Force capabilities
- co-operation in combined exercises between the Australian and Papua New Guinea forces in either country
- assistance with transport, logistic support and technical services.

The two Prime Ministers agreed that the continuation of such arrangements, and the details of their implementation, would be as decided by their two Governments from time to time.

The two Prime Ministers noted that both Governments had already entered into the following Agreement and subsidiary Arrangements negotiated by the Papua New Guinea Minister for Defence, the Hon. Sir Maori Kiki and the Australian Minister for Defence, the Hon. D.J. Killen:

- a Status of Forces Agreement to make proper legal provision, in accordance with customary international practice, for the status of all Service personnel from either country present in the other. This Agreement would be registered with the United Nations;
- an Arrangement for continuing with the provision of supply support to the Papua New Guinea Department of Defence by the Department of Defence, Australia; and
- an Arrangement to continue with consultative procedures to ensure that there would be adequate and timely consultations between their two Governments on politically sensitive situations in which Australian loan personnel might be involved.

Both Prime Ministers expressed their satisfaction and confidence that this joint statement, and the Agreement and Arrangements mentioned in it, appropriately reflected the desire of their Governments to maintain and develop the close and co-operative defence relationship between their two countries.

11 February 1977

APPENDIX 5

TRAINERS AND STUDY VISITORS TO AUSTRALIA UNDER THE DCP

	Malaysia	Philippines	Thailand	Singapore	Indonesia	Fiji	PNG	Tonga	Solomon Islands	Vanuatu	Other Countries	Total
1963	21	6										27
1964	33	4	6									43
1965	104	3	2	2								111
1966	118	2	5	-								125
1967	128	2	1	7							138	
1968	110	2	1	13	1							127 ⁵
1969	162	3	4	24	21							214
1970	290	4	6	14	43							357
1971	306	-	2	24	91							423
1972	268	7	8	21	240	1						545
1973	294	10	8	9	164	6						491
1974	304	13	11	8	141	12						489
1975	205	17	18	13	126	22	229					630
1976	363	27	8	15	81	30	104				4	632
1977	290	13	9	52	47	24	133				2	570
1978**	346	25	11	28	81	39	161	7	1		7	706

	Malaysia	Philippines	Thailand	Singapore	Indonesia	Fiji	PNG	Tonga	Solomon Islands	Vanuatu	Other Countries	Total
1978/ 79**	268 (9)*	31 (11)	15 (4)	25 (3)	63 (26)	11 (9)	95 (-)	- (1)	4 (-)		5	517 (63)
1979/ 80	204 (34)	34 (6)	21 (8)	35 (6)	60 (21)	19 (-)	110 (12)	7 (5)	1 (-)		8 (6)	499 (98)
1980/ 81	491 (30)	103 (12)	34 (60)	52 (27)	43 (27)	29 (4)	190 (3)	10 (1)	5 (1)		15 (8)	972 (173)
1981/ 82	651 (30)	87 (11)	82 (38)	64 (5)	66 (28)	43 (2)	208 (10)	11 (2)	12 (2)	(1)	9 (2)	1233 (131)
1982/ 83	406 (9)	112 (7)	63 (47)	64 (9)	80 (11)	39 (3)	185 (12)	16 (5)	14 (3)		38 (16)	1017 (122)

Footnotes:

* The figures in brackets represent the number of study visits in that year.

** Prior to 1978 training was done on a calendar year basis, there is some overlap of the 1978 and the 1978/79 figures.

SOURCE: Submission No. 25 - Department of Defence.

APPENDIX 6
(Source: Department of Defence)

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH MALAYSIA

(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Training and Study Visits to Australia	0.972	1.398	1.449	2.263	1.694	1.446	1.372	2.855	3.468	3.419	3.629		
Australian Advisers	0.354	0.298	0.267	0.346	0.232	0.231	0.196	0.163	-	-	-		
Combined Exercises					0.006	0.047	0.051	0.002	-	-	-	0.082	
Special Warfare Centre	0.078	0.110	0.285	0.346	0.220	0.307	0.264	0.044	0.014	0.093	-		
Defence Research Centre	0.131	0.169	0.200	0.089	0.352	0.292	0.136	0.080	0.087	0.110	0.106		
Armed Forces Manufacturing Centre	0.068	0.531	1.158	0.659	1.485	1.471	0.685	0.507	0.085	0.003	0.114		
Lumut Naval Base					0.001	-	0.021	0.001	-	-	-		
Medical Equipment			0.034	0.037	-	0.017	-	-	-	-	-		

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH MALAYSIA
(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Royal Malaysian Police Patrol Boats								0.150	-	-	-	-	-
Dart Ranges	0.359	0.071	0.062	0.001	-	-	-	0.172	0.008	-	-	-	-
Cataloguing Project									0.090	0.076	0.089	0.071	
Ordnance Training Project									0.137	0.084	0.003	-	
Miscellaneous	1.902	1.184	0.470	0.047	0.061	-	-	-	0.002	0.005	-	0.006	
Armoured Corps Adviser									0.087	0.080	-	-	
Armoured/Artillery/EME Assistance (AAATM)									0.035	0.703	1.289		
Titan Boats									0.012	0.040	-	-	
RAEME Adviser									0.088	-	-	-	
Air Photography									0.116	0.017			
Survey and Mapping									0.015	0.074			
Language Assistance									0.033	0.041			
Production Management Assistance									0.045	-			

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH MALAYSIA

(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Computer Logistics Assistance												0.014	0.228
School of Hydrography												0.008	0.021
Work Study Equipment													0.066
Projects													
Royal Malaysian Police Technical School			0.122	0.170	0.113	0.103	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL MALAYSIA	3.705	5.523	3.986	3.931	4.038	3.891	4.050	3.962	2.876	3.909	3.954	4.859	5.744

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH INDONESIA

(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Additional Attack Class Patrol Boats												1.733	2.375
Air Navigation Training classrooms			0.100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Instrument flying trainers			0.012	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Research and Development Stage 2												0.070	0.103
Anti-Malaria Assistance												0.016	0.001
Nomad 100 Hourly Menado												0.157	0.044
T56 Aircraft Engines												0.027	0.017
TNI-AU Nav aids/Comms/ Avionics												0.015	0.004
Mobile Air Photo Lab.												0.017	0.004
Ferret Engines												0.008	-
Titan Boats												0.217	0.067
Communications/Electronics Project												0.035	0.041
Nomad 100 Hourly Ambon													0.253

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH INDONESIA
(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Nomad 100 Hourly Sabang													0.247
Sioux Helicopter Stage 3													0.782
Computer Training Centre													0.036
TNI-AD Helicopter Maintenance													0.014
AMBAL Proving Ground													0.030
Projects Mobile Workshop					0.024	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Combined Exercises						0.075	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dart Electronic Target Ranges	0.078	0.551	0.232	0.049	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dental Equipment			0.022	0.029	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL INDONESIA	3.402	4.572	5.397	6.076	6.596	7.209	7.183	9.588	11.935	8.627	10.184	8.902	

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH PAPUA NEW GUINEA

(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Loan Personnel					11.225	10.769	11.138	8.605	8.345	8.117	9.631	9.900	9.143
Training and Study Visits in Australia					0.856	0.521	0.557	0.770	1.038	1.439	2.252	2.362	2.476
12 Chief Engineer Works					0.462	0.494	0.720	0.788	0.971	1.082	1.234	1.444	1.485
Survey Project					1.274	0.751	1.060	1.129	1.217	0.646	0.492	0.339	0.347
Trade Training Unit								0.018	0.004	-	0.130	0.069	0.045
ICM Spares								0.042	0.047	-	-	-	-
Patrol Boat Spares								0.003	-	-	-	-	-
GS Vehicles								0.016	-	-	-	-	-
Radar RM 916								0.003	-	-	-	-	-
Nomad Stage 1								0.074	0.245	0.303	0.028	incl. in Stage 2	-
SSB Transcievers								0.028	0.156	0.002	-	-	-
Miscellaneous								0.036	0.007	0.041	0.025	0.063	0.006
1979 Capital Items									0.368	0.657	0.062	-	-
Fire Fighting Engines									0.215	0.670	-	-	-

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH PAPUA NEW GUINEA

(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Nomad Stage 2									1.004	0.986	1.007	0.824	0.549
Dakota									0.445	0.072	0.385	0.055	-
Specialist Technical Advisory Teams									0.016	0.026	0.098	0.059	0.078
Combined Exercise								0.100	-	-	0.289	0.129	
RAAF Transport Assistance									0.545	-	0.077	-	
Patrol Boat (Replacement)									0.013	-	-	-	
Equipment Purchases in Country									0.393	-	-	-	
Equipment Outside Named Projects									0.253	-	-	-	
Portable Radios									0.103	-	-	-	
Housing Upgrade									0.278	0.050	-	-	
Cast Iron Cylinder Heads									0.486	0.003	-	-	
Chinook Support and Training									0.040	-	-	-	
Lombrum Wharf									0.020	0.030	-	-	

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH PAPUA NEW GUINEA
(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Maritime Capability Study											0.014	-	-
Low Cost Defence Housing											0.210	0.273	-
PAN Assistance to PNGDF											0.153	-	-
PNGDF Indonesian Language Course											0.006	-	-
Training Films											0.005	-	-
PABX Equipment											0.492	-	-
Taurama and Vanimo Feasibility Study											0.015	-	-
Flight Loader and Scales											0.005	0.243	-
Backhoe Equipment											0.126	0.319	-
Nomad Replacement											0.800	0.628	-
QAKEY Nomad Maintenance											-	-	0.349
81mm Mortars											-	-	0.174
ATS Replacement Accommodation											-	-	0.037
Medical and New Dental											-	-	0.025

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH PAPUA NEW GUINEA
(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Ambulances													0.004
Surveillance Cameras													0.002
Tentage													0.001
Communications Equipment													0.070
7.62mm Rifles													0.006
DC3 Refurbishment													0.125
Bosun Dinghy Replacement													0.023
English Teaching Development Course													0.015
Lancron Microwave Link													0.168
Projects/Equipment													-
Units in Support of PNGDF (Air Support)													-
TOTAL PAPUA NEW GUINEA	4.777	15.684	13.968	14.565	11.512	14.178	15.245	16.654	17.280	16.447			

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH PAPUA NEW GUINEA
(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Defence Financial Assistance Grant				3.007	8.100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Special Assistance				70.000	4.007	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH SINGAPORE

(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Training and Study Visits to Australia	0.025	0.175	0.054	0.216	0.095	0.075	0.479	0.876	0.897	1.123	1.167		
Australian Advisers	0.101	0.240	0.270	0.322	0.349	0.211	0.220	0.255	0.339	0.471	0.450		
Combined Exercises			0.105	0.111	0.005	-	-	0.044	-	-	-		
Defence Cataloguing			0.014	0.035	0.047	0.008	-	-	-	-	-		
CL30 Simulator						0.098	-	-	-	-	-		
Miscellaneous	0.718	0.221	0.280	0.013	0.055	0.002	-	-	-	-	-		
RAAF Bloodhound Advisory Flight	0.320	0.067	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Microwave Communications	0.580	0.557	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
TOTAL SINGAPORE	1.744	1.260	0.723	0.697	0.551	0.394	0.699	1.175	1.236	1.594	1.617		

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH FIJI

(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Disaster Relief								0.148	-	-	-	-	-
Rural Development Project								0.170	0.176	0.198	0.278	0.085	0.090
Survey Project								0.054	0.021	0.004	0.189	-	0.003
Advisers								0.122	0.117	0.136	0.138	0.156	0.211
Training and Study Visits								0.059	0.095	0.160	0.219	0.343	0.307
Supply of Tents								0.196	-	-	-	-	-
Communications										0.103	0.065	-	-
Hydrographic Project										0.014	-	0.006	-
Miscellaneous										0.001	-	0.003	-
Catering Project										0.003	-	-	-
Field Engineer Project										0.215	-	0.427	-
Publications										0.001	-	-	-
Signal Flags										0.010	-	-	-
SATNAV Project										0.125	-	-	-
RFMF Navy Workshop Tools										0.009	-	-	-

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH FIJI

(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Aerial Photography							0.187	-					
Short Term RAN Adv. Asst. Stores													0.008
QE Barracks													0.229
TOTAL FIJI	0.436	0.553	6.005	0.498	1.160	0.981	1.284						

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH SOLOMON ISLANDS

(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Patrol Boat							0.691	0.090	0.086	0.089	0.030	-	
Henderson Airfield							0.007	-	-	-	-	-	
Advisers							0.001	-	0.020	0.045	-	-	
Training and Study Visits							0.001	0.004	0.037	0.086	0.097	0.175	
Miscellaneous								0.026	0.002	0.005	-	0.006	
Accommodation								0.332	0.088	0.002	0.002	0.036	
Reef Blasting							0.055	-	-	-	-	-	
Survey and Mapping							0.171	0.005	-	-	-	-	
Hydrographic Equipment							0.033	0.086	0.017	-	-	-	
Malaria Study Visit							0.008	-	-	-	-	-	
Communications							0.013	-	-	-	-	-	
Operation Conversion							0.175	-	-	-	-	-	
Channel Clearance 1982							0.090	0.134	-	-	-	-	
Off Shore Hydrographic							0.002	0.092	-	-	-	-	
Police Band							0.017	0.127	0.001				

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH SOLOMON ISLANDS

(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Channel Clearance 1983												0.351	0.011
Survey Adviser												0.003	-
Police Communications												0.009	0.367
BOD Training In-Country												0.003	0.097
Hydrographic Adviser												0.045	-
NDENDE Workshop												0.301	-
RAN Patrol Boat Deployment Study												0.014	-
New Patrol Boat Feasibility Study												0.017	0.014
Coastal Hydrographic Project													0.124
RSIP Expansion Feasibility Study													0.002
Temporary Medical Assist.													0.009
Disaster Preparedness													0.005
TOTAL SOLOMON ISLANDS	0.001	0.700	0.120	0.744	0.701	1.242	0.847						

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH VANUATU

(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Force Development										0.893	-	-	-
Bandmaster Adviser										0.050	0.033	-	-
VMF Transport										0.072	-	-	-
Mobile Force										0.066	-	-	-
Armoury Adviser										0.047	0.068	-	-
Additional VMF Equipment										0.027	0.172	0.075	-
Police Communications										0.003	0.011	0.355	-
Rural Water Supply										0.009	0.071	0.169	-
Malaria Control Project										0.008	-	0.004	-
Training and Study Visits										0.021	0.078	-	-
Third Country Training										0.021	-	-	-
Training Aids										0.008	0.009	-	-
Catering Project										0.039	0.053	-	-
Aerial Photography										0.093	-	-	-
Map Production										0.009	0.001	-	-

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH VANUATU
(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Police Weapons Project													0.006
Field Engineering													0.002
Australian Advisers													0.062
EEZ Planning Visit													0.021
ADFA Housing													0.006
Hydrography													0.047
VMP Fire Service													0.036
TOTAL VANUATU										0.893	0.282	0.546	0.924

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH KIRIBATI
(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Advisers							0.033	0.019	0.002	-	-	-	-
Training and Study Visits							0.014	-	0.016	0.011			
Reef Blasting						0.028	-	-	-	-			
Channel Clearance							0.148	0.199	0.004				
Survey (EEZ Basepoint Survey)							0.004	0.388					
TOTAL KIRIBATI							0.033	0.019	0.044	0.148	0.219	0.403	

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH TONGA

(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Workshop Building								0.002	-	-	-	-	-
Advisers								0.032	0.067	0.114	0.185	0.208	0.214
Training and Study Visits								0.035	0.037	0.038	0.094	0.063	0.171
Construction Project								0.117	-	-	-	-	-
TDS Equipment									0.091	0.204	0.017	0.025	
Accommodation									0.173	0.080	-	0.016	
Survey Project									0.141	0.002	0.031		
Slipway Feasibility Study									0.044	-	-		
Marine Workshop										0.007	0.001		
Maritime Equipment										0.011	0.070		
Slipway Repair Project										0.014	-		
Carpentry Training											0.012		
Landrover Spares											0.003		
Repair Nuku' Alofa												0.018	
Slipway													0.018

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH TONGA

(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Surveillance Flight													0.006
TOTAL TONGA					0.011	0.069	0.221	0.416	0.748	0.322	0.567		

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH WESTERN SAMOA
(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Advisers								0.001	-	-	-	-	-
Training								0.001	-	-	-	0.013	0.062
EEZ Basepoint Survey												0.018	-
Catering Assistance for South Pacific Games													0.063
Police Communications													0.025
Band Training													0.003
TOTAL WESTERN SAMOA								0.002	-	-	-	0.031	0.153

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH TUVALU

(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
EEZ Basepoint Survey													0.184
TOTAL TUVALU													0.184

EEZ Basepoint Survey

TOTAL TUVALU

0.184

0.184

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH GENERAL ASSISTANCE TO S.W. PACIFIC
(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
General Assistance to the South West Pacific									0.108	0.018	-	-	-
Training												0.054	-
Miscellaneous													0.032
TOTAL									0.108	0.018	-	0.054	0.032

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH THAILAND

(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84	
Training and Study Visits								0.053	0.107	0.438	0.876	1.054	1.187	
VW and MTRTS										0.192	0.205	0.154	0.015	
Language Training										0.017	0.108	0.088	0.088	
MRDC Assistance										0.002	-	0.098	0.114	
Tracker Assistance											0.017	0.001	-	
Porter Aircraft											0.009	-	-	
T53 Engines Assistance											0.006	0.041	0.041	
RIN Nomads											2.150	3.060	3.060	
RTAF Nomad Assistance											0.279	0.958	0.958	
Combined Exercises													0.179	
TOTAL THAILAND								0.027	0.053	0.107	0.649	1.206	3.839	5.642

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH PHILIPPINES
(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Training and Study Visits							0.090	0.804	0.449	0.567	0.671	0.879	
Miscellaneous Equipment						0.026	0.011	-	-				
Dart Ranges						0.264	0.774	0.258	0.061				
Naval Maintenance						0.422	0.565	0.554	0.695				
Medical Cooperation						0.037	0.025						
TOTAL PHILIPPINES						0.078	0.090	0.804	1.161	1.917	1.520	1.660	

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH OTHER NON S.W. PACIFIC COUNTRIES

(All figures in \$m)

	71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
Training and Study Visits								0.030	0.067	0.206	0.113	0.412	0.531
General Expenses										0.041	-	-	-
TOTAL								0.030	0.067	0.247	0.113	0.412	0.531

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH PAKISTAN
(All figures in \$m)

71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
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Defence Cooperation

0.008 - - - - -

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH INDIA
(All figures in \$m)

71/72	72/73	73/74	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84
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Defence Cooperation

0.010 - - - - - -

INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANISATIONS WHO MADE WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
TO THE COMMITTEE

Individuals/organisations	Submission No.
ACTION FOR WORLD DEVELOPMENT, Fitzroy, Vic.	33
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Sydney, NSW.	38
AROUSTIAN, A., Sydney, NSW.	24
AUSTRALASIAN TRAINING AIDS PTY LTD Albury, NSW.	12
AUSTRALIA DEFENCE ASSOCIATION, North Melbourne, Vic.	3
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE ASSOCIATION, Rockhampton, Qld.	23
AUSTRALIA QUAKER PEACE COMMITTEE, Hampton, Vic.	26
AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, O'Connor, ACT.	34
BOOKER, M., Deakin, ACT.	17
BOURKE, K.A., Mosman, NSW.	20
COLWELL, J., Townsville, Qld.	6
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE SUPPORT, Canberra, ACT.	32
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, Canberra, ACT.	25
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Canberra, ACT.	40
DEVEREUX, K.D., Moora, WA.	10
DUESBURY, Sir Christopher, Bondi, NSW.	4
EAGLE, P.M. Belfield, NSW.	30
EISERMAN, M. Cairns, Qld.	7
FERDOUS, Hasan Shaheed, Dacca, Bangladesh	16
FROCHTER, Dianella, WA.	9
FRY, G. Canberra, ACT.	42
HASTINGS, P., Manly, NSW	1
HAWKER DE HAVILLAND AUSTRALIA PTY LTD, Barton, ACT.	41
HAWKER PACIFIC PTY LTD, Yagoona, NSW.	14
HERR, Dr. R.A., Hobart, Tas.	28
KING, Professor G.P., University, PNG.	19
KISSOCK, W.A.J., Fingal Head, NSW.	36
METAL TRADES AND INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA, North Sydney, NSW.	11
NORTH QUEENSLAND ENGINEERS AND AGENTS PTY LTD Cairns, Qld.	15
O'DONOGHUE, P., North Perth, WA.	27
PAINGAME, V., Cairns, Qld.	8
PHILIPPINE RESOURCE CENTRE, Fitzroy, Vic.	35
QANTAS AIRWAYS, Sydney, NSW.	13
RIX, A., Nathan, Qld.	22
ROUSE, E., Erskineville, NSW.	31

Individuals/organisations

Submission No.

SCULFER, C., Modbury Heights, SA.	18
STAVRIDIS, T., West Footscray, Vic.	2
SWAIN, N., Camp Hill, Qld.	5
THE AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL FOR OVERSEAS AID, Canberra, ACT.	39
THE PHILIPPINE ACTION SUPPORT GROUP, Sydney South, NSW.	29
UNITING CHURCH IN AUSTRALIA, Sydney, NSW.	37

INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANISATIONS WHO APPEARED AS WITNESSES
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE AT PUBLIC HEARINGS

Date of hearing Individuals/organisations	Represented by
23 FEBRUARY 1984	
Department of Defence, Canberra, ACT.	Mr J. Nockels Mr R.K. Thomas
Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra, ACT.	Mr W.G.T. Miller Mr J.S. Holloway Mr J. Hoyle Mr J.M. Powell
9 MARCH 1984	
Department of Defence Support, Canberra, ACT.	Mr B.C. Owen Mr K.H. Spencer Mr C.W. Barclay
Mr G.E. Fry, ANU, Canberra, ACT.	
Australian Council for Overseas Aid, Canberra, ACT.	Mr R. Rollason Ms P.A. Lee
Hawker de Havilland Pty Ltd, Barton, ACT.	Mr M.J. Cullen
QANTAS Airways Ltd, Sydney, NSW.	Mr W.A. Vella
Mr Peter D. Hastings, Ultimo, NSW.	
Australasian Training Aids Pty Ltd Albury, NSW.	Mr A. Shaw
6 APRIL 1984	
Philippines Resource Centre, Fitzroy, Vic.	Mr R.M. Searle
Australia Defence Association North Melbourne, Vic.	Mr M.J. O'Connor

Date of hearing
Individuals/organisations

Represented by

6 APRIL 1984 (cont'd)

Hawker Pacific Pty Ltd,
Bankstown, NSW.

Mr I.S.G. Gregg

Philippine Action Support Group
Sydney, NSW.

Ms V.J. Grivell

Australia Quaker Peace Committee,
Hampton, Vic.

Mr G.D. Hess