

CHAPTER 7

THE DEFENCE CO-OPERATION PROGRAM - ISSUES OF CONTENTION

Purposes and Objectives

There is only minimal awareness within Australia of Australia's defence co-operation policies and programs with countries in the Asian-Pacific region.

Detailed information on the Defence Co-operation Program is not easily obtained. An air of secrecy surrounds the program, apparently partly because of security concerns (real or unreal) and partly because of commercial interest involved.¹

The Committee saw the inquiry as an opportunity for the Departments involved with the Defence Co-operation Program to put on the public record the purpose, objectives, policies, management and achievements of Defence Co-operation Programs.

This opportunity was not grasped fully by the respective Departments. Evidence presented to the Committee often was inadequate. For instance, the Department of Defence, in reply to a question on monitoring the success of Defence Co-operation Program's stated:

The Department itself also monitors the program in terms of its own criteria for effectiveness. Those criteria relate to achieving the objectives that we have established for the program of developing effective capabilities in regional countries and of achieving co-operative activities which are common and agreed between the

countries concerned. Those objectives are regularly assessed against each program in the course of developing the activities.²

From this explanation at least two statements of some substance can be extracted: namely that the criteria relate to (i) developing effective capabilities in regional countries and (ii) achieving co-operative activities which are common and agreed between the countries concerned. However, no hard information was offered to the Committee by the Department of Defence to elucidate this statement.

The use of terminology by the Departments such as 'criteria', 'achieving the objectives', 'developing effective capabilities', 'achieving co-operative activities' and 'objectives regularly assessed against each program', fail to establish what the true criteria and objectives are.

This feeling of events occurring in a policy vacuum was felt by others. Hawker Pacific, in its submission to the Committee stated that they had to base their comments on a number of assumptions about the Defence Co-operation Program 'As the exact terms of reference under which the Divisions controlling Defence Co-operative Programmes [operate] are not known to us ...'.³ The stated long term objective of the program - security (from Australia's perspective) is hardly an adequate criterion for assessing individual programs and the needs of individual countries, and provides no specific guidance for the development of useful programs.

The Australian Council for Overseas Aid pointed out in their submission, that the promotion of 'national independence of participating countries' is usually the first line of any statement of objectives of the Defence Co-operation Program. This presumes that the possession of a defence force or more particularly that the degree of defence capability Australia is able to promote through Defence Co-operation Programs is a relevant factor determining a nations' independence.⁴

The Committee cautions the over-dependence of the use of the simplistic objective of 'national independence' as the guiding principle in determining Australia's Defence Co-operation Program.

South West Pacific Islands like Vanuatu and Tuvalu have no defence capability as we understand it and yet they are independent. With no industrial base and small export earnings assistance to develop a defence capability will build up a dependence on imported technology, equipment parts, organisation and structure and skills. Such a dependence will mean increased budgetary costs for the island states.

In addition as Arthur Schlesinger Jr said, 'self-determination was attractive as long as national independence seemed a way of assuring democratic decencies. But, as General Idi Amin has been only the most recent tyrant to demonstrate, states may meet all the criteria of national self-determination and still be blots on the planet'.⁵

Regional Progress and Australia's Strategic Interests

During the course of the inquiry, the Committee received evidence on the internal political situation in some of the countries with which Australia has a Defence Co-operation Program. In particular, the abuse of human rights in these countries was a major concern of a number of witnesses. It was argued that Australia should not maintain a Defence Co-operation Program with any country whose human rights record is not good. As a recent British survey identified only one country in the Asian region (Japan) as not being involved in the violation of internationally accepted human rights, the implications are clear.⁶

Implicit in the above argument by witnesses linking the Defence Co-operation Program with human rights is that the provision of military assistance implies a pledge by the Australian Government of uncritical support of a regime or, potentially, actual assistance in the repression of a community. The Department of Foreign Affairs argues that it is possible for military assistance to be provided while '... stopping short of any involvement which might be construed as support of particular regimes'.⁷ The Department of Defence also argued that 'Defence Co-operation Programs are not intended to draw neighbouring countries into our alliance commitments, or to signify Australian endorsement of their policies'.⁸

Elsewhere, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs is less circumspect. They maintain that:

the Defence Co-operation Program

'... can also serve as a valuable statement of support, falling somewhat short of a formal security alliance';⁹

it has

'a symbolic importance ... as a natural part of a friendly bilateral relationship' ¹⁰ and;

the decisions to offer military assistance 'are based on principles within which human rights considerations are implicit ...'.¹¹

The Committee does not believe that these observations by Foreign Affairs fit comfortably together with the initial statement by Foreign Affairs and Defence that the Defence Co-operation Program does not involve support for a particular regime. If Human Rights considerations are implicit in providing a program, then the provision of such a program must imply some form of endorsement for particular regimes. Indeed, if nothing else, this simply highlights the degree of uncertainty and

confusion that exists within and between departments on what may be the long-term implications of a co-operation program with a particular country, both for Australia and the recipient.

The aims of the Defence Co-operation Programs are specifically to assist recipient nations develop their defence capacity and, more generally, to foster good relations with the Government and peoples of the recipient countries. It is incumbent on the Australian Government to consider whether a particular program is, in fact, achieving these objectives rather than being continued merely out of habit. A number of witnesses to this inquiry argued that the continued provision of aid to regimes which are engaged in suppression by force of internal opposition may represent a failure of the Defence Co-operation Program.

In practical terms, providing equipment to a government whose principal military concern is the repression of internal opposition will not enhance its defence capability in the sense of contributing to regional stability. Explicit military support for such regimes may, despite the low level of that support, result in Australia being identified with transient and unpopular regimes and thus weaken our standing within the recipient country and throughout the region.

Obviously the decision to provide a program will involve value judgments which will be political in nature and must be assessed against other policy considerations. Nonetheless, if Australia is to be sincere in its concern for human rights it must be prepared to exhibit that concern in its own region and if necessary accept some short term hostility from individual governments as a result.

Our standing in the international community is very good. This is exemplified in Australia's recent election as a

member of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. As Mr Hayden said, '... (this) result reflected widespread international recognition of Australia's commitment to constructive international action to promote the realisation of human rights and to combat gross violations of human rights wherever they might occur'.¹²

Moral judgments are difficult to make in the provision of the Defence Co-operation Program, nonetheless the Committee is of the opinion that human rights considerations can be a valid criterion in the assessment of a particular program and that this consideration should be explicit rather than implicit.

The Defence Co-operation Program and Civil Projects

Not all the projects under the Defence Co-operation Program can be described as military assistance. In 1983-84 some 16% of the program was of a civil nature.¹³

Australia's use of the Defence Co-operation Program for assistance in civil aid activities is apparent in the South Pacific. Except for some minor assistance to Fiji, the remainder of the \$3.395m that was allocated to the South Pacific in 1982/83 was for projects of a non-military type.

The Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) recommends that the Defence Co-operation Program should not seek to achieve development goals. ACFOA believes that as the Australian Development Assistance Bureau (ADAB) is the section of the Government charged with assisting development in Third World countries, ADAB is better placed than the Defence Department to assess needs and develop appropriate policies.¹⁴

It has also been argued that the use of Australian service personnel on civil projects confuses the legitimate role of defence with that of development assistance. The Committee

found no suggestion of this and notes that regional defence forces are already used on civil projects in their own countries.

The Committee was informed that there is a regular exchange at a day-to-day desk level between Defence and ADAB where the Defence Co-operation Program is of a civil nature. What was not determined was whether projects under the Defence Co-operation Program received the same scrutiny for priority, cost effectiveness and management that they would receive if they were to be provided under ADAB.

In the hearings, officers associated with the program and ADAB were not able to explain cogently to the Committee the methods for ensuring the daily co-operation between the two agencies. This lack of explanation leaves the Committee with some doubts as to the effectiveness of their operation.

The Committee has no objection to the provision of what amounts to civil aid to the Pacific Islands involving military personnel. It accepts that defence personnel may be the most appropriate to carry out particular projects of a civil nature at a project level. However, the Committee lacks sufficient evidence to recommend one way or other whether the Department of Defence or ADAB should have overriding responsibility for civil projects involving defence personnel. The Committee was not presented with any evidence to indicate which was the most cost-effective way of controlling such projects.

Aid and Trade

It was argued before the Committee that the Defence Co-operation Program provides Australian industry with opportunities to develop an export market and 'helps develop bonds that are advantageous to Australia's defence industry effort'.¹⁵

Many countries take advantage of defence assistance to promote the sale of their own defence equipment. In hearings before the Committee on Appropriations in the United States House of Representatives, the Government said that 'the net effect of these programs (of military assistance) and agreements should be to enhance the sale by private US firms of both military and commercial equipment'.¹⁶ However, the policy of the Australian Government always has been of untied bilateral aid in both the civil and military areas. It is Australian Government policy that recipient countries decide their own priorities and requests for assistance comes through Australian High Commissions and Embassies.

There is a desire in some quarters for the notion of 'aid and trade' to be more closely linked. One witness said that Australia is seen as naive as no other country in the world is so generous with its aid. 'If the equipment is good enough to give them and to be accepted and put into service, I believe it should be good enough to be standardised so that further supplies and support come from Australian industry.'¹⁷

The Department of Defence Support argues that this is already occurring; 'that the recipient countries tend to 'lock in' to our goods and services when they are eventually in a position to buy these'.¹⁸

This 'lock-in' occurs because:

- (a) 'There develops a 'broad' familiarity with the users. If the equipment is of high quality and suited to the contracted country's needs, then Australia's image of a supplier is enhanced;
- (b) There is a continuing liaison between Australia as a supplier and the recipient country through service and maintenance agreements ...;

- (c) There is an increased possibility that the recipient of defence goods would deal preferentially with Australia as a future customer - because of technological compatibility ...'19

Yet the only evidence that the Committee received contradicted this assertion. There are very few examples where sales of equipment followed the supply of equipment under the Defence Co-operation Program. In the case of Nomads, for example, Australia has been singularly unsuccessful in the sale of Nomad aircraft to Indonesia and Papua New Guinea even though both countries have received significant numbers of Nomad aircraft under the Defence Co-operation Program. Indeed, elsewhere in their submission, the Department of Defence Support states that 'Australia's experience to date as an exporter of defence related products has been disappointing', with price, delivery, scheduling and quality being seen as the factors acting against Australia (Submission: 7).

With regard to the program in the South Pacific, two points can be made: firstly, the sale of defence equipment to countries in the South Pacific is extremely limited given the small scale of the defence forces in the South Pacific and secondly; the Defence Co-operation Program in the South Pacific is primarily of a civil nature, therefore the 'lock-in' factor will be very slight. Indeed any attempt to develop the South Pacific as a market for defence equipment would be at the least irresponsible given the lack of military tension within the area.

The Committee believes that the Defence Co-operation Program is not a suitable means of promoting defence industries and notes the failure to achieve this in the past.

What Type of Defence Assistance?

What type of assistance should Australia be providing to countries in South East Asia and the South Pacific? Because of the lack of evidence and the inability of the Committee to question recipient countries directly, the Committee can only make some general observations.

The focus of Australia's defence assistance is directed mainly toward the transfer of skills and technology and of equipment which is supportive in nature rather than that which may directly enhance the defence capabilities ('the sharp end') of particular countries.²¹ While such a distinction may at times become blurred, the Committee supports such a policy but emphasises that ongoing evaluation of each program is the only way of ensuring that any equipment does not become used in an overtly aggressive manner.

Australia should assist recipients in measures which the latter see as improving national security but should ensure that such assistance does not provoke long-term budgetary problems among recipients. The provision of patrol boats to some of the South Pacific states seems likely to pose the latter danger. Few have the infrastructure that is necessary to support the operation of such craft, and Australia should be careful to ensure that in 'donating' such items, undue pressure is not placed on the recipient country in its attempt to maintain and crew the boats.

In the provision of military assistance, care must be taken to ensure that the aid does not build into the economies of these small island states further commitments which they may be unable to meet in the long term.

Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Program

A Departmental officer, during evidence to the Committee, was asked a question on monitoring the effectiveness of the program. He replied to the Committee 'you would be aware of the regular Senate Estimates Committee consideration of the estimates and in particular the opportunity senators have to question the program in some detail'.²²

However, that same officer, when asked in the Senate Additional Estimates Committee hearings in May 1984, for detailed information relating to proposed Defence Co-operation Program expenditure replied by referring the Estimates Committee to his Department's submission and evidence given to this Committee. This, he said, contained the information being sought. But in fact the Department's submission and evidence to the inquiry on Defence Co-operation Programs did not contain all the required information.

The Committee during the course of its inquiry examined the Explanatory Notes of the Estimates of the Department of Defence since 1970 to seek extra information on the Defence Co-operation Program. The exercise was frustrating as the notes vary in layout, sometimes significantly, year by year and the level of information in the notes is usually minimal. As an example, from 1971-73, projects provided under the Defence Co-operation Program for each country were under a one line heading - 'Projects'. From 1973-78/79, it was decided that 'Projects' would be itemised. Then in 1979, an arbitrary and regressive decision was made by the Department to return to a single line heading of 'Projects', thus deleting the extra information.

The Committee is concerned that there is a lack of information on the Defence Co-operation Program for scrutiny by the public and Parliament. One way of providing this would be for the Departmental explanatory notes on the Defence Co-operation Program to be more expansive so that there is a true opportunity for Senators to examine the program in detail. This would mean that there would need to be a clear policy decision on the objectives of the Defence Co-operation Program which the Committee believes is lacking at the moment. This lack of a clear statement of policy is severely hampering proper evaluation of the Defence Co-operation Program, especially in the Estimates hearings.

For this proper scrutiny to occur the Committee would like to see the explanatory notes reorganised in the following manner:

- . In the synopsis of Division 240 (DCP) there should be an explanation of the long term basis for the program.
- . For each country the purpose of the item of expenditure should be the justification of maintaining a program with that country. The current wording simply says 'This item covers payments in respect of the continuation of the Defence Co-operation Program ...' This tells the Parliament nothing of why Australia needs to maintain a program with these countries. The explanation should inform Parliament of the criteria that are used for individual programs which satisfy Australia's long term interest in the area.
- . For each project or category there should be:
 1. An explanation of what the project or category entails.

2. How it fits into the program's overall objectives
3. When the project commenced.
4. Estimated cost at the commencement of the project.
5. Expenditure on the project or category in the last financial year.
6. Estimated expenditure for this financial year.
7. Total expenditure on the project or category to date.
8. Total project cost.
9. Where civil aid costs are funded through the Defence Co-operation Program, the explanatory notes should identify how it fits into ADAB objectives.

Until this information is made available to Parliament, through the explanatory notes, and to the public, in the form of a booklet, public debate on the program will be ill-informed.

As an example of the danger of restricting information, ACFOA, in its monthly publication News, claimed that 'each year a portion of the Government's Defence Co-operation Program (DCP) is charged to the aid vote'.²³ While this is incorrect, the mistake is understandable.

The Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean is not within the Committee's terms of reference. Nonetheless, in the course of the inquiry the importance of the Indian Ocean was raised both in hearings and

in the public arena. As it appears that consideration is now being given to commencing a Defence Co-operation Program with Indian Ocean Island States, the Committee feels compelled to make some preliminary observations on such a possibility.

(i) Importance to Australia

On 17 January 1984 the Government announced that it had approved guidelines for a comprehensive and integrated policy approach to Indian Ocean issues. In making the announcement, the Foreign Minister, Mr Hayden, said that the guidelines were consistent with the Government's desire to focus Australia's foreign policy towards our region. If the Defence Co-operation Program is to serve Australia's national interest in its immediate region and strategic environment, the inclusion of the Indian Ocean island states in the scheme deserves close analysis in the context of greater recognition of the importance of the Indian Ocean region.

A number of factors lie behind the Government's interest in the Indian Ocean region. These include:

- . the responsibility of the Government to protect Australia's western coastline, our offshore resources, and territories (including Christmas Island and the Cocos Islands);
- . the need to ensure secure lines of communication for our trade and civil aviation traffic through the region - a concern shared by our allies and trading partners (22 per cent of our shipping crosses the Indian Ocean);
- . the instability created by conflicts on the littoral and in the hinterland of the region (including the Gulf War, the invasion of Afghanistan, conflict in the Horn

of Africa, instability in Southern Africa, the tension between India and Pakistan) - all of which have contributed to an increased naval and military presence by outside powers, including both super-powers;

- . appreciation that, in a conflict in the north west quadrant of the Indian Ocean, and more specifically, in the Persian Gulf area, the United States may take a westward route for its military forces to the area in a time of crisis, including use of the US base at Diego Garcia;
- . a need for humanitarian aid and development assistance in many of the poorer states on the littoral and in the Indian Ocean. There is a recognition that Australia could become increasingly important to the region as a source of aid, training, technology and investment;
- . the lack of cohesion and co-operation between island states of the Indian Ocean which inhibits their national development; and
- . the commitment of the Australian Government to the idea of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace while recognising that because of the conflict and instability in the region, this is not possible at the moment.

A reason often advanced for Australia's apparent lower level of interest in the Indian Ocean until recently is that most of our population live on the eastern seaboard and are therefore not aware of the problems to our west.

However, as the Committee to Review the Australian Overseas Aid Program (Jackson Committee) said:

Australia is a major littoral of the Indian Ocean. The small island states are of strategic importance to Australia given our continuing imports of Gulf oil and dependence on sea lines of communication with Western Europe. Australia has a favourable balance of trade with all four states. There are significant numbers of Indian Ocean islanders, especially Mauritians and Seychellois, living in Australia. There are historical links with Mauritius, and now regular air services. However, Australia's visibility in the Indian Ocean is not the same as in the South Pacific. For example, even though ties are growing, Australia does not have resident diplomatic representation in any of the four island states, although representation is to be established in Mauritius in 1984.²⁴

(ii) Recent Proposals to Promote Australian Interests

Under the guidelines released by the Australian Government, it was announced that Australia would:

- . recognise the importance of Australia's status as an independent but aligned Indian Ocean littoral state, both for the pursuance of our own interests and those of our allies;
- . continue to play an active role in the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean; maintain the goal of the resumption of United States/Soviet talks on arms limitation in the region; and support other arms limitation initiatives where these accord with Australia's assessment of its own interests and those of the region as a whole; and
- . seek to give greater attention to the development of relations with Indian Ocean island states; and to a lesser extent East African States, by broadening our

links with these countries through, for example, cultural exchanges and visits, and by the establishment of a regular pattern of naval visits.

In announcing the guidelines, Mr Hayden said that the Government sought to place greater emphasis on the pursuit of what Australia judged to be its interests and priorities in the region. At the same time, Australia would recognise that in pursuing its interests the Government would be seeking to give appropriate support to Western interests in the region.

The general thrust of the Government's new policy approach was consistent with the findings of the Jackson Committee in the context of its proposals for Australian priorities in giving aid.

The Jackson Report said, in relation to the Indian Ocean islands states:

These states face similar development constraints to those of the South Pacific, but they lack the subsistence affluence and cultural resilience which exists in the Pacific. They deserve special consideration within the Australian aid program.²⁵

In addition, in relation to the 'Eligibility Framework' for Australian aid, the Indian Ocean islands should be in the highest category:

This category is designed to respond to our special relationship with Papua New Guinea and concern for the problems of island developing countries, particularly in the South Pacific ... The only other states for which budget support should be considered are the smallest states in this category, and then only in exceptional circumstances.²⁶

The opening of a post in Mauritius in 1984 was a substantive expression of the increasing importance with which Australia is regarding the region.

(iii) The Department of Foreign Affairs Submission

The Department of Foreign Affairs opened its discussion of the Defence Co-operation Program in the context of Indian Ocean states as follows:

In the light of the current review of Australia's policy towards the Indian Ocean it may be desirable to explore the possibility of a small defence cooperation program to extend training and other practical assistance to selected Indian Ocean island states, stopping short of any involvement which might be construed as support of particular regimes.²⁷

As it was not within the Committee's terms of reference, the Department of Defence did not address the issue of extending the Defence Co-operation Program to include Indian Ocean island states in its submission to the Committee.

(iv) Other Parliamentary Committee Reports on the Indian Ocean

The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence tabled a report on 'Australia and the Indian Ocean Region' in November 1976. In that report the Committee noted the growing importance of the region to Australia, and made a number of recommendations relating to it. Some of the recommendations related to the need for naval and maritime surveillance and for the upgrading of defence facilities on our West Coast, matters which have now been addressed by the Government. The Committee made a number of observations about other matters which are not relevant to the issue of a possible Defence Co-operation Program in the island states.

Three reports of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence have made passing reference to the growing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean to Australia, especially in the wake of the Iraq-Iran War, the Ethiopian-Somali War of 1977 and its aftermath, and the naval build-up by the United States, the Soviet Union, and France in the northwest quadrant. The competition for port and air facilities between the super-powers is also referred to.²⁸

(v) Discussion

The proposal to include the Indian Ocean in the Defence Co-operation Program will depend on value judgements concerning the merit of the Defence Co-operation Program generally. To the extent that it has been easier to see tangible benefits flow from the Defence Co-operation Program in the island states of the Pacific than in South East Asia, an argument could be mounted that such a program could be equally successful in the Indian Ocean. It is among island states that the Defence Co-operation Program can contribute to ensuring territorial integrity and sovereignty, protection of fishing zones and EEZs, and contributing to civil economic development. The goodwill flowing therefrom, and the possibility of denying countries unfriendly to Australia a foothold in some of these countries may well be of advantage to us.

The Indian Ocean states are more remote from Australia than the Pacific Islands and this country does not have a tradition of involvement with them. They are culturally distinct and politically less stable. Thus the Department of Foreign Affairs proposal will need to be evaluated very carefully, especially since it means incurring more expenditure on a program, the rationale of, and the benefits from which, the Department of Defence has yet to satisfactorily explain.

General Conclusion

The Committee supports the concept of a Defence Co-operation Program where the emphasis is on support and training and where the aim is to transfer appropriate levels of technology to assist in the development of self-sufficiency.

However, the Committee has reservations regarding the functioning of the Defence Co-operation Program. The failure of the Departments involved (Defence, Foreign Affairs and Defence Support) to spell out clearly the objectives, purposes and criteria of the program raises questions about the clarity of those objectives and the effectiveness of the program in achieving them.

There is no doubt that the Defence Co-operation Program is expected to 'buy' something for Australia - an Australian presence in the region, regional security, closer links with the recipient country (in a political and economic sense)? Until the purpose of the program is more clearly established Australia's expectations will remain ill-defined.

The Committee accepts that it may be difficult to assess effectively some of the benefits of the program such as 'access to [recipients] strategic valuations ... to training and operational doctrines'.²⁹ Nonetheless, there appear to be no effective monitoring devices at various stages of Defence Co-operation Programs. The Committee is concerned that there are insufficient resources directed to program development, evaluation and monitoring.

The Committee believes that it is incumbent upon the Departments concerned to establish a more professional and consistent approach to the delivery of defence co-operation with our neighbours and to consult them frankly on their requirements.

The Committee believes that where a policy is vague there is often an inability to control it. With the lack of adequate guidelines it is not impossible for the program to get out of control.

Senator G.D. McIntosh
Chairman

October 1984

ENDNOTES

1. Submission, (Australian Council for Overseas Aid - ACFOA), p. S179.
2. Evidence, (23 February 1984, Defence), p. 7.
3. Submission, (Hawker Pacific Pty Limited), p. S310.
4. Submission, (ACFOA), p. S197.
5. Boston Globe, 13 March 1977, p. 171, 'Morality born again in U.S. Foreign Policy'.
6. C. Humana, World Human Rights Guide, Hutchison, London, 1983, p. 114.
7. Submission, (Foreign Affairs), p. S135.
8. Submission, (Defence), p. S3.
9. Submission, (Foreign Affairs) p. S135.
10. Submission, (Foreign Affairs), p. S135.
11. Submission, (Foreign Affairs), p. S138.
12. Australian Foreign Affairs Record, Volume 55, No. 7, July 1984, p. 713.
13. Report of the Committee to Review the Australian Overseas Aid Program, (Jackson Committee Report), March, 1984, p. 54.
14. Submission, (ACFOA), p. S189.
15. Submission, (Defence Support), p. S145.
16. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee of Appropriations House of Representatives, Ninety-eighty Congress, Second Session, p. 1430.
17. Evidence, (9 March, 1984, Hawker de Havilland Australia Pty Limited), p. 151.
18. Submission, (Defence Support), p. S143.
19. Submission, (Defence Support), pp. S143-144.
20. Submission, (Defence Support), p. S144.
21. Evidence, (23 February 1984, Defence) p. 8.
22. Evidence, (23 February 1984, Defence), p. 7.

23. ACFOA News, June 1984, p. 2.
24. Report of the Committee to Review the Australian overseas Aid Program, March 1984, p. 184.
25. op.cit., p. 186.
26. op.cit., p. 140.
27. Submission, (Foreign Affairs), p. S135.
28. See 'The Gulf and Australia', May, 1982, 'Some Observations on Australia's Diplomatic Representation in Africa and Adjacent Indian Ocean Island States', December, 1983, and 'Regional conflict and Super power rivalry in the Horn of Africa', April, 1984.
29. Evidence, (9 March 1984, Peter Hastings), p. 179.