

# Chapter 2

## Changing nature of peacekeeping operations

2.1 Peacekeeping operations have changed significantly since Australia's first contribution in 1947 when diplomatic staff were seconded to assist in supervising a ceasefire between Dutch forces and those of the newly-established Indonesian Republic.<sup>1</sup> Since then, Australia's involvement in peacekeeping operations has been shaped by changing international circumstances and the increasingly complex nature of such operations.

2.2 This chapter provides the international context as the basis for understanding Australia's involvement in peacekeeping operations. The committee examines the United Nations' (UN) role in maintaining world peace and security through its engagement in peacekeeping operations. It considers the nature and conduct of these operations and the effect that the changing international environment is having on the complexity and scope of missions. The committee looks at recent trends in the deployment of peacekeepers and prevailing views about the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions. Finally, it considers operations not initiated by the UN, including regional operations.

### UN—maintaining peace

2.3 Under its charter, the UN is charged with maintaining international peace and security by taking effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace.

2.4 As a universal forum pledged to protect the international community from war, the UN is recognised world-wide as the pre-eminent body responsible for peacekeeping. It has conferred on the Security Council, one of its subsidiary bodies, the primary responsibility for promoting international peace and security.<sup>2</sup> In this role, the Security Council encourages hostile parties to a dispute likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security to find a peaceful resolution. It may also intervene in a dispute, determining when and where a UN peacekeeping operation

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1 The Good Offices Commission established in 1947 to assist in the delineation and supervision of the ceasefire and repatriation of Dutch forces to the Netherlands. It became the UN Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) in 1949. Department of Veterans' Affairs, *From Gallipoli to Dili, The Spirit of Anzac*, pp. 17–33, <http://www.anzacsite.gov.au/download/schoolkit.pdf> (accessed 30 June 2008).

2 See for example, UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2004/16, 17 May 2004.

should be deployed. Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter provide the legal foundations for a UN operation.<sup>3</sup>

### ***Foundations for a peacekeeping operation***

2.5 Traditionally, UN peacekeeping operations were given mandates under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Under this chapter, the Security Council may call on parties to settle their disputes peacefully and may recommend appropriate procedures with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.<sup>4</sup> Chapter VI mandates typically involve the use of force only in self-defence, although at times self-defence has been interpreted broadly to include property and persons entrusted to the care of the operation, as well as implementation of the mandate.<sup>5</sup>

2.6 Chapter VII may be invoked where stronger action is required with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. In these situations, the Security Council may call upon the members of the UN to apply measures not involving the use of armed force such as complete or partial interruption of economic relations, transport routes and means of communication, or the severance of diplomatic relations. Should the Security Council determine these measures inadequate, it may consider using military action—demonstrations, blockades, and other operations by forces of UN member states. Such operations are particularly serious undertakings, as they allow for the threat or use of force beyond self-defence and do not require the consent of the host state. Given the gravity of these peace enforcement operations, there has been considerable debate as to the circumstances that warrant such intervention. This debate is considered further in Chapter 5 of this report.

2.7 Generally, when a dispute or conflict reaches a stage calling for UN intervention, the Secretary-General issues a report to the Security Council recommending options. In the case of a peacekeeping operation, the report would make suggestions regarding its nature, size and the required resources. The Security Council would then decide whether or not to adopt a resolution based on the report. To take effect, a resolution of the Security Council requires nine votes from its 15 members and is subject to veto by any one of its five permanent members.

2.8 Historically, Chapters VI and VII were used to denote the nature of an operation—Chapter VI referring to peacekeeping and Chapter VII to peace enforcement. The changing nature of peacekeeping operations has, however, blurred the definitions. Ms Gillian Bird, Deputy Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and

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3 See for example, UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, A/47/277–S/24111, 17 June 1992, paragraphs 42–43.

4 See Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VI, Articles 33 and 38.

5 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, quoted in Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Australia's Role on United Nations Reform*, June 2001, p. 49.

Trade (DFAT), indicated that, 'A lot of peacekeeping now is what we would call chapter 6½: it is a peacekeeping operation but at least bits of it have a chapter 7 mandate'.<sup>6</sup>

## Changing international environment

2.9 Attempts at collective security and peacekeeping-type activity have developed over a long period in association with the evolution of modern international relations.<sup>7</sup> Inevitably, changing international circumstances, as well as the development of international law, the growth of satellite-driven international media and changing public expectations have come together to alter not only the public perception of international crises but also the nature of peacekeeping operations.

### *Peacekeeping operations and the Cold War*

2.10 The structure of the Security Council is very much a product of World War II. The permanent membership comprises five major powers—China, France, the Russian Federation (former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), the United Kingdom and the United States (US)—each with the power of veto. With the onset of the Cold War after 1945, a political gulf developed between China and the Soviet Union on one side, and the US, Western Europe and other democratic states, such as Australia, on the other. As a result of this East–West divide, members of the Security Council had difficulty reaching agreement which limited the number and scope of UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations. In 1992, the then Secretary-General, Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, noted that since 1945 over 100 major conflicts around the world had left some 20 million dead. In his view, the UN had been rendered powerless to deal with many of these crises 'because of the vetoes—279 of them—cast in the Security Council, which were a vivid expression of the divisions of that period'.<sup>8</sup>

2.11 Furthermore, the UN—intended to promote collective security among nation-states—was not structured to deal with the emerging ethnic and political tensions within post-colonial states.<sup>9</sup>

2.12 Despite these difficulties, during its early years the UN deployed military observers to, for example, Indonesia, Kashmir, Korea, Lebanon and Yemen.<sup>10</sup> It also

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6 *Committee Hansard*, 25 July 2007, p. 57.

7 A. Bellamy, P. Williams, & S. Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2004, pp. 60–74. Bellamy *et al* discuss in particular the activities of the Concert of Europe and League of Nations.

8 UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, A/47/277–S/24111, 17 June 1992, paragraph 14.

9 Dr Peter Londey, *Committee Hansard*, 5 September 2007, p. 41.

10 Dr Peter Londey, *Committee Hansard*, 5 September 2007, p. 41 and United Nations Peacekeeping, *List of operations*, [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/list/list.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/list/list.pdf) (accessed 11 November 2007).

set up peacekeeping operations such as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle East which commenced in 1948 and the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which commenced in 1964. Both of these operations continue today. These so-called traditional peacekeeping missions typically involved:

- the consent of parties to a conflict as a precondition to deployment;
- impartiality of the peacekeeping force; and
- no use of force by peacekeepers other than in self-defence.

### ***Peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era***

2.13 The end of the Cold War, with its concomitant thawing of relations between East and West, allowed greater latitude for UN action. In 1992, Dr Boutros-Ghali reported that the 'immense ideological barrier that for decades gave rise to distrust and hostility had collapsed' and that the Security Council had emerged as 'a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace'.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, no longer hamstrung by the US/Soviet rivalry, the Security Council has deployed an increasing number of peacekeeping operations in recent decades. Since 1948, there have been 63 UN peacekeeping operations, of which 48 (71 per cent) were established after 1989.<sup>12</sup>

#### *Intra-state conflict*

2.14 The above figures show that the end of the Cold War did not usher in a period of international peace. It did, however, mark the beginning of a significant shift in the nature of conflicts which increasingly involved disputes occurring within states rather than between states. Dr Boutros-Ghali noted this trend in 1992 when he stated:

...fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty spring up, and the cohesion of States is threatened by brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife. Social peace is challenged on the one hand by new assertions of discrimination and exclusion and, on the other, by acts of terrorism seeking to undermine evolution and change through democratic means.<sup>13</sup>

2.15 Numerous witnesses drew the committee's attention to the effect that this change in the nature of conflicts was having on the conduct of peacekeeping

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11 UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, A/47/277–S/24111, 17 June 1992, paragraphs 8 and 15.

12 United Nations Peacekeeping, *List of Operations*, [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/list/list.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/list/list.pdf) (accessed 29 January 2008). There are currently 17 UN peacekeeping operations ongoing.

13 UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, A/47/277–S/24111, 17 June 1992, paragraph 11.

operations. The Canadian Government observed that unlike earlier operations, now there was often no clear peace accord to be monitored, the combatants were not easy to identify, the contested terrain or issue was not constant and on many occasions there were no formal armed forces present.<sup>14</sup> World Vision Australia similarly noted that modern disputes tend to involve irregular militias engaged in protracted insurgencies rather than regular armies. It was of the view that these types of conflict—where non-state forces are often indistinguishable from civilian populations, less disciplined than regular armies and may not feel bound by peace agreements—may create significant challenges.<sup>15</sup>

### *Multidimensional, multifaceted peacekeeping operations*

2.16 In response to these developments, the Security Council has moved away from the traditional peacekeeping operations that required the deployment of military observers or small contingents to monitor truce lines or state borders with the permission of the host country.<sup>16</sup> Since the 1990s, it has tended to deploy larger and more complex UN peacekeeping missions, often to help implement comprehensive peace agreements between protagonists in intra-state disputes. To be successful in its endeavours, the Security Council has recognised the need to engage a greater range of skills and personnel to resolve the complexities of modern day conflicts. Thus, as the objectives of peacekeeping operations started to extend beyond preserving peace to addressing the 'deepest causes of conflict', the composition of missions began to involve more and more non-military elements. Indeed, one of the most notable developments in peacekeeping operations has been their evolution into multidimensional operations.

2.17 With the expanding scope of peacekeeping operations, the UN has become increasingly aware of the significance of the different phases of these missions. In his 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*, Dr Boutros-Ghali used the terms preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding to define the actions taken by the UN to prevent, resolve and preserve peace.

2.18 He saw preventative diplomacy as a means of easing tensions before they resulted in conflict; of creating confidence and building good faith to reduce the likelihood of disputes between states. On the other hand, in his view, peacemaking was intended to bring hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means, while

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14 Government of Canada, *Submission 37*, p. 1.

15 World Vision Australia, *Submission 19*, pp. 1–2.

16 United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping, Meeting New Challenges*, DPI/2350/Rev. 2, pp. 4–5, <http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q&a.pdf> (accessed 18 January 2007). While the end of the Cold War was significant in the evolution of peacekeeping, Bellamy *et al* note that its evolution has been 'protracted, uneven and inconsistent', that it is difficult to clearly distinguish different forms of peacekeeping and misleading to organise the evolution into distinct 'generations' of peacekeeping. A. Bellamy, P. Williams, & S. Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2004, p. 13.

peacekeeping was a means of implementing settlements that had been negotiated by peacemakers. Under the definition of peacemaking, Dr Boutros-Ghali understood the Security Council to have the authority, if all peaceful means had failed, to enforce peace by taking military action to maintain or restore international peace and security.<sup>17</sup> Today, however, peacemaking is considered to imply 'diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement' while peace enforcement involves the use of coercive measures to bring about peace.<sup>18</sup>

2.19 He also added the term post-conflict peacebuilding to the range of functions because in his view, to be truly successful, peacemaking and peacekeeping 'must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people'.<sup>19</sup> He noted that the terms are integrally related:

Just as diplomacy will continue across the span of all activities...so there may not be a dividing line between peacemaking and peace-keeping. Peacemaking is often a prelude to peace-keeping—just as the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field may expand possibilities for the prevention of conflict, facilitate the work of peacemaking and in many cases serve as a prerequisite for peace-building.<sup>20</sup>

2.20 Lieutenant General (Retired) John Sanderson, military commander for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992–1993), identified this mission as 'the first truly complex, multifaceted operation of the post-Cold War era'.<sup>21</sup> DFAT also considered that UNTAC marked a turning point for UN peacekeeping operations. It had seven components addressing all the modalities of the peace agreements, from a ceasefire arrangement to elections to the establishment of a

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17 UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, A/47/277–S/24111, 17 June 1992, paragraph 43.

18 United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Guidelines and Principles* (UN Capstone Doctrine), March 2008, pp. 17–18. See also UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the United Nations*, A/50/60–S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, paragraphs 77–80, <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html#INSTRUMENT> (accessed 21 May 2008); and Jane Boulden, *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*, 2000, pp. 14–16.

19 UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, A/47/277–S/24111, 17 June 1992, paragraph 55.

20 UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, A/47/277–S/24111, 17 June 1992, paragraph 45.

21 John Sanderson, 'The Changing Face of Peace Operations: A View from the Field', *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring 2002, vol. 55, no. 2, p. 281.

neutral political environment with a just human rights regime.<sup>22</sup> The mission was called upon to organise and conduct an election rather than simply monitor an election taking place. Further, it was heavily involved in the civil administration of Cambodia and had a supervisory role in a number of key ministries.<sup>23</sup> UNTAC is an example of a situation where a peacekeeping operation required an integrated approach focused not only on bringing an end to hostilities, but also achieving enduring stability through a long-term coordinated approach involving a number of government agencies and NGOs.

2.21 Missions such as UNTAC relied on military, police and civilian personnel including participants from the NGO sector. Indeed, the UN accepts that humanitarian actors can play a useful role when 'linked and coordinated with peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building'.<sup>24</sup> Ensuring that the different components of a peacekeeping operation work together effectively became a major challenge for the UN. Thus, while it was important for the UN to understand the different roles and aims that existed across operations and within phases of individual operations, it also needed to consider peacekeeping operations as an integrated whole.

### ***Brahimi Report***

2.22 In 1992, while acknowledging the increased and broadening tasks of peacekeeping operations, Dr Boutros-Ghali noted that the demands for peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations would continue 'to challenge the capacity, the political and financial will and the creativity of the Secretariat and Member States'.<sup>25</sup> A number of missions, particularly those conducted in the Balkans during the 1990s, exposed major weaknesses in the ability of the UN to meet the growing demands of complex peacekeeping operations.<sup>26</sup>

2.23 Prompted by these failures, the then Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan, convened a high-level panel in 2000 to conduct a thorough review of UN peace and security activities. Published in August 2000, the so-called Brahimi Report—named

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22 John Sanderson, 'The Changing Face of Peace Operations: A View from the Field', *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring, 2002, vol. 55, no. 2, p. 281.

23 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Submission 15*, p. 2.

24 UN General Assembly, Report of the Joint Inspection Unit, *Investigation of the relationship between humanitarian assistance and peace-keeping operations*, (JIU/REP/95/6), A/50/572, 24 October 1995, p. vi.

25 UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, A/47/277–S/24111, 17 June 1992, paragraph 49.

26 United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping, Meeting New Challenges*, DPI/2350/Rev. 2, p. 5, <http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q&a.pdf> (accessed 18 January 2007). There are many and varied views on the underlying causes of peacekeeping failures. See for example, UN General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305–S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, p. 4; and F. Fleitz Jr, *Peacekeeping Fiascos of the 1990s*, 2002.

after the chairman of its investigative panel, Lakhdar Brahimi—confirmed and built on the findings contained in the 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*.<sup>27</sup>

2.24 The report drew attention to the changing nature of peacekeeping and how complex peacekeeping operations tended to occur in volatile circumstances with greater risks and costs than experienced in traditional peacekeeping operations.<sup>28</sup> In particular, it noted the intra-state nature of disputes and the dangerous environment created by 'spoilers' who had reneged on their commitments or sought in other ways to undermine a peace accord by violence. As examples, the report cited the activities of groups that had 'challenged peace implementation in Cambodia, threw Angola, Somalia and Sierra Leone back into civil war, and orchestrated the murder of 800,000 people in Rwanda'.<sup>29</sup> It argued:

The United Nations has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over the past decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping is to succeed.<sup>30</sup>

2.25 It also noted the key and growing role of peacebuilding in internal conflicts.<sup>31</sup> The report underlined the importance of a well-integrated mission, with the various components, military and civilian, complementing each other's contribution to ensure peace:

In such complex operations, peacekeepers work to maintain a secure local environment while peacebuilders work to make that environment self-sustaining. Only such an environment offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces, making peacekeepers and peacebuilders inseparable partners.<sup>32</sup>

2.26 To be able to assist communities and nations make the transition from violence to sustainable peace, the report acknowledged the need for highly trained and experienced personnel particularly in the area of post-conflict peacebuilding. In particular, it mentioned the requirement to develop transitional civil administrations for Kosovo and East Timor and its concern about the difficulties recruiting experts at short notice.<sup>33</sup> It stated:

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27 UN General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305–S/2000/809, 21 August 2000. Hereafter referred to as 'The Brahimi Report'. The full text of the report can be found at [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/) (accessed 18 January 2007).

28 The Brahimi Report, p. 3.

29 The Brahimi Report, paragraph 21, p. 4.

30 The Brahimi Report, Executive summary, p. viii.

31 The Brahimi Report, Executive summary, p. ix and paragraph 18, p. 3.

32 The Brahimi Report, Executive summary, p. viii and p. 5. See also Austcare, *Submission 11*, p. 6.

33 The Brahimi Report, paragraphs 76, 128 and 129, pp. 13 and 22.



Few staff within the Secretariat, or within United Nations agencies, funds or programmes possess the technical expertise and experience required to run a municipality or national ministry.<sup>34</sup>

2.27 The Brahimi Report provided a valuable insight the challenges facing the UN in deploying a mission. It also critically examined the UN's failings and made recommendations which included:

- United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence;
- before the Security Council agrees to implement a ceasefire or peace agreement with a United Nations-led peacekeeping operation, the Council assure itself that the agreement meets threshold conditions, such as consistency with international human rights standards and practicability of specified tasks and timelines; and
- a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peacekeeping operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments.<sup>35</sup>

2.28 The UN responded positively to the report and its findings influenced the Security Council's approach to the deployment of peacekeeping operations beyond the year 2000. A DFAT representative commented that the Brahimi Report was 'quite useful in laying down some real guidelines for the UN on how they should go forward on peacekeeping'. In her view, its findings have informed peacekeeping activities in the last seven years or so resulting in more complex operations being 'much better managed than after that initial post Cold War success period which...led to some real problems'.<sup>36</sup>

2.29 The trend toward increasingly complex UN peacekeeping missions continued after 2000 with multidimensional operations encompassing areas such as the rule of law, civil administration, economic development and human rights.<sup>37</sup> For example, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), established under Chapter VII, reflected the broadening dimension of UN peacekeeping missions. Under its mandate, adopted in May 2004, ONUB was, *inter alia*, to ensure the respect of ceasefire

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34 The Brahimi Report, paragraph 129, p. 22.

35 The Brahimi Report, Summary of Recommendations, p. 54.

36 Ms Gillian Bird, *Committee Hansard*, 25 July 2007, p. 52.

37 United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping, Meeting New Challenges*, DPI/2350/Rev. 2, p. 7, <http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q&a.pdf> (accessed 18 January 2007).

agreements; carry out disarmament and demobilisation; contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance; contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. It was also to provide advice and assistance to the transitional government and authorities in their efforts to, among other things, carry out institutional reforms and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the police.<sup>38</sup> In some cases, such as in East Timor and Kosovo, transitional administrations have been established with operations required to provide 'all the functions usually associated with statehood'.<sup>39</sup>

2.30 In his 2005 report, *In Larger Freedom*, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan emphasised the connection between development, human rights and security. He noted the importance of building long-term stability and resilience within states:

If States are fragile, the peoples of the world will not enjoy the security, development and justice that are their right. Therefore, one of the great challenges of the new millennium is to ensure that all States are strong enough to meet the many challenges they face.<sup>40</sup>

2.31 Bellamy *et al* also commented on these multifaceted operations that combine a robust military force with a significant civilian component and aim to fundamentally change conflict ridden societies. They stated:

The purpose of the force is not to police a buffer zone while the belligerents make peace. Rather it is to provide security, often as a prelude to the creating of an interim UN administration intended to establish a functioning (liberal democratic) state. This involves an extensive expansion of peacekeeping functions to include civilian policing, institution building, infrastructure reconstruction and national reconciliation.<sup>41</sup>

2.32 The international community has come to expect peacekeeping operations to reach a stage where, in a secure and stable environment, local authorities assume the full range of state activities that will enable their country to continue to build lasting peace. In order to achieve this ultimate objective, the coordination and cooperation between the different elements of a peacekeeping operation becomes paramount. The Government of Canada explained:

The concept of an 'integrated mission' was developed to ensure this close co-ordination, often requiring [a] senior official to be placed in charge to oversee the complex, multifaceted components of the mission. 'Integrated peace operations' now involve significant political/diplomatic, human rights, governance, judicial, police and development personnel (and

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38 UN Security Council, Resolution 1545, S/RES/1545 (2004), 21 May 2004.

39 A. Bellamy, P. Williams, & S. Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2004, p. 230.

40 UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General, *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, p. 6.

41 A. Bellamy, P. Williams, & S. Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2004, p. 165.

resources) in addition to the traditional military forces which are mandated to provide a stable environment.<sup>42</sup>

### ***Regional peacekeeping operations***

2.33 Although many of the world's peacekeeping operations have been conducted under a UN mandate, the UN is not the only initiator of peacekeeping operations. Regional coalitions, alliances or individual countries can and do conduct peacekeeping operations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.<sup>43</sup> This occurs at the invitation, or with the authority, of the host country, often when the international community cannot afford to wait for UN approval. In 1992, Dr Boutros-Ghali acknowledged the contribution that regional bodies could make to peacekeeping operations:

Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.<sup>44</sup>

2.34 By sanctioning regional organisations or pivotal states to undertake peacekeeping operations, the Security Council has facilitated greater involvement by some key states, allowing them to participate in peacekeeping without putting their soldiers under UN command. In some cases, a regional response may be possible where parties to a conflict will not permit UN involvement, as was the case until recently in the Darfur region of Sudan.<sup>45</sup>

2.35 Currently, there are a number of significant peacekeeping operations being undertaken by regional organisations. According to the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, in the 12 months to 30 September 2006, the

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42 *Submission 37*, p. 2.

43 Charter of the United Nations, Article 52, <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/> (accessed 25 October 2007). Chapter VIII of the UN Charter states: 'Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations'.

44 UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992, paragraph 64.

45 UN News Service, *Sudan accepts UN-African force for Darfur without conditions—Council official*, 17 June 2007. Bellamy *et al* also cite the examples of Chechnya, where the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe was 'allowed access when the UN was not', and Zimbabwe where the 'government preferred regional and continental bodies as election observers to personnel from non-African organisations', *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2004, p. 214.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union and the European Union had a combined number of 68,000 peacekeepers serving in operations.<sup>46</sup> This figure rose to 78,000 military and police personnel in the field in 2007.<sup>47</sup> It should be noted that the Centre includes operations in Afghanistan in its statistics. According to the Centre, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is the largest mission which in 2006 had over 30,000 troops deployed. It is a UN-authorized operation in Afghanistan and operates under the auspices of NATO.<sup>48</sup>

2.36 The involvement of regional bodies or coalitions in non-UN mandated peacekeeping operations seems set to continue. A DFAT representative commented that the UN, with about 80,000 peacekeepers deployed around the globe, is stretched and there is a limit to what the UN can be expected to provide, particularly with regard to troops and police.<sup>49</sup> She acknowledged that the UN has long encouraged regional groupings and countries to play more of a role in peacekeeping operations and this was a trend that would continue.<sup>50</sup>

2.37 Similarly, Associate Professor Elsinä Wainwright observed that there are likely to be difficult situations emerging that are going to require complex responses. For example, in her view, the call for policing resources was going to increase and the UN, unable to meet this demand, would increasingly endorse regional intervention.<sup>51</sup>

### *Committee view*

2.38 Whether peacekeeping operations are UN or non-UN mandated, countries and agencies involved in such missions continue to deal with difficult situations requiring a complex, multidimensional response. Individually, and as a coalition, they are required to meet new challenges.

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46 *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007*, Briefing Paper, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, with the support of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the International Peace Academy, 2007, p. 1.

47 *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008*, Briefing Paper, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, with the support of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008, p. 2.

48 *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007*, Briefing Paper, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, with the support of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the International Peace Academy, 2007, p. 1.

49 Ms Gillian Bird, *Committee Hansard*, 25 July 2007, pp. 52–53.

50 Ms Gillian Bird, *Committee Hansard*, 25 July 2007, p. 53.

51 *Committee Hansard*, 20 August 2007, p. 3.

## **Conclusion**

2.39 This chapter provided an overview of the factors that have influenced and continue to influence the deployment of peacekeeping operations. These operations have changed significantly since 1947. Today's international environment is not only very different from that experienced immediately after the Second World War and during the Cold War, but it is also more fluid. Peacekeeping operations are deployed to parts of the world where either the state has collapsed or, riven by internal strife, is severely debilitated. Traditional boundaries between warfare and peacekeeping, and between military and civilian roles, have blurred. Thus, peacekeeping operations have developed into multidimensional missions focused not only on bringing an end to hostilities but on resolving the root causes of those hostilities. They are concerned with implementing a durable, comprehensive strategy aimed at reconstructing or strengthening the fundamentals of a nation-state—including economic development and sustainable governance—so as to ensure lasting stability.

2.40 As the short-term and long-term agendas of today's peacekeeping operations become increasingly interwoven, a larger range of government agencies and other organisations are required to coordinate and work together towards sustainable strategic goals. Although the various activities of a peacekeeping operation—conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding—are grouped under separate headings, the UN clearly understands that the elements of peacekeeping operations are not mutually exclusive. It understands that there is a close interaction and interdependence of the various elements that occur within the same operation.

2.41 All of these trends have implications for the way the UN and member states prepare for and coordinate peacekeeping operations into the future. Countries are being asked to undertake a much broader range of tasks within the one integrated mission and to meet new challenges, especially in situations where 'spoilers' seek to undermine the work of the mission.<sup>52</sup> The increased use of regional arrangements also has implications for participating countries.

2.42 The changes that have taken place in the nature and scope of peacekeeping operations have profound implications for Australia as a member state of the UN and a long-time contributor to peacekeeping missions. They influence Australia's approach to participating in such missions and its decisions on the composition and structure of its deployment; the training and preparation of its personnel; and how it coordinates its effort. The committee now turns to consider Australia's contribution to peacekeeping operations and starts by looking at the decision-making process.

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52 See reference to 'spoilers' at paragraph 2.24.



## **Part II**

### **Decision to participate**

In this part of the report, the committee looks at Australia's decision to participate in a peacekeeping operation. It examines the framework in which this decision is made, including the systems and mechanisms that government agencies use to consult with each other and to contribute to the whole-of-government decision-making process.

The committee then looks at the major factors that influence the decision to participate in a peacekeeping operation, including the objectives and timeframe of the mission and the nature and level of commitment to those objectives. It also looks in greater depth at major considerations in the decision to participate including: the humanitarian imperative to initiate an operation; the legal aspects of a mission; the rules governing the operation, especially the use of force; and the exit strategy.