Supplementary Submission to the Senate Inquiry

Environmental Regulation of Uranium Mining

Dr Dennis Matthews
October 7 2002

KEY POINTS FROM WRITTEN SUBMISSION

Public Inquiry into Uranium (1996)

ACCOUNTABILITY
Despite the sending of personal invitations, no state or Commonwealth government minister, no Government department, and no uranium mining company or mining organization made a submission to the inquiry and only the Office of the Supervising Scientist was represented at the hearings on March 3 1997.

MONITORING AND REPORTING
The Public Inquiry recommended:
•	That there be adequate assessment of the environmental, health, social, and cultural impacts of the uranium industry.
•	That there be constant monitoring of the environmental, health, social and cultural impacts of the uranium industry, and that this monitoring be overseen by an independent body.
•	That the public be privy to all of the information regarding the monitoring and that the public be consulted about any changes or extensions to the operations being monitored.

Environmental Impact

NUCLEAR INDUSTRY RECORD
It is noteworthy that the problems that characterised uranium mining activities 50 years ago are the same ones which we encounter with present day uranium mines. These problems involve water use, water contamination, tailings or wastes (including run off), leaks and health and safety.

Just as with the earlier ventures, the companies involved, while freely admitting to past mistakes in the industry, deny that there is a current problem.

These assurances are in stark contrast with recent experience at Roxby, Beverley and Honeymoon.

At Roxby, despite being a very recent operation by a very large and well resourced mining company (WMC) and despite monitoring by both the company and the South Australian Government, there was a massive loss of liquid into the ground beneath the tailings retention system (Roxby Downs water leakage, Parliament of SA, Environment, Resources and Development Committee, 19th Rpt, April 10 1996) and two multi-million dollar fires.

Beverley has been plagued by above-ground leaks and spills.

Both Beverley and Honeymoon are deliberately polluting aquifers with acidic, toxic, radioactive liquid.

Radioactive Wastes

REGULATION
The same type of acidic, toxic, radioactive waste that is being produced and crudely stored at Roxby is being pumped into the underground water at Beverley and Honeymoon.

Radioactive wastes from uranium mining should be managed in the same way as radioactive wastes from any other source. They should be securely stored above ground as close as possible to the site at which they are produced.

The preferential treatment given to the mining industry in allowing its radioactive wastes to be stored in tailings dams or pumped underground should be replaced by secure storage in properly engineered above-ground facilities.

Health and Safety

REGULATION
This is a highly undesirable arrangement that can only hinder the proper functioning of such committees, which should be reconstituted such that the membership is independent from the industry that it is entrusted to regulate.

Because it takes about 20 years for solid cancers produced by low levels of ionising radiation to become apparent it is not easy to trace the cause. It is imperative that long-term medical records are kept of all workers, residents and their children, including those conceived after leaving the area. A mandatory National Register has been requested for over 25 years.

SECRECY/ACCOUNTABILITY
Uranium mines are unique in that they involve radioactive materials that pose an extra hazard to workers and the public. It is a glaring anomaly that details of radiation exposure are kept from public scrutiny. Such secrecy does not serve to protect workers or the public.

The Beverley Uranium Mine

SECRECY
There was no public consultation on the DEF and the relevant documents were provided by the South Australian Government in February 1998 at the last moment under the threat of a Freedom of Information request from the Australian Conservation Foundation.

In a statement from the Minister for Resources, Rob Kerin, on February 24, 1998 it was claimed “There is nothing secret about the Beverley Project. We have consistently released information as requested by the Conservation Foundation.” First as Minister and then as Premier, Rob Kerin consistently denied the ACF access to documents about the trials.

REGULATION/PROMOTION NEXUS
According to both Heathgate and the South Australian Government the 4 to 12 month trials were a key step in providing information for an EIS, but one month after the trial started it was announced (The Australian, February 12 1998) that the EIS would be released in March, that is less than three months after trials began.

The final report on the trials was submitted to the SA Government in July 1999, three months after the Government had given the go-ahead for commercial operation of the Beverley mine.

NATURAL ATTENUATION/GOVERNMENT INCOMPETANCE
Heathgate claimed at a public meeting on February 28, 1998 at Davenport near Port Augusta South Australia that all liquid wastes revert back to solids when reinjected into the aquifer, but no evidence was given to support this claim. Four years after the original claim no empirical evidence has been publicly released to support the claim.

MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES
It is intrinsic to the acid-ISL process that it mobilises radioactive and toxic materials. These materials should be properly managed. This requires that all wastes be contained in evaporation ponds and that all of the residual solids be kept out of the groundwater. This is not the case at Beverley where the liquid wastes are being deliberately disposed of into the groundwater.

The wastes that Heathgate is disposing of into the underground water are very similar to the wastes that WMC is not allowed to leak into the ground. Both wastes contain radioactive and toxic pollutants.

REGULATION/PROMOTION NEXUS
A project EIS should include pilot plants, mining trials, and exploration mining.

REGULATION/PROMOTION NEXUS
The EIS for the Beverley uranium mine was released on June 29, 1998, six months after mining started at Beverley, and one year before the final report of the trials was submitted to the SA Government. According to Heathgate and the SA Government the trials were a key step in providing information for an EIS yet the final report was not written until one year after the EIS and it was not publicly released until two years after commercial operation was given the go ahead.

MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES
It is intrinsic to ISL mining that the groundwater is contaminated by the leach solution and by the substances that it dissolves.

Unlike most mining projects in developed countries where liquid wastes are evaporated and the resulting solid wastes are responsibly managed, the liquid wastes at Beverley are disposed of by pumping back into adjoining and mined-out aquifers. This is a practice that should be rejected by responsible governments.

There are no plans to restore the aquifers that will be polluted by the mining solution and liquid wastes from the project.

An environmentally responsible government would:

•	Not allow discharge of liquid wastes into the underground water but would evaporate the liquid wastes and properly manage the solid residue.
•	Require restoration of the aquifer to its original quality by flushing with clean water, evaporating the polluted water and properly managing the solid residue.

It was claimed in the EIS that “long-lived alpha dust doses will be negligible given that spillages are captured when wet ….” Yet the only spill that had been made public during the EIS process was not cleaned up.

The plan to bury solid radioactive waste in shallow, unlined trenches was inconsistent with the guidelines for the national radioactive waste repository.

There was even greater contradiction between the guidelines and the planned disposal of liquid radioactive wastes into underground water. This aspect of radioactive waste disposal was not even mentioned in this section of the EIS.

In effect, the company is transferring the costs to the general public in the form of environmental damage. This irresponsible and archaic practice was only possible through the cooperation of a government that put a low value on the environment.

PRODUCT RESPONSIBILITY
Neither the EIS nor the Supplement addressed either the appropriateness of uranium mining or the uses of uranium. This was equivalent to mining asbestos without regard to its appropriateness or to the problems caused by its use.

REGULATION/PROMOTION NEXUS
This is an incredible series of failures. It cast serious doubt on the effectiveness of current regulatory processes. A review of the regulation of mining is urgently needed. In particular, is it appropriate that the department that promotes mining in SA is also the department that has the responsibility for regulating mining, including safety and environmental aspects?

The SA Government did not release news of the accident until nearly 24 hours later.

Government inspectors did not go to the accident site until nearly 48 hours after the accident.

When inspectors did arrive they reported that there was no evidence of radioactive contamination. The basis on which this statement was made has yet to be released.

Workers at the processing plant would almost certainly have inhaled increased amounts of radon gas in the first hours after the accident.

By the time inspectors arrived, two days after the accident, the invisible cloud of radon gas had probably dispersed.

The spilt mining liquid was put into the holding ponds along with other mining wastes and has presumably now been pumped into the underground water.

REGULATION/PROMOTION NEXUS
The Beverley uranium mine was given permission by the then SA Minister for Mines, Rob Kerin, to dispose of its liquid wastes by pumping them into the underground water. Kerin did not consult the public when he made this decision. Kerin’s decision was later confirmed by the then Federal Minister for the Environment, Senator Robert Hill.

The date on this report is July 1999. This is 13 months after the EIS was submitted (June 1998), 10 months after the EIS Supplement (Sept 1998), and four months after approval was given for commercial production (March 1999).

The trials were given permission by the SA Government in November 1997 through a process that did not involve public consultation. It involved a Declaration of Environmental Factors (DEF). The details of this arrangement between the Government and Heathgate were eventually made public by the Minister, Rob Kerin, in February 1998 under threat of a FoI action.

One of the stated objectives of the FLT was “to provide environmental and radiation monitoring data for input into the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), and to demonstrate appropriate environmental protection and radiation control measures.”

This objective contrasts with the facts that the EIS was submitted half way through the trials and that almost no environmental or radiation data from the FLT was given in the EIS.

The Honeymoon Uranium Mine

MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES
Radioactive waste is a by-product of using uranium. Without uranium there would be very little radioactive waste. The first priority in managing any intractable hazardous material is to minimise its production. In the case of radioactive waste this means minimising the use of uranium, which in turn means minimizing the mining of uranium.

The Honeymoon Project not only contributes to the world’s radioactive waste but it directly produces large amounts of radioactive and toxic wastes which Southern Cross Resources is pumping into the underground water on its mining lease. This practice was condoned by the SA and Commonwealth Governments.

REGULATION/PROMOTION NEXUS
Permission for the Honeymoon “trials” was given on the basis of a Declaration of Environmental Factors (DEF) written on October 31 1997 but not publicly available until after the SA Government had given permission for the trials in April 1998.

EIS PROCEDURES
The Honeymoon DEF was a grossly deficient document, lacking basic information such as background radiation levels, estimates of radiation doses, and comprehensive chemical analyses. It appeared to be based almost entirely on the previous EIS, which was written 16 years earlier. In some cases the information was 22 years old.

Incredibly for a uranium-mining project, the draft DEF contained no data on ionising radiation, either background levels or increased levels due to the project or doses to workers.

Southern Cross Resources justified the lack of ionising radiation data in the draft DEF on the basis that the DEF guidelines did not require such information. This is an indictment of the Government department that supervised the DEF.

The EIS claimed to have consulted with both the Conservation Council of SA (CCSA) and the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF). The extent of this consultation can be judged by the fact that the EIS did not give the correct names of these organizations.

The company did not deal directly with community groups. When, as a pre-requisite to consultation, information was requested from Southern Cross Resources no response was received.

WHICH OXIDANT?
Despite prolonged Field Leach Trials the proponents were unable to state what oxidants will be used. They stated that oxidants other than oxygen, hydrogen peroxide, sodium chlorate and ferric sulphate could be used. The oxidant has a major effect on what elements, other than uranium, are dissolved and hence on the pollutants which will be disposed.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

WHICH OXIDANT FOR ISL?

The composition of the liquid extracted from the ore body using ISL mining is determined by a number of factors including flow rate, temperature and the nature of the ore body. The solubility and rate of dissolution of not only the uranium but also accompany elements are crucially determined by the composition of the liquid being injected into the ore body. The active ingredients in the injected liquid are acid and an oxidant.

Information provided in the DEF and later in the EIS for both the Honeymoon and Beverley identified the acid as sulphuric acid of varying concentrations. The oxidant was less clearly defined. The oxidants that were mentioned as possible oxidants included, oxygen, hydrogen peroxide, sodium chlorate, and ferric chloride. The type and concentration of the oxidant has a pronounced effect on what impurities will be dissolved along with the uranium. These impurities include a wide range of toxic and radioactive elements.

The DEF and EIS for both Honeymoon and Beverley used oxygen as the oxidant, yet in both cases hydrogen peroxide appears to have been selected as the preferred oxidant. The information on liquid compositions given to the government (in the case of the DEF) and to the government and general public (in the case of the EIS) is therefore irrelevant. This data includes composition of extracted liquid, waste liquids, and re-injected liquid.

Decisions about the disposal of waste liquids and the hazard of spilt liquids have been made on the assumption that oxygen was the oxidant, whereas the commercial ISL mines may be using hydrogen peroxide.

There is a significant difference in many aspects of ISL mining depending on whether oxygen or hydrogen peroxide is used. This includes safety and environmental hazards. The integrity of piping used to convey process liquids under pressure is also dependent on the oxidant being used.

Permission for the both the Field Leach Trials and for commercial operation may have been given on the basis of incorrect information about an important part of ISL mining, namely the oxidant.

If permission was based on wrong information about the oxidant then permission should be revoked.

NATURAL ATTENUATION OF LIQUID WASTES FROM ISL

It has long been claimed by ISL proponents that disposal of liquid waste into ground water is acceptable because the wastes do not contain anything that was not originally present in the aquifer. This is misleading because the impurities were originally present as water-insoluble solids. They were chemically extracted using sulphuric acid and an oxidant and are being returned to the aquifer in liquid solution, which presents a completely different hazard to the original water-insoluble solid.

The proponents, however, claim that the dissolved impurities will revert to solid by a process described as natural attenuation. No empirical evidence for this process has been presented over the 4-5 year period that this claim has been made. The only evidence is theoretical. Computer modelling has been used to demonstrate natural attenuation. The work was carried out by a higher degree student (M.C.Pirlo). The modelling produced some bizarre results such as natural attenuation leads to a uranium concentration in the underground water that is millions of times less than currently exists in the water.

Even if the computer modelling was valid it has a severe limitation, it is theoretically impossible for it to predict the rate at which the attenuation occurs and hence how long it will take. The modelling uses a branch of science called thermodynamics, which deals with what tends to happen, but not the rate. The rate at which things happens is the province of kinetics. Kinetics frequently over-rides thermodynamics, for example in the operation of a lead-acid battery. According to thermodynamics a lead-acid battery should neither yield any power nor be re-chargeable. The fact that a lead-acid battery is the most common battery and can be recharged is because kinetics takes precedence over thermodynamics.

Neither the defects in the modelling nor its impossibility of telling how long natural attenuation takes was recognised by government bodies responsible for assessing the EIS for Honeymoon or Beverley.

Despite the opportunities and frequent requests the mining companies have provided no empirical evidence in the form of field tests that support their claims of natural attenuation.

Given the environmental significance of dumping radioactive, toxic liquid wastes into an aquifer, the invalidity of theoretical models and the absence of empirical data to support natural attenuation should lead the government to require that all be liquid wastes be managed above ground.