

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

1. A common source of concern to all Parliaments is the growing imbalance in the relationship between Parliament and the Executive, the rapidly increasing power and influence of the Executive, the need for Parliament to strengthen its oversight and check of Executive activity, and the concurrent need for the Parliament to regain or assert greater independence and autonomy in regard to its own internal arrangements. . . . Paragraph 3.1.
2. In the majority of countries throughout the world, the respective Parliaments and Executives have made arrangements which provide for real autonomy in relation to their financial appropriations . . . Paragraph 3.3.
3. The Select Committee recognises that the present constitutional arrangements place financial initiative firmly in the hands of the Executive; it concludes that this is a proper arrangement for Government appropriations, but not for Parliamentary appropriations and, therefore, that the Constitution should be amended when the occasion next arises. . . . Paragraphs 5.2 to 5.4.
4. In the meantime, it is still possible to make new arrangements to achieve a desirable measure of autonomy for the Parliament. . . . Paragraph 5.5.
5. The present procedure for Parliament's appropriations is unsatisfactory as it involves Parliament making bids about which the Executive may apply a qualitative judgement and thereby restrict the ability of the Legislature to discharge its constitutional duties. . . . Paragraph 5.6.
6. The Select Committee re-affirms the conclusion that Parliament is not an ordinary annual service of the Government and that such classification is inconsistent with the concept of the separation of powers and the supremacy of Parliament. Accordingly, it is unsatisfactory for the Parliament to be included in the Government's Appropriation Bills. . . . Paragraph 5.7.
7. The Select Committee is confident that the arrangement which best recognises the proper relationship between Parliament and the Executive is for the appropriations for each House to be included in a separate Appropriation Bill. . . . Paragraph 5.8.
8. The Select Committee is of the opinion that if, in addition to the separate Appropriation Bill, each House established a Committee, with Executive representation, to examine and modify, if necessary, the parliamentary estimates, then not only is a desirable level of autonomy achieved for the Parliament, but also the Government's examination from its budgetary policy standpoint is preserved. . . . Paragraph 5.8.
9. The administrative procedure imposed by Government has meant that, without the agreement of the Public Service Board, a staffing proposal has virtually no chance of approval. And the history of the debate surrounding this matter shows that the Senate, in particular, believes that the Board is not qualified in matters concerning staffing of the Parliament to be given what virtually amounts to a power of veto over Parliament's proposals. . . . Paragraph 5.9.
10. The Select Committee considers that the concept of a separate Parliamentary Service as proposed by the Royal Commission on Government Administration is attractive and, whilst some work remains to be done to refine the plan, it might well be of benefit to the Parliament in the future. . . . Paragraphs 5.10 to 5.12.

11. The Select Committee considers that the Presiding Officers should have access to the Public Service Board for advice whenever they consider it necessary; on no account should such advice be mandatory. . . . Paragraphs 5.13 and 5.14.
12. Subject to modifications concerning the creation, etc. of offices and the Board's advisory role, the proposals of the Board are sound and would only require a simple amendment to the Public Service Act to be implemented. . . . Paragraphs 5.12 to 5.15.
13. The Select Committee concludes that if the Committees of each House were, in addition to examining the Parliament's appropriations, charged with an advisory role in relation to staffing proposals, once again a desirable level of autonomy is achieved for the Parliament and also the Government's examination from the standpoint of its manpower policy is preserved. . . . Paragraphs 5.8 and 5.16.
14. The Select Committee is mindful of the need for an experimental approach to be adopted as it can understand a reluctance on the part of the Government to agree to an immediate total reform. . . . Paragraphs 6.1 and 6.2.
15. The Select Committee does not see a Commission similar to the United Kingdom's as being suitable at this stage. The creation of a Commission would produce a rigid, structured approach rather than the flexible approach which is required at the moment. . . . Paragraph 6.3.
16. The Select Committee believes that the Senate and, where appropriate, the Government, should agree to a trial of the proposed arrangements . . . Paragraph 6.4.

Recommendations

1. As a first step, the Select Committee recommends that the Senate establish a Standing Committee to be known as the Senate Appropriations and Staffing Committee. . . . Paragraph 6.5.
2. The Select Committee recommends that the appropriations for the Parliament be removed from the Bill for the ordinary annual services of the Government and included in a separate Parliamentary Appropriation Bill. . . . Paragraph 6.13.
3. The Select Committee also recommends that all items of expenditure administered by the Executive departments on behalf of the Parliament be brought together in the Parliamentary Appropriation Bill and that provision be made for an Advance to the President of the Senate on the same basis as the Advance to the Minister for Finance . . . Paragraph 6.14.
4. The Select Committee recommends that the President arranges for discussions to be held with the appropriate Executive departments to review those functions which are currently administered by them, and subsequently to plan the transfer of functions suitable for administration by the Senate. . . . Paragraphs 6.16 and 6.17.
5. The Select Committee recommends that section 9 of the *Public Service Act* 1922 be amended to vest in the Presiding Officers, separately or jointly as the case may be, the power of appointment, promotion, creation, abolition and reclassification of offices, and the determination of rates of pay and conditions of service.

