

**Rural Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee**

**ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON NOTICE**

Budget Estimates May 2011

**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 107

**Program:** 2.1

**Division/Agency:** (OTS) Office of Transport Security

**Topic:** Emails from AIPA

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** 24-25 (26/05/2011)

**Senator Heffernan asked:**

**Senator HEFFERNAN:** I have got one of the payrolls here which backs it up. Thank you. Could I put in a request for some emails that have been sent. If I could detail the emails: on 5 May 2010, there was an email to transport security—I can provide you with a list. The sender was a bloke called Max Thompson, topic was 'prohibited items and EIA requirements'; 2 June, same thing, topic, 'differences to annex 17 Security'; 3 June, to Max Thompson, sender Tina Lee, 'difference to annex 17 security'; 3 June, another to Tina Lee from Max Thompson, 'differences to annex 17 security'. It goes on, there is a long list, and if you could take that on notice, I would be grateful. There would be no trouble getting those emails?

**Mr Wilson:** We will take it on notice and look for those.

**Answer:**

The Department corresponded with Mr Thomson on a number of occasions and discussed the following issues: prohibited items, Annex 17, Aviation Security Identification Cards, reporting of possible breaches under the Act or Regulations and Visitor Identification Cards.

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**ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON NOTICE**

Budget Estimates May 2011

**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 108

**Program:** 2.1

**Division/Agency:** (OTS) Office of Transport Security

**Topic:** ASIC pass holders

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** 29 (26/05/2011)

**Senator Heffernan asked:**

**Senator HEFFERNAN:** No. My concern is that a person who has an ASIC pass does not have to show it if they are asked to show it, especially to the senior pilot boarding the plane. Should it be displayed at all times?

**Mr Retter:** I understand the nature of your question goes to an incident at a regional airport. I am not aware of the particular incident or the precise facts around it. If I could, I would like to take your question on notice.

**Answer:**

The Aviation Security Identification Card (ASIC) must be visible at all times.

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**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 109

**Program:** 2.1

**Division/Agency:** (OTS) Office of Transport Security

**Topic:** Incident at Brisbane Airport

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** 30 (26/05/2011)

**Senator Heffernan asked:**

**Senator HEFFERNAN:** At Brisbane Airport masking tape confiscated from a pilot, even though it is not on the prescribed list; however, masking tape is now allowed. That is correct? It was confiscated. I could figure a reason why: you could tie someone up with masking tape.

**Mr Retter:** I am not aware of masking tape being removed from a pilot.

**Senator HEFFERNAN:** I might let you take that on notice. Is the Office of Transport Security aware of cockpit door opening incidents?

**Mr Retter:** I am not aware of any particular incidents...

**Answer:**

Masking tape is not a prohibited item.

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**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 110

**Program:** 2.1

**Division/Agency:** (OTS) Office of Transport Security

**Topic:** Sir John Wheeler recommendations

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** 33 (26/05/2011)

**Senator Xenophon asked:**

**Senator XENOPHON:** Could you take on notice an indication of what has been done in relation to those recommendations and where you think there is room for improvement. Mr Mrdak, I appreciate all your answers in relation to this; I still wonder why Allan Kessing was convicted under section 70 for writing a report that was in the public interest. He was convicted of leaking it, which he denies to this day. He was vindicated in the Wheeler Report and more. Is Sir John Wheeler still around the place?

**Mr Mrdak:** I presume so; I think he is still alive.

**Senator XENOPHON:** That is the first bit.

**Senator HEFFERNAN:** Better take my own pulse to check; yes, I am still going.

**Mr Mrdak:** The last time I spoke with Sir John was around 2008.

**Senator XENOPHON:** If Sir John Wheeler is still active in public service in the UK, is there any consideration being given for Sir John Wheeler to do a follow-up report six years after the initial recommendations?

**Mr Mrdak:** I do not know how active Sir John is these days in such matters but I will take that on notice.

**Answer:**

No.

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**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 111

**Program:** 2.1

**Division/Agency:** (OTS) Office of Transport Security

**Topic:** ASIC Passes Regulations

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** 35 (26/05/2011)

**Senator Heffernan asked:**

**Senator HEFFERNAN:** Thank you very much. With ASIC passes, that is one there, the regulation on an ASIC pass, and it is blanked-out, is it has to be worn above the waist et cetera, where it can be seen. What is the penalty for people that wear it upside down? Is there some way of correcting that?

**Mr Retter:** I am not aware if there is a penalty if they are wearing it upside down. We might have to check and take that on notice.

**Answer:**

There is no penalty attached to a person wearing an ASIC upside down.

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**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 112

**Program:** 2.1

**Division/Agency:** (OTS) Office of Transport Security

**Topic:** X-rayed out of size baggage

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** 35 (26/05/2011)

**Senator Heffernan asked:**

**Senator HEFFERNAN:** That is another issue that has been raised. We talked about un-X-rayed out-of-size luggage. You had better take that on notice. I am instructed, and further instructed during this hearing, that there is luggage that does not fit through whatever it fits through, that just gets taken round and put back on the belt.

**Mr Retter:** We will, as we always do, inquire into any allegations of inappropriate security arrangements.

**Answer:**

In accordance with Regulation 4.23 of the Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005, it is an offence for a screened air service to carry checked baggage, regardless of its size, without the baggage being cleared.

The Aviation Screening Notice 2011 (ASN) made under Regulation 4.17 specifies the methods, techniques and equipment to be used for screening. Part 3.77 of the ASN provides an overview of the techniques to be used for screening checked baggage. Part 3.77 also specifies that checked baggage that is unsuitable to be screened by x-ray equipment must be cleared by explosive trace detection screening and inspection.

The Department is not aware of any security incidents where 'oversize' checked baggage has not been cleared using the ASN required screening techniques before being loaded onto a screened air service.

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**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 113

**Program:** 2.1

**Division/Agency:** (OTS) Office of Transport Security

**Topic:** ASIC Failure and breakup rate

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** 35-36 (26/05/2011)

**Senator Heffernan asked:**

**Senator HEFFERNAN:** I apologise. I asked about an MSIC and what was the failure rate of applications for the MSIC, as opposed to ASIC, and we were given details of the various 30-something failures, drug activity, murder threats, all sorts of things. Could you do the same for the ASIC?

**Mr Retter:** Yes. You want the percentage breakup?

**Senator HEFFERNAN:** The failure rate and breakup of the failure rate.

**Mr Retter:** Yes.

**Answer:**

Of the 53,583 ASIC applications (from 1 July 2010 to 30 April 2011), 155 (0.29%) applicants were found Not Eligible on the basis of a discloseable criminal history.

The following are the reasons for the findings of Not Eligible:

- Drug Offences	16 (10.32%)
- Violence	52 (33.54%)
- Dishonesty	85 (54.83%)
- Damage to Property	2 (1.29%)

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**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 114

**Program:** 2.1

**Division/Agency:** (OTS) Office of Transport Security

**Topic:** Aviation Transport Security Regulations

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** Written

**Senator Heffernan asked:**

- 1) Please identify the Australian “Appropriate Authority” referred to on Annex 17 3.1.2.
- 2) Are the current Aviation Transport Security Regulations designed to comply with Annex 17 4.1.1?
- 3) What systems are in place at all CTFR airports in Australia to prevent unauthorized access to airside areas?
- 4) What screening methods are in place for supply vehicles and their contents entering the Security Restricted areas at CTFR airports?
- 5) Is there an error on the Infrastructure website <http://infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/international/icao/annexes/index.aspx> where it indicates that the agency responsible for Annex 17 is the Department of Infrastructure?
- 6) Was The Rt Hon Sir John Wheeler JP DL in error in Chapter 4 Paragraph 16 of his report when he identified OTS as the body responsible for “active participation in relevant international forums, and the administration of measures which come out of international agreements”?
- 7) If The Rt Hon Sir John Wheeler JP DL was not in error in 2005, when was the responsibility for overseeing compliance with Annex 17 transferred to another government department?

**Answer:**

- 1) The Australian “appropriate authority” referred to in Annex 17 at 3.1.2 is the Office of Transport Security, which is a Division of the Department of Infrastructure and Transport.
- 2) Annex 17 does not contain a clause 4.1.1.
- 3) There are various systems in place at CTFR airports in Australia to prevent unauthorised access to airside areas. These systems include, but are not limited to:
  - Perimeter fencing;
  - Patrolling and electronic surveillance;
  - Access control points for personnel and vehicles;
  - Identity checks for persons entering airside areas; and
  - Terminal doors leading airside being locked and alarmed when not in use.
- 4) Screening methods for supply vehicles at CTFR airports involve:
  - Verification of the identity of the driver and any passengers;
  - Visual inspection of goods, including personal possessions; and
  - Visual inspection of the vehicle.
- 5) No.
- 6) No.
- 7) Responsibility for Annex 17 has not been transferred to another government department.

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**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 115

**Program:** 2.1

**Division/Agency:** (OTS) Office of Transport Security

**Topic:** International Incidents

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** Written

**Senator Heffernan asked:**

- 1) In reply to a question from Senator Nash at a previous Estimates session on the 27<sup>th</sup> May 2010, you suggested that international incidents would indicate that pilots were not as trusted as they believed. Could you please details those incidents?
- 2) What is the difference between a regional airport and a CTFR airport?
- 3) What category of airport does Brisbane fall into?
- 4) If Australia is a signatory to the Chicago Convention, what obligation is there for airports and/or airlines in Australia to comply with Annex 17? Please refer to your answer to me on Page 25 – 26<sup>th</sup> May 2011.
- 5) After November 2011, please advise the maximum number of VIC passes that one individual could be issued within a 365 day period?

**Answer:**

- 1) The comment was in reference to the generic vulnerability related to trusted insiders.
- 2) Division 3.5 of the Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005 prescribe 11 'designated airports' which require a *counter-terrorist first response* capability, being:
  - a) Adelaide Airport;
  - b) Alice Springs Airport;
  - c) Brisbane Airport;
  - d) Cairns Airport;
  - e) Canberra Airport;
  - f) Coolangatta Airport;
  - g) Darwin Airport;
  - h) Hobart Airport;
  - i) Melbourne Airport;
  - j) Perth Airport;
  - k) Sydney Airport.

The Act and the Regulations do not provide a definition for 'regional airport.'

- 3) See answer 2 above.
- 4) Obligations arising under Annex 17 fall on the Contracting State.
- 5) An individual will be able to be issued up to an aggregate of 28 days of VIC passes for a 12 month period at a specific airport.

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**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 116

**Program:** 2.1

**Division/Agency:** (OTS) Office of Transport Security

**Topic:** Criminality

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** Written

**Senator Heffernan asked:**

- 1) Please confirm that your differentiation between criminal and terrorist acts would confirm your departments position that a hijack/bomb threat for monetary reward would never occur.
- 2) Could you please clarify your statement on page 26 line 7 with reference to ATSR 6.46 Sub Reg 2,3 & 4.
- 3) Wheeler Report Executive Summary Para 1,2,3,4, & 5. It would appear as though Wheeler was concerned that criminal activities at airports could be exploited by terrorists. Please explain why OTS has no interest in criminal activities at airports.
- 4) When will legislative impediments be overcome so that the Recommendation XI of the Wheeler Report can be implemented?
- 5) If you have read the Wheeler Report, how could you come to the conclusion that the report mainly focused on policing when only two of the seventeen recommendations relate to criminality or policing?
- 6) Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2.18A specifies the requirements to be included in the TSP of the CTFR airport. How can these airports comply with the regulation when no Enhanced Inspection Areas exist?
- 7) When will the Enhanced Inspection Areas at CTFR airports be gazetted?

**Answer:**

- 1) The Government does not agree with such a proposition.
- 2) The comment was with relation to the general practice undertaken at airports for VICs issued on a daily basis. It is common that issuing bodies will require such VICs to be returned at the end of each day. However where this does not occur, Regulation 6.45 requires VICs to be returned within one month of expiry. Where a person fails to do this, a strict liability penalty applies.
- 3) OTS administers the *Aviation Transport Security Act 2004*, which is concerned with unlawful interference to aviation. This could include criminal activities in some circumstances.
- 4) Commonwealth agencies and major airports are working together to meet the intent of Recommendation XI of the Wheeler Report. There are no legislative impediments.
- 5) The comment concerned the Wheeler recommendations on the policing model, and not the report itself.
- 6) The regulation operates whether or not enhanced inspection areas have been established.
- 7) There is no requirement for enhanced inspection areas to be gazetted under the *Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005*.

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**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 117

**Program:** 2.1

**Division/Agency:** (OTS) Office of Transport Security

**Topic:** ICAO ANNEX 17

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** Written

**Senator Heffernan asked:**

- 1) How can specific security outcomes at Australian airports be delivered when any files difference to ICAO Annex 17 guarantees that the minimum standard required by ICAO is not met?
- 2) Why was there no consideration of ground crew (namely engineers, refuelers, cargo loaders, cleaners & caterers) being a threat to civil aviation when “The review of Aviation Security Screening: Report” was carried out?
- 3) Is ATSR 3.16.3 (4) at odds with Annex 17 4.1.1.1?
- 4) Why is there no “Fit and Proper” test applied to ASIC applicants as detailed in the Wheeler Report?
- 5) Has ASIO been approached to confirm the ease of obtaining fake ASIC cards, either from Bangkok or in Australia. If so, what was their response? If not, why not?

**Answer:**

- 1) Not all of the ICAO standards or recommendations may be suitable or possible to implement in all ICAO member states. As such, a difference may have to be filed, but this does not mean that security standards are compromised. An assessment in a country may indicate that a difference to an ICAO standard would not compromise aviation security and that a difference between national aviation security legislation and Annex 17 is acceptable.
- 2) The Wheeler Review had already addressed the issue and its recommendations have been implemented under the airside inspection regime.
- 3) Annex 17 does not contain a clause 4.1.1.1.
- 4) The Wheeler Report made a single ASIC related recommendation regarding the tightening and centralising of the background checking process. This recommendation has been implemented through the establishment of AusCheck.
- 5) The Government does not make public statements about the activities of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.

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**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 118

**Program:** 2.1

**Division/Agency:** (OTS) Office of Transport Security

**Topic:** Gangway / Aerobridge

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** Written

**Senator Heffernan asked:**

What is the difference between a gangway and an aerobridge?

**Answer:**

In common usage, an aerobridge is a corridor that extends from an airport terminal to aircraft that allows passengers to embark and disembark. A gangway is an opening in the ship that allows boarding (by means of a gangplank) that allows passengers to embark and disembark.

**Rural Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee**

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**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 119

**Program:** 2.1

**Division/Agency:** (OTS) Office of Transport Security

**Topic:** OTS Privacy Issues

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** Written

**Senator Heffernan asked:**

- 1) Does OTS make it a habit of not replying to emails that highlight problems that fall within their jurisdiction?
- 2) Why did Mr Dreezer and others at OTS claim "Privacy Issues" to a request for information regarding persons/entities that were granted a dispensation from displaying an ASIC in a secure area at Brisbane International airport when the ATSRs specifically state that the Secretary must gazette any dispensation given to a class of persons. Refer ATSR 3.08 (7).
- 3) Please details how procedures in place at all CTFR airports are in compliance with Annex 17 4.2.6 and 4.2.7.
- 4) Does OTS deem it an acceptable security practice to have a key to the cockpit door of an RTP aircraft secreted in the cabin area close to the cockpit door? Is OTS aware of any such practice? Should any airline that approves such procedures notify OTS?
- 5) In the company of Captain Max Thomson and Second Officer Clayton Simmons at the conclusion of the founding ASECF meeting at the OTS offices in Canberra, did you give an undertaking to Captain Thomson to provide information in the geographic details of the Enhanced Inspection Area at Sydney Airport as well as advice concerning whether Australia had filed a difference to Annex 17 4.7.8?
- 6) If the answer to the previous question is "Yes", when did you deliver both sets of the promised information?
- 7) At the ASECF meeting at that AIPA Offices in Sydney on the 22<sup>nd</sup> October 2010, did you state to Captain Thomson words to the effect," There is a breach of Annex 17. There are two ways we can handle it. We can lodge a difference or we can get the airlines to comply."
- 8) If you were aware of the breach of Annex 17, what actions did you take to rectify the breach? Is it your duty or responsibility to notify the relevant Authorised Authority?

**Answer:**

- 1) No.
- 2) Under Regulation 3.08(7), the Secretary must publish exemption notices relating to classes of people.
- 3) Screening and/or inspection requirements are in place for people and vehicles for restricted areas at CTFR airports.
- 4) The Government does not comment on any specific security measures.
- 5) The Department's records of the outcomes and action items from the relevant meetings do not reflect an undertaking was made on the issues raised.
- 6) See 5 above.

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- 7) The statement was to explain that if a Contracting State decided not to conform with a standard under Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention, the State may choose to file a difference setting out the extent of non-conformance.
- 8) See 7 above.

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**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 120

**Program:** 2.1

**Division/Agency:** (OTS) Office of Transport Security

**Topic:** ICAO AVSEC Montreal Meeting

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** Written

**Senator Heffernan asked:**

- 1) Please advise the total number of persons in the party that accompanied you to the ICAO AVSEC meeting in Montreal in March 2011. Of that total, how many persons were from OTS and how many were from the Attorney General's department? Were you the chief delegate representing Australia?
- 2) How many Australian government persons attended the Doc 8973 GMWG in Montreal the following week?
- 3) What actions would follow advice that proven breaches of the ATSRs have occurred and are continuing to occur? What is the time frame for such actions?
- 4) How many prosecutions have commenced against CTFR airport operators for breaches of the ATSRs? If prosecutions were commenced, what was the result of those prosecutions?
- 5) How many prosecutions have commenced against the four major airlines, namely Qantas, Jetstar, Virgin and Tiger for breaches of the ATSRs? If prosecutions were commenced, what was the result of those prosecutions?
- 6) The EU had intended to change the procedures for LAGS screening in April 2011 due to improvements in screening technology. The change has been deferred due to concerns of the TSA. How does OTS view the risks attributed to LAGS on international aviation when screening techniques in use in Australia are based on the honesty of passenger and crew due to the fact the current screening equipment cannot detect lags in non-metal containers in carry-on baggage?

**Answer:**

- 1) The General Manager, Aviation Security Branch, Office of Transport Security is Australia's Panel member to the ICAO AVSEC Panel, and attended the 22<sup>nd</sup> ICAO AVSEC Panel meeting in March 2011. He was accompanied by three other officers from OTS, and one industry representative. There were no members from the Attorney-General's Department.
- 2) None.
- 3) The actions and time frame associated with any breach of the ATSRs would vary depending upon the nature and complexity of each case.
- 4) No prosecutions have commenced.
- 5) No prosecutions have commenced.
- 6) The current x-ray screening technology in place at a passenger screening check point is able to detect liquid, aerosol or gel (LAG) items in a person's carry-on possessions. In addition, random and continuous frisk searches for LAG items are conducted at Australian LAGs screening points as a further security measure.

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**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 121

**Program:** 2.1

**Division/Agency:** (OTS) Office of Transport Security

**Topic:** Melbourne Airport Security Breach

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** Written

**Senator Heffernan asked:**

Melbourne Airport security personnel allowed a member of the public to enter into the secure security cleared (sterile area) area of the airport through an exit. An evacuation was required and significant delays resulted.

- 1) Has there been an inquiry into the incident and what as the response to this inquiry?
- 2) How was it possible that the security staff allowed a member of the public into a sterile area through an exit? Has this security weakness been repaired? If so, how has it been repaired, if not why not? Please provide details.
- 3) What was the response by Aviation and Airports to the security personnel who allowed this incident to occur?
- 4) How is it possible that this weakness occurred in the airport? Are weaknesses such similar to this present in other location around the country? If so please give details? If not, how was Aviation and Airports ensured that this is the case?
- 5) In attempts to find the man who crossed the sterile area the security personnel lost the man on CCTV footage. How is it possible that the CCTV system has blind spots which allow this to occur? Has this been rectified? Provide details.

**Answer:**

The incident referred to occurred in Terminal 1 of Melbourne Airport which is wholly leased and operated by Qantas Airways and its subsidiaries. The Department has received from Qantas a report in to the events and causes of the incident and is satisfied that the actions taken were appropriate.

The area concerned has electronically controlled double doors designed to impede a person entering the sterile area through an exit, supervised by a guard. In this case the guard was ineffective but the guarding procedures, if followed, would have prevented the incident from occurring.

All major Australian airport terminals have complex and extensive CCTV networks, which are continuously being upgraded and improved.

In this case, the failure was not caused by deficiencies in the CCTV system, but in the guarding of the access door. Nevertheless, Qantas has advised that CCTV system around the exit door in question will be upgraded. Qantas is also installing additional technology at exit races to prevent the movement of persons backwards through the exit race towards the sterile area.

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**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 122

**Program:** 2.1

**Division/Agency:** (OTS) Office of Transport Security

**Topic:** Sydney Airport Security Breaches

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** Written

**Senator Heffernan asked:**

Terminal Two of Sydney Airport was evacuated after the power was cut to a security scanning machine allowing 16 people to enter the sterile area without being scanned. It is believed that the power cut because a security guard tripped over the power cord of the machine, cutting the power. The evacuation resulted in significant delays.

- 1) Has there been an inquiry into this incident, if so what was the result?
- 2) How is it possible that the security system is so fragile that it could be significantly disrupted by something so innocuous as tripping over the power cord?
- 3) Why was there no alternate backup power supply to the scanning machine?
- 4) Why was there no warning system to alert the security personnel of the loss of power?
- 5) How is it possible that this loss of power was not immediately detected by the security personnel?
- 6) Have the issues of back up power, alerts of loss of power and security awareness been resolved? If so, provide details of the steps implemented to resolve these issues.
- 7) What was the response of Aviation and Airports to the security personnel who allowed this incident to occur?
- 8) Are security scanners now hardwired rather than plugged in? Are scanners being hardwired in all airports?

**Answer:**

The Office of Transport Security immediately tasked its Regional Director with investigating the Terminal 2 incident at Sydney Airport. The incident and subsequent evacuation were the consequence of inadvertent disconnection to mains power, compounded by equipment maintenance issues and staff procedural error. The incident occurred because these three levels of assurance failed simultaneously.

While the failings which resulted in the incident are unacceptable, the response of the airport and the subsequent corrective action they commissioned were appropriate.

As a result of the incident and investigation:

- Sydney Airports Corporation Ltd (SACL) has reviewed its passenger screening equipment standards, specifications and maintenance procedures;
- SACL has also reviewed its screener certification and training in the use of screening equipment both generally and for the individual screening officer concerned; and
- The Department has issued a Transport Security Advisory notice to all screening authorities appointed under the Act, setting out the lessons learnt and appropriate mitigations which Screening Authorities should implement.

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**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 123

**Program:** 2.1

**Division/Agency:** (OTS) Office of Transport Security

**Topic:** CTFR Airports

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** Written

**Senator Heffernan asked:**

Would like DEPT to provide gazetted information detailing the Security Restricted area for the CTFR (Counter Terrorism First Response) airports in Australia? Their airports are referred to in ATSR 2.18A.

**Answer:**

Please find attached the notices published in the *Gazette* for the 11 major airports referred to in regulation 2.18A of the Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005.

**Attachments:**

- A. Adelaide Airport gazetted information
- B. Alice Springs Airport gazetted information
- C. Brisbane Airport gazetted information
- D. Cairns Airport gazetted information
- E. Canberra Airport gazetted information
- F. Coolangatta Airport gazetted information
- G. Darwin Airport gazetted information
- H. Hobart Airport gazetted information
- I. Melbourne Airport gazetted information
- J. Perth Airport gazetted information
- K. Sydney Airport gazetted information

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**ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON NOTICE**

Budget Estimates May 2011

**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 124

**Program:** 2.1

**Division/Agency:** (OTS) Office of Transport Security

**Topic:** CHOGM Preparations

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** Written

**Senator Back asked:**

Is Infrastructure (aviation and airports) engaged in cross-departmental discussions with airports with respect to arrangements for the upcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings in October?

- 1) If so, who is represented?
- 2) What measures are being put in place to ensure that they have a great first impression of Perth?
- 3) Are there any special concessions being made to accommodate the heads of government and their staff as they arrive into each state / territory for the visits?
- 4) How is Perth Airport being engaged to ensure that it is able to cope with the increased influx of visitors?
- 5) What is being done to ensure that they don't face the same issues as ordinary travellers to Perth – long lines at security screening?
- 6) It is likely that the Heads of Government will be accompanied by security detail – have you received any requests to carry weapons? What provisions are being made?

**Answer:**

- 1) The Department is a member of the CHOGM Security Sub Committee and other security-related working groups associated with the Commonwealth's CHOGM planning. The Department is represented by officers from the Office of Transport Security.
- 2) Questions on facilitation arrangements should be directed to PM&C's CHOGM Taskforce.
- 3) Questions on facilitation arrangements should be directed to PM&C's CHOGM Taskforce.
- 4) Questions on facilitation arrangements should be directed to PM&C's CHOGM Taskforce.
- 5) Questions on facilitation arrangements should be directed to PM&C's CHOGM Taskforce.
- 6) Questions on facilitation arrangements should be directed to PM&C's CHOGM Taskforce.