Outcome: 1. Environment	Question No:  65
Division/Agency:	Supervising Scientist Division
Topic:	Uranium
Hansard Page ECITA:	19

Senator Allison asked:
I am sorry; you did not quite answer the question. Is it possible to get a report rather than just a verbal account? Can we have a full list of the incidents over the last two years? 

Answer:
A report as requested is attached. 

INCIDENT REPORTING FROM URANIUM MINING OPERATIONS – ALLIGATOR RIVERS REGION – TWO YEARS TO MAY 2006

Statutory reporting 

Energy Resources of Australia (ERA) is required to report environmental incidents at its Ranger and Jabiluka operations to meet statutory requirements for incident reporting under the Environmental Requirements of the respective sites and under the regulatory regime prescribed by the Northern Territory Mining Management Act.

Immediately upon receipt of notification of such incidents the Office of the Supervising Scientist (OSS) assesses the circumstances of the situation and a senior officer makes a decision on the appropriate level of response.  Dependent on the assessment, this response will range from implementation of an immediate independent investigation such as occurred in March 2004 following a potable water contamination incident, through seeking further information from the mine operator before making such a decision.  In those cases where immediate action is not considered to be required the situation is again reviewed on receipt of a formal incident investigation report from the operator.

Routine reporting

Since 2000 ERA has undertaken to provide stakeholders with a comprehensive list of environmental incidents reported at its Ranger and Jabiluka operations on a regular basis.  The regular monthly environmental incident report is additional to reports made to meet the statutory requirements for incident reporting.  This regime of reporting all recorded environmental incidents is undertaken voluntarily by ERA in response to concerns expressed by stakeholders about the establishment of suitable thresholds of incident severity for reporting.

Also since 2000, the OSS has undertaken routine periodic inspections of environmental aspects of the relevant mine sites.  These routine periodic inspections are currently monthly in the case of the operating mine at Ranger and quarterly in the case of the Jabiluka project which is managed under a long-term care and maintenance regime.  A suitably qualified inspector from the Northern Territory Government Minerals and Energy Group and a staff member of the Northern Land Council, representing the local Aboriginal community, accompanies the OSS on these inspections.  The inspection team always includes one or more members who are familiar with the site and the regulations and conditions of authorisation under which it operates.

Prior to each monthly inspection the inspection team reviews the previous month’s incident reports and any open issues.  Where incidents are considered to have any potential environmental significance or represent repetitions of a class of occurrences an onsite review is scheduled as a part of the routine inspection protocol.

Under this regulatory framework all significant and all potentially significant environmental incidents, as determined by a qualified team of regulatory authority and community representatives are subject to multiple levels of assessment, and where concerns are identified, followed up with inspections and investigation as necessary.

As requested by Senator Allison, an attached table records all incidents involving uranium diuranate (ADU or “yellowcake”) or uranium oxide product spills reported by ERA in the two years preceding May 2006 senate estimates hearings.  These incidents have been subject to the outlined assessment regime by the OSS, the NT Government and representatives of the local Aboriginal community.

LIST OF RANGER ADU and URANIUM PRODUCT INCIDENTS
Date	Incident Summary	
30/06/2004	Approximately 0.6 m2 of the external wall of the precipitation bund was stained yellow as a result of an ammonium diuranate spill inside the bund. Once identified, the stained area was cleaned immediately. 	
28/07/2004	Small amount of ammonium diuranate was carried outside of the precipitation bund on boots. Once identified the ammonium diuranate was cleaned up immediately.  	
9/08/2004	Small amount of product (thin lens spread over 2 m2 – less than 0.5 litres) spilled to ground outside of product packing shed as a result of hosing down inside shed. The product was cleaned up immediately.	
14/08/2004	Approximately 5 litres of ammonium diuranate sprayed outside of the precipitation bund as a result of the underflow discharge pump hose bursting. The pump was shut down, the hose repaired and the area of contamination cleaned up immediately. 	
29/10/2004	On 29 October 2004 ammonium diuranate entered the plant compressed air system within the product packing and precipitation buildings. This led to an employee being exposed to ammonium diuranate when it spilt out of the system and on to the ground. This incident was subject of an on-site investigation by the Supervising Scientist and is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of the 2004-05 Supervising Scientist Annual Report.	
2/04/2005	Supervising Scientist Division staff were notified of an incident where calcined product was found in droplets on the roof of the calciner building. The product is believed to have found its way onto the roof from the product packing exhaust stack. This stack exhausts the product packing building to ensure product dust levels within the room are kept to a minimum. Within the stack is a “scrubber” system designed to remove any product dust in the airstream. During operation an employee wearing full Personal Protective Equipment discovered material containing product on the precipitation building roof.  Total product sprayed onto the building was determined to be approximately 0.5 kg. To remove the product the area was spray cleaned with high pressure water. Product that remained against the side of the calciner and on the precipitation roof and that could not be removed with high pressure water was contained using an epoxy coating. This step was seen as the best option for containing any product dust that may remain given that it is unlikely that the roofing materials of the calciner will ever be radiation cleared for removal from site on closure. Supervising Scientist Division staff visited the incident site as part of the April 2005 routine inspection. 	
18/05/2005	An ERA employee tripped on a bund in the solvent extraction area in which ammonium diuranate was being temporarily stored and fell partly into the water covering the ammonium diuranate but was not submerged.  He was wearing full Personal Protective Equipment at the time, which he removed to immediately shower in the safety shower, before further showering and changing his clothes. On the basis of urine monitoring results and the biokinetic model for uranium published by the International Commission on Radiological Protection, the committed effective dose to the operator as a result of ingestion of uranium was approximately 60 Sv (60 microSieverts). This dose is roughly equal to that received in a modern X-Ray and small compared to the average of 2000 Sv we all receive each year from natural background.	
6/10/2005	Ammonium diuranate was spread from the ammonium diuranate bund across the access steps through the toilet/shower facilities and into other bunded areas. The contamination was identified immediately and cleaned up. The area was inspected by Supervising Scientist Division staff during the October 2005 routine inspection where a description of the incident was given. The employee concerned was subject to disciplinary action by ERA due to the nature of the incident.	
14/10/2005	An ERA employee was exposed to ammonium diuranate when flushing out a product Bredel pump. The employee was leaning across a scale trap to turn the pump off when the product Bredel pump discharge hose burst spraying dilute ammonium diuranate and flushing water across the operator’s chest and head area. As it was indicated that the employee may have ingested some of the product, a 24 hour urinalysis was undertaken. This analysis indicated an exposure of approximately 0.1 Sv. The area was inspected by Supervising Scientist Division staff during the October 2005 routine inspection where a description of the incident was given.	
13/12/2005	An employee reported that some product had been spilt outside of solvent extraction area on the road between the product packing shed and the ammonia storage tanks. It was reported that the spill occurred during the empting of the solvent extraction waste skip into the dump truck. The spill was cleaned up immediately.	
27/02/2006	Whilst working near a fill station in product packing an employee reported an irritation to their throat and a metallic taste in their mouth. The employee was wearing full Personal Protective Equipment (including airstream helmet) and the Personal Protective Equipment was determined to be operational. Testing confirmed that no contamination had occurred.	
7/03/2006	ERA advised that ammonium diuranate had been reported to have been emitted from a hose used in washing down the product packing Area. ERA indicated that the pond water supply network to which the hose was connected was physically isolated from any ammonium diuranate production area so it is assumed that the ammonium diuranate was already present in the hose. Investigations into the incident by ERA concluded that it was likely that the hose had been used in an area where ammonium diuranate was temporarily being stored, and that an employee had sourced the hose from this area without it being cleaned. 	
27/04/2006	A spillage of ammonium diuranate occurred adjacent to ammonium diuranate Tank 1 outside of the bunded area. It is believed that a coupling in this area leaked just before product enters the tank. A small area of some 1m2 of ground outside the controlled area was covered with a fine spray of ammonium diuranate. No people were exposed to ammonium diuranate during this incident The area was immediately bunded  All ammonium diuranate released from the controlled area of the solvent extraction section was contained. The area was cleaned up with all contaminated materials from the area removed to Pit 1. Supervising Scientist Division  staff inspected the site as part of the May 2006 audit.