Dr RJ May
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
Glossary
Major Issues
Introduction
Background - 1988-94
- The early development of the conflict
- Events during the Wingti Government
- The period of the Chan Government
Developments since the Arawa Peace
Conference
The present security situation
- The BRA
- The PNGDF
- The Resistance
The political environment
External relations
- Papua New Guinea - Solomon Islands Relations
Papua New Guinea-Australia relations and
Bougainville
- The Defence Cooperation Program (DCP)
- Development assistance
- Recent developments
Conclusion
Further Reading
Appendices
- The Charter of Mirigini for a New Bougainville
- Address to the Nation on Bougainville Developments
- The Waigani Communique
- Bougainville Leaders Talks
- Peace Plan - 1996
- Memorandum of Understanding


- BRA
- Bougainville Revolutionary Army
- BIG
- Bougainville Interim Government
- BLF
- Buka Liberation Front
- BTG
- Bougainville Transitional Government
- DCP
- Defence Cooperation Program
- NGO
- Non Government Organisation
- PNGDF
- Papua New Guinea Defence Force
- RPNGC
- Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary
- SINRSF
- Solomon Islands National Reconnaissance and Surveillance
Force
- SPPKF
- South Pacific Peace Keeping Force
In early September, elements of the Bougainville Revolutionary
Army overran a small detachment of the Papua New Guinea Defence
Force at Kangu Beach, in the south of the island of Bougainville.
An estimated twelve soldiers were killed and several others
captured. The event was a public symbol of the failure of the
latest attempt by the Papua New Guinea national government to end
the conflict on Bougainville by force of arms. In fact, the
government had effectively conceded defeat the previous July, when
one of the two battalions conducting Operation High Speed
II, the assault on the BRA, was withdrawn.
The conflict on Bougainville has persisted for almost eight
years and appears no closer to resolution. Successive attempts by
the Papua New Guinea security forces (the PNGDF and the Royal Papua
New Guinea Constabulary) to defeat the BRA since the conflict broke
out in 1988 have failed. Alternating with military operations have
been attempts to negotiate a settlement, some of which have
appeared promising, yet all of which have eventually broken down.
The province, which was once the most prosperous and best educated
in Papua New Guinea, has become impoverished, with about half of
its population living in government care centres, unable to tend
traditional village food gardens and inadequately fed and cared for
by an over-stretched government relief operation.
Yet over the last few years there have been signs that the
people of Bougainville are becoming more determined that a solution
be found. The last attempt at a negotiated settlement, the peace
conference at Arawa in October 1994, failed to attract the
participation of the major leaders of the Bougainville independence
movement but did entice a number of its prominent supporters to
abandon violence in favour of political reconciliation. A
Bougainville Transitional Government was established in April 1995,
with some former members of the independence movement prominent; it
was charged with pursuing reconciliation with BRA commanders,
restoring the island's economy and considering the future structure
of government in the province.
However, the BTG's program has now been seriously compromised by
the launch, and failure, of the national government's latest
military operation. The security situation is more precarious,
relations between the various participants are strained and the
national government's policy approach to the conflict has become
muddled. With national elections to be held in mid-1997, a major
re-evaluation of Bougainville policy is not likely, however much
the Government might benefit from a settlement of issues on
Bougainville.
The progress of the conflict is now becoming a serious
international problem for Papua New Guinea. The development of the
conflict over the last year has seen the PNGDF again infringing the
sovereignty of the Solomon Islands and attacking Solomon Islands'
citizens and security forces. UN intervention to control the border
is now a possibility following acceptance by the Secretary-General
of a Solomon Islands' request. Clear public disapproval by the
Australian Government of the last military operation and specific
complaints by Australia about the use of defence equipment supplied
by it have strained relations and led to a review by both countries
of the scheme under which will have to overcome all of those
problems which have beset its management of the situation to date,
some of which appear to be endemic at this stage of the nation's
development.
Indiscipline amongst the PNGDF and police (not just amongst
soldiers but in relations between the national government and some
senior staff) has been a feature of the conflict. The national
government cannot be secure in the management of its policies for
Bougainville as they may be derailed by an intemperate act of its
security personnel.
Repeated failure to restore civic services on Bougainville,
causing recurring hardship for civilians in care centres, has been
another feature of the conflict. As a result, people have returned
to the bush thus undermining attempts to normalise the
situation.
Papua New Guinea's economy has been in trouble for the last
three years. The Government does not have adequate finance to run
an effective military campaign on Bougainville or to restore
government services. International finance assistance is available
for the latter but, in many cases, cannot be used until the
security situation has improved.
At times over the last two and a half decades it has been
difficult for national administrations to come to terms with
Bougainvilleans' sense of nationalism. Recently, the system of
provincial government, established to cope with these sentiments at
the time of Independence, was substantially changed. The tenure of
the BTG is limited and the national parliament would have to agree
to an alteration of the recent changes to provincial government to
extend its life. It is debatable whether such changes would pass
the Parliament, but equally debatable whether Bougainvilleans will
accept any solution which does not institute some form of autonomy
for the island.
Amidst these impasses, Australia may have a role to play.
Australia is distrusted by many on both sides of the conflict but
her assistance has helped in overcoming some of the impediments to
peaceful negotiation and rehibilitation. The report of the
Australian Parliamentary Delegation which visited Bougainville in
early 1994 was a useful instrument in facilitating the Arawa peace
conference, which was made possible with the provision of
logistical support by the Australian Defence Force. Australian
offers of aid to restore services on Bougainville, once security is
improved, remain extant. And Australia has the expertise to
establish viable administrative structures to support the
rehabilitation of the island in such an event.
As was shown in conferences between the BTG and the Bougainville
Interim Government (the political arm of the BRA) in Cairns at the
end of 1995, Australia can still facilitate discussions between
various groups involved in the conflict, which otherwise are
somewhat estranged. The customary reconciliation processes of the
Bougainville people provide a mechanism which may still prove
effective in eventually ending the cycle of violence in
Bougainville. At the moment, however, such traditional solutions
cannot be applied. The contesting groups distrust of each other
threatens to end, at least for the present, further attempts to
solve the problem.
In these circumstances, any role which Australia can play in
reducing tensions and restoring dialogue could prove important in
alleviating an otherwise unpromising situation.
The conflict in Papua New Guinea's Bougainville (North Solomons)
Province(1) has been going on now for almost eight years.* What
began essentially as a protest by a disgruntled landowner faction
against the operations of the majority-CRA-owned Bougainville
Copper mine at Panguna has become a violent confrontation between
Bougainvilleans and the national government, and amongst
Bougainvilleans themselves. Hundreds have died in the conflict and
tens of thousands have been displaced; at present about half of the
population of Bougainville has been relocated to care centres,(2)
many without adequate food or health facilities. The mine, which
before its forced closure in 1989 provided Papua New Guinea with
around 17 per cent of its government revenue and 40 per cent of its
exports, seems unlikely to recommence production. The province,
formerly one of the country's richest in terms of physical and
human resources, has been devastated and many of its young people,
deprived of education, have been socialised into a culture of armed
conflict.
Hopes for a peaceful settlement were raised in late 1994 when a
Pan-Bougainville Peace Conference was organised on Bougainville, in
the presence of a South Pacific Peacekeeping Force. The conference
ended prematurely when the core rebel leadership failed to attend
but a dialogue was established, with a Bougainville Transitional
Government acting as an intermediary between the national
government and the hardline rebels of the Bougainville
Revolutionary Army (BRA). As recently as January 1996 these talks
appeared to be making good progress, but an escalation of fighting
on Bougainville in early 1996, which led to the lifting of a 1994
ceasefire and the launching of a major military offensive against
the BRA in late June, appears to have substantially negated the
gains that were made since 1994.
* The author of this paper, Dr Ron May, is Senior Research
Fellow in the Department of Political and Social Change, Research
School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National
University. He has pursued research on Papua New Guinea for over
two decades and his recent publications include The
Bougainville Crisis (co-edited with M. Spriggs, 1990) and
The Changing Role of the Military in Papua New Guinea
(1993). In addition to the sources cited, this paper draws on the
author's previous research and on numerous recent discussions with
people in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Australia, many of
whom have preferred to remain anonymous. |
The latest developments raise a number of questions:
- why has the conflict proved so intractable?
- given the present circumstances, is a peaceful settlement
possible, and if so what is needed to bring the warring parties
together?
- what are the implications of the conflict for Papua New
Guinea's neighbours - particularly Australia, which, as the former
colonial power, has had a close relationship with Papua New Guinea
and for whom Papua New Guinea is the main recipient of development
assistance and defence cooperation funding?
With these questions in mind, the purpose of this paper is to
provide a background to events since 1988 (especially since the
Arawa Peace Conference in October 1994), to review the present
security situation and political environment, and to comment on
Papua New Guinea's external relations - especially its relations
with Australia - in the context of the Bougainville conflict. The
primary focus of the paper is on issues concerning the peace
process and the re-establishment of civil authority in
Bougainville. It does not attempt to make specific policy
recommendations, though some of the preconditions considered by the
author to be necessary for a settlement are spelled out in the
paper, as are some of the implications for Australia.
(3)
The early development of the conflict
The present Bougainville conflict has its immediate origins in
an 1988 dispute between a breakaway faction of the Panguna
Landowners' Association (which represented landowners in the area
of the Bougainville copper mine) and the mining company over
compensation payments and the environmental impact of the mine.
Escalation of the dispute, with a series of attacks on mine
installations, together with an outbreak of fighting between
Bougainvilleans and non-Bougainvillean plantation workers, brought
intervention by police and subsequently by the Papua New Guinea
Defence Force (PNGDF), which was called in to assist the civil
authority. By early 1989 the militant landowner group had joined
with local cargo cultists and had attracted raskol
(criminal) elements, and its leader, Francis Ona, had become
something of a local folk hero. In April Ona first announced the
independence of the 'Republic of Bougainville'; the same month the
security forces suffered their first casualties. In May the mine
was forced to close and, though it opened again briefly, by the end
of 1989 it had been 'mothballed'.
During the course of 1989 and early 1990 several peace
initiatives were pursued by the government of Rabbie Namaliu, but
divisions between 'hawks' and 'doves' within the national
government and differences among Bougainvilleans made negotiations
difficult. North Solomons Provincial Premier Joseph Kabui was not
only assaulted by PNGDF troops over his supposed sympathy with the
militants but was abused by Bougainville separatists for supporting
a negotiated peace package, and Provincial Minister John Bika was
murdered by Ona's supporters. Tensions also developed between the
security forces and national politicians. In March 1990, coincident
with the arrival of international observers overseeing a
hastily-brokered ceasefire, the security forces made an
unauthorised total withdrawal from Bougainville and Buka, and two
months later the acting Prime Minister, Ted Diro, imposed an
effective blockade of the islands.
The rebel forces made a further declaration of independence and
announced the formation of a Bougainville Interim Government (BIG),
headed by Ona, with a military arm, the Bougainville Revolutionary
Army under former PNGDF officer Sam Kauona. But they were unable to
maintain any sort of order, and the province suffered a general
economic and political collapse; Bougainvilleans describe this
period as one of violent anarchy.
Negotiations between the BIG and the national government resumed
in mid-1990 and in August an agreement was reached, aboard the
HMNZS Endeavour anchored off Kieta, which provided for the
restoration of services to Bougainville and Buka. Subsequent
discussions in the Solomon Islands capital Honiara resulted in the
January 1991 'Honiara Declaration', which seemed to pave the way
for a peace settlement, though neither Ona nor Kauona was present
at the talks (the Bougainville delegation being led by Kabui,
'Prime Minister' of the BIG).
Meanwhile community leaders on Buka, where a Buka Liberation
Front (BLF) had been raised in opposition to the BRA, had requested
the return of the security forces in September 1990 and in October,
in a memorandum of understanding with the national government, the
BLF supporters specifically rejected secession.
Peace initiatives continued to be pursued in early 1991,
notwithstanding differences between the Papua New Guinea Government
and its security forces, differences within the Papua New Guinea
Government, and differences within the BIG (particularly concerning
arrangements for the restoration of services). But in March 1991 an
apparently unauthorised decision by local PNGDF commander Colonel
Leo Nuia, to land troops on north Bougainville and attack a
strategic bridge and a BRA base near Kieta, substantially
undermined peace negotiations. (Two months later Nuia was removed
after his public revelations concerning the use of
Australian-supplied helicopters - see below.) Although talks
continued at various levels, little more was achieved during the
following twelve months. An important political development on
Bougainville, however, was the creation of a number of
regionally-based interim governing authorities (five by early 1992)
to help restore governance in the province.
From late 1991 community leaders in south Bougainville had been
negotiating for the restoration of government services and in May
1992, at their request, security forces personnel landed in the
Torokina and Siwai areas, where they were assisted by local
Resistance forces opposing the BRA.
Events during the Wingti Government
Following national elections in mid-1992, a change of national
government raised hopes of a settlement. The incoming government,
under Paias Wingti, quickly entered into negotiations with the
BIG's representative in Honiara, Martin Miriori. Around the same
time the Buka Interim Authority formed a peace committee with
representatives from the interim authorities in north and south
Bougainville and from the churches, and initiated negotiations with
the BIG and traditional leaders from central Bougainville. Plans
were formulated for a Pan-Bougainville Peace Conference in Honiara
in September 1992.
Meanwhile the diplomatic situation facing the Papua New Guinea
Government deteriorated, first as a result of incursions by
security forces personnel into the neighbouring Solomon Islands,
and, secondly, after a resolution of the UN Human Rights Commission
called on the Papua New Guinea Government to restore freedom of
movement on Bougainville and provided for a review of peace
negotiations.
In September 1992 a further border violation by Papua New
Guinea's security forces, in which two Solomon Islanders were
killed, scuttled the proposed Pan-Bougainville meeting.
Nevertheless, six months later a meeting was held, on Buka. The
meeting, which was attended by the province's national MPs and some
fifty traditional leaders from the province's interim authorities,
considered a BIG peace plan and agreed to carry on negotiations.
Subsequently, a North Solomons Peace Negotiating and Monitoring
Committee was established, which met with BIG representatives in
Honiara in July 1993 and produced a 'Peace and Ceasefire
Agreement'.
Lack of effective response from the national government (which
at this time was involved in moves to drastically reform the
country's provincial government system - moves which were strongly
opposed in the [other] island provinces) caused frustration among
Bougainvilleans, who called for the dismissal of the Minister for
Bougainville Affairs, Michael Ogio, and the administrator of
Bougainville, Sam Tulo.
Little further progress was achieved until April 1994, when,
following the visit of an Australian Parliamentary Delegation,
Prime Minister Wingti issued a statement calling on the BIG/BRA to
work with his government to end the crisis. Shortly after this,
Deputy Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan, who in early 1994 had been
appointed Foreign Minister, announced proposals for a multinational
South Pacific peacekeeping force which would assist in the
Bougainville peace process; this was the first concrete
acknowledgement of the demand for a multinational supervisory team
which the BIG had been making since 1991. In June 1994 a series of
talks was held between representatives of the BIG and the Papua New
Guinea Government in Honiara; it was agreed that a preparatory
meeting, attended by representatives of the BIG, the chairmen of
the now seven interim authorities, and other Bougainville
representatives, should be held to formulate arrangements for a
Pan-Bougainville Peace Conference. Negotiations between the BIG and
the government, however, again broke down, and in August the
security forces retook Panguna.
The period of the Chan Government
In August 1994 Chan replaced Wingti as Prime Minister and hopes
of a settlement were revived. Another round of talks was promptly
held in Honiara, attended on this occasion by BRA commander Sam
Kauona; a ceasefire was established and it was agreed that a peace
conference would be held in the former provincial capital, Arawa,
in October. Arrangements were made for a South Pacific Peacekeeping
Force (SPPKF) - comprising personnel from Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu,
with Australian and New Zealand funding and logistic support - to
ensure the safe passage and security of all delegates.
In the event, the principal leaders of the BIG/BRA - Ona, Kauona
and Kabui - failed to attend the Peace Conference, despite
representations from Bougainvilleans (particularly Bougainvillean
women's representatives) and the conference ended without reaching
a settlement.
The reasons for the non-attendance at Arawa of the BIG/BRA
leadership have been a subject of debate.(4) There is little doubt
that Ona, Kauona and others feared an assassination attempt. Fears
within the BRA were heightened with the shooting by security forces
of a BRA member on his way to the Arawa conference. But there was
also disinformation among the BIG/BRA about the possibilities of UN
support for an independent Bougainville and the possibility of the
withdrawal of the security forces from Bougainville, and
expectations that a change in government in the Solomon Islands
would strengthen support for the BIG there. It is also likely that,
had the Papua New Guinea Government been prepared to extend the
period of the conference and arrange for the continued presence of
the SPPKF, the BIG/BRA might have been persuaded to come to
Arawa.
Although the Arawa conference did not achieve its objectives,
some BRA commanders (including the present BRA Chief of Operations,
Ishmael Toroama) did attend, and the large number of
Bougainvilleans who were present passed resolutions expressing a
commitment to peace and reconstruction. In the following weeks
peace ceremonies were held in various parts of Bougainville and
movement of people around the province became more free. Church,
women's, and other non-government organizations began to assist in
the process of reconciliation. Moreover, attempts by Prime Minister
Chan to maintain a dialogue promised to open up a new phase in the
peace process. A key figure in the continuing dialogue was Theodore
Miriung, ex-seminarian, former acting Supreme Court judge, former
legal adviser to the BIG, and interim chairman of the North Nasioi
Village Council of Chiefs.
In October and November 1994 a series of meetings of
Bougainvillean leaders, including interim authority chairmen,
national MPs and some BRA and Resistance commanders, was held to
follow up the broad resolutions of the Arawa conference. The
outcome of these meetings (which became The Bougainville Leaders
Forum) was a decision to reestablish civil authority in the
province, but not by simply reinstating the former provincial
government system. Discussions were subsequently held with Prime
Minister Chan, and although there were reservations within the
Government about the proposals for a transitional government. In
mid-November the Prime Minister announced a 'New Deal for
Bougainville' and shortly after a 'Mirigini Charter for a New
Bougainville' was signed by the Prime Minister and a Bougainville
delegation (see Appendix 1). Under the Mirigini Charter the two
parties agreed to establish a Bougainville Transitional Government,
comprising leaders nominated by councils of chiefs from each
interim authority area (councils of chiefs had emerged as the
principal form of community organization following the collapse of
provincial government in 1989-90), and to begin a programme of
negotiations on a political settlement. By January 1995 a
Bougainville Leaders Forum technical team had produced a statement
of concept and strategy and a draft bill to amend the North
Solomons provincial constitution. Meanwhile, members of the
Bougainville Leaders Forum toured parts of the province seeking
reconciliation with local BRA commanders.
The Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG) was formally
established in April 1995, with Miriung as premier, and between May
and August 1995 it held a series of consultations with the national
government. Following the first consultation Chan and Miriung
issued a statement ('The Waigani Communique;') setting out their
agreement on a number of issues, including: amnesty for surrendered
BRA fighters; rehabilitation of the Bougainville economy;
administrative arrangements for a proposed restoration programme;
the future of Resistance forces; and the future structure of
provincial government on Bougainville (see Appendix 3). A specific
provision lifted the restrictions of movement and bounties on
Kabui, Ona and Kauona to enable them to participate in the peace
dialogue through the BTG. Following the fourth consultation, in
August, a further statement of Areas of Common Understanding was
issued.
While these consultations were in progress the BTG was also
moving on two other fronts: a structure of village and regional
councils of chiefs was being formulated as a basis for a permanent
provincial government, and consultations were initiated with the
BIG/BRA leadership.
In September and December 1995 delegations from the BTG and the
BIG met in Cairns for formal consultations, facilitated by the
Australian Government. The second meeting was held under the joint
chairmanship of representatives of the Secretaries-General of the
UN and the Commonwealth, and in the presence of representatives of
the International Commission of Jurists and the Unrepresented
Nations and Peoples Organisation. It was attended by Kauona and
Kabui, and agreed to continue the dialogue process and to allow
access to the island by UNICEF and other health care workers (see
Appendix 4).
On their way back from the Cairns meeting in December, while
crossing from the Solomon Islands, the BIG/BRA leaders were fired
upon by Papua New Guinea security forces. The Papua New Guinea
Government responded to their outraged protests by pointing out
that the BIG/BRA leaders had declined offers of secured transport
and had not informed the government of their travel plans; but
there was a widespread feeling that the incident could have been a
deliberate attempt at assassination. In the wake of recriminations,
Chan announced that there was no likelihood of further talks
outside Papua New Guinea.
In the weeks that followed BRA military activity escalated.
Following the killing of eleven members of the security forces on
Buka in March 1996 Chan called off the ceasefire negotiated in 1994
(but frequently breached), referring to the activities of
'criminals who continue to kill, destroy and destabilize the
peace'. Chan's frustration was also reflected in his suggestion
that special provincial government arrangements for Bougainville
might not be extended beyond 1997 (when all provincial governments
come fully under the 1994 Organic Law on Provincial Government and
Local-Level Governments).
Notwithstanding this, in February-March 1996 the BTG produced a
Peace Plan (see Appendix 5). In it the BTG expressed its view that
there should be a further one or two meetings on Bougainville
... to complete negotiations
on all issues, including the issue of the future political status
of Bougainville, and to agree to a political settlement with the
National Government by June or September 1996.(5)
It also suggested 'that the possibility for a settlement will
now depend on the willingness of the National Government to concede
greater autonomy to Bougainville, on the one hand, and the
willingness of the BIG and BRA leadership to accept a "compromise"
on the other'.(6) The BTG's demands were discussed at a meeting in
Port Moresby in June. The Prime Minister's frustration at what he
saw as the slow rate of progress was evident, but a memorandum of
understanding was signed by Chan and Miriung recording their broad
agreement on arrangements for the extension of the transitional
government beyond 1997, the possibility of 'some degree of autonomy
for Bougainville', the need for local level government, and funding
arrangements (see Appendix 6).
It appears, however, that while these negotiations were under
way preparations were being made for a major military assault on
BRA strongholds. In June 1996 the normal rotation of the two PNGDF
infantry battalions did not take place, leaving both battalions
(comprising around 1400 troops) on Bougainville; it was
subsequently confirmed that an 'all-out assault', Operation
High Speed II, was being made against the BRA, with
helicopters and patrol boats supplied by Australia some years
earlier said to be playing a 'crucial role' in the operation.
Despite earlier military intelligence advice to the contrary, the
PNGDF's apparent intention was to execute a 'surgical strike'
against the BRA leadership on Bougainville. In fact, the security
forces gained little ground before withdrawing in mid- July, in
effect conceding victory to the BRA. Following up their advantage,
in early September BRA fighters attacked PNGDF troops at Kangu
Beach in southern Bougainville, killing an estimated twelve and
capturing several others. Sources on Bougainville claim that
members of the Resistance, angered by the behaviour of security
forces personnel towards civilians in the area, assisted in the
attack.
In early July, too, there were media reports that a PNGDF patrol
boat had attacked Solomon Islands National Reconnaissance and
Surveillance Force (SINRSF) personnel at the Solomon Islands border
post on Ovau Island (allegedly the latest of more than thirty
border violations by Papua New Guinea security forces or armed
civilians since March 1996) and that the UN Secretary-General was
considering Solomon Islands requests for urgent intervention in the
Bougainville conflict (see below).
The BRA
Prior to 1994, Papua New Guinea military intelligence
assessments suggested that the security forces did not have the
capacity to take and hold the core BRA-controlled areas of
south-central Bougainville (assessments which were borne out by
events). Following the 1994 Arawa conference there appears to have
been some disenchantment with the BIG/BRA leadership among BRA
supporters, a number of whom were prepared to take part in
post-Arawa reconciliation efforts; particularly significant was the
defection of the North Nasioi people, led by Miriung. A campaign by
the BIG to downplay the Arawa initiatives and discredit those
involved in the formation of the transitional government may have
limited the damage to the militant leadership, but there appears to
have been a steady drift from the hardcore BRA to the peace process
up till early 1996.
Tours of the province (especially in south and central
Bougainville) by BTG and other community leaders, the strengthening
of local councils of chiefs, the efforts of church, women's and
other NGO groups in conflict resolution, and especially a growing
weariness of the war and belief that reconciliation and
reconstruction was achievable under the Chan government, sustained
this trend. Continuing instances of excesses by the security forces
and local Resistance forces, however, have hindered the process,
and the termination of the ceasefire and launching of Operation
High Speed II further undermined the reconciliation process.
More recently, actions by the security forces to move people out of
villages in south and central Bougainville (in an attempt to create
free fire zones) and to relocate and consolidate care centres
(consequentially, and unfortunately, renamed 'concentration
centres'), without provision for gardens or food supplies, has
resulted in some drift of people back into the bush, and thus into
the arms of the BRA.
Though figures are unreliable, BTG sources estimate that there
are around 400-500 BRA permanently under arms, concentrated in the
Buin, Siwai, Kongara-Panguna and, to a lesser extent, Wakunai
areas. But numbers can vary with the situation and there is a large
pool of young men without education or jobs, and with easy access
to weapons. There is some evidence of fresh recruitment by the BRA
over recent weeks. The BRA is said to have a quantity of automatic
and semi-automatic weapons (estimates range from less than 100 to
500), including several reconditioned World War II machine guns;
around 500-700 shotguns and rifles, and 800-1000 home-made weapons.
There is reported to be a continuing inflow of weapons through the
Solomon Islands. Ammunition has been mainly captured or stolen from
the PNGDF and police.
However, The BRA is factionalized; its military organization
tends to be localized, loose and fractious, and there are political
differences between hardliners (led by Ona, who was quoted by BIG
spokesman John Zale as saying in July 1996: 'There can be no
ceasefires, no peace talks, no negotiations only independence'(7))
and an apparently increasing number of moderates.
The PNGDF
(8)
Within the PNGDF morale has been low for some years. Apart from
dissatisfaction over pay, allowances and general conditions in the
field, many soldiers have felt that military success has been
denied them by political indecision. The failure of Operation
High Speed II may have dispelled that notion but will have
lowered morale further. At senior levels, the decision of the Papua
New Guinea Government (and the advice of Australian defence
specialists) not to accede to the PNGDF's demands for new, more
sophisticated materiel, and to concentrate rather on the PNGDF's
civic role, has added to the disgruntlement. Discipline has been a
problem in the PNGDF and relations between the security forces
generally and the civil government have been severely strained on
several occasions since 1989. Relations between Chan and PNGDF
Commander Brigadier General Jerry Singirok appear to have been
good, but questions have been asked about Singirok's judgement and
managerial ability following the ill-fated Operation High Speed
II.
Bougainvillean sources suggest that the security forces have
been much more aggressive since early 1996 and that there has been
an increasing incidence of civil rights abuses (allegedly, the
Prime Minister ordered the removal of one officer, who was
court-martialled over civil rights violations, but he remains on
Bougainville and has been cited in further allegations of abuse of
high-profile civilians). The recent relocation of people from
villages to care centres seems likely to exacerbate such
problems.
Relations between the security forces, and the BTG and other
Bougainvillean leaders are poor; there is a general distrust of the
BTG on the part of the security forces, and little communication
between the two. (In August 1996 Premier Miriung was ordered off
Bougainville when he arrived from Buka to open a church-backed
women's peace conference, and in September PNGDF sources and the
Minister for Defence accused him of being implicated in the Kangu
Beach attack - an accusation vigorously denied - and placed him
under house arrest.)
The Resistance
Resistance forces were first organized on Buka around 1990 as a
local militia (the Buka Liberation Front) opposed to the BRA.
Subsequently Resistance forces operated throughout the province,
being armed and supported by the security forces, who relied on
them for local knowledge, military intelligence, and manpower. The
Resistance appears to have lapsed in 1994, with a number of
Resistance fighters joining the BTG. However there has been a
resurgence of Resistance forces during 1996, and the Resistance
seems to have taken up the security forces' more aggressive
attitude towards anyone suspected of BIG/BRA sympathies. To counter
the divisive potential of Resistance activities against other
Bougainvilleans Premier Miriung has been pressing for the disarming
of Resistance forces and the integration of local security forces
(or 'home guards') into the provincial government structure.(9)
When Chan, as Foreign Minister, took over the primary
responsibility for handling the Bougainville situation in early
1994, there was optimism among Bougainvilleans that conditions
might improve. This optimism was seen to be confirmed when, on
becoming Prime Minister, Chan listed the Bougainville crisis as his
first priority, met with Kauona in Honiara and proceeded with
arrangements for the Arawa peace conference. Subsequently, despite
reservations within his administration and perhaps on his own part,
Chan facilitated the creation of the BTG and sanctioned the BTG's
negotiations, outside Papua New Guinea, with the BIG/BRA.
But Chan was deeply disappointed at the breakdown of the Arawa
conference and angry at the BIG/BRA leadership's failure to attend;
on several occasions after the conference he has referred to the
BRA leaders as 'criminals'. He also appears to have been
disappointed that the BTG has not made more rapid progress in
restoring peace and establishing an administrative structure
capable of restoring services. This was evident at the June 1996
consultations between Chan and the BTG, which nevertheless produced
a broad agreement. With national and (for the first time) local
elections looming in mid-1997 Chan is clearly anxious to achieve a
settlement; the unsuccessful adventure with Operation High
Speed II, however, seems to have created a policy vacuum at
the national level.
On Bougainville there is undoubtedly a groundswell of opinion in
favour of peace and reconciliation (the recent womens' peace
conference at Arawa in August 1996(10) is a manifestation of this
groundswell), and significant progress has been made in
reestablishing a political structure for restoring civil
administration; legislation establishing local-level government is
currently (September 1996) before the BTG Assembly. But events
since 1988 have not only divided communities along
pro-BRA/pro-government lines, and frequently along generational
lines, they have opened up numerous old animosities and created new
ones. Excesses by the security forces, BRA fighters, and Resistance
fighters have created bases for lasting bitterness, and the
conflict has produced a pool of young people deprived of education
and socialized into a culture of war.
With the closure of the mine, and the destruction of gardens,
plantations and infrastructure, rehabilitation will be slow. The
financial crisis which has faced the national government since
1994, a result of fiscal indiscipline, limits its capacity to fund
recovery, especially when other parts of the country have
experienced a decline in government services prior to the beginning
of the Bougainville conflict. Some attempts are now being made to
reestablish health and education services on Bougainville but
reports suggest that, even in government-controlled areas in south
and central Bougainville, food and medicines are scarce.
International assistance is available but requires an
administrative structure for its delivery. (In recent weeks,
following the relocation of people in south Bougainville,
newly-reconstructed schools and health centres are understood to
have been destroyed by the BRA.) (11)
Popular support remains strong on Bougainville for a substantial
degree of autonomy. It is unlikely that any political settlement
can be reached without special arrangements being made to extend
the transitional government arrangements beyond 1997 and eventually
accept arrangements which would differ from those in Papua New
Guinea's other provinces. This will require amendment of the
Organic Law on Provincial Government and Local-Level
Governments.(12) At present there are doubts as to whether the
National Parliament will accept such an amendment; in July
Opposition leader Roy Yaki warned against granting autonomy, which
he described as 'an easy way out'.(13) As against this, remembering
the anarchy which followed the withdrawal of the security forces in
1990, most Bougainvilleans seem to believe that, in the absence of
a multinational peacekeeping force, the continued presence of the
Papua New Guinea government's security forces is, at present,
preferable to what might ensue if they were withdrawn.
Leaving aside, for the moment, Papua New Guinea's relations with
Australia, the Bougainville conflict has impacted on Papua New
Guinea's external relations in three directions. Firstly, to the
west, Indonesia is now more inclined to see Papua New Guinea as a
source of regional instability, and with the PNGDF committed to
Bougainville is more likely to act unilaterally against its West
Papuan insurgency, which is concentrated in the Indonesia-Papua New
Guinea border area. This, however, does not appear to be a major
consideration for Papua New Guinea, which since 1986 has had a
cooperative relationship with Indonesia over border management.
Secondly, the Bougainville conflict has now attracted significant
concern from international sources, which often, simplistically,
equate the Papua New Guinea government's actions in Bougainville
with those of, say, the Indonesian government in East Timor. By
restricting media access to Bougainville and on several occasions
refusing entry to concerned international groups, Papua New Guinea
- and particularly the security forces - has sometimes provoked
criticism. There is little doubt that the Bougainville conflict has
harmed Papua New Guinea's international reputation,(14) especially
among human rights groups and at the UN.
Papua New Guinea - Solomon Islands Relations
Thirdly, and more significantly, the Bougainville conflict has
created tensions between Papua New Guinea and its eastern
neighbour, the Solomon Islands, and attracted UN attention. Since
1989 - and especially since the 1990 blockade of Bougainville - the
western islands of the Solomon Islands have provided a place of
refuge for displaced Bougainvillean villagers (in 1994 there were
estimated to be some 2000 Bougainvillean refugees in the Solomon
Islands) and a source of medical and other supplies, including
weapons and ammunition, for the BRA. The Solomon Islands has also
been a point of entry for outside journalists and activists, and
the BIG has maintained an office in Honiara. Some Solomon Islands
politicians have openly expressed support for Bougainville
independence(15) and Solomon Islands Prime Minister Solomon
Mamaloni is generally regarded as having sympathies for the
BRA.
In 1990 the two countries signed a Memorandum of
Understanding ... on the Combined Surveillance Programme of the
Common International Border, though the Solomon Islands
rejected Papua New Guinea proposals concerning 'hot pursuit' and
extradition. The following year, however, there were complaints
from Papua New Guinea that the Solomon Islands Police Field Force
was not arresting illegal border crossers, and members of the
PNGDF's Small Boats Team made several incursions into Solomon
Islands territory. In March 1992 the Bougainville conflict spilled
over the international border in a more serious way when Papua New
Guinea security forces raided a Solomon Islands village and
destroyed a fuel dump used by the BRA. In apologising to his
Solomon Islands counterpart Papua New Guinea's then Prime Minister
Namaliu said that although his government did not condone the
action, 'this sort of thing is bound to happen' if the Solomon
Islands did not cooperate in preventing the use of its territory by
the BRA.(16) Further incursions took place in 1992 and 1993; in one
of these, members of the Papua New Guinea security forces raised
the Papua New Guinea flag on the island of Omea, inside Solomon
Islands territory.
In July 1992 Mamaloni and Papua New Guinea's incoming Prime
Minister Wingti resolved to adopt 'a comprehensive and mutually
agreed approach' to border management (the so-called 'Vila
Declaration'), but following a further incident in September
Mamaloni was quoted as suggesting that the Solomon Islands
government expel the Papua New Guinea High Commissioner from
Honiara, recognize the rebel Republic of Bougainville, and request
Australian troops to patrol the border;(17) the chairman of the
Solomon Islands' Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee
subsequently delivered a report on the subject to the UN Security
Council. The rift widened when Prime Minister Wingti accused
Mamaloni of meddling in Papua New Guinea's affairs after Mamaloni
had publicly supported critiques, by Papua New Guinea's Islands
Region premiers, of proposed provincial government reforms, and
following publication of a letter from Mamaloni to Deputy Prime
Minister Chan criticizing Papua New Guinea's handling of the
Bougainville situation.
Notwithstanding these tensions, in February 1993 the Foreign
Ministers of the two countries agreed on a draft bilateral
'framework treaty', and in April Papua New Guinea and Solomon
Islands officials held talks which produced agreement on a range of
issues including joint border surveillance, repatriation of
Bougainvillean refugees, and closure of the BIG office in Honiara.
Shortly after this Mamaloni was replaced as Solomon Islands Prime
Minister by Francis Billy Hilly, and at a South Pacific Forum
meeting following his election Hilly announced a six-point
initiative to normalize relations with Papua New Guinea.(18) Early
in 1994 Deputy Prime Minister Chan visited Honiara, presenting a
compensation payment in respect of the earlier incursions by Papua
New Guinea security forces, and pursuing proposals for a
Pan-Bougainville Peace Conference. The Solomon Islands Government
subsequently played an important role in facilitating a meeting
between Chan and Kauona and encouraging moves towards the October
1994 peace conference in Arawa.
Between late 1994 and early 1996, movement across the Solomon
Islands-Papua New Guinea border and attempts by the Papua New
Guinea security forces to control it, and the continuing presence
of the BIG in Honiara, remained points of contention but
(notwithstanding the return of Mamaloni as Solomon Islands Prime
Minister in November 1994) relations between the two countries were
generally amiable. Indeed the presence of the BIG made it easier to
pursue the peace dialogue.
However, with the resumption of hostilities in 1996 relations
again deteriorated. In January 1996 the BIG office and house of
Miriori in Honiara was burned down, supposedly by members of the
Papua New Guinea security forces or the Resistance. In March-April
Papua New Guinea Defence Minister Ijape renewed attacks on the
Solomon Islands for supporting the BRA and there were several
reports of border incursions into the Solomon Islands by the Papua
New Guinea security forces and other 'armed but unidentified' Papua
New Guineans. An exchange of fire occurred between the PNGDF and
the Solomon Islands Police Field Force. Within the Solomon Islands
there were calls for the recognition of independent Bougainville.
Mamaloni expressed regret at the lifting of the ceasefire and urged
the Papua New Guinea Government to pursue peace negotiations.
Solomon Islands Deputy Prime Minister, Danny Philip suggested that
it was time to repatriate some 1000 Bougainvilleans resident in the
Solomon Islands, provided Papua New Guinea could guarantee their
safe passage. The following month, at the request of the UNHCR and
the Solomon Islands Government, an Australian Defence Force
aircraft was used to airlift Miriori and his family from Honiara in
view of threats against his life (Miriori took up residence in the
Netherlands).
In early June, in what was described as the most serious
incident since 1992, it was reported that a Papua New Guinea patrol
boat had fired on the Solomon Island village of Liuliu on northern
Choiseul. The Solomon Islands Government formally protested and
claimed compensation for eighteen other incursions by Papua New
Guinea nationals in the past two months.(19) Chan's attempt to
justify the incursions, and suggestions by both Chan and Defence
Minister Ijape that the Solomon Islands Government was turning a
blind eye to the shipment of arms through the Solomon Islands to
the BRA, brought further protests from the Solomon Islands
Government. The situation was exacerbated when a PNGDF helicopter
reportedly entered Solomon Islands territory in hot pursuit of
suspected BRA members, killing several, and by a further incident
in early July in which a PNGDF patrol boat fired on Solomon Islands
Police Field Force personnel in what the SINRSF commander described
as 'acts of war' and a 'disproportionate response' to the border
situation.
In June 1996 it was announced that the UN Secretary-General had
agreed to a Solomon Islands request for UN intervention to oversee
the international border.
By virtue of their long historical association, geographical
proximity, and substantial common interests, Papua New Guinea and
Australia have shared a close relationship.(20) For several years,
however, relations between Australia and Papua New Guinea have been
undergoing a slow transformation. In part this has had to do with a
change of political generation in both Australia and Papua New
Guinea and with an emerging nationalism in Papua New Guinea which
has sought to move away from a colonial relationship. (This
tendency was expressed, for example, in Prime Minister Wingtis
'Look North' policy.) In part it has been prompted by resentment
(particularly on the part of Sir Julius Chan) over changes in the
form of Australia's development assistance to Papua New Guinea.
Recent developments on Bougainville have placed further strains on
the relationship.
Since the Bougainville conflict began, Australian policy has
been to support the authority of the Papua New Guinea Government
over a unified Papua New Guinea. This policy was stated by then
Prime Minister Hawke in Port Moresby in September 1990:
We fully support the Papua New Guinea
Government's resolute commitment to a political solution and we
agree with you that Bougainville must remain an integral part of
Papua New Guinea.
Australia has supplied military assistance, through the Defence
Cooperation Program, and humanitarian aid, it has made a number of
representations on human rights issues, and it has supported and
facilitated talks between the national government and the BTG on
the one hand, and the BIG/BRA on the other.
In 1991 the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade, in its report, Australia's Relations with
Papua New Guinea, addressed the question of 'Australia and the
Bougainville Crisis'. It noted that 'Australia was not directly
involved in the Bougainville crisis' (p.191), but went on to say
(p.192):
a recognition of Papua New Guinea's
sovereignty and integrity has had to be balanced by legitimate
humanitarian concerns and the ability of Australia to offer
assistance in the negotiation of a settlement or in the alleviation
of suffering on the island.
Among its recommendations were:
- that Australia adopt a more active
diplomatic role in trying to resolve the impasse between the
Bougainvilleans and the Papua New Guinea Government (Recommendation
45);
- that on providing gifts of military equipment to Papua New
Guinea the Australian and Papua New Guinea Governments should
develop clear and agreed guidelines about how the equipment will be
used (Recommendation 47); and
- that the Australian Government should do more to encourage
Papua New Guinea to investigate human rights abuses (Recommendation
48).
Almost four years later the Australian Parliamentary Delegation
to Bougainville broadly endorsed these recommendations; it
concluded that:
- there can be no military solution
to the conflict on Bougainville. Equally .... secession through
force of arms is not an option;
- The current [Papua New Guinea Government] policy [of
confidence building, restoration and rehabilitation] needs to be
consistently and vigorously pursued and financially supported;
and
- ... through AIDAB or its Defence Cooperation Program Australia
offer assistance to identify priorities in the restoration program
and assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid to
Bougainville.(21)
The Australian Government played a significant role in
facilitating talks which led to the Endeavour Accord of
1990 and the Honiara Declaration of 1991, notwithstanding
a good deal of suspicion towards Australia on the part of the
BRA.(22) And, following the visit of the Australian Parliamentary
Delegation, it assisted in setting up the 1994 peace conference in
Arawa and in arranging the dialogue between the BTG and BIG in
Cairns during September and December 1995.
The Defence Cooperation Program (DCP)
Under this program Australia has supported the PNGDF, mainly
through payment of salaries of Australian personnel serving with
the PNGDF, costs of training, and mutually agreed major projects.
DCP payments rose from $15.7 million in 1975/76 to $24.3 million in
1987/88, then increased to a peak of $52.1 million in 1990/91,
thereafter declining to $14.6 million in 1995/96 and a budgetted
$12 million in 1996/97.
In 1989, in response to requests made well before the
Bougainville crisis, Australia gave Papua New Guinea four Iroquois
helicopters. At the time they were handed over conditions were
attached to the use of the helicopters, stipulating that they be
used for transport, surveillance and medivac purposes, but not as
gunships. In fact, there were allegations that the helicopters were
being used offensively in 1990 and in 1991 it was admitted that
they had been used in effect as gunships, and that the bodies of
six alleged BRA sympathizers, executed by PNGDF soldiers, had been
dumped at sea from the helicopters. The admission generated
considerable controversy, though the view was put strongly at the
time that the attaching of such conditions to military equipment
was impracticable.(23)
In the context of the June 1996 military offensive by the PNGDF,
and specifically with reference to the involvement of
Australian-supplied helicopters and patrol boats in incursions into
Solomon Islands territory, questions concerning the use of
Australian-supplied military equipment have been raised again.
There is a growing call within Australia to cut Australian military
assistance to Papua New Guinea. As against this the Papua New
Guinea Government has reacted by objecting to the imposition of
conditions on the use of Australian-supplied equipment and
threatening to seek other sources of supply (Malaysia, Singapore
and Israel have been mentioned as possible alternative
sources).
Development assistance
Since 1990-91 Australia has provided development assistance for
humanitarian purposes and restoration of services on Bougainville,
both directly to the Papua New Guinea Government and to the Red
Cross and other NGOs. Currently, AusAID funding is supporting care
centres, the restoration of health centres, and NGO activities in
community development and conflict resolution. The provision of
assistance has been constrained, however, by the lack of capacity
for service delivery and sometimes by restrictions on access
imposed by the Papua New Guinea Government or the security
forces.
Recent developments
At the time of the lifting of the ceasefire in March 1996, the
recently-elected government of John Howard - which had committed
itself to giving 'a significantly higher priority to assisting
Papua New Guinea ... in resolution of internal difficulties that
are occurring on Bougainville'(24)- expressed concern at the move
and called for the peace process to be revived.(25) Subsequently
Foreign Minister Downer condemned the June 1996 military offensive
against the BRA and suggested that 'an attempt to achieve a
military solution ... will simply exacerbate the situation'.(26)
This brought a quick response from Papua New Guinea: at a
conference in Sydney in late June Papua New Guinea Defence Minister
Ijape reportedly complained that Australia had 'consistently
misunderstood the nature of the [Bougainville] conflict', and
Foreign Secretary Dusava said that Australia's criticism could
jeopardize bilateral relations.(27) Prime Minister Chan reacted in
even stronger terms, saying that, by harboring 'separatist
leaders',(28) Australia and the Solomon Islands had exacerbated the
Bougainville conflict; he went on to express disappointment that
'The new Government does not seem to have any innovative policy in
respect of the special relationship between our two
countries.'(29)
Shortly after this Foreign Minister Downer responded to reports
of the incursion by a PNGDF helicopter into Solomon Islands
territory by stating: 'This is a serious incident. There is no
doubt that Australian-supplied helicopters are not to be used for
military purposes',(30) and Opposition Foreign Affairs spokesman
Brereton called on the government to review Australian defence
support for Papua New Guinea to ensure that no direct support was
given to the offensive on Bougainville.(31) Among other sources,
Community Aid Abroad supported the call for a review of Australian
support for the PNGDF(32) and one Australian journalist proposed
that the government 'slash all official aid' to Papua New
Guinea.(33) In late July Foreign Minister Downer, while offering
Australian assistance in arranging further peace talks, warned that
further breaches of the conditions attached to the use of the
helicopters supplied by Australia in 1989 could place the
Australian Defence Cooperation Program at risk.
This prompted a further strong reaction from Chan, who, in reply
to a question in the Papua New Guinea National Parliament, strongly
criticized Downer's statement, accusing Australia of failing to
understand the situation on Bougainville, having a 'paternalistic
mentality', and condoning 'treasonous actions' against Papua New
Guinea; he also informed the Parliament that he had requested a
review of the DCP by the PNGDF, with the possibility that it be
discontinued.(34) In September, on the eve of the annual Papua New
Guinea-Australian ministerial forum (and coincident with reports of
the killing of twelve PNGDF soldiers in a BRA ambush at Kangu Beach
in southern Bougainville), Papua New Guinea's Foreign Minister
described a further Australian offer to facilitate peace talks as
'farcical' and suggested that 'the Bougainville problem is largely
an Australian-created problem'.(35) However, by the time the forum
concluded relations appear to have recovered sufficiently for the
two countries to have agreed to a joint review of the DCP and to
changes in the general aid relationship, including provision of
urgent humanitarian assistance to the care centres on
Bougainville.(36)
Recent developments have highlighted the growing tensions in the
Australia-Papua New Guinea relationship. On their part, Australian
Governments have been reluctant to admit (a statement by then
Defence Minister Senator Robert Ray notwithstanding(37)) that the
attaching of conditons to military assistance is impractable and
deeply offensive to Papua New Guinea's sense of sovereignty. On the
other hand, Papua New Guinea's leaders seem to underestimate the
growing domestic and international pressure (poorly informed though
it often is) on Australia to exert its influence to restrain
military excesses by Papua New Guinea on Bougainville and help
bring about a peaceful settlement.
For Australia, the problem is one of balance: being seen neither
as excessively interventionist nor insufficiently engaged. The
scope for substantial changes in Australian policy on Bougainville
seems to be limited. Attempts to dictate action to the Papua New
Guinea Government (for example by tying aid to policy actions) is
likely to be either ineffective (as it has been in the case of the
helicopters) of counter-productive. Cutting the DCP would further
weaken the security forces and exacerbate existing problems of
capability, discipline and funding, with implications beyond
Bougainville. Attaching conditions to military assistance may give
Australia some leverage but would perpetuate frictions and probably
remain ineffective. Sensitively made offers of assistance, however,
may be productive.
Specifically: the propects for a peaceful settlement would seem
to depend critically on
- the continuation of dialogue between the national government
and the BTG, and between the BTG and the BIG/BRA;
- the establishment of an administrative structure at provincial
and local level which will enable the restoration of government
services and provide the basis for establishment of a lasting
political settlement; and
- social and economic rehabilitation. In all of these, the
viability and credibility of the BTG seems essential. Particularly
in view of the degree of mutual distrust which seems to exist
between the national government, the military, the BTG, and the
BIG/BRA (especially between the BTG and the military), Australia
may be able to play a useful role in achieving the first of these
preconditions, and possibly to provide technical assistance in the
second; Australia is already assisting, through AusAID, in the
third. The Australian Government might also be expected to make
representations, as it has in the past, in instances where human
rights violations have occurred.
After six years of largely unsuccessful political negotiation
and military operations, the October 1994 peace conference in Arawa
promised to achieve a breakthrough in the conflict between the
national government and the BIG/BRA. Although the non-attendance of
the BIG/BRA leadership undermined the effectiveness of the
conference, a dialogue was established between the national
government and a Bougainville Transitional Government, and between
the BTG and the BIG/BRA, and steps were taken to reestablish
effective governance in the province. At the beginning of 1996
prospects for a peaceful settlement in Bougainville looked good. An
escalation of fighting in early 1996, however, led to the lifting
of the 1994 ceasefire and subsequently a major - but essentially
unsuccessful - military assault on BRA strongholds.
The failure of Operation High Speed II has boosted the
confidence of the BRA and further lowered the morale of the
security forces. Incidentally, it has also rendered more difficult
the task of the BTG, which has from the outset been regarded with
suspicion by both the security forces and some in the national
government. Further, repeated incursions into Solomon Islands
territory, and exchanges between Papua New Guinea and Australia
over the use of Australian-supplied military equipment, have
created tensions in the relationships between Papua New Guinea and
its eastern and southern neighbours.
If the ground lost in 1996 is to be regained, it is essential
that the Papua New Guinea Government:
- recognize the critical role to be
played by the BTG (and eventually by a provincial government
enjoying special autonomy arrangements);
- facilitate the process of rehabilitation and restoration in
Bougainville; and
- seriously address the difficulties in its present relations
with the Solomon Islands and Australia.
For its part, Australia has a potential role to play:
- in facilitating dialogue between
the various parties to the Bougainville conflict;
- in assisting in the establishment of a viable administrative
structure in Bougainville; and
- in providing humanitarian and infrastructural assistance.
In the area of defence cooperation, Australia must balance its
policy objectives of avoiding direct involvement in the
Bougainville conflict on the one hand and, on the other, supporting
the constitutional order.
- The North Solomons Province (prior to 1975 known as
Bougainville District) comprises the islands of Buka to the north,
the 'mainland' island of Bougainville, and a number of small
offshore islands. Since the present conflict began in 1988 the
province has generally been referred to as Bougainville and draft
legislation to amend the North Solomons provincial constitution
proposes that the province be renamed Bougainville.
There are some twenty-two languages in the province, with Nasioi
being the main language in the area of the mine site.
- There are currently estimated to be around 70 000 people in
care centres. The province's population, which has not been
assessed since the 1980 census, has been given by Papua New Guinea
sources as 168 000, which is almost certainly an overestimate.
- For a detailed review of the Bougainville conflict up to 1994
see R.J. May and M. Spriggs (eds), The Bougainville
Crisis, M. Spriggs and D. Denoon (eds), The Bougainville
Crisis: 1991 Update, and other references listed under
'Further Reading'.
- See, for example, M. Spriggs, 'The failure of the Bougainville
peace talks', Pacific Research 7(4) 1994, pp. 19-23.
- Bougainville Transitional Government, Peace Plan 1996,
p. 11.
- ibid., p. 10.
- Australian, 31 July 1996; Post-Courier, 1
August 1996.
- For a more detailed analysis of the PNGDF see R.J. May, The
Changing Role of the Military in Papua New Guinea.
- See the reports of a meeting of Resistance fighters on Buka in
the Post-Courier, 11 and 25 January 1996.
- For a report on this conference see Sun-Herald, 8
September 1996.
- See for example, Post-Courier, 3 September 1996.
- For background on these developments see Derek Woolner,
Papua New Guinea: 20 Years On, Parliamentary Research
Service, Research Paper No. 4 1995-96.
- Quoted in the Weekend Australian, 20-21 July
1996.
- An interesting recent development is the support for
Bougainville independence expressed by the King of Tonga. See
Matangi Tonga, July-September 1996, p. 12.
- See, for example, Islands Business Pacific, April
1992, p. 12.
- Post-Courier, 20 March 1992.
- Post-Courier, 15 and 17 September 1992
- For a detailed report, see Helen Fraser in Asia-Pacific
Defence Reporter, October-November 1993.
- Canberra Times, 5 June 1996; Australian, 12
June 1996.
- For a detailed discussion of Australia's relations with Papua
New Guinea, see the 1991 report of the Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JCFADT) entitled
Australia's Relations with Papua New Guinea.
- Bougainville: A Pacific Solution. Report of the Visit of
the Australian Parliamentary Delegation to Bougainville 18-22 April
1994, pp. 43-44.
- This factor is addressed in JCFADT, op.cit. pp.
190-91.
- This subject is discussed in detail in JCFADT, op.
cit. pp. 193-96, and in submissions to the Joint Committee.
Also see R.J. May, The Changing Role of the Military in Papua
New Guinea, pp.22-23.
- Insight, 25 March 1996, p. 20.
- Weekend Australian, 23-24 March.
- Sydney Morning Herald, 19 and 25 June 1996.
- Weekend Australian, 29-30 June 1996.
- The reference to separatist leaders in Australia was presumably
a reference to BIG spokesmen Moses Havini and Mike Forster.
- Sydney Morning Herald, 3 July 1996.
- As reported in the Australian, 5 July 1996.
- Canberra Times, 5 July 1996.
- Australian, 9 July 1996, p. 12.
- Brian Toohey, Canberra Times, 6 July 1996.
- Post-Courier, 31 July 1996; Sydney Morning
Herald, 31 July 1996.
- Australian, 13 September 1996.
- Weekend Australian, 14-15 September 1996.
- Post-Courier, 13 August 1991.
Amnesty International. Papua New Guinea 'Under the Barrel of
a Gun': Bougainville 1991 to 1993. [np] 1993. [ASA
34/5/96].
Australia. Parliament. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade, 1991. Australia's Relations with Papua New
Guinea. Canberra, The Parliament, 1991.
Australia. Parliamentary Delegation to Bougainville.
Bougainville: A Pacific Solution. Report of the Visit
of the Australian Parliamentary Delegation to Bougainville, 18-22
April 1994. Canberra, AGPS, 1994.
Liria, Y.A. Bougainville Campaign Diary. Melbourne,
Indra Publishing, 1993.
May, R.J. The Changing Role of the Military in Papua New
Guinea. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 101.
Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of
Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1993.
May, R.J. & Spriggs, M. (eds) The Bougainville
Crisis. Bathurst, Crawford House Press, 1990.
Oliver, D. Black Islanders. A Personal Perspective on
Bougainville 1937-1991. Melbourne, Hyland House, 1991.
Rogge, J.R.(ed.) The Rehabilitation of Bougainville, Papua
New Guinea: A Needs Assessment and Program Proposal. Draft
report of a United Nations Inter-Agency Mission on Behalf of the UN
Resident Coordinator for Papua New Guinea at the Request of the
Government of Papua New Guinea. Port Moresby, 17 May 1995.
Spriggs, M. 'The failure of the Bougainville peace talks',
Pacific Research 7(4) 1994, pp.19-23.
Spriggs, M. & Denoon, D. (eds) The Bougainville Crisis:
1991 Update. Political and Social Change Monograph 16.
Bathurst, Department of Political and Social Change, Research
School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University in
association with Crawford House Press, 1992.
Standish, B. Bougainville: Undermining the State in Papua
New Guinea, Legislative Research Service Background Paper.
Canberra, The Parliament, 1989.
Australian-Papua New Guinea Friendship Association Inc. &
Australian Institute of International Affairs (NSW Branch).
Papua New Guinea: Security and Defence in the Nineties and
Beyond 2000. Conference Proceedings, 28 June 1996.
'A legacy of development: three years of crisis in Bougainville'
Special Issue of The Contemporary Pacific 4(2) 1992.

Appendix 1
The Charter of Mirigini for a New Bougainville
Preamble
1. We, the leaders of the National Government and the people of
Bougainville having met in Waigani, determined as partners to
continue the peace process on Bougainville, commit ourselves under
this Charter to a new spirit, a new deal for a new
Bougainville.
2. In pursuance of the Resolution of the Bougainville Peace
Conference held in Arawa from 10 - 14 October 1994, including the
Agreement signed on 18 October 1994 between North Nasioi Village
Council of Chiefs and the National Government, hereby resolve to
step up the pace and momentum of bringing normalcy, services and
legal authority to Bougainville by doing the following:
Transitional Political Arrangement
3. Under this Charter, the National Government will, in the
framework of the Constitution, its relevant acts and subject to the
completion of preparatory work, arrange for the establishment of a
transitional legal body.
4. The National Government has agreed with the Bougainville
leaders to establish a transitional legal body by March 1995, for
Bougainville. This body will be known as the Bougainville
Transitional Government which shall exercise all powers and
functions as set out in the Organic Law on Provincial
Government.
5. The Bougainville Transitional Government will have an
Assembly comprising of leaders nominated by Councils of Chiefs from
each interim authority area.
6. The Assembly of the Transitional Government will act as a
Constituent Assembly to review the Constitution of the North
Solomons Provincial Government after a negotiated settlement is
reached between the National Government and the Bougainville
Transitional Government.
Political Settlement
7. The National Government and Bougainville leaders hereby
declare this Charter as their commitment to an active programme for
consultations and negotiations on a political settlement and that
the parties shall agree on a structured programme for these talks
by 31 December 1994.
8. The leaders agree that the starting point for consultations
and negotiations on a new deal for Bougainville is to review the
Bougainville Agreement of 1976 at the next round of talks.
Other Dialogue
9. The National Government and Bougainville leaders will
maintain dialogue on all other issues pertinent to the resolution
of the crises, including a programme of reconciliation,
reconstruction and restoration of services in Bougainville.
Declared at Waigani on the 25th day of November 1994.
For National Government
Rt Hon Sir Julius Chan GCMG KBE MP
Prime Minister
Hon Arnold Marsipal MP
Minister for State Assisting the Prime Minister
Hon Castan Maibawa MP
Minister for Provincial Affairs and Village Services
For Bougainville Province
Mr Nick Penial
Chairman (South-West Interim Authority)
Mr Thomas Anis
Buka Interim Authority
Mr Theodore Miriung
Interim Chairman (North Nasioi Village Council of Chiefs)
Hon John Momis MP
Regional Member of Bougainville and Minister for Communications
Appendix 2
The Rt. Hon. Sir Julius Chan GCMG, KBE, MP
Prime Minister
&
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade
Address to the Nation
on Bougainville Developments
Port Moresby
31 March 1995
My fellow Papua New Guineans
You will recall that from the first day of my Government's
operations, I made a firm pledge that a solution to the
Bougainville crisis was my number one priority. Nothing has
changed.
The price of peace, as with freedom, is eternal vigilance.
As we enter the final 10 days before the swearing-in of the
Bougainville Transitional Government, we are assured of clinching
peace.
Peace is necessary to rebuild the shattered lives of the
Bougainville people.
In the past six months, I believe there can have been no
doubting the integrity of my Government's commitment to resolving
the Bougainville situation. In our short period in office. I have
worked, and I know others have worked, tirelessly.
You will recall my very first act upon gaining the Prime
Ministership was to embark on a lonely journey to Honiara in search
of peace. I met with Sam Kauona on the 2nd and 3rd of September,
and this resulted in the signing of the Honiara Commitments. Since
then we have had a ceasefire agreement, the Arawa peace conference
in October, the signing of the Charter of Mirigini in November,
committing me to a time table to Parliament's establishing of the
Bougainville Transitional Government by March. Ten days from now on
the 10th of April, we will have the swearing-in of the Members of
that Government.
And all this time, quietly in the background, there has been a
slow but ongoing programme of restoration, rebuilding and
rehabilitation.
My Government has not backed down from its commitment to
Bougainville despite the nation's financial woes, natural disasters
and its commitment to major projects such as Lihir.
We. will continue to make it our number one priority. We will
look for peace, and we will keep working, striving and praying for
peace until it is finally and totally achieved.
There is nothing passive in our commitment. It is action - all
action - and let that fact be a timely reminder to those elements
who stand against peace and for violence. It is fair to say that I
and my Government are concerned at information and intelligence
that reveals a build-up in BRA activities.
We, as a responsible Government, will not shrink from our
responsibility to protect the people. As Prime Minister, I cannot
allow attacks on innocent civilians who simply want to exercise
their right to live in peace, or on our soldiers who are as
vulnerable as sitting ducks.
We will do what is necessary to protect the people. We will make
the hard decisions; we will take the tough action.
We the Government, and the people of Bougainville, are fiercely
determined.
The people of Bougainville will have peace, and you can be a
part of it. Put down your weapons and join the only decent fight
there is on Bougainville - the fight for peace.
Then you will stand shoulder-to-shoulder with real heroes - the
good people of Bougainville who are pursuing peace with absolute
courage.
Peace will reign on Bougainville because those who work and
create things will always have final victory over those who would
destroy.
I say to all thinking people: Seek peace.
The Pope brought that message to us here in Papua New Guinea at
the beginning of this year that he announced as the Year of
Peace.
1, too, am determined that it shall be a year of peace - God
willing, may our goal be achieved.
Appendix 3
THE WAIGANI-COMMUNIQUE
The Prime Minister and the Leader of the National Government
Delegation of Papua New Guinea, the Rt Hon Sir Julius Chan and the
Premier and Leader of the Bougainville Transitional Government
Delegation, Mr Theodore Miriung having met at Mirigini House, Port
Moresby on 18 May, 1995, and:
- Pursuing the Charter of Mirigini through the establishment of
the Bougainville Transitional Government.
- Noting that the functions of the Bougainville Transitional
Government includes a negotiated settlement towards peace,
normalcy, services and permanent legal authority to the situation
on Bougainville.
- Committed to their on-going programs for consultations and
negotiations, including dialogue on all other issues pertinent to
the resolution of the Bougainville situation, such as,
(i) Pardon Amnesty and Temporary
Refuge;
(ii) Reconciliation and Compensation
(iii) Restoration of Services and Reconstruction of
Bougainville;
(iv) and Others.
- Taking realistically into account the current situation,
including the wishes of the Chiefs, the Bougainville Transitional
Government Assembly, various interest groups, other leaders and the
people of Bougainville as a whole for peace and unity through the
provision of incentives, resources and goodwill.
Having held extensive discussions;
HAVE AGREED as follows:
Amnesty (Pardon) for surrendered BRA
1. That the National Government will grant as from 2400hrs on 18
May 1995, within the framework of the laws of Papua New Guinea, and
as part of the overall settlement to the Bougainville crisis
Amnesty to various members of illegal and criminal forces, groups
and individuals
2. This Amnesty from prosecution will commence from October 1988
to 2400hrs of the date of the signing of this Communique.
3. The National Government also grants as of 2400hrs of 18 May
1995, amnesty for the surrender and destruction of all firearms in
possession of these illegal, criminal forces, groups and
individuals up to and including a period of fourteen (14) days.
Rehabilitation of Bougainville Economy (Future of
Panguna Mine and Plantations)
4. That the rehabilitation of the Bougainville Provincial
economy must be approached in the same manner, framework and
process applied in respect of the development of resource projects
in the rest of the country. That these resource projects shall be
looked at as "new projects".
5. That the re-opening of the Panguna Mine shall be base on a
re-negotiated arrangement and that proceeds from it also contribute
towards the restoration programme in the Province.
6. That compensation for "people" will be addressed in the
context of and as part and parcel of the Rehabilitation Programme
of the economy. The "people" to be compensated will be categorised
by the BTG and settlement will be made with the constraints of
resources and capacities of the Province and the National
Government.
Future Administrative Arrangements for the Restoration
Programme
7. That Bougainville Transitional Government in the
interim arrangement must be responsible for the programming and
implementation of the 3R Strategy - Restoration
Programme.
8. The permanent Government for Bougainville upon it's
establishment, will be responsible for the continued programming
and implementation of that Progamme.
9. The budgetting, financing and implementation of the
3R Strategy - Restoration Programme shall be the responsibility of
the Department of Bougainville.
Future of Resistance Forces
10. That a package will be negotiated to:
(i) recognize the contributions by
Resistance Forces;
(ii) consider making appropriate compensation
(iii) re-deploy them to other productive activities within the
Province and country as a whole; and
(iv) rehabilitate and re-settle them into normal life.
Future Structure of Provincial Government of
Bougainville
11 That a permanent structure of Provincial Government for
Bougainville will be installed as soon as possible. This will be
the responsibility of the Premier and his Transitional Government
to develop and propose to the National Government, taking into
account the principles of self-reliance, links and power sharing
under the National Constitution.
12. The National Government will lift all restrictions of travel
including prize rewards of K200,000 previously set for the
apprehension and prosecution of BRA leaders, including Joseph
Kabui, Francis Ona and Sam Kauona in order to enable them to become
part of; and, participate in the dialogue, goodwill, peace and
normalcy through the Bougainville Transitional Government.
Implementation
13. That officials of the National Government and the
Bougainville Transitional Government shall carry out detailed
negotiations and conclude programmes and projects arising from this
Communique and those envisaged in the Charter of Mirigini, and
report to the next meeting on 29 May 1995.
Signed at Waigani, on 18th day of May, 1995
RT HON SIR JULIUS CHAN GCMG KBE MP
PRIME MINISTER
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
MR THEODORE MIRIUNG
PREMIER
BOUGAINVILLE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT
Appendix 4
BOUGAINVILLE LEADERS TALKS
CAIRNS, AUSTRALIA DECEMBER 1 995
JOINT COMMUNIQUE:
ONE
The delegation of the Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG)
and the delegation of the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG)
held talks in Cairns, Australia, from 14 to 18 December 1995 under
the joint chairmanship of the representatives of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and of the
Secretary-General of the Commonwealth. A list of participants is at
Annex 1.
TWO
The two delegations have agreed to enter into a process of
dialogue that will permit the achievement of a political settlement
to the Bougainville conflict.
THREE
The delegations of the BTG and of the BIG expressed their
intention to convene a new round of Talks in Bougainville in
March/April 1996. In order to ensure the success of the Talks, they
have agreed to hold a series of preparatory meetings comprised of
four members from each side, with the facilitation of the United
Nations Secretary-General, at a venue to be determined.
FOUR
Both sides agreed subject to the concurrence of the Papua New
Guinea Government to the continued association of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and of the
Secretary-General of the Commonwealth in-the on-going discussions
and in their eventual outcomes.
FIVE
Representatives of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)
and the unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) have
participated and may continue to participate in an observer
capacity in the Talks. Other non-governmental organisations may be
granted similar observer status with the consent of all the parties
to the Talks.
SIX
At each round of Talks, the delegations will determine the
degree of confidentiality that will apply.
SEVEN
The two sides have reached agreement on the Agenda for the All
Bougainville Leaders Talks (Annex 2), it being understood that the
discussion of the items need not follow the order in which they are
enumerated.
EIGHT
The two sides will endeavour to reach early agreement on the
issues covered in the Agenda so that talks may be held between the
Government of Papua New Guinea and the Bougainville leadership.
NINE
All parties to the Talks agree on the need for access to be
immediately granted throughout Bougainville to UNICEF and relevant
donor organisations for the implementation of health care
programmes, especially child immunisation.
TEN
In so far as the BTG, the United Nations and the Commonwealth
Secretariat are concerned. the understandings contained in this
document are subject to the agreement of the Government Of Papua
New Guinea.
ELEVEN
The delegations expressed their appreciation to the Government
of Australia for the excellent arrangements it had made for hosting
the meeting.
TWELVE
The Representatives of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations and of the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth will
report to the Government of Papua New Guinea on the results of the
current talks.
Signed in the presence of the Representatives of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and of the
Secretary-General of the Commonwealth.
Appendix 5
BOUGAINVILLE
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT
PEACE PLAN
1996
Prepared
by the
Policy Secretariat
Bougainville Transitional Government
February 1996
PART I - INTRODUCTION
1.1 Since its establishment on the 10th of April 1995 the
Bougainville Transitional Government has initiated a number of
steps to meet its objective under the "Charter of Mirigini for a
New Bougainville" (Mirigini Charter)
1.2 Most of these steps have jointly been taken with the
national Government. These include negotiations with the National
Government: starting with the first round held in Port Moresby on
the 18th of May 1995 and ending with the fourth round on the 3rd of
August 1995. Issues covered in these rounds include pardon and
amnesty, an arms amnesty, a commitment to a "new projects" approach
for all new developmental projects in the province, a proposed
policy on the future of armed youth, their disarmament and
rehabilitation, and the future political status of Bougainville.
All these are contained in various documents; principally, "the
Waigani Communique" and the "Areas of Common Understanding Reached
Between the Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan, and BTG Premier Mr
Theodore Miriung on the Occasion of their Fourth Negotiating
Session at the Mirigini State House on Thursday 3rd August 1995"
(Areas of Common Understanding).
1.3 Before and during negotiations with the National Government,
Bougainville leaders had felt that a parallel process of dialogue
should be initiated with leaders of the Bougainville Interim
Government (BIG) and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). For
this reason, after the fourth round of talks with the National
Government, BTG had initiated two rounds of talks with these
leaders outside PNG, with the approval of the National Government.
These were held in Cairns, Australia: the first one in September
and the second in December 1995. All these have been possible
through the assistance of, and facilitation by, the Australian
Government.
1.4 From these rounds of talks both with the National Government
and with the leaders of BIG and BRA, BTG believes that the
foundations have been laid for a political settlement.
1.5 This Peace Plan has been put together from a collection of
the common views of leaders of BTG. It is intended to guide BTG
leaders in the peace process.
PART II - OBJECTIVES OF THE BOUGAINVILLE TRANSITIONAL
GOVERNMENT
2. OBJECTIVES OF THE BOUGAINVILLE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT UNDER
THE CHARTER OF MIRIGINI FOR A NEW BOUGAINVILLE and UNDER THE NEW
PREAMBLE TO THE AMENDED CONSTITUTION OF THE PROVINCE.
2.1 The Bougainville Transitional Government was established as
a transitional arrangement to resolve the Bougainville conflict.
Its objectives are set out under the Mirigini Charter, and are more
particularly spelled out in the new preamble to the amended
Constitution of the province.
2.2 Clause 7 of the Charter provides as follows -
"The National Government and
Bougainville leaders hereby declare this Charter as their
commitment to an active programme for consultations and
negotiations on a political settlement..."
2.3 Clause 8 provides as follows -
"The leaders agree that the starting
point for consultations and negotiations on a new deal for
Bougainville is to review the Bougainville Agreement of 1976 at the
next found of talks".
2.4 In addition the Charter provides that the National
Government and Bougainville leaders will maintain dialogue on all
other issues pertinent to the resolution of the crisis, including a
programme of reconciliation, reconstruction and restoration of
services.
2.5 The new preamble to the amended Constitution of Bougainville
provides as follows-
"The Bougainville Transitional
Government is established as a transitional arrangement to restore
the civil authority of the people of Bougainville under the
Organic Law on Provincial Government. Apart from running
the affairs of the province the Bougainville Transitional
Government will be responsible for negotiating a political
settlement with the National Government. It is not intended that
this body become the ultimate form of government for the province.
Under the "Charter of Mirigini for a New Bougainville" signed on
the 25 November 1994, Bougainville leaders and leaders of the
National Government agreed that after a political settlement is
reached between the National Government and the Bougainville
Transitional Government the Assembly of the Transitional Government
shall act as a Constituent Assembly to review the Constitution of
the North Solomons Provincial Government and enact a new
Constitution. The Bougainville Transitional Government will be
committed to this task. The leaders also committed themselves to "a
new spirit" and to "a new deal for a new Bougainville". The
Bougainville Transitional Government and the National Government
will be committed to working out a new deal for Bougainville which,
the leaders of both governments agree, must address the basic
grievances of the people and of the province, politically, socially
and economically."
2.6 In addition to the specific aims of BTG as are provided
under these instruments BTG has an obligation, as a government, to
respect, if not follow, the policies of the National Government,
both past and present, in so far as those policies relate to its
efforts for peace on Bougainville. In this regard all past
agreements or understandings between the National Government and
Bougainville leaders are binding on BTG, to the extent they are
relevant. These agreements have provided the context from which a
number of fundamental policies have emerged, and from which various
stands (not always similar) have been taken by leaders of
Bougainville and leaders at the national level as to what the
national policy was, or ought to have been, in relation to
Bougainville.
2.7 These agreements include -
(a) the Endeavor Accord;
(b) the Kavieng (Malangan) Agreement;
(c) the Honiara Declaration of 1991;
(d) the South Bougainville Agreement;
(e) the Tambea Accord;
(f) the Honiara Commitment to Peace on Bougainville;
(g) the Cease-fire Agreement of 1994;
(h) the Bougainville Peace Conference resolutions;
(i) the North Nasioi Agreement;
(j) the Charter of Mirigini for a New Bougainville;
(k) the Waigani Communique;
(l) Summary Record of Mirigini Discussions on (the)
Implementation of the Waigani Communique;
(m) Areas of Common Understanding reached by the Prime Minister,
Sir Julius Chan, and BTG Premier Mr Theodore Miriung on the
Occasion of their Fourth Negotiating Session at the Mirigini State
House on Thursday 3rd August 1995.
2.8 In pursuing its main objective BTG has found it necessary to
spell out its ideas in a Peace Plan for a number of good reasons.
First, it has been felt that National Government policy on
Bougainville over the past seven years - outside of the specific
accords with Bougainville leaders - have, more often than not,
excluded the views of Bougainville leaders. This has created
problems in the past, in so far as leaving people to believe they
cannot be made part of the solution. This may have been unintended
on the part of past governments, but that has been the fact. On the
contrary it may have been quite necessary on the part of past
governments to have excluded Bougainville leaders in the way it
did, given the part that some of these leaders have been perceived
by the National Government to have played in the conflict. The
exclusion of Bougainville leaders in the peace process was
exacerbated by the suspension of the North Solomons Provincial
Government, among other reasons. It is the common consensus among
the population that a durable settlement can only be achieved
through the active participation of all Bougainville leaders and
their people.
2.9 Secondly, BTG believes that its role in the process towards
a political settlement must in the beginning focus on building
bridges of confidence and trust between and among all players and
factions in the conflict. Only from these foundations can there be
real prospects for a settlement. This has been the approach of BTG
since its establishment in April 1995.
2.10 Thirdly, and this is related to the second, it was clearly
spelled out in the Mirigini Charter that negotiations and dialogue
are the central means by which BTG's will have to achieve its
objectives. For this reason BTG believes that it ought to be seen
as a peace-maker and a peace-builder, working primarily in the
management of the conflict through peace-building efforts and
confidence-building foundations. It ought not to be seen, strictly
speaking, as an enforcer of the law. This is not to say that it
cannot assert its authority as the civilian legal authority on the
ground. On the contrary it is bound to do so. It will continue to
condemn violence and killings in any form and do everything within
its power and influence to prevent these. But it believes that its
success as a transitional arrangement or as a vehicle for bringing
the people to a political settlement requires that it be firm but
fair.
2.11 Fourthly, BTG believes that it must look beyond July 1997
when a new government will govern the country after the national
elections. BTG believes that a negotiated political settlement is
possible before 1997. If none were possible by that time, BTG
believes it has an obligation to the people under the Mirigini
Charter to prepare the foundations for a political settlement with
the incoming government, even if it were itself to be abolished in
1997 under the terms imposed by the Organic Law on Provincial
Governments and Local Level Governments
PART III - FOUNDATIONS OF BTG'S STRATEGY
3 FOUNDATIONS OF BTG'S STRATEGY
3.1 BTG's peace strategy is based, though not entirely, on three
main foundations, two of which were laid by and through the
policies of Sir Julius Chan and his Government upon its assumption
of power in August of 1994. The first foundation is derived from
which the Prime Minister and Bougainville leaders have collectively
termed under the Mirigini Charter as the "new spirit for a
new deal for a new Bougainville". The "new spirit"
according to the speeches of the Prime Minister - to which BTG
fully concurs - contains three main themes - namely -
(i) throwing away the suspicion which
had contained to undermine or prevent a full understanding between
Bougainville leaders and national leaders;
(ii) not making the same mistakes of the past in relation to
Bougainville;
(iii) knocking down legal and constitutional "brick walls" if
they stand in the way of a settlement.
3.2 BTG observes that these principles have been quite
successful in moving the National Government to establishing
dialogue with the BRA, initially, through Sam Kauona in Honiara in
1994 and subsequently to re-establishing the civil authority of the
province through the formation of BTG. Since BTG's establishment
this same spirit has allowed BTG the liberty to initiate talks with
BIG and BRA outside PNG - a policy for which the National
Government should be given all due credit, as it is one not
normally tried in other countries by governments in resolving
internal disputes.
3.3 The second foundation is the recognition of the value of
peace talks, and the need for proactive talking. It is a policy
that was not deliberately encouraged by past governments - except
for those occasions which had resulted in signed agreements and
memoranda of understanding between Bougainville leaders and the
National Government and national leaders. This recognition has,
however, been the centrepiece of Sir Julius Chan's policy; where
all peace efforts must revolve around peace talks and on-going
dialogue.
3.4 BTG observes that though a lot of positive things have been
achieved through talking, National Government action has been
somewhat limited or had not gone all the way, or far enough.
3.5 The third foundation upon which BTG has placed its efforts
is the need to involve all factions in the search for a solution.
BTG believes that a successful political settlement will hinge upon
one main factor, namely, the involvement of all factions in the
working out of a political settlement. BTG believes that factions
should not be deliberately left out of the process.
PART III (sic.) - BTG's PEACE STRATEGY
4. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
4.1 BTG believes that the foundation for a solution depends on a
number of fundamental principles -
(i) an acceptance of the fact that
there cannot be a pure military solution to the conflict;
(ii) an acceptance of the fact that peace cannot be forced upon
a group who wants to go on fighting;
(iii) an acceptance of the fact that only through peace talks
there can be understanding - which can lead to success in
negotiations and a political settlement.
4.2 These principles, however, need qualifying. BTG believes
that -
(i) military presence had been
necessary to protect lives and property, and this may continue to
be so as long as there is a threat posed to the lives of the
people;
(ii) though peace talks are indispensable to the peace process,
there is always a possibility that they can protract, without
anything being achieved. Pressure must, therefore, be exerted on
all parties to make them come to the negotiating table.
4.3 BTG believes that the foundations for a political settlement
have been laid as a result of negotiations between BTG and the
National Government, and of the peace talks held between BTG and
leaders of BIG and BRA.
4.4 BTG believes that the possibility for a settlement will now
depend on the willingness of the National Government to concede
greater autonomy to Bougainville, on the one hand, and the
willingness of the BIG and BRA leadership to accept a "compromise"
on the other.
4.5 BTG believes that the acceptance by the rebel leadership of
such a "compromise" depends on the "idea of an autonomous
Bougainville" being negotiated between the BTG and the National
Government.
4.6 BTG believes that the stage can be set for a "compromise" if
negotiations between the National Government and the Bougainville
leadership can conclude on the "future political status of
Bougainville".
4.7 As a "compromise" inevitably takes time, the process can be
accelerated, even only slowly, upon the content of the "New Deal
for a New Bougainville" being agreed to, in principle, by BTG and
the National Government and that this has been acceptable to the
people of Bougainville.
5. CONCEPT OF PEACE STRATEGY
5.1 BTG's concept involves doing the following -
(i) to keep the negotiations with the
National Government active and progressive while also ensuring that
peace talks and the on-going dialogue with leaders of BIG and BRA
continue; and that the 'doors" are open and remain so; and
(ii) to allow negotiations with the National Government to come
to a decision on the future political status of Bougainville or on
the level of autonomy to be granted to Bougainville, taking as its
starting point - as agreed under Clause 8 the Mirigini Charter -
the level of autonomy envisaged by the Bougainville Agreement of
1976; or, - as had been resolved by the Transitional Assembly on
the 28th of July 1995 - "the highest possible level of autonomy",
and
(iii) to allow one or two more meetings of Bougainville leaders
on Bougainville in March or April as agreed to under the Cairns II
Joint Communique; and
(iv) depending on the outcome of those meetings - to
complete negotiations on all issues, including the issue
of the future political status of Bougainville, and to agree to a
political settlement with the National Government by June or
September 1996.
5.2 While the process of negotiations and dialogue with both the
BIG/BRA leaders and with the National Government is underway - i.e.
before June 1996 - BTG will attempt to institute peace-building
measures in order to lay the foundations for a negotiated
settlement. These measures should thereby also lay the foundations
for the institutionalisation of peace in the province after a
settlement. These measures include -
(i) the re-structuring of local level
government in the province using powers conferred by the Organic
Law on Provincial Government; and
(ii) the establishment of a process for dealing with arms which
would involve local level government structures and with clan
chiefs and leaders or more particularly the re-consolidation of
traditional spheres of control and influence - a process which will
begin with arms control and end with total disarmament; and
(iii) subject to the approval of the National Government, the
creation of a peace-keeping unit comprising, in the main, local
youth; and
(iv) the laying down of clear policies for social and economic
development and their initial implementation through the
restoration programme.
5.3 BTG will aim at consolidating common positions on issues for
negotiations with the National Government at the planned
Bougainville leaders talks on Bougainville in April or March
1996.
5.4 After the planned Bougainville leaders on Bougainville, BTG
will resume negotiations with the National Government on all issues
outstanding. In the event that the talks on Bougainville cannot be
held, BTG then will need to re-assess the situation before resuming
negotiations with the National Government.
PART V - PRIORITIES IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE
RESTORATION PROGRAMME
6. BTG'S PRIORITIES IN THE PEACE PROCESS.
6.1 BTG's priorities in the peace process are -
(i) to maintain constant dialogue
with all Bougainville leaders and especially leaders of BIG and
BRA; and
(ii) to reach an understanding with leaders of BIG and BRA on
the future political status of Bougainville; and
(iii) to encourage leaders of BIG and BRA to come to the
negotiation table; and
(iv) on failing (iii), to complete negotiations with the
National Government on all issues; and
(v) to agree to a political settlement.
6.2 In pursuing those priorities BTG is mindful of the fact that
agreeing to a political settlement may not necessarily mean the
cessation of all hostilities. However, BTG believes that a
political settlement which is acceptable to the people would, in
time, receive endorsement from hard-liners.
7. PRIORITIES IN THE RESTORATION PROGRAMME.
BTG's priorities in the Restoration programme are -
(i) health;
(ii) education;
(iii) social order;
(iv) infrastructure;
(v) economic services; and
(vi) administration.
These priorities must be reflected in the policies set by
BTG.
Appendix 6
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE LEADER OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
DELEGATION, THE RT. HON SIR JULIUS CHAN GCMG, KBE, MP AND THE
PREMIER AND LEADER OF THE BOUGAINVILLE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT
DELEGATION, MR THEODORE MIRIUNG HAVING MET AT THE MIRIGINI HOUSE,
PORT MORESBY ON THE FOURTH (4TH) JUNE, 1996 AND:
- IN FURTHER PURSUIT OF THE MIRIGINI CHARTER AND ITS
IMPLEMENTATION AS DETERMINED IN THE WAIGANI COMMUNIQUE WHICH THEY
SIGNED ON 18 MAY 1995,
- DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN THE PROCESS OF PEACE, RECONCILIATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION ON BOUGAINVILLE, INCLUDING THE IMPETUS CREATED TO
DATE,
- HAVING HELD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS,
- REACHED THE FOLLOWING UNDERSTANDING:
1. TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR BTG
IT WAS REQUESTED BY PREMIER THEODORE MIRIUNG THAT THE CURRENT
TERM OF THE BOUGAINVILLE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT BY EXTENDED BEYOND
THE 1997 NATIONAL ELECTIONS.
THE PRIME MINISTER APPRECIATES THE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS RELATING
TO BOUGAINVILLE AND COMMITS THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO DO ITS BEST
ENDEAVOUR TO PASS AMENDMENTS TO THE ORGANIC LAW ON PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENTS AND LOCAL LEVEL GOVERNMENTS TO EFFECT THE ABOVE.
IT WAS FURTHER AGREED THAT THE PROCESS BY INITIATED AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE AND CONCLUDED BY THE SIXTEENTH 16TH DAY OF JUNE, 1996. THE
OFFICIALS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE BTG HAVE BEEN MANDATED
T IMMEDIATELY WORK ON THE DETAILS.
2. AUTONOMY
WHILST ACKNOWLEDGING THE COMPLEXITIES OF ANY DISCUSSION ON THE
GRANTING OF SOME DEGREE OF AUTONOMY FOR BOUGAINVILLE BOTH PARTIES
AGREED TO DELIBERATE FURTHER ON THE LEVEL AND SCOPE OF AUTONOMY FOR
BOUGAINVILLE. THE DETAILS ARE TO BE WORKED OUT BY OFFICIALS FROM
BOTH SIDES LATER ON.
3. LOCAL LEVEL GOVERNMENT
BOTH PARTIES AGREED THAT A SYSTEM OF LOCAL LEVEL GOVERNMENT BE
ESTABLISHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO FACILITATE THE PROCESS OF
NORMALISATION ON BOUGAINVILLE.
4. FUNDING
WHILST ACKNOWLEDGING PAST DIFFICULTIES ON DRAWING DOWN FUNDS
ALLOCATED FOR BOUGAINVILLE AND THE BTG, BOTH PARTIES AGREED TO WORK
WITHIN THE CURRENT ARRANGEMENT TO FACILITATE A PROMPT RELEASE OF
FUNDS EARMARKED FOR BOUGAINVILLE.
SIGNED AT MIRIGINI STATE HOUSE ON THE FOURTH DAY OF JUNE,
1996
JULIUS CHAN
PRIME MINISTER
WITNESSED BY:
W NOEL LEVI
SECRETARY
THEODORE MIRIUNG
PREMIER
WITNESSED BY
JAMES TOGEL
MEMBER, BTG