Dr Stephen Sherlock
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
23 June 1997

Contents
Major Issues Summary
Introduction
Hong Kong and China: The Legacy of
History
A Free Port: The 'Gateway to
China'
Imperialism, 'Unequal Treaties' and Chinese Sovereignty
Hong Kong's Economic Transition: The Golden
Egg?
An Integrated Economy
'One Country, Two Systems'
Guanxi, Corruption and Cronyism
Hong Kong's Political Transition: Whither
Democracy and Human Rights?
Hong Kong's New Constitution: The
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law
Elected or Appointed Government?
Protection of Human Rights
Hong Kong and Australia
Trade and Investment
People-to-People Links and Migration
Hong Kong and Australia-China Relations
Conclusion
Endnotes
On 1 July 1997 sovereignty over the British colony of Hong Kong
will be formally transferred to China. The handover has raised
questions about the capacity of the territory to continue its
economic success and maintain the political freedoms and rule of
law enjoyed under British rule. This paper examines the issues
involved in the transfer and the prospects of Hong Kong's viability
after 1997 and the implications for Australia.
Hong Kong was seized from China in the mid-nineteenth century
and was established as a free port. The free movement of goods and
capital has been the key to Hong Kong's success, both before and
after the 1949 Chinese Revolution. Although a separate Hong Kong
has been economically important for China, it regards the
territory's occupation by a foreign power as a national humiliation
and will not countenance anything it sees as interference in
China's right to govern Hong Kong as it sees fit.
Hong Kong has been economically transformed over the last thirty
years and now has a higher GDP per capita than Australia. Its
success has been based on acting as a conduit of expertise and
capital between China and the outside world, thus playing a key
role in China's recent economic growth. For many years there were
fears that when China assumed control it would kill the goose that
laid the golden egg. These fears subsided, however, when China
developed the principle of 'one country, two systems', under which
Hong Kong will maintain its separate economic and political system
under Chinese sovereignty. The main concern is not that there will
be an abrupt change of policy but that the culture of corruption
and guanxi (connections) in China will slowly undermine
the open conduct of business and legal affairs in the
territory.
While a free market enclave presents few major problems for the
Chinese leadership, it is less certain that it will be able to
tolerate an autonomous region with a culture of free political
expression. The British and Chinese Governments agreed to political
autonomy in the Joint Declaration of 1984 whose principles were
incorporated by China into its Basic Law for the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (SAR). The two governments, however,
interpreted the principles differently and the Tiananmen Square
massacre of 1989 led the people of Hong Kong to press for
guarantees of their political freedom after the handover. The last
Governor of Hong Kong, Mr Chris Patten, introduced some political
reforms in the early 1990s, most notably the introduction of
popular elections for the territory's Legislative Council (Legco).
The Chinese Government, however, has rejected these reforms as
inconsistent with the Joint Declaration and Basic Law and has
established an appointed Provisional Legislative Council which will
take over from the elected Legco on 1 July 1997. The limited
British reforms have proved too belated to make China feel obliged
to accept them.
Just as Britain neglected electoral reform until the last
moment, it did not extend its generally good record on respect for
civil liberties in the territory to include Hong Kong in the
international regime for the protection of human rights. Only after
the Tiananmen Square massacre was a Bill of Rights enacted in 1991.
China is not a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. The new Chief Executive of the Hong Kong SAR, Mr
Tung Chee-Hwa, appointed by China, has foreshadowed various
restrictions on political activity, although he appears to have
modified his proposals in response to criticism in Hong Kong. China
did agree to an independent-minded judge becoming the new Chief
Justice.
China will probably send contradictory signals about its
intentions on political and legal issues in Hong Kong, because of
uncertainty about how to deal with a unique arrangement and because
of divisions between reformers and conservatives within the Party
and the Army. A lot will depend upon the political adroitness of
the Chief Executive in balancing the demands of different factions
in Beijing with those of interest groups in Hong Kong.
Australia has a keen interest in the future of Hong Kong because
the territory is Australia's tenth largest merchandise trading
partner and important for investment and trade in services. There
is also a large movement of people between Hong Kong and Australia
because of growing migration in recent years (especially
professional and business people), including people who maintain
business links in the territory, as well as Hong Kong students in
Australia and a large two-way flow of tourists. Australia may face
the problem of people from Hong Kong overstaying tourist visas
after 1997. The controversy about China's installation of an
unelected Provisional Legislative Council, and the different
position on the issue taken by Australia, Britain and the US,
highlights the fact that political problems in Hong Kong after 1997
will not only potentially be a cause of friction between Australia
and China but may also have implications for Australia's other
relationships in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly with the
US.
There is a starkly contradictory character to opinions about the
future of Hong Kong after 1997, with most people confident about
economic prospects but few sanguine about the chances of preserving
existing standards on the rule of law and political freedoms. The
best prospects for Hong Kong lie in the fact that continued
prosperity in the territory is in China's interest and that the
Chinese leadership is keen to use Hong Kong as an example or 'trial
run' in its efforts towards reunification with Taiwan and in its
general foreign relations. It is critical that Beijing acts in the
realisation that the distinct character of Hong Kong means that it
must be governed differently from the rest of China or a mass
exodus of skilled people and capital will undermine the viability
of the territory.
On 1 July 1997 sovereignty over the British colony of Hong Kong
will be formally transferred to the People's Republic of China
(PRC). The territory is being returned to China on that date
because the British lease on the so-called New Territories, which
make up the majority of the land area of Hong Kong, expires after
ninety-nine years. Although sovereignty over Hong Kong Island and
Kowloon was ceded to the British Crown in perpetuity in 1841 and
1860 respectively, the British government decided that continued
possession of these small territories was not an option on either
political or economic grounds and the entire territory of Hong Kong
will be handed over to Beijing on 1 July.
The transfer of Hong Kong from British to Chinese sovereignty
has raised questions about the capacity of the territory to
maintain the economic performance which has seen it develop from a
backwater in the 1950s to a wealthy industrialised economy today.
Hong Kong has played a key role as a bridge between China and the
outside world and an important part in promoting the rapid
development of the Chinese economy since the reforms begun in 1978.
The question often posed, however, is whether integration into
China will undermine the very features, such as the rule of law and
a relatively open political system, which have made the territory
attractive as a destination for investment. The handover has also
aroused fears within Hong Kong and internationally that integration
into a China ruled by an authoritarian but increasingly uncertain
post-Maoist regime will bring to an end the political freedoms and
respect for the rule of law and human rights which the territory
has enjoyed under British rule. A deteriorating political and human
rights situation in Hong Kong after 1997 could lead to an outflow
of refugees and friction between China and other countries in the
Asia-Pacific region, especially the US. Such issues are of major
importance for Australia because Hong Kong is now a major trade and
investment partner and because political problems in the territory
would inevitably affect Australia's sensitive relationship with
China.
This paper outlines the background to the issues involved in the
handover of Hong Kong to China and why it is such an emotive
national issue for China. It discusses the importance of Hong Kong
in China's economic transformation and the likelihood that the
territory will continue to prosper after 1997. It also examines the
controversy between Britain and China over the reform of Hong
Kong's Legislature and the prospects for the protection of civil
liberties and human rights after 1997. It details the importance of
Hong Kong for Australia and the implications of any deterioration
in the political situation in the territory for Australia and the
region.
Hong Kong has played a central role in the history of China's
relations with the outside world and two particular aspects of that
history are crucial for an understanding of the issues surrounding
the transfer of the territory to China. The first is that the
colony was established as a free trading port, chosen for its deep
water harbour and designed not for territorial conquest but to open
up trade with the previously closed Chinese hinterland. The second
is that Hong Kong was ceded to Britain by force, against the wishes
of the then Chinese Empire.
A Free Port: The 'Gateway to China'
The character of Hong Kong as a free trade port was the impetus
for British activities in the territory from the very beginning and
defined its later roles as an entrepot port, manufacturing site and
financial centre. Before the 1840s, British merchants traded in
textiles and tea under strict control by Chinese imperial
authorities. But since the Chinese Government's ban on
opium-smoking made opium a very profitable trading commodity, there
was bound to be conflict when the Chinese attempted to suppress its
import. Chinese objections were overcome by the British Navy in the
'Opium Wars' of the 1840s and 1850s when the British established
Hong Kong as a permanent presence on the Chinese coast. Hong Kong
remained a significant trading port for British and other foreign
interests well into the twentieth century, but by the 1920s and
1930s was overtaken in importance by Shanghai.
The Chinese Revolution of 1949 confronted Hong Kong with a
potential crisis, but when the new Communist government decided, on
strategic grounds, not to take back what they regarded as
rightfully part of China, the territory underwent a new surge of
growth. An influx of wealthy Chinese refugees, especially from
Shanghai, provided the capital and expertise for new investment in
manufacturing industry. This development was based on exploitation
of the continuing stream of cheap Chinese labour and was encouraged
by the permissive policies of the British administration, which
maintained the free port tradition and imposed no tariffs on the
import or export of goods. Hong Kong also became the principal
gateway through which Communist China conducted its (limited)
financial and trade relations with the outside world. When China
began liberalising its economy after 1978, Hong Kong as a free
entry point for trade and finance became even more important to
China, providing a source of investment capital, technology and
marketing skills to help fuel China's rapid economic development
and growing foreign trade. In the 1990s, Hong Kong has been the
source of between 60 and 80 per cent of total direct foreign
investment in China.(1)
Imperialism, 'Unequal Treaties' and Chinese Sovereignty
Whatever its role as a conduit between China and the rest of the
world, the continued existence of Hong Kong as a separate territory
was regarded by successive Chinese governments, whether Imperial,
Nationalist or Communist, as a humiliating imposition forced upon
China at a time of weakness and tolerated only because of political
and/or economic necessity. The treaties on which British rule was
based were, in China's eyes, 'unequal' treaties which had no basis
in law or justice.(2) The Nationalist government made Hong Kong the
target of anti-British demonstrations during the 1920s and the
territory was the scene of mass unrest during China's Cultural
Revolution in the 1960s. For diplomatic and commercial reasons, the
Communist Government accepted the reality of the British occupation
of the territory, but always looked upon Hong Kong as a temporarily
separated part of China which would be returned to the motherland
at such time as the Chinese people decided to take it back.
The abiding sense of historical injustice which is part of the
official Chinese position on Hong Kong helps explain the continuing
disagreement and misunderstanding which has marked Sino-British
negotiations over the territory in recent years. Many Chinese
officials have long distrusted British intentions, in particular
harbouring fears that the British would leave Hong Kong stripped of
its wealth on their departure or that they were using the territory
to subvert the People's Republic and its values. These
undercurrents became especially evident when, in 1992, the last
British Governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, began reforms to
introduce a degree of popular representation into the colony's
governmental institutions. To the Chinese authorities these changes
were, at best, a breach of previous agreements between the two
sides to allow a smooth transition to Chinese rule or, at worst, an
attempt to provide subversive elements with an entry point into
post-1997 Chinese politics. The Chinese government's determination
not to allow the reforms to stand after 1997 are a reflection of
the fact that it feels no obligation to respect any unacceptable
political arrangements established by illegitimate foreign
occupiers of what was always rightfully Chinese soil.
The legacy of Hong Kong's history as a free port established by
the British against China's will is thus at the heart of the issues
which surround transfer of the territory to Chinese sovereignty
today. Hong Kong was able to survive as a viable entity separate
from China (without financial support from Britain) because its
people successfully capitalised upon the needs of the People's
Republic for a gateway to the outside world and as a source of
capital and expertise. Notwithstanding this role, the affront to
Chinese sovereignty implicit in Hong Kong's existence has meant
that the political issues involved in the transfer have been
difficult to resolve.
Hong Kong until the 1950s was something of an economic
backwater, but has since grown into a major manufacturing, trade
and services centre and was one of the first four 'newly
industrialising countries' or 'Asian tigers'(3) which set the
standards to which most other Asian developing countries now
aspire. In 1995 it had a GDP of over $US150 billion and a GDP per
capita of over $US24,000, which is even higher than Australia's. In
the last five years annual economic growth in Hong Kong has been
around 5 to 6 per cent.(4)
For many years there was concern in Hong Kong and amongst
international investors that China, with its languishing command
economy, was casting envious eyes on Hong Kong's continuing
economic success. The fear was that when Beijing assumed control,
its policies would destroy the very features which made the
territory so attractive for investment-that it would kill the goose
that laid the golden egg.
An Integrated Economy
As July 1997 drew closer, however, anxieties about the economic
effects of the Chinese takeover diminished. Just as Hong Kong
survived the formation of the People's Republic by becoming its
gateway to the world, so the territory has become even more
important to China since the economic reforms instituted by Deng
Xiaoping from 1978. From the early 1980s Hong Kong manufacturers
began to take advantage of China's new openness to establish
factories across the border in Guangdong province, making use of
China's cheap labour and land. For their part, the Chinese
authorities established four Special Economic Zones which provided
concessional tax and regulatory regimes aimed at attracting
capital, technology and expertise, particularly from Hong Kong,
Macao, Taiwan and other 'overseas Chinese' communities. Hong Kong
quickly became the largest source of direct foreign investment in
China and has continued to play such a role. From 1985 it became
China's largest trading partner and was only overtaken by Japan in
1993.(5)
These developments have in the process radically changed the
economic structure and role of Hong Kong. While manufacturing was
the mainstay of the Hong Kong economy during the 1960s and 1970s,
since the 1980s and the transfer of production to China, services
have become the most important sector, accounting for over 70 per
cent of GDP and employment.(6) Hong Kong is now the world's busiest
port, with re-export of goods to and from China predominating. The
territory provides a wide range of other services to China as it
continues to open to the world economy. As a leading commentator,
Michael Yahuda, expressed it:
In the absence of a legal culture on
the mainland ... it is hardly surprising that Hong Kong with its
internationally respected rule of law and with reliable and
efficient financial services has become the main base for the
conduct of business with China. The territory not only provides
China with the facility for myriad economic exchanges with the
outside world, but it is also a major centre of learning where
China's key international trade and investment organisations
acquire expertise and invaluable experience in dealing with the
many facets of the international economy.(7)
Thus Hong Kong has been effectively integrated into the economy
of China, especially southern China, supplying services crucial for
the mainland's transformation from an inward-looking command
economy to a major player on the world market.
'One Country, Two Systems'
Given the commitment by the post-Deng Xiaoping government to
continuing economic reform and the further integration of China
into the world economy, it is highly unlikely that Beijing would
take any policy actions which it knew would jeopardise the robust
economy of Hong Kong. From the time when the issue of Hong Kong's
future status was first raised during discussions with Britain in
the late 1970s, the Chinese government has affirmed that it would
follow the principle of 'one country, two systems', that is that
Hong Kong under Chinese sovereignty would maintain a separate
identity, a market-oriented economic system and its distinct 'way
of life'. The preservation of the existing economic structure of
Hong Kong is important for China because of the contribution the
territory makes to China's GDP and because it provides the
knowledge and institutions necessary to compete in the world market
that China currently lacks. But in addition to the direct economic
significance of Hong Kong, it is vitally important to Beijing that
integration of the territory is successful because the whole
exercise is being closely watched as a 'trial run' for the much
more substantial challenge of an eventual reunification with
Taiwan. The 'one country, two systems' idea was originally
developed as a solution to the Taiwan question and any major
economic problems for Hong Kong would hardly make unity with the
mainland an attractive prospect for the people of Taiwan.
Hong Kong will also benefit from what appears to be an improving
capacity on the part of economic policy-makers in Beijing to
control the cycles of the Chinese economy. China's economy since
the 1980s has been characterised by huge boom-bust cycles -
flurried investment leading to overheating, inflation and
bottlenecks, provoking the government to overly-strong corrective
measures which induced slumps and excess capacity, leading in turn
to expansionary measures which fuelled a further unsustainable
boom. In response to the overheating of 1993-94, however, the
Chinese government introduced reforms to monetary policy and
brought the economy to a 'soft landing' without adversely affecting
growth. Inflation, which peaked at 24 per cent in mid-1994, is
expected to be less than 6 per cent in 1997, but strong growth
rates of around 8 per cent are forecast for the next three
years.(8)
Guanxi, Corruption and Cronyism
While the Chinese authorities' intentions appear to be to cause
as little disruption to the economic life of Hong Kong as possible,
some commentators remain concerned that the closed and often
arbitrary culture of decision-making in China will inevitably
undermine the relatively open, legally-based system in Hong Kong
and that this will have an adverse effect on the territory's
economy. In China, in the absence of a clear rule of law, the
wheels of economic life are greased by guanxi, (political
and family connections), increasingly another name for corruption
and cronyism as getting rich has become the dominant credo in
post-Maoist China.(9) Family linkages and connections in government
were always crucial for money-making in Hong Kong, but the rule of
law and permissive rather than prescriptive regulations have made
Hong Kong more conducive for local and international business than
the mainland. There are signs, however, that with the approach of
July 1997 the culture of guanxi and corruption is already
becoming a feature of Hong Kong. The Independent Commission Against
Corruption (ICAC), established by the Hong Kong administration in
1972, estimated that the cost of 'gifts' and other payments to
facilitate business with the mainland added from 3 to 5 per cent to
operating costs.(10) One commentator, pessimistic about the long
term prospects for Hong Kong, argued that, after 1997:
... China will not change, and the
rule of officials rather than the rule of law will ultimately
dominate Hong Kong. As corruption becomes more commonplace, as the
'princelings' and other relatives of the politically powerful take
positions of responsibility in [Hong Kong] ... the success of the
territory will begin to slip and the efficient, laissez-faire
centre that we know will begin to dim.(11)
One Hong Kong lawyer expressed his concern that any
deterioration in the legal system would inevitably have adverse
effects on business. He argued that if individuals or firms were
unable to contest government actions in the courts they would turn
to well-connected individuals who could, giving 'enormous
employment to Mr. Fix-its' but undermining free and open
competition.(12) Thus any potential problems for Hong Kong's
currently robust economy in the transition to Chinese rule would
appear to lie not in an abrupt change in policy from Beijing or in
an end to the territory's role as an entry point for the
international market, but in a gradual erosion of the legal and
institutional structures and practices which have enabled the
territory to take advantage of the opportunities which were
historically open to it. The critical issues which will confront
Hong Kong after 1997 are therefore unlikely to be strictly economic
questions but will take a political, legal and constitutional
form.
We have seen that the special nature of Hong Kong as a free port
on the edge of a command economy allowed the territory to carve
itself a niche role as China's gateway to the world. Since the
reforms begun in 1978, Hong Kong's continued importance to the
Chinese economy has ensured that its free market economy will be
left intact after 1997. But while the existence of a capitalist
enclave presents no major problems for the People's Republic, the
government in Beijing will find it much more difficult to tolerate
recent trends in the political evolution of Hong Kong. While China
has gone through massive economic change in the last two decades,
its political structures remain relatively unchanged from the
Maoist era. Hong Kong, on the other hand, although ruled by an
unelected executive-led government, has long enjoyed a fairly open
political culture and a range of civil liberties unknown on the
mainland. Contrary to the common perception that the people of the
territory are interested only in business, there is a long
tradition of grass-roots and activist politics in Hong Kong.(13)
The huge outpouring of support for the pro-democracy movement
during the events in Beijing in June 1989 was a particular
indication that the people of Hong Kong valued political freedom as
well as wealth and were worried about their future under Beijing's
rule.
The persistent current of independent political activity in Hong
Kong, together with belated efforts by Governor Patten to increase
popular representation in the Hong Kong legislature, have ignited
fears in the authoritarian political establishment in Beijing that
the territory is a conduit for dangerous ideas. Hong Kong as a base
for subversion has been a longstanding feature of Chinese official
attitudes, but the return of Hong Kong is occurring at a time when
the debunking of Maoism and popular resentment about corruption and
nepotism has left the legitimacy of the Communist Party at its
lowest ebb and its leadership fearful of any additional element
putting pressure on the brittle and potentially unstable political
situation in China.(14)
Hong Kong's New Constitution: The Joint Declaration and the
Basic Law
When negotiations between Britain and China on the political
future of Hong Kong began in 1982, the British government's initial
proposal was that it should retain an administrative role in the
territory even after 1997. Such a position outraged the nationalist
sensibilities of the Chinese government and its outright rejection
caused widespread consternation within the territory about possible
unilateral action by the Chinese. During a series of tense
negotiations, however, the British conceded to the Chinese position
and, in September 1984, an agreement for the transfer of
sovereignty was signed in the form of a Joint Declaration.
According to the Declaration, China was to draft a Basic Law
embodying certain basic policies. These were that on 1 July 1997
Hong Kong would become a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the
People's Republic of China with a government 'composed of local
inhabitants'. The SAR would have 'a high degree of autonomy, except
in foreign and defence affairs' and its 'current social and
economic systems' and 'life-style', including civil liberties,
would be as at present. The SAR would retain its status as a free
port, a separate customs territory and monetary system and the
right to conduct its own economic relations with other countries
and with international organisations. Such arrangements were to
remain unchanged for fifty years.(15)
From the very beginning, however, the two sides had different
ideas about how the process would evolve. The British side saw the
drafting of the Basic Law as entirely a Chinese responsibility but
did not expect Beijing to begin the task immediately. The British
apparently assumed that there would be time between 1984 and 1997
for actual constitutional arrangements in the territory to
'converge' with the provisions of the Basic Law, including any
reforms the British government might have introduced. In the
Chinese view, on the other hand, the Basic Law should largely
reflect the state of political arrangements prevailing in the
territory in 1984. A further powerful element was introduced when
the negotiations came under intense pressure from the people of
Hong Kong following the mass anti-Beijing feeling generated by the
Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989. By the time the National
People's Congress of the PRC adopted the Basic Law in 1990, its
provisions on the structure of government and on political rights
had become the subject of controversy within the territory and
disagreement between the Chinese and British governments.(16)
Elected or Appointed Government?
In the first years following the signing of the Joint
Declaration in 1984 there were few points of disagreement between
Beijing and London. While there were likely to be differences over
the amount of popular representation in the Legislative Council,
both governments shared the view that an executive-led government
of appointed officials would prevail in the territory after 1997 as
it had under colonial rule. Both sides also worked with the
understanding that the people of Hong Kong were to be largely
excluded from negotiations over the transfer of sovereignty.
The British administration in Hong Kong has been based on the
effective exclusion of democratic participation in the government
of the territory. Supreme executive power is vested in the
Governor, advised by an Executive Council (Exco), wholly appointed
by the Governor himself, and most policy making is carried out by
the powerful civil service. Bills are submitted to a Legislative
Council (Legco) which, before 1985, was entirely appointed and
contained a majority of civil servants. In the wake of the signing
of the Joint Declaration, however, the British administration was
concerned to shore up its authority and legitimacy in the final
years of its rule and began to introduce an element of elected
representation in the Legco. In 1985 indirect elections through an
electoral college and functional constituencies (such as business
and professional groups) were held for 24 of the 56 seats in the
Legco, with the majority remaining official and appointed members.
In response to pressure for direct elections for the 1988 Legco
elections, the government conducted a review into the issue which
revealed a sharp division of opinion between business interests who
supported the status quo and liberal professional groups, led by
Martin Lee, who argued for at least 50 per cent direct
representation. The government's decision, in 1988, to postpone any
changes until the 1991 election was, in the view of many
commentators, largely swayed by strong pressure from China to
desist from further reform.(17)
In the meantime, the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 greatly
politicised the people of Hong Kong, leading to a collapse in
popular confidence about Beijing's intentions towards the territory
and increasing pressure on the government to bring about democratic
reform and measures to protect civil liberties and human rights. In
May 1989 one million people (one sixth of the entire population)
took part in a demonstration in support of the pro-democracy
movement in China and in June another million-strong demonstration
attacked the bloody crackdown and called for an end to the
government of Premier Li Peng. These events led to the formation of
Hong Kong's first formal political party, the liberal United
Democrats of Hong Kong led by Martin Lee.
The Hong Kong administration responded to the rise of popular
feeling in ways designed, on the one hand, to boost confidence that
the British government was defending the interests of the people of
the territory and, on the other, to maintain good relations with
the Chinese government. In December 1989, a British government
representative paid a secret visit to Beijing where he reassured
the Chinese authorities of Britain's commitment to the Joint
Declaration and promised that Hong Kong would not be allowed to
become a base for anti-Chinese subversion. In 1990 the Hong Kong
administration arrested and fined pro-democracy activists for petty
offences, invoking authoritarian colonial public order ordinances
aimed at quashing independent political activity. At the same time,
following secret negotiations between the British and Chinese
governments, it was announced that popular representation in the
Legco would be increased to 18 directly elected seats in the 1991
election, 20 in 1997, 24 in 1999 and 30 in 2003.(18) A clause
reflecting this agreement was incorporated into the Basic Law in
1990.(19) No change, however, was proposed for the executive arm of
government. The Executive Council continued as a fully appointed
body and the Governor maintained his supreme executive
position.
Pressure for political reform increased after the 1991 Legco
elections when 18 of the 20 directly elected seats were won by the
United Democrats and other liberal candidates. The new (and last)
Governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, therefore sought to increase
popular involvement in the political process while remaining within
the framework of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. In
October 1992 Patten proposed that in addition to 20 directly
elected seats, the functional constituencies would be elected by
the entire Hong Kong workforce of 2.7 million and there would be
direct elections to the territory's municipal bodies. Despite, or
perhaps because, the proposals were well-received in liberal
political circles in Hong Kong, the Chinese reacted extremely
negatively and accused the Governor of breaching the agreement that
any new arrangements should 'converge' with the Basic Law and of
attempting to magnify British influence and undermine Chinese
control after 1997. In a demonstrative move designed to highlight
its capacity to determine events in Hong Kong even before 1997,
Beijing stalled on arrangements for a huge new airport project by
refusing to honour certain contracts, thereby effectively delaying
its completion until after the handover. In a further assertion of
authority, the Chinese government, in June 1993, established the
Preliminary Working Committee (PWC) for the Preparatory Committee
of the SAR to be responsible for transitional political,
governmental and legal arrangements before and after 1997, the
so-called 'second stove'.(20)
Negotiations between Britain and China continued through 1993
but Beijing refused to countenance Patten's plans and abandoned its
original agreement for a 'through train' Legco which would remain
in place for 2 years after 1997. It declared that the reformed
Legco elected in the 1995 elections, where the Democrats emerged as
the largest party (including 16 of the 20 directly-elected seats),
would not continue after the transfer to Chinese sovereignty. The
Chinese government has in fact appointed a parallel Provisional
Legislature which will take over on 1 July 1997. Some commentators
have suggested that some members of the Legco may be included in a
post-1997 Legislature, but it is certain that none of the Democrats
or other liberal members would be amongst them, even though such
candidates won the highest votes in the poll.(21) Hong Kong will
thus revert to the old arrangement of a fully appointed Legislature
after July 1997.
The much-publicised efforts by the British administration in
Hong Kong to increase democratic participation in the government of
the territory therefore seem to be have been too little, too late.
Negotiations with China over the transfer of sovereignty began at a
time when non-official representation in the Legco was merely token
and confined to selected elite individuals. Once agreement had been
reached in 1984 to allow the Chinese government to draw up a Basic
Law, there was little that could be done to reform the system
outside the framework of the Law. The Provisional Legislature will
remain in place until 1998 or 1999 and although China is committed
to introducing, in two stages, a Legco with half its members
directly elected, it remains to be seen how such an arrangement
will actually operate in practice. The Chinese Foreign Minister has
said that elections would 'embody democratic, free and open
principles' and that anyone who met China's criteria would be
allowed to stand.(22) Eligibility could be restricted to a number
of specific parties or, more likely, candidates could be required
to swear allegiance to a restrictive pledge which would rule out
anyone likely to be critical of the SAR or Beijing authorities. The
future of genuinely elected government in Hong Kong is very much an
open question.
Protection of Human Rights
Most commentators have placed considerable stress on the rule of
law as one of the key advantages offered by Hong Kong for business
investment and thus an important element in its economic success.
The codification of laws to protect commercial activity from
arbitrary intervention has, however, not been matched by the
entrenchment of human rights in Hong Kong's legal framework.
Although the Hong Kong government has a good practical record in
the application of common law and protecting basic civil liberties,
efforts to guarantee these rights by placing the territory within
the emerging international human rights regime were, until recent
years, deliberately neglected so as to avoid offending Beijing.(23)
Unlike its other colonies, Britain excluded Hong Kong from the 1953
European Convention on Human Rights and from access to the European
Court of Human Rights. When Britain ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1976 it reserved
the right to restrict the application of the Covenant in Hong Kong
on matters such as imprisonment and deportation, freedom of
movement and residence, freedom of speech, association and
assembly, universal suffrage, elected legislatures and,
significantly, the right of self-determination for non-self
governing territories.
Mounting domestic and international concern about the need for
safeguards against human rights abuses after 1997 led the British
government to have the ICCPR included as an annex to the Joint
Declaration of 1984. But it was not until the upsurge of
politicisation in Hong Kong after the Tiananmen massacre of 1989
that the British government responded to demands to embody human
rights protection in domestic Hong Kong law by passing the Bill of
Rights Ordinance of 1991 (BORO). In order to prevent fears about
political repression in a future Hong Kong causing a flight of
professional people and capital from the territory, BORO, which
reflects the provisions of the ICCPR, was made justiciable before
Hong Kong's courts and was accorded primacy over other legislation.
The Hong Kong administration also appealed or amended colonial
emergency powers ordinances which conflicted with BORO.
It is uncertain, however, what practical effect these measures,
like the changes to Legco, will have after the transfer to Chinese
sovereignty. Any obligation on China's part to respect the
provisions of domestic Hong Kong law or international treaties
entered into on the territory's behalf by Britain is a matter of
interpretation. The British government, for example, considers that
the PRC will be obliged by Article 40 of the ICCPR to submit
reports to the UN Human Rights Committee on its efforts to protect
human rights in Hong Kong. China, however, is not a signatory to
the ICCPR and has not confirmed whether it will apply the Covenant
in Hong Kong or respect the reporting obligations. Chinese
government representatives argued that the introduction of a Bill
of Rights was unnecessary because the ICCPR was incorporated in the
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law and that therefore the PRC
might not recognise the primacy of BORO after 1997.
The possibility of a clampdown on civil liberties after July was
strengthened when China's National People's Congress voted, in
February 1997, that BORO would not have the power to override
legislation inconsistent with the ICCPR. The Congress also voted to
modify or repeal recent Public Order and Security ordinances
introduced by Governor Patten which liberalised Hong Kong's
previously draconian controls on political activity. Following this
decision, China's Chief Executive designate for Hong Kong, Tung
Chee-Hwa, circulated a paper on proposed legal changes under which
police permission would be required to hold demonstrations and
which would make it illegal for political organisations to accept
overseas funding or support. Tung was reported as saying that the
reforms introduced by Governor Patten had been 'very
unfortunate'.(24) The justification given for what represented a
reversion to colonial controls was that they were necessary to make
Hong Kong's post-1997 legislation consistent with the Basic Law. In
the face of a strong negative reaction in Hong Kong, Tung later
issued a revised draft law which eased some restrictions on
demonstrations but which retained the ban on foreign support for
parties, although allowing individuals to make contributions. One
of the first actions of the Provisional Legislative Council on 1
July will be to pass legislation which will make illegal any
demonstration deemed to be a threat to 'national security'.
Many leading political figures in Hong Kong, including members
of the elected Legco, fear that there will be little to prevent a
gradual erosion of civil liberties and access to legal redress,
both because of Chinese intentions and because of an unwillingness
to resist on the part of powerful business interests in Hong Kong.
Key Chinese leaders have indicated their uneasiness about an
environment of free criticism, including Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen, who said, in October 1996, that the media could 'put
forward criticism, but not rumours or lies. Nor can they put
forward personal attacks on the Chinese leaders.'(25) Confronted
with such attitudes, many business people have been reluctant to
risk the investment climate in Hong Kong by antagonising China over
human rights issues. The Chairman of the Hong Kong General Chamber
of Commerce, for example, was reported as observing that business
cared about 'rule of law for foreign disputes, not for protests and
students demonstrating'.(26) Some argue that signs of decline can
already be seen in a slow infusion of self-censorship in the
territory's media as major media proprietors appoint pro-Beijing
consultants to advise on likely official reactions to reports on
sensitive issues and previously strident critics of China have
fallen silent.(27) In a widely-noted case, a satirical comic strip
in the South China Morning Post, 'The World of Lily Wong',
which commented on China and its leaders, was removed from the
paper in 1995.(28) The issue is whether these developments indicate
simply a transitional uncertainty on both sides or are the
beginnings of serious and permanent change.
There are factors which may mitigate against a heavy-handed
intervention by the Chinese authorities. The first of these depends
on the degree of awareness amongst the Chinese leadership that Hong
Kong's economic success has been underpinned by political stability
and predictability. A nuanced understanding of the operation of a
relatively open political and legal environment would allow Beijing
to understand that free debate and criticism, along with judicial
limits to government action, need not be a threat to the Communist
Party's rule and has actually been part of the formula which has
made the territory an asset for China. Some commentators have seen
the appointment of an independent-minded judge, Andrew Li
Kwok-Nang, as the territory's new Chief Justice, rather than a more
pro-Beijing candidate, as an encouraging sign. An optimistic view
would say that, faced with the possibility that widespread popular
discontent with Chinese actions in Hong Kong might jeopardise this
asset, Beijing will keep its intervention in the territory's
political life to a minimum. Once again, a successful transition in
Hong Kong, as seen by the international community and the people of
Taiwan, will be important for China in its relations with the
Western world, especially the US, and in developing its economic
links and political relationship with Taiwan.
Many of China's actions, particularly in the early months and
years after the handover, may be uncertain and send contradictory
signals about the intentions of the Communist Party leadership.
This is partly because Beijing will be dealing with an entirely new
political environment, one which confronts few if any other
government in the world: exercising authority over a major economic
region which is autonomous in most respects and has developed its
own political and economic system after a hundred years of
separation. Secondly, a degree of inconsistency can also be
anticipated as ideological and regional divisions within the
Communist Party and the Army lead to policy reversals and differing
approaches by various arms of the Chinese state. While reformers
and modernisers in the Chinese political establishment can be
expected to see the political integration of Hong Kong as an
opportunity to strengthen the process of change in China, more
conservative elements look upon the territory as a symbol of the
subversion of traditional Chinese and Maoist values and as a
conduit for ideas undermining the leading role of the Party.
A great deal will depend on the capacity of the Chief Executive
of the Hong Kong SAR, Mr Tung Chee-Hwa, to balance the competing
demands of the various factions in the Party and the Army against
those of Hong Kong's business interests and the popular pressure
within the territory for maximum autonomy and the protection of the
rule of law and human rights. Tung will be faced with a number of
key decisions in the near future which will test his personal
strength in asserting the autonomy of the SAR and the extent to
which the Chinese authorities are willing to give it real meaning.
Decisions on the economy will include fixing the exchange rate of
the Hong Kong dollar, relations between Chinese and Hong Kong
financial institutions and drawing up a Budget without interference
from Beijing. Important political issues will include the
independence of the civil service, the suppression of corruption,
controls on the press and public demonstrations and elections to
the Legislative Council.
Australia has immediate and broadbased interests in a successful
transfer of sovereignty in Hong Kong. Hong Kong's importance in
Australia's trade and investment flows gives Australia a direct
stake in the maintenance of healthy economic growth in the
territory. Australia cannot afford political unrest during or after
the handover or a collapse in confidence in the local or
international business community. The issue of Hong Kong is of
course intimately connected with Australia's relations with China,
one of the country's most important but often difficult
relationships and one which inevitably has implications for key
regional connections such as the US and Japan.
Trade and Investment
Hong Kong in 1995 was Australia's tenth largest trading partner,
accounting for 2.6 per cent of Australia's total merchandise trade,
while Australia, as Hong Kong's fourteenth largest partner,
accounted for 1.1 per cent of the territory's merchandise trade.
Two-way trade has grown substantially in recent years (reaching
over $4 billion in 1995) and become more diversified, with a
gradual shift away from the predominance of primary products in
Australia's exports. Testimony to the economic integration of Hong
Kong with China is provided by the fact that an estimated one
quarter of Australia's merchandise exports are re-exported to
China.(29) An especially important development has been the growth
in the trade in services, especially in education and tourism but
also in insurance, consultancy, legal services, finance and
banking. Estimates of the value of this trade reach as high as $1
billion. In 1996 it was estimated that there were over 12,000
students from Hong Kong in Australian educational institutions.
Around 280,000 Australians visited Hong Kong as tourists in 1995
and about 167,000 tourists visited Australia from Hong
Kong.(30)
Australian investment in Hong Kong stood at around $3.22 billion
in 1995, while Hong Kong investment in Australia had reached $14.5
billion. Hong Kong is Australia's sixth largest destination for
overseas investment, with interests in manufacturing, insurance,
banking, telecommunications, construction and industrial
processing. Hong Kong was the fourth largest source of foreign
investment in Australia in 1995, with 90 per cent in portfolio
investment and 10 per cent in the form of direct investment.
People-to-People Links and Migration
A key aspect of the relationship which has developed between
Australia and Hong Kong in recent years is the two-way movement of
people between the territory and Australia. Each year about half a
million people travel between Australia and Hong Kong.(31) In
addition to tourist visits and the numbers of student who have been
coming to Australia for many years, there is a large community in
Hong Kong with Australian connections. There are around 30,000
Australian citizens resident in Hong Kong, together with at least
2000 holders of Australian permanent residency.
The question of emigration has become an increasingly prominent
topic of discussion in Hong Kong as the time for the handover to
China has approached and many people in the territory have acted to
secure residence rights in other countries. Australia, along with
the US, UK and Canada, has been one of the sought-after
destinations for resettlement from Hong Kong. There are at present
nearly 90,000 Hong Kong-born Australian citizens and permanent
residents in Australia. Numbers steadily increased from 28,000 in
1986, with the peak of arrivals (16,000) occurring from 1990-91 to
1991-92.(32) The majority of migrants from Hong Kong are
well-educated and in professional, managerial or business
occupations and some of whom have brought substantial amounts of
capital for investment in Australia.(33) Some migrants from Hong
Kong have settled their family in Australia but continue to work in
the territory or maintain close business links there - the
so-called 'astronauts'.
Hong Kong and Australia-China Relations
Australia has major interests in the viability of Hong Kong as a
special economic and political entity within China, but even
greater interests in maintaining and developing close relations
with China itself. Balancing the demands of the Australia-China
relationship against the interests of the people of Hong Kong will
present unique problems for Australian foreign policy.
From the late 1980s, as the economic relationship between
Australia and Hong Kong began to enlarge rapidly, Australia
developed a policy on Hong Kong which emphasised its separateness
from both Britain and China. Australia supported Hong Kong's
accession to the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a
separate contracting party in 1985 and its membership of the
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) in 1990. Most
importantly, Australia played an important role in having Hong
Kong, along with Taiwan, granted entry into the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) on the basis that APEC was a
group of 'economies' rather than states. Membership of these
international organisation was important for establishing a
practical framework for Hong Kong's operation as a separate
economic region after 1997, as well as bolstering confidence that
other aspects of Hong Kong's separateness, notably the rule of law
and political freedoms, might also be respected. Australia's
closeness to the Hong Kong issue was highlighted when Governor
Patten visited Australia in 1994 as part of his tour of a number of
Asia-Pacific countries to build regional support for his political
reforms in the territory.
Although it appears that maintaining a separate economic
relationship with the Hong Kong SAR will not present problems for
Australia's relations with China, there is potential for
controversy over political and human rights issues which may well
emerge after 1997. This has already been made clear over the issue
of the China's installation of an appointed Provisional Legislative
Council and Australia's attendance at its opening ceremony on 1
July 1997. The British Government criticised China's action in
creating the new Council as contrary to the Joint Declaration and
the Basic Law and the US State Department called the move
'unjustified and unnecessary'.(34) Australia's response was,
however, subdued, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr
Alexander Downer, stating that it was 'disappointing that China and
Britain were unable to agree' on arrangements enabling the elected
Legco to continue over the handover period.(35) The US and Britain
have also announced that they will not be officially represented at
the ceremony while the Australian Government has decided to attend.
There are no indications that other countries in the region, such
as Japan or ASEAN members, or any European countries will boycott
the ceremony.
Critics have argued that the Australian Government's position is
contrary to its stated commitment to promote human rights
internationally and that the observance of human rights in China
would assist its integration into the region.(36) This criticism
was given weight by the fact that the leader of the most
widely-supported party in Hong Kong, Mr Martin Lee, condemned the
decision to appoint a Provisional Legislative Council and after
appealing to the Australian Government to join a boycott of the
opening ceremony, said that the decision to attend had 'sacrificed
Hong Kong for trade with China'.(37) A public opinion poll taken in
Hong Kong in mid-June found that only 7 per cent of respondents
thought that the appointed Council would serve their interests
better than the elected Legco.(38) Other commentators have
contended that the Australian Government was pushed into such a
position because some ill-considered policy actions affecting China
during 1996 jeopardised the relationship with the Chinese
Government.(39) They argue that the Government has been forced to
go to extreme lengths to placate China, thus reducing the space for
a flexible response on sensitive issues relating to Hong Kong.(40)
The Government's stance on the issue, according to Mr Downer, is
that it was 'not in Australia's interest or in Hong Kong's
interest' for the handover ceremonies to be affected by such a
controversy and that China was more effectively engaged by a
cooperative approach.(41) The Chinese Government has agreed to an
Australian proposal to conduct a regular dialogue on human rights
between the two countries, the first meeting of which is planned
for August.
The controversy about the opening of the Provisional Legislative
Council, although arguably not a major issue in itself, is symbolic
of the kind of difficulties which may develop if there are
significant political problems in Hong Kong after the handover. If
major unrest grows in the territory and Beijing reacts by arresting
pro-democracy campaigners or suppressing demonstrations and other
protests, severe strains might be placed on Australia's policy of
not directly criticising China on human rights. As the Provisional
Legislative Council question showed, such matters have the capacity
not only to affect relations with China but also to reveal
differences with the US, Australia's other key partner in the
region. President Clinton's emphasis on human rights issues has
been moderated in his second term, but stills stands in contrast to
the Australian Government's more low-key approach.(42)
The possibility that political repression or violence might
cause a flood of refugees from Hong Kong has haunted discussions
about the territory for many years. For many Hong Kongers, the
prospect that they might have to flee the territory is clearly
still in their minds. The June opinion poll found that 4 out of 10
respondents would seek to leave if conditions in the territory
deteriorated. The number of people in a position to emigrate is
uncertain, with between 300,000 and 500,000 having valid travel
documents. Surveys have shown that up to 20 per cent of the
territory's population of over 6 million have overseas family
connections which could allow them entry into other countries.(43)
Australia would be a preferred destinations for many emigrants and
a problem for the Australian Government could develop if
significant numbers of Hong Kong residents were to enter Australia
on tourist visas and remain in the country illegally after their
visas expired. A large outflow of people from the territory could
potentially become a major regional problem, with implications for
China's integration into the region and its relations with
Australia, the US and other countries in the Asia-Pacific and
Europe.
There is a starkly contradictory character to opinions about the
future of Hong Kong after 1997. Business people and economists,
looking at Hong Kong's continuing integration into a booming
Chinese economy and all the signs that Beijing will not tamper with
the territory's market economy, are optimistic about future growth
and prosperity. On the political front, however, there are few
people who are sanguine about the prospects for preserving the same
standards on freedom of speech, rule of law and general respect for
human rights that Hong Kong enjoyed under British rule. Given
recent Chinese moves, many people are also pessimistic about the
chances of maintaining the limited democratisation which was
introduced by the British Government in its final years of
authority. Even leading business people, who speak confidently
about the future so long as Beijing's ground rules are observed,
are said to keep their foreign passports close at hand. The June
opinion poll found that 92 per cent of respondents thought that
corruption would adversely affect Hong Kong's economic performance
after the handover.(44)
The strongest argument in favour of a successful economic and
political transition is that it is in the interests of the Chinese
Government for Hong Kong to remain prosperous and politically
stable. Hong Kong is still very important for the Chinese economy
and demonstrated success in the Hong Kong example is crucial for
China's plans to effect an eventual reunification with Taiwan and
Macau. China is also aware that the eyes of regional countries such
as Japan, the US and the international community as a whole will be
focused closely on the new Hong Kong SAR after July 1997. The
provisions in the Basic Law which guarantee Hong Kong's separate
identity under the 'one country, two systems' formula indicate that
the Chinese leadership understands the importance of protecting the
territory's institutions in maintaining its viability.
The principal source of concern about the future of Hong Kong
relates not to the immediate prospects for the maintenance of
economic growth but to the protection of political freedoms and
respect for legal institutions such as an independent judiciary and
the rule of law. Such arrangements are foreign to the political
culture of Beijing and are regarded in many quarters as dangerous
and subversive. This applies not only to conservatives who resent
the displacement of pure Maoist ideology with the worship of wealth
and consumerism, but also to reformers who fear that the leading
role of the Party (including the privileged position of themselves
and their families) is coming under threat from the liberal ideas
championed in Hong Kong.
There is clearly an awareness within ruling circles in China
that the political distinctiveness of Hong Kong must be recognised
for symbolic reasons and because of perceptions in Taiwan, the US
and elsewhere. On the other hand, the idea that the legal and
political institutions and culture in the territory have been
genuinely important in underpinning Hong Kong's economic
achievements does not appear to be universally accepted,
particularly given China's recent economic growth under an
authoritarian regime. Hong Kong, however, has been separated from
China for over a century and cannot be governed as if were just
another Chinese city. An upsurge in unrest in the territory due to
political repression would unsettle its image as a secure place for
investment and any major instability would see a flood of
emigration and a loss of the skills, expertise and capital which is
the territory's main resource. Integrating Hong Kong will be one of
the key tasks facing the Chinese state as it attempts to deal with
the social and political effects of the country's continuing
economic transformation and will challenge the political will of
the reformers who may find the issue being used by conservative
elements in the Party and the Army to regain political
ascendancy.
The coming months and years will be a critical time for Hong
Kong and will call for close attention from policy-makers in the
countries of the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. In Australia's
case, it has significant interests in the Hong Kong's viability and
relations with China are becoming a increasingly central part of
the country's foreign policy, at both the bilateral and regional
level. Hong Kong will be one of the major tests for the Australian
Government's efforts to develop an independent diplomatic position
in Asia, balancing demands created by issues in trade, human rights
and security.
- Michael Yahuda, Hong Kong: China's Challenge, London,
1996, p.24.
- According to a recent Chinese account, the handover of Hong
Kong was 'a scene of humiliation and agony inflicted by foreigners
that has seared into the hearts of all 1.2 billion Chinese people'.
See Liu Shuyong, 'History of Hong Kong: A completely objective
account of how Hong Kong was stolen from China', China
Today, Feb. 1997, pp.29-32.
- Along with South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore.
- DFAT, Country Economic Brief. Hong Kong: November
1995, pp.8-11.
- Yahuda, op. cit., p.24.
- Clyde Haulman, 'Asia-Pacific Economic Links and the Future of
Hong Kong', Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, no.547, Sep 1996, pp.154-55.
- Yahuda, op. cit., p.25.
- East Asia Analytical Unit, China Embraces the Market:
Achievements, Constraints, Opportunities, Canberra, 1997,
pp.128-31. Sydney Morning Herald, 11 April 1997.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, David Newman, Alvin Rabushka, Red
Flag Over Hong Kong, Chatham NJ, 1996, pp.137-38.
- Yahuda, op. cit., p.129.
- Haulman, op. cit., pp.160-61.
- Business Week, 9 June 1997, p.51.
- Michael Degolyer & Janet Lee Scott, The Myth of Political
Apathy in Hong Kong, Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 547, Sep 1996, pp.68-78.
- Lo Shui Hing, 'Democracy Movement in Hong Kong and Its
Implications for South China', Journal of Contemporary
Asia, vol. 27, No. 2, 1997, pp.198-216.
- Paul Bowers, Hong Kong: The Final Stages, Research
Paper 96/104, House of Commons Library, 1996, Text of the Joint
Declaration, reproduced as Appendix 1
- Frank Ching, 'Toward Colonial Sunset: The Wilson Regime,
1987-92', in Ming Chan (ed.), Precarious Balance: Hong Kong
between China and Britain 1842-1992, New York, 1994,
pp.176-182.
- Brian Martin, Hong Kong in Transition, Parliamentary
Research Service Research Paper No. 9, 1994, pp.13-14.
- ibid., pp.16-17.
- Annex II to The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, in
International Legal Materials, Vol. XXIX, No. 6, Nov.
1990.
- The 'second stove' referred to a metaphorical tale in which a
newly-married young couple set up a second stove in the parental
kitchen as a way of asserting their independence.
- Bowers, op. cit., p.20.
- Dow Jones News/Retrieval World Report, 23 May 1997.
- Nihal Jayawickrama, 'The Bill of Rights', in Raymond Wacks
(ed.), Human Rights in Hong Kong, Oxford, 1992,
pp.63-65.
- Sydney Morning Herald, 7 May 1997, p.21.
- Bowers, op. cit., p.14.
- Business Week, 9 June 1997, p.51.
- Business Week, 9 June 1997, pp.50-53.
- Khergamvala, 'Media, asked to bend, chose to crawl', The
Hindu (Madras), 10 June 1997.
- Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade,
Hong Kong: The Transfer of Sovereignty, Canberra, 1997,
p.104.
- ibid., p.105.
- Canberra Times, 23 May 1997, p.7.
- Figures supplied by the Department of Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs.
- Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade,
Hong Kong: The Transfer overeignty, Canberra, 1997,
p.113.
- The Age, 23 December 1996, p.4.
- Sydney Morning Herald, 23 December 1996.
- Age, 17 June 1997, p.15. Australian, 17 June
1997, p.14.
- Australian, 13 June 1997, p.1. Weekend
Australian, 14 June, 1997, p.10.
- Sydney Morning Herald, 18 June 1997, p.8.
- For an account of the friction in Australia-China relations
during 1996 see Stephen Sherlock, Australia's Relations with
China: What's the Problem, Parliamentary Information and
Research Services Current Issues Brief, No. 23, 1996-97.
- See for example, Ian McPhedran, 'Policy now rests on
kowtowing', Canberra Times, 16 June 1997.
- Age, 14 June 1997, p.2.
- For a discussion of US-China relations see Frank Frost, The
United States and East Asia: Containment or Engagement?,
Parliamentary Research Service Current Issues Brief No. 5,
1996-97.
- Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade,
Hong Kong: The Transfer of Sovereignty, Canberra, 1997,
pp.111-112. Florence Chong, 'Passports proliferate as HK residents
ponder 1997', Australian, 7 May 1997, p.66.
- Sydney Morning Herald, 18 June 1997, p.8.