

**THE NEED TO DISMANTLE OR REFORM MULTICULTURALISM**  
Submission to the Inquiry into Multiculturalism in Australia  
Joint Standing Committee on Migration  
Parliament House  
Canberra ACT, Australia

by

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*Introduction and terms of reference*

I am an expatriate Australian citizen who has worked in Europe for the last twenty years, part of the Australian diaspora discussed in the Terms of Reference for this Inquiry. I am also a political scientist educated at Sydney and Griffith Universities, followed by research and teaching in Europe and the U.S. One of my research fields is the impact of ethnic diversity on social cohesion and public goods. I have published and taught extensively on the subject.

Given this background I thought I would have something to offer the Inquiry, to give something back to Australia. I expected my research to be relevant to an inquiry into multiculturalism. The opening words of the Inquiry's Terms of Reference seem to confirm that: "The Joint Standing Committee on Migration shall inquire into the economic, social and cultural impacts of migration in Australia and make recommendations to maximise the positive effects of migration." (<http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/mig/multiculturalism/tor.htm>) However I can find nothing else in the document that asks open questions about the success of multiculturalism, about its impact on Australia. Respondents are not asked to volunteer their concerns or ideas in general but to respond to a small number of narrow issues, such as: "The role of multiculturalism in the Federal Government's social inclusion agenda". No link is provided to that agenda.

My initial thought was that perhaps I could not assist the Inquiry. However statements by the Chair, Ms Maria Vamvakinou MP, indicate otherwise. Near the beginning of her press release of 17 February 2011 she stated: "Australia is a diverse society – it is part of who we are as Australians both in the city and the bush. Some European leaders have suggested that multiculturalism has failed in Europe. The lessons from Europe are important, but multiculturalism in Australia . . . is quite different." It is puzzling that the Chair of an Inquiry

would preempt some of the most important issues regarding the Inquiry's investigations. Nevertheless the issues of identity and diversity and their interaction fall squarely within my field of research.

The video presentation by Ms Vamvakinou, posted on 17 February, follows the same pattern. "[W]e hope that the inquiry will allow us to reaffirm the benefits of migration to Australia and in particular look at multiculturalism as a policy." That is as close as the talk comes to inviting spontaneous assessments of immigration and multiculturalism. It is as if the committee is afraid to ask. Given the declared crisis of multicultural policies overseas in societies that resemble Australia in economic level and culture, it seems to me appropriate for the Inquiry to put the policy of multiculturalism on the table. It is remarkable that an Inquiry into a subject of controversy overseas and in Australia did not call for submissions about the complaints involved. It is extraordinary that Islam is not mentioned and that there was no call for academic input.

More appropriate terms of reference, I think, would have asked for, in addition to responses to specific issues, spontaneous evaluations and observations about multicultural policy and especially about the impact it is having on Australians in general. The emphasis should not have been solely be on the welfare of migrant communities. In a democracy all policies, including immigration and ethnic affairs, should primarily serve the interests of the majority or be consistent with those interests. The majority should at least have the opportunity to influence policies that affect their interests.

In this submission I evaluate multiculturalism based on my knowledge of relevant social science research. While acknowledging the appropriateness of governments providing for the special needs of immigrant communities, in this submission I address the more important issue of whether multiculturalism serves the interests of the Australian population as a whole and in particular the historical Australian nation.

#### *The growing cost of diversity in Australia*

The Committee Chair stated in launching this Inquiry (Press Release of 17 February 2011) that while multiculturalism had failed overseas "multiculturalism in Australia . . . is quite different". The overseas failure, announced by a number of European leaders, involved social polarization, residential segregation, persistent socio-economic inequality, disproportionate crime rates by some immigrant communities, the special problem of sexual abuse of young white women and girls, and escalating conflict including no-go areas for whites, severe rioting and terrorism. The European leaders criticised multiculturalism for encouraging immigrants to retain values that run counter to those of the native population.

The immediate issue is Islamic immigration. Switzerland has banned the construction of minarets and the French have banned the head scarf. German prime minister, Angela Merkel, has come under pressure to abandon multiculturalism and has made some gestures in that direction, including her recent statement that attempts to build a multicultural society in Germany have utterly failed, that expecting people to live side by side and enjoy one another's differences does not work. She continued that immigrants must respect Germany's Christian beliefs (<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451>, accessed 7 April 2011). Actually Merkel remains pro-immigration but seeks to please an electorate increasingly suspicious of rising diversity. A recent book by a senior banker, Thilo Sarrazin, criticizes Islamic immigration for being a drain on Germany's high tech economy and for showing high rates of welfare dependency and crime (Sarrazin 2010). The rising criticism of

multiculturalism in Europe is really directed at the diversity produced by Third World immigration in general and Islamic communities in particular.

These examples indicate that European and Australian conceptions of multiculturalism are not very different. Both see it as a rejection of assimilation, the encouragement of immigrant communities to preserve their traditional ways of life, a celebration of diversity of ethnicities and cultures within the same state, and as the increase of diversity through immigration unrestricted by ethnicity. There are also associated normative values – that it is illegitimate for a receiving (Western) nation to impose its culture on immigrants because the latter have a legitimate interest in preserving their cultures, that diversity is superior to homogeneity (in Western societies), and that it is illegitimate for the host nation to act to preserve its own ethnic identity by restricting immigration. The last attracts the accusation of racism. Furthermore multiculturalists claims that Western nations have no legitimate ethnic identity and are instead “proposition nations” standing for ideals stated in their constitutions or other founding documents.

It is possible that Australian and European conceptions of multiculturalism are similar but that Australia has managed to avoid the problems experienced elsewhere. Is that the case? This is an important question in assessing multiculturalism because the policy was introduced partly as a means of harmonizing inter-ethnic relations. In fact Australia has witnessed escalating communal conflict after almost 40 years of multiculturalism. Consider some examples.

In 2005 Australian-born Lebanese youths showed misogynous and aggressive behaviour at Cronulla Beach culminating in a severe assault on two surf life savers. This provoked a protest rally and riot which targeted individuals of Middle Eastern appearance, responded to in turn by widespread attacks on people and property by Lebanese-Australian youths. Although there have been no successful terrorist attacks on Australian soil, attempted terrorism in the last several years has been motivated largely by Islamic jihadism. Since 2003 fifteen Australian Muslims have been convicted of planning five terrorist attacks ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism\\_in\\_Australia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism_in_Australia), accessed 7 April 2011).

Both sides of politics have been playing the ethnic card in electoral politics for years. To give just one example, in the 2007 federal elections the Labor Party extended its usual appeal to the migrant vote to win over Asian voters in John Howard’s seat of Bennelong (<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2007/12/12/1197135558234.html?page=2>). Campaigning combined affiliative and aggressive ethnic signals. Ethnic Chinese and Korean campaigners were deployed by Labor headquarters specifically to win over voters of the same ethnicity. At the same time voters were reminded of Howard’s view that high Asian immigration was ill advised during times of recession. He made the remark in 1988, almost 20 years earlier. The Liberal Party has also tried its hand at ethnic politics, beginning with Malcolm Fraser’s employment of Al Grassby as commissioner for community relations in the 1970s. The racialisation of politics in Australia is widespread and indeed an intrinsic component of multiculturalism as discussed further below.

Inequality in Australia increasingly has an ethnic face. Aborigines continue to occupy the lowest rung on the socio-economic ladder. Despite the points system for assessing immigrants, some ethnic minorities have high rates of unemployment and criminality. Many white Australians are losing out to competition from immigrants. Selective public schools show spectacular overrepresentation of Chinese and other Asian students, an imbalance that

feeds through to elite universities and thence to the professions (Wilkinson 2007). Ethnic socioeconomic stratification is growing as the population becomes more diverse.

Other examples of the dysfunctions of diversity, as promoted by multiculturalism, are ethnic branch stacking in the Labor Party (Allan 2002; M. Wilkinson 1994), the racist pack rapes of young Australian women in 2000 (<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/07/13/1026185124700.html>, accessed 7 April 2011), and the rise of criminal ethnic gangs. Indeed, the “father of multiculturalism” himself, Al Grassby, was intimately involved with the Calabrian Mafia based in Griffith. The crime organization funded his election campaigns. His closest associate was Toni Sergi, identified in court and parliament as the man who ordered the murder of anti-drugs campaigner and member of parliament Donald McKay in 1977. Grassby then gave political cover to the assassination. He was paid \$40,000 by the Mafia to circulate a document that alleged Mackay’s wife and son had organised his murder. Grassby was a long-time agent of influence for the Mafia. When in office as Minister for Immigration Grassby hampered a National Crime Authority investigation into organised crime and facilitated the entry to Australia of Mafia criminals (Keith Moor, “Grassby Crimes Cover-up”, *The Herald Sun*, 9 May 2005; <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/ex-cop-links-labor-with-mafia/story-e6frg6o6-111118782228>, accessed 7 April 2011; <http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/monuments-to-honesty-and-deceit-20090215-881s.html?page=-1>, accessed 6 April 2011). Thus from its inception multiculturalism in Australia was associated with corruption.

The examples surveyed here indicate that multiculturalism in Australia is failing to deliver on its promise of making diversity workable. Indeed, it appears to be an example of diversity’s dysfunction.

#### *The cost of diversity in other countries*

Why is multiculturalism failing wherever it is tried? The answer indicated by above examples from Australia is that it fails because it frees government to increase diversity through immigration. When governments are constrained to foster assimilation and preserve national identity, they choose immigrants who are readily assimilable. They are freed from that constraint by multiculturalism’s promise to solve the diversity problem.

This interpretation assumes that diversity is a significant risk factor. The remainder of this section reviews evidence that ethnic and religious diversity have multiple invidious and economic effects.

*Trust.* Ethnic homogeneity increases solidarity and trust. This is confirmed in studies of ethnic mafias, ethnic middleman trading groups, dissidents in authoritarian regimes, and nationalist freedom fighters (Salter 2002a). Solidarity and trust facilitate joint ventures that are too risky for isolated individuals to undertake. Organised crime is just one example of such risky transactions. Another is ethnic monopolies in lucrative but risky sectors of the economy. Cohesive minority groups can dominate economically despite the presence of well developed contract law, contrary to the tenets of established free-market economics (Landa 2009). These are social costs of diversity.

The connection between ethnic homogeneity and trust was confirmed by Harvard professor Robert D. Putnam who tested the hypothesis with majority ethnic groups (Putnam 2007). His study of 30,000 Americans from diverse social settings found that rising diversity lowers general social trust, not only of other ethnic groups but of one’s own, for example of political leaders and the local shopkeeper. Putnam found that as diversity increases, for example due to immigration, altruism and community cooperation decline and people have

fewer friends. They feel more politically powerless, vote less often (in America voting is not compulsory), have less confidence in local government and news media, but engage more in protest marches. They work less on community projects, give less to charity, volunteer less, spend more time watching television, feel less happy and have a lower perceived quality of life. Research in Australia has confirmed the deleterious effect of diversity with regard to volunteering (Healy 2007).

*Public altruism.* Public altruism – help and cooperation shown towards strangers of one's own society – can be measured by the generosity of welfare in democracies, because the electorate decides which welfare policy to support. A symposium that tested this prediction in 1999 found much empirical support for it and also made some unexpected findings.

In global comparison welfare rights negatively correlate with ethno-religious diversity. The latter explains 24 - 32 percent of the global variation in welfare rights (Sanderson and Vanhanen 2004, p. 120). Welfare has complex origins and influences including the peculiarities of national history, religious and cultural differences, and the power of organised labour. So it is extraordinary that a quarter of the variation in welfare generosity is explained by one variable. A predictable consequence is that relatively homogeneous societies also experience less inequality due to greater redistribution of income.

Diversity also depresses giving to charitable causes. James Schubert and Michael Tweed of Northwestern University compared how local communities across the U.S. gave to the charity The United Way. They found a low but significant negative correlation between per capita giving and ethnic diversity. There was a threshold effect. Giving did not begin to fall until minorities reached about 10% of the population.

An observational study of begging helped narrow the search for the behavioural causes of the welfare and charity findings (Butovskaya *et al.* 2004). Marina Butovskaya of the Russian Academy of Sciences and colleagues observed street beggars in Moscow and asked them about the size of the donations they received. Ethnic Russians, who constituted the majority of passersby, donated more to beggars of their own ethnic group than to two minority groups.

Diversity can also degrade governance. Governments of diverse societies with weak legal and democratic institutions tend to make poor decisions because policy is used to serve sectional interests rather than benefit the overall economy (Easterly and Levine 1997; Masters and McMillan 2004). So long as Australia retains strong institutions it will hopefully avoid this trend. However, a danger sign is that diversity attacks the integrity of institutions that are meant to rise above sectional interests. For example, in a cross-national study economist Paolo Mauro's (1995) found that ethnic diversity correlates negatively with institutional efficiency (0.38), political stability (0.41), bureaucratic efficiency (0.28), and positively with corruption (0.31), all significant at the 1% level. The cross-national study by Easterly and Levine (1997) also found that diversity correlates with corruption and the breakdown of rule of law and democracy. Economists Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore's (2003) cross-national study found that diverse societies are generally run less well and are less prosperous than more homogeneous ones. Furthermore, when geographically clustered minorities get the chance provided by the introduction of democracy, they often prefer to secede to form their own relatively homogeneous nation with themselves as the ethnic majority. These new nations then rise in stability, happiness and wealth compared to the original multi-ethnic state. They spend more on welfare and suffer from less inequality.

Further evidence that the industrial West is not immune to the negative impact of diversity came from Masters and McMillan's (2004) study which found that diversity depresses a country's giving to foreign aid, which comes mainly from wealthy industrial societies. One measure of ethnic diversity accounts for 80% of the variation in foreign aid giving. Relatively homogeneous countries are the most generous global citizens. This confirms the hypothesis that diverse societies are less able to build and maintain public goods, large public projects such as foreign aid, generous welfare provisions, or fair and rational government.

*Civil war.* Rising diversity can have more serious effects than reducing welfare and boosting organised crime. Tatu Vanhanen, Professor emeritus in political science at Finland's University of Tampere, compared disturbances in 183 states in the period 1990-1996 at the height of post-Cold War ethnic conflicts (Vanhanen 1999). He found that ethnic conflict correlated 0.740 with degree of ethnic diversity, accounting for 54% of the variance, much stronger than the correlations with GDP/capita (-0.294) or level of democracy (-0.281), which accounted for only 8.6% and 7.9% respectively of the variance. Vanhanen found a weaker but still robust correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and violent conflict in general of 0.468, accounting for 22% of the variance. A historical confirmation of Vanhanen's analysis was presented by Rudolf J. Rummel, professor emeritus in political science at the University of Hawaii (1997). Rummel studied civil violence of all kinds, not only ethnic conflict, between 1932 and 1982. He found that degree of ethno-religious diversity accounted for 21% of the variance in communal violence such as guerrilla and civil wars.

Ethnic diversity is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for ethnic conflict. Other factors can be more important. For example Rummel found that the level of democracy was more influential in moderating general violence than was ethnic diversity. People are less likely to resort to violence to end grievances when they have recourse to democratic mechanisms. However it is also true that the risk of communal violence between ethnic groups rises with the degree to which a society is ethnically mixed and that diversity tends to undermine democratic institutions. That is why diverse societies are vulnerable to external shocks such as war and recession, more prone to spiral into civil conflict.

Diversity has also caused conflict due to incompatible religions. A well known example is the ongoing clash between Hindu nationalists and Muslims in India, often over contested religious sites (Vanhanen 1991). Australia was founded as a Christian society and largely remains so, with continuities evident in contemporary worship as well as secular values, often unacknowledged. The Church was a major source of inspiration for the development of liberal conscience and institutions, beginning early in Church history. Christendom's enforcement of monogamy was a ground-breaking check on aristocratic power in the Middle Ages, unknown in other stratified societies (MacDonald 1995). This contributed to the division of power, a mainstay of liberal states. From the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 Christianity accommodated itself to a secular political culture. The tension between Christianity and Enlightenment values has been worked out over centuries. The separation of church and state did not occur in Islamic societies. Christianity's contribution to liberal values continued. It was William Wilberforce's Evangelical Christian convictions that moved him to lead the abolitionist movement that in 1807 succeeded in having slavery banned in Britain and the British Empire, the first time this ancient practice had been voluntarily abandoned. Wilberforce also turned his Christian conscience towards the prevention of cruelty to animals, another historic first for Christendom. All these reforms were examples of Christian conscience and institutions

overcoming vested private interests to create the type of open Western society we too often take for granted.

It is no exaggeration to state that Christianity is an intimate part of Australia's British and Western culture and history. It is part of our core cultural identity, part of what we are as a people. By facilitating competition from other religions for the role of arbiter of social values, multiculturalism alienates parts of the public culture from the nation's core Christian identity. That competition is occurring mainly demographically through immigration and higher birthrates (Caldwell 2009). Proselytism also plays a role because it magnifies claims on public morality. The introduction of non-Christian proselytizing religions – mainly Islam – is especially problematic. Islam is simultaneously aggressive in its claim on public standards and lacking an institutional culture adapted to secular government developed by Christianity over a period of almost two millennia.

The findings summarised above contradict the prevailing wisdom that diversity is an unalloyed benefit to society. The risks of diversity apply to broad human values. Civil violence and inequality harm society as a whole, as do organised crime, corruption and inefficient government, not to mention guerilla conflicts and civil war. Parsimonious welfare systems and reduced foreign aid hurt the lower classes and poor countries respectively. Ethnic monopolies hurt businesses large and small.

#### *The intellectual origins of multiculturalism*

The above research findings have not been taken up by Australia's political culture. This can be traced back, in part, to the politicisation of the social sciences in Australian universities where left-utopian notions are commonplace.

Utopian ideas will always be expressed in an open society. Their charms will normally be resisted by an educated population. However such ideas can spread when their advocates gain one or more monopoly positions in critical forums such as the elite media or the universities. That leads to a breakdown in J. S. Mills's recommended market of ideas. Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman (2009) recently identified the near monopoly of a type of Right utopianism as contributing to the financial collapse of 2007-2008. "[I]f you start from the assumption that people are perfectly rational and markets are perfectly efficient, you have to conclude that unemployment is voluntary and recessions are desirable."

Much of Left utopianism can be traced to belief in the perfectability of human nature, which entails misconceptions about human behaviour. Such misconceptions can be found in the view that Australia's borders should be open to all who wish to come until the country's standard of living comes to equal that of the poorest country in the world (Salter 2010). Contributing ideas include the view that nations do not serve human values, that humans evolved in borderless communities, that felt duty to strangers is the same as to kith and kin, that once violence is controlled ethnic groups do not have conflicting interests, etcetera.

Such utopian ideas are widespread and often dominant in the social sciences and humanities in Australian universities; opposing ideas can be hard to find within the system. The imbalance promotes political bias because different ideologies are expressed with different sets of ideas. The degree of politicisation at our universities is indicated by the fact that academic research and work groups are often dedicated to leftist or minority-activist values but never to the interests of the Australian majority. I have been surveying social science departments in Australian universities for a decade and have not found one position dedicated to researching or teaching Anglo-Celtic or white interests, in a country where the

founding population is headed for minority status. This is as clear an example of institutional capture as one could imagine within an ostensibly plural liberal democracy. A similar situation exists at the publicly funded Australian Broadcasting Commission. Institutional capture also helps explain the rising repressiveness of Australia's "human rights" industry, an integral part of the social controls directed at the Australian nation. Arthur Calwell (1978) warned that this was the inevitable outcome of diversifying the population.

It is difficult for governments to formulate prudent ethnic policy in the absence of information on diversity's invidious effects. In addition to the above findings, many more discoveries made over the last quarter century bear on ethnic affairs (listed below). Few of these findings are included in curricula taught at Australian universities. There are partial exceptions such as contributors to the recently closed journal *People and Place* edited at the universities of Monash and Swinbourne in Melbourne. That does not change the broad picture.

1. The thesis that national identities originate in founding tribes and ethnic groups (Smith 1988) contradicts the neo-Marxist view that states and ruling classes invent national identities (e.g. Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992/1983).
2. The realisation that nations existed in ancient and Medieval times, such as Israel, Greece, and Armenia (Smith 2000), contradicts the modernist theory that the first nation was revolutionary France in the 1790s.
3. Ethnic national bonds are much stronger than civic national bonds (van den Berghe 1981; Connor 1993). In times of crisis civic nations often fragment while ethnic nations endure.
4. The distinctions between ethnicity, nation and state (Connor 1978) are not widely understood. Max Weber's (1946/1922) definition of ethnicity, now generally accepted among academics, places putative common descent at the centre of ethnicity, i.e. ethnicity is perceived to be a type of kinship.
5. Confirming Weber's definition, patriotic discourse is rich in kinship terms (Johnson 1987).
6. Genetic kinship within ethnic groups is typically equivalent to that of first cousins (Harpending 2002; Salter 2002b). This contradicts the view that ethnic groups and nations are no more than social constructs.
7. Ethnic solidarity and endogamy are economic assets to ethnic middleman trading groups (Landa 1994) and market dominant minorities (Chua 2003) such as the Chinese in South East Asia.
8. A weakness of multi-ethnic states is that people universally wish to be in the ethnic majority and societies with a clear majority enjoy economic and political advantages (Alesina and Spolaore 2003).
9. Parochial altruism in which defensive and nurturant behaviour is directed primarily at one's ethnic group, appears to be a human universal (e.g. Keith 1947/1968; Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1982; Bernhard et al. 2006) regulated psycho-biologically (Dreu et al. 2010).
10. The rank order of educational performance and thus class mobility remains constant among ethnic groups based on a study of 12 countries and regions (Lynn 2008).
11. A trend in anthropological and evolutionary theory is to conceptualise religion as part of the cultural environment that shaped human nature, including ethnic instincts. For example Boyd and Richerson (1985; 1992; Richardson and Boyd 2001) theorise that



culture, including religion, has been instrumental in directing group selection of genes and culture, Wiessner and Tumu (1998) document the adaptiveness of religions in Highland New Guinea, MacDonald (1994) posits Judaism as an adaptive group strategy and D. S. Wilson (2002) develops a general thesis along similar lines. Historical research is converging on this trend, e.g. Smith's (2003) thesis that the chosen people doctrine has repeatedly inspired national identity. One implication is that religious communities have special qualities that complicate ethnic affairs, especially when the religions proselytise.

### *Discussion and conclusion*

Multiculturalism is an ideology that legitimates open-ended diversity through open-ended immigration. Its original formulation in the United States by Horace Kallen in 1924 had that intention. By easing anxieties about diversity Kallen hoped to promote liberal immigration. However the ideology is flawed. It is predicated on erroneous assumptions whose scholarly support has come from politicised sections of the social sciences and humanities.

Multiculturalism forms part of an ideological-administrative system that is helping swamp the Australian nation through ethnically diverse immigration. As a result it is putting at risk the nation's ability to produce the public goods that nations excel in producing: relative cohesion and harmony, public altruism, trust, efficient government and political stability.

Diversity is not the only deleterious side effect of multiculturalism. Another is to perpetuate population growth because immigration is part of the *quid pro quo* offered ethnic minorities in exchange for votes. Perpetual large scale immigration cannot be sustained for well-rehearsed environmental reasons. In the end failure to regulate population growth causes severe suffering and social and economic dislocation. It follows that multiculturalism should be counteracted as part of a responsible population policy. The conflict between the two policies is already evident. The charge of racism is often directed at recommendations for reducing immigration overall, even without changing the ethnic mix. The tactic has been used against prominent environmentalists with no history of Anglo loyalism such as Dick Smith and Tim Flannery after they proposed that Australia should reduce immigration to protect the continent's ecology and species diversity (e.g. <http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2010/08/12/2981023.htm>, accessed 7 April 2011; <http://www.foe.org.au/resources/chain-reaction/editions/96/environmental-racism-in-australia/>, accessed 7 April 2011). Environmentalists who include cultural issues in their policy mix – for example People Against Further Immigration in the 1990s – are responded to solely on that basis by multicultural activists, placing ethnic advocacy ahead of ecological concerns (<http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/hansart.nsf/V3Key/LC19940420026>, accessed 7 April 2011).

Clearly multiculturalism should be dismantled or reformed. Its positive achievements such as special services for migrants can be preserved within other government departments and under different titles. Its toxic elements – those which promote open-ended diversity and perpetual immigration – should be cleaned up, though doing so will be politically challenging. Here I shall consider two approaches. The first is to rescind the relevant legislation and dismantle the agencies that implement it. The second is to retain the legislative structure but reform it in such a way that it serves the multicultural ideal. The reform route might be more feasible, though both approaches have shortcomings.

Consider the abolition approach. The goal, simple though naïve, would be for the majority of Australians to demand that all the major parties adopt immigration and ethnic policies that serve the interests of the country as a whole. While any government with a

majority in the Lower House and Senate need only exercise the will to enact reforms, correcting the institutionalised corruption of multicultural politics will be much more difficult. Multicultural ideology and practices are deeply embedded in Australia's political, intellectual and media elites. To give just two examples, years after his Mafia connections were widely disseminated in the media a life-sized statue of Al Grassby was commissioned by the ACT Labor government and displayed in Canberra (<http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/monuments-to-honesty-and-deceit-20090215-881s.html?page=1>). On the Liberal side there is still no principled repudiation of Malcolm Fraser's open hostility to Anglo Australia. Disparaging pre-Second World War Australia as a "narrow, Anglo-Saxon society" (quoted in Maley 2009) and declaring "Anglo-Saxon Australia is dead" (quoted in Lopez 2000, p. 440) does not reflect empathy for Australia's founding people. In his autobiography Fraser insisted that the Australian people must not be consulted in setting immigration policy. It is legitimate for governments to force immigration from anywhere upon them against their will because, he argued, they always come to accept the decision sooner or later (Fraser 2003, p. 250).

Although Howard's ethnic analysis was better informed than Fraser's and he never showed hostility towards Anglo-Celtic Australians, he appears to have been handicapped by the generally underdeveloped public discourse on the subject. The renaissance in scholarship of ethnicity and nationalism that began in Europe during the 1990s, discussed above, has made little headway in Australia. Discussion was and is chilled by political intolerance in much of the university and media sectors, a hallmark of the aggressive multiculturalist ideology.

During the 1990s Howard rejected multiculturalism as divisive but embraced what he called multiracialism, the view that ethnic and racial diversity is harmonious in the absence of multiculturalism. From the perspective of the new scholarship on ethnicity the obvious weakness of multiracialism is that it does not credit diversity as an independent variable having multiple social impacts. Immigration trended upwards during the Howard prime ministership ending at an all time high in 2007-2008 with net migration at over a quarter of a million people (Birrell and Healy 2010, p. 59, Table 2). Whether due to intellectual isolation or expediency, Howard's image as a conservative is belied by the high-risk radicalism of his ethnic and population policies. It remains to be seen whether the economic payoff from his administration's emphasis of the skilled category and deemphasis of the family reunion category will assuage disaffection from rapid demographic displacement ([http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/statistics/popflows2007-08/PopFlows\\_09\\_chp2.pdf](http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/statistics/popflows2007-08/PopFlows_09_chp2.pdf), accessed 7 April 2011, p. 26).

The elitism and intellectual weakness of the Liberal leadership regarding ethnic affairs has handicapped their ability to challenge Labor's wholesale use of racial vote-buying. The obvious counter move, to mobilise Anglo-Celts by championing their ethnic interests, has not been attempted in an overt principled way, though it is possible that Howard manoeuvred to win Pauline Hanson's constituents by adopting a tough stance on border control while reserving legal immigration policy for different political markets (e.g. see Gittins 2003). One or more corporate lobbies might be at work, though the evidence is not clear. Whichever interests are being served, Howard's doctrinal shift from multiculturalism to multiracialism appears to have been cosmetic, not intended to affect immigration numbers or ethnic content. After all, the shift occasioned no significant impact on domestic policy. A federal ministry's name was changed to omit 'multiculturalism'. The new doctrine allowed immigration to continue and expand in its previous form.

To summarise, abolishing multiculturalism will be difficult because it serves vested interests that are influential with the major parties. Perhaps reform would be a more viable approach than abolition. The multicultural industry could be encouraged to live up to its pluralist rhetoric by accepting all Australians in the process. That would include Anglo-Celtic Australians in multicultural politics, an idea approximately advanced by the community organisation the British Australian Community ([http://www.oocities.org/endeavour\\_uksa/uksa.html](http://www.oocities.org/endeavour_uksa/uksa.html), accessed 7 April 2011).

A start could be made through political action in which politicians began recognizing the nation's founding population as a legitimate interest group. Anglo-Celtic organisations would be provided with funding for community projects and professional activists, who would then be included in government-sponsored conferences and consulted with regarding policy. Once the practice got underway, political parties would compete for endorsement. Al Grassby's statue in Canberra would disappear. Expressions of hostility towards Anglo-Celtic Australians would become less frequent.

This would be true multiculturalism, one that respected all ethnic groups and included them in the spoils system. The legitimacy and financial rewards and ethnic politicking would likely feed back to the Anglo-Celtic population in much the same way it does with ethnic minorities, raising ethnic consciousness above its spontaneous level. The Anglo-Celtic vote would increasingly go to politicians who delivered on ethnic interests. Immigration might return to relatively low levels and come to reflect Australia's traditional ethnic proportions.

There might be other ways to rein in the runaway diversity being promoted by multiculturalism. It might be decided to continue current practice and accept the risks. Whichever decision is made it should be informed by the best available social analysis.

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