

# The Parliament

## COMPOSITION

The Parliament is composed of 3 distinct elements, the Queen<sup>1</sup>, the Senate and the House of Representatives.<sup>2</sup> These 3 elements together characterise the nation as being a constitutional monarchy, a parliamentary democracy and a federation.

The Constitution vests in the Parliament the legislative power of the Commonwealth. The legislature is bicameral, which is the term commonly used to indicate a Parliament of 2 Houses.

Although the Queen is nominally a constituent part of the Parliament the Constitution immediately provides that she appoint a Governor-General to be her representative in the Commonwealth.<sup>3</sup> The Queen's role is little more than titular as the legislative and executive powers and functions of the Head of State are vested in the Governor-General by virtue of the Constitution<sup>4</sup>, and by Letters Patent constituting the Office of Governor-General.<sup>5</sup> However, while in Australia, the Sovereign has performed duties of the Governor-General in person<sup>6</sup>, and in the event of the Queen being present to open Parliament, references to the Governor-General in the relevant standing orders<sup>7</sup> are to the extent necessary read as references to the Queen.<sup>8</sup>

The Royal Style and Titles Act provides that the Queen shall be known in Australia and its Territories as:

Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God Queen of Australia and Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth.<sup>9</sup>

## GOVERNOR-GENERAL

There have been 19 Governors-General of Australia<sup>10</sup> since the establishment of the Commonwealth, 6 of whom (including the last 4) have been Australian born.

The Letters Patent, of 29 October 1900, constituting the office of Governor-General, 'constitute, order, and declare that there shall be a Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in and over' the Commonwealth. The Letters, inter alia, make provision for the appointment of a Governor-General from time to time and provide that he shall be keeper of the Great Seal of the Commonwealth. They recognise that 'certain powers, functions, and authorities were declared to be vested in the Governor-General' by the Constitution. They also provide for the Governor-General to appoint judges and to exercise the power of dissolution, and so on, such powers also being prescribed by the Constitution. As much of what appears in the Letters Patent is a

1 The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act extends the provisions of the Constitution to the Queen's (Queen Victoria's) successors, s. 2.

2 Constitution, s. 1.

3 Constitution, s. 2.

4 Constitution, s. 2 with s. 61; with certain exceptions relating to disallowance of laws and matters of assent (ss. 58, 59, 60, 74) still nevertheless formal in essence (see Ch. on 'Legislation') by virtue of the *Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942*.

5 'Constitution of Office of Governor-General', Letters Patent, 29 October 1900, in *Commonwealth Statutory Rules 1901-1956*, V, p. 5301.

6 See *Royal Powers Act 1953* (Act No. 74 of 1953).

7 S.O.s 2-10.

8 S.O. 11.

9 *Royal Style and Titles Act 1973*, Schedule (Act No. 114 of 1973).

10 See Appendix 1.

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repetition of powers granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, certain parts of the Letters Patent would appear to be superfluous.<sup>11</sup>

The Letters Patent have been amended<sup>12</sup> and have been supplemented by Instructions to the Governor-General<sup>13</sup> and by the assignment of certain (additional) powers to the Governor-General.<sup>14</sup>

These instruments together with the Constitution determine the powers and functions of the office of Governor-General. In addition certain prerogative powers are by practice assumed and exercised by the Governor-General (*see* p. 4). The title of Commander-in-Chief is not only derived from the Letters Patent but by the Constitution which prescribes that the command in chief of the naval and military forces of the Commonwealth is vested in the Governor-General as the Queen's representative.<sup>15</sup>

### Appointment

The Governor-General is appointed by the Crown, in practice on the advice of Australian Ministers of the Crown.<sup>16</sup> The Governor-General holds office during the Crown's pleasure, appointments normally being for 5 years, but some Governors-General have had extended terms of office, and others have resigned or have been recalled. The method of appointment was changed as a result of the 1926 and 1930 Imperial Conferences.<sup>17</sup> Appointments prior to 1924 were made by the Crown on the advice of the Crown's Ministers in the United Kingdom (the Governor-General being also the representative or agent of the British Government<sup>18</sup>) in consultation with Australian Ministers. The Balfour Report stated that the Governor-General should be the representative of the Crown only, holding the same position in the administration of public affairs in Australia as the Crown did in the United Kingdom. The 1930 report laid down certain criteria for the future appointments of Governors-General. Since then Governors-General have been appointed by the Crown after informal consultation with and on the formal advice of Australian Ministers.

The Instructions of 11 August 1902 order that the commission appointing the Governor-General shall be read and published and every Governor-General shall take the oath of allegiance. These acts are to be performed by the Chief Justice of the High Court (or some other judge). The ceremonial swearing-in of a new Governor-General takes place in the Senate Chamber.

### Administrator and Deputies

The Letters Patent constituting the office and the Constitution<sup>19</sup> make provision for the Crown to appoint an Administrator to administer the Government of the Commonwealth 'in the event of the death, incapacity, removal, or absence of the Governor-

11 Peter Hanks (ed.), *Fajgenbaum and Hanks' Australian Constitutional Law*, 2nd edn, Butterworths, Sydney, 1980, pp. 355-6.

12 'Absence of Governor-General', Letters Patent, 15 December 1920, in *Commonwealth Statutory Rules 1901-1956*, V, p. 5303; 'Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor-General', 30 October 1958, in *Commonwealth Statutory Rules 1958*, p. 494.

13 'Instructions to the Governor-General', 29 October 1900, 11 August 1902, 15 December 1920, in *Commonwealth Statutory Rules 1901-1956*, V, pp. 5310-14.

14 'Assignment of Certain Powers to Governor-General', 2 November 1954, in *Commonwealth Statutory Rules 1901-1956*, V, p. 5315.

15 Constitution, s. 68.

16 *See also* H.R. Deb. (28.11.46) 742-3; H.R. Deb. (19.2.47) 19-20; H.R. Deb. (7.5.47) 2051.

17 'Imperial Conference 1926', *Summary of Proceedings*, PP 99(1926-28) (*see* Balfour Report, pp. 10-12); 'Imperial Conference 1930', *Summary of Proceedings*, PP 293(1929-31) 17.

18 L.F. Crisp, *Australian National Government*, 4th edn, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1978, p. 398.

19 Constitution, s. 4.

General' (in effect an Acting Governor-General). As with the Governor-General, the Administrator is required to take the oath of allegiance before his commission takes effect. The Crown's commission is known as a dormant commission<sup>20</sup>, only being invoked when necessary. An Administrator is not entitled to receive any salary from the Commonwealth in respect of any other office during the period of his administration.<sup>21</sup> In practice it is a State Governor, generally the most senior, who receives the Administrator's commission. More than one dormant commission may exist at any one time. The Administrator may perform all the duties of the Governor-General under the Letters Patent, the Instructions and the Constitution during the Governor-General's absence.<sup>22</sup> References to the Governor-General in the standing orders extend and apply to the Administrator during any period he is administering the Government of the Commonwealth.<sup>23</sup> There is a precedent for an Administrator opening a session of the Parliament when Administrator Brooks opened the Third Session of the 23rd Parliament on 7 March 1961.<sup>24</sup>

The Constitution empowers the Crown to authorise the Governor-General to appoint Deputies to exercise, during his pleasure, such powers and functions as he thinks fit.<sup>25</sup> The Letters Patent constituting the office also so authorise the Governor-General. The Governor-General traditionally appoints 2 Deputies (usually the Chief Justice and one other Justice of the High Court) to carry out certain duties in connection with the opening of a new Parliament. The practice of appointing 2 Deputies ensures the simultaneous administering of the oath of allegiance to Senators and Members of the House of Representatives on the Opening of Parliament following a general election.<sup>26</sup> But where the President of the Senate is still in office and has a commission to administer the oath or affirmation to newly elected or appointed Senators, the Governor-General may appoint a single Deputy to swear in Members of the House of Representatives only.<sup>27</sup>

The Governor-General hands to the Speaker, once he is elected, a commission to administer the oath of allegiance to Members during the course of a Parliament.<sup>28</sup>

The Governor-General normally appoints the Vice-President of the Executive Council to be his Deputy to summon meetings of the Executive Council and, in the Governor-General's absence, to preside over meetings.<sup>29</sup>

## Salary

The Constitution originally provided for the annual salary of the Governor-General to be £10 000, until the Parliament provides otherwise. The Constitution also precludes any alteration of salary during a Governor-General's term of office.<sup>30</sup> The salary, which is non-taxable, was last altered in 1977<sup>31</sup> to \$37 000 per annum and became payable to the next succeeding Governor-General (Sir Zelman Cowen) who was appointed on 8 December 1977. *The Governor-General Act 1974*<sup>32</sup> makes certain retiring allowance provisions for Governors-General and their widows.

20 An example of a dormant commission can be found in *Commonwealth Statutory Rules 1901-1956*, V, p. 5307.

21 Constitution, s. 4.

22 See VP 1974-75/510 (presentation of new Speaker), 532 (recommending amendment to bill).

23 S.O. 11A.

24 VP 1961/1-2.

25 Constitution, s. 126.

26 VP 1976-77/2-3; J 1976-77/2-3.

27 VP 1978-80/3; J 1978-80/3-4.

28 VP 1978-80/6-7.

29 Gazette S150(9.8.78).

30 Constitution, s. 3.

31 *Governor-General Amendment Act 1977* (Act No. 118 of 1977).

32 Act No. 16 of 1974.

## Powers and functions

Bagehot described the Crown's role in England in the following classic statement:

To state the matter shortly, the sovereign has, under a constitutional monarchy such as ours, three rights—the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn.<sup>33</sup>

In Australia for all practical purposes it is the Constitution which determines the nature and the exercise of the Governor-General's powers and functions. In essence these powers can be divided into 3 groups—prerogative, legislative and executive. The power to appoint royal commissions is, in a sense, a combination of the three.<sup>34</sup>

Although since Federation it has been the established principle that the Governor-General in exercising his powers and functions should only do so with the advice of his Ministers of State, the principle has not always been followed. This principle of responsible government is discussed further in the chapter on 'The structure of the House'.

The Letters Patent are not prescriptive as to prerogative powers (also termed 'reserve' powers or 'discretionary' powers). On the other hand the Constitution provides definite and limited powers although in some cases how these powers may be exercised is not specified. The identification and range of prerogative powers are somewhat uncertain and, thus, have on occasions resulted in varying degrees of political and public controversy.

*Quick and Garran* defines prerogative powers as:

. . . matters connected with the Royal prerogative (that body of powers, rights, and privileges, belonging to the Crown at common law, such as the prerogative of mercy), or to authority vested in the Crown by Imperial statute law, other than the law creating the Constitution of the Commonwealth. Some of these powers and functions are of a formal character; some of them are purely ceremonial; others import the exercise of sovereign authority in matters of Imperial interests.<sup>35</sup>

To some extent this definition may be regarded as redundant or superfluous in modern times. However, the fact that the Constitution states, in some of its provisions, that the Governor-General **may** perform certain acts **alone**, while other provisions state that he shall act '**in Council**', suggests an element of discretion in exercising certain of his functions, that is, those in the first category. *Quick and Garran* states:

The first group includes powers which properly or historically belong to the prerogatives of the Crown, and survive as parts of the prerogative; hence they are vested in the Governor-General, as the Queen's representative. The second group includes powers either of purely statutory origin or which have, by statute or custom, been detached from the prerogative; and they can, therefore, without any constitutional impropriety, be declared to be vested in the Governor-General in Council. But all those powers which involve the performance of executive acts, whether parts of the prerogative or the creatures of statute, will, in accordance with constitutional practice, as developed by the system known as responsible government, be performed by the Governor-General, by and with the advice of the Federal Executive Council . . . parliamentary government has well established the principle that the Crown can perform no executive act, except on the advice of some minister responsible to Parliament. Hence the power nominally placed in the hands of the Governor-General is really granted to the people through their representatives in Parliament. Whilst, therefore, in this Constitution some executive powers are, in technical phraseology, and in accordance with venerable customs, vested in the Governor-General, and others in the Governor-General in Council, they are all substantially in *pari materia*, on the same footing, and, in the ultimate resort, can only be exercised according to the will of the people.<sup>36</sup>

33 Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, 4th edn, Fontana, London, 1965, p. 111.

34 *Royal Commissions Act 1902*.

35 *Quick and Garran*, p. 390.

36 *Quick and Garran*, p. 406.

Modern references relating to the prerogative or discretionary powers of the Governor-General clarify this view in the interests of perspective. Sir Paul Hasluck made the following observations in a lecture given during his term as Governor-General:

The duties of the Governor-General are of various kinds. Some are laid on him by the Constitution, some by the Letters Patent and his Commission. Others are placed on him by Acts of the Commonwealth Parliament. Others come to him by conventions established in past centuries in Great Britain or by practices and customs that have developed in Australia.<sup>37</sup>

All of these duties have a common characteristic. The Governor-General is not placed in a position where he can run the Parliament, run the Courts or run any of the instrumentalities of government; but he occupies a position where he can help ensure that those who conduct the affairs of the nation do so strictly in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth and with due regard to the public interest. So long as the Crown has the powers which our Constitution now gives to it, and so long as the Governor-General exercises them, Parliament will work in the way the Constitution requires, the Executive will remain responsible to Parliament, the Courts will be independent, the public service will serve the nation within the limits of the law and the armed services will be subject to civil authority.<sup>38</sup>

The dissolution of Parliament is an example of one of the matters in which the Constitution requires the Governor-General to act on his own. In most matters, the power is exercised by the Governor-General-in-Council, that is with the advice of the Federal Executive Council (in everyday language, with the advice of the Ministers meeting in Council).<sup>39</sup>

The Governor-General acts on advice, whether he is acting in his own name or as Governor-General-in-Council. He has the responsibility to weigh and evaluate the advice and has the opportunity of discussion with his advisers. It would be precipitate and probably out of keeping with the nature of his office for him to reject advice outright but he is under no compulsion to accept it unquestioningly. He has a responsibility for seeing that the system works as required by the law and conventions of the Constitution but he does not try to do the work of Ministers. For him to take part in political argument would both be overstepping the boundaries of his office and lessening his own influence.<sup>40</sup>

On 12 November 1975, following the dismissal of Prime Minister Whitlam, Speaker Scholes wrote to the Queen asking her to intervene and restore Mr Whitlam to office as Prime Minister in accordance with the expressed resolution of the House the previous day.<sup>41</sup> On 17 November, the Queen's Private Secretary, at the command of Her Majesty, replied, in part:

The Australian Constitution firmly places the prerogative powers of the Crown in the hands of the Governor-General as the representative of The Queen of Australia. The only person competent to commission an Australian Prime Minister is the Governor-General, and The Queen has no part in the decisions which the Governor-General must take in accordance with the Constitution. Her Majesty, as Queen of Australia, is watching events in Canberra with close interest and attention, but it would not be proper for her to intervene in person in matters which are so clearly placed within the jurisdiction of the Governor-General by the Constitution Act.<sup>42</sup>

Other than by recording the foregoing statements and discussing the question of dissolution (*see* p. 6), it is not the intention of this text<sup>43</sup> to detail the various constitutional interpretations as to the Governor-General's discretionary powers. Based on the weight

37 Paul Hasluck, *The Office of Governor-General*, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1979, p. 10.

38 Hasluck, p. 12.

39 Hasluck, p. 16.

40 Hasluck, p. 20.

41 VP 1974-75/1125-7.

42 H.R. Deb. (17.2.76)6.

43 For further reading *see* Bibliography.

of opinion, the exercise of discretionary power by the Governor-General can be interpreted and is conditional upon the following principal factors:

- the maintenance of the independent and impartial nature of the office is paramount;
- in the view of *Quick and Garran* the provisions of the Constitution vesting powers in the Governor-General are read as being exercised 'in Council';
- the provisions of sections 61 and 62 of the Constitution (Federal Executive Council to advise the Governor-General **in the government of the Commonwealth**) are of significance and are interpreted to circumscribe discretions available to the Governor-General;
- the Statute of Westminster diminished to some extent the prerogative powers of the Crown in Australia;
- almost every area of power is directly or indirectly provided for in the Constitution;
- where discretions are available they are generally governed by constitutional conventions established over time as to how they may be exercised, and
- it is either a constitutional fact or an established constitutional convention that the Governor-General acts on the advice of his Ministers in all but exceptional circumstances.

### *Dissolution*

The act of dissolution puts to an end at the same time the duration of the House of Representatives and *ipso facto* the term of the Parliament.<sup>44</sup> This alone means that the question of dissolution and how the power of dissolution is exercised is of considerable parliamentary importance because of the degree of uncertainty as to **when and on what grounds** dissolution may occur.<sup>45</sup>

The overriding provision of the Constitution, insofar as its intention is concerned, is found in the words of section 28 'Every House of Representatives shall continue for three years from the first meeting of the House, and no longer'<sup>46</sup> to which is added the proviso 'but may be sooner dissolved by the Governor-General'. The actual source of the Governor-General's power to dissolve is found in section 5, the effect and relevant words of which are that 'The Governor-General may . . . by Proclamation or otherwise . . . dissolve the House of Representatives'.

While the Constitution vests in the Governor-General the power to dissolve the House, the criteria for taking this action are not prescribed and, therefore, they are matters generally governed by constitutional convention. In a real sense the exercise of the Crown's power of dissolution is central to an understanding of prerogative powers and the nature of constitutional conventions.

As described earlier in this chapter (*see* p. 5), while it is the prerogative of the Crown to dissolve the House of Representatives, the exercise of the power is subject to the constitutional convention that it does so only on the advice and approval of a Minister of State, in practice the Prime Minister, directly responsible to the House of

44 See also Ch. on 'The parliamentary calendar'.

45 There is among constitutional authorities considerable divergence of opinion on the true nature and exercise of the power. This is well illustrated by the analysis of Evatt in *The King and His Dominion Governors* and Forsey in *The Royal Power of Dissolution of Parliament in the British Commonwealth*; and see Bibliography for further reading.

46 Section 28 was considered by the High Court in 1975. It was held that an ordinary general election means an election held at or towards the end of the period of three years: *Attorney-General (ex rel. McKinlay) v. Commonwealth* (1975) 135 CLR 1. *Per Barwick C.J.*; Section 28 contemplates that the ordinary general election will take place in each three years: *ibid.*, p. 29.

Representatives. The granting of dissolution is an executive act, the ministerial responsibility for which can be easily established.<sup>47</sup>

The nature of the power to dissolve and some of the historical principles, according to which the discretion is exercised, are illustrated by the following authoritative statements:

Of the legal power of the Crown in this matter there is of course no question. Throughout the Commonwealth . . . the King or his representative may, in law, grant, refuse or force dissolution of the Lower House of the Legislature . . . In legal theory the discretion of the Crown is absolute (though of course any action requires the consent of some Minister), but the actual exercise of the power is everywhere regulated by conventions.<sup>48</sup>

If a situation arises, however, in which it is proposed that the House be dissolved sooner than the end of its three-year term, the Governor-General has to reassure himself on other matters. This is an area for argument among constitutional lawyers and political historians and is a matter where the conventions and not the text of the Constitution are the chief guide. It is the function of the Prime Minister to advise that the House be dissolved. The most recent practices in Australia support the convention that he will make his proposal formally in writing supported by a written case in favour of the dissolution. It is open to the Governor-General to obtain advice on the constitutional question from other quarters—perhaps from the Chief Justice, the Attorney-General or eminent counsel—and then . . . a solemn responsibility rests on [the Governor-General] to make a judgment on whether a dissolution is needed to serve the purposes of good government by giving to the electorate the duty of resolving a situation which Parliament cannot resolve for itself.<sup>49</sup>

The right to dissolve the House of Representatives is reserved to the Crown. This is one of the few prerogatives which may be exercised by the Queen's representative, according to his discretion as a constitutional ruler, and if necessary, a dissolution may be refused to responsible ministers for the time being.<sup>50</sup>

It is clear that it is incumbent on the Prime Minister to establish sufficient grounds for the need for dissolution particularly when the House is not near the end of its 3 year term. The Governor-General forms his own judgment on the sufficiency of the grounds. It is in this situation where it is generally recognised that the Governor-General may exercise a discretion not to accept the advice given.<sup>51</sup>

The grounds on which the Governor-General has accepted advice to dissolve the House of Representatives have not always been made public. It is reasonable to presume that no special reasons may be given to the Governor-General, or indeed are necessary, for a dissolution of the House if the House is near the end of its 3 year term.<sup>52</sup> As far as is known, the majority of dissolutions have taken place in circumstances which presented no special features. Where necessary, it is a normal feature for the Governor-General to grant a dissolution on the condition and assurance that adequate provision, that is, parliamentary appropriation, is made for the Administration in all its branches to be carried on until the new Parliament meets.<sup>53</sup>

47 *Quick and Garran*, p. 407.

48 Eugene A. Forsey, *The Royal Power of Dissolution of Parliament in the British Commonwealth*, Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1968, p. 3.

49 Hasluck, p. 15.

50 *Quick and Garran*, p. 464.

51 It is relevant to any discussion of this discretion to consider Howard's comment 'It is one thing to decline to act in accordance with the advice of your Ministers and Law Officers. It is quite another to act positively contrary to that advice, and it is yet another to decline even to seek that advice' in Colin Howard, 'A further comment on the dissolution of

the Australian Parliament on 11 November 1975', *The Parliamentarian* LVII, 4, 1976, pp. 240-1.

52 Sawyer has commented 'I would have thought that the precedents raise no doubt at all about the ability of a government to call for a general election at any time during the last six months of its normal existence, and probably earlier' in Geoffrey Sawyer, 'Dissolution of Parliament in mid-term', *The Canberra Times*, 6 July 1977.

53 H.R. Deb. (18.9.25)2576; see also correspondence between the Prime Minister and the Governor-General in relation to the simultaneous dissolution of 11 November 1975 (PP 15(1979)5-6) and the dissolution of 30 November 1977 (PP 16(1979)4).

## 8 *House of Representatives Practice*

The precedents which follow represent those 'early' dissolutions where the grounds, available from the public record, were sufficient for the Governor-General to grant a request for a dissolution. A feature of the precedents is that in 1903, 1917, 1955 and 1977, the grounds included the need to synchronise the election of the House of Representatives with a periodic election for half the Senate.

**TABLE 1** EARLY DISSOLUTIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (a)

<i>Dissolution date</i>	<i>Parliament: length</i>	<i>Reason (b)</i>
23 November 1903	1st: 2 years 6 months 14 days	Principally to synchronise House elections with elections for half the Senate to avoid expense (VP 1903/186; Governor-General's speech to both Houses; H.R. Deb. (30.9.03) 5575; H.R. Deb. (7.10.03) 5781).
26 March 1917	6th: 2 years 5 months 19 days	To synchronise election of the House with election for half the Senate and to gain a mandate from the people prior to the forthcoming Imperial War Conference (H.R. Deb. (6.3.17) 10 993-11 000).
3 November 1919 (c)	7th: 2 years 4 months 21 days	Not given to House.
16 September 1929	11th: 7 months 11 days	The House amended the Maritime Industries Bill against the wishes of the Government. The effect of the amendment was that the bill should not be brought into operation until submitted to a referendum or an election. Prime Minister Bruce based his advice on the following: 'The Constitution makes no provision for a referendum of this description, and the Commonwealth Parliament has no power to pass effective legislation for the holding of such a referendum. The Government is, however, prepared to accept the other alternative—namely a general election' (H.R. Deb. (12.9.29) 873-4; correspondence read to House).
27 November 1931	12th: 2 years 8 days	The Government was defeated on a formal motion for the adjournment of the House. The Governor-General took into consideration 'the strength and relation of various parties in the House of Representatives and the probability in any case of an early election being necessary' (H.R. Deb. (26.11.31) 1926-7; correspondence read to House).



TABLE 1—*continued*

<i>Dissolution date</i>	<i>Parliament: length</i>	<i>Reason (b)</i>
7 August 1934 (c)	13th: 2 years 5 months 22 days	Not given to House.
4 November 1955	21st: 1 year 3 months 1 day	To synchronise elections of the House with elections for half the Senate; the need to avoid conflict with State election campaigns mid-way through the ensuing year; the impracticability of elections in January or February; authority (mandate) to deal with economic problems (H.R. Deb. (26.10.55) 1895-6; John Kerr, <i>Matters for Judgment</i> , pp. 153, 412).
1 November 1963	29th: 1 year 8 months 13 days	Prime Minister Menzies referred to the fact that the Government had gone close to defeat on 5 occasions; the need to obtain a mandate on policies concerning North West Cape radio station, the defence of Malaysia and the proposed southern hemisphere nuclear free zone (H.R. Deb. (15.10.63) 1790-5).
10 November 1977	30th: 1 year 8 months 25 days	To synchronise House election with election for half the Senate; to provide an opportunity to end election speculation and the resulting uncertainty and to enable the Government to seek from the people an expression of their will; to conform with the pattern of elections taking place in the latter months of a calendar year (H.R. Deb. (27.10.77) 2476-7; Kerr, pp. 403-15; <i>Dissolution of the House of Representatives by His Excellency the Governor-General on 10 November 1977</i> , PP 16 (1979)).

(a) A dissolution of the House of Representatives is termed 'early' if the dissolution occurs 6 months or more before the date the House of Representatives is scheduled to expire by effluxion of time. The table does not include simultaneous dissolutions of both Houses granted by the Governor-General under s. 57 of the Constitution (see Ch. on 'Disagreements between the Houses'). (b) The reasons stated in the table may not be the only reasons advised or upon which dissolution was exclusively granted. (c) On 2 occasions dissolution ended Parliaments of less than 2 years 6 months duration where reasons, if any, were not given to the House.

On 10 January 1918, following the defeat of a national referendum relating to compulsory military service overseas, Prime Minister Hughes informed the House that the Government had considered it its duty to resign unconditionally and to offer **no advice** to the Governor-General. A memorandum from the Governor-General setting out his views was tabled in the House:

On the 8th of January the Prime Minister waited on the Governor-General and tendered to him his resignation. In doing so Mr. Hughes offered no advice as to who should be asked to form an Administration.

The Governor-General considered that it was his paramount duty (a) to make provision for carrying on the business of the country in accordance with the principles of parliamentary government, (b) to avoid a situation arising which must lead to a further appeal to the country within twelve months of an election resulting in the return of two Houses of similar political complexion, which are still working in unison. The Governor-General was also of the opinion that in granting a commission for the formation of a new Administration his choice must be determined solely by the parliamentary situation. Any other course would be a departure from constitutional practice, and an infringement of the rights of Parliament. In the absence of such parliamentary indications as are given by a defeat of the Government in Parliament, the Governor-General endeavoured to ascertain what the situation was by seeking information from representatives of all sections of the House with a view to determining where the majority lay, and what prospects there were of forming an alternative Government.

As a result of these interviews, in which the knowledge and views of all those he consulted were most freely and generously placed at his service, the Governor-General was of opinion that the majority of the National Party was likely to retain its cohesion, and that therefore a Government having the promise of stability could only be formed from that section of the House. Investigations failed to elicit proof of sufficient strength in any other quarter. It also became clear to him that the leader in the National Party, who had the best prospect of securing unity among his followers and of therefore being able to form a Government having those elements of permanence so essential to the conduct of affairs during war, was the Right Honourable W.M. Hughes, whom the Governor-General therefore commissioned to form an Administration.<sup>54</sup>

A further case which requires brief mention is that of Prime Minister Fadden who resigned following a defeat in the House on 3 October 1941. According to Crisp the Prime Minister 'apparently relieved the Governor-General from determining the issue involved in the request of a defeated Prime Minister by advising him, **not a dissolution** [emphasis added], but sending for the Leader of the Opposition, Curtin'.<sup>55</sup>

The Governor-General has refused to accept advice to grant a dissolution on 3 known occasions<sup>56</sup>:

- *August 1904*.<sup>57</sup> The 2nd Parliament had been in existence for less than 6 months. On 12 August 1904, the Watson Government was defeated on an important vote in the House.<sup>58</sup> On the sitting day following the defeat, Mr Watson informed the House that following the vote he had offered the Governor-General 'certain advice' which was not accepted. He had thereupon tendered the resignation of himself and his colleagues which the Governor-General accepted.<sup>59</sup> Mr Reid was commissioned by the Governor-General to form a new Government.

54 H.R. Deb. (10.1.18)2895-6; see also Herbert Vere Evatt, *The King and His Dominion Governors: a Study of the Reserve Powers of the Crown in Great Britain and the Dominions*, 2nd edn, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1967, pp. 153-6.

55 Crisp, pp. 403-04.

56 For comment on these precedents see Evatt, pp. 50-4.

57 No documents in relation to the refusal were made public.

58 VP 1904/147; see also Ch. on 'Motions'.

59 H.R. Deb. (17.8.04)4265.

- *July 1905.* The 2nd Parliament had been in existence for less than 16 months. On 30 June 1905, the Reid Government was defeated on an amendment to the Address in Reply.<sup>60</sup> At the next sitting Mr Reid informed the House that he had requested the Governor-General to dissolve the House. The advice was not accepted and the Government resigned.<sup>61</sup> Mr Deakin was commissioned by the Governor-General to form a new Government.
- *June 1909.* The 3rd Parliament had been in existence for over 2 years and 3 months of its 3 year term. On 27 May 1909, the Fisher Government was defeated on a motion to adjourn debate on the Address in Reply.<sup>62</sup> Mr Fisher subsequently informed the House that he had advised the Governor-General to dissolve the House and the Governor-General on 1 June refused the advice and accepted Mr Fisher's resignation.<sup>63</sup> Mr Deakin was commissioned by the Governor-General to form a new Government. In 1914, Mr Fisher, as Prime Minister, tabled the reasons for his 1909 application for a dissolution.

The advice of Prime Minister Fisher in the 1909 case consisted of a lengthy Cabinet minute which contained the following summary of reasons:

Your Advisers venture to submit, after careful perusal of the principles laid down by Todd and other writers on Constitutional Law, and by leading British statesmen, and the precedents established in the British Parliament and followed throughout the self-governing Dominions and States, that a dissolution may properly be had recourse to under any of the following circumstances:—

- (1) When a vote of 'no confidence,' or what amounts to such, is carried against a Government which has not already appealed to the country.
- (2) When there is reasonable ground to believe that an adverse vote against the Government does not represent the opinions and wishes of the country, and would be reversed by a new Parliament.
- (3) When the existing Parliament was elected under the auspices of the opponents of the Government.
- (4) When the majority against a Government is so small as to make it improbable that a strong Government can be formed from the Opposition.
- (5) When the majority against the Government is composed of members elected to oppose each other on measures of first importance, and in particular upon those submitted by the Government.
- (6) When the elements composing the majority are so incongruous as to make it improbable that their fusion will be permanent.
- (7) When there is good reason to believe that the people earnestly desire that the policy of the Government shall be given effect to.

All these conditions, any one of which is held to justify a dissolution, unite in the present instance.<sup>64</sup>

According to Crisp 'The Governor-General was unmoved by considerations beyond "the parliamentary situation"'.<sup>65</sup> Evatt offers the view that 'certainly the action of the Governor-General proceeded upon a principle which was not out of accord with what had until then been accepted as Australian practice, although the discretion may not have been wisely exercised'.<sup>66</sup>

60 VP 1905/7; see also Ch. on 'Motions'.

61 H.R. Deb. (5.7.05) 134-5.

62 VP 1909/7; see also Ch. on 'Motions'.

63 H.R. Deb. (1.6.09) 227.

64 'Ministerial Crisis 1909', *Cabinet Minute in connexion with the application of the Hon. Andrew Fisher for a dissolution*, PP 5(1914-17) 13.

65 Crisp, p. 402.

66 Evatt, p. 54.

*And the Parliament*

The functions of the Governor-General in relation to the legislature are discussed in detail in the appropriate parts of the text. In summary his constitutional duties (excluding functions of purely Senate application) are:

- appointing the times for the holding of sessions of Parliament (s. 5);
- proroguing and dissolving Parliament (s. 5);
- issuing writs for general elections of the House (in terms of the Constitution, exercised 'in Council') (s. 32);
- issuing writs for by-elections in the absence of the Speaker (in terms of the Constitution, exercised 'in Council') (s. 33);
- recommending to Parliament the appropriation of revenue or money (s. 56);
- dissolving both Houses simultaneously (s. 57);
- convening a joint sitting of both Houses (s. 57);
- assenting to bills, withholding assent or reserving bills for Queen's Assent (s. 58);
- recommending to Parliament amendments in proposed laws (s. 58), and
- submitting to electors proposed laws to alter the Constitution in cases where the 2 Houses cannot agree (s. 128).

The Crown in its relations with Parliament is characterised by formality, ceremony and tradition. For example, tradition dictates that the Sovereign should not enter the House of Representatives. The ceremonial opening of a new session of Parliament by the Governor-General (or at times by the Sovereign) takes place in the Senate Chamber, communications between the Houses taking place by message or messenger.

The Governor-General may on occasions appoint a Deputy to swear-in Senators, and also appoints a Deputy to administer the oath or affirmation to Members in their own Chamber. The ceremonial presentation of the Speaker to the Governor-General, following his election, usually takes place in the Parliamentary Library. Traditionally the Mace is not taken into the presence of the Crown.

It is the practice of the House to agree to a condolence motion on the death of a former Governor-General and to suspend the sitting until a later hour as a mark of respect.<sup>67</sup> In the case of the death of a Governor-General in office the sitting of the House has been adjourned as a mark of respect.<sup>68</sup> An Address to the Queen has been agreed to on the death of a former Governor-General who was a member of the Royal Family<sup>69</sup>, and references have been made to the death of a Governor-General's close relative.<sup>70</sup>

During debate in the House no Member may use the name of the Queen, the Governor-General (or a State Governor) disrespectfully, or for the purpose of influencing the House in its deliberations.<sup>71</sup> The practice of the House is that, unless the discussion is based upon a substantive motion which admits of a distinct vote of the House, reflections (opprobrious references) must not be cast in debate concerning the conduct of the Sovereign or the Governor-General<sup>72</sup>, including a Governor-General designate.<sup>73</sup> It is acceptable for a Minister to be questioned, without being critical or reflecting on conduct, regarding matters relating to the **public duties** for which the Governor-General is responsible.<sup>74</sup>

67 VP 1976-77/253-4.

68 VP 1961/6.

69 VP 1974-75/9.

70 VP 1974-75/153.

71 S.O. 74.

72 H.R. Deb. (19.2.76)130-1.

73 H.R. Deb. (26.2.69)207.

74 H.R. Deb. (25.2.69)5-6,12-13; see also Ch. on 'Control and conduct of debate'.

On 2 March 1950, a question without notice was directed to Speaker Cameron concerning a newspaper article alleging that during the formal presentation of the Address in Reply to the Governor-General's Speech, the Speaker showed discourtesy to the Governor-General. Speaker Cameron said:

I am prepared to leave the judgment of my conduct at Government House to the honourable members who accompanied me there.<sup>75</sup>

Later, Speaker Cameron made a further statement to the House stating certain facts concerning the personal relationship between himself and the Governor-General. In view of this relationship, the Speaker had decided, on the presentation of the Address, to:

... treat His Excellency with the strict formality and respect due to his high office, and remove myself from his presence as soon as my duties had been discharged.<sup>76</sup>

In a previous ruling Speaker Cameron stated that 'the name of the Governor-General must not be brought into debate either in praise or in blame'.<sup>77</sup> Several Members required the Speaker to rule on this previous ruling in the light of his statement as to his conduct at Government House. Speaker Cameron replied that in his statement he had:

... made a statement of fact. I have made no attack upon His Excellency. I have simply stated the facts of certain transactions between us, and if the House considers that a reflection has been made on the Governor-General it has its remedy.<sup>78</sup>

Dissent from the Speaker's ruling was moved and negatived after debate.<sup>79</sup> Two sitting days later, the Leader of the Opposition moved that, in view of the Speaker's statement, the House 'is of opinion that Mr Speaker merits its censure'. The motion was negatived.<sup>80</sup>

#### *And the Executive Government*

The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen, and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative<sup>81</sup>, the Queen's role being essentially one of name only. Section 2 of the Constitution and the various Letters Patent and Instructions also bear on the Governor-General's executive role (*see p. 1*). Section 61 of the Constitution states 2 principal elements of executive power which the Governor-General exercises, namely, the execution and maintenance of the Constitution, and the execution and maintenance of the laws passed (by the Parliament) in accordance with the Constitution.

The Constitution however immediately provides that, in the government of the Commonwealth, the Governor-General is advised by a Federal Executive Council<sup>82</sup>, effecting the concept of responsible government. The Governor-General therefore does not perform executive acts alone but 'in Council', that is, acting with the advice of the Federal Executive Council.<sup>83</sup> The practical effect of this is, as stated in *Quick and Garran*:

... that the Executive power is placed in the hands of a Parliamentary Committee, called the Cabinet, and the real head of the Executive is not the Queen but the Chairman of the Cabinet, or in other words the Prime Minister.<sup>84</sup>

75 H.R. Deb. (28.3.50)1207.

76 H.R. Deb. (30.3.50)1416.

77 H.R. Deb. (2.3.50)362.

78 H.R. Deb. (30.3.50)1417.

79 VP 1950-51/47-8.

80 VP 1950-51/55-6.

81 Constitution, s. 61.

82 Constitution, s. 62.

83 Constitution, s. 63.

84 *Quick and Garran*, p. 703.

Where the Constitution prescribes that the Governor-General (without reference to 'in Council') may perform certain acts, it can be said that these acts are also performed in practice with the advice of the Federal Executive Council in all but exceptional circumstances.

As Head of the Executive Government, in pursuance of the broad scope of power contained in section 61, the constitutional functions of the Governor-General, excluding those of historical interest, are summarised as follows<sup>85</sup>:

- choosing, summoning and dismissing Members of the Federal Executive Council (s. 62);
- establishing departments of State and appointing (or dismissing) officers to administer departments of State (these officers are Members of the Federal Executive Council and known as Ministers of State) (s. 64);
- directing, in the absence of parliamentary provision, what offices shall be held by Ministers of State (s. 65);
- appointing and removing other officers of the Executive Government (other than Ministers of State or as otherwise provided by delegation or as prescribed by legislation) (s. 67), and
- acting as Commander-in-Chief of the naval and military forces (s. 68).

#### *And the Judiciary (and see p. 19)*

The judicial power of the Commonwealth is vested in the High Court of Australia, and other federal courts that the Parliament creates or other courts it invests with federal jurisdiction.<sup>86</sup>

The judiciary is the third element of government in the tripartite division of Commonwealth powers. The Governor-General is specifically included as a constituent part of the legislative and executive organs of power but he is not part of the judiciary. While the legislature and the Executive have common elements which tend to fuse their respective roles, the judiciary is essentially independent. Nevertheless in terms of its composition it is answerable to the Executive (the Governor-General in Council) and also to the Parliament. The Governor-General in Council appoints Justices of the High Court, and of other federal courts created by Parliament. Justices may only be removed by the Governor-General in Council provided that both Houses agree to an Address praying for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity.<sup>87</sup> There has been no occasion of a Justice being removed from any federal court. An alteration to the Constitution in 1977 provided for the retiring ages for judges of federal courts. Judges appointed after the date of effect of the alteration retire upon attaining the age of 70 years.<sup>88</sup>

### **POWERS AND JURISDICTION OF THE HOUSES**

While the Constitution states that the legislative power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen, a Senate and a House of Representatives<sup>89</sup> and, subject to the Constitution, that the Parliament shall make laws for the 'peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth'<sup>90</sup>, the Parliament has powers and functions other than

85 For further discussion on the Executive Government (i.e. the Ministry) as an integral part of the Parliament's composition see Ch. on 'The structure of the House'.

86 Constitution, s. 71.

87 Constitution, s. 72.

88 *Constitution Alteration (Retirement of Judges) 1977* (Act No. 83 of 1977).

89 Constitution, s. 1.

90 Constitution, ss. 51, 52.

legislative. The legislative function is paramount but the exercise of Parliament's other powers, which are of historical origin, are important to the understanding and essential to the working of Parliament.

## Jurisdictional power

### Section 49

Section 49 of the Constitution states:

The powers, privileges, and immunities of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, and of the members and the committees of each House, shall be such as are declared by the Parliament, and until declared shall be those of the Commons House of Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the establishment of the Commonwealth.

The Parliament has not declared its powers, privileges and immunities under section 49 of the Constitution, except in relation to a few relatively minor powers:

- Parliamentary Papers Act—protection of Government Printer and others;
- Parliamentary Proceedings Broadcasting Act—protection of Australian Broadcasting Commission;
- Public Accounts Committee Act and Public Works Committee Act—privileges of, and protection of, witnesses who appear before these committees, and
- Jury Exemption Act—exemption from jury service of Members and certain officers.

The Parliament is, therefore, strictly limited to the powers, privileges and immunities of the House of Commons as at 1 January 1901, being the date of establishment of the Commonwealth.

The significance of this provision is to give to both Houses considerable authority in addition to the powers which are expressly stated in the Constitution. The effect on the Parliament is principally in relation to its rightful claim to the 'ancient and undoubted privileges and immunities' which are necessary for the exercise of its constitutional powers and functions.<sup>91</sup>

May states that:

The privileges of Parliament are rights which are 'absolutely necessary for the due execution of its powers' [Hatsell]. They are enjoyed by individual Members, because the House cannot perform its functions without unimpeded use of the services of its Members; and by each House for the protection of its Members and the vindication of its own authority and dignity.<sup>92</sup>

It is important to note that in 1704 it was established that the House of Commons could not create any new privilege<sup>93</sup>; it may expound the law of Parliament and vindicate its existing privileges. The Australian Parliament likewise could not create any new privilege for itself.

The following are among the principal powers and privileges of each House, and of the Members of each House, drawn from the law and custom of the House of Commons as at 1901<sup>94</sup>:

- the power to order the attendance at the Bar of the House of persons whose conduct has been brought before the House on a matter of privilege;
- the power to order the arrest and imprisonment of persons guilty of contempt or breach of privilege;

91 See Ch. on 'Parliamentary privilege' for a detailed discussion of the application of privilege.

92 May, p. 67.

93 May, p. 72.

94 Quick and Garran, p. 501.

- the power to arrest for breach of privilege by warrant of the Speaker;
- the power to issue such a warrant for arrest, and imprisonment for contempt or breach of privilege, without showing any particular grounds or causes thereof;
- the power to regulate its proceedings by standing rules and orders having the force of law;
- the power to suspend disorderly members;
- the power to expel members guilty of disgraceful and infamous conduct;
- the right of free speech in Parliament, without liability to action or impeachment for anything spoken therein; established by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, and
- the right of each House as a body to freedom of access to the Sovereign for the purpose of presenting and defending its views.

The following are instances of parliamentary immunities<sup>95</sup>:

- immunity of Members from legal proceedings for anything said by them in the course of parliamentary debates;
- immunity of Members from arrest and imprisonment for civil causes whilst attending Parliament, and for 40 days after every prorogation, and for 40 days before the next appointed meeting;
- immunity of Members from the obligation to serve on juries;
- immunity of witnesses, summoned to attend either House of Parliament, from arrest for civil causes;
- immunity of parliamentary witnesses from being questioned or impeached for evidence given before either House or its committees, and
- immunity of officers of either House, in **immediate** attendance and service of the House, from arrest for civil causes.

### *Section 50*

Section 50 of the Constitution provides that:

Each House of the Parliament may make rules and orders with respect to—

- (i.) The mode in which its powers, privileges, and immunities may be exercised and upheld;
- (ii.) The order and conduct of its business and proceedings either separately or jointly with the other House.

The first part of this section enables each House to deal with procedural matters relating to its privileges and, accordingly, the House has adopted a number of standing orders relating to the way in which its powers, privileges and immunities are to be exercised and upheld. These cover such matters as:

- procedure in matters of privilege (S.O.s 95-97);
- control of disorder (S.O.s 303-306);
- power of arrest (S.O.s 309-311);
- power to appoint committees (S.O. 323);
- power of summons (S.O.s 334-335, 354-358);
- rules on evidence (S.O.s 340, 368), and
- protection of witnesses (S.O. 362).

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<sup>95</sup> *Quick and Garran*, p. 502.



The second part enables each House to make rules and orders regulating the conduct of its business. A comprehensive set of standing orders has been adopted by the House and these orders may be supplemented from time to time by way of sessional orders and special resolutions.

Section 50 confers on each House the absolute right to determine its own procedures and to exercise control over its own internal proceedings. The House has in some areas imposed limits on itself in respect of its privilege, power and conduct of proceedings, for example, with respect to censure, suspension, or expulsion of its own Members, and by the restrictions placed on Members in its rules of debate.

#### *Standing order 1*

Standing order 1 provides that, in all cases not provided for by the standing, sessional or other orders or practice of the House, resort shall be had to the practice of the House of Commons in force for the time being, which shall be followed as far as it can be applied.

Much of the practice and procedure of the House of Representatives has been translated from that of the House of Commons but, inevitably, over a period of 80 years, many of the initial standing orders have been omitted or altered to meet the needs of a House operating in a different political environment.

The House has also developed its own practice in most given situations and, therefore, recourse to the practice of the House of Commons is seldom made. The obvious exception is in respect of matters relating to privilege where the House continues to use the precedents of the House of Commons.

### **Legislative power**

The legislative function of the Parliament is probably its most important and time-consuming.<sup>96</sup> The principal legislative powers of the Commonwealth exercised by the Parliament are set out in sections 51 and 52 of the Constitution. However, the legislative powers of these sections cannot be regarded in isolation as other constitutional provisions extend, limit, restrict or qualify their provisions.<sup>97</sup>

The important distinction between the sections is that section 52 determines areas within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Parliament, while the effect of section 51 is that the itemised grant of powers includes a mixture of exclusive powers and powers exercised concurrently with the States. For example, some of the powers enumerated in section 51:

- did not belong to the States prior to 1901 (e.g. fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits) and for all intents and purposes may be regarded as exclusive to the Federal Parliament;
- were State powers wholly vested in the Federal Parliament (e.g. bounties on the production or export of goods), and
- are concurrently exercised by the Federal Parliament and the State Parliaments (e.g. taxation, except customs and excise).

In keeping with the federal nature of the Constitution, the exercise of powers in areas of government activity not covered by section 51, or elsewhere by the Constitution, remains within the jurisdiction of the States, known as the 'residual powers' of the States.

<sup>96</sup> See Ch. on 'The role of the House of Representatives' for its other functions.

<sup>97</sup> For a full list of Commonwealth laws enacted by the Parliament under each section of the Constitution see *Acts Tables 1901-1972 and 1973*, Government

Printer of Australia, 1974; and see Attorney-General's Department, *The Australian Constitution Annotated and 1976-1979 Cumulative Supplement*, AGPS, Canberra, 1980.

It is not the purpose of this text to detail the complicated nature of the federal legislative power under the Constitution.<sup>98</sup> However, the following points are useful for an understanding of the legislative role of the Parliament:

- as a general rule, unless a grant of power is expressly exclusive under the Constitution, the powers of the Commonwealth are concurrent with the continuing powers of the States over the same matters;
- sections, other than sections 51 and 52, grant exclusive power to the Commonwealth, for example, section 86 (customs and excise duties);
- section 51 operates 'subject to' the Constitution, for example, section 51(i.) (Trade and Commerce) is subject to the provisions of section 92 (Trade within the Commonwealth to be free);
- section 51 must be read in conjunction with sections 106, 107, 108 and 109, for example, section 109 prescribes that in the case of any inconsistency between a State law and a Commonwealth law the Commonwealth law shall prevail;
- the Commonwealth has increasingly used section 96 (Financial assistance to States) to extend its legislative competence, for example, in areas such as education, health and transport. This action is a continuing point of contention and has led to changing concepts of federalism;
- section 51 (xxxvi.) recognises Commonwealth jurisdiction over 22 sections of the Constitution which include the provision 'until the Parliament otherwise provides', for example, section 29 (electoral matters). Generally they are provisions relating to the parliamentary and executive structure and, in most cases, the Parliament has taken action to alter these provisions<sup>99</sup>;
- section 51 (xxxix.) provides power to the Parliament to make laws on matters incidental to the powers prescribed by the Constitution. This power, frequently and necessarily exercised, has been put to some significant uses, for example, jurisdictional powers and procedure of the High Court, and legislation concerning the operation of the Parliament<sup>100</sup>;
- section 51 itself has been altered on 2 occasions, namely, in 1964 when paragraph (xxiiiA.) was inserted and in 1967 when paragraph (xxvi.) was altered<sup>101</sup>;
- the Commonwealth has been granted exclusive legislative power in relation to any territory by section 122, read in conjunction with section 52;
- the Federal Parliament on the other hand is specifically prohibited from making laws in respect of certain matters, for example, in respect of religion by section 116, and
- in practice Parliament delegates much of its legislative power to the Executive Government.<sup>102</sup> Acts of Parliament frequently delegate to the Governor-General (that is, the Executive Government) a regulation making power for administrative purposes. However, regulations must be laid before Parliament which exercises ultimate control by means of its power of disallowance.<sup>103</sup>

98 Detailed discussion can be found in *Quick and Garran*, pp. 508-662; R.D. Lumb & K.W. Ryan, *The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia Annotated*, 3rd edn, Butterworths, Sydney, 1981, pp. 100-224; W. Anstey Wynes, *Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia*, 5th edn, Law Book Co., Sydney, 1976, Chs. 6 & 7; *The Australian Constitution Annotated*, pp. 45-175; and see Bibliography.

99 See *Quick and Garran*, pp. 647-8.

100 *Quick and Garran*, pp. 651-5.

101 *Constitution Alteration (Social Services) 1946* (Act No. 81 of 1946); *Constitution Alteration (Aboriginals) 1967* (Act No. 55 of 1967).

102 Under Constitution, s. 61.

103 See Chs on 'The role of the House of Representatives' and 'Legislation'.

## THE COURTS AND PARLIAMENT

The Constitution deliberately confers great independence on the federal courts of Australia. At the same time the Parliament plays a considerable role in the creation of courts, investing other courts with federal jurisdiction, prescribing the number of justices to be appointed to a particular court, and so on. In the scheme of the Constitution, the courts and the Parliament provide checks and balances on each other.

### Constitutional provisions

With the exception of the High Court which is established by the Constitution, federal courts depend on Parliament for their creation.<sup>104</sup> The Parliament may provide for the appointment of Justices to the High Court additional to the minimum of a Chief Justice and 2 other Justices.<sup>105</sup> As prescribed by Parliament, the High Court now consists of a Chief Justice and 6 other Justices.<sup>106</sup>

Justices of the High Court and other federal courts are appointed by the Governor-General in Council and retain office until the age of 70 years.<sup>107</sup> Justices may only be removed from office by the Governor-General in Council, on an Address from both Houses of the Parliament in the same session, praying for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity.<sup>108</sup> A joint Address under this section may originate in either House although *Quick and Garran* suggests that it would be desirable for the House of Representatives to take the initiative.<sup>109</sup> There is no provision for appeal against removal.<sup>110</sup> There has been no case in the Commonwealth Parliament of an attempt to remove a Justice of the High Court or other federal court and consequently no precedents have been established regarding the procedure or definition of the grounds of such an action. *Quick and Garran* holds that:

Misbehaviour includes, firstly, the improper exercise of judicial functions; secondly, wilful neglect of duty, or non-attendance; and thirdly, a conviction for any infamous offence, by which, although it be not connected with the duties of his office, the offender is rendered unfit to exercise any office or public franchise. (Todd, *Parl. Gov. in Eng.*, ii. 857, and authorities cited.)

"Incapacity" extends to incapacity from mental or bodily infirmity, which has always been held to justify the termination of an office held during good behaviour . . . The addition of the word does not therefore alter the nature of the tenure of good behaviour, but merely defines it more accurately.

No mode is prescribed for the proof of misbehaviour or incapacity, and the Parliament is therefore free to prescribe its own procedure. Seeing, however, that proof of definite legal breaches of the conditions of tenure is required, and that the enquiry is therefore in its nature more strictly judicial than in England, it is conceived that the procedure ought to partake as far as possible of the formal nature of a criminal trial; that the charges should be definitely formulated, the accused allowed full opportunities of defence, and the proof established by evidence taken at the Bar of each House.<sup>111</sup>

Thus, in such matters, as in cases of a breach of parliamentary privilege or contempt of Parliament, the Parliament may engage in a type of judicial procedure.

104 e.g. Federal Court of Australia, Family Court of Australia.

105 Constitution, s. 71.

106 *Judiciary Act* 1903, s. 4.

107 Constitution, s. 72.

108 Constitution, s. 72.

109 *Quick and Garran*, p. 731.

110 *Quick and Garran*, p. 730.

111 *Quick and Garran*, pp. 731-2.

The appellate jurisdiction (i.e. the hearing and determining of appeals) of the High Court is laid down by the Constitution but is subject to such exceptions and regulations as the Parliament prescribes<sup>112</sup>, providing that:

... no exception or regulation prescribed by the Parliament shall prevent the High Court from hearing and determining any appeal from the Supreme Court of a State in any matter in which at the establishment of the Commonwealth an appeal lies from such Supreme Court to the Queen in Council.<sup>113</sup>

The Parliament may make laws limiting the matters in which leave of appeal to Her Majesty in Council (the Privy Council) may be asked.<sup>114</sup> Laws have been enacted to limit appeals to the Privy Council from the High Court<sup>115</sup> and to exclude appeals from other federal courts and the Supreme Courts of Territories.<sup>116</sup> Special leave of appeal to the Privy Council from a decision of the High Court may not be asked in any matter except where the decision of the High Court was given in a proceeding that was commenced in a court before the date of commencement of the Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act on 8 July 1975.

The Constitution confers original jurisdiction on the High Court in respect of certain matters<sup>117</sup> with which the Parliament may not interfere other than by definition of jurisdiction.<sup>118</sup> The Parliament may confer additional original jurisdiction on the High Court<sup>119</sup> and has done so in respect of 'all matters arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation' and 'trials of indictable offences against the laws of the Commonwealth'.<sup>120</sup>

Sections 77-80 of the Constitution provide Parliament with power to:

- define the jurisdiction of the federal courts (other than the High Court);
- define the extent to which the jurisdiction of any federal court (including the High Court) shall be exclusive of the jurisdiction of State courts;
- invest any State court with federal jurisdiction;
- make laws conferring rights to proceed against the Commonwealth or a State;
- prescribe the number of judges to exercise the federal jurisdiction of any court, and
- prescribe the place of any trial against any law of the Commonwealth where the offence was not committed within a State.

## The courts as a check on the power of Parliament

In the constitutional context of separation of powers, the courts, in their relationship to the Parliament, provide the means whereby the Parliament may be prevented from exceeding its constitutional powers. Wynes writes:

The Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth being, by covering Cl. V. [5] of the *Constitution Act*, "binding on the Courts, judges and people of every State and of every part of the Commonwealth", it is the essential function and duty of the Courts to adjudicate upon the constitutional competence of any Federal or State Act whenever the question falls for decision before them in properly constituted litigation.<sup>121</sup>

112 e.g. *Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act* 1970, s. 16; *Judiciary Act* 1903, s. 35.

113 Constitution, s. 73.

114 Constitution, s. 74.

115 *Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act* 1968, s. 3 (Act No. 36 of 1968); *Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act* 1975, s. 3 (Act No. 33 of 1975).

116 *Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act* 1968, s. 4.

117 Constitution, s. 75.

118 Constitution, s. 77; e.g. *Extradition (Foreign States) Act* 1966, s. 25 (Act No. 76 of 1966).

119 Constitution, s. 76.

120 *Judiciary Act* 1903, s. 30.

121 Wynes, p. 30.

Original jurisdiction in any matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation has been conferred on the High Court by an Act of Parliament<sup>122</sup>, pursuant to section 76(i) of the Constitution. The High Court does not in law have any power to veto legislation and it does not give advisory opinions<sup>123</sup> but in deciding between litigants in a case it may determine that a legislative enactment is unconstitutional and of no effect in the circumstances of the case. On the assumption that in subsequent cases the court will follow its previous decision (not always the case<sup>124</sup>) a law deemed *ultra vires* becomes a dead letter.

The power of the courts to interpret the Constitution and to determine the constitutionality of legislation gives the judiciary the power to determine certain matters directly affecting the Parliament and its proceedings. The range of High Court jurisdiction in these matters can be seen from the following recent cases:

- Petroleum and Minerals Authority case<sup>125</sup> — The High Court ruled that the passage of the Petroleum and Minerals Authority Bill through Parliament had not satisfied the provisions of section 57 of the Constitution and was consequently not a bill upon which the joint sitting of 1974 could properly deliberate and vote, and thus that it was not a valid law of the Commonwealth.<sup>126</sup>
- Webster's case<sup>127</sup> — On 22 April 1975, the Senate referred 2 questions to the High Court as the Court of Disputed Returns, namely, whether Senator Webster (1) was or (2) had become incapable of being chosen or sitting as a Senator under sections 44(v) and/or 45(iii) of the Constitution.<sup>128</sup> The Court answered 'No' to both questions.<sup>129</sup>
- McKinlay's case<sup>130</sup> — The High Court held that (1) sections 19, 24 and 25 of the *Commonwealth Electoral Act* 1918, as amended, did not contravene section 24 of the Constitution and (2) whilst sections 3, 4 and 12(a) of the *Representation Act* 1905, as amended, remain in their present form, the Representation Act is not a valid law by which the Parliament otherwise provides within the meaning of the second paragraph of section 24 of the Constitution.
- McKellar's case<sup>131</sup> — The High Court held that a purported amendment to section 10 of the *Representation Act* 1905, contained in the *Representation Act* 1964, was invalid because it offended the precepts of proportionality and the nexus with the size of the Senate as required by section 24 of the Constitution.

### Jurisdiction of the courts in matters of privilege

By virtue of section 49 of the Constitution the powers, privileges and immunities of the House of Representatives are, until otherwise declared by the Parliament, the same as those of the House of Commons as at 1 January 1901. As far as the House of Commons is concerned, the origin of its privileges lies in either the privileges of the ancient High Court of Parliament (before the division into Commons and Lords) or in later statutes, for example, Article 9 of the Bill of Rights of 1688 declares what is perhaps the basic privilege:

That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament.

122 *Judiciary Act* 1903, s. 30.

123 See *In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts*, (1921) 29 CLR 257.

124 e.g. *Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd (Engineer's Case)* (1920) 28 CLR 129.

125 *Victoria v. Commonwealth* (1975) 134 CLR 81.

126 See also Ch. on 'Disagreements between the Houses' for the cases concerning s. 57.

127 *In re Webster* (1975) 132 CLR 270.

128 S. Deb. (22.4.75) 1198-1223; J 1974-75/628-9.

129 See also Ch. on 'Elections and the electoral system' regarding the Court of Disputed Returns.

130 *Attorney-General (Australia) (ex rel. McKinlay) v. Commonwealth* (1975) 135 CLR 1.

131 *Attorney-General (NSW) (ex rel. McKellar) v. Commonwealth* (1978) 139 CLR 527.

This established the basis of the relationship between the House of Commons and the courts. However a number of grey areas remained, centering on the claim of the House of Commons to be the sole and exclusive judge of its own privilege, an area of law which it maintained was outside the ambit of the ordinary courts and which the courts could not question. The courts maintained, on the contrary, that the *lex et consuetudo parliamenti* (the law and custom of Parliament) was part of the law of the land and that they were bound to decide any question of privilege arising in a case within their jurisdiction and to decide it according to their own interpretation of the law. Although much of this question of jurisdiction remains formally unresolved, the position is that there has developed a wide field of agreement between the House of Commons and the courts on the nature and principles of privilege. *May* summarises as follows<sup>132</sup>:

(1) It seems to be recognized that, for the purpose of adjudicating on questions of privilege, neither House is by itself entitled to claim the supremacy over the ordinary courts of justice which was enjoyed by the undivided High Court of Parliament. The supremacy of Parliament, consisting of the Sovereign and the two Houses, is a legislative supremacy which has nothing to do with the privilege jurisdiction of either House acting singly.<sup>133</sup>

(2) It is admitted by both Houses that, since neither House can by itself add to the law, neither House can by its own declaration create a new privilege. This implies that privilege is objective and its extent ascertainable, and reinforces the doctrine that it is known by the courts.<sup>134</sup>

On the other hand, the courts admit:—

(3) That the control of each House over its internal proceedings is absolute and cannot be interfered with by the courts.<sup>135</sup>

(4) That a committal for contempt by either House is in practice within its exclusive jurisdiction, since the facts constituting the alleged contempt need not be stated on the warrant of committal.<sup>136</sup>

This reflects the position in Australia, and the courts may determine whether a privilege is properly claimed by reference to precedents involving the House of Commons.

### **The right of Parliament to the service of its Members in priority to the claims of the courts<sup>137</sup>**

This is one of the oldest of parliamentary privileges from which derives Members' immunity from arrest in civil proceedings and their exemption from attendance as witnesses and from jury service.

Members of Parliament are immune from arrest in civil proceedings during a session of Parliament and for 40 days before and after a session.<sup>138</sup> This privilege lost most of its importance in the 19th century with the virtual abolition of imprisonment in civil process.<sup>139</sup>

On 26 February 1980, the Senate agreed to the following resolution which was communicated to the Presiding Officers of the Parliaments of the States, the Attorneys-General of the States and the Speaker of the House of Representatives:

That the Senate, having considered the Fifth Report of the Committee of Privileges, resolves that—

(1) It is the right of the Senate to receive notification of the detention of its members.

<sup>132</sup> *May*, p. 201.

<sup>133</sup> See *R. v. Knollys*, 1694 in *May*, p. 184; *Ashby v. White and others*, 1703-04 in *May*, pp. 184-5; *Stockdale v. Hansard* 1836-37 in *May*, pp. 187-8.

<sup>134</sup> See *Stockdale v. Hansard* 1836-37 in *May*, pp. 187-8.

<sup>135</sup> See *Stockdale v. Hansard* 1836-37 in *May*, pp. 187-8; *Bradlaugh v. Gossett* 1884 in *May*, p. 190.

<sup>136</sup> See *Burdett v. Abbott* 1811 in *May*, pp. 186-7; *Howard v. Gossett* 1845 in *May*, pp. 189-90.

<sup>137</sup> For a more detailed treatment of this subject see Ch. on 'Parliamentary privilege'.

<sup>138</sup> *May*, pp. 99, 148.

<sup>139</sup> *May*, p. 93.

- (2) Should a Senator for any reason be held in custody pursuant to the order or judgment of any court, other than a court martial, the court ought to notify the President of the Senate, in writing, of the fact and the cause of the Senator's being placed in custody.
- (3) Should a Senator be ordered to be held in custody by any court martial or officer of the Defence Force, the President of the Senate ought to be notified by His Excellency the Governor-General of the fact and the cause of the Senator's being placed in custody.
- (4) The Presiding Officers of the Parliament should confer with the Presiding Officers of the Parliaments of the States, and the Attorney-General should confer with the Attorneys-General of the States, upon the action to be taken to secure compliance with the foregoing Resolutions.<sup>140</sup>

The Parliament also claims the right of the service of its Members and officers in priority to a subpoena to attend as a witness in court. In the House of Commons it has been held on occasions that the service of a subpoena on a Member to attend as a witness was a breach of privilege.<sup>141</sup> Under present usage the normal practice is for the Speaker to write to the court asking that the Member be excused. The alternative is for the House to grant leave to the Member to attend.

The serving or executing of a civil or criminal process within the precincts of the House while the House is sitting without obtaining the leave of the House has been considered to be a contempt of the House.<sup>142</sup>

By virtue of the Jury Exemption Act, Members of Parliament are not liable, and may not be summoned, to serve as jurors in any Federal, State or Territory court.<sup>143</sup>

### Attendance of parliamentary officers in court<sup>144</sup>

Standing order 368 provides that no officer of the House, or shorthand writer employed to take minutes of evidence before the House or any committee thereof, may give evidence elsewhere in respect of any proceedings or examination of any witness without the special leave of the House.

A number of parliamentary officers are exempted from attendance as jurors in Australian Capital Territory or New South Wales courts as the case may be.<sup>145</sup> Exemption from jury service is provided in respect of those officers required to devote their attention completely to the functioning of the House and its committees.

### Parliamentary debate and the courts

Other matters involving the relationship between Parliament and the courts which require brief mention are:

- *Interpretation of the Constitution.* In 1908, the Speaker ruled:  
 . . . the obligation does not rest upon me to interpret the Constitution . . . the only body fully entitled to interpret the Constitution is the High Court . . . Not even this House has the power finally to interpret the terms of the Constitution.<sup>146</sup>  
 This ruling has been generally followed by all subsequent Speakers.
- *The sub judice rule.* It is the practice of the House that matters awaiting or under adjudication in a court of law should not be brought forward in debate, except by means of a bill. This rule is sometimes applied to restrict discussion on current proceedings before a royal commission, depending on its terms of reference. Issues of national importance before the Arbitration Commission, for example,

<sup>140</sup> J 1978-80/1153.

<sup>141</sup> *May*, pp. 101-02.

<sup>142</sup> *May*, p. 147.

<sup>143</sup> *Jury Exemption Act 1965*, s. 4.

<sup>144</sup> See also Chs on 'Papers and documents' and 'Parliamentary privilege'.

<sup>145</sup> *Jury Exemption Regulations*, SR 131 of 1970.

<sup>146</sup> H.R. Deb. (22.4.08) 10 486.

may be referred to unless such references would constitute a real and substantial danger of prejudice to the proceedings. In exercising his discretion in applying the sub judice rule the Speaker makes decisions which involve the inherent right of the House to inquire into and debate matters of public importance which are within the responsibility of Ministers while at the same time ensuring that the House does not set itself up as an alternative forum to the courts or permit the proceedings of the House to interfere with the course of justice.<sup>147</sup>

- *Reflections on the judiciary.* Standing order 75 provides, inter alia, that no Member may use offensive words against any member of the judiciary.<sup>148</sup>

## CONSTITUTION ALTERATION

The Constitution from which Parliament obtains its authority cannot be changed by Parliament alone. A majority vote of the people of the Commonwealth is also required (*see below*). The Constitution itself, expressing as it does the agreement of the States to unite into a Federal Commonwealth, was originally agreed to by the people of the States at referendum.<sup>149</sup> The process of constitutional alteration commences with the Houses of Parliament.

A proposal to alter the Constitution may originate in either House of the Parliament by means of a bill. Normally, the bill must be passed by an absolute majority of each House but, in certain circumstances, it need only be passed by an absolute majority of one House.<sup>150</sup> Subject to the absolute majority provision, the passage of the bill is the same as for an ordinary bill.<sup>151</sup>

In the case of a bill having passed through both Houses, it shall be submitted to the electors in each State and Territory not less than 2 or more than 6 months after its passage. The bill is presented to the Governor-General for the necessary referendum arrangements to be made.<sup>152</sup>

If the bill passes one House and the other House rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with any amendment to which the originating House will not agree, the originating House, after an interval of 3 months in the same or next session, may again pass the bill in either its original form or in a form which contains any amendment made or agreed to by the other House on the first occasion. If the other House again rejects or fails to pass the bill or passes it with any amendment to which the originating House will not agree, the Governor-General **may** submit the bill as last proposed by the originating House, either with or without any amendments subsequently agreed to by both Houses, to the electors in each State and Territory. The words 'rejects or fails to pass, etc.' have the same meaning as those in section 57 of the Constitution.<sup>153</sup>

The manner of voting on bills submitted to the electors has been prescribed by the Parliament in the *Referendum (Constitution Alteration) Act 1906*, as amended. This Act provides that substantial provisions of the Commonwealth Electoral Act apply to a referendum as if it were an election.<sup>154</sup> If convenient, a referendum is held jointly with an election for the Senate and/or the House of Representatives.

If the bill is approved by a majority of the electors in a majority of the States, that is, at least 4 of the 6 States, and also by a majority of all the electors who voted, it is presented to the Governor-General for assent.<sup>155</sup> However, if the bill proposes to alter the

<sup>147</sup> See also Ch. on 'Control and conduct of debate'.

<sup>148</sup> See also Ch. on 'Control and conduct of debate'.

<sup>149</sup> See *Quick and Garran*, pp. 282 ff.

<sup>150</sup> Constitution, s. 128.

<sup>151</sup> See Ch. on 'Legislation'.

<sup>152</sup> See Ch. on 'Legislation'.

<sup>153</sup> See Ch. on 'Disagreements between the Houses'.

<sup>154</sup> *Referendum (Constitution Alteration) Act 1906*, s. 4.

<sup>155</sup> For assent details see Ch. on 'Legislation'.



Constitution by diminishing the proportionate representation of any State in either House, or the minimum number of representatives of a State in the House of Representatives, and so on<sup>156</sup>, the bill shall not become law unless the majority of electors voting in that State approve the bill. This means that the State affected by the proposal must be one of the 4 (or more) States which approve the bill.

The reference to 'Territory' in relation to a referendum means a Territory which is represented in the House of Representatives. Electors in the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory gained the right to vote at a referendum in 1977.<sup>157</sup>

There is no limit to the power to amend the Constitution provided that the restrictions applying to the mode of alteration are met.<sup>158</sup> However, there is considerable room for legal dispute as to whether the power of amendment extends to the preamble and the preliminary clauses of the Constitution Act itself.<sup>159</sup>

The validity of any referendum or of any return or statement showing the voting on any referendum may be disputed by the Commonwealth or any State by petition addressed to the High Court within a period of 40 days following the gazettal of the referendum results.<sup>160</sup> Pending resolution of the dispute or until the expiration of the period of 40 days, as the case may be, the bill is not presented for assent.

The short title of a bill proposing to alter the Constitution, in contradistinction to all other bills, does not contain the word 'Act' during its various stages, for example, the short title is in the form *Constitution Alteration (Referendums) 1977*. While the proposed law is converted to an 'Act' after approval at referendum and at the point of assent, in a technical sense it is strictly a Constitution alteration and its short title remains unchanged.

An Act to alter the Constitution comes into operation on the day on which it receives the Royal Assent, unless the contrary intention appears in the Act.<sup>161</sup>

## Constitution review

In August 1927, the Government appointed a royal commission to inquire into and report upon the powers of the Commonwealth under the Constitution and the working of the Constitution since Federation. The report was presented to Parliament in November 1929<sup>162</sup> but did not bring any positive results. In 1934, a Conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers on Constitutional Matters was held but little came of it.<sup>163</sup> In 1942, a Convention of Government and Opposition Leaders and Members from both Commonwealth and State Parliaments met in Canberra to discuss certain constitutional matters in relation to post-war reconstruction. They made significant progress and approved a draft bill transferring certain State powers, including control of labour, marketing, companies, monopolies and prices, from the States to the Commonwealth Government. However only 2 of the State Parliaments were prepared to approve the bill.<sup>164</sup>

156 See 5th paragraph of s. 128 of Constitution.

157 *Constitution Alteration (Referendums) 1977* (Act No. 84 of 1977).

158 *Quick and Garran*, pp. 988-91. One exception could be the constitutional validity of a proposal for the abolition or secession from the Commonwealth of an Original State see Lumb & Ryan, p. 403.

159 Lumb & Ryan, pp. 402-03.

160 *Referendum (Constitution Alteration) Act 1906*, ss. 27, 28.

161 *Acts Interpretation Act 1901*, s. 5(1B).

162 *Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution*, PP 16(1929-31); VP 1929-31/9.

163 P.H. Lane, *An Introduction to the Australian Constitution*, 2nd edn, Law Book Co., Sydney, 1977, p. 247.

164 *Convention of Representatives of Commonwealth and State Parliaments on Proposed Alteration of the Commonwealth Constitution—Record of Proceedings*, 24 November—2 December, 1942, Govt Pr., Canberra.

The next major review of the Constitution was conducted by a Joint Select Committee of the Parliament, first appointed in 1956.<sup>165</sup> The committee presented its first report in 1958<sup>166</sup> and a final report in 1959.<sup>167</sup> The report made many significant recommendations, but no constitutional amendments resulted in the short term.

Recommendations of the committee which were submitted some years later to the people at referendum were:

- to enable the number of Members of the House to be increased without necessarily increasing the number of Senators (1967);
- to enable Aborigines to be counted in reckoning the population (1967);
- to ensure that Senate elections are held at the same time as House of Representatives elections (1974 and 1977);
- to facilitate alterations to the Constitution (1974);
- to ensure that Members of the House are chosen directly and democratically by the people (1974), and
- to ensure, so far as practicable, that a casual vacancy in the Senate is filled by a person of the same political party as the Senator chosen by the people (1977).

In 1970, the Victorian Parliament initiated a proposal to convene an Australian Constitutional Convention. Following agreement by the States to the proposal and the inclusion of the Commonwealth in the proposed convention, the first meeting took place at Sydney in 1973 and was followed by further meetings of the convention at Melbourne (1975), Hobart (1976) and Perth (1978). The convention has agreed to a number of proposals for the alteration of the Constitution, some of which were submitted to the people at the referendums of 1977. The referendums on Simultaneous Elections, Referendums, and the Retirement of Judges were the subject of resolutions of the convention at meetings held in Melbourne and Hobart.<sup>168</sup>

### **Distribution to electors of arguments for and against proposed constitutional alterations**

The Referendum (Constitution Alteration) Act makes provision for the distribution to electors of arguments for and against proposed alterations. The 'Yes' case is prepared and authorised by a majority of those Members of both Houses who voted in favour of the proposed law and the 'No' case by a majority of those Members of both Houses who voted against it.<sup>169</sup> The provision however is not mandatory and only applies where the proposed law has passed both Houses. In the case of the 4 Constitution alteration bills of 1974<sup>170</sup>, which were passed by the House of Representatives only, the Government provided by administrative arrangement for 'Yes' and 'No' cases to be distributed, the 'No' case being prepared by the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives.<sup>171</sup>

### **Referendum results**

Of the 36 referendums<sup>172</sup> submitted to the electors since Federation, 8 have been approved. Of those which were not approved, 24 received neither a favourable majority of

<sup>165</sup> VP 1956-57/168-9,171.

<sup>166</sup> VP 1958/214; *Report of the Joint Committee on Constitution Review*, PP 50(1958).

<sup>167</sup> VP 1959-60/306; *Report of the Joint Committee on Constitutional Review*, PP 108(1959-60).

<sup>168</sup> For references to proceedings of the Australian Constitutional Convention see Bibliography.

<sup>169</sup> *Referendum (Constitution Alteration) Act 1906*, s. 6A.

<sup>170</sup> See Appendix 25.

<sup>171</sup> See S. Deb. (21.3.74)469-70.

<sup>172</sup> See Appendix 16.

electors in a majority of States nor a favourable majority of all electors, while the remaining 4 achieved a favourable majority of all electors but not a favourable majority of electors in a majority of States.

The 8 Constitution alterations which gained the approval of the electors were submitted in 1906, 1910, 1928, 1946, 1967 and 1977 (3). The successful referendums were approved by majorities in every State, with the exception that New South Wales alone rejected the Constitution Alteration (State Debts) Bill submitted in 1910.

The proposals of 1906, 1910, 1946 and 1974 were submitted to the electors concurrently with general elections.

Successful referendums relating to the electoral and parliamentary processes have been:

- *Constitution Alteration (Senate Elections)* 1906. This was the first constitutional referendum. It altered section 13 to cause Senators' terms to commence in July instead of January.
- *Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual Vacancies)* 1977. It provided that, where possible, a casual vacancy in the Senate should be filled by a person of the same political party as the Senator chosen by the people and for the balance of his term.
- *Constitution Alteration (Referendums)* 1977. It provided for electors in the Territories to vote at referendums on proposed laws to alter the Constitution.

The Constitution Alteration (Mode of Altering the Constitution) Bill 1974 sought to amend section 128 in order to facilitate alterations to the Constitution but was rejected by the electors. The intention of the amendment was to alter the provision that a proposed law has to be approved by a majority of electors 'in a majority of the States' (4 States) and, in its stead, provide that a proposed law has to be approved by a majority of electors 'in not less than one-half of the States' (3 States). The further requirement that a proposed law has to be approved by 'a majority of all the electors voting' was to be retained.

Proposals rejected by the electors which have specifically related to the parliamentary and electoral processes have been:

- *Constitution Alteration (Parliament)* 1967. This proposal intended to amend section 24 by removing the requirement that the number of Members shall be, as nearly as practicable, twice the number of Senators. Other than by breaking this 'nexus', an increase in the number of Members can only be achieved by a corresponding increase in the number of Senators, regardless of existing representational factors applying to the House of Representatives only.
- *Constitution Alteration (Simultaneous Elections)* 1974 and 1977. These proposals were intended to ensure that at least half of the Senate should be elected at the same time as an election for the House of Representatives. It was proposed that the term of a Senator should expire upon the expiration, or dissolution, of the second House of Representatives following the first election of the Senator. The effective result of this proposal would be that a Senator's term of office, without facing election, would be for a period less than the existing 6 years.
- *Constitution Alteration (Democratic Elections)* 1974. This proposal intended to write into the Constitution provisions which aimed to ensure that Members of the House and of the State Parliaments are elected directly by the people, and that representation is more equal and on the basis of population and population trends.

### **Other referendums**

Referendums, other than for purposes of Constitution alteration, were held in 1916 and 1917. These referendums related to the introduction of compulsory military service and were rejected by the people. The first was authorised by an Act of Parliament<sup>173</sup> and the second was held pursuant to regulations made under the War Precautions Act.<sup>174</sup>

In May 1977, concurrent with the Constitution alteration referendums then being held, electors were asked, in a poll as distinct from a referendum<sup>175</sup>, to express on a voluntary basis their preference for the tune of a national song to be played on occasions other than Regal and Vice-Regal occasions.

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<sup>173</sup> *Military Service Referendum Act* 1916 (Act No. 27 of 1916).

<sup>174</sup> War Precautions (Military Service Referendum) Regulations, SR 290 of 1917.

<sup>175</sup> VP 1977/4.