6.1
This chapter considers key recommendations arising from significant biosecurity reviews and looks at the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry's (DAFF) performance in implementing those recommendations. The chapter also looks at key recommendations arising from the reviews where the committee received significant evidence as part of its inquiry, including in relation to sustainable biosecurity funding. Lastly, the chapter examines several issues which cut across the biosecurity continuum and makes recommendations for improvement.
Findings of major biosecurity reviews and inquiries
6.2
Over recent decades, governments have commissioned several independent reviews into biosecurity. These reviews have been the catalyst for significant regulatory and structural reforms—many of which are in the process of being implemented. Concurrently, the Inspector-General of Biosecurity (IGB) and the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) have played an ongoing oversight role. Key reviews and audits referenced throughout this inquiry include:
Independent reviews
The Beale review (2008)—recommended moving from the concept of 'quarantine' to that of 'biosecurity', adopting a risk management approach, prioritising partnerships with non-government stakeholders and the development of a National Agreement on Biosecurity, a new Biosecurity Act and a new statutory office of IGB;
the Matthews review (2011)—looked into Australia's preparedness to prevent and respond to an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), leading to dedicated FMD Taskforce (active 2012 to 2014) and development of a National FMD Action Plan; and
the Craik review (2017)—which looked at the operation of the national biosecurity system as underpinned by the original 2012 Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity (IGAB). The Craik review recognised that biosecurity threats are increasing rapidly, recommended a series of major reforms with a five-to-ten-year timeframe, and led to a new IGAB between Australian governments, which came into effect in January 2019.
Exotic Animal Disease Preparedness Joint Interagency Taskforce
6.3
Announced on 4 August 2022, the taskforce brought together officials from DAFF, Emergency Management Australia, the Australian Defence Force, Australian Border Force (ABF) and Animal Health Australia (AHA) to work with states, territories and industry. The taskforce conducted a range of exercises to determine roles and responsibilities and assess preparedness for an FMD or lumpy skin disease (LSD) incursion. The taskforce noted that 'participants showed tremendous good will and cooperation … and expressed a willingness to share information and build upon Australia's world class system'.
6.4
The taskforce reported to the Minister on 5 September 2022. It found that 'the scale and speed of response required in the case of an FMD or LSD incursion would be significant and therefore place considerable pressure on the system'. However, the taskforce also reported that the biosecurity system was prepared, concluding that:
… [Emergency Animal Disease, (EAD)] response arrangements are comprehensive and well-understood by system participants. These response arrangements are regularly used, with success, in responding to biosecurity incidents. Overall, the system is strong, in particular in prevention and mitigation, and the system is sound.
6.5
The taskforce made 14 recommendations, including:
the need for improved national coordination and stakeholder engagement and participation;
development of a national crisis communications strategy and content with an emphasis on the value of 'strong and consistent messaging';
the need for a national biosecurity data and intelligence capability that informs the national collection, processing and dissemination of intelligence;
improvement of preparedness and responses at the federal level;
expansion of modelling, including potential economic impacts of an EAD incursion and weather events that could transport LSD to Australia;
review, rationalisation and modernisation of key response plans and policies by all jurisdictions;
development of a system-wide workforce capacity and training strategy;
development of a resource plan (including mission critical supplies);
additional work on a national approach to interstate border control; and
quarterly reporting on progress of these recommendations.
Inspector-General of Biosecurity reviews
6.6
Since being formally established in 2016, the IGB has published 20 reviews, with 246 recommendations. Currently, 136 are listed as 'closed' and 110 remain 'open and being progressed' by DAFF (see Appendix 1).
6.7
In February 2021 the IGB completed a key review into the DAFF's operational model, which found:
Australia's biosecurity system 'is not in a strong position to address the diverse and evolving biosecurity risks and business environment';
the current administrative structure creates perverse incentives for DAFF officers to 'escalate risks in their own area', in order to compete for resources, leading to a fragmentation of Australia's approach to biosecurity;
the department is 'better at starting initiatives and promising improvements' than 'delivering the targeted outcomes and locking in completed reforms';
the department has failed to embrace co-regulation and to work with industry as a partner; and
the absence of an appropriate biosecurity funding model.
6.8
In November 2021, the Inspector-General released a report on DAFF's implementation of IGB review recommendations. This report concluded that DAFF had:
… struggled to understand how to handle the independent role of Inspector-General established under the Biosecurity Act 2015, the seriousness of Inspectors-General recommendations, and the necessity for the small staff team assigned to support the Inspector-General to also provide independent support. … Australia needs the department to be better at what it does in providing biosecurity functions for our nation. That improvement requires better governance, not just more resources and more hard work from its committed workforce.
6.9
The IGB made ten recommendations addressing weaknesses in DAFF's management of its response to reviews, such as: increasing accountability and 'ownership'; improving the timeliness of implementation and reporting of progress; clearer 'verification of completion'; and 'integration of [IGB] recommendations within an overall improvement program'.
6.10
The IGB also suggested that the department implement routine monitoring and progress reporting against review recommendations, 'to maintain strong governance processes that provide the Director of Biosecurity with clear line of sight'. The current IGB, Dr Lloyd Klumpp, also observed that 'it's all very well making recommendations … [and] identifying lessons. We actually need formal processes … to ensure that there's accountability for making things change'.
6.11
Dr Klumpp advised that, as part of his forward work plan, he would be reviewing 'the strategic approaches of the department for system-wide benefit. Rather than focussing on FMD as an example, or varroa mite as an example'. His immediate priorities are to review the use of science and research and development within the department to ensure that it is relevant to the needs of the biosecurity system, and to improve the management and use of data.
Australian National Audit Office
6.12
The ANAO has conducted a number of recent audits relevant to the inquiry, such as the Responding to non-compliance with biosecurity requirements audit. This review made several concerning findings in relation to DAFF's compliance frameworks, operational arrangements and use of regulatory tools:
arrangements to respond to non‑compliance were 'largely inappropriate', citing an 'absence of frameworks, plans or targets';
was not able to demonstrate that its response to noncompliance is effective at managing biosecurity risks;
detection arrangements were 'partially appropriate'; and
use of regulatory tools was 'partially effective'.
6.13
The ANAO noted that 'undetected non-compliance' is increasing, despite improvements in some areas. Like the IGB, the ANAO also concluded that the department is failing to 'effectively use the full suite of regulatory tools available' to it. It made eight recommendations, all of which were agreed by government. These included recommendations that the department should provide:
guidance for its use of intelligence in regulating biosecurity, and improved governance arrangements for information systems;
a framework to assess and manage risk across the entire biosecurity system and to ensure resources are allocated proportionate to risk;
a planning framework for biosecurity regulation; and
a performance framework to 'support the effective use of the full suite of available regulatory tools'.
Australia's Biosecurity Future report
6.14
Another key biosecurity report, published in 2020 by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), was Australia's Biosecurity Future. This report created a 'vision for a resilient biosecurity system in 2030' and outlined key actions to achieve that vision. The report made 20 recommendations relevant to system connectivity, shared responsibility and innovation in science and technology. The CSIRO also called for a 'One Biosecurity and 'One Health' approach that incorporates human, agricultural, environmental, and marine biosecurity and promotes 'strong collaboration across governments, industry, research, and the community'.
Parliamentary reviews
6.15
The House of Representatives and the Senate have produced several recent reports into Australia's biosecurity system, many of which considered bills and administrative arrangements for individual agricultural imports.
6.16
Previous inquiries relevant to this inquiry include:
Inquiry into the biosecurity of Australian honey bees (2017);
Inquiry into the future of the beekeeping and pollination services industries in Australia (2014);
Review of the citrus industry in Australia (2013); and
Australia's biosecurity and quarantine arrangements (2012).
Government response to key reviews
6.17
According to DAFF, while Australia's biosecurity system is 'robust and mature', it must continually evolve over time to respond to new challenges and risks. This evolution can be seen in the department's responses to the key reviews outlined in this chapter.
6.18
A major development was the release of Commonwealth Biosecurity 2030, as discussed in Chapter One. Commonwealth Biosecurity 2030 includes a commitment to releasing annual action plans to guide the delivery of the strategy and 'ensure transparency'. The first annual action plan was released in May 2022. It provides an overview of work undertaken in 2021 and outlines priority activities for 2022 under the nine strategic areas.
6.19
Also resulting from the Commonwealth Biosecurity 2030 was Australia's first National Biosecurity Strategy (NBS). The strategy is designed to 'provide clear direction to ensure our system remains fit to meet the challenges of the next decade and beyond' and was developed collaboratively with states and territories, industry, relevant peak bodies and other key stakeholders.
6.20
The NBS includes 'initial actions under priority areas', as well as a roadmap for a national implementation plan that 'builds upon initial actions and establishes a framework for monitoring and evaluation to ensure accountability'. The strategy will be supported by the NBS Implementation Committee comprising representatives from plant, animal and aquatic industries, freight and logistics, environmental groups, research organisations and Indigenous communities. Stakeholder responses to the strategy are considered below.
6.21
As part of its response the Australian Government has also increased maximum penalties under the Biosecurity Act 2015 (Biosecurity Act) and regulations in 2021.
6.22
Further amendments to the compliance framework were implemented on 29 November 2022, with the passage of the Biosecurity Amendment (Strengthening Biosecurity) Act 2022. This legislation amended the Biosecurity Act to strengthen the management of biosecurity risks posed by goods and by maritime and aviation traveller arrivals and increased a range of civil and criminal penalties.
Response to Inspector-General and ANAO reviews
6.23
DAFF submitted that it has an 'ongoing program of work' underway to address all agreed IGB and ANAO recommendations. While almost half of the Inspector-General's recommendations are still being progressed, none of the recommendations in recent key ANAO reports have been finalised. However, the department submitted that four of these recommendations (out of 11) are 'in the final stages of closure'.
6.24
Dr Klumpp commented that the department is making progress and that:
As a result of that review [into departmental accountability for implementation of IGB recommendations], the department now has processes in place for accountability for those recommendations … There's also a developing internal assurance framework within the department, which is very encouraging. That internal assurance framework, although immature…offers great promise to ensuring the department has a continuous improvement process within biosecurity.
6.25
The IGB advised that he would again be reviewing the effectiveness of the department's management and implementation of previous IGB recommendations towards the end of his tenure in 2025.
Stakeholder perspectives on government response
6.26
Stakeholders from key industry and non-government organisations were frustrated with the Australian Government's progress on implementing review recommendations, and the pace of reform generally, with some, including the National Farmers' Federation (NFF), also calling for better reporting on the progress of implementation.
6.27
Australian Pork Limited observed that independent reviews into Australia's biosecurity have continued to 'share' the same recurring themes over time, including 'dwindling biosecurity budgets' and the need for sustainable funding, the need for more frontline resources and capacity building, lack of regulatory maturity, and the requirement for better regulatory solutions through co-regulation.
6.28
Australian Pork Limited added that the potential for these reviews to improve the biosecurity system, preparedness and response arrangements will only be realised if 'they are subsequently implemented' and it has joined with other stakeholders to lobby the government on implementation priorities.
6.29
The NFF said reviews show government funding for biosecurity has 'generally been static or in decline', while funds and levies on industry have increased. Data shows a 25 per cent decrease in the number of frontline biosecurity inspection staff between 2013–14 and 2017–18, and a halving of biosecurity detector dogs between 2012 and 2017. In this context, the NFF noted its 'disappointment' at the Government's decision not to progress the introduction of a biosecurity container levy and argued this 'should be progressed as a matter of urgency' (see Sustainable biosecurity funding later in this chapter).
6.30
Noting declining confidence in Australia's biosecurity system, GrainGrowers argued there needs to be a 'reset' of the national operating and resourcing model. It called for the recommendations made from biosecurity reviews to 'be seen as opportunities to learn and improve rather than administrative hurdles to be cleared'.
6.31
Other issues highlighted included the strong support for greater Australian Government national leadership and further connectivity within the biosecurity system. The need for greater regional partnerships and wider stakeholder engagement on biosecurity issues was also raised, including with Indigenous communities, agricultural resellers, industry field consultants, pest management technicians, national parks, the resource sector, government land managers, recreational hunters, smallholdings and Defence.
Responses to the National Biosecurity Strategy
6.32
Stakeholders were generally positive about the NBS, seeing it as an opportunity for a reset and refresh of Australia's biosecurity arrangements.
6.33
However, Australian Pork Limited highlighted the need for the strategy to be supported by a comprehensive implementation plan, and 'sustainable funding and governance arrangements'. It recognised that the NBS could deliver 'genuine cultural change' towards a 'one biosecurity' approach to future proof Australia's biosecurity system. To manifest this change Australian Pork Limited called for authentic partnerships between all stakeholders, 'including health, regional development and infrastructure, community services and tourism'.
6.34
The NFF encouraged the committee to consider how government can best support the broad acceptance of the strategy 'by all parties', to ensure its success. The Centre of Excellence for Biosecurity Risk Analysis (CEBRA) recommended governments work together to develop 'a forward plan for future skills bottlenecks', incorporating specific measures to 'identify, recruit, train, and retain' biosecurity specialists.
State government perspectives
6.35
State governments were generally positive about the progress that the Commonwealth has made in recent years towards reforming the national biosecurity system, while noting that 'gaps remain'.
6.36
The Western Australian Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development (WA DPIRD) specifically identified 'skills shortages, traceability, data sharing and use, and laboratory proficiency' as issues, and argued for greater investment, better prioritisation and better coordination of activities across jurisdictions, 'industries and supply chains, and communities'. It thought that this should include better sharing of 'physical and non-physical resources', the use of national modelling to respond to incursions, and the 'centralisation' of specialised skills.
6.37
WAFarmers expressed concern that state governments may not be 'pulling their weight', with state biosecurity funding reportedly at a standstill. WAFarmers recommended this committee benchmark state government biosecurity budget allocations 'since 2017 in respect to the intergovernmental agreement'. WA DPIRD submitted that it is currently reviewing Western Australia's primary biosecurity legislation and developing a Biosecurity Roadmap.
6.38
The Queensland Minister for Agricultural Industry Development and Fisheries submitted that the Queensland government had increased funding and ramped up activity in the biosecurity sector. In this context, the Minister argued that the recommendations of the 2017 Craik review are 'still relevant' and should be 'revisited and re-assessed for implementation'. In particular, the Commonwealth should progress action on developing a sustainable funding model, along with increasing research and innovation.
6.39
Other state governments that submitted to the inquiry (Victoria, South Australia and the Northern Territory) did not comment on the adequacy of the government's response.
'Urgency' of action and investment levels
6.40
Key stakeholders and industry bodies acknowledged recent developments, such as the NBS, but argued the Commonwealth is not acting with sufficient urgency. For instance, the Integrity Systems Company (ISC) said stakeholders are concerned about 'complacency' due to the slow pace of reforms.
6.41
During his appearance before the committee on 10 August 2022, Andrew Metcalfe AO, Secretary of DAFF, assured the committee that the department is not sitting on its hands:
We are never complacent. We fully understand the consequences of these pests and diseases. We have mobilised all available resources, our networks across industry and government, and our international partners to keep Australia FMD and LSD free.
6.42
The department overtly recognised the need to 'accelerate reform' in its strategic roadmap, Commonwealth Biosecurity 2030:
The urgency for accelerating reform is driven by the impacts of globalisation, which continues to rapidly change and add complexity to the environment in which our biosecurity system must operate.
Higher trade, travel and international freight volumes are increasing the number of opportunities for pests and diseases to hitchhike into Australia. There are also more stakeholders involved in global supply chains than ever before, making it more complex to identify potential risks.
6.43
Annual action plans under Commonwealth Biosecurity 2030 will continue to outline the department's progress and achievements, along with its roadmap for the following year. DAFF submitted:
Implementing meaningful change in response to such findings is not always fast or simple. Some recommendations require significant change (in policy and/or operational arrangements) as well as consultation with other national and international agencies, industry and/or further decisions by government.
6.44
CSIRO Biosecurity Mission lead, Dr Andrew Sheppard agreed that transformation of the biosecurity system is vital:
Since the Craik review, there's been pretty much general acceptance that there is a pressing need to transform the biosecurity system, and just scaling up the current biosecurity system would not deliver the protection that we need as a nation … Throughout the preparation of the [National Biosecurity Strategy] I did my best to make sure that the important need for transformational change, particularly supported by science and technology innovation, was a core component of that strategy, going forward, and I think it is adequately captured.
6.45
Along with implementing the annual action plans, the government established the Agriculture Policy Taskforce in August 2022 to advise the department on 'preparedness for a nationally significant exotic animal disease outbreak'. The Exotic Animal Disease Preparedness Joint Interagency Taskforce has also contributed to Australia's preparedness, as discussed earlier in this chapter, with the department noting that it is focussed on addressing a range of issues covered by the Taskforce's recommendations, in particular in relation to data, crisis communications, workforce capacity and capability and access to critical supplies.
Committee view
6.46
The committee recognises the ongoing work that is being done by the department to address the high complexity and increasing biosecurity challenges, including the development of Commonwealth Biosecurity 2030, the annual release of action plans, the inaugural NBS and its future implementation plan.
6.47
However, the committee notes with concern the slow progress and in some cases lack of progress of the implementation of review recommendations. Based on evidence received by the committee, this lack of urgency appears to result from insufficient governance measures, organisational culture, and insufficient staff and financial resources within DAFF.
6.48
The committee endorses the IGB's recommendations in relation to improved governance and reporting arrangements relating to the implementation of review recommendations and notes the department's progress and increased transparency in this area, through its annual action plans. It also notes that the IGB intends to again review the implementation of IGB recommendations as outlined in the forward review program for 2022–25.
6.49
The committee welcomes the further increased penalties for biosecurity non-compliance that have been proposed, in recognition of the risks posed by weed, pest and disease incursions to Australia and its economic and environmental security. The committee recognises that the department has made significant progress in this area and has improved the transparency of information available to stakeholders. However, the committee remains concerned that DAFF does not appear to be utilising the full suite of regulatory, compliance and enforcement tools it has available.
Sustainable biosecurity funding
6.50
In alignment with previous reviews into the biosecurity system, this inquiry has reinforced the need for sustainable biosecurity funding.
6.51
Given forecast average international passenger increases of around five per cent per annum between 2015 and 2034, and significant increases in mail and cargo arising from the pandemic, DAFF advised that the current biosecurity system is 'unable to continue to provide the same level of protection by simply scaling existing resources'. Modelling of the 'current trajectory' shows that even 'tripling' current investment will still see 'higher residual risk levels for Australia in 2025 than at 2014–15'.
6.52
Mr Metcalfe highlighted the role the NBS has in 'ramping up' the response on a national level, saying the strategy represents 'governments committing to continuing their focus and looking at their funding, their resourcing, their collaborative effort and how we can collectively, as a biosecurity family, work together'. However, funding levels and resource allocation are ultimately a question for each jurisdiction.
6.53
Stakeholders from across the animal, plant and environment biosecurity system collectively called for the creation of new, on-going and sustainable biosecurity funding measures, as an integral element to improving Australia's biosecurity planning and readiness.
6.54
AgForce Queensland highlighted the challenges of attracting biosecurity preparedness funding—unless there is an imminent or actual biosecurity threat:
Without a biosecurity threat you don't invest in biosecurity, right? Now we've got a biosecurity threat, so, guess what? We're investing in biosecurity. Isn't that a surprise? Moving forward, how do we make sure that we have enough of a biosecurity threat to invest enough in biosecurity?
6.55
The Biosecurity Collective along with other submitters, called for sustainable biosecurity funding 'to properly prepare and reform Australia's biosecurity' system and 'protect its [Australia's] agriculture, environment, communities and economy from the increasing risk of damaging invasive pests and diseases'. It asserted that whilst preparedness plans and programs are in place, effective implementation is reliant upon adequate funding, with spending on prevention and early detection measures, a more cost-effective approach.
6.56
The Biosecurity Collective argued that '[a] doubling of funding in real terms by 2030 will likely be required, sourced from a variety of government and non-government sources, at the federal and state/territory levels'. Further, it contended that there is a need to consider 'the disparity between ongoing funding for the interlinked components of the national system, beyond the attention given to agricultural productivity and market access'. The Biosecurity Collective also highlighted that '[i]nvestment in environmental biosecurity risks continues to lag behind agricultural risks'.
6.57
Likewise, representatives of the plant industry were concerned at the inequality of biosecurity resources allocation. For example, the Plant Industry Forum (PIF) pointed out that each year Australia is exposed to an average of 40 exotic plant pest incursions, whereas the animal sector experiences less than one. It argued that government-run plant biosecurity services are beyond capacity, as evidenced by the 'high workload … plant biosecurity agencies are exposed to on a day-to-day basis'. PIF asserted that governments' biosecurity funding reveals a 'systemic lack of support for plant industries'.
6.58
DAFF confirmed that the Australian Government was 'committed to implement a sustainable funding mechanism … to strengthen Australia's biosecurity system and allow it to continue to evolve to support our trade and protect our animals, plants, environment and the Australian community'.
Biosecurity Budget measures—2022–23
6.59
In the 2021–22 budget the government flagged $400 million towards biosecurity as part of its Agriculture 2030 initiative.
6.60
On 25 October 2022, the Australian Government announced a further $134.1 million of four years from 2022–23 (and $3.3 million annually, ongoing) in additional funding to Australia's biosecurity system. Specific measures announced as part of the 2022–23 Budget included:
$61.6 million over two years to strengthen frontline biosecurity capability through the enhance of measures in northern Australia, and supporting domestic preparedness and biosecurity outcomes in neighbouring countries;
$46.7 million over three years to improve on-farm biosecurity measures, including a national livestock traceability system;
$14 million to improve Australia's biosecurity systems, with specific funding to FMD and LSD outbreaks in neighbouring countries; and
$11.7 million over four years (and $3.3 million per year ongoing from 2026–27) to expand Australia's detector dog capability at its borders.
Biosecurity import levy
6.61
One solution proposed to improve resourcing of Australia's biosecurity system, argued by many witnesses and submitters, was the application of a biosecurity import levy on shipping containers entering Australia. The AHBIC made clear that the current arrangement did not include all parties with any involvement in biosecurity, submitting that:
… the international transport industry that facilitates the incursion bares no financial responsibility for surveillance operations or incursion eradications. Strangely, it is the recipient industry, and those other horticulture industries impacted most that are footing the bills and paying.
6.62
A biosecurity imports levy was recommended by both the 2017 Craik review and the 2019 Steering Committee. In 2020 after industry consultation and further consideration of the impacts, the Australian Government determined not to proceed with a levy at that time. However, Mr Metcalfe said the then Coalition Government had intended to 'return to the issue' in the future.
6.63
The committee received evidence that called for the Australian Government to recommence consultations with industry to reconsider a viable biosecurity levy model. Grain Producers Australia (GPA) advised the committee that it was not understood 'why the container levy was rejected or not implemented'. However, it speculated that it was a result of practicalities about the system. The committee heard that the GPA remained hopeful that a way forward could be found to overcome objections to the levy and support its implementation, 'given the benefits that it can deliver not only for growers in [the grain] industry but for the broader public as well'.
6.64
Similarly, the NFF submitted that it was 'disappointed that this [proposal] did not progress'. It submitted that it was 'imperative that biosecurity pathways that generate risk contribute to the need for increased biosecurity measures', whilst also emphasising the importance of clarity, transparency, and accountability on how funds are collected and invested into the biosecurity system. More broadly, the NFF highlighted the importance of sustainable long-term funding 'to deliver not only the priority areas of the National Biosecurity Strategy, but [also] the areas of enhanced preparedness'.
6.65
PHA clarified its position on the suitability of a biosecurity import levy and potential pathways forward, having previously written to the then Minister for Agriculture expressing its members' disappointment in the decision not to proceed with the biosecurity levy. Its Chief Executive Officer, Sarah Corcoran explained that PHA supported a 'funding model that brings in other beneficiaries when we have incidents to emergency plant pests', and that the biosecurity levy was one measure that could deliver that outcome. Regarding the Australian Government's consultation with industry on how best to apply the levy, PHA recommended that an extensive consultation process recommence:
I understand the consultation around that levy was not as good as what it could have been; hence, there was the feeling of not being brought along on the journey when the discussions were had. That doesn't preclude us from thinking about doing something similar, in the future, and, in terms of rolling out that process, the recommendation would be an extensive consultation process.
6.66
The Australian Government is currently conducting further consultation on a sustainable funding mechanism for biosecurity, with consultations closing at the end of November 2022, and recommendations to be made to the government in 2023.
6.67
The department noted that 'there's no specific model defined as yet' and that the purpose of the discussion paper is 'to seek views from the broader public', including views about the adequacy or otherwise of current funding. Options canvassed with stakeholders included increases to budget appropriations, co-funding and investment strategies with partners, levies paid for by risk creators and/or beneficiaries, and cost recovery arrangements.
Committee view
6.68
It is apparent to the committee that the premier matter of concern for all stakeholders of the biosecurity system is access to adequate and long-term funding. This concern has been reflected time and again in the findings of various reviews and reports into Australia's biosecurity system.
6.69
Australia's world-class biosecurity system must be adequately funded to ensure its optimal functionality, and reflect the growing risks associated with globalisation and the changing climate. As demonstrated in this report, prevention and early detection are key areas of focus, highlighted by the FMD and LSD outbreak in our region and the detection of varroa mite in New South Wales (NSW). The failure of prevention and detection measures, through inadequate funding, will have profound and widespread impacts on the Australian economy, the agricultural sector, regional and rural communities, and Australia's unique ecosystem.
6.70
The committee is encouraged that the Australian Government has recommenced consultations to explore sustainable and long-term biosecurity funding options. The committee agrees that potential pathways forward for developing a sustainable and long-term funding arrangement include through budget appropriation to increase real base funding levels, and through the application of a biosecurity import levy. It is a rational conclusion that the freight sector, which is the creator of a major biosecurity risk, should contribute funds to biosecurity control measures. However, it is equally important that such a levy is applied fairly, is proportionate to risk profiles and committed to biosecurity measures.
6.71
The committee recommends that the Australian federal, state and territory governments commit to a sustainable biosecurity funding model to reflect the changing risk profile of pests and diseases to Australia's agriculture and environment and overall way of life.
6.72
Finally, the committee sees significant benefit of biosecurity funding being adequately and appropriately allocated to reflect the interconnectivity and risk profiles across animal, plant, environmental and even human health and biosecurity. As exemplified by the FMD and LSD outbreak in Indonesia, a major vulnerability is a potential outbreak within wild animal populations. Similarly, a plant biosecurity incursion may have broader impacts on both animal and environmental biosecurity.
6.73
The committee considers a fully functional biosecurity system as one that is cognisant of the interconnectivity of biosecurity risks, is adequately and appropriately resourced across all risk pathways, and is informed by economic, agricultural and environmental impact considerations. In this respect, the committee considers it timely to conduct a review of biosecurity system to ensure future biosecurity funding is holistically allocated and in accordance with risk profiles.
6.74
The committee recommends the Australian Government, in partnership with animal, plant and environment biosecurity stakeholders, conducts a review of how biosecurity funding is allocated to ensure that it is adequate and equitable.
Workforce capability and development
6.75
The committee were told of industry support for a biosecurity workforce capability and skills framework, skills surveys, assessments and registers, and workforce capability planning to ensure Australia has a skilled biosecurity workforce ready to respond to threats.
6.76
The need to bolster Australia's biosecurity workforce is clear and DAFF has committed to the development of a national biosecurity workforce strategy, including identifying skills needs, improving retention, strengthening professional development, and building existing partnerships.
6.77
Submitters also advocated for a greater focus on biosecurity and technical specialist training and education, including ongoing professional development, within the vocational education and training and university sectors, in partnership with industry, research and other education providers. The Australian Academy of Technology and Engineering (ATSE) called for long term investment in engaging younger people in science, technology, engineering and medical areas to ensure Australia's future biosecurity workforce.
6.78
Australian Pork and Australian Dairy Farmers also observed the increasing role of technology and data in biosecurity and the need for professionals with data science, statistics, risk analysis and information, communications, and technology skills. Similarly, Horticulture Innovation Australia (Hort Innovation) called for the development of a biosecurity workforce skilled in the use of 'innovative technologies and apply them effectively across the biosecurity spectrum' to address labour shortfalls.
6.79
Witnesses and submitters recognised the need to increase the capacity and capability of the biosecurity workforce across all jurisdictions and all sectors, and risks associated with lack of workforce surge capacity which would be required during a large response, an issue also identified by the Joint Interagency Taskforce.
6.80
In particular the committee noted evidence relating to insufficient numbers of biosecurity officers and inspectors, as demonstrated by workforce shortages impacting on the response to the varroa mite incursion in NSW. In this respect, bee industry representatives highlighted the lack of biosecurity compliance officers and trained personnel with necessary skills to effectively respond to an incursion. These stakeholders called for an increase in state and territory biosecurity officers and training programs available to industry to support biosecurity activities.
6.81
In relation to rural livestock veterinarians, the Australian Veterinary Association (AVA), the NFF and Dr Ken Jacobs told the committee of 'critical [veterinary] workforce shortages and other sustainability challenges, especially in rural and regional areas.' The NFF submitted that the rationalisation of government veterinary services, a change in emphasis from livestock to companion animals, an ageing workforce, and the sustainability of rural vet practices have contributed to shortages. Submitters warned of the risks associated with insufficient front-line vets available to diagnose, trace and eradicate diseases as early in an outbreak as possible.
6.82
The committee was told that measures could be put in place to address these shortages, including:
greater resourcing for public-private partnerships between the government and private veterinary sectors;
the development of a coordinated framework to ensure veterinary capability;
compensation for private vets for loss of earnings and maintenance of infrastructure in the event of an EAD response;
the expansion of public-private surveillance initiatives to ensure financial viability of rural practices;
enhancements to encourage veterinary studies and rural practice incentives for early career veterinarians.
6.83
The committee heard that DAFF's biosecurity workforce has not increased to match the increasing workload, as well as increasing biosecurity threats, with the Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU) alleging that 'the Department has been unable to meet increasing and changing workload demands with not enough staff to manage its core functions adequately'. Its members have warned that high workloads and shortcuts are impacting the effective operation of Australia's biosecurity system biosecurity policies and resulting in an 'inability to manage current risks'.
6.84
Witnesses called for an expansion of the department's biosecurity workforce, with a greater emphasis on attracting and retaining skilled staff, including surveillance officers, diagnosticians, and detector dogs and handlers.
Committee view
6.85
Based on the evidence received by the committee, it is clear the current biosecurity workforce has neither the capacity nor the full capability to address the current risks, with no surge capacity should there be multiple incursions across multiple jurisdictions. The committee supports the development of a national biosecurity workforce strategy to identify skills needed and bolster capability and capacity, and supports the inclusion of an audit of existing capabilities and training to inform the development of the strategy.
6.86
In particular, the committee notes the ongoing delays and industry costs in relation to cargo screening and assessment. While the establishment of a rapid response team is welcomed, additional biosecurity officers are required and further development of technology and systems is needed to ensure pests and diseases are captured at the border, with minimal impact.
6.87
The committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry incorporate an audit of existing skills and gaps in the development of the national biosecurity workforce strategy.
6.88
The committee recommends that the Australian Government support and prioritise biosecurity officers' capacity and capability development to improve border responses and reduce delays for passengers and importers, and improve Australia's overall biosecurity readiness.
6.89
The rural veterinary profession appears to be in crisis, especially in remote areas. Veterinarians are an essential part of Australia's biosecurity system—holding key front-line defence roles in monitoring and surveillance, disease detection, EAD preparedness and response and animal welfare. Veterinarians bear significant pressures in any EAD response, and there needs to be sufficient capacity to meet initial and potentially extended response measures. Attracting and retaining rural vets is clearly challenging and complex, and will require a coordinated response between government and industry to address shortfalls in the medium-long term.
6.90
The committee recommends that the Australian Government work with relevant industry bodies to design and implement measures to improve the capacity and capability of production animal veterinarians, particularly in rural and remote areas, including:
enhancement of veterinarian attraction and retention strategies and initiatives such as graduate and rural practice incentives;
compensation paid to veterinarians in the event of their involvement in an EAD response; and
increased utilisation of rural and remote veterinarians in surveillance and monitoring activities.
6.91
The committee commends the work of DPI officials and bee industry personnel, including volunteers, for their extensive and hard work since the start of the eradication response. The varroa mite incursion has demonstrated vulnerabilities with respect to human resourcing and deployment, whether it be the number of personnel available, or gaps in qualifications and training. Many valuable lessons have been learnt through this process, which should be analysed and shared widely within the bee biosecurity sector and other stakeholders of the biosecurity system.
Stakeholder engagement, awareness and communications
6.92
Meat and Livestock Australia (MLA) acknowledged the unprecedented levels of collaboration that have been seen across a wide range of stakeholders in response to the regional FMD and LSD incursions.
6.93
However, various submissions highlighted that the Australian Government could do more to engage with stakeholders and raise biosecurity awareness, including through ongoing and targeted communications and initiatives like disease identification training through the supply chain. A key element of the Joint Interagency Taskforce's work has been to identify, map and bring together a wider range of stakeholders in the context of an EAD outbreak.
6.94
Specifically engagement needs to be improved in relation to industry, the environmental sector, First Nations peoples, communities, and the general public. The Biosecurity Collective noted in their submission that:
Too often there is poor communication, typified by one-directional communication from governments and lack of openness to stakeholder views. This traditional model of government making decisions and advising industry and the community is not aligned with the shared responsibility model or a true partnership in managing biosecurity threats and preparing for future incursions.
6.95
Furthermore, the committee was told that decision making needs to be more transparent, and roles and responsibilities need to be clarified and communicated.
6.96
The Plant Industries Forum (PIF) referenced the lack of industry representation within biosecurity committees as a key concern. It argued that those committees are exclusively made up of government representatives, with PHA and AHA occasionally invited as observers. The PIF called for greater inclusivity of industry into these decision-making bodies (such as the NBS Implementation Committee), rather than 'being held at arm's length'.
6.97
Several submitters suggested that the Commonwealth play a greater coordination role to improve communications, with the NFF and Australian Pork Limited suggesting that further support be given to established mechanisms such as the National Biosecurity Communications and Engagement Network (NBCEN). The Exotic Animal Disease Preparedness Joint Interagency Taskforce also made recommendations to improve crisis communications, including through the NBCEN, particularly given the role of social media, and work on national communications and engagement plans has begun.
6.98
Animal Medicines Australia (AMA) insisted that 'biosecurity must embed communication at the heart of all activities'. GrainGrowers reinforced the need for improved communications:
Effective communication needs to be underpinned by industry trust and confidence in the biosecurity system, which needs to be an ongoing area of attention and cannot be built during an incursion response. Clear proactive communication by government that responds quickly to concerns raised by industry and can engage through social media in real time will be useful to allay fears and counter misinformation.
6.99
Several submitters observed that communications need to be clear and factual to maintain trust and confidence in decision-making and to ensure that biosecurity does not become an ideological battleground. The committee heard that some media attention in relation to FMD and LSD has been unhelpful. Patrick Hutchinson from the Australian Meat Industry Council (AMIC), advised that 'the amount of media that occurred that was exceptionally ignorant, in having limited to no idea … got to a point where … it was overload of an epic proportion'.
6.100
Red meat industry representatives emphasised the importance of clear communications and the value of addressing media and communications in response planning:
A lot of the fear in the industry was that nothing was happening, so it was very much a communication strategy to say, 'Things are happening' and we need to make sure that we're working with the Commonwealth government. And I have to say the Commonwealth government has been fantastic …
6.101
WoolProducers Australia called for enhanced communications and awareness campaigns aimed at the public so that biosecurity becomes 'business as usual', while the Woolworths Group highlighted the importance of 'early, authoritative and consistent safety messaging' in relation to food safety in to shore up consumer confidence.
Committee view
6.102
The committee heard of the important roles that stakeholder engagement, awareness and communications play in enabling and supporting Australia's biosecurity system. In particular, the committee notes the value of broad stakeholder engagement and collaboration across the entire production supply chain to ensure that risks are understood and appropriately mitigated, and that all parties are aware of their roles and responsibilities in the event of an incursion.
6.103
The committee recommends that government departments, Animal Health Australia and Plant Health Australia consult a wider range of stakeholders from across the supply chain, including the transport and livestock transport sectors and the retail sector.
6.104
A number of witnesses told the committee of critical need for clear communications and messaging aimed at the general public in order to engender trust and confidence in Australia's biosecurity system. The experience of FMD in Indonesia and elements of the media's reporting appears to have highlighted the importance of communications to the department and biosecurity stakeholders. The committee therefore welcomes the heightened emphasis placed in this area by the department and industry.
Research and innovation
6.105
A key defence of Australia's biosecurity system is the development and integration of new and emerging technologies. Various submitters and witnesses highlighted the importance of biosecurity research, development and extension (RD&E) into animal and plant biosecurity. The integration of such technologies into the biosecurity system creates efficiencies throughout the system, including in relation trade imports, surveillance, diagnostics, and the treatment of pests and diseases. As described by Hort Innovation, the use of innovative technologies supports a system and workforce that 'work[s] smarter rather than harder'.
6.106
The need for greater emphasis on research and innovation was identified by the CSIRO in its 2020 Australian Biosecurity Future report. The report proposed key recommendations relating to innovation in science and technology, including the setting of national biosecurity innovation priorities—incorporating major risks and research and development priorities—and the development, investment, commercialisation, and manufacture of innovative biosecurity technologies.
6.107
The NBS recognises the need for ongoing research and innovation, identifying 'integration supported by technology, research and data' as a priority area, with increased stakeholder coordination, building of science and research capacity, and the development of private sector investment.
6.108
The committee heard from a range of witnesses who advised that further support and funding is needed for multi-disciplinary biosecurity research and innovation, and the implementation of data and information technology and tools to improve surveillance, diagnostics, and disease preparedness, decision-making and response.
6.109
Charles Sturt University highlighted the complexity of the biosecurity system and called for improvements in the 'identification of gaps and risks, supported in part by social science research.' The AHA noted current potential gaps in RD&E, including in relation to traceability, disposal, destruction and decontamination, and the training of detector dogs. The committee heard of other potential gaps in relation to the impacts of climate change on biosecurity, wildlife health and surveillance, and environmental biosecurity.
6.110
Hort Innovation highlighted the importance of sustainable research funding models, adding that industry-led investment into plant and bee biosecurity research plays a key part in the funding ecosystem. However, Hort Innovation described a key challenge in progressing big-picture changes, such as large-scale infrastructure requirements and cross-jurisdictional data access. Charles Sturt University also drew attention to the difficulties in building and maintaining research infrastructure and capacity in regional areas and the need for additional funding.
Committee view
6.111
The committee appreciates the value of RD&E to understanding biosecurity risks, pests and diseases and how to prepare for and eradicate or treat incursions. RD&E will also result in advances in biosecurity that improve the quality of tests and treatments and improve the productivity of the workforce.
6.112
However, evidence provided to the committee appears to indicate a need for a national approach to RD&E to ensure that research priorities are identified and aligned, gaps are identified and addressed. Better integration between research and industry to support the development and commercialisation of Australia's research is also required. The committee heard that this needs to be underpinned by a long-term funding strategy to ensure that the strategy continues to meet stakeholder needs, and that key initiatives can be implemented.
6.113
The committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, in consultation with stakeholders, coordinate the development of a strategy for biosecurity research development and extension which includes:
a long-term funding mechanism for biosecurity research;
approaches to identify research, development and extension gaps and national priorities across the biosecurity continuum;
strategies to develop better integrations between industry and research organisations; and
mechanisms to support the commercialisation of research, development and extension outputs.
Information systems and data
6.114
The committee heard that DAFF and the Department of Home Affairs share technology, data, business, and technical expertise improve border assessment and screening, and that these developments have reduced the need for manual identification and screening efforts, improving operational efficiency.
6.115
However, the committee also received evidence that departmental systems and data analytics capabilities are not as integrated and effective as they could be. The need to improve data and systems was also flagged by the Joint Interagency Taskforce as 'critical to inform the response to an outbreak'. Participants specifically identified the National Joint Common Operating Picture as a valuable platform for analysing, displaying and sharing data about nationally significant disasters and crisis events.
6.116
Technology and data are priority areas in the NBS and the department has flagged investment in and implementation of new technologies, active data sharing, and the development of national information management frameworks as key actions.
6.117
Submitters recommended that a range of measures to improve biosecurity outcomes and enable productivity gains, including:
the development of national data-sharing frameworks, agreements, standards, networks and platforms;
closer partnerships with industry to help improve technological infrastructure for biosecurity screening; and
the implementation of open, modern, and flexible import systems.
6.118
Charles Sturt University, in particular, noted that data management, sharing and analysis were 'areas in which there is considerable room for improvement'. The university noted that, while it is working with MLA to establish a national agricultural industry data exchange platform through the Australian AgriFood Data Exchange:
At present in Australia this kind of data [impacted producers and businesses, source of the threat, vectors, conditions and threat spread] exists but is contained in disconnected, isolated or incompatible datasets managed by individual producers and businesses, industry bodies and local, state and national government agencies, limiting our preparedness for responding to biosecurity threats.
6.119
Michael Beer from AgriFutures Australia told the committee of the importance of national systems for data collection, telling the committee that the formation of a business case for a national data resource is nearing completion:
…we are aware of the opportunity for the harmonisation and bringing together of data across supply chains. So, in that light, we are supporting that view of getting better at bringing our digital resources together and across the supply chain, and that would have the key benefit for application areas like biosecurity, traceability systems and other information requirements for market access.
6.120
Data sharing between governments and industries is essential for Australia's biosecurity system. However, as noted by Hort Innovation, data sharing requires a high degree of trust because '[g]overnments and industry are both wary that their data is not misused or used against them'. It noted that progress is still needed for data sharing arrangements to become routine.
6.121
According to Hort Innovation, further impediments are the misalignment between data systems, particularly those old systems that are 'incompatible with new ones, data quality is highly variable, and a lot of data cleaning may be required before data can be shared, which is resource intensive'. Hort Innovation added that '[d]ata sovereignty is a potential roadblock if governance arrangements are not adequately addressed early'.
AUSPestCheck
6.122
AUSPestCheck is an innovative system that has facilitated data sharing arrangements for plant pest and disease surveillance. Developed by PHA as a surveillance tool 'to collect, analyse and display plant pest surveillance data', the AUSPestCheck provides a real-time picture of the spread and number of a pest, with data inputted from 'both general and targeted surveillance activities in agriculture and environmental settings'. Data is held securely in the cloud, incorporating citrus surveillance data and information from the National Bee Pest Surveillance Program (NBPSP).
6.123
Hort Innovation referenced AUSPestCheck as a good model for a future system that incorporates increased functionality that 'allows storing many types of data, which may involve multiple components that are brought together in a central interface' bringing 'significant value to the biosecurity system'. This increased functionality would transform the system beyond its current primary purpose as a market access tool.
6.124
Whilst AUSPestCheck has potential to enhance surveillance activities, Citrus Australia outlined the challenges of integrating its data into AUSPestCheck, stating that 'it requires funding and leadership to make it a valuable tool for biosecurity data management'. It recommended that government, PHA and R&D corporations 'require industry to conduct exotic species surveillance activity to … meet a minimum quality standard in future funded projects'.
Committee view
6.125
There is considerable work that needs to be done to improve data and information systems, standards, connectivity and sharing to enable and support Australia's biosecurity system. Further, this work needs to occur in a nationally integrated and consultative way. The committee welcomes that this is a priority area of the NBS. In order to deliver a robust biosecurity system and productivity gains, it is vital that the department remain focussed on the development of governance standards, protocols, arrangements and systems, as well as its own data analytics and systems development.
6.126
The committee notes that an important element in data sharing arrangements between governments and industry is trust. It is also imperative that intentions and expectations about data sharing arrangements are aligned and clearly understood. These clear parameters will help instil trust between stakeholders and prevent misuse of data sharing systems.
6.127
The committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry coordinate the development of national data and information standards, and sharing protocols in relation to biosecurity.
6.128
Whilst the committee is optimistic that the current varroa mite incursion will be eradicated, it seems timely to consider whether the functionality of existing national data-sharing systems is fit-for-purpose. The committee acknowledges that there are challenges in aligning data across government and industry stakeholders—this alignment process takes time and may delay the use of data in a central system. For this reason, it seems prudent for governments and industry to commence work on integrating such data requirements into the AUSPestCheck system, which could act as a vital tool for the management and mapping of any varroa mite spread.
6.129
The committee recommends that Plant Health Australia in partnership with the bee industry and other stakeholders of AUSPestCheck, consider the platform's capability and data sharing arrangements for tracking varroa mite should it become endemic.
Senator the Hon. Matthew Canavan
Chair