Minority report by the Australian Democrats
1.1
The Democrats agree with a
majority of the recommendations presented in the Chair’s report.
1.2
We note the majority of
submissions desire a single comprehensive legislative regime dealing with
access to telecommunications information.
1.3
The Democrats note this Bill
amends the Telecommunications (Interception) Act
1979 to implement further recommendations from the August 2005 Review
of the Regulation of Access to Communications by Anthony Blunn AO (the
Blunn Review).
1.4
We believe the Bill, as
introduced, does not adequately account for privacy considerations.
1.5
The operation of the Bill is in
conjunction with other legislation which further reduces fundamental civil
liberties of Australian citizens.
1.6
We
believe a majority of the recommendations contained in the Chair’s report will
improve the Bill and lessen the potential for abuses of
privacy but provide the following additions:
Definition of enforcement agency
1.7
The legislation gives enormous
powers to law enforcement agencies to listen to the private conversations of
Australians.
1.8
The Democrats believe that the
definition of 'law enforcement agency' is too broad.
1.9
In particular we share the concerns
raised in the inquiry that the Bill will grant new powers to the CrimTrac
Agency to apply for stored communications warrants and to issue authorisations
for access to historical 'telecommunications data'.
1.10
As Electronic Frontiers Australia state
in their submission, CrimTrac is not a law enforcement agency authorised to
conduct investigations into suspected offences except in limited circumstances
related to spent conviction legislation.[1]
1.11
While we note the Department has
stated that CrimTrac's functions do not include the investigation of any
offences and therefore they will be ineligible to be issued with a stored
communications warrant,[2] CrimTrac's functions could
just as easily be expanded. We note that, in addition to providing criminal
history checks, CrimTrac's functions have already been expanded into the area
of DNA samples.
1.12
The Democrats do not consider, at
this time, it is appropriate for CrimTrac to be included in the definition of a
law enforcement agency.
Recommendation 1
1.13
The Democrats support the
removal of CrimTrac from the definition of 'enforcement agency'.
Convergent
technologies
1.14
There is a need to consider how
best to respond to the fact that current and emerging communications
technologies have resulted in a convergence of areas that
have traditionally been separately regulated by federal or state government laws.
1.15
During the course of this inquiry
various examples of converging technologies were discussed including, web
browsing, downloading from the internet, entering chat rooms, sharing emails,
taking digital photographs and video footage and playing MP3 files all from a
mobile telephone. Questions were raised as to what information captured can
properly be considered telecommunications data.
1.16
The best way to deal with these
new technologies is to give certainty as to whether or not the information they
produce can be categorised as telecommunications data. This is something which
the Attorney-General's Department appears reluctant to do.
1.17
The Attorney-General’s Department
has stated that they are 'concerned about defining technology and call
associated data now because the definition might be redundant in 12 months time'.[3]
The Democrats are dissatisfied with this reason.
1.18
As a matter of public policy, it
is desirable to clarify what is meant by telecommunications data now. If in a
certain time period, albeit 6 or 18 months, that definition needs amending then
this can occur. The absence of a clear definition should not be justified by an
assertion that this will allow the law to remain current with technology.
1.19
With advances in technology it is
important to clarify the scope of telecommunications data to reassure current
and future users of new technologies that such communications may or may not be
intercepted.
Recommendation 2
1.20
The Democrats will be
amending any future Bill to define telecommunication data. The definition of
telecommunications data will balance a desire to be technology neutral with a
desire to protect certain citizen's lawful activities from disclosure to
enforcement agencies
Location
Information
1.21
Location and identity are
fundamental characteristics of telecommunications data. Location requires
measurement. Identity requires classification and definition.
1.22
A by-product of locating a mobile
telephone is the ability to locate with precision people. The Democrats
acknowledge that this is a by-product, not an aim, of most telecommunications
data collection. But it is a by-product that as the Law Council has noted in
its submission which requires greater controls.[4]
1.23
Tom Wright, Information and Privacy Commissioner for Ontario, Canada, considered
that location can:
in essence become a personal identifier because geographical
information systems technology enables the synthesis and analysis of
information not possible with other information management systems. It can
construct a very detailed picture of an individual’s life, even without the use
of their name, just by collecting and analysing data related to a specific
location.[5]
1.24
The Democrats recommend that a
person's mobile telephone phone should not be used as a surrogate tracking and
tracing technology for people in the absence of any countervailing public
interest, significant independent oversight and public reporting.
1.25
We favour access to location
information only through a warrant.
Recommendation 3
1.26
The Democrats will be
amending the Bill to ensure that real time data, in other words
location information, can only be accessed by enforcement agencies with a
warrant.
Time periods
1.27
As noted above, the Democrats
believe in a requirement to allow mobile telephone location information to be
disclosed under a warrant.
1.28
However, if this is not accepted
by the government, then the Bill will allow mobile telephone location information to
be disclosed under a written authorisation for a period of 45 or 90 days
without the need to obtain a warrant.
1.29
The Democrats consider this time
frame is excessive and should be limited.
Recommendation 4
1.30
Written authorisations to
access mobile telephone location information should be limited to 14 days
duration and should not be renewable unless during that 14 days information
material to the investigation has been obtained which suggests that continued
interception would likely result in further material information. The duration
of a renewed warrant should not exceed 20 days.
Public Interest
Monitor
1.31
This Bill creates a
new two tier access regime. The first tier encompasses the traditional access
to existing telecommunications data. The second tier allows for access to
future telecommunications data. The Bill also creates new controls over the existing access
framework.
1.32
The Democrats view this Bill as a
widening of the Commonwealth phone-tapping powers. As such it is appropriate
that there be an independent umpire to balance necessary, lawful, and
proportionate access by law enforcement agencies to telecommunications data
with the public's right to communicate free from surveillance.
1.33
The Democrats note that in
relation to the area of listening devices, a model can be found in Queensland,
where a Public Interest Monitor is authorised under the Police Powers and
Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) to intervene in applications for listening
devices warrants, and to monitor and report on the use and effectiveness of the
warrants.
1.34
Queensland Premier Peter Beattie has
also prepared telephone interception legislation to include a Public Interest
Monitor.
1.35
The Democrats see merit in
adopting the Queensland public interest monitor model to improve
accountability.
Recommendation 5
1.36
The Democrats will amend
the legislation to require enforcement agencies consult with the Public
Interest Monitor (PIM) before they apply for an authorisation under the TIA Act.
Collection of
telecommunications data which is necessary
1.37
Proposed sections 174 and 177
concern voluntary disclosures of telecommunications data to ASIO and
enforcement agencies by employees of a carrier or carriage service provider.
1.38
The Democrats are concerned that
an employee of a carrier or carriage service provider may volunteer more
personal information than is necessary for ASIO and enforcement agencies to
perform their functions. The reality is that employees of a carrier or carriage
service provider when faced with a request or warrant from ASIO or an
enforcement agency will be overly cooperative.
Recommendation 6
1.39
The Democrats propose that
there be a positive obligation on the part of ASIO and the enforcement agency,
where they suspect or have actual knowledge that an employee of a carrier is
volunteering personal information, to warn that employee that they are not
legally obliged to disclose telecommunications data.
Conclusion
1.40
This Bill confirms
privacy as a valued norm but does not do enough to protect Australians' private
conversations and communications.
1.41
While legitimate law enforcement
activities may in exceptional circumstances override a right to privacy the
increasingly complex telecommunications environment exposes individuals to
arbitrary interference.
1.42
The Democrats will be moving a
number of amendments to this Bill to ensure there are greater protections afforded for
telecommunications data.
Senator Stott Despoja
Australian
Democrats
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