Chapter Two - Issues
2.1
Most submissions to the inquiry endorsed the initiative
to update the AAT, and expressed support for those provisions of the Bill
that aim to improve the review process. However, a number of concerns were
raised, particularly in relation to the impact that the proposed changes may
have on the standing and independence of the Tribunal. This chapter addresses
concerns regarding:
- the removal of the requirement that the
President of the AAT must be a Federal Court judge (item 15 of the Bill);
- the removal of provisions allowing tenured
appointment of members (item 21 of the Bill);
- provisions allowing the President to remove a
member from a tribunal, and to reconstitute a tribunal (item 66 of the Bill);
- provisions allowing the Tribunal to request a
person applying for review to amend their statement of reasons (item 95 of the
Bill);
- provisions allowing the Minister rather than the
Governor-General to assign members to Divisions of the Tribunal (item 36 of the
Bill); and
- other provisions.
Removal of the requirement that the President of the AAT must be a Federal
Court judge (item 15)
2.2
The proposed removal of the requirement that the President
of the Tribunal must be a judge of the Federal Court attracted the strongest
criticism from submittors and witnesses. Not one of the 17 primary submissions
received by the Committee expressed support for this change, and those expressing
firm opposition included significant bodies such as the Administrative Review
Council (ARC) and the Law Council of Australia (the Law Council).[13]
2.3
At present, only a Federal Court judge may be appointed
as President.[14] The Bill
expands the range of qualification requirements for appointment as President to
include:
- a current or former judge of any federal court;
- a former judge of any state or territory supreme
court; and
- a person who has been enrolled as a legal
practitioner in Australia for at least five years.[15]
2.4
The Attorney-General's second reading speech stated
that:
The purpose of the reform is to ensure that the most appropriately
qualified person occupies the position of president, regardless of whether or
not they happen to be a judge of the Federal Court.[16]
2.5
A representative from the Attorney-General's Department
told the Committee it was the Government's view that the Federal Court judge
requirement unnecessarily restricts the pool of qualified people.[17] She advised the Committee:
... the President has a range of functions and powers and needs
to bring a range of qualities. Some of those qualities are administrative, some
are to do with managing the organisation, some are to do with managing its
workload and its membership, and others are to do with procedures and practices
in particular matters or kinds of matters. And, yes, that mix of skills may
well reside in a Federal Court judge, but it may also reside in a judge from
another court—a Federal Court magistrate, for example—or somebody who has not
been appointed to the bench.[18]
2.6
Many submissions, however, put forward a number of
reasons why it was crucial to retain the requirement that the President be a
Federal Court judge, and moreover, why it was not desirable that the President
could potentially be a person with only five years of legal experience. The
reasons are discussed below.
Independence
2.7
It was put very strongly to the Committee that it was crucial
that the President of the Tribunal should be, and be seen to be, independent of
government. The Law Society of Western Australia submitted that the
independence of the Tribunal was of particular significance, in that it was a body
whose work involved the review of acts of the executive, its agents, servants
and instruments.[19]
2.8
The Committee took particular note of the views
expressed by the ARC, a statutory body whose functions include keeping the
Commonwealth administrative law system under review, monitoring developments in
administrative law, and recommending to the Minister improvements that might be
made to the system.[20] The pre-eminent
membership of the ARC includes the President of the Australian Law Reform
Commission, the Commonwealth Ombudsman, and the President of the AAT. ARC
President Mr Wayne Martin QC emphasised the
importance of the independence of the AAT President, advising the Committee
that:
The President is the public face of the Tribunal and he has a
vital role in organising and discharging its business. We think it is important
that he or she be, and be seen to be, independent of government.[21]
2.9
Mr Martin
pointed out that a judge of the Federal Court has security of employment by
nature of his or her tenured appointment (until the age of 70).[22] As many submittors argued, it is the
security provided by tenure that allows freedom to make decisions that may not
be popular with government.[23]
2.10
Part-time AAT members Dr
Maxwell Thorpe
and Dr John
Campbell submitted that a Tribunal President
who is a Federal Court judge has no direct or personal stake in the outcome
other than determining a correct and fair decision. They argued that this independence
at the top of the organisation can influence the Tribunal as a whole towards impartial
decisions:
This [impartial] attitude toward decision-making may then be
adopted by members. If this is the case, there can be no perception of bias and
the Tribunal, under the stewardship of a Federal Court judge, may enjoy the
respect of the community.[24]
2.11
Mr Graham
McDonald, a Deputy President member of the
Tribunal, submitted:
It is the independence guaranteed by having a Federal Court
judge appointed which gives citizens lodging appeals against decisions of
government ministers, departmental officers and government instrumentalities
the confidence that their matters will be dealt with in accordance with the
highest possible quasi-judicial standards.
...
This is of particular importance where the decision being reviewed always
involves the Government as a party.[25]
(emphasis added)
2.12
The importance of the perception of independence was
highlighted in a submission from constitutional specialists at Melbourne
University's Centre for Comparative
Constitutional Studies. They argued that under the revised requirements, there
would be nothing to stop the Minister appointing a relatively junior public
service lawyer to the position of President. They also pointed out that there
may be a perception that the appointee is subject to political pressure:
Even if the government had no intention of putting any pressure
on that appointee to act in a particular manner, the appointee must be aware
that, after his or her term expires, he or she will be at the mercy of the
government either for reappointment or appointment to a new governmental position.
Even if the appointee him or herself still intended to act with independence
and integrity it is hard to see such an arrangement maintaining high levels of
public confidence.[26]
2.13
Several submittors argued that the independence of the
President was of even greater importance if additional powers proposed for the
President in other provisions of the Bill came
into effect. This is particularly the case for proposed new powers relating to
the composition and recomposition of tribunals, and to the removal of members.
These powers are discussed in a later section of this report. ARC
President Mr Martin told the Committee:
[The ARC thinks] it is very important that those powers be
exercised by somebody who is both actually and perceived to be independent.[27]
2.14
Other provisions of the Bill
will, in effect, mean that tenured appointments to the AAT will no longer be
possible, for any member of the Tribunal, or for the President. Concerns
regarding this provision are discussed in detail below. The prospect of members
no longer being appointed with tenure makes it all the more crucial that the
President of the Tribunal be a tenured Federal Court judge, according to AAT presidential
member Mr Graham McDonald:
Should the Parliament decide on the abolition of tenure for all
other appointees, it is even more imperative that the President should be
independent and be seen publicly to have that independence, in order that the
integrity of the Tribunal is better placed to be protected.[28]
Experience and status
2.15
Another reason put forward for maintaining the
requirement that the President be a Federal Court judge was the experience,
knowledge and status that such a judge brings to the position. It was argued
that judicial appointment provided a guarantee that the required skills and
qualities would be available. The Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC), for
example, pointed to the extensive powers the President has over the operation
of the Tribunal, and argued that:
The President’s broad powers and responsibilities necessitate
that the incumbent be a person of extensive legal and management experience. A
Federal Court Judge is the ideal candidate as they have considerable experience
as practitioners and adjudicators, and in managing proceedings.[29]
2.16
Other submittors echoed this opinion, including ARC
President Mr Martin who emphasised the
importance of the quality of decision-making that was associated with a Federal
Court judge:
If the president is a judge of the Federal Court we think it more
likely that he or she will be experienced in the process of weighing evidence
and evaluating competing submissions in order to come to a decision. That is
the essential role of the tribunal. It is also likely that he or she will be
eminently legally qualified and that can be important in resolving some of the
difficult questions of law that come before the tribunal.[30]
2.17
The high standing and authority of a Federal Court
judge was also cited as important. PIAC submitted that the appointment of a
Federal Court judge as President gives the Tribunal greater status and
authority.[31] The Law Council argued
that a judicial appointment to the AAT President position 'removes the [AAT]
from the general body of executive decision makers and gives it status,
recognition and respect'.[32] Mr
Mark Robinson
representing the Law Council told the Committee:
That authority is respected and adhered to by all lawyers around
the country and in the common law world. It is also respected, appreciated and
acknowledged by all private citizens.[33]
2.18
It was put to the Committee that any appointment less
than a Federal Court judge downgrades the Tribunal as a whole,[34] and risks a folding-back, or
'dumbing-down' of the Tribunal.[35]
Coordination with the Federal Court,
and relationships within the Tribunal
2.19
The ARC argued that having a Federal Court judge
preside over the Tribunal assists coordination of matters between the Court and
the Tribunal, especially where there are proceedings at both levels relating to
the same subject matter.[36] The ARC
observed that:
The capacity for the same judicial officer to preside over
related cases in the Court and the Tribunal can save a lot of time and the
resources of both the parties and Government and avoid the risk of inconsistent
decisions. Questions of law may also be referred from the Tribunal to the Court
in the midst of a Tribunal review, and it is currently possible for the
President of the Tribunal to participate in the full Federal Court’s
determination of such questions.[37]
2.20
The ARC also pointed to other problems that may arise
within the Tribunal if a person who was not a judge was appointed President.
These problems will arise as judges (for example Family Court judges) will
inevitably remain as members of the Tribunal. As ARC President Wayne
Martin noted:
It would seem odd ... that if there were members of the tribunal
who were judges they were subject to direction by a president who was not a
judge and if they were subordinate in the hierarchy of the tribunal to a
president who was not a judge. That in turn might cause some concerns within
the Federal Court and perhaps make it harder to get Federal Court judges to
serve on the tribunal.[38]
Trends in comparable jurisdictions
2.21
Another argument put forward for retaining judicial
leadership of the Tribunal was that appointment of persons who were not judges
would go against the trend for tribunals in comparable jurisdictions. It was
pointed out that the presiding officer of comparable administrative review
tribunals in Victoria, New South
Wales and Western Australia
is a judge. The case of the United Kingdom
was also cited, with submissions observing that the proposed unified tribunals
service there would have extensive judicial leadership.[39] This, it is argued, is in recognition
of the critical need to maintain community confidence in the independence and
impartiality of such tribunals, it also being recognised that independence should
be the most important guiding principal for tribunals.[40]
The Committee's view
2.22
The Committee notes the very strong concerns expressed
in submissions and by witnesses that the Tribunal as a whole will be downgraded
if the President is not a judge, and in particular if he or she does not have
the standing, authority, and independence of a Federal Court judge. The fact
that a Federal Court judge has security of tenure is an important part of his
or her ability to be independent, and to be seen to be independent, of
government. This independence is considered particularly vital, given that the
Tribunal by its nature is one where the Government is always a party to
proceedings. That fact alone makes an independent President a crucial element in
maintaining the community's respect for the integrity of the Tribunal.
2.23
Evidence presented to the Committee makes it clear that
the experience, knowledge and authority brought to the position by a Federal
Court judge is highly respected by all stakeholders. The Committee further
notes concerns raised that the additional powers given to the President of the
AAT under the Bill[41] make it all the
more important that such powers have the safeguard of being placed in the hands
of a Federal Court judge.
2.24
Of particular note to the Committee is the fact that
not one stakeholder has expressed support for the removal of the requirement that
the President be a Federal Court judge. In particular, the ARC, the body
representing the peak professional and governmental expertise in this area, is
opposed to this measure, despite supporting the majority of the provisions of
the Bill.
2.25
The origins of this proposal remain unclear to the
Committee. In contrast to other changes proposed in the Bill,
this change does not arise out of the recommendations of the major reviews
which have inquired into the review tribunal system. That is, the ARC's Better Decisions: review of Commonwealth
Merits Review Tribunals (1995), and the Australian Law Reform Commission's Managing Justice: a review of the federal
civil justice system (2000).[42]
2.26
Although the Committee recognises the argument that there
may be advantages to be gained from widening the pool of those qualified for
the position of President, the submissions of well-respected bodies in the
legal field in Australia
demonstrate that current arrangements requiring a Federal Court judge operate
well, and that the current pool of qualified people is sufficient. The
Committee also is not convinced that retaining the requirement that the
President be a Federal Court judge would detract from the objectives of the Bill
in seeking to make the Tribunal more efficient. Indeed, there is widespread agreement
that to lessen the qualifications for President would be a backward step, and
would undermine the independence, reputation, and efficacy of the AAT.
2.27
Accordingly, the Committee is of the opinion that the
position of President of the AAT should remain reserved for a judge of the
Federal Court.
Recommendation 1
2.28
The Committee recommends that the Bill
be amended to retain the requirement that the President of the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal must be a judge of the Federal Court of Australia.
That is, subsection 7(1) should not be repealed.
Removal of provisions allowing tenured appointment of members (item 21)
2.29
A further area of concern raised in submissions is the
proposed replacement of tenure for presidential and senior members with
fixed-term appointments. The Bill proposes to
restrict the term of appointment for all members to up to a maximum of seven
years, with eligibility for re-appointment.
2.30
The AAT is structured to have four classes of member,
as shown in the following table. The table also shows the number of members in
each class, with the number having tenure shown in brackets.
Table 2.1: AAT classes of membership
Class of member
|
Current provisions for tenure*
|
No. of members
(No. with tenure)**
|
Presidential Members (judges)
|
To 70 years of age, or at ceasing to be a judge
|
9 (9)
|
Deputy Presidents
|
To 70 years of age (if full-time)
|
10 (2)
|
Senior Members
|
To 65 years of age (if full-time)
|
15 (4)
|
Members
|
No provision for tenure
|
39
|
Total
|
|
73 (15)
|
* Source: Administrative
Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, section 8.
**
Source: Attorney-General's Department, Submission
18, p. 6.
2.31
In his second reading speech the Attorney-General
explained the rationale for removing provisions for tenured appointments:
'tenured appointments reduce the flexibility of the tribunal to
respond to the changing case load'
and
'tenured appointments undermine the ability of government to
ensure that the pool of available members corresponds with the needs of the AAT
and its users.'[43]
2.32
A number of submissions argued that the removal of the
ability to make tenured appointments would affect the independence, and
perceived independence, of the Tribunal. Mr
Graham McDonald
asserted that it would 'inevitably result in a drop in public confidence that
the AAT is truly independent of Government'.[44] Other
submittors were of the same view, including the South Brisbane Immigration and
Community Legal Services (SBICLS) which expressed concern that:
With power to appoint and re-appoint applicants for fixed terms
it is possible there will be a real or perceived risk that appointees may be
susceptible to governmental pressures. This has the potential to undermine the
integrity of the AAT and its perceived independence.[45]
2.33
The Law Society of NSW, arguing against the removal of
tenured appointments, emphasised the link between the security of tenure, and
the independence of the Tribunal:
The security of tenure is one of the cornerstones of
independence, whether for a court or tribunal, and that independence should not
be compromised.[46]
2.34
The Law Society of NSW also argued against any move
towards equating AAT appointments with practices in the Public Service:
The term of the President, Deputy President and permanent
members should not be based on practices within the public service. ...The
[Tribunal resolution] process requires particular skills and abilities which
are not dissimilar to those of the judiciary. Confidence, discernment and tact
are developed over time from dealing with the Tribunal's business. The Tribunal
should not lose this expertise by limiting tenure.[47]
2.35
The Law Council contended that if all future
appointments to the AAT were for fixed terms only, the Tribunal as a whole
would be downgraded, with the potential that its independence would be
seriously undermined.[48] The Law
Council argued in favour of maintaining the ability to make tenured
appointments:
... the Law Council ... believes that the alternative of tenured
appointments to the age of 70 years should be available where appropriate in
order to secure good appointments.[49]
2.36
Other submissions also favoured a mix of tenured and
fixed term appointments. In expressing its opposition to removal of tenure, the
Lawyers Alliance argued in particular that tenure be retained for Presidential
members.[50]
2.37
Some submissions pointed out that the proposal for
fixed-term appointments did not specify a minimum term, which left open the
option to government of making very short term appointments. It was argued that
short-term appointments may further undermine public confidence in the
integrity of the Tribunal.[51] In
addition, it was also pointed out that short-term appointments were not
conducive to a build-up of knowledge and experience by members. Mr
Simon Moran
of PIAC told the Committee:
A minimum amount of time ... is essential for garnering the
knowledge of the various pieces of legislation and the process for people to
have expertise, which will be built up over time. The AAT covers a very broad
variety of pieces of legislation. To get on top not only of the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal’s procedures but also of that legislation, you need a minimum
amount of time.[52]
2.38
The suggestion that a minimum term should be specified
was supported by other submittors. The Legal Services Commission of South
Australia, though opposed to the abolition of tenure, argued that in the event
that fixed-term appointments become law, deputy presidents and other members
should have minimum terms specified (of seven and five years respectively).[53] This suggestion was qualified by the
statement that the President should remain a judge of the Federal Court.[54]
2.39
Some submissions pointed out that a consequence of lack
of tenure, combined with the potential for only a short-term appointment, may
be that well-qualified people would not be attracted to leave successful
positions to take up office with the Tribunal.[55]
Ms Genevieve
Bolton of the National Welfare Rights
Network (NWRN) told the Committee:
Another by-product of shorter term appointments is that they are
less likely to attract the high-calibre and best-qualified people to these
positions, and that will then have the effect of diminishing both the work and
the value of the tribunal.
In our submission, it would be very unlikely for, say, someone
who has built up a practice at the bar over a 10- or 15-year period to be
attracted to a position on the tribunal where there is only the security of a
two- or three-year term.[56]
2.40
The submission from the ARC did not oppose limited-term
appointments to the AAT.[57] ARC
President Mr Martin commented that there is
a need to strike a balance between the competing considerations of independence
on the one hand, and of accountability and efficiency on the other.[58] However, Mr
Martin did express the ARC's view that there
should be a minimum term set, and told the Committee:
We are of the view that the balance between independence and
accountability and efficiency supports the notion of limited-term appointments,
but appointments have to be long enough not to jeopardise independence.[59]
2.41
Mr Martin
referred to the ARC's previously published position in its 1995 Better Decisions report, that terms of
between three and five years were appropriate for review tribunal members.[60] The ARC stated that terms of less than
three years do not provide a sufficient sense of security to members.[61] The Better Decisions report pointed out that terms of longer than three
years may be appropriate for some senior members, to assist with continuity and
to attract the best qualified and able members.[62]
2.42
In further support of setting a minimum term, the ARC argued
that a minimum term of at least three years does not unduly hamper the ability
of the Tribunal to be flexible in response to changing demands.[63]
2.43
A representative of the Attorney-General's Department
told the Committee that in recent times, no tenured appointments of deputy
presidents or senior members have been made, and that since 1989, appointments
have been for fixed terms. It was also advised that the majority of
appointments made in 2004 were for a period of three years or more, with a
small number of appointments being for less than three years.[64]
2.44
The Departmental representative also argued that short
term appointments were sometimes useful in that they allowed the Tribunal the
flexibility to carry on its business and to deal with the exigencies of the appointments
process. The example was given of a situation where a short term appointment
would bridge the gap when delays in making an appointment are experienced.[65]
The Committee's view
2.45
The Committee acknowledges the view expressed that the
security of tenure for AAT members is one of the cornerstones of independence,
and recognises concerns that the removal of provisions for tenured appointments
as presidential and senior members may compromise the independence and
perceived independence of the Tribunal. The Committee also notes arguments
favouring the retention of a mix of tenured and non-tenured appointments.
2.46
The Committee notes the view that non-tenured
appointments, and particularly short-term appointments, may result in fewer
well-qualified people being attracted to leave successful positions in order to
take up office with the Tribunal.
2.47
The Committee notes that for over 15 years now, only
fixed term appointments have been made. As such, it could be considered that the
provisions of the Bill have the effect of
formalising long-term practice. However, the Committee remains concerned that
there is no minimum term specified. The Committee notes that the ARC has for
some time supported three to five year terms for review tribunal members, and
also notes the ARC view that a minimum term of at least three years does not
unduly hamper the ability of the Tribunal to be flexible in response to
changing demands. Accordingly, the Committee sees merit in incorporating the
specification of a minimum term into the Act.
Recommendation 2
2.48
The Committee recommends that the Bill
be amended to specify a minimum term of appointment of three years. Subsection
8(3) of the Act should be amended to read: 'subject to this Part, a member
holds office for a term of at least 3 years and not more than 7 years as
is specified in the instrument of appointment, but is eligible for
re-appointment.'
Provisions allowing the President to remove a member from a tribunal, and
to reconstitute a tribunal (item 66)
2.49
Item 66 of the Bill inserts
new sections 23 and 23A (amongst others) detailing the powers of the President
of the AAT regarding reconstitution of a tribunal. A number of concerns were
raised in relation to these sections.
2.50
Proposed subsection 23(2)(b)(iii) authorises the President
to direct that a member not continue to take part in proceedings if the
President is satisfied that it is 'in the interests of justice' to do so (subsection
23(9)(a)). The President must also consult the member concerned before
exercising this power. Concerns were raised that this power is too broad and
subject to misuse.[66] Whilst
submissions acknowledged there may be circumstances where it was necessary to remove
a member from a tribunal, the view was expressed that the term 'in the
interests of justice' was 'remarkably vague',[67]
and that these circumstances needed to be explicitly set out in the Act.[68]
2.51
PIAC submitted that the reconstitution of a tribunal in
the middle of proceedings may involve considerable expense and lead to delays,
because the interests of justice would require a rehearing:
... if the Tribunal had to be reconstituted, the interests of
justice could only be served if the new Tribunal reheard the entire proceedings...
... the Tribunal can only make a fully informed decision if it [has]
heard all of the evidence and come to its conclusion at the veracity of evidence
and the credibility of witnesses.[69]
2.52
Similar concerns were raised in respect of new
subsection 23A(2). It confers a power on the President to reconstitute a
multi-member tribunal if he or she is satisfied that it is 'in the interests of
achieving the expeditious and efficient conduct of the proceeding'. The
Explanatory Memorandum gives examples of when this provision might apply,
including where it is necessary to add a member because of his or her
expertise, or to remove a member where expertise is not required.[70] The NWRN argued that this power is not
justified, and that its inclusion risked a focus on 'economical and quick'
review, rather than more important objects of 'fair and just' review.[71]
2.53
The Committee heard concerns that the broad reconstitution
powers conferred on the Tribunal President under new sections 23 and 23A are
unprecedented. After examining legislation for comparable administrative review
bodies in Australia,
the ARC has determined that there are several examples of provisions giving the
presiding officer power to reconstitute if there is a conflict of interest,[72] and one example of a provision
relating to perception of bias.[73] There
are also examples of provisions where a presiding officer is given powers to
reconstitute in the interests of efficiency, though these powers are qualified.[74] Importantly, though, the ARC has been
unable to identify any existing provision in comparable legislation that
empowers a president of a tribunal to direct reconstitution 'in the interests
of justice', however defined.
2.54
The ARC commented that there was a need for provisions
allowing the AAT President to reconstitute a tribunal, for example in unusual
cases where an AAT member had not reached a decision after a lengthy period, or
where a member was guilty of misconduct.[75]
The ARC expressed support for the new provisions, but made the point strongly
that reconstitution powers were only acceptable where the powers were exercised
by a President who was a judge of the Federal Court. ARC
President Mr Wayne Martin
explained to the Committee the importance of having this safeguard:
[If the President were not a Federal Court judge] ... one has
the increased spectre of the power possibly being used for political purposes.
... it is these sorts of powers that we think reinforce the need
for the president to continue to be a judge of the Federal Court. In that
circumstance, one could have greater confidence that the power would only be exercised
for the purposes for which we think it is being conferred and not for any improper
purpose.[76]
2.55
Other submittors supported this view.[77] The Australian Lawyers Alliance, for example,
pointed out the implications for the credibility of the AAT if a tribunal
member was removed by a President whose independence was perceived to be in
question:
The removal of a Tribunal member by a President whose
appointment was publicly perceived to be political could create a scandal
impugning the prestige and credibility of the AAT.[78]
The Committee's view
2.56
The Committee is satisfied there are circumstances
where there is a need for the President of the Tribunal to have the flexibility
to reconstitute tribunals and to remove members. The Committee notes concerns
raised that the potential exists for these powers to be misused, and is
particularly mindful of the fact that (in the case of section 23) the only
guidance given to the President in the exercise of the power to remove a member
is that the removal is 'in the interests of justice', a term which is not
defined.
2.57
The Committee notes that the Explanatory Memorandum
lists two examples of situations that may warrant a direction by the President
to remove a member from a tribunal. These are:
- where the member has a conflict of interest in the
proceeding; or
- where the member has made a public statement
that could prejudice the impartiality of the proceeding.[79]
2.58
When asked for a definition of 'the interests of
justice', a representative of the Attorney-General's Department told the
Committee:
I think it is that, if the situation arose where a president
were considering acting under that provision, the interests of justice would
need to be determined by considering the objects of the act and the range of
factors that come into play in ensuring that the tribunal is able to make
correct and preferable decisions and that the parties are able to obtain a
proper decision from a tribunal proceeding.[80]
2.59
In responses provided to the Committee following the
public hearing, the Attorney-General's Department confirmed that the term
'interests of justice' is used in a range of Commonwealth legislation in the
context of powers exercised by the courts and certain statutory authorities. It
is understood that, in these circumstances, the term is rarely defined by the
legislation. As such, what constitutes the interests of justice in a given case
is invariably left to the decision-maker concerned to determine. The intention
is to confer a discretion requiring the decision-maker to balance properly any
competing interests so that justice is served.[81]
The Department cited the examples listed in the Explanatory Memorandum of a
tribunal member having a conflict of interest or perceived bias, as instances
when such a balancing exercise would be required. The Department stated:
The reason for proposed paragraph 23(2)(b)(iii) is to ensure ...
that the Tribunal provides fair and just review. The provision allows the President to
intervene to prevent reviews by the Tribunal that may not be fair and just or
may not be seen to be fair and just. This ensures that the parties can have confidence in the Tribunal as a
decision maker and removes the need for further proceedings challenging the
decision in such circumstances.[82]
2.60
The Committee remains concerned as to the lack of
guidance in the Bill itself as to when the
'interests of justice' may warrant the removal of a member from a hearing. The
examples listed in the Explanatory Memorandum of situations that may warrant a
decision by the President to remove a member is not an exhaustive list.
Further, regardless of whether the examples given in the Explanatory Memorandum
are comprehensive, interpretive problems can arise when supporting information
is included in an explanatory memorandum, but statutory guidance is not set out
in the legislation itself. This has been a matter of note for the Committee on
previous occasions when examining proposed legislation. It remains an ongoing
concern for the Committee.
2.61
The Committee's view is that the Bill should be amended
to prescribe the reasons why the President may direct a member to no longer
take part in proceedings, with the added requirement that the President may
only issue such a direction if he or she is satisfied that it is in the
interests of justice to do so, for one or more of those reasons. Precedents
exist in other Commonwealth legislation for this approach.[83]
2.62
The Committee notes the support of the ARC for the
proposed reconstitution powers, but shares the ARC's concerns that the powers
should only be exercised by a President who is a Federal Court judge. The
Committee agrees that having a Federal Court judge as President of the AAT
provides a safeguard, and sends a signal to the community that Tribunal decisions
are being made with independence and integrity.
Recommendation 3
2.63
The Committee recommends that proposed subsection
23(9)(a) be amended, in order to provide guidance as to the circumstances under
which the President should exercise the power to remove a member, and
reconstitute a tribunal, 'in the interests of justice'.
Recommendation 4
2.64
The Committee recommends that new sections 23 and 23A
should proceed, subject to the retention in the Act of the mandatory
requirement that the President be a Federal Court judge (Recommendation 1).
Provisions allowing the Tribunal to request a person applying for review to
amend their statement of reasons (item 95)
2.65
This amendment allows the Tribunal to request a person
applying for review to provide a further statement of reasons if the Tribunal
considers the initial statement to be insufficient. According to the
Explanatory Memorandum, the reason for this provision is:
...to overcome the practise of applicants submitting in their
statement of reasons that there was ‘error in fact and law’ without further
substantiation, particularly where the applicant has legal representation.[84]
2.66
The Attorney-General's Department submitted that the
amendment would assist the Tribunal to better manage its workload. A sufficient
statement of reasons would allow decisions to be made at an earlier stage as to
what type of expertise may be required on a tribunal, and whether the matter
was suitable for an alternative dispute resolution process.[85] The Department advised that the power
to request a further statement of reasons is discretionary, and that there
would be no sanction for a failure to comply with such a request.[86]
2.67
The Law Council expressed concern about this amendment.
It submitted that the AAT was set up as an accessible forum to which anybody
could apply for review of an administrative decision, and receive a fair go.[87] The Law Council argued that the
amendment could disadvantage applicants who do not have legal representation,
and who had trouble dealing with complex legislation. It was further argued
that there is ample opportunity later in the process for refinement of an
applicant's case.[88] Mr
Mark Robinson
representing the Law Council told the Committee:
It is a little tough to force the applicant at the start to
present an analysis that is critical or is a critique of what was wrong with
the original decision, particularly identifying legal errors and errors of
rationality and logic. It presumes that all applicants are able to do that
equally. For disadvantaged applicants, for self-represented applicants, it is a
very big ask. If it needs to be done, it can be done later at the preliminary
conference or after the preliminary conference.[89]
2.68
PIAC representative Mr
Simon Moran
echoed these concerns, arguing that:
One of the key attributes of the tribunal is its accessibility
to unrepresented applicants. This will be diminished if unrepresented
applicants face legalistic hurdles which they are unable to meet.[90]
2.69
Both PIAC and the Law Council observed that the current
approach whereby preliminary hearings are used to distil the real nature of a
review works well.[91] Mr
Chris Cunningham
representing the Law Council argued that, although efficiency was important, it
was also important that the process was fair. He told the Committee:
In practice, it is only when [the parties] actually sit around a
table and discuss the issues that both parties work out exactly where they are
at odds in relation to that decision. If an applicant, especially if they are
an unrepresented applicant, is put to the task of reformulating something that
they know is wrong but they are not sure why because they do not have the
benefit of reading all the documents, getting medical evidence if necessary and
all the other preliminary things that they require before they can make a value
judgment, even as an applicant in person, then the system will become harsh and
unfair, particularly to unrepresented applicants before the tribunal.[92]
2.70
Concerns were again raised regarding information
included in the Explanatory Memorandum, but not in the Bill.
PIAC suggested that if the amendment is aimed at applicants with legal
representation (as is suggested in the Explanatory Memorandum), then the
amendment should apply only to these applicants, and not unrepresented
applicants.[93] The Law Council argued
that it should be made clear in the legislation itself (and not just stated in
the Explanatory Memorandum) that a request for a further statement by the
Tribunal would not mean that the original application was not a valid
application.[94]
The Committee's view
2.71
The Committee notes the concerns raised suggesting that
the amendment will place hurdles in the path of unrepresented applicants. The
Committee notes the reassurance provided by the Department that there would be
no sanction for a failure to provide a further statement, but remains concerned
that the fact of the Tribunal making a request for further details may deter an
applicant not familiar with procedures from proceeding with an application.
2.72
The Committee also notes the benefits to the operation
of the Tribunal if more informative statements of reasons are provided earlier
in the process. On balance, the Committee considers that the concerns raised
are not sufficient to prevent the passage of the Bill.
Provisions allowing the Minister rather than the Governor-General to assign
members to Divisions of the Tribunal (item 36)
2.73
Under subsection 19(3) of the Act the Governor-General
assigns non-presidential members to a particular Division or Divisions of the
Tribunal, such as the Taxation Appeals Division or the Security Appeals
Division. The Bill amends this arrangement so
that the Minister will now make these assignments.
2.74
PIAC submitted that the independence, both actual and
perceived, of the Tribunal is diminished by this amendment, and that there is
no compelling reason to make such a change.[95]
The Australian Lawyers Alliance also questioned this amendment, stating that:
The amendment of section 19 to allow the Attorney General,
rather than the Governor General, the right to move members from one division
to another also represents increased political control of the work of the
Tribunal.[96]
2.75
The Attorney-General's Department advised that the
proposed provision will facilitate faster assignments and variations of
assignments because it removes a layer of formality. The Department stated that
there is no particular reason why the Governor-General should be concerned with
assignments, and that:
... [assignments] represent a level of detail more appropriately
left for the Minister, in consultation with the President and other appropriate
Ministers to determine. If the Minister is able to vary the assignments, it is
more appropriate that the Minister make the assignments as well. Otherwise, the
Minister is given a power to vary a decision of the Governor-General.[97]
The Committee's view
2.76
The Committee recognises the view of the
Attorney-General's Department that the amendment removes a layer of formality
in relation to assignments of members to Divisions of the Tribunal. However,
the Committee also acknowledges concerns that this amendment undermines the
perceived independence of the AAT.
2.77
In recognition of these concerns the Committee considers
that it would be desirable to ensure, though legislation, that the Minister is
obliged to consult with the President of the AAT, prior to making or altering
assignments. The Committee considers that the inclusion of a tenured AAT
President in the process of making assignments to Divisions will give the
public confidence that the independence of the Tribunal is being maintained.
Accordingly, the Committee recommends that assignments to Divisions of the AAT
should be made in consultation with the President of the Tribunal.
Recommendation 5
2.78
The Committee recommends that item 36 of the Bill
be amended to include the requirement that the Minister must first consult with
the President before making or altering assignments of members to a Division of
Divisions of the Tribunal.
Other issues
2.79
A number of other issues were raised in submissions to
the inquiry, and are discussed below. These include:
- insertion in the Act of an objects statement referring
to 'quick' and 'economical' (Item 1);
- removal of the requirement that a presidential
member should be part of a tribunal considering certain migration matters (Item
226);
- alternative dispute resolution provisions (Item
112);
- ordinary members to constitute multi-member
tribunals (Item 47); and
- proposal to allow the Tribunal to limit the
scope of a review (Item 73).
Insertion in the Act of an objects statement referring
to 'quick' and 'economical' (Item 1)
2.80
Item 1 inserts an objects statement into the Act,
stating that:
In carrying out its function, the Tribunal must pursue the
objective of providing a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical,
informal and quick.[98]
2.81
It was put forward in certain submissions that the
focus should be on 'fair and just', and that 'economical' and 'quick' are not
appropriate objectives for the AAT.[99]
2.82
The Explanatory Memorandum comments that the proposed
objects statement is similar in terms to statements included in legislation for
the Migration Review Tribunal, the National Native Title Tribunal, the Refugee
Review Tribunal, and the Social Security Appeals Tribunal.[100] Some submissions argued, however,
that reviews conducted at the level of the AAT should not be constrained by
terms that apply to lower tiers of review.[101]
The NWRN submitted that:
Given the AAT’s place as the final tier of external merits
review for social security matters, the paramount goal of the AAT must be to
reach the correct and preferable decision. In the NWRN view, the objectives of
‘fair and just’ are consistent with this goal whereas the objectives of ‘quick
and economical’ will detract from the quality of AAT review.[102]
Removal of the requirement that a presidential member
should be part of a tribunal considering certain migration matters (Item 226)
2.83
Item 226 of the Bill amends the Migration Act 1958 to repeal the provisions that the Tribunal must
be constituted by a presidential member alone when conducting a review of
certain decisions made by the Minister. The Explanatory Memorandum states that the
removal of this requirement provides the President of the AAT with greater
flexibility in constituting the Tribunal.[103]
PIAC submitted that the relevant migration matters (which can include significant
issues such as review of certain ministerial deportation orders and the refusal
of a visa) require consideration from a highly-skilled adjudicator, and that
these matters should be heard by a presidential member.[104] In addition, PIAC expressed concern
that the amendment may lead to delay in Tribunal proceedings, due to legal
challenges to the President's decision on the make-up of the tribunal. PIAC
argued that:
... the amendment gives the President a discretion that must be
applied by considering criteria set out in the section. If an applicant
believes that the appointed Tribunal lacks the expertise required by the
section, they may seek to challenge the President’s decision on the grounds
that it did not lawfully comply with the section. This would lead to further proceedings
and delay of the Tribunal proceedings.[105]
Alternative dispute resolution provisions (item 112)
2.84
The range of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
mechanisms available to the Tribunal will be expanded under the Bill.
The President will have the power to direct that a proceeding be referred to an
ADR process. The NWRN submitted that ADR processes are only relevant and
appropriate in certain situations (for example, where ADR is optional and
voluntary).[106]
Ordinary members to constitute multi-member tribunals
(item 47)
2.85
This amendment will remove the requirement that a multi-member
tribunal be constituted by at least one presidential or senior member. This
would allow multi-member tribunals to be constituted by ordinary members only.
Some submittors have argued that multi-member tribunals are constituted in
cases involving some complexity or significant questions of law and that the
ability to resolve such issues may be lost if legally qualified presidential
and senior members are not required to sit on multi-member tribunals.[107] In contrast, others argue that an
increased ability to use ordinary members, where a senior or presidential
member would otherwise be required, may lead to an earlier resolution of
matters and may assist in a more timely and efficient resolution of cases.[108]
2.86
A representative of the Attorney-General's Department
provided clarification on this matter, advising that it is not currently a
requirement under the Act that there be a legally qualified person on a
multi-member panel. Senior members are normally legally qualified, but this is
not a requirement.[109]
Proposal to allow the Tribunal to
limit the scope of a review (item 73)
2.87
Item 73 of the Bill
clarifies that the Tribunal will have the power to determine the scope of the
review of a decision. The NWRN expressed concern regarding this amendment,
stating that:
On its face, this proposal appears to give the Tribunal an
unfettered discretion to determine the scope of the review by placing limits on
questions of fact and the evidence and issues that it will consider. If that
was the intent of the proposal, it could prejudice a consumer’s case where
other issues may well affect the outcome.[110]
2.88
However, the NWRN goes on to note from the Explanatory
Memorandum that the proposal is not intended to allow the Tribunal to limit its
own jurisdiction conferred by the Act or other legislation. The NWRN suggests
that it be made clear in the legislation itself that the power is limited to
evidence or issues of law and fact that are not within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.[111]
The Committee's view
2.89
The Committee acknowledges the concerns raised in
relation to these, and some other issues that are not discussed in this report.
After careful consideration, the Committee considers that the concerns raised
are not sufficient to prevent the passage of the Bill.
Recommendation 6
2.90
Subject to the preceding recommendations, the Committee
recommends that the Bill proceed.
Senator
Marise Payne
Chair