2.1
Many submissions discussed the available evidence of Uyghur forced labour in laying out their support for the objectives of the bill. Submitters pointed to various sources, in particular reports produced by academics and think tanks drawing on official People's Republic of China (PRC) government documents, evidence from publicly available satellite imagery and witness testimony.
2.2
Many also noted the difficulty of ascertaining and verifying the full scope of Uyghur forced labour given the lack of access to and transparency about the region. Some submissions questioned whether sufficient credible evidence was available on this topic to justify the actions proposed in the bill.
Recent research
2.3
Many respondents pointed to the research of Dr Adrian Zenz, including his work indicating that as many as 1.8 million Uyghurs and other ethnic groups are currently subjected to forced labour in the PRC.
2.4
Dr Darren Byler, post-doctoral researcher at the University of Colorado, told the committee about his research:
Since 2019, I've interviewed 10 former Xinjiang workers and 30 immediate family members of workers and what I've learned from them through those interviews and through comparison to open-and-closed access Chinese government documents, such as internal police documents, is that a system of unfree labour is now widespread in Xinjiang and, to a certain extent, across China. In factories and other institutions, the workers are taught to speak Mandarin and embrace state political ideology, all while learning to work on an assembly line or as maintenance workers, cleaners, nannies and cooks in state-directed labour programs. Though some of these new workers referred to as 'surplus' labourers were simply farmers from nearby villages, many of them are also relatives of detainees or former detainees themselves. All of them know that overt refusal of these job assignments could result in their internment in camps or imprisonment.
2.5
Ms Ramila Chanisheff, President, Australian Uyghur Tangritagh Women's Association (AUTWA), provided evidence to the committee that '[e]very single Uyghur in Australia has family members and/or friends in these concentration and/or labour camps'.
2.6
Dr Michael Clarke, an Associate Professor at the Australian National University focused on the history and politics of Xinjiang, told the committee that Xinjiang 'is the site of the largest mass repressing of an ethnic and/or religious minority in the world today'.
2.7
Many submitters noted that the forced labour takes place under the guise of poverty alleviation programmes and vocational training. Dr Byler provided further detail on this aspect:
Many of the jobs that are assigned to these workers—or that workers are assigned to—are a part of a pairing assistance program called Xinjiang Aid, which is a poverty alleviation program, or that's how it's described, that pairs localities in eastern China with localities in Xinjiang. It runs a whole range of different pairing assistance, but the primary focus is economic assistance, which means that the locality in eastern China will set up an industrial park in the paired city or county where they're located in Xinjiang.
2.8
The World Uyghur Congress (WUC) noted that forced labour tended to take place 'in or around internment camps, prisons, and workplaces inside East Turkistan, as well as across China'. Dr Byler also discussed this:
There is a direct relationship between the factory spaces and the concentrated, closed education training centres. Former workers I've interviewed see them as interrelated camp spaces. They indicate that factory managers often understand that they are what stand between the workers and their return or their entrance into the camps. They know that they can decide whether this person goes to the camp or not. Factory managers in Xinjiang often have clear knowledge of the conditions in the camp and, at times, are involved in the selection of workers from the camps. They actually go to the camps and select workers for their factories.
2.9
The phenomenon of the transfer of Uyghur workers to other parts of the PRC, as documented in Uyghurs for sale report, was also widely referred to. Ms Vicky Xu, lead author of the report, explained that the report documented the movement of Uyghur workers out of Xinjiang to other parts of the PRC between 2017 and 2019:
The report Uyghurs for sale detailed how the Chinese government has facilitated the mass transit of Uighur and other ethnic minority citizens from the far west region of Xinjiang to factories across China. Under conditions that strongly suggest forced labour, Uighurs are working in factories that are in the supply chains of more than 80 well-known global brands in the technology, clothing and automotive sectors.
2.10
Ms Xu said that '[n]umerous sources, including government documents, show that transferred workers are assigned minders—50 workers per minder—and have limited freedom of movement'.
2.11
In her submission, Ms Xu, stated that despite the attention given to the issue:
Uyghurs are still for sale. Labor agents in China are still advertising tens of thousands of “absolutely obedient” Uyghur workers at a time; factories in coastal cities are still looking specifically for Xinjiang workers. Despite the Covid-19 outbreak and increasing international media attention, these labor transfers continue, in a Chinese government [official's] words, to “demonstrate the success” of Xinjiang’s “re-education camps”. In 2020, Shenzhen, just one of China’s technology hubs in China, has been…ordered to resettle 50,000 Uyghurs.
2.12
Submitters drew the Committee's attention to the International Labour Organization (ILO) indicators on forced labour and argued that many were evident with respect to Uyghurs. For example, Professor James Leibold, Professor of Politics and Head of Department at La Trobe University and Senior Fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), and Ms Kelsey Munro, Senior Analyst at ASPI, described how conditions experienced by Uyghur workers in the PRC today align with five of the indicators: abuse of vulnerability, restriction of movement, isolation, intimidation and threats, and withholding of wages.
2.13
Submitters drew attention to the indicators of Uyghur forced labour developed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Fair Supply said that these included:
Where the company’s factory is located within a detention facility
Where the company’s factory is located in an industrial park connected to a re- education facility
Where the company is hiring workers through government recruiters
Where the Chinese government is providing incentives or subsidies for training supplements ‘vocational training, or ‘aid to Xinjiang’
Where the company is participating in poverty reduction or pairing assistance programs.
Government incentives
2.14
The WUC noted reports that the Chinese government had put in place a 'policy of incentives to Chinese-owned companies to incorporate Uyghur workers into their businesses'. They reported that the government subsidies include 'free land, lower electricity cost, low cost loans, transportation subsidies, and even subsidised labour'. Professor James Cockayne, affiliated with the University of Nottingham, US Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on Trafficking in Persons and Finance Against Slavery and Trafficking, also noted that the 'government’s subsidies incentivize employers, especially in cities and towns in eastern China ‘paired’ with urban centres in XUAR under earlier development policies, to hire this ‘reeducated’ labour force'.
2.15
Dr Byler told the committee that, since 2017, factory owners from across eastern China have relocated parts of their manufacturing base to Xinjiang 'using state incentives such as rent-free manufacturing facilities and subsidies allowing them to expand their production.' He further outlined:
For each worker they train in their factories they're given 5,000 yuan. They're often given rent-free facilities. They're also given discounts on shipping, because logistically Xinjiang is far away from eastern China and there are additional costs of shipping. There are all of these kinds of incentives that are built into it.
Ideological motivations and rationalisations
2.16
Various submitters considered that the use of forced labour acted as a means of social control. Dr Clarke observed that the Chinese Communist Party sought to 're-educate' various groups within the PRC through labour.
2.17
Dr Anna Hayes, an academic focusing on human insecurity in in PRC based at James Cook University, told the committee that the global war on terror ' had a significant influence on Beijing's contemporary attitudes towards the Uyghurs'. She continued:
Beijing is also showing rising levels of Islamophobia. Prior distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Uyghurs have disappeared and the Chinese Communist Party now identifies religion (Islam) as an aggressor.
2.18
Dr Byler told the committee that a 2019 state-sponsored study noted that 'a primary purpose of the labour programs was to 'diminish the importance of Islamic practice and accelerate social modernisation within Uyghur and Kazakh societies'.
2.19
The East Turkistan Australian Association (ETAA) said the PRC government 'purposefully conflates extremism and terrorism with quotidian religious practices and expression' and had criminalised 'basic tenets of Islam practiced by Uyghurs and other Turkic groups'.
Economic motivations and rationalisations
2.20
Dr David Brophy, a historian of modern China at the University of Sydney, noted that the crackdown on Uyghurs had not only an ideological motivation, but also socio-economic ones:
This aims at removing Uyghurs from predominantly non-Chinese environments such as the rural regions of southern Xinjiang and integrating them into factory work. This facilitates surveillance but is also intended to eventually turn them into more loyal, Chinese-speaking citizens. Effectively, what is going on is the coercive “proletarianization” of large sections of the Xinjiang population.
2.21
In a similar vein, Professor Cockayne said that:
By late 2018, cheap labour emerging from ‘reeducation camps’ associated with the Xinjiang Aid strategy had become an important driver of Xinjiang’s economy, according to an official statement by the Xinjiang Development and Reform Commission.
2.22
Professor Cockayne discussed the PRC government narrative around Uyghur forced labour:
In this narrative, forced labour is reframed as ‘vocational training’, re-skilling and re-education of Uyghurs and other minorities, transforming them into a low-wage, low-skill workforce.
2.23
Dr Byler said that 'the goal of factories associated with internment camps in Northwest China is to turn Kazakhs and Uyghurs into a deeply-controlled working class'. He continued:
By turning a population of people regarded as not deserving of legal protections into workers, state authorities and private industrialist[s] hope that they will extend the market expansion of the Chinese textile and garment industry via an ethnoracialized dormitory work regime which squeezes a constant surplus value from ‘surplus workers'.
2.24
Dr Byler also told the committee that:
My interviews and research suggest that the way that they can garnish wages from these workers and pay them very little is probably the greatest motivator in relocating factory work to Xinjiang. They have this supply of workers that is limitless, in some ways—at least from their perspective—and it's also incentivised by the state. There's kind of a push and a pull, but certainly the economic drivers I think are what's guiding this, because there's money to be made. They talk about it very openly, that they're making quite a lot of money by opening up these new factories in Xinjiang.
Links to global and Australian supply chains
2.25
Submitters noted documentation of the links between goods produced by Uyghur forced labour and global supply chains, including in relation to textiles, electronics, fish, tomatoes, and the solar energy industry. Several noted that cotton is of particular concern. Again, many referred to the Uyghurs for sale report on this topic.
2.26
Ms Xu told the committee that the brands identified in the Uyghurs for sale report included 'Apple, BMW, Gap, Huawei, Nike, Samsung, Sony and Volkswagen.' In the Australian context, Ms Xu informed the committee:
the Queensland state government is investigating Chinese rail manufacturer KTK for Uighur forced labour related concerns. KTK works with a number of other state governments in Australia, including New South Wales and Victoria.
2.27
Professor Leibold pointed out that trade between Xinjiang and Australia is growing:
The fact that two-way trade between Xinjiang and Australia is not only significant but also increasing should be of serious concern to the parliament. The custom bureau of the Xinjiang regional government releases monthly statistics on the import and export of products between Xinjiang and other countries. Much to my surprise, Australia is one of the regime's top trading partners. Over the four years of the brutal crackdown in Xinjiang, Australia's two-way trade with Xinjiang increased by 150 per cent. The vast majority of that trade—about 73 per cent—is the import of goods from Xinjiang into Australia, with imports increasing by 150 per cent in 2009 and amounting to US$37 million. By comparison, in 2019, neither Canada nor the UK was among Xinjiang's top 30 trading partners. Germany and Japan imported far less. In fact, in 2019, Australia's imports from Xinjiang actually exceeded that of the United States and comprised about two per cent of Xinjiang's total exports.
2.28
Ms Keren Adams, Legal Director, Human Rights Law Centre (HRLC), told the committee that the 'scale of China's forced labour program, and in particular Australia's reliance on Chinese cotton, means it's likely that some of us here today may be wearing clothes that are made with Uyghur forced labour'.
Genocide
2.29
Some submissions argued that the human rights abuses in Xinjiang amounted to genocide. The Campaign for Uyghurs (CFU) called for the government to recognise the crimes against Uyghurs as genocide. The Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), an 'international cross party network of parliamentarians working to reform the approach of democratic countries towards China', said that forced labour was 'inseparable from the broader persecution endured by Uighurs' and that '[e]xperts argue that state sponsored mass sterilisation, forced abortions and the forced separation of families could meet internationally agreed criteria for genocide'.
2.30
The Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) said that:
Australia should undertake a determination of whether the Chinese government’s recent actions in Uyghur Region meet the threshold of acts constitutive of genocide, core international crimes under the Genocide Convention and are consistent with crimes against humanity, an international crime under the Rome Statute.
2.31
Ms Ramila Chanisheff, President, Australian Uyghur Tangritagh Women's Association, told the committee that '[c]redible news, academic reports, and well-researched documentaries have all been made public in Australia and internationally on human rights abuses amounting to genocide of the Uighur people under the Chinese Communist Party.'
Disputes over veracity of claims
2.32
The PRC regime has consistently denied allegations of human rights abuses against its Uyghur citizens; denials which many respondents found unconvincing.
2.33
Witnesses provided troubling evidence of PRC government intimidation in response to the publication of research in this area. Professor Leibold and Ms Munro said that the Uyghurs for sale report had been 'repeatedly criticized by the Chinese government', seeking to 'besmirch ASPI as an organization and its researchers (who have been repeatedly doxed and threatened) while ignoring the substance of the report and the specifics of its evidence'. Ms Xu informed the committee that the PRC had 'threatened to sue ASPI for libel' following the publication of the reports.
2.34
Ms Xu noted that although some characterise the evidence of Uyghur human rights violations as contested, that was 'not the understanding in the academic or journalistic world'. She continued:
As to the evidence from Dr Adrian Zenz and Darren [Byler,] to us at ASPI—we have done research into these issues with proper referencing, peer review, and so all we know about Xinjiang, forced labour, sterilisation and detention camps, are facts that have been fact checked by reporters on the ground in China when they still had access.
2.35
In response to a question on notice, Professor Leibold described ASPI's peer review process:
All of ASPI’s research reports undergo rigorous internal and external peer-review at a standard that is not all that dissimilar to research published in an academic journal, and in fact can be more extensive. Our Uyghur for Sale report was externally peer-reviewed by Dr Darren Byler of University of Colorado Boulder, Ms Maya Wang of Human Rights Watch, and by multiple forced labour experts who reviewed the report as anonymous peer reviewers. Internally, it was reviewed by Fergus Hanson, Michael Shoebridge and Peter Jennings. There was a team of 7 researchers/analysts working on the report, and over 6 months of original empirical research fed into the report.
2.36
Evidence of Uyghur forced labour has continued to emerge in the period since the inquiry's public hearing. For example, on 11 June 2021, Amnesty International published a report titled "Like We Were Enemies in a War": China's mass internment, torture and persecution of Muslims in Xinjiang. The report is based on field and remote research, including 'first-hand testimonies that Amnesty International gathered from former detainees of the internment camps and other people who were present in Xinjiang after 2017, as well as from an analysis of satellite imagery and data'. Specifically on forced labour, it outlined:
The testimony of former detainees shows that for many, there is a clear compulsory labour component to the system of detention and of “transformation-through-education” targeting Uyghurs, Kazakhs and other ethnic minority groups in Xinjiang.
…
Despite this being described by the Chinese authorities as a “voluntary” skills training and job placement programme, some detainees who spoke to Amnesty described arrangements that left them with little or no choice or control but to accept employment or “training placements” with minimal pay, poor working conditions, a discriminatory work environment, and often continued restrictions on their freedom of movement under threat of further punishment.
2.37
The report further includes details on first-hand testimony from 11 former detainees who were transferred to different types of labour, including 3 who were sent to factories:
Arzu told Amnesty that after spending six months in one camp he was transferred to another camp, where he was taught to sew in preparation for being sent to a factory. He was then required to live and work in a factory for several months making government uniforms.
…
Aldiyar told Amnesty he spent three months working in a factory for low pay after being released from the camp. All workers were members of ethnic minorities but senior managers were Han Chinese.
…
Ibrahim told Amnesty he worked and lived in a factory for two weeks after being released from a camp. Some other workers in the factory had not been sent from camps; rather, they had been pressured to work in the factory when another member of their family was taken to a camp.
Responses
2.38
Many submitters drew attention to the approaches to forced labour, modern slavery and Uyghur forced labour in other countries, particularly the United States, United Kingdom and Canada.
2.39
Some respondents noted the lack of response from Muslim states. Dr Hayes cited research assessing that this was a result of: those countries observing the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states; a fear of political Islam in some Muslim states; their involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative; and a belief that the PRC is too big to challenge.
United States
2.40
The US State Department informed the committee that the United States had issued measures similar to those contained in the bill 'pursuant to Section 307 of the US Tariff Act of 1930, which prohibits the importation of merchandise mined, manufactured or produced, wholly or in part, by convict labor, forced labour, and/or indentured labor, including forced or indentured child labor.' The US Customs and Border Protection has issued 16 withhold release orders (WROs) on goods from the PRC since 2016, including most recently a 'WRO requiring the detention of all cotton and tomato products originating from Xinjiang as well as any goods that use cotton or tomato products from Xinjiang as an input'.
2.41
The State Department also outlined that the Departments of State, Commerce, Homeland Security and the Treasury 'issued a business advisory to caution businesses about the risks of supply chain links to entities that engage in human rights abuses, including forced labor, in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China'.
2.42
In addition, the Department of Labor issues a biannual report flagging 'goods that agencies charged with enforcement duties should pay attention to when enforcing federal law', which identifies 'five goods produced by forced labor in Xinjiang, including textiles, thread/yarn, and tomato products'.
United Kingdom
2.43
The British High Commission in Canberra informed the committee that on 12 January 2021, the UK Foreign Secretary 'announced a package of measures to help ensure that British organisations in the public and private sectors, are not complicit in, nor profiting from, human rights violations in Xinjiang'. It outlined that these included:
…new, robust and detailed guidance to UK businesses on the specific risks of working with companies with links to Xinjiang, providing additional clarity on the challenges of conducting effective due diligence there. This has been supported by a minister-led campaign of business engagement to reinforce the need for UK businesses to take concerted action to address that particular and specific risk.
2.44
The United Kingdom also introduced financial penalties for those that fail to comply with its Modern Slavery Act and declared that it would 'exclude suppliers from government procurement where there is sufficient evidence of human rights violations in any of their supply chains. It also announced a review of export controls 'as they apply specifically geographically to the situation in Xinjiang'.
2.45
On 22 March 2021, the United Kingdom announced sanctions against four PRC government officials and one entity under its 'Global Human Rights sanctions for systemic violations against Uyghurs and other minorities'. The UK's Sanctions Act 'expressly provides that sanctions regulations may be made…to provide accountability for or be a deterrent to gross violations of human rights'.
Canada
2.46
The Canadian High Commission in Canberra detailed for the committee its government's 'comprehensive approach to defending the rights of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities, including by advancing measures to address the risk of goods produced from forced labour from any country from entering Canadian and global supply chains and to protect Canadian business from becoming unknowingly complicit'. It further explained that Canada's approach includes:
…the prohibition of imports of goods produced wholly or in part by forced labour; a Xinjiang Integrity Declaration for Canadian companies; a Business Advisory on Xinjiang-related entities; enhanced advice to Canadian businesses; increasing awareness for Responsible Business Conduct linked to Xinjiang; export controls; and a study on forced labour and supply chain risks.
2.47
In addition, on 1 July 2020, Canada amended its Customs Tariff Act 'to prohibit the importation from all countries of goods produced, in whole or in part, by forced or compulsory labour.'
2.48
On sanctions, the High Commission informed the committee that new sanctions against four officials and one entity were announced on 22 March 2021' 'based on their participation in gross and systematic human rights violations in Xinjiang', under Canada's Special Economic Measures (People's Republic of China) Regulations.
Australia
2.49
Australia has expressed deep concern about reports of human rights violations and abuses in Xinjiang. As outlined by Ms Vanessa Holben, Group Manager, Deputy Comptroller-General Customs, Australian Border Force:
The government continues to raise Australia's grave concerns about severe human rights abuses that include restrictions on freedom of religion, mass surveillance, large-scale extrajudicial detentions as well as forced labour and forced birth control, including sterilisation, directly with China, in public statements and at the United Nations. Foreign Minister Payne joined New Zealand Foreign Minister Mahuta in expressing grave concerns about severe human rights abuses in Xinjiang in a statement issued on 23 March. Minister Payne has raised concerns directly with her Chinese counterpart, State Councillor Wang Yi, as well as in her Human Rights Council address in September 2020.
Australia is one of 39 countries that joined a statement delivered in the United Nations General Assembly Third Committee in New York on 6 October 2020 regarding the situations in Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Tibet. We were one of 28 countries that joined a statement in the Human Rights Council on 30 June 2020 conveying concerns about Xinjiang and Hong Kong and calling for China to allow independent access to the region. Australia has also consistently raised our concerns in our national statements at the Human Rights Council, and we continue to call on China to give unfettered, meaningful access to Xinjiang for international observers, including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, at the earliest opportunity.
2.50
The government also provided the committee with information on its international engagement to address modern slavery, including involvement in:
…dedicated regional anti-trafficking programs; the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (the Bali Process), co-chaired by the Foreign Ministers of Australia and Indonesia, its Senior Officials Meeting, co-chaired by Australia’s Ambassador for People Smuggling and Human Trafficking; and the Bali Process Government and Business Forum.
PRC
2.51
Ms Xu told the committee that the PRC had in 2021 started a 'nationwide campaign…to endorse Xinjiang cotton, which has now become a symbol of Uighur forced labour', with dozens of well-known PRC entertainers cutting ties 'with brands that have expressed concerns over Uighur forced labour'.
2.52
Professor Leibold told the committee that:
…the Chinese government's propaganda apparatuses are in absolute overdrive when it comes to Xinjiang and the Uighur issue. They are pulling out all stops to ensure that their side of the narrative gets out there. Putting it in the Global Times is not enough for them; they want to find Australian voices, American voices, to repeat that narrative.
Private sector
2.53
Be Slavery Free (BSF) noted that the Better Cotton Initiative, a global not-for-profit organisation and the largest cotton sustainability program in the world, had 'suspended its activities in Xinjiang in China on the back of concerns over the prevalence of labour abuses in the region.'
2.54
BSF also noted the actions taken by Woolworths, Kathmandu and PVH Brands, as outlined in their Modern Slavery Statements. Woolworths commenced tracing its 'garment supply chain in that region' and Kathmandu noted that the risk of exposure to forced labour was 'potentially present at all levels of the supply chain'. PVH Brands said it had 'withdrawn from the area'.
2.55
Ms Xu noted the variety of responses of the brands identified in the Uyghurs for sale report since its publication in 2020:
Some have denied direct contractual relationships with the listed factories or they have claimed they have recently terminated these relationships. However, many were unable to rule out the possibility that forced labour may exist in a second or third tier of their supply chains. Others argued to be taken out of the report simply because they were satisfied with their suppliers' assurances that no forced labour had been found.
2.56
Ms Xu also outlined in some detail for the committee how the response from Nike unfolded over time:
Firstly, there was a denial and then Nike said it had sent all 700 to 800 Uighur workers they had back to Xinjiang following expert advice, but it wasn't made available to us or to the public by what methods and how these workers were sent back, what conditions they were living in and which expert advice Nike was following. More recently, when Nike was facing another round of backlash in China for having put up statements last year showing concerns for forced labour, Nike is again subject to another round of public protest and government crackdown simply because they seemingly care about human rights, and Nike has made, as I understand it, renewed statements and has renewed positions on the issue. As far as I can see, companies I would like to believe are doing their part, consulting experts, politicians and auditing firms, but their power is very limited in this situation. The information they feel they can give us and make available to the public is also very limited, for the exact reason that they are stuck in between Chinese consumers, Chinese government, human rights organisations, research organisations and the Western parliaments.
2.57
Ms Xu also acknowledged how difficult it is for businesses to 'follow standard auditing protocols when it comes to human rights audits and Uighur related audits in China'. She continued:
Auditors are routinely denied access and greeted by hostile government officials or police officers when they visit Chinese factories. In the unlikely event that others are able to conduct a private interview with a Uighur worker, concerns are that they're not in a position to truthfully describe their working conditions, and at a time when Uighurs continue to be thrown into camps with no reasons needed. By conducting Uighur related human rights audits, auditing firms also risk putting their employees in danger, especially those who are Chinese citizens. We understand that some global auditing firms have since begun changing their data collection practices to assess this risk, including identifying Uighur workers in factories across China and flagging labour agents with Chinese government links. However, without adequate auditing access it remains difficult to determine whether a factory uses forced labour or not.