6.1
This chapter outlines the practical measures witnesses and submitters sought and sets out the Australian Government’s policy response to the human rights crisis unfolding in Iran.
6.2
The chapter covers the following matters:
Australia’s initial response;
the application of Magnitsky-style sanctions by democratic nations, including Australia;
listing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation;
requests to expel the Ambassador of Iran to Australia; and
visa pathways to Australia for Iranians.
Calls for concrete action
6.3
Submitters and witnesses were largely consistent in calling for the Australian Government to take practical steps to stand up for and protect the universality of human rights. The key measures proposed include, but are not limited to:
Making significant use of Australia’s Autonomous Sanctions regime (applying Magnitsky sanctions);
listing the IRGC as a terrorist organisation;
expelling the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) Ambassador from Australia;
revoking the Australian citizenship of IRI-affiliated individuals, as well as of any family members residing in Australia;
cracking down on IRI intimidation of the Iranian diaspora in Australia; and
supporting the removal of the IRI from the United Nations (UN) Commission on the Status of Women (CSW).
6.4
Organisations such as Human Rights Watch called for more public support of the Iranian people and their broader social and political rights.
6.5
Similarly, Iranian-Australian community organisations urged the Australian Government to join like-minded nations in sponsoring and passing ‘a strong resolution against the criminal actions of the Islamic Republic both in the Australian Parliament and UN General Assembly’. This echoed calls from international non-profit organisations focused on Iran, which advocate for the international community to ‘publicly condemn [the] Islamic Republic’s heinous crimes and pursue accountability through international mechanisms’.
6.6
While the committee acknowledges steps the Australian Government has already taken in response to the crisis in Iran, outlined below, evidence received suggests that more could be done to support the people of Iran and the Iranian-Australian community alike.
6.7
This chapter makes a series of recommendations to bolster the Australian Government’s policy response.
Australia’s initial response
6.8
In response to the events following the death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini on
16 September 2022, the Australian Government first responded by issuing a joint statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Women on 27 September 2022 condemning ‘the deadly and disproportionate use of force against protesters in Iran’. It outlined the following actions and commitments:
The government has raised its concerns regarding the circumstances surrounding Mahsa (Jina) Amini’s death in custody with the Iranian Embassy in Canberra;
It supports calls led by the Acting UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for a prompt, impartial investigation into Mahsa (Jina) Amini’s death by an independent body;
It supports the right of the Iranian people to protest peacefully and calls on the IRI authorities to exercise restraint in response to ongoing demonstrations;
The government regularly raises IRI’s significant discrimination against women and human rights violations with officials in both Tehran and Canberra, as well as in multilateral fora;
It stands with Iranian women and girls in their struggle for equality and empowerment, and calls on Iran to cease its oppression of women; and
Is committed to promoting gender equality and women’s human rights, empowerment and ending violence against women and girls worldwide.
6.9
On 9 November 2022, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese responded to a question in the parliament about the government’s response to the situation in Iran, making mention of Australia’s economic relationship with the IRI:
I have, as well as the foreign minister, expressed my abhorrence at the actions of the Iranian regime in clamping down on the rights of women—in particular, to wear whatever they want—after the tragic killing of Mahsa Amini …
The Labor government will continue to work with our allies, including in multilateral forums such as the United Nations … I acknowledge the enormous hurt that Iranian people, but Iranian women in particular, are feeling at this very difficult time, watching this clampdown on human rights in Iran for things that we in this country take for granted …
We actually don't have a vast number of economic relations between Australia and Iran. One of the things we have done is make sure … that, in any action that's taken, we're fully cognisant of the implications for Australian businesses of that.
6.10
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (DFAT) submission to the inquiry summarised the actions taken by the Australian Government as at
16 November 2022, stating that the government ‘has been active and consistent in publicly calling out Iran on its egregious behaviour [and] has also mobilised internationally with partners to hold Iran to account for its violent crackdown’. DFAT’s submission explained:
The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have made public comments, statements and issued social media messages, while at officials’ level, seven statements have been made and supported in multilateral fora. DFAT has also spoken to the Iranian Embassy Charge d’affaires on five occasions.
Australia was also on the core drafting group of the UN General Assembly 3rd Committee resolution on the human rights situation in Iran …
Under both our UNSC and autonomous sanctions regimes, Australia has already imposed targeted financial sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) including its overseas arm the Quds Force since 2012. Financial and travel sanctions have been applied to a number of
IRGC-linked individuals and financial sanctions against entities.
6.11
A primary method used by the government to communicate its concerns has been summoning the Iranian Embassy Charge d’affaires. DFAT was asked by the committee to provide the following table highlighting the dates and specific purpose of these meetings with the Iranian Charge d’affaires:
Table 6.1:
|
|
|
|
26 September 2022
|
The death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini and Iran’s violent crackdown on the protests.
|
|
13 October 2022
|
The crackdown on protesters and reports the death toll had risen to the hundreds.
|
|
2 November 2022
|
Iran’s response to the crackdown on protesters, notably live fire being used against protestors in Kurdistan province and in Khorramabad.
|
|
7 November 2022 (phone call)
|
Reports of apparent efforts by Iranian authorities to intimidate the Iranian community in Australia and Iran’s response to the crackdown on protesters.
|
|
15 November 2022
|
Reports of a protester being sentenced to death, the joint letter signed by 277 Iranian members of parliament supporting the death penalty for protesters and Iran’s response to the crackdown on protesters.
|
|
22 November 2022
|
Iran’s response to the ongoing protests and the violent crackdown in Kurdistan and Khuzestan provinces.
|
|
12 December 2022
|
The execution of a protester in Iran on 8 December 2022 and Iran’s response to the crackdown on protesters.
|
|
14 December 2022
|
The execution of a second protester in Iran on 12 December 2022 and Iran’s response to the crackdown on protesters.
|
|
19 December 2022
|
Australia’s imposition of sanctions on Iranian persons and entities on 10 December 2022 and Iran’s response to the crackdown on protesters.
|
|
10 January 2022
|
The execution of two protestors on 7 January 2023 and Iran’s response to the crackdown on protesters.
|
Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade - answer to question on notice (QoN 002) from public hearing held 21 December 2022, Canberra (received 19 January 2023).
6.12
It is not clear what impact or effect these representations from DFAT to the Iranian embassy have had.
6.13
On 10 December 2022, the government designated a number of Magnitsky-style sanctions against IRI officials and associated entities. These sanctions are discussed below.
Magnitsky-style sanctions
6.14
This section will outline Australia’s Magnitsky-style sanctions legislation, which sanctions the government has applied to date, and cavass the views expressed in submissions and at hearings regarding the application of sanctions in response to the human rights concerns relating to the IRI.
6.15
Dr Anton Moiseienko, a lecturer at the Australian National University College of Law, explained that Magnitsky sanctions are, ‘simply put, asset freezes and travel bans imposed in response to alleged human rights abuses or corruption’.
6.16
Professor Ben Saul, Challis Chair of International Law at the University of Sydney and an Associate Fellow of Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs) in London, stated that sanctions are:
… really important in stigmatising and deterring violators, expressing solidarity with victims, … bringing pressure for accountability and reaffirming Australia's global commitment to human rights. This is true even if those targeted may retaliate. Human rights are fundamental and non-negotiable Australian values.
6.17
In December 2021, the Australian Parliament amended the Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 to include Magnitsky-style sanctions powers, enabling the Australian Government to issue thematic sanctions. These types of sanctions target particular issues including serious human rights abuses, threats to international peace and security, and malicious cyber activities.
6.18
Australia first used Magnitsky-style sanctions in March 2022, targeting Russian individuals responsible for the corruption that Russian whistle-blower,
Mr Sergei Magnitsky, uncovered and those complicit in his subsequent mistreatment and death in 2009.
Sanctions applied by Australia
6.19
On 10 December 2022, timed to coincide with Human Rights Day, the Australian Government announced plans to impose targeted Magnitsky-style sanctions on two entities and six individuals ‘involved in the violent crackdown on protests following the death of Mahsa ‘Jina’ Amini and the continued oppression of the people of Iran’. A further three Iranians were also sanctioned under Russia-related regulations for supplying drones to Russia to fight its war in the Ukraine. These individuals and entities were:
Mohammad Rostami Cheshmeh Gachi;
Sardar Seyed Sadegh Hosseini;
Mohammad Hossein Bagheri;
6.20
On 1 February 2023, the day this report is scheduled to be tabled in the Senate, the Minister for Foreign Affairs announced additional Magnitsky-style sanctions:
… on 16 Iranian individuals and one Iranian entity.
Among those subject to Magnitsky-style human rights sanctions are the Basij Cooperative Foundation, and senior law enforcement, political and military figures – including those within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) …
Additionally, Australia is joining partners to impose additional targeted financial sanctions on four Iranian individuals and four entities involved in the production and supply of drones to Russia.
Views on the application of Magnitsky-style sanctions
6.21
Largely, submissions and witnesses have called on the Australian Government to apply Magnitsky-style sanctions on those responsible for the violence and killing of women, girls and protestors in Iran.
6.22
Other issues raised in evidence on Magnitsky-style sanctions covered the following topics and will be discussed in this section:
timing of the application of sanctions by Australia compared with other countries;
breadth of sanctions applied by Australia compared to other countries;
departmental resourcing for sanctions, as well as the lack of information published in relation to sanctions designations, including the rationale for the sanction;
effectiveness of Magnitsky-style sanctions; and
proposed amendments to the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011.
Timing of the application of sanctions
6.23
The timeframes in which different countries have acted to implement sanctions in response to the human rights concerns in Iran, following the death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini, were raised at the committee’s hearing.
6.24
The United States (US) announced its first tranche of sanctions on
22 September 2022, Canada on 26 September 2022 the United Kingdom (UK) on 10 October 2022, Council of the European Union (EU) on 17 October 2022, and Australia 10 December 2022.
6.25
Since those dates the US, Canada, the UK and the EU have announced further multiple rounds of sanctions. At the time of writing, Australia’s Government is yet to announce a second round of sanctions on Iranian officials or entities.
6.26
When asked why there was a significant delay of more than two months between the first sanctions announcement by Australia’s allies and the announcement by the Australian Government of its first sanctions, DFAT explained that there were a range of considerations taken by government, and ‘sanctions were only one of our toolkits in responding’ to the situation in Iran. DFAT stated that the government carefully evaluates the situation and weighs up a number of complex factors. However, DFAT would not discuss those factors in a public forum:
CHAIR: What were those factors?
Mr Innes-Brown: As I said, they're of a nature that I wouldn't divulge in a public forum.
CHAIR: Okay, and would it be fair to say—given there was a two-month gap between the United Kingdom doing what they did and Australia doing what we did—that it took two months to weigh up those factors?
Mr Innes-Brown: I'm not going to go into the nature of them, and whether that impacted on the time frame.
6.27
DFAT also added that a part of the reason that sanctions differ between countries is because their sanctions regimes differ:
Ms Smith: The [sanctions] regimes are not all exactly the same, and our processes are different. With decisions that the Australian government takes to impose sanctions, the timing of those are considered with regard to our national interest in an Australian context. We're not always going to end up having exactly the same considerations or the same criteria. Even with just that starting point, there will—not always—be differences.
CHAIR: Does that mean that our processes for sanctioning take longer to enact than those of other likeminded nations?
Ms Buckingham: Not necessarily, no. It's just a matter of the factors, as mentioned by Ms Smith, that need to be taken into account in all the circumstances, depending on the nature of the regime. It may be that those need to be weighed up, but the processes themselves are not necessarily significantly different.
CHAIR: So it does go back to that question that I don't think Mr Innes-Brown really wanted to go into in this public forum, of what factors were being considered by Australia in sanctioning Iran over the last couple of months and how long it took to consider those factors. What we're in effect saying is, because of the complexity of those factors, we weren't able to get to a position until well after many of our allies had.
Ms Buckingham: I think that's correct.
Mr Innes-Brown: Yes, Senator.
Breadth of sanctions applied
6.28
Whilst Australia’s application of sanctions to six individuals and two entities has been welcomed, many still argue that additional sanctions are necessary.
6.29
For example, STARTTS outlined its support for ‘considered and targeted use of Magnitsky-style sanctions on Iranian individuals and entities responsible for human rights violations’. However, it criticised the breadth of sanctions applied by Australia to date, stating:
Since Iranian Government commenced its use of violence to curb the protests in late September 2022, other like-minded countries have used Magnitsky-style sanctions on many Iranian individuals linked to the human rights violations. The United Kingdom have applied Magnitsky-style sanctions to at least 24 individuals; the European Union to at least
29 individuals, and the United States of America to at least 18 individuals. In contrast, the Australian Government, in December 2022, applied Magnitsky-style sanctions to 6 individuals.
6.30
In response to a question taken on notice at a public hearing on the difference between the number of individuals and entities sanctioned by Australia and other nations, DFAT advised that, as at 4 January 2023:
the US has imposed sanctions on at least 45 Iranian individuals and
5 Iranian entities;
Canada has sanctioned at least 84 Iranian individuals and 19 Iranian entities; and
the United Kingdom has sanctioned at least 41 Iranian individuals and
1 Iranian entity.
6.31
Evidence received by the committee included calls for the IRGC to be more broadly targeted under Australia’s Magnitsky-style sanctions. For example,
Ms Sara Zahedi, a representative of Woman Life Freedom Australia, an Iranian-Australian activist group, stated:
Only one of the six officials [sanctioned] is a member of the IRGC, so it remains unclear what, if any, financial presence these six individuals have on Australian soil … Given the IRGC's very function and purpose in Iran, and the blood that is on its hands from recent months, it remains a real question in the minds of many Australians why our government has not chosen to sanction the IRGC or its key members and entities, who largely control the Basij and the morality police.
6.32
UN Watch also suggested sanctioning the three main entities that the IRGC use to fund its activities, as well as the three main entities controlled by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, which include:
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, the largest construction company in Iran;
The IRGC Cooperative Foundation, a financial holdings company that invests in Iran’s economy;
The Basij Cooperative Foundation, a financial holdings company that invests in Iran’s economy;
Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (IKO), which oversees dozens of subsidiaries and front companies, including Tadbir Group, Rey Group, and Barkat Foundation;
Mostazafan Foundation, which was designed to seize and manage assets owned by the deposed Royal Family and its associates; and
Astan Quds Razavi, which tightly controls the economy of the three Southern provinces of Iran where it owns companies in energy and agriculture.
6.33
A number of submitters and witnesses also highlighted the rationale for imposing sanctions on IRI judges and those associated with the judicial system. Distinguished international barrister and human rights advocate,
Mr Geoffrey Robertson KC stated, ‘the jurists who act and send people to death should be sanctioned’, giving the example of:
Judge Salavati, who was the hanging judge of Tehran, who was sanctioned by America a couple of years ago. He's been sanctioned by Europe. Australia has a particular reason for sanctioning him because he was the judge who convicted Kylie Moore-Gilbert on no evidence at all. Her grossly unfair trial was orchestrated by this particular judge.
Departmental resourcing for sanctions and information published on sanctions designations
6.34
The committee heard evidence from submitters and witnesses who raised concerns regarding adequate departmental resourcing to deal with Australia’s sanctions effectively. Additionally, others raised the lack of detail provided by government on the rationale for the designation of particular sanctions as a concern.
6.35
Mr Robertson KC was critical of the Australian Government’s approach to utilising Magnitsky-style sanctions as ‘foreign policy tools in pursuit of foreign policy goals’ as opposed seeing it ‘as an instrument for the advancement of human rights’. He also suggested that Australia’s limited approach to Magnitsky-sanctions could be a product of a lack of resourcing within DFAT. He noted that other countries such as the US have a thousand full-time officers involved in their equivalent sanctions department, and the UK several hundred.
6.36
Dr Moiseienko also noted that ‘one aspect of global practice where there is some divergence [with what Australia does] … is the level of detail that one can find in relation to sanctions designations’. In particular, an ‘explanation of what the targeted person has actually engaged in’ and the ‘identification of associated individuals and companies [, which] can make it easier for private sector actors to comply with sanctions’. He gave the example of the US, where:
… in certain US designations you not only see a person's name being trotted out and a description being provided of what they are alleged to have engaged in; you also see a range of, potentially dozens in some instances, affiliated companies listed in that designation. That gives a hook for the private sector in identifying whether they have any dealings with the sanctioned person, albeit in a different guise. Sanctioned individuals with a reasonable degree of sophistication are unlikely to hold assets in their own name, and therefore there is a fundamental question of what exactly the government is doing to make it easier to identify those assets in the jurisdiction that can then be frozen.
6.37
Mr Robertson KC stated that DFAT should have a dedicated team capable of researching human rights violations and consulting with bodies concerned with Iran, not just other governments, as well as a website that outlines the evidence used to inform the application of each sanction to demonstrate that its sanctions are authoritative.
6.38
Similarly, the National Assembly of Iranian Jurists (NAJ) recommended that the government establish a multi-agency sanctions taskforce to investigate, advise and keep the sanctions regime effective by:
(a)
Mapping out relevant Islamic Republic entities, especially those connected to the IRGC;
(a)
Mapping out private enterprises with links to them – critical to have a detailed understanding of ownership of the said private entities;
(b)
Identify the individuals behind the said entities or those with true beneficial ownership;
(c)
Detect those with assets and investments in Australia and impose sanctions as appropriate; and
(d)
With the cooperation of [the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre] (AUSTRAC) and other relevant security agencies, take active steps to assess whether the said sanctions are having the desired effect and identify any evasion therefrom.
Effectiveness of Magnitsky-style sanctions
6.39
Dr Moiseienko raised the point that discussions about the effectiveness of Magnitsky-style sanctions raises flawed questions because:
… there is no consensus as to what exactly sanctions are meant to achieve and therefore what precisely they're supposed to be effective at. What I would suggest, in the context of this discussion and more generally, is that one should have realistic expectations of sanctions. They're not likely to change the world in and of themselves, they might not even alter the behaviour of a rogue regime, but they can be useful as part of the broader suite of measures aimed at putting pressure on a particular government. So, in a sense, the better question is not one about the effectiveness of sanctions, but simply this: are they a helpful pressure tool to utilise? And very often they are.
6.40
Since Magnitsky-style sanctions involve asset freezes and travel bans,
Dr Moiseienko noted that whilst many within the IRI are unlikely to be planning to travel to Australia nor have assets here, that is still not necessarily a good measure of the effectiveness of these types of sanctions. He explained:
If the targeted person is involved in commercial activities around the world, banks worldwide are likely to pay attention to Australian designations. Other allies also may take Australian sanctions as an impetus to join in in those sanctions and impose designations of their own. The point, therefore, is that we should account for a much broader range of variables when we think about the impact of sanctions than simply the amount of assets frozen.
6.41
However, Dr Moiseienko added that in order for a sanctions program to be impactful and not merely symbolic:
… it is vital to give some thought to the impact of sanctions and try to tailor them in such a way as to produce greatest possible impact and to bring maximum pressure to bear. That involves identifying people who do have links to Australia, but also thinking more creatively about how, even when those links are not there, sanctions can nonetheless be, hopefully at least, a significant irritant for those who are targeted and not merely a symbolic statement of condemnation, important though symbolic statements might be.
6.42
Ms Zahedi agreed that Australia needs to consider its approach carefully ‘in order for the sanctions to be really effective and to change [the IRI’s] behaviour as opposed to having some kind of symbolic value’. She suggested that efforts should be made to understand which individuals are involved, what their activities are within Australia’s borders, and to work in combination with others, such as the UK and Canada, who have already implemented a broad suite of sanctions.
6.43
Mr Hillel Neuer, Executive Director at UN Watch, argued that ‘the US and Canada have adopted the most comprehensive sanctions on Iranian officials to date’ and that Australia should look to these allies as models.
6.44
STARTTS also recommended that the Australian Government actively consider sanctioning other IRI individuals that have been sanctioned by countries such as the UK, EU and US, and working multilaterally, in coordination with other like-minded countries.
Amendments to the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011
6.45
A submitter and witness outlined amendments to the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 they perceived to be important for Australia’s response to the human rights concerns in Iran.
6.46
In Annexure “A” of Mr Ek Taghdir’s submission, amendments to Regulation 3 and Item 4 of Regulation 6 of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 were outlined to clarify important distinctions that would enable sanctions on the IRI to be more effective in support of Iranian women, girls and their allies. The recommended amendments would enable:
(a)
Recognition of significant nuances such as the understanding that there is no “Iranian government or regime” but rather, a ruling ‘Islamic Republic regime’ which does not represent the ‘people of Iran’ who are from the ‘land of Iran’;
(b)
Recognition that there is no differentiating between the various governmental departments or paramilitary arms within the power structure of the I.R regime;
(c)
Ensuring that Australia is not a residential or financial haven for current and former ministers and officials of the regime, their immediate family members, affiliates and associates - by way of the following targeted measures:
(i)
Travel & visa terminations: refusal of entry or residence in Australia;
(ii)
Freezing of assets in Australia, including real estate or commercial;
(iii)
Suspension of any business or trade activity directly or indirectly with the Australian Government or any Australian business;
(iv)
Suspension of any commercial activity within Australia; and
(v)
Termination of enrolments in any Australian educational institution.
(d)
Disincentivising any financial or ideological support for the regime by avoiding superficial sanctions which only target some very high ranking officials.
6.47
On the other hand, Professor Saul argued that Regulation 6A which implements the serious human rights violations threshold under the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 does so in an ‘unduly narrow way’.
He explained:
It only covers killings, torture or slavery, servitude or forced labour. Killings and torture are, of course, occurring in Iran, but such a narrow approach does not do justice to the victims of the spectrum of other rights violations in Iran.
… at the moment, we can impose sanctions for killing one person like Magnitsky himself, but you can't impose sanctions for gender persecution against half of the Iranian population of tens of millions of people. You can't impose sanctions for the persecution of religious minorities in Iran. I just think it's nonsensical. It's a very poor sense of how you should interpret serious human rights violations. Obviously you don't want every possible rights violation to be sanctionable, but we're talking here about really systematic, broad-based violations affecting large numbers of people.
6.48
Professor Saul recommended that the government’s primary response to the violence and killing of women, girls and protestors in Iran should be to widen the regulations to capture other serious human rights violations—which would also widen the pool of people or entities which Australian sanctions could target—including:
… mass arbitrary arrests and detention, grossly unfair trials and excessive punishments for vague theocratic crimes, gender persecution, systematic suppression of political and media freedoms and the persecution of minorities, such as the Kurds and followers of the Baha'í faith.
…
Surprisingly, even the act itself omits international crimes, such as genocide and crimes against humanity, which also should be covered.
Committee view
6.49
The committee acknowledges the government’s announcement on
10 December 2022 regarding the imposition of Magnitsky sanctions on individual members of the IRI regime. The committee considers this to be a first step. However, the committee notes and is concerned by the time it took for the government to act. Given that the very purpose of Australia’s Magnitsky legislation is to ensure that Australia can act quickly against human rights abusers, the committee is left questioning why Australia was so far behind other democratic and like-minded countries in taking this step.
6.50
The government has not been able, or willing, to explain why Australia has sanctioned significantly less individuals than allies with whom we share intelligence. During the course of the inquiry, government agencies were unwilling to discuss the reasons for this, beyond referring to the existence of ‘factors’ and complexities that the government won’t disclose, and to “having regard to our national interest in the Australian context”.
6.51
The committee also notes the recent confirmation by the Australian Signals Directorate that Iranian IRGC affiliated actors have targeted Australian organisations with malicious cyber activity. Australia’s Magnitsky-style sanctions regime provides the capacity for sanctions relating to cyber offences.
6.52
The committee recommends that the Australian Government use the available Magnitsky legislation to expand the list of individuals and entities subject to sanctions in response to human rights abuses in Iran, with particular focus on senior officials responsible for violence, human rights abuses, arbitrary detention and executions without due process.
6.53
The committee recommends the use of sanctions to target Islamic Republic of Iran and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated individuals and entities responsible for malicious cyber activity against Australia.
Listing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation
6.54
According to a number of submitters, the IRGC is officially tasked with protecting the Islamic regime, as opposed to Iran, and spreading its reach beyond the IRI’s borders. Its actions in attempting to achieve this goal is what submitters point to in their calls for the IRGC to be listed as a terrorist organisation in Australia.
6.55
United Action for Iran, a broad coalition of about 700 Iranian Australian community members and 19 organisations, stated that ‘IRI is widely acknowledged as the world’s preeminent sponsors of terrorism and the IRGC is its main arm in carrying out such activities both inside and outside of Iran’.
6.56
The Monash University Gender, Peace and Security Centre (MUGPSC) explained that the ‘IRGC is constituted as an ideological organisation for the purpose of imposing by armed violence an Islamist totalitarian sociopolitical scheme in Iran and abroad,’ made clear by its goal and mission, according to its Constitution:
The Revolutionary Guards is an institution under the Leader’s supreme command. Its goal is to protect Iran’s Islamic Revolution and its achievements and relentlessly struggle to realize the divine ideals and spread the law of God in accordance with the Islamic Republic of Iran’s laws ... To struggle in accordance with the [Islamic Republic] law against agents and groups that aim to undermine or destroy the Islamic Republic system or act against the Islamic Revolution of Iran.
6.57
Therefore, the MUGPSC submitted that as ‘[t]his conduct logically proceeds from the identity of the IRGC as a constituted body; it is inscribed in its DNA, so to speak. To stop it from doing what it does means to de-constitute it. That is the only way. A multilateral international listing of the IRGC as a terrorist organization turns it into a real liability for the Islamic Republic’.
6.58
Dr Moore-Gilbert added that:
One of the primary instigators of violence against the peaceful protesters in Iran is the IRGC … The IRGC is not formally part of the Iranian government, it functions as a ‘state within a state’ and answers only to the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.
The IRGC has a stated policy of ‘exporting the revolution’ beyond Iran’s borders, and this has led to its sponsorship of a number of Islamist proxies in other parts of the Middle East, many of which have been designated terror organisations by Australia and its Western allies. Such groups including Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Ansar Allah (‘the Houthis’) in Yemen and a variety of Iraqi paramilitary groups such as al-Hashd al-Shaabi (‘Popular Mobilisation Forces’). The IRGC is also the feeder organisation of the Basij militia group within Iran, volunteer forces which are also responsible for much of the current bloodshed on Iran’s streets.
6.59
Another submitter outlined additional actions attributed to the IRGC, including:
Abroad, IRCG is responsible for the illegal seizure of shipping vessels in international waters, hacking operations against western targets, the assassination or kidnapping of dissidents from abroad and attacks on international targets with bombs and other devices.
In Iran IRGC forces been detaining, and torturing many political activist, environmental activist, journalist, and university students who dare to criticise the Islamic regime even in slightest tone.
IRGC has been behind many show trials and execution of political activist, and planning to do more right now …
The IRGC is the responsible entity behind the Islamic regime Nuclear Program, disguised as peaceful energy program but indeed aiming to develop nuclear weapons.
6.60
At the committee’s hearing, DFAT confirmed that:
The Islamic Republic of Iran has been involved in a range of nefarious activities over the past 40 years, including attacks on diaspora groups. They've been involved in supporting militia and other groups throughout the Middle East and so forth. There has been evidence … that Iran has been involved in cyberactivities as well. So that's a quick summary. There's been a lot of malign international behaviour … [and] our travel advice for Iran specifically warns against the risk of arbitrary detention in Iran.
6.61
A large number of submissions made clear that the IRGC is feared not only by Iranians in Iran, but by people of Iranian descent living all over the world, including Australia. A number of these submissions noted that the IRGC is known to be active around the world.
6.62
It is also relevant to note that the IRGC and its leadership has a long history of making threats against western nations. As an example, in a speech in January 2023, the commander of the IRGC was reported as threatening to take revenge against the west for the killing of former IRGC General Qassem Soleimani.
Views on the designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organisation
6.63
Overwhelmingly, submissions requested that the Australian Government designate the IRGC as a terrorist organisation under the Criminal Code Act 1995. However, some evidence raised potential legislative obstacles to achieving this within Australia’s current legislative framework.
6.64
Mr Reza Parsaee pointed out in his submission that ‘[i]n Australia, a terrorist organisation is defined as an organisation that is: “… engaged in preparing, planning, assisting or fostering the doing of a terrorist act, or advocating the doing of a terrorist act”’, if the Minister for Home Affairs is satisfied of the above. Given the amount of evidence available to the Minister, Mr Parsaee asked what more is required for the IRGC to be designated as a terrorist organisation.
6.65
The Zionist Federation of Australia (ZFA), a representative body committed to advocating for the State of Israel on behalf of the Jewish community in Australia, agreed. Its submission stated that there is ‘copious open-source evidence that the IRGC and organisations associated with it pursue activities that would meet [Australia’s] definition of terrorism in pursuit of its mission to ‘export the revolution’’.
6.66
The Australian Jewish Association (AJA), a membership-based Jewish communal organisation, noted that ‘[b]y distinguishing the IRGC from the regular Iranian military,’ and proscribing the IRGC as a terrorist organisation, ‘Western nations can send a strong and targeted signal’.
6.67
A submitter explained that:
Listing the IRGC as a terrorist organisation would enable Australian law enforcement to prohibit anyone in Australia from sending funds or other support to the IRGC. It would also better enable Australia to deny visas to IRGC members, many of whom are known to have studied in Australian universities in the past, and to prevent IRGC members from seeking refuge and using Australia as a safe haven.
6.68
In addition, Dr Moore-Gilbert added that:
… the IRGC is the main hostage taker in this case. They were the hostage takers of me, Jolie and Mark, the two Australian backpackers who were arrested in 2019, and of several others whose cases are less publicly known. Internationally, there are a number of European, American and other citizens still sitting as hostages in Iranian prisons today because of the IRGC. So listing this group as a terror organisation, which it very clearly is, would act on the issue of hostage diplomacy as well.
6.69
Dr Morteza Sharifi stated it is ‘in the best long-term interests of Australia to proscribe the IRGC. There are clear legal, ethical, moral, and humanitarian rationales to support such a move’.
6.70
The Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC) supported calls for the IRGC to be listed as a terrorist organisation under the Criminal Code Act 1995, arguing that:
Australia has long been out of step with key allies and partners when it comes to holding the Iranian regime and associated entities and individuals accountable – not only for the horrifying and pervasive human rights abuses against Iranians domestically, but also for its global sponsorship and orchestration of terrorism; its proliferation of drones and missiles to regional terrorist groups; its nuclear program; its hostage-taking and piracy; its assassination of dissidents and journalists across the world; its regional destabilisation and aggression; and its participation in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine via the provision of drones and missiles and advisers on the ground.
6.71
On 15 April 2019, the US formally proscribed the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO). Canada also proscribed the IRGC in 2020.
6.72
Furthermore, German Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock, stated that listing the IRGC as a terrorist organisation is ‘politically important and makes sense’.
6.73
The European Parliament has recently voted in support of listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity, and media reports suggest the UK Government is expected to declare the IRGC as a terrorist organisation.
6.74
When asked whether DFAT had briefed the Attorney-General’s Department or had other interdepartmental briefings with other departments regarding the listing of the IRGC, it responded:
It is the Australian Government’s longstanding practice not to comment on the possible listings of terrorist organisations under the Criminal Code, including whether or not a particular entity is under consideration for listing.
Potential legislative barriers
6.75
Professor Saul raised a potential legislative barrier to listing the IRGC as a terrorist organisation under current Australian law, stating that:
Section 100.1(1) of the Criminal Code defines an ‘organisation’ as a body corporate or an unincorporated body. The Australian courts have interpreted bodies corporate and unincorporated bodies as excluding governments, which thus cannot be listed as terrorist organisations. The IRGC is clearly an Iranian state entity.
6.76
Mr Faraz Maghami, a member of United Action for Iran and a barrister, stated:
As a matter of legal analysis, that's probably correct. The IRGC is an extension of the arm of government of Iran. What is not clear to perhaps outsiders is this: Sepah, or the IRGC, are not your traditional form of military arm. They have investments within and outside Iran. They have banks. They run schools. They run universities. They run basically the social security system, a part of it called the downtrodden group; that is the English translation of my bad Farsi. It is the downtrodden organisation which Sepah pays a weekly or monthly stipend to. These are all independent and individual organisations that are connected to the IRGC.
That means, in short, in my view, they can, and in fact do, fall within the parameters of the act currently. Upon briefing and consideration by the government, they can be designated as a terrorist organisation … Even if it is the case that the IRGC is an extension of the arm of the government, and whilst I've set out all these individual parts and entities which can be, in fact, designated, all it requires is a slight legislative amendment … That is, the definition is widened to allow specific arms of government which does include the IRGC, or will rather capture it, I should say.
6.78
Mr Taghdir also commented on the evidence raised in Professor Saul’s submission, noting that ‘it's probably a correct interpretation of the current legislation, despite the fact that the IRGC, in all respects, acts like a terrorist organisation.’ Therefore:
… legislative amendments would be required for it to be deemed a terrorist organisation under the Criminal Code 1995—specifically section 102.1. Also, amendments would be required to the Foreign States Immunities Act in order for the definition of 'organisation' to include a foreign entity … We also need to encourage the Australian Federal Police to utilise division 92 of the Criminal Code 1995 as necessary. That is related to provisions for foreign interference by foreign principals, which I believe the IRGC or any other arm of the Islamic Republic regime would definitely be part of.
6.79
The ZFA argued that ‘foreign state-owned or -controlled organisations that directly or indirectly engage in, prepare, plan, assist in or foster the doing of a terrorist act should not be immune to proscription under Australian law’.
Its submission questioned whether there still remained some ambiguity in the court’s decision referenced by Professor Saul, stating:
Notwithstanding the definitive tone of Prof Saul’s submission, the court decision upon which he relies is ambiguous on the matter. It states that a nation (by which it means state) or its government is not a body corporate, and that a nation or its population is not an unincorporated association. While it is thus clear that a state or a state government cannot be considered a terrorist organisation according to this ruling, it is not clear whether an organisation (which is not a government) controlled by a state should be immune from proscription by Australia.
6.80
Mr Robertson KC added that ‘anything that is obstructive at the moment to listing the revolutionary guards can be changed. Parliament is supreme, and it's not very difficult to rewrite the law to clarify that it can, in fact, be listed’.
6.81
However, at the committee’s hearing, Professor Saul explained that there are primarily two reasons why countries generally do not enable the listing of states as terrorist organisations:
Let's say you change the legislation and you listed a state entity. There is really not much point doing that because the consequence of listing primarily is a whole raft of criminal offences, which go to membership and recruitment et cetera. Of course, if you are part of the Iranian state, you've got state immunity before Australian domestic courts. So there's really no point in doing that. There's no exception for terrorism from state immunity. The second point is more historical. Why has terrorism generally not been defined as including states internationally? Western states generally have argued against it by saying that other areas of international law—international humanitarian law, international criminal law, the law on the use of force, the UN charter—already apply to states. So if states are committing unlawful violence, they are already war criminals or committing the international crime of aggression et cetera. There is a right of self-defence against them. Labelling them as terrorists doesn't give you anything extra that is seen to be valuable.
6.82
Therefore, Professor Saul’s recommended approach, as outlined previously, is to amend the Autonomous Sanctions Regulation 2011 to widen the basis on which the government can target the full range of human rights violations happening in Iran which then widens the pool of people or entities which Australian sanctions could target.
6.83
In debating the proposed proscribing of the IRGC in the UK, the Institute of Global Change noted that:
Formally banning or proscribing the IRGC as a terrorist organisation will send a clear message to the clerical regime in Iran that the terrorism and militancy pursued through the Guard, including on UK soil, will not be tolerated. Proscription would not close the door to diplomatic engagement with Tehran – as has been seen in the case of continuing diplomacy with the Lebanese government after the full proscription of Hizbullah in 2019.
6.84
Likewise, Dr Moore-Gilbert argued that:
Listing the IRGC as a terror organisation would enable Australian law enforcement to prohibit anyone in Australia from sending funds or other support to the IRGC from our territory. It would also better enable Australia to deny visas to IRGC members, many of whom are known to have studied in Australian universities in the past, and to prevent IRGC members from gaining residency or citizenship.
6.85
On 31 January 2023, the Attorney-General’s Department made a late submission to the inquiry expressing the following view:
As the department responsible for administering the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code), this submission is limited to providing information on terrorist organisation listings in Division 102 of that Act.
Division 102 of the Criminal Code contains a number of offences related to terrorist organisations, including the offence of directing the activities of, being a member of, recruiting for, providing funds to, from or for, training with or providing training for a terrorist organisation.
The Attorney-General's Department is of the view that, as an organ of a nation state, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is not the kind of entity that is covered by the terrorist organisation provisions in the Criminal Code.
Committee view
6.86
The committee acknowledges the body of evidence on the IRGC’s support and facilitation of terrorism. It also acknowledges that there is significant fear of the IRGC in the Iranian-Australian community—a fear which is founded in the clear evidence that the IRGC operates well beyond Iran’s borders with the express purpose of threatening, intimidating and committing acts of violence against individuals it believes threatens its ideology. The IRGC is a terrorist organisation and should be recognised as such. Doing so would not just send the right message, it would better empower agencies in Australia to place a greater focus on the IRGC’s activities and operations in Australia.
6.87
While the arguments for listing the IRGC as a terrorist organisation are strong, the committee notes the conflicting evidence received on whether existing legislation is sufficient for these purposes. The committee urges the government to explore how best to achieve formal recognition of the IRGC as a terrorism-supporting entity. Government agencies were asked by the committee whether advice had been taken on this point, as well as whether agencies had provided advice to government. Agencies declined to provide this information to the committee.
6.88
Listing of the IRGC as a terrorist group is not only the request of hundreds of submissions to this inquiry, but it is the subject of a worldwide campaign. The European Parliament and the UK Government are both actively considering taking this step. Although Australian Government agencies giving evidence during public hearings would not confirm whether the listing of the IRGC has been or is being considered by the Australian Government, the late submission received from the Attorney-General’s Department reveals that it believes the IRGC is an ‘organ of a nation state’ and therefore ‘not the kind of entity that is covered by the terrorist organisation provisions in the Criminal Code’. Presuming the Australian Government agrees with and accepts this advice, the obligation is on the government to bring forward legislative amendments to ensure that the IRGC—clearly a facilitator and promoter of terrorism—does not escape listing as a terrorist organisation based on a technicality.
6.89
The committee recommends that the Australian Government take the necessary steps to formally categorise the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as an organisation involved in supporting and facilitating terrorism.
Iranian Embassy in Australia
6.90
Another response called for by the majority of submitters, as well as some witnesses, was for Australia to expel the Ambassador of Iran to Australia and other diplomatic staff of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
6.91
United Action for Iran, for example, requested that Australia immediately ‘designate the ambassador and other representative of the Islamic regime in Australia, as “persona non grata” in protest to the illegal and inhumane treatment of protesters in Iran and only allow consulate level representation to remain’.
6.92
Ms Zahedi explained that many in the diaspora have requested this action given that many sources, including security agencies:
… have confirmed that Iranian embassies operate mainly as hubs of intelligence gathering and, in Australia, promote the harassment of peaceful Iranian-Australian human rights advocates.
6.93
The AIJAC agreed that it was well documented that ‘Iranian diplomats routinely plan, oversee and even participate in attacks, and act as agents of the regime in monitoring, and sometimes initiating violence or threats against, Iranian dissidents living abroad’ and argued that closing the Iranian embassy in Canberra could therefore result in tangible security benefits for Australia.
6.94
Mr Robertson KC relayed that ‘[t]here is some evidence that the Iranian embassy is being used to intimidate’ which he noted was not surprising given that:
Iranian embassies have been implicated in not only a planned attack in Britain on Salman Rushdie but also a case in Europe where one of the so-called diplomats in an Iranian embassy smuggled in a bomb that was expected to go off in Paris to kill hundreds, if not thousands, of people at a meeting held by the National Council for Resistance in Iran. So there is ample evidence that Iran is prepared to kill its critics and, from time to time, to use its embassies for that purpose.
6.95
Evidence received by the committee indicated that other countries had expelled the IRI’s ambassadors to their respective countries. For example,
Mr Robert Gregory, Public Affairs Director at the AJA, stated:
Iran's ambassador was recently expelled from the Ukraine after Iranian suicide drones and missiles were terrorising the civilians in Kiev. Albania also expelled Iran's ambassador recently because they wanted to deal with cyberhacking. This issue has also affected Australia. The Australian Cyber Security Centre, the ACSC, issued a warning about Iranian government sponsored cyberattacks targeting Australian infrastructure, but we haven't seen any further action from the Australian government.
6.96
Mr Taghdir argued that expelling diplomatic staff of the IRI in Australia would send a strong message to the IRI, especially in response to the executions that have been occurring.
6.97
Similarly, the Kurdish Lobby Australia (KLA), an organisation advocating for the people of the Kurdistan regions, suggested that the Australian Government consider investigating ‘the Iranian embassy in Canberra as a centre of spying and other illegal activities’.
6.98
DFAT outlined its position on the continuance of the IRI’s diplomatic mission in Australia, stating:
We believe it's important to continue to have diplomatic lines of communication open for a range of reasons. It's for the same reason we've had an embassy in Iran for many years—because it's in our interest to do so and, generally, it's important to have those channels of communication.
Committee view
6.99
The committee received evidence that Iranian embassies around the world have been used to facilitate a range of illegal behaviour including terrorism activity. The inquiry also received a number of submissions outlining the credible fears that Iranian embassies are used to facilitate the monitoring, surveillance and intimidation of critics of the IRI regime. The Australian Government should have no hesitation in expelling any members of the Iranian embassy deemed to be involved in or facilitating such behaviour.
6.100
The main counterargument to the expulsion of the Iranian Ambassador is that put by DFAT, which is that maintaining lines of communications are important, and that both the Iranian Embassy in Australia and the Australian Embassy in Iran are necessary to maintain these lines of communication.
6.101
The key question to be considered is: what type of bilateral relationship should Australia have with a regime which is involved in state-sponsored terrorism, gross human rights violations, extreme oppression of women, girls and ethnic minorities, malicious cyber activity and ransomware attacks targeting Australia, hostage diplomacy targeting Australia, and even attempted murder and abduction of critics in western countries?
6.102
The committee recommends that Australia should minimise relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran to the greatest extent possible in recognition of the appalling behaviour of the regime.
6.103
The committee recommends that the Australian Government increase transparency and better inform the Australian public about the status of our diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran regime, as well as our security concerns in relation to the regime’s behaviour relating to cybercrime, hostage diplomacy and threats to, and intimidation of, Australian residents.
6.104
The committee recommends that any Iranian officials in Australia considered to be involved in intimidation, threats, or monitoring of Australians be expelled.
Visa pathways to Australia for Iranians
6.105
In addition to other requested actions, a number of submissions called on the Australian Government to provide more visa pathways for Iranians, including an increase to Australia’s humanitarian visa intake, provision of permanent visas to temporary protection visa holders, and extending visas of students and skilled workers from Iran currently in Australia, with pathways to permanent residency.
6.106
A submitter explained that due to the crackdown by the IRI, many Iranians are at serious risk of imprisonment, amongst other threats to their human rights. It also noted that those already living in Australia are also at risk given the monitoring of protestors in Australia who may now be unable to travel back to Iran after speaking out against the IRI.
6.107
Amnesty International Australia indicated that there are approximately 2,800 Iranians in Australia on final departure bridging visas (Bridging visa E) as of March 2022, and 7,047 Iranians on a temporary protection visa (including TPV and SHEV) as of October 2022.
6.108
STARTTS explained that:
The Temporary Protection Visa (TPV) and Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV) are visa types used in Australia for people who have arrived in Australia without a visa and have successfully sought asylum. These visas offer temporary protection- a TPV is issued for three years and a SHEV for five years. These visa holders need to reapply for the visa, which involves a new refugee status assessment to demonstrate that they are still in need of protection … We acknowledge that the current Australian Government has committed to abolishing the temporary protection visas (TPV and SHEV) and transition eligible refugees onto permanent visa arrangements.
6.109
Specifically in relation to Iranian women and girls, the Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs) provided the following table outlining the number of temporary visas held by Iranian women and girls in Australia, as at
21 December 2022:
6.110
STARTTS outlined six recommendations for the Australian Government to consider regarding visa pathways for Iranians, including to:
cease any actions to forcibly return any Iran-nationals that have had their application for asylum denied and for these applications to be reviewed;
ensure that people are not detained solely because of their immigration status;
expedite the processing and review of applications for asylum;
grant permanent protection to all Iran-nationals currently on temporary humanitarian visas in Australia, noting that this may include an alternate offer, by agreement, of resettlement in a third country;
expand its Iranian humanitarian intake, additional to the existing Humanitarian Program numbers, in a similar fashion to the additional places introduced for refugees from Afghanistan. It was noted that those most vulnerable due to their gender, political opinion, and civil society participation, as well as faith, ethnicity, and sexuality should be prioritised; and
offer to extend the visas of students and skilled workers from Iran currently in Australia, with pathways to permanent residency, noting that this would be a similar approach to that taken for Hong Kong passport holders.
6.111
The Iranian Women’s Association recommended that the committee advocate for the establishment of a taskforce to expeditiously examine visa applications for Iranians seeking asylum and refuge in Australia and designate Iran as a safe haven category. Furthermore, the taskforce should also review the visa applications of applicants from Iran who have previously had their visas cancelled or were previously found not to meet Australia's protection obligations and allow these applicants to re-apply for protection.
Government response to date
6.112
In its submission, Home Affairs explained that there are a range of visa pathways available for Iranian nationals to apply for under Australia’s Humanitarian Program, provided they meet the relevant visa requirements. There are 17,875 places allocated in total in the 2022–23 Humanitarian Program, and ‘priority is given to the most vulnerable applicants who are assessed as refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and formally referred to Australia for resettlement, and those proposed by an immediate family member’.
6.113
Additionally, the offshore component of the Humanitarian Program has three categories, including: Refugee, Special Humanitarian, and Community Support Program. Home Affairs stated that ‘any person, including Iranian nationals, who believe they meet the criteria for an offshore humanitarian visa are able to apply. The 2022–23 Program targets refugees of nationalities from four major regions, including humanitarian entrants from the Middle East, including from Iran, Iraq and Syria’.
6.114
According to Home Affairs, the number of applications for onshore protection visas made by Iranians during the 2022 calendar year are outlined as follows:
Table 6.2: Number of applications for onshore protection visas by Iranians in 2022 by month
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
< 5
|
12
|
18
|
< 5
|
6
|
12
|
14
|
21
|
10
|
13
|
56
|
n/a
|
Source: Mr Andrew Kiley, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Refugee, Humanitarian and Settlement, Home Affairs, Committee Hansard, 21 December 2022, p. 34.
6.115
Home Affairs stated that in the 2022–23 program year, 47 onshore protection visas have been granted so far. However, it was noted that ‘naturally, [there is] some time between lodgement and a decision’ and:
… individuals who have lodged an application for protection in Australia will be able to stay in Australia lawfully on their current visa or on a bridging visa if their current visa expires during the time at which the department assesses their individual application. It may take many months for that application to be assessed, but I want to guarantee that they would be able to stay lawfully in Australia until the point at which their application is finalised.
6.116
In an answer to a question on notice, Home Affairs revealed that the average processing time for permanent protection visas, for the program year
1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022, from lodgement to primary decision was
841 days.
Committee view
6.117
The committee is of the view that the human rights situation in Iran has substantially deteriorated and it will not be safe for many Iranians currently in Australia, particularly women and girls, to return to Iran in the foreseeable future.
6.118
The committee also believes it is appropriate for the Government to increase the number of visa places available to Iranians—particularly women and girls—across a number of visa programs. Many Iranian women may be eligible for skilled visa places, in addition to places available within the humanitarian visa program.
6.119
In view of the concerns outlined earlier in this report about the presence of IRI-affiliated persons in Australia, it is essential that visa applications are appropriately vetted to ensure officials and agents of the regime are not accepted into Australia.
6.120
The committee recommends that the Australian Government increase the intake of Iranians under various visa programs, with a particular focus on women, girls and persecuted minorities seeking to escape the IRI regime. Iranians in Australia on temporary visas who cannot safely return to Iran due to the current crisis and policies of the IRI should not be required to do so.
Conclusion
6.121
The committee thanks all of those who provided submissions and gave evidence to the committee. Many individuals showed enormous bravery in doing so.
6.122
The events of the last five months in Iran confirm that the IRI regime is a danger to its own citizens, but also to people around the world. Its behaviour is that of a rogue state with no regard to human rights, particularly the rights of women and girls.
6.123
Australia has not only a moral obligation to take a stand against such behaviour, but a practical requirement to protect Australians from the dangerous and threatening behaviour of the IRI.
6.124
The recommendations in this report are designed to ensure Australia acts in accordance with our principles and with respect for human rights. It is entirely appropriate that the IRI regime, which has chosen to trample human rights and international norms in so many ways over such a long period of time, bears the consequences of its own actions in the form of being isolated from the international community. It is in Australia’s interests to be at the forefront of international efforts to make clear to the IRI, and to other rogue nations, that there will always be consequences for engaging in unlawful activities such as terrorism, cybercrime, hostage diplomacy and systematic abuse and oppression of women and girls.
6.125
We urge the Australian Government to respond promptly to the committee’s recommendations.
Senator Claire Chandler
Chair
Senator for Tasmania