Chapter 8 - The administrative system—investigations
The inquiry process
8.1
The previous chapter examined the process of reporting
wrongdoing or making a complaint about inappropriate conduct. The receipt of a
complaint or report triggers further administrative action which generally
involves some form of investigation. This chapter examines the inquiry stage of
the administrative system. It describes the types of administrative inquiries
and then focuses on the routine inquiry and the investigating officer inquiry.
It considers the criticism levelled at the inquiry process and assesses its
overall effectiveness.
8.2
The inquiry process is one of the major components of
the administrative system. Administrative inquiries are fact-finding
undertakings to help commanders make decisions in response to incidents that
may affect the ADF.[497] They are not
judicial procedures; they do not involve courts or tribunals. Their purpose is
not to investigate whether ADF members have committed an offence under the DFDA
or civilian criminal laws. The Department of Defence explained:
Adverse findings or recommendations about a member that are of
an administrative character are incidental to the primary purpose of an
inquiry—that is, to find the facts as to why an incident occurred.
8.3
Administrative inquiries can take a number of forms but
are always preceded by a brief initial inquiry designed to provide a quick
overview of the matters under consideration.
Quick assessment
8.4
Following the notification of an incident or complaint,
a quick assessment must be undertaken. The Administrative Inquiries Manual
makes clear that it is mandatory to conduct a quick assessment before the
commanding officer takes any further action.[498]
This preliminary assessment is not an inquiry under the Defence (Inquiry)
Regulations but rather derives its authority from 'the inherent powers of
military rank and command'.[499] Quick
assessments are intended to establish whether any immediate corrective action
needs to be taken to reduce the risk of any further harm or damage. They also
provide the means for determining the most appropriate course to take in
dealing with the report or complaint.
Figure 6.1—Administrative inquiries as part of the ADF's administrative
system
Army News, Issue 1093, 25 March 2004.
8.5
When appointing a person to conduct a quick assessment,
the commanding officer does not need to use Instruments of Appointment or draw
up terms of reference. An oral briefing should suffice and 'an outline of that
brief should be documented'.[500]
8.6
Based on the results of the quick assessment, a
commander may decide that alternative conflict resolution methods such as
conciliation or mediation may be a better and more constructive means of
resolving a problem than holding a formal inquiry. These alternative dispute
resolution methods are suitable for minor workplace complaints (see paras 6.5–6.9).
On the other hand, the assessment may show that, because of the seriousness of
the incident, a formal inquiry such as an investigating officer inquiry is
required.
8.7
The CO is required to record the decisions taken in
respect of an incident or complaint together with a short summary of reasons
for the decision. This report is to be retained on the appropriate unit file.
8.8
With regard to preliminary processes following a sudden
death or accident, Lieutenant General Peter
Leahy explained some of the current procedures:
The first thing we ask for in sudden deaths or other very
serious accidents is a quick assessment. Rather than prepare terms of
reference, we want to know right now whether there is anything we should be
doing that might stop something from happening again. Under the Defence
(Inquiry) Regulation, the terms of reference are drawn up and an investigating
officer is appointed and he will take statements and evidence and talk to
witnesses. But what we are seeing is that the two ways are separate things. The
first is a commander’s quick assessment of what happened and what we can do
right now to stop it; the second is under the Defence (Inquiry) Regulation.[501]
8.9
The quick assessment phase drew little comment from
witnesses. It should be noted, however, that Mr
Geoffrey Earley,
Inspector-General Australian Defence Force, expressed concern that:
There is some evidence—not a lot—that, because it is easy and
quick, a quick assessment may be used, if we are not careful, as the actual
inquiry. It was not intended to be that way but, again, it is understandable in
some cases why that might happen. We need to make sure that does not develop.[502]
8.10
The experience of one witness touched on this matter of
the scope and intention of the quick assessment. In his case, the quick assessment
'went beyond a mere scoping exercise and made findings of fact and
recommendations like a routine inquiry'. He observed that, 'a Routine Inquiry
would have given you an opportunity to respond to the allegations made against
you, whereas the so-called quick assessment did not. It was not a quick
assessment at all, and did not lead to any further inquiry'.[503] Another witness maintained that, in
his case, the mandatory quick assessment before the appointment of the
investigating officer was not carried out.[504]
8.11
The committee notes and endorses Mr
Earley's concerns and suggests that the ADF
underline the function and role of the quick assessment in its manual.
Recommendation 26
8.12 The committee recommends that the Defence (Inquiries)
Manual include at paragraph 2.4 a statement that quick assessments while
mandatory are not to replace administrative inquiries.
8.13
As the following section illustrates, there are a
number of options available to the commanding officer if he or she decides that
a formal inquiry is needed.
Types of administrative inquiries
8.14
If the commanding officer decides, after a quick
assessment has taken place, that an inquiry is needed, he or she must determine
the appropriate type of inquiry. Inquiries take various forms according to the
seriousness, magnitude and complexity of the circumstances surrounding the
incident. The following inquiries are ranked in ascending order of their
significance depending on the importance and likely consequences to the ADF or
to broader national interests:
-
a Routine Inquiry—conducted with as little
formality as possible, and is frequently employed in response to a redress of
grievance issue at unit level and examines less serious or complex matters,
such as 'minor loss or damage to Service property, harassment or personnel
management issues';[505]
-
an Investigating Officer—used by commanders to
investigate a wide range of significant matters concerning the ADF which arise
under their command or control but do not require the standing or status of a
Board of Inquiry;
-
a Board of Inquiry—appointed by a senior
commander to inquire into matters concerning the administration or aspects of
the command control of the ADF;
-
a Combined Board of Inquiry—established to
inquire into matters concerning the ADF and the armed forces of another
country; and
-
a General Court of Inquiry—appointed by the
Minister, has extensive powers, is chaired by a judge or senior lawyer and its
members are expected to have greater breadth and depth of experience. It is
appropriate in cases of very serious and complex matters such as matters of
national significance.
8.15
To date, a General Court of Inquiry and a Combined
Board of Inquiry have not been used and will not be discussed in detail in this
report.[506] Chapter 12 will look at
the Board of Inquiry. This chapter examines the Routine and the Investigating
Officer inquiries.
Routine inquiry
8.16
Routine Inquiries are intended to deal with less
serious and less complex matters and are thus conducted on a relatively
informal basis free from the constraints of the requirements under the Defence
(Inquiry) Regulations.[507] A CO may
appoint any member of the Defence Force who is an officer, warrant officer or
senior non-commissioned officer to conduct a Routine Inquiry.[508]
8.17
The Administrative Inquiries Manual stresses the
importance of inquiries complying with 'applicable standards of procedural
fairness and administrative law'.[509]
Although it recognises that the informality of a Routine Inquiry offers
advantages, it nonetheless sets down principles that should be observed during
this process. They require the inquiry to be conducted without bias and without
the investigator prejudging either a complainant or the person who is the
subject of the complaint.
8.18
Furthermore, routine inquiries are not to be conducted
without informing a person of an allegation or complaint that has been made
against him or her. Such a person is to have adequate opportunity to respond to
any allegation or complaint. He or she should be provided with all material
relevant to the allegation and have the right to have any information provided
by them considered by the officer conducting the inquiry. Witnesses before a
Routine Inquiry may seek legal advice but they are not entitled to legal
representation.[510] It should be noted
that inquiries are held in private.
8.19
A Routine Inquiry requires a written report to the
commanding officer. There are no specific reporting requirements and the
reporting will be at the discretion of the commanding officer. If the
investigating officer has the authority to make recommendations, the report
should include recommendations that are based on the findings and which the
investigating officer thinks fit to make.[511]
8.20
The commanding officer considers the findings and
recommendations contained in the report. He or she is not bound by these
recommendations and may decide which of the recommendations will be implemented.[512] As soon as possible after any
decision based on the report is made, the commanding officer is to provide
complainants and respondents who gave evidence to the inquiry with written
notification of the results of the inquiry with regard to matters relevant to
them.[513] The reports of Routine
Inquiries are to be retained on the appropriate unit file.
Officer Investigation
8.21
A commanding officer, or an officer holding an
appointment superior to that of a commanding officer may appoint an
investigating officer to inquire into a complaint or incident concerning the ADF
which is under his or her command.[514]
The purpose of the inquiry is to establish the facts and circumstances
surrounding an incident or complaint so that an informed decision can be made
about action that should be taken. An investigating officer is not to conduct a
criminal or disciplinary investigation nor determine that an offence has or has
not been committed.[515]
8.22
He or she is not authorised to 'pass judgement'. Lieutenant
General Leahy told the committee that an
inquiry is conducted so that steps can be taken immediately to find out what
happened and to put in place actions and procedures that would prevent it
happening again.[516] He underlined the
point that the task of an investigating officer is not to apportion blame and
hold people accountable but to establish what happened.
8.23
The regulations require that, where the investigating officer
is satisfied that all information relevant to the inquiry that 'is practicable
to obtain has been obtained, he or she shall prepare a report setting out his
or her findings'.
8.24
Recommendations coming out of an inquiry may then lead
to either an administrative or legal process that may apportion blame. A person
with the appropriate responsibility and authority will then determine a
person's innocence or guilt. Lieutenant General Leahy
explained:
It might be that at some DFDA hearing or some other form of
hearing later, where people have the responsibility and the authority to judge
whether it was innocent or guilty by hearing all of the facts from both defence
and prosecution and by considering the law, that is where judgments are made
and blame is apportioned.
Again he stressed that the investigating officer 'tells us
what happened'.[517]
The importance of a well-conducted investigation
8.25
The committee recognises the central importance of the
inquiry process to the overall effectiveness of the administrative system. Any
shortcomings or failings during this stage have the potential to set the
administrative proceedings on a long and troubled course that could drag
through the system for years. The integrity of the inquiry process and its
ability to protect the fundamental rights of those involved in the process are
crucial to its credibility and its effectiveness. The Burchett Report observed
that:
...if an investigation is conducted carelessly or incompetently,
so as to miss the real point, or if it is conducted in such a manner that,
although its actual conclusions are realistic, the persons most concerned are
left with a feeling that they have not been treated fairly, no decision
dependent upon the investigation is likely to be received with general
satisfaction...the person it is important to convince that all arguments have
been fairly and fully considered is the party who loses.[518]
8.26
The Defence Force Ombudsman also underlined the
importance of getting the investigation right. He made the observation that 'if
the initial handling, investigation or whatever of a complaint is defective
then it establishes a bad platform which is reflected at every subsequent stage
of the process...'[519] Mr
Neil James,
Executive Director, Australian Defence Association, strongly endorsed this
view. In his words, 'an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure'.[520]
The effectiveness and fairness of administrative inquiries
8.27
The report now considers whether administrative inquiries
are fair and proper processes that adequately protect the interests of all
parties involved in the inquiry, and, at the same time, effectively gather and
analyse the evidence and produce recommendations designed to remedy identified
problems. It details some of the safeguards built into the system to ensure
that basic principles of procedural fairness are observed. It then considers concerns
raised in evidence about the adequacy of administrative inquiries.
8.28
The notion of procedural fairness derives from the
doctrine of natural justice which relies on fundamental principles intended to
ensure the fair treatment of persons. Article 10 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights proclaims that 'Everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his
rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him'. Article 11, in
part, states that 'Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the law in a public trial at
which he has all the guarantees necessary for his defence'. Although the right
to a fair trial has long been established as a fundamental right, its
recognition in the Universal Declaration has set a common standard for all
peoples and nations. It has provided inspiration for and found expression in a
number of international instruments and is now enshrined in Article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
8.29
Administrative inquiries are deemed to be different
from penal proceedings. One of the most important distinctions between a
disciplinary and administrative inquiry is that the investigating officer may
make recommendations but cannot determine guilt or innocence or impose a
penalty. Hence, adherence to the principles underpinning the right to a fair
hearing do not apply with the same force to administrative inquiries. Notably, investigating
officer inquiries are not held in public, a person who is subject to adverse
comment does not have the right to call or examine people giving evidence, nor
does he or she have the right to be present during the taking of evidence. Also
members of the ADF must, unless they have a reasonable excuse for declining to
do so, answer all questions put to them by the investigating officer and
produce any documents or articles.[521]
8.30
It should be noted that the recommendations coming out
of an administrative inquiry may form the basis upon which adverse
administrative action may follow. Moreover, adverse administrative action may
result in severe consequences for an individual including discharge from the
ADF. Administrative action is not merely about warnings, fines and extra
duties. Thus the fundamental principles underpinning the notion of a fair trial
offer a sound and sure guide on important matters that should be observed
during an administrative inquiry.
8.31
The Burchett Report was concerned about ensuring that
procedural fairness was observed in administrative inquiries.[522] It recommended that 'General policy
guidance be developed as to the exercise of the command prerogative, and as to
the extent and nature of the observance of the dictates of natural justice
which is required in connection therewith'.[523]
8.32
In keeping with the principles of natural justice and
procedural fairness, the fair hearing and no bias rules apply to administrative
inquiries. Indeed, the Administrative Inquiries Manual notes:
It is important that ADF inquiries comply with applicable
standards of procedural fairness and administrative law. The due process
aspects of Natural Justice must be observed throughout the inquiry process.[524]
8.33
The following section discusses the rules underpinning
natural justice and their application to administrative inquiries.
Procedural fairness—right to know
allegations or adverse comment
8.34
One of the main safeguards to ensure a fair outcome in
an investigation process relies on the right of persons who are the subject of
evidence that reflects adversely on them to put their case. To be in a position
to defend their interests, they must have full knowledge of the allegation made
against them and the evidence that supports such an allegation. Without access
to such information, a person is ill-equipped to test the validity of the
evidence before the investigating officer and thus is not in a fair position to
rebut allegations or evidence damaging to his or her interests. Matters such as
the right to legal advice, to adequate time and facilities to prepare a
defence, and the opportunity to present a case are also important considerations
in ensuring that an inquiry is both fair and proper.
8.35
The ADF Manual makes clear that before an inquiry can
proceed the person against whom allegations or complaints have been made must
be made aware of them except where to do so may result in the destruction or
removal of evidence.[525] Also any
member against whom an allegation or complaint has been made is entitled to
know the substance of it, have adequate notice of any adverse evidence and have
a reasonable opportunity to respond to any allegation or complaint.[526]
8.36
The Manual is unclear about the timing involved in
advising a member of allegations made against him or her. It does, however,
make clear that members affected by the report of an investigating officer do
not have an automatic right to access the report. The report of an inquiry
conducted under the Defence (Inquiry) Regulations can only be released with
Ministerial approval.[527]
8.37
Some witnesses gave evidence that they were not
accorded the fundamental right to know the allegations being made and were
denied access to material central to the accusations made against them.[528] A number of submitters maintain that
investigations concerning them were conducted without their knowledge.[529] One member wrote:
At no time during or after the investigation did the investigating
officer inform me, as required under the Fair
Hearing Rule, of any adverse evidence or allegations or complaints.[530]
8.38
Many have had to rely on the Freedom of Information (FOI)
Act to obtain relevant information. One witness, the subject of anonymous
allegations, told the committee that 'the only reason I know where I am at the
moment is freedom of information... because it is the only vehicle through which
I have been able to find out what is going on.'[531] He explained:
...I have not been allowed to call witnesses, been properly
informed of the existence of key documents relied upon by Defence or been given
the opportunity to adequately challenge and redress the injustices perpetrated
against my family and me.[532]
8.39
He informed the committee that the Army failed to provide
him with the information he requested under the Freedom of Information Act
until the investigation was complete and the Minister approved the release of
information.[533] In other evidence,
Mr Williams
related an incident where, 'The first victim was not allowed to stay in the
hearing room to hear the evidence given by the sergeant, but the sergeant was
present in the room when the young victim was recounting his side of events.
The victim told us that the tone of the proceedings was that he was the one at
fault.'[534]
Committee view
8.40
The committee believes that there is no excuse for
failing to inform a person alleged to have committed a wrongdoing of that
allegation or not providing that person with all relevant material. It notes
that the Manual makes clear that investigating officers should observe this
principle. Even so, the committee would like to see stronger guarantees in
place to ensure that the rights of people subject to adverse reflections are
protected. It would also like to see prompt corrective action from an
independent body unconnected with the initial inquiry available to people who
believe that they have been denied procedural fairness.
Communication and provision of
information—Complainants
8.41
Although procedural fairness dictates that a person who
is the subject of adverse comment has the right to know the substance of the
allegation and the evidence supporting the allegations, there are many other
people involved in an inquiry process who believe they also have a right to
information, particularly the complainant.
8.42
The Burchett Report referred to the lack of
transparency of the outcome of an administrative inquiry and the lack of
feedback to complainants or persons affected by the offending conduct. It
concluded that 'strong guidelines should be laid down to ensure that persons
with a real interest, such as victims and complainants, are not left in the
dark as to what was done about an alleged breach of discipline'.[535] It also found that at least some of
the long running complaints that have plagued the ADF for years might have been
avoided had the complainant, as a victim, been fully enlightened about action
taken and the reasons for it at an earlier stage.[536]
8.43
The current manual takes particular note of the
attention that should be given to the complainant. It requires that where there
is a complainant, the investigating officer should notify that person of the
inquiry and the procedures to be followed. It makes the point that an interview
with the complainant is important because it helps to clarify the allegations
and assists the investigating officer to better understand the nature of the
complaint by obtaining specific details about the relevant matters.
8.44
Defence Instructions also require that the complainant
be provided with 'meaningful advice of the progress of the investigation into
the complaint at appropriate milestones':
When advised of the latest action taken in relation to the
complaint, the member is also informed of when he or she may expect to receive
further advice. The commitment to contact the member is to be by a specific
date or time, rather than a general undertaking to simply keep the member
informed. The member may request at any time to be advised of the progress of
the complaint.[537]
8.45
In some instances, it would appear that Defence
Instructions were ignored and complainants had trouble in obtaining information
about the progress of their complaint.[538]
Indeed, some witnesses underlined the same shortcomings identified in the
Burchett Report. Again and again, the committee heard stories about the problems
that members of the ADF or their relatives experienced in understanding the
military justice system and navigating their way through what appeared to many
an unfathomable maze.[539] Their
difficulty in trying to explain to the committee the administrative processes
involved in their particular cases indicates the complexity of the system. One
of their main difficulties was obtaining relevant information and 'meaningful
advice' from the investigating officer.
8.46
One witness, who alleged she had been sexually harassed
in the workplace and consequently the subject of victimisation and ostracism
due to submitting a formal complaint, stated that she had not received progress
reports at the stipulated intervals. Furthermore she did not receive a copy of
the Quick Assessment which was 'conducted without my knowledge.'[540] Another ADF member, who had reported
the use of illegal drugs in his unit, observed that 'we were never kept
informed as to what the investigative procedure was and how they were going to
go about it'.[541]
8.47
Some members who had lodged complaints also felt that
they had not been adequately consulted about their grievance. One witness who
submitted a complaint informed the committee that she had not been interviewed
during the quick assessment despite making clear that she wanted to be
'continuously informed of processes and procedures being undertaken'. Another
complainant also noted that he had not been interviewed by the investigating
officer or given the opportunity to respond to statements.[542]
Committee
view
8.48
Complainants should be confident that their grievance
has been taken seriously and properly investigated. Any deficiency in these
areas may sour their perceptions of the administrative processes. Without
doubt, the evidence shows that many people are disappointed with this aspect of
administrative inquiries and that the ADF must improve the way it communicates
with complainants.
Confidentiality
8.49
In 1998, the Defence Force Ombudsman questioned whether
the ADF pays sufficient attention to the need for confidentiality and privacy
to be respected when dealing with member's complaints. She found 'some
suggestion that information relating to an incident had been provided to, or
sought from, individuals who did not have a right to know. She observed that,
while the guidance was clear on this matter, it was not 'always adhered to'.[543] Six years on, the committee heard of
a number of instances where allegations still under investigation became
publicly known.[544]
8.50
The committee believes that observing the right to
privacy is an important aspect of the administrative system that the ADF should
improve.
Conflicts of interest and the independence
of the inquiry
8.51
The credibility of any inquiry process rests heavily on
the actual and perceived impartiality of those conducting the inquiry. The Administrative Inquiries Manual recognises
the importance of upholding the no bias rule. It states unequivocally that the
person or persons selected to conduct an investigating officer inquiry:
...must be free from bias and conflict of interest. Subject to
these constraints and providing that they are not directly responsible in the
chain of command for the personnel or activities under inquiry, a member of the
same unit may be selected.[545]
8.52
The manual explains that a commanding officer, who by
definition is likely to be involved in the implementation of recommendations
with respect to members under their command, is not to be appointed to
investigate the conduct of any member under their command.[546] It directs investigating officers to
'avoid being improperly influenced by particular witnesses' and advises that,
'regardless of personal feelings, an Investigating Officer must keep an open
mind at all times'.[547]
8.53
The manual also provides specific advice on inquiries
into unacceptable behaviour. It recognises that such matters require particular
skills and approaches. It suggests that maturity and sensitivity are necessary
but most notably that the inquiry should be seen to be and actually be free
from bias. It states:
...where it is practical to do so, consideration should be given
to appointing an officer from a unit other than that to which the personnel
under inquiry belong. If a suitably qualified officer can not be identified,
the Appointing Officer should consult their superior authority.[548]
8.54
It reinforces this directive by adding that one of the
principal criteria to be taken into account when selecting personnel to inquire
into allegations of unacceptable behaviour is 'that personnel who are direct
supervisors, personnel who have a close working relationship or a friendship
with any of the parties or witnesses should not be involved.'[549]
8.55
Despite this guidance, one of the most persistent concerns
raised by witnesses involved conflicts of interest and the perceived unfairness
of the investigation process. Any perception that an ADF inquiry lacks
objectivity and impartiality undermines the integrity of the whole military
justice system. Previous reports have also identified the apparent lack of independence
of the investigating officer as a source of criticism.
8.56
Lieutenant General Leahy
assumed that when he gave an investigating officer the appointing authority and
the terms of reference that the officer would 'answer that impartially'.[550] He accepted that 'in nearly every
instance the investigating officer will know of, or perhaps has been associated
with, the person that he is investigating.' Having said that, Lieutenant
General Leahy offered the following assurance:
We do many of these investigations. I am not aware of anyone who
has called into question the objectivity of the individual, the investigating
officer, to say that he is [not] impartial.
...It is not something that is of primary concern to me, because I
expect impartiality from my officers. If the officer who is assessed feels that
impartiality is not present, he has very clearly open to him a whole range of
further redresses.[551]
8.57
He reiterated his conviction:
Officers know each other. But I also take it implicitly that if
I give a job to an officer he is going to carry it out impartially and properly
and will not be prejudiced by his knowledge of the other officer. And, if he
is, he will come to me and say, ‘I don’t think I’m the right guy to be doing
this. Get someone else.’[552]
8.58
When asked what could be done if adherence to this
standard did not occur, he replied that the complainant:
... can go to the next level using the redress process to say,
‘That bloke is dodgy. He and I had a spat in Timor three
years ago and I don’t think he should be making those judgments.’[553]
8.59
Evidence before the committee clearly shows that many
do not share Lieutenant General Leahy's
confidence. The belief that ADF officers will acknowledge a potential conflict
of interest and act appropriately and that complainants have the wherewithal to
challenge the appointment of an investigating officer on the grounds of a conflict
of interest is admirable. It does not, however, necessarily reflect the reality
of people's experiences.
8.60
An environment where leaders in the chain of command naturally
want to protect themselves and their careers by not having attention drawn to
problems under their command creates a situation where conflicts of interest
are bound to emerge where investigations are conducted 'in-house'. [554] One witness argued that a system
that self-manages its discipline without outside accountability is seriously
flawed. He was of the view that:
...subordinates will always be inclined to agree with those more
senior than them. Members of the military will never be able to properly
investigate other members of the military. I strongly believe that the
intensely hierarchical nature and relatively small size of the services makes
it impossible for each one to investigate itself.[555]
8.61
Another stated his belief that 'the practice by members
of the Chain of Command keeping things in-house to avoid damage to its
reputation and career prospects is commonplace in the military'.[556]
8.62
Consistent with this view, another former ADF member
stated:
The bottom line is really quite easy to state: the Defence
Force—be it Navy, Army or Air Force—cannot investigate itself on the one hand
and defend itself on the other. This simply cannot be done fairly, without
bias, thoroughly or properly. Do I feel that cover-ups are occurring? Again the
answer is yes. I have no doubt whatsoever in my mind that this is the case.
Whilst the Defence Force continues to investigate itself, this will continue to
be the case.[557]
8.63
These general observations are drawn from personal
experiences with the administrative system and are supported by a number of
witnesses who conveyed to the committee the details of their particular case.[558] Mr
Nigel Southam
asserted that his CO was not impartial. In his redress of grievance lodged with
his commanding officer, Mr Southam
made allegations of mistreatment of himself and others under the CO's command. He
maintained:
In this case, he [the CO] personally decided to keep things
'in house' so that he could control the investigation himself and determine the
outcomes to suit his purposes. This led to his personal bias in all aspects of
this complex case and he became too personally involved, as did his RSM who
laid the charges...he was protecting a newly formed 1MP Bn as the first ever CO1
MP Bn and his intention was to ensure that it worked without airing any
negative issues to his superiors. [559]
8.64
He informed the committee that, when he was told by his
CO that the CO would hear his case, he 'put up a stink through my lawyer and
indicated that he was biased'. As a consequence, 'the CO pulled out and let the
CO1 Int Battalion take it over'.[560] Members
do not always have the support, knowledge or fortitude to take such a stand. Even
so, Mr Southam
suffered a psychological breakdown which he attributed to the ineffective
procedures in pursuing his complaints and with continued harassment.[561] He told the Committee
:
These [procedures in pursuing his complaints] have caused me to
be medically discharged as a result of psychological issues, and I have
attempted suicide along the way after some three years of trying to find some resolutions
in relation to these submissions.[562]
8.65
The committee notes that in his efforts to pursue his
case, Mr Southam
made a submission to the committee, attended and gave evidence at a public
hearing and remained in regular contact with the committee during its inquiry. The
committee was advised on 12 August
2004 that Mr Southam
had died suddenly in a road accident.
8.66
Another witness who was advised to use the available
process to submit a complaint argued that this would have entailed addressing
the grievance directly to the person against whom the grievance was made. He
suggested that 'The resulting "Caesar looking at Caesar" scenario
would have been meaningless, with a predictable non-productive outcome.'[563] Legal advice obtained by another
complainant suggested that, 'although the person appointed as the investigating
officer ought to have been aware of a reasonable apprehension of bias, he
failed to refuse the appointment'.[564] Similarly, Ms
Jayne Fitzpatrick
noted:
Internal unit investigations achieve little where the
complaint is against a senior member of the unit. My complaints expanded to
include the CO and Chief Clerk in regard to their inappropriate behaviour. It
became a farcical situation when the CO was investigating himself and the RSM
was calling members to his office to write their statements about his
behaviour...[565]
8.67
She joined the many other witnesses who called for
independent investigations. In her mind such investigations 'may lend
credibility and allow for a two way passage of information more readily than
the closed door policy of the military justice system'.[566]
8.68
Mr Nigel
Danson was also looking for greater
independence and impartiality in the investigation processes. He complained
about unacceptable treatment by various supervisors and senior officers, which included
belittlement and continual harassment, while serving with the Air Force in East
Timor. In his submission he claimed that he 'only ever wanted the
members to be held responsible for their actions'. He came to the conclusion,
however, that 'justice will never happen due to the rank of who the complaints
were against and the current procedures for these investigations'.[567] He held the view that:
The only way I can see the problem of Officers investigating
other Officers of the same mustering and rank, but returning a fair and legal
decision is to totally remove the investigation process from the same branch of
each Defence Force.[568]
8.69
He suggested further that a civilian representative be
included in the investigation chain of command that could report direct to the
Defence Department to present an objective point of view and show accountability.[569]
8.70
The above accounts represent only a fraction of the
total number of witnesses who voiced their concern about the potential lack of
independence and the perceived conflict of interest that exists where the
military investigates itself.[570]
8.71
This perception that there is real pressure on Service personnel
to put other priorities before that of securing a fair and just investigation leaves
the military justice system open to criticism. The many witnesses who expressed
concerns about the lack of independence speak
with one voice in calling for an independent adjudicator so that a neutral and
unbiased investigation can take place free from third party interference.[571]
8.72
The JSCFADT reached similar conclusions about the potential
for conflict of interests. It recommended that 'Investigating Officers should
be appointed from outside the chain of command of the individual(s) or element
immediately under investigation and should not be personally acquainted with
any of the parties involved in the incident.'[572]
8.73
In response to this recommendation, the government
agreed in part and, as noted above, the Manual now offers guidance on this
matter. The government was of the view, however, that it would not be possible
to implement the second part of the recommendation that requires the
investigating officer not to be acquainted with the individuals under
investigation on the grounds that this would be impractical.[573]
8.74
It should be noted that a number of witnesses agreed
that, in straightforward cases, the administrative system performs well. For
example one witness stated:
...in minor cases, such as a drunken soldier being late for work,
the system probably operates reasonably.
He noted, however, that:
Where the power relationship is in any way challenged at the
higher level—in instances of loyal opposition, for example—the soldier has no
protection.[574]
Committee view
8.75
The committee makes no judgement about whether the
independence of the investigating officer was compromised in any of the
incidents related above. It is clear, however, that the present
arrangement certainly allows, at the least, a perception of bias to undermine
the integrity of the administrative inquiry process. It believes that the ADF
must do more to address this problem and to eliminate this perception.
8.76
The committee notes the steps taken by the ADF
following the recommendations made by the JSCFADT. It believes that stronger
measures are necessary. Guidance offered in a Defence manual will not convince
people that such advice will effectively counter service loyalty and/or self
interest especially where the language is not sufficiently direct.
8.77
In particular, the committee recommends that stronger measures
be taken to ensure the actual and perceived independence of the investigating
officer and appointing officer. The committee is firmly of the belief that
there are circumstances where a person should not be appointed as an
investigating officer or where circumstances arise during the inquiry that should
require him or her to withdraw automatically as the investigating officer of an
inquiry. It suggests that the ADF revise and strengthen the language in
their Manuals to ensure that due process is guaranteed to all ADF members
involved in an investigation. For example, sub para 5.15(b) should read 'that
personnel who are direct supervisors, personnel who have a close working
relationship or friendship with any of the parties or witnesses must not
be involved in an investigating officer inquiry'.
Recommendation 27
8.78 The committee recommends that the language in the Administrative
Inquiries Manual be amended so that it is more direct and clear in its advice
on the selection of an investigating officer.
8.79
Mindful that the meaning conveyed in the Manual about
the importance of appointing an impartial investigating officer is clear, the committee
is concerned that strengthening the language may still not be an adequate
safeguard to ensure the independence of an investigating officer. The Manual is
intended to provide advice and guidance.[575]
It therefore recommends further that the guidance offered in the Manual be
drafted as regulations to be inserted in Part 6 of the Defence (Inquiry) Regulations
1985.
8.80
There are also a range of options available to help
remove the perception of conflict of interest by making the system more accountable
and the appointment of investigating officers more transparent.
Recommendation 28
8.81 The committee recommends that the following proposals
be considered to enhance transparency and accountability in the appointment of
investigating officers:
-
Before an inquiry commences, the investigating
officer be required to produce a written statement of independence which
discloses professional and personal relationships with those subject to the
inquiry and with the complainant. The statement would also disclose any
circumstances which would make it difficult for the investigating officer to
act impartially. This statement to be provided to the appointing authority, the
complainant and other persons known to be involved in the inquiry.
-
A provision to be included in the Manual that
would allow a person involved in the inquiry process to lodge with the
investigating officer and the appointing officer an objection to the
investigating officer on the grounds of a conflict of interest and for these
objections to be acknowledged and included in the investigating officer's
report.
-
The investigating officer be required to make
known to the appointing authority any potential conflict of interest that
emerges during the course of the inquiry and to withdraw from the investigation.
-
The investigating officer's report to include
his or her statement of independence and any record of objections raised about
his or her appointment and for this section of the report to be made available
to all participants in the inquiry.
8.82
Having clearly enunciated the measures that an
investigating officer must take to ensure that any person subject to an
investigation is afforded procedural fairness is only the first step. There
must be an independent oversight body with the responsibility and authority to ensure
that the measures are enforced. The proposed Australian Defence Force
Administrative Review Board should provide this necessary oversight (see
recommendation 29, para 11.67).
Competence of the Investigating
officer
8.83
A fundamental principle underpinning the right to a
fair hearing is that everyone is entitled for such a hearing to be held by a
competent, independent and impartial body established by due process. The committee
believes that, although an administrative inquiry is not a judicial process, it
should nonetheless guarantee that any inquiry will be conducted by a competent
body.
8.84
Lieutenant General Leahy
looked to the training and education of officers as an indication of the level
of competency attained by investigating officers. He stressed that the training
is inherent in the upbringing of an officer:
The training is as an investigating officer, his duties and responsibilities
are through the Royal Military
College conducting lower level
investigations as a young officer at the staff college and at other colleges
that he attends and, again, at the precommand course what needs to be done as
an investigating officer.
...a user's guide is always available to these officers, and we
expect that they use that guide. [576]
8.85
Similarly, Air Marshal Angus
Houston explained:
...those posted to command positions in the Air Force undergo
specialised training in the roles and responsibilities of command. This
training includes the military justice system, its procedures and its
application to our people. To support them in fulfilling their command
obligations, they are also provided with specialist administrative and legal
support to ensure they carry out their command responsibilities within the
framework of both discipline and administrative law.[577]
Clearly, the service chiefs believe that investigating
officers are well trained and competent.
8.86
Despite the training process for officers in undertaking
inquiries, many witnesses held an opposing view on the competency and level of
training of investigating officers.[578]
8.87
In 1998 the Commonwealth Ombudsman in her review of the
practices and procedures of ADF investigations, found a number of commonly
occurring problems in ADF investigations, particularly administrative
investigations of personnel-related issues. They included:
-
inadequate planning of investigations;
-
failure to interview all relevant witnesses and
assumptions made about the credibility of witnesses interviewed;
-
pursuit of irrelevant questioning techniques and
failure to put contradictory evidence to witnesses for a response;
-
failure to record evidence properly, and
possibly, preparation of witnesses and unauthorised questioning of witnesses;
-
failure to analyse evidence objectively, and to
weigh evidence appropriately, thereby leading to flaws in the way conclusions
were drawn and findings made; and
-
inadequate record keeping.[579]
8.88
The ADF took note of the Ombudsman's findings and
formed a working party to develop an ADF-wide training strategy and guidance on
Defence Inquiry Regulations and to set about drafting a new inquiries and
investigation manual.[580]
8.89
Six years later, however, the Defence Force Ombudsman was
again highly critical of the poor standard of administrative investigations. He informed the committee that his office had seen
instances in which investigations had been undertaken by people with inadequate
training and, in some cases, the investigation was not as professional as it
should have been.[581] He noted in
particular the following deficiencies which, he said, in large measure reflected
the poor training and lack of experience and expertise in investigations
identified six years earlier:
-
investigations of serious allegations being carried
out by officers with apparently inadequate training in investigations and
approaches inappropriate for the allegations being investigated;
-
an investigation being thorough but conclusions
and recommendations not being drawn together logically from the evidence for
the decision-maker;
-
an investigation taking an inordinate length of
time with changes in investigation officer and failure to address the substance
of the complaint;
-
investigations resulting in recommendations
which appear never to have been considered by anyone with the appropriate
authority;
-
an investigation where the members of the public
are questioned with little apparent thought for the potential consequences; and
-
investigations which have taken so long it
renders any outcome favourable to the member virtually meaningless.[582]
8.90
A number of witnesses who described their experiences
of an investigation process concur with the Ombudsman's general observations.
Two submissions, in particular, dealing with allegedly fraudulent activity,
indicate a lack of thoroughness on the part of the investigating officer, especially
the failure to ask the most basic questions, to interview key witnesses, and to
establish relevant facts. They maintained that there was unprofessional, even
unethical, conduct in pursuing and conveying information, and scant regard for
confidentiality or privacy matters.[583]
Legal advice obtained by another member contended that, among a raft of
failings, the investigating officer did not comply with certain mandatory
procedures imposed on an investigating officer, including the failure to obtain
all evidence that was practicable to obtain.[584]
It also advised that the investigation was in breach of legislation such as the
Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act and the Defence (Inquiry)
Regulations.
8.91
Group Captain Behm,
who had been appointed the investigating officer for a number of inquiries,
suggested that the majority of investigating officers may not have appropriate training.[585] In his own assessment, he maintained
that he had very limited experience as an investigating officer. With regard to
his first investigation, he stated 'my legal assistant at the time gave me a
lot of hands-on skill and training. It was basically learning on the job'.[586]
8.92
Mr Earley,
IGADF, also identified a lack of understanding of procedural fairness in the
conduct of investigations. He stated that the awareness of procedural fairness
obligations in administrative inquiries was 'probably less than desirable, and
we need to concentrate a bit more on that'.[587]
8.93
The ADF has taken note of the Burchett Report
recommendation that a register of suitable persons to act as investigating
officers under the Defence (Inquiry)
Regulations be developed.[588] In
August 2004, Mr Earley
told the committee that, as well as the establishment of a Register of Inquiry
Officers, the ADF was trying to improve the training of investigating officers.
He explained further:
The initial course will happen next month for 25 people. The
intention is to run it about four times a year. Over a period of time—and it
will not happen overnight—we would expect the general standard of people
conducting administrative inquiries to be substantially improved as a result of
that. [589]
8.94
The committee takes account of Mr
Earley's view that the new training course together
with revisions to the manual should improve the level of competency in
investigating officers.[590] Even so, it
notes that in 1998, following the Ombudsman's own motion inquiry, the ADF
undertook to develop a training program and to produce a new investigation
manual. Clearly, those initiatives have not worked. In light of the failure of past
initiatives, the committee believes that a close watch is needed to ensure that
the proposed training and other initiatives produce the desired results. The committee's
proposed Australian Defence Force Administrative Review Board should have an
active role in monitoring the effectiveness of these initiatives (see
recommendation 29, para 11.67).
Committee view
8.95
Undoubtedly, the investigating officer is in a position
of great influence in the management and direction of an inquiry. He or she
determines whether a particular fact or piece of evidence is relevant to the
inquiry and the weight that should be assigned to it. The investigating officer
has the responsibility to test the veracity of evidence and ensure that all
relevant material has been considered.[591]
Furthermore, keeping in mind that it is the investigating officer who will be
possession of the information, the onus falls on him or her to ensure that all
parties are treated fairly, their privacy respected, and that all people
involved in the proceedings are afforded procedural fairness.
8.96
The importance of having an impartial, well-trained,
competent and experienced investigating officer is heightened when considering
the degree of discretion held by that person and the lack of transparency and
accountability of the administrative inquiry process—particularly, the closed
nature of its proceedings and the limited distribution of its report. Indeed, one
of the main problems with in camera proceedings is that the absence of public
scrutiny does not encourage witnesses to come forward to present evidence
truthfully and does not allow questioning of the evidence gathering, the
assessment of that evidence and the findings. Any steps taken to open the
window on administrative proceedings, while still respecting the privacy of
people involved in the inquiry, would be welcome. But more importantly, the
qualifications and training of investigators must be of a standard to ensure
that they are able to conduct a proper and fair investigation. This is clearly
not the case at the moment. The establishment of a pool of highly qualified
investigators must be one of the ADF's most important military justice priorities.
8.97
The IGADF is currently developing a training program designed
to improve the competence of investigating officers. The committee welcomes
this initiative and has recommended that its proposed Australian Defence Force Administrative
Review Board, an independent review body for military grievances and
complaints, further develop and implement the program (see recommendation 29,
para 11.67).
Assistance to investigating officers
8.98
Group Captain Behm
was from the school of opinion that appreciated the importance of having investigating
officers who have had 'operational experience and wide experience in their
military discipline'.[592] He
concluded:
It is very important for an investigating officer to have a
background in administration, operational things or human resource management.
I am not saying that an investigating officer necessarily needs to be trained
as an investigator. I think those sorts of things, if he is not trained as an
investigator, presuppose that the legal support that the investigating officer
gets will cover those issues.[593]
8.99
As noted by Group Captain Behm,
the matter of competency in conducting an investigation also relies on the
provision of necessary expert advice to the investigating officer. As an
officer who had been appointed an investigating officer for a number of
inquiries, he expressed concern about the availability of legal advice for the
investigator. He held that there:
...is a disconnect between the right of an appointing authority to
appoint an investigating officer and determine the methodology of that inquiry
and the power of the Defence Legal Service to refuse to exercise the financial
delegation to pay any legal officer appointed by Command under the defence
inquiry regulations, as it did in this case. It is my view that there is
potential for the Defence Legal Service to undermine the decision of a commander
from running an inquiry as he sees fit just by refusing to provide or pay the
legal advisor.[594]
8.100
From personal experience, he cited a case where the
Defence Legal Service (TDLS) denied the appointing authority the legal
assistance he required. The appointing officer was advised that the tasks
outlined 'were administrative rather than legal in nature and tasked for the
investigating officer to undertake'. He argued:
The Defence Legal Service was prepared to make a legal officer
available on an ad hoc basis, to answer over the phone any legal questions I
may have had. It saw no need for the legal officer to be on hand or to
participate in the interview of key witnesses. The Defence Legal Service approach
presupposes that I can identify that I have a legal issue and that I know what
legal question to ask. The ad hoc legal advisor would not be apprised of the
issues being investigated or the evidence collected and would be required to
give legal advice in a vacuum. The Defence Legal Service approach does not
allow for the strategic management of an inquiry.
8.101
He concluded:
The ultimate result was that I, as an investigating officer, was
not provided with legal advice which was independent of Command and there was
interference by Command in the conduct of my inquiries.[595]
8.102
He recommended that consideration be given to the
provision of legal support to appointing officers and investigating officers
pursuant to the Defence (Inquiry) Regulations, and that appointing officers
have the authority to determine the level of legal support to be made available
to investigating officers of the TDLS.[596]
8.103
The committee notes this criticism of TDLS and
acknowledges the important role that appointing authorities should have in
determining whether legal assistance should be provided. The provision of legal
assistance is a matter of procedural fairness and should be assessed
objectively and with natural justice as a primary consideration.
Delays
8.104
Any disruption to an inquiry has the potential to affect
the quality of evidence gathering as well as to cause unnecessary hardship for
both the complainant and persons subject to allegations. A prolonged inquiry
adds to the ordeal of those wanting information about a sudden death or an accident
or those seeking redress of a complaint. Also, while waiting for the result of
an inquiry, those facing the prospect of adverse administrative action may have
their reputation tarnished, their career prospects and health damaged or suffer
financial loss. This has been the case in many instances presented to the
committee.
8.105
As a precaution against delay, the appointing officer,
in planning an inquiry, is to determine the time expected to complete the
inquiry including setting a specific date for submitting the final report. He or she must monitor the progress. The Administrative
Inquiries Manual stipulates that:
A progress report will demonstrate that the scope of the inquiry
is being kept under constant review and will advise the Appointing Officer of
any difficulties encountered—will explain why the inquiry could not be
completed in the time allocated and justify a specific extension of time for
the completion of the inquiry and final report.[597]
8.106
Even so, one of the most persistent criticisms levelled
at the investigation phase was the length of time taken to complete the
process.[598] Hold-ups may occur at the
initial stage of an administrative inquiry—the quick assessment. According to
the Australian Peacekeeper & Peacemaker Veterans' Association (APPVA), the
military justice system is far too slow in undertaking inquiries into whether
administrative action or disciplinary action should be taken against an
individual. It noted that a number of APPVA members have reported waiting long
periods of up to eighteen months, for decisions to be made.[599]
8.107
Lieutenant General Leahy
conceded that delays have dogged the system for many years. He explained:
Delay is not always the result of institutional
mismanagement or bureaucratic bungling, nor should it be assumed as such. Most
service police investigations and administrative inquiries in the Army are
conducted efficiently, expeditiously and to the satisfaction of all parties
involved. When there is delay, this is often the result of complexity and the
volume of work asked of our military justice team. Our desire to ensure the
processes are fair and just sometimes adds to that delay. But we cannot afford
to deny natural justice to anyone in the name of haste.[600]
8.108
The experience of many witnesses does not marry with this
observation. Some witnesses saw delay as yet another tactic to frustrate the
inquiry process in the hope that the complainant would go away. Mr
Dean Wirth, who initially made a report in
regard to a harassment complaint in October 2002, had not received any formal
resolution by March 2004. He was of the view that he had been directly obstructed
in obtaining a resolution to this situation:
...I am of the opinion that those who are supposed to deal with
this have taken the attitude that out of sight out of mind, and that they knew
I was discharging due to this harassment. So they have played the waiting game
until I discharged, and now they are using the good old red tape excuse to
delay even more.[601]
8.109
Mr Southham
was informed that the investigation into his complaint, initially dated 1 October 2001, might be completed
sometime in April 2004—'over 2½ years'.[602]
8.110
Often delays formed only one part of a baffling pattern
of obfuscation and stalling which left witnesses confused and frustrated. Based
on personal experiences, Mr David
Down, who claimed he was subjected to
harassment and sexual assault while in the Navy, noted that:
...eventually the victims get out either by being discharged as
unsuitable or dishonourably. Due to the affect that the events have on their
personality and performance, or in the extreme by suicide. This leaves the
perpetrators to continue their career and evil ways which perpetuates the cycle
of violence.[603]
8.111
In support of this assessment, another witness who had
been through the strain of pursuing a complaint understood how a person's
resolve is worn down by stress and subtle pressure and how he or she would give
up as a result of having been 'delayed to death by the military justice system.'[604] Another witness who had experienced
the difficulties—delay, lack of information, and confusion about the procedure—surmised:
Imagine an ordinary soldier: most of these kids cannot handle
all this kind of stuff ...The diggers are just overwhelmed by this.[605]
8.112
Those subject to allegations may also endure long
periods of uncertainty and anxiety. One witness, after four years of being the
subject of an investigation, has yet to be formally advised of the outcome. To
his mind, the delay clearly rests with the Army which:
...has at great time and expense afforded itself every opportunity
to bring a case against me. It has had lawyers repeatedly review decisions and
has employed a dysfunctional process that contravenes the fundamental human
rights of justice delayed is justice denied.[606]
Committee view
8.113
Delays lead to disappointment which often fuels a growing
resentment especially for those already feeling aggrieved. Often this dissatisfaction
taints future proceedings. Protracted investigations may also cause unnecessary
distress to those involved in the process and have a detrimental effect on
their mental health. The committee notes Lieutenant General Leahy's
concern that 'the ADF cannot afford to deny natural justice to anyone in the
name of haste'. The committee cannot accept, however, that the nature and
length of delays chronicled in this report are due solely to the requirement to
adhere to the principles of procedural fairness. Missing or misplaced
documentation, poor record keeping, recourse to the Freedom of Information
legislation, conflicts of interest, lack of support in processing a complaint,
investigating officers who lack the necessary skills, experience or training to
conduct a competent inquiry all contribute to unnecessary delays. Steps must be
taken to correct this problem of delay.
8.114
With this objective in view, the committee recommends
that all complaints lodged with a CO and being investigated within the chain of
command be referred to the proposed Australian Defence Force Administrative
Review Board if the matter is not resolved 60 days from lodgement (see recommendation
29, para. 11.67).
Reprisals for providing evidence
8.115
The last chapter noted that, in some cases, the threat
of reprisal or actual retaliation deters members from lodging a complaint
(paras 7.39–7.59). The committee heard reports of the same type of behaviour
occurring should a person decide to lodge a complaint and/or provide evidence
during an investigation.[607] One
witness told the committee of repeated unacceptable behaviour involving public
humiliation and ostracism toward her on account of her pursuing a complaint. She
submitted that the unfair treatment was allowed to go unchecked despite
investigations.[608] In her formal
complaint, she recorded that:
Part of my chain of command...did not make any corrective actions
to alleviate the victimisation and harassment I was experiencing, despite being
advised of the severity of the issues and my health problems on a number of
occasions.[609]
8.116
She noted that this lack of action was a failure to
adhere or abide by DI(G) PERS 35–3 which states:
Any measure aimed at resolution must include steps to ensure
there is no repeat of the behaviour or victimisation of either party. Regular
follow-up action must be undertaken by the chain of command to ensure that the
behaviour has not been repeated and/or victimisation has not resulted.[610]
8.117
The committee also heard allegations from a case
officer assigned to assist a complainant who was also subject to victimisation.
He alleged:
I have been unfairly treated and harassed by staff...for
protecting and supporting a whistleblower. I have been subject to unpleasant
comments and incidents and accused of being a troublemaker by staff including
my peers for associating with [the whistleblower]. My Commanding Officer ...stated
that 'overwhelming evidence indicated that I was a problem...and that staff are
out to get me.'[611]
8.118
An alarming case of intimidation and physical abuse was
also reported to the committee by a member who had given evidence before a
Defence inquiry.[612] This evidence
builds on that cited by the committee in the previous chapter and highlights
the extent of the problem. It further underlines the need for the ADF to take a
strong stand against this type of conduct.
8.119
Defence Regulations and Instructions clearly spell out the
procedures to be followed to ensure the impartiality, fairness and timeliness
of inquiries. One witness who complained about a number of process deficiencies
following the lodgement of her complaints acknowledged that, while there are
well-developed policies and procedures in place, 'The RAN...appear unable to
manage real events or follow their own directions'.[613]
8.120
Evidence before the committee supports this observation,
which applies across the three services, and highlights the need for ADF to go
much further than reviewing and up dating its manuals and instructions. Enforcement
of the guidelines must be a priority.
Conclusion
8.121
The report has clearly identified serious shortcomings
in administrative inquiries that include:
-
lapses in adherence to the principles of
procedural fairness—particularly the right to know the allegation and the evidence
supporting the allegation—even to the extent that investigations were carried
out without the knowledge of the person subject to the inquiry;
-
breaches of confidentiality;
-
conflicts of interest that call into question
the independence and fairness of the investigation process and rob the system
of its integrity;
-
poorly conducted investigations that lack
thoroughness due to factors such as inept gathering of evidence, inadequately
trained and or unprofessional investigators, and flawed analysis;
-
failure in some cases to protect, or prevent
reprisals against, those pursuing a complaint or giving evidence before an
administrative inquiry.
8.122
The committee is concerned that there appears to be no
mechanism in place to ensure that the requirements set down in Defence
regulations and instructions are rigorously enforced. Furthermore, evidence
suggests that the ADF has had little success in removing the perception that
administrative inquiries lack impartiality and independence. The committee
believes that its proposed Australian Defence Force Administrative Review Board
will provide the necessary oversight to ensure that any failure by
investigating officers to observe the guidelines set out in the various ADF
manuals will be brought to light and corrected. It would also provide the
necessary appeal or review process to improve investigating officer inquiries
which would now be restricted to non-notifiable incidents. It would turn the
spot light on the shortcomings in such investigations and not only correct
individual investigating officer failings but more broadly act as an incentive
for investigating officers to apply themselves more assiduously to their
responsibilities. More importantly, however, this statutorily independent review
board would for the first time effectively combat the perception that
administrative investigations lack impartiality. A full discussion of the details of this proposed board are
presented in chapter 11.
8.123
This chapter was primarily concerned with presenting a
general understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of investigations under the
current ADF's administrative system. There is a particular subset of inquiries
that come under this general category of routine and investigating officer
inquiries that have distinct features. They deal with serious accidents and
sudden deaths and are considered in the following chapter.
Navigation: Previous Page | Contents | Next Page