Chapter 4 - Japan—On the edge of change
Economies are not static; they perpetually change. Changes in
[an] economy cause deviations from predictions in supply and demand, and in the
long run economic frameworks like institutions and customs no longer mesh with
reality. In response to these changes, private enterprise, households and the
government make adjustments, which then induce further changes in the economy.
In this way, the real world economy continues to change, repeating the
adjustment process from disequilibrium to equilibrium, and from a state with
problems toward an optimal state.
Economic Planning Agency of
Japan, 1994 [1]
The Japanese economy
4.1
Japan has reached a
critical juncture in its development. For a number of years, its customs and
institutions have ‘no longer meshed with reality’ and, even with the recent
indications of an economic revival, it is yet to make that adjustment ‘from a
state with problems toward an optimal state’.
4.2
Despite the many experts who have applied their
minds to solving Japan’s
economic problems, the country is still struggling, after many years of
stagnation, to rehabilitate its economy and restore it to robust health. The
implementation of initiatives on a number of policy fronts could not prevent Japan sliding further into recession in
1998. At the beginning of 1999, there were loud and strident calls for bolder
action.[2]
As the year progressed, the economy rallied but some analysts still held
serious reservations about the soundness of the recovery. In October 1999, Keidanren,
for example, declared that the Japanese economy was ‘undergoing the gravest
crisis since the war’.[3]
4.3
The previous chapter chronicled the numerous
measures taken by the Japanese Government to address the problems besetting the
economy. In this chapter, the Committee looks behind the numerous recovery
initiatives, rescue packages and the reform programs introduced after the
asset-price bubble burst in 1990, to gain a better understanding of the forces
driving economic change in Japan and the obstacles impeding its progress.
4.4
Between 1992 and November 1999, the government
put in place several economic packages featuring fiscal spending measures and
structural reform initiatives to help lift the economy from its slump and place
it once again on a healthy growth path. At the beginning of 1999, eight years
after the bubble economy collapsed, the outlook continued bleak with ‘four
straight quarters of negative growth; two straight years of contraction of the
macro economy; the steadily worsening disintegration of what used to be vaunted
systems in the corporate sector; and growing anxiety about job security among
the public’.[4]
Even with the encouraging signs of a recovery during 1999, the country has not
yet set itself on a clear and determined path to economic growth.
4.5
Over the years, financial experts and
politicians have had no difficulty in identifying broadly what needed to be
done to return Japan’s economy to vigorous health and have called repeatedly
for decisive action. In 1995, Mr Ryutaro Hashimoto, as Minister for
International Trade and Industry, stated in general terms that ‘in order to
stay ahead, an advanced economy must make constant efforts to respond to
changing economic environments and explore unknown technological frontiers so
that it may continue to find new sources of economic vitality’.[5] Despite this observation and
its wide acceptance, Japan has been unable to find that source of ‘economic
vitality’.
4.6
In the same year, the Financial System
Stabilization Committee and the Financial System Research Council recognised
the need for Japan to construct a transparent financial system under which
market mechanisms and the principle of self-responsibility of both banks and
depositors would come fully into play.[6]
Again, despite the implementation of structural reform programs designed
deliberately to restore credibility to Japan’s financial system, the country
has been unable to rebuild an effective and vibrant financial sector able to
win back the trust and confidence of the Japanese people.
4.7
The evidence shows that officials have a sharp
appreciation of what needs to be done but they seem unable or reluctant to map
out and put in place a workable strategy that would achieve their stated
objectives. In brief, Mr Peter Hartcher told the Committee that the Japanese
have a clear understanding of all their own dilemmas going back a long way. He
noted, however, that despite the acute diagnosis, the highly developed dialogue
and debate, the accurate perceptions and prescriptions—‘The problem is that
nobody does anything about it’.[7]
In a similar vein, other commentators have spoken of an administration with a
wait-and-see attitude and a policy of forbearance.[8] Despite this perception of an
administration unable to act decisively, the Japanese Government has taken
numerous measures to rehabilitate the economy.
Stimulus packages
4.8
The efforts of government to boost the economy
are most evident in the introduction of numerous well publicised rescue
packages. In summary, between 1992 and the first half of 1998, the government
put together a total of seven economic packages featuring fiscal spending and
tax cuts for projects amounting to 80 trillion yen. In addition, in November
1998, the government approved an economic stimulus package of approximately 17
trillion yen, the largest in Japan’s history. On cue, the government introduced
more fiscal stimulus measures 12 months later. Unfortunately, the contribution
of these fiscal stimulation initiatives to economic growth has not been as
effective as hoped. Although the economy rallied during 1999, there is no
current evidence to suggest that the stimulus packages have produced a return
to solid and sustainable growth.[9]
Throughout the decade, domestic demand, despite the fiscal stimulus measures,
has remained flat and unable to provide the necessary boost to reignite the
economy.
4.9
Indeed, in October 1999, the Economic Planning
Agency stated clearly the wish to see ‘a smooth baton pass, toward full-scale
recovery, from public to private demand’. But, while the government waits with
baton in hand, there is no firm indication that the Japanese consumer is
preparing for the hand-over. As late as May 2000, the Dai-Ichi Kangyo Research
Institute observed that, although personal consumption was emerging from the
‘free-fall’ at the end of 1999, ‘a full-fledged recovery in personal
consumption is unlikely in view of the grim employment conditions and the
restrictive stance taken by corporations toward personnel costs’.[10]
4.10
Clearly, Japan has yet to reach a stage where
private-demand supports autonomous economic recovery.[11] Japanese consumers, by
refusing to spend, have kept domestic demand depressed. There are a number of
reasons why the stimulus packages have not provided the expected necessary
impetus to economic growth.
Inflated/overstated estimates of
the size of the stimulus packages
4.11
Some analysts argued that despite the fanfare
accompanying the announcement of the stimulus packages, the impressive sums
quoted were misleading and the overall contribution made to invigorate the
economy was, in practice, not as substantial as the figures would first
suggest. Mr Adam Posen maintained that all announced fiscal packages were far
smaller than claimed and, indeed, many budgets acted to reverse the effects of
these programs. He stated:
Total public investment in all seven stimulus packages from 1992
through to spring 1998 was 23 trillion yen, about a third of the total amount
announced, or 4.5% of GDP. While not a small sum, it seems hardly adequate
after taking into account that there have been over 7 years of recession with
an output loss in excess of 9% of GDP and that the claimed total public
expenditures was 65–75 trillion yen.[12]
4.12
In supporting this view, senior economist, Jon
Choy, pointed out that the actual increases in government spending often have
fallen far short of the amounts pledged when the initiatives were announced.
When comparing the stated value of the six stimulus packages between August
1992 and September 1995 with the actual supplementary budgets passed to
implement them, there is a significant discrepancy. He argued that as a result
of the modest contribution made by the stimulus packages:
Japanese financial markets as well as consumers and businesses
have learned to discount what is announced and to look closely at actual spending
and tax change—what is called ma-mizu (pure water, or the real amount of
new stimulus)—to evaluate the potential consequences of a package.[13]
4.13
Despite the boast of a 16 trillion yen infusion
of funds, the April 1998 package appears not to have carried the fiscal clout
it supposedly was going to bring to the economy. In assessing this package,
Professor Nariai Osamu found that ‘the effect of the stimulus package on the
real economy comes to some ¥3 yen from public works, ¥1 yen from tax relief,
and ¥2 yen from other measures, for a total of about ¥6 yen. This is only
slightly over 1% of gross domestic product.’[14]
4.14
While the fiscal stimuli failed to encourage
spending and thereby raise domestic demand, it did succeed, however, in
increasing the short-term growth forecasts and kept the economy afloat. Some
analysts saw merit in this approach. They argued that, by simply allowing the
economy to tread water, the packages prevented the economy from sinking
further. As Peter Hartcher noted:
If you look at the various simulations that have been done
concerning what might have happened to the level of activity in the Japanese
economy without that fiscal stimulus, the chart would fall at a fairly
depressing rate. GDP growth would decline fairly steeply. It would have been a
bit of a train wreck if not for that stimulus. So it has had some utility.[15]
4.15
On the other hand, some were highly critical of
this approach. Many analysts pointed out that the packages served more as a
band-aid measure than a building block for sustained growth. They did not win
back the confidence of consumers who refused to loosen their hold on the purse
strings and they did not seize the imagination of the business community, which
still baulked at embarking on new enterprises.[16]
4.16
They maintained that by not providing the
impetus needed to carry the economy out of troubled waters, it has languished
while consumer confidence, already shaky, has been further eroded. Mr Adam
Posen argued emphatically that ‘stimulus attempts that are solely intended to be
sufficient to keep growth non negative are setting far too paltry a goal’.[17]
4.17
The most recent stimulus package of November
1999 followed the pattern established by its predecessors. The Economist
Intelligence Unit suggested that the amount of spending was far less than the
headline figure of around 18 trillion yen and was closer to 6.5 trillion yen,
with the remaining sum largely repackaging of already allocated spending.[18]
4.18
Putting to one side the argument about the
actual size and value of the stimulus packages and whether they were overstated
or not, there were other factors that have undermined the effectiveness of the
government’s fiscal stimulative policy. While the public funds injected
into the economy may have prevented it from sliding further into trouble, many
argued that the short-sightedness in planning and poor decision-making blunted
their effectiveness and, overall, failed to provide an impetus to solid
recovery.
Funding concrete
4.19
A considerable number of analysts, especially
among the witnesses appearing before the Committee, criticised the lack of
strategic economic planning in allocating the funds from the stimulus packages.
At a time when the economy clearly needed a boost in economic activity that
would provide the platform for future growth, the stimulus packages should have
channelled money into areas best targeted to secure those foundations. As shown
in the last chapter, business people, politicians, and academics recognised the
need for innovation; for better managed and targeted research and development;
for new enterprises that would take Japan into the next century. In the
government’s own words, it was looking to create new ventures that would lift
the Japanese economy and carry it forward, moving from a manufacturing age to
an information age. From all quarters, the business sector was being urged to
think boldly, to show initiative and to be innovative: but funding available
for new ventures was limited.
4.20
Many analysts pointed out that public works
spending was not necessarily dedicated to projects that were either
economically sound or productive in the long run. As late as November 1999,
some were calling for an urgent reassessment of the current allocation of
projects which ‘no longer correspond to the changes in the economic environment
and needs of the people’. They insisted that more emphasis must be given to
cost-effectiveness and efficiency.[19]
4.21
Some highly critical analysts, such as Professor
Gavan McCormack, argued that the characteristic of the public works agenda had
been ‘the capacity to think up a steady flow of projects of sufficient scale to
warrant gargantuan outlays of public moneys’.[20]
4.22
Thus, although the government did direct funds
from the rescue packages into spending programs, the funding was funnelled into
areas that did not address the pressing problem of consumer demand. Many people
cited the large amounts of money that were squandered on the construction
industry as the most glaring example of the misguided use of public money.
Professor Robert Steven argued ‘...the big government expenditure program is
going into concrete—Japan produces concrete...’[21]
4.23
Professor Steven suggested that the government
should ensure that the packages give priority to consumption rather than
investment demand. He explained that the funding going into public work
stimulates a whole range of industries related to construction, such as iron
and steel, but not ‘the white goods industries, which would be consumer goods
industries’.[22]
4.24
Mr Peter McGill observed that national
development and Keynesian pump-priming have long been cited as justifications
for the injection of public money into the economy. He pointed out, however,
that critics now charge that:
...public works projects are increasingly ineffective as economic
stimulants, and serve largely as fodder for construction companies and as
reward from politicians to their constituencies in a brazen exchange for votes.
The visible result is that the Japanese archipelago has been inundated with
public works of questionable utility. At vast expense of labor, technology and
money, tunnels, suspension bridges, high-speed railway lines, expressways and
airports have been built to connect small communities.[23]
4.25
According to Mr McGill, the construction lobby
in Japan was so powerful that it shrugged off even the most vociferous and
well-founded criticism.[24]
In Mr David Hale’s words, fiscal stimulus in Japan meant ‘just a lot of public
works spending...basically campaign contributions to the Liberal Democratic
Party.’ Put succinctly, ‘A lot of concrete has been poured into a lot of silly
places...’[25]
4.26
This policy of funding industries, such as the
construction industry, not only propped up an industry unlikely to provide the
necessary boost for economic recovery but also absorbed limited funds that
could have gone toward areas with the potential to lift and sustain economic
growth.
4.27
Mr Bradley Treadwell pointed out that domestic
pump priming, particularly into areas such as construction, did not foster a
vibrant efficient and competitive market and moreover it worked against change.
He stated ‘What you find traditionally under the current political system is a
propensity to spend money on construction; new roads going nowhere, new
shinkansen lines going up all over the place, and new mammoth bridges being
built in particular areas.’ For him there was no incentive for change. [26]
4.28
Professor Osamu also noted the unnecessary
wastefulness in not providing encouragement to areas with the potential to
reinvigorate the economy:
When we look ahead to the twenty-first century and think about
which industries will have the capacity to maintain a sustained expansion once
again, we find that the construction industry will not be among them. But it is
this industry that benefits when the government opens its purse, whether the
spending is called public works investment or dressed up in fancier terms, such
as ‘industrial infrastructure installation’.[27]
He made the point that such spending would only coddle an
industry that desperately needs restructuring and went on to explain:
New demand-side measures designed to deliver short-term stimulus
will make no contribution to the reforms Japan is most in need of. All they may
do is preserve firms that have little competitive power. What is needed today
is a clear sense of where Japan needs to go, along with a coherent set of
policies for getting there.[28]
Stimulus fatigue
4.29
The Japanese Government clearly articulated its
intention to lift demand through its stimulus packages but its application was
not supported by clear and well-directed plans. A distinct pattern emerged
where, despite the short-term boost to the economy, the effects of the fiscal
stimulus soon faded, enthusiasm waned and the economy relapsed into low or
negative growth.
4.30
Thus, the credibility of the government’s fiscal
policy was brought into question with the introduction of each stimulus
package. Exaggerated statements concerning the real amount of stimulus, the
inflated expectations generated by the overblown rhetoric and the concentration
on public works construction that had become increasingly unproductive—roads,
railroads, bridges to nowhere—had little effect in lifting consumer demand.[29]
4.31
This loss of faith in the effectiveness of
stimulus packages was very evident with the announcement of the April 1998
package. Despite being the largest fiscal stimulus package to that date, its
reception was lukewarm. The Economist Intelligence Unit suggested that, by this
time, the Japanese markets were suffering from ‘stimulus fatigue’. It noted
that, even as the Prime Minister was announcing the package, the Nikkei average
of 225 leading stocks listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange
dropped around 50 points and the yen fell against the dollar. Put bluntly, the
investors were ‘simply no longer willing to accept the government’s statements
at face value and wanted to hear details regarding how the money would be
spent’.[30]
4.32
Keidanren also drew attention to a public and
market place growing increasingly weary with the announcement of each record
breaking stimulus package despite the mounting sense of urgency. It pointed out
that these economic policy packages have remained powerless and their
ineffectiveness has led to observations abroad that Japan is suffering from
‘package fatigue’. It pointed out that ‘The policy packages introduced up to
now in 1998 have swollen to the size as large as ¥16 trillion, but the
continued fall of the yen and share prices is indicative of how strong distrust
of such packages has grown’.[31]
4.33
Clearly enthusiasm for the packages soon fizzled
and people were becoming increasingly cynical with the government, and stale,
recycled policies together with a lack of imagination and aggression in
tackling the difficult economic situation. Jon Choy observed:
Fiscal stimulus plans have appeared with such clockwork
regularity in the 1990s that each successive package somehow must be bigger or
better to achieve the desired level of attention. Clearly, there is an upper
limit to how much can be added to public works budgets. The ¥16 trillion
edition may have hit this ceiling.[32]
4.34
It did not. The November 1998 package, with the
inclusion of a tax reduction measure, reached the record amount of over 20
trillion yen. Twelve months later, in anticipation that the effects of this
package would taper off, the government announced its ‘Economic Rebirth
Package’ worth close to 18 trillion yen. It was to be a breathtaking initiative
that ‘responds to the expectations of the people of Japan and can be fully
comprehended both in Japan and abroad’.[33]
But one editorial greeted the initiative with disdain stating, ‘Removing the
make-up, however, reveals a parade of the same old public works projects.’[34] In brief, the constant flow of
stimulus packages not only reduced their ‘novelty and impact’ but also eroded
the public’s trust in the competency of the administration.[35]
4.35
While the implementation of fiscal stimulus
packages since 1992 saved the economy by enabling it to mark time, the failure
of these initiatives to put the economy back on a steady growth track fed
scepticism about the continuation of this approach. This disenchantment with
government policy, fuelled the already serious problem of low consumer
confidence which translated into weak domestic demand.
Low consumer confidence
4.36
By adopting a fiscal expansionary policy, the
government hoped to encourage and sustain domestic demand. To date, the policy
has not worked. The lack of success in boosting consumer spending is not,
however, attributable solely to shortcomings with the packages. Highly
sceptical and with their confidence in the future shaken, people have
deliberately chosen to save and not spend.[36]
Mr Jim Storey summarised the situation:
As quickly as new money is introduced into the economy,
consumers save it and capital-strapped banks refuse to lend out the new
deposits, preferring instead to purchase government bonds.[37]
4.37
Consumer confidence is fundamental to any
economic recovery; it provides the necessary incentive for business to expand
and grow. Once lost, it is difficult to rekindle and moreover to sustain but,
once firmly in place, it is a very powerful and positive force.[38] Consumer confidence has been
falling in Japan since the bubble economy burst. But even with some encouraging
indications of an economic revival, the Bank of Japan concluded as late as
March 2000 that there were no clear signs of a self-sustained recovery in
private demand.[39]
Two months later, the Bank reported that a rally has been observed in some
areas of private demand but that ‘it may take some time for households’ income
conditions to improve and, in turn, for private consumption to recover’.[40]
4.38
This collapse in consumer confidence has created
a strong reinforcing cycle of lower demand, falling sales, rising inventories,
shrinking profits, lower wages and fear of unemployment which, in turn, breeds
greater insecurity, further eroding consumer confidence. The cycle feeds upon
itself. The more anxious the Japanese people become about their future, the
more tightly they hold on to the purse strings and the longer domestic demand
remains depressed.
4.39
There are a number of forces at work in Japan
giving rise to feelings of uncertainty and insecurity. Shifts in employment
patterns and changing demographics with a falling birth rate and a rapidly
ageing population have disturbed the status quo and present new challenges. These
trends worry people, gnaw at their faith in the economy’s ability to prosper
and to provide for all. Thus many people, as well as preserving their existing
savings, prefer to save any benefit from tax relief or additional earnings.[41] The most immediate source of
concern for the Japanese people is the high rate of unemployment.
Fear of unemployment
Unemployment rates
4.40
The unemployment rate in Japan has ranged from
3–3.5% in past years. In April 1998, however, the unemployment rate reached
4.1%, which was the worst result to that time since the figures were first
calculated in 1953.[42]
More recently, due to the deepening recession, unemployment figures have
continued to rise. They reached 4.3% in August and September 1998 until finally
they climbed to a record high in June 1999 with the worst-ever figure of 4.9%.[43]
4.41
The official unemployment figure may seem low
but these statistics mask a more serious unemployment situation. It is
generally assumed that the official rate underestimates the level of
unemployment and does not indicate the extent of underemployment. Unofficial
estimates put the Japanese jobless at a much higher rate since labour market
practices in Japan mean that workers can be idle or virtually unemployed
without appearing to be so in the official statistics.[44] A number of analysts also
pointed out that Japan’s official figures exclude many people who want jobs,
but are not registered as job seekers.[45]
4.42
On a practical level, the recession has reduced
the incomes of many would-be consumers. The slowdown in production has resulted
in a reduction in take home pay while falling corporate profits have kept
bonuses from rising. Households have lost income from diminished casual and
part-time employment opportunities, in particular, for female employees.[46] Mr Darryl McGarry submitted:
With full-employment, the regular provision of bonuses was a
substantial and regular kick for the economy. With the economic downturn, the
size of bonuses has been hit and increasingly bonuses have been done away with
by corporations in response to tapered profitability while attempting to
maintain the level of employment and remain in business.[47]
4.43
Despite indications of a strengthening Japanese
economy, the total amount of wages in 1999, even with an increase in overtime
payments, was still declining because of the fall in bonus payments.[48] For a people accustomed to
lifetime employment, the growing number of unemployed, together with the
closure of businesses and the sale of assets, has a deeply negative influence
on consumer sentiment.
Structural changes in the labour
force
4.44
The employment situation in Japan is further
complicated by economic, commercial and demographic pressures, which have led
to structural changes in the workforce. These shifts in Japan’s labour market
have given rise to an unprecedented level of insecurity in the workplace.
4.45
After World War II, Japan built up an employment
system whereby, once full-time employees were hired, they tended to remain with
the company as a family member until they reached retirement age. Minister
Taichi Sakaiya argued that this gave credence to the ‘full employment myth’
which held that Japan would never experience serious unemployment problems.[49] It gave the Japanese people a
sense of security. During the 1990s, however, business was beginning to realise
that lifetime employment, especially with practices such as wages based on
seniority, was becoming ‘a drag on Japanese production systems because they
just cannot maintain an increasingly highly paid workforce at senior levels’.[50]
4.46
The corporate ‘hoarding’ of employees, where
Japanese companies are likely to keep their workers on the payroll in recession
even though it results in significantly lower profits, is another practice
peculiar to Japan.[51]
But, as economic conditions have changed, such practices are being acknowledged
as economically unsound and, despite a long tradition, the expectation of
lifetime employment, a fundamental tenet of Japanese economic life, is being
set aside. Companies, finding that they cannot survive in the market place
without restructuring their workforce, are making the hard decision to retrench
people. In simple terms, ‘the full employment myth has finally passed away’
leaving the Japanese people confused about shifting values and worried about
future trends.[52]
4.47
The employment situation in Japan certainly
exposes the tension between strongly held traditional views and those of a new
emerging corporate world where market forces and not time-honoured values such
as loyalty and social responsibility dictate employment practices. Thus, at
this time in Japan anxiety about job security is being heightened by a
recession that has meant the shedding of jobs, the loss of overtime and reduced
bonuses. The dismantling of a well-established and valued system of employment
only further exacerbates people’s fears.
4.48
In such a climate of uncertainty, people will
tend to be very cautious about spending. As long as they harbour misgivings
about their future employment prospects, they will keep a watchful and nervous
eye on their income and savings. Uncertainty ‘is paralysing individuals in
their spending profile’; they will choose to stockpile rather than spend.[53] The current push for
structural reform is simply fuelling the prevailing unease about Japan’s
unemployment situation and, as a result, further dampening domestic demand.[54]
Ageing society
Demographic trends
4.49
The redefining of long-standing employment
practices as well as the actual reshaping of the labour force is taking place
as concerns about the ageing population are mounting. This combination only
adds to people’s worries.
4.50
Of major concern to the Japanese people are the
demographic trends showing a declining birth rate, now at 1.38 children per
female; an ageing of society; and a shrinking population. The population aged
65 and over will increase from 14.6% of the total population in 1995 to 26.9%
in 2020 and 32.3% in 2050, the highest percentage in the world. Concomitantly,
the productive population (ages 15 to 64) has been decreasing since peaking in
1995 and is estimated to fall 16% by 2020 and approximately 43% by 2050. The
decline in birth rates combined with an ageing population is expected to have a
major effect on Japan’s macroeconomic environment.[55]
4.51
The ageing of the population is progressing in
Japan at a pace that is without parallel in the rest of the world. Such a trend
suggests not only a decrease in the working population but also a rise in the
public burden due to increased social security expenditures. Within two
decades, the future ratio of workers to pensioners will be reduced by
approximately half of the present level. Currently each elderly person in Japan
is supported by slightly less than five working age persons. By the year 2015,
Japan will have approximately 2.5 persons to support each elderly person and,
by the year 2025, the ratio will drop to 2.2 persons. Clearly, the rate of
dependency is increasing rapidly.[56]
As summarised by economic journalist, Mr Luke Gower, ‘Aging implies a rising
dependency ratio, which will inflate expenditure on social security for the
elderly and ultimately increase the tax burden’.[57]
4.52
Thus, the ageing population is a major
preoccupation for Japanese political and business leaders aware that it will
have a significant effect on the welfare budget and government outlays as well
as on the structure of the labour force and changing patterns in consumer
demand.[58]
The increasing welfare burden is of particular concern to the government, which
is facing the responsibility for meeting the needs of an older population but
with a shrinking revenue base as the labour force contracts. According to MITI:
...the consequent increase in such public burdens as taxes and
social insurance premiums may weaken the international competitiveness of
Japanese business corporations by pushing up wage costs and may eventually
hamper the growth of the Japanese economy. Given such prospects, it is a matter
of urgency that a system be established which will minimise the public burden.[59]
4.53
The Japanese people are also worried about the
effects of a rapidly ageing population. They have the longest average life
expectancy in the world, 83 years for women and 77 years for men, and are
acutely mindful of this fact. They are also aware of the trend towards
population ageing with fewer children. But at the moment they do not feel
confident that adequate measures are in place to ensure that they will be
looked after in their retirement. Concerned about providing for an uncertain
future, they prefer to save precisely at a time when increased consumption is
needed to re-boot the economy.[60]
4.54
According to Mr Christopher Pokarier,
state-backed pensions and aged care facilities are limited and yet are still
expected to become a major drain on public revenues at current contribution
levels. It has been estimated that pension contributions will increase from
their current level of 17.35% to 27% of monthly wages by 2015.[61] The ailing financial system
has also raised doubts about the soundness of private pension products. Mr
Pokarier stated:
More generally, in the wake of the revealed failures of
regulators to engage in adequate prudential supervision of banks and other
financial institutions many Japanese citizens hold a residual fear for the
security of private retirement funds. Amongst current retirees, extremely low
interest rates means that people are consuming their capital and this
contributing to not only their own sense of diminished wealth but of those who
might inherit from them as well. Falls in land prices, which some people have
used as a savings vehicle in response to the burden of inheritance taxes, have
further exacerbated this sense of being less well off.[62]
4.55
There is no doubt that people fear for their
pensions. In particular, most Japanese private sector employees suspect that
the corporate sector pensions that they had been expecting until just a few
years ago are no longer deliverable.[63]
They are also anxious about their jobs, and they know that the demographic
trends pose problems for the future, giving rise to ‘a worried consumer
sector’.[64]
The government is acutely aware of the uncertainty and loss of confidence
prevailing throughout the country. Minister Yosano stated:
The emphasis is thrown entirely on potential future risks to the
general welfare of the people, such as health insurance and pensions, which
together with the series of failures of major companies...has left the people of
Japan with an extremely negative mindset.[65]
4.56
While Japan’s changing demographic profile will
result in a tightening labour market by the end of the decade, the uncertain
prospects for many firms and industries in the short term continues to dampen
consumer sentiment. The unease felt by many of Japan’s baby boomers about their
financial prospects lies at the heart of the government’s repeated failed
attempts to boost aggregate demand in Japan.[66]
4.57
In summary, amid mounting uncertainty regarding
the future of Japan’s economy, Japan’s household consumption has slumped while
the savings rate has been increasing from 1990. A study by the Bank of Japan
revealed the depth of concern in the community about the future of Japan’s
economy. The middle-aged and elderly low-income households feel anxious about
employment conditions; the young households are worried about the pension
systems and the elderly households are very concerned about nursing care. [67]
4.58
This study concluded that people from a wide
cross-section of the Japanese community are apprehensive about their future and
that their fears touch specifically on their financial security and their
ability to provide for themselves as they age. Clearly, the government has a
major task in convincing the Japanese people that the economy will pick up,
employment rates will rise, pension funds are both adequate and safe and that
the nation can meet the needs of its elderly citizens.
4.59
The issue of aged care, in particular, is
looming as a major problem for Japan. Official studies have suggested that the
current national health insurance schemes are currently not viable at present
charges against the projected growth in costs, despite the reform measures
adopted that imposed additional costs on the elderly. The rising dependency
ratio and the increasing welfare burden raises the question of whether or not
Japan will be able to support the current level of social welfare benefits for
its elderly population in the future. These issues have led to concerns about
aged care facilities and health care and are a leading motivator behind the
national emphasis on saving for the future.[68]
The Ministry of Health and Welfare noted:
Today, the long-term care issue is the largest cause for concern
of the Japanese people about their post-retirement life. In the year 2025, the
continually aging population is predicted to make the number of people
requiring long-term care to 2.6 times that in 1997, or 5.2 million people.
Also, the period of time long-term care is required and the age of those caring
for the elderly will increase. Therefore, long-term care for bedridden and
senile elderly people will become a critical issue.[69]
4.60
Ms Jill Miller told the Committee that the aged,
who make up around 14 per cent of the population, account for 35 per cent of
medical costs.[70]
Mr Pokarier suggested that a more serious commitment by government to provide
access to affordable aged care in the future and the immediate protection of
the retirement savings of those who are now middle-aged might help boost
consumer sentiment amongst those Japanese with the greatest capacity for
discretionary spending. Put bluntly ‘It would certainly do more than continued
public sector spending on infrastructure projects of dubious worth’.[71]
4.61
Mr Pokarier also drew attention to the problem
of the escalating public debt, noting that further expansion of this debt to
invigorate the economy might be largely self-defeating if ‘it is widely
perceived that the government’s implicit underwriting of private savings and
its capacity to invest in aged care are diminished’.[72]
Government deficit
4.62
Although pushed from centre stage for the time
being by the more pressing need to revitalise the economy, the nation’s public
debt lurks menacingly in the wings as another serious problem.[73] This issue was openly
discussed by officials during 1997 when the economy held promise of a recovery
and the government had the confidence to air the matter of fiscal
restructuring. At this time, Prime Minister Hashimoto made clear that:
With Japanese society aging at a pace unprecedented anywhere
else in the world, if we leave the fiscal structure in its present state and
invite further expansion of the fiscal deficit, the economy and welfare of the
Japanese people in the 21st century will be destined for failure.
Under these conditions, we must take every possible step and devote all efforts
toward the realization of vitalized and prosperous lives for the Japanese
people.[74]
In the clearest of terms, he argued that if Japan did not
reform its fiscal structure, it would pass on to its children ‘an unbearable
burden’.[75]
4.63
This situation has not changed. Indeed, the debt
has continued to grow. Since the recession deepened in 1997, the urgent and
immediate task of keeping the economy afloat has assumed precedence over
considerations of public debt. The government looks to fiscal stimulation to
rescue the economy.
4.64
The IMF acknowledged the difficulty for Japan in
reconciling the conflicting priorities of stimulating the economy and reducing
government expenditure. In October 1998, it noted:
...the current need for fiscal stimulus has to be traded against
the requirements for longer-term fiscal consolidation in anticipation of the
pressures that will arise from population aging, particularly given that the
surpluses in the social security accounts have recently been declining.[76]
4.65
A year on, the problem of the mounting public
debt still awaited attention. The OECD observed that ‘earlier counter-cyclical
fiscal measures had led to a rapid and worrisome deterioration in public
finances, with gross and net debt reaching historically high levels’.[77] In looking ahead, Mr Atsushi
Takeda from the Dai-Ichi Kangyo Research Institute argued that the extremely
high level of public investments resulting from the numerous economic stimulus
packages must be corrected at some time. Without mincing words, he stated,
‘Should the unbridled fiscal expansion continue, a fiscal meltdown and a heavy
burden upon future generations would become unavoidable.’[78]
4.66
Nonetheless, the government remains committed to
economic stimulus to revitalise the economy. Minister Taichi Sakaiya made this
point clear when he explained Prime Minister Obuchi’s use of the ancient
Japanese proverb, ‘He who hunts two hares loses both’ to explain his
government’s policy.
The Prime Minister was often criticized for only chasing the
hare of economic recovery with expansion of expenditure, so letting the fiscal
deficit hare run wild. But I say this criticism was unwarranted. The two hares of
economic recovery or economic rebirth and fiscal reconstruction are not running
in different directions, but rather moving along the same course, and the Prime
Minister was correct. We must first bag the hare of economic recovery and
economic rebirth that lies just before us, and only then hunt down the hare of
fiscal reconstruction that waits further down the path. If we abandon our
economic rebirth measures halfway and rush to increase taxes and resist
government expenditures, we surely loose both hares and come home empty-handed.[79]
4.67
People are conscious of the growing deficit.
Those saving for retirement realise that if the government borrows a lot of
money—spends it—then eventually they will have to raise taxes.[80] They are aware of the trend
towards population ageing and fewer children and the increasing demand this
will place on the welfare budget as well as the more immediate problem of the
deteriorating fiscal situation. The government understands the need to address
public concern over the future of the social security system.[81] The Ministry of Health and
Welfare acknowledged:
Japan’s finances are in a grave situation. Amidst such a state,
concerns are beginning to emerge that the burden of whatever scale the future
of social security takes may likely become a limiting factor in maintaining an
energetic society and economy.[82]
4.68
For the moment, the issue of public debt may be
kept in the shadows, but it remains another unresolved difficulty that plays on
the minds of decision-makers and, more generally, troubles the Japanese people.
4.69
But at a time when the Japanese people are
looking for reassurance about their long-term security, as they search for
guarantees and look to their leaders for sound and strong leadership, they are
disappointed. Scandals that have involved the bureaucracy, indecisive
leadership, policy inconsistency, and mounting public debt only deepen their
doubts about their futures. The government faces a difficult job in winning the
confidence of a highly wary people, particularly in light of its own
performance.
4.70
Without doubt, the people’s trust in Japan’s
policy-makers has been seriously tested. Japan’s leaders are yet to provide a
clear or coherent vision of where they hope to take the country. But officials,
academics, journalists and politicians are constantly reminding the people that
the world is changing. They argue that Japan and its people must adjust if the
nation is to retain its place as a leading economy in the coming decades. At
this critical juncture in Japan’s history, its leaders are still struggling to
meet the challenges of reviving a sluggish economy in a changing world. The
stream of fiscal stimulus packages introduced by the government, rather than
offer some respite for an anxious people, have raised further doubts about the
ability of the administration to deal with the difficulties ahead. Moreover,
their failure to secure the full support and trust of the people on fiscal
policy has been compounded by their failure to resolve problems in other areas.
The response to the bad loan problem, for example, and their mishandling of
sections of the banking system has generated further misgivings about the
government’s ability to come to grips with the economic problems facing the
country.
4.71
Even in the face of crisis, the administration
has responded slowly. The banking industry, which has provided a most glaring
example of the ‘muddling on’ approach, has only recently felt the firm hand of
government intervention on its shoulder. Despite the growing seriousness of the
problem, the regulatory authorities failed to acknowledge the full magnitude of
the banking crisis and were reluctant to act decisively to fund major financial
restructuring.[83]
In September 1998, the Governor of the Japan Bank voiced his irritation at the
failure of government to put in place full disclosure of non-performing loans
that were to him a prerequisite for disposing of bad debts and a necessary step
to restore confidence in the economy. He stated, ‘I find it very frustrating to
see this situation unrectified fully seven years after the collapse of the
bubble economy’.[84]
4.72
The Ministry of Finance, the primary regulatory
agency, initially adopted a ‘forbearance policy’ toward the non-performing loan
problem. Clinging to the hope of a quick economic recovery and an improvement
in the real estate market, it allowed banks to hold non-performing loans
without special write-offs.[85]
4.73
Professor Freedman endorsed this view that the
Ministry was out-of-touch. He told the Committee that despite the mounting
crisis in the banking system:
The Ministry of Finance treated this sector with great
gentleness reminiscent of a Japanese mother with a slightly wayward
son...essentially, the belief was that the economic growth would wash away these
temporary financial difficulties if officials could manage to muddle through
and cover things up in the interim period.[86]
4.74
Less charitably in July 1998, Mr Douglas Ostrom
called this approach the ‘crossed-fingers strategy’ and argued that the
Ministry of Finance adhered to this policy throughout the early to mid-1990s.
Moreover, he suggested that they may still have their heads in the sand.[87]
4.75
With hindsight, officials now recognise, in
public at least, the folly in assuming that one way or another the economy,
particularly the banking system, would right itself. Mr Taichi Sakaiya
explained ‘...it was as if the managers of financial institutions and the
bureaucrats responsible for supervising the financial industry were treating a
festering internal infection, but relied on prayer because they were afraid to
perform surgery’. [88]
4.76
The neglect and mismanagement of this urgent
banking problem certainly exposed a level of incompetence among some sections
of the bureaucracy that only further damaged consumer confidence. The exposure
of an underworld of corruption and scandal that touched a number of officials
at the highest levels of the administration, however, proved far more
disheartening for the people of Japan.
Scandals
4.77
For many years, authorities had turned a blind
eye to the close relations between business and the bureaucracy; a relationship
in which lavish rewards by corporations to government officials were a
significant feature. By the late 1990s, a steady trickle of scandals involving
officials at the highest levels of the bureaucracy came to public attention
provoking open condemnation and finally government action.
4.78
Mr Edward Lincoln argued:
With the scandals that have emerged in the 1990s have come truly
shocking revelations of indiscretion and malfeasance—shocking at least in the
frequency of exposure; much of the revealed behaviour seems quite
unsurprising.
...
These scandals have gone far beyond isolated incidents. They
paint a picture of widespread routine corruption and incestuous relations among
financial firms, their clients, government officials and politicians.[89]
4.79
The uncovering in 1997 and 1998 of an
‘entertainment-for-favour’ practice demonstrated ‘...how Ministry of Finance
mandarins wielded their discretionary powers to bend the rules of the
marketplace and the extent to which bank and financial sector executives
cultivated their bureaucratic relationships’.[90]
According to Mr Michael Backman, it became apparent that:
...the nation’s most prominent banks and insurance companies had
systematically spent enormous sums on entertaining government bureaucrats in
exchange for confidential information, tip-offs when bank inspections were
about to be made, advance notice of changes to banking law, and helping conceal
damaging records.[91]
4.80
In March 1998, there was the astonishing
spectacle of prosecutors marching into the Bank of Japan to arrest a senior
official suspected of trading inside information for expensive dinners and golf
sessions. The Ministry of Finance suffered a similar loss of face when public
investigators staged a raid on the Ministry’s headquarters, seized papers and
arrested two officials involved in regulating the banking sector. These
officials were accused of giving the banks advance warning as to when to expect
‘surprise’ inspections in return for lavish entertainment and gifts. Although
exposing the bureaucracy to public ridicule, these dramatic events at least
signalled the government’s intention to deal with this problem.[92] In April 2000, the Prime
Minister himself felt the need to state in Parliament that ‘The recent series
of improper acts perpetrated by civil servants is indeed truly deplorable.’[93] The startling disclosures of
corruption and of the existence of a web of intrigue and collusion in the upper
reaches of the Ministry of Finance and the nation’s central bank have, without
question, seriously dented their prestige.[94]
4.81
Accusations of misconduct were also levelled at
the business community. It suffered a serious loss of confidence in 1997 both
within Japan and abroad because of the management failure in numerous
corporations and the ‘sokaiya’ payoff scandals.[95] These scandals, involving a
number of executives from two large and respected institutions, Nomura
Securities and Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, confirmed that extortion was a problem
among Japanese companies.[96]
4.82
These revelations of bribery and corruption
turned a harsh spotlight on the dark side of sections of the Japanese corporate
and bureaucratic world. The unfolding tales of serious impropriety within the
bureaucracy and business community diminished the people’s trust in their
leaders and has given rise to another cause for concern.[97]
The push and pull for reform in
Japan
Pressure to reform
4.83
In the face of all these difficulties—ailing
economy, rising unemployment, rapidly ageing population, erosion of traditional
values such as lifetime employment, poor leadership, corruption, mounting
public debt and falling consumer confidence—Japan was being urged to reform.
4.84
The parlous state of the economy highlighted the
urgent need for structural reform in Japan to facilitate its long-term economic
development. Both Japanese and overseas analysts agree that the country can no
longer look to its traditional industries and ways of doing business to
generate growth. The United States, in particular, has been a consistent and
vocal advocate for Japan to restructure its economy. It acknowledged that the
government had boldly put forward a significant amount of fiscal stimulus to
jumpstart the economy and also noted the government’s ‘very accommodative
monetary policy’. But it went on to suggest:
Those are two legs to a stool of restoring prolonging economic
growth. But there is a third leg missing, and without it we don’t believe we
can have sustained economic growth in Japan, and that is a serious
restructuring of the Japanese economy, which means deregulating and
reregulating and rechannelling the efforts of the Japanese economy and helping
it move into the information age from the machinery age.[98]
4.85
Many argued that early reform would immediately
begin to restore confidence in the region and would be an enormous boost to the
region’s future economic prospects. They warned that if Japan’s economic
structure remained essentially unchanged, the economy would continue to
flounder and even slip further behind.[99]
Short-term dislocations versus
long-term benefits
4.86
There is, however, a down side to such
restructuring. It threatens to create short-term difficulties for and
disruption to an economy already beset with problems. This presents Japan with
a difficult trade-off—restructure with an eye to longer-range developments and
future economic security but risk short-term upheavals, such as rising
unemployment.
4.87
Although concerned that reform would aggravate
economic difficulties in the short term, the government, for the moment, has
decided that the long-range advantages of restructuring outweigh the more
immediate complications arising during the adjustment period. In outlining its
policy measures for the November 1999 Economic Rebirth Package, the government
emphasised that reform was an indispensable element in transforming the
Japanese economy to the appropriate foundation for the knowledge-based age of
the 21st century.
4.88
Having opted for change, Japanese leaders are
now at pains to impress on the Japanese people the importance of restructuring.
But their actions do not match the urgency of their words. As with the
government’s efforts to stimulate the economy through fiscal policy, it has
demonstrated the same faltering and half-hearted approach to reform.
Progress slow
4.89
A recent assessment by the OECD of regulatory reform
in Japan restated a common and long-held view that Japan needs to act rapidly
and forcefully. It acknowledged the progress made in deregulation, but stated
bluntly that Japan needs a ‘sharp break with past regulatory practices’.[100] Despite all the talk about
the pressing need to restructure, the government at first tinkered with reform;
it responded with piecemeal measures and without determination. Although the
Big Bang reforms in particular have given momentum to the reform initiatives,
the Japanese Government is yet to formulate a well-defined template outlining
the reform process. Put starkly by Mr Richard Katz in 1999, ‘Japan is stuck. It
can’t maintain the old system, but it [is] not ready to embrace reform. It is
drifting, trying to muddle through.’[101]
4.90
According to one economist, ‘Deregulation has
required the Japanese to rethink their extensive network of formal and informal
controls imposed upon the economy. Change has been incremental, at best, with
implementation lagging far behind prescription.’[102] Mr Peter Hartcher also noted
the lack of coherence and foresight in the reform process. He maintained that
Japan is restructuring through crisis ‘as market inevitabilities force
themselves on reluctant policy makers and terrified politicians’. He considered
that the depth of restructuring and of the transition point reached by the
Japanese economy explains why Japanese consumers and employees are ‘so
traumatised and so reluctant to spend’.[103]
He explained that this is why the recession is proving to be so deep and so
intractable.
The inertia of traditional
systems—reluctance to change
4.91
Although this hesitancy in implementing reform
clearly contradicts the acknowledged and stated need to restructure, it is
understandable within the context of Japan’s economic tradition. The roots of
established practice and customs run deep in Japan, especially as they are
anchored in many years of achievement. Despite the recent economic
difficulties, there remains in Japan a stubborn reluctance to tamper with a
proven system. The changes required are drastic. They demand a reassessment, a
shift in approach and attitude, and a shedding of the practices of the past.
The Japanese people, who emerged from a country devastated by war to build one
of the leading economies in the world, value the economic system that has
carried them to success. For them, it has been a source of economic prosperity
and security—it is a familiar, proven and reliable system.
4.92
As Mr Hartcher pointed out, ‘Success of the
system has entrenched these arrangements very deeply in the system and made it
extremely resistant to change.’[104]
Thus many Japanese hold dearly to a way of thinking that is set in a period of
bygone growth.[105]
The government itself is finding it difficult to let go of past practices and
ideas. A number of witnesses pointed out that the government basically
mistrusts competition and is not yet prepared to put its faith in the free
market.[106]
4.93
This strong but natural inclination to stay with
valued and successful traditions is heightened during times of uncertainty.
Under stress, people look to the familiar for reassurance. Thus, despite the
compelling argument for reform, the Japanese people still have an enduring
attachment to the past ways of doing things. People recognise the need for
reform but are as yet unwilling to embrace such change. Even though fears
continue to grow for the future, many in Japan still hanker after time-honoured
practices to allay their anxieties.
4.94
The Economist Intelligence Unit Report for the
third quarter 1999 noted the degree of tension between accepting the need for
change and a willingness to undertake such change. It acknowledged that there
was a broad international consensus that Japan needs to tolerate higher levels
of unemployment if its economy is to become more competitive and grow more
quickly. In contrast, it maintained, however, that there was no general
agreement among the Japanese people that this trade-off is worth making. Thus,
according to the Unit, ‘the political calculus militates in favour of politics that
sustain the status quo, even if this delays a return to sustainable economic
growth’.[107]
4.95
A major concern is that the Japanese may
postpone or merely play at reform until the situation deteriorates to such an
extent that conditions will force their hand. As pointed out by DFAT:
We conclude that Japan is not on the verge of economic,
political or social breakdown or dislocation. Its traditional systems are,
however, under stress and there is as yet within Japan no broad consensus that
radical change is necessary. While the prolonged economic slump have finally
brought a sense of crisis in some quarters, the Japanese unsurprisingly, remain
attached to traditional socio-economic practices which have brought them many
benefits, especially to rural Japan. This is causing pressures and tensions in
how Japan conducts itself internationally and how its leadership manages its
domestic economic and political debate.[108]
4.96
The Chairman of Keidanren recognised the desire
by many to cling to established norms and proven practices. He accepted and
sympathised with this inclination but warned of the danger in harbouring such
tendencies. He told a gathering of journalists:
In some ways it is easier for all of us—politicians, government
administrators, the general public and industry—to continue operating according
to regulations that we know. However, circumstances are changing rapidly both
in Japan and abroad, so it is no longer feasible to maintain existing
regulations and the existing order, nor is it possible for those who support
the status quo to persuade us to maintain them.[109]
Complacency
4.97
Not only have the long years of economic
progress in Japan engendered a degree of conservatism but it has also bred
complacency. Hopes for Japan’s recovery are buoyed by admiration for, and
conviction in, the resilience of the people. There is a very real expectation
that Japan’s economy will eventually lurch back on track; an outlook, however,
that encourages forbearance and blunts the drive for reform.
4.98
This complacency was most evident in the
administration’s dealing with the bad debt problems. The evidence has shown
that, to a large measure, the government in particular and the financial system
generally acted on the hope that the bad debt problem would eventually be
resolved over time and were thus prepared to let the problem drift.[110] As Minister Sakaiya said
bluntly:
The managers and bureaucrats lacked the courage to decisively
dispose of the bad debts, and simply prayed that land and stock prices would
soon recover.[111]
4.99
The grounds for assuming that Japan will be able
pull itself out of this prolonged slump are strong. The country possesses a
reservoir of rich talent, experience and values that could be tapped to carry
it through this troubled time. Indeed, many commentators draw on the strengths
in Japanese society and look with optimism to the future. As explained by DFAT,
Japan is still the world’s largest creditor nation; it has an economy based
firmly on the cultural discipline of a high savings rate, its people are highly
educated and motivated and they have a powerful work ethic, it has a strong
manufacturing sector and a remarkable export performance which should provide
the basis for strong economic growth beyond the short term.[112]
4.100
While most analysts would agree that Japan has
the potential to return its economy to robust health, most would stress that
there is no room for complacency. Rather, they would point to a pressing need
for a determined and driving force to galvanise all sectors of the nation into
concerted action.
Lack of urgency/commitment
4.101
Undoubtedly, the ability of the government to
implement proposed reforms will be a decisive factor in the recovery.[113] Unfortunately, there is no
sense of urgency compelling Japan to usher in reform. Many commentators are
concerned by this lack of political drive in Japan at this most critical time.[114]
4.102
Lack of aggression and timid leadership have
undermined attempts by those sectors of the economy eager to marshal the
resources of the country into a determined effort to reinvigorate the economy.
For them, precious time has been and is being wasted. Clearly concerned about
lost opportunities, Mr Robert Uriu wrote, ‘While the country searched
desperately for some sign of strong domestic leadership, such leadership was in
short supply’.[115]
The wait-and-hope approach frustrated those committed to pushing ahead with
reform and confirmed in the minds of many that the administration was not fully
committed to change.
4.103
Dr Yasuo Takeo noted that Japan does ‘not have
the kind of overwhelming power to usher in a transformation of Japanese
society’.[116]
According to Mr Larry Crump, from Griffith University, Queensland, ‘The
government of Japan, behaving in a very Japanese way, has taken the safe
approach and not done very much’.[117]
4.104
A reticence to tackle difficult problems seems
to be at the very heart of the administration’s failure to launch a successful
reform program. The government has tinkered with reforms but stopped short when
tough decisions had to be made. Akira Kawamoto accepted the argument that the
reform plan lacks a firm political hand to drive it forward and give it overall
shape and coherence.[118]
4.105
The Queensland Government, for example,
questioned the determination of the Japanese officials to implement the
financial system reform. As an indication of this lack of commitment, it noted
the Japanese Government’s intervention in the stock market in 1997 to protect
Japanese banks and the legislative schedule which suggests that changes are not
coming into force until as late as 2001.[119]
4.106
The United States was particularly concerned
with the Japanese Government’s unwillingness to move ahead, boldly and
decisively, with reform. It stated:
But what we do not see yet is a commitment by the Japanese
government to move away from a command-and-control mentality to a government
that encourages competition.
...
What we worry about is that Japan cannot make the transformation
to the information age.[120]
4.107
This lukewarm commitment to reform also
manifests itself in the government’s inability to put together a credible
reform plan. It will respond when pushed but there is no long-term vision and
no overarching architecture to guide progress in the restructuring process. Mr
Arun Rhada Krishnan drew attention to the way the reforms have been pursued in
small bits—‘tax concessions here, pump priming here, fighting fires as they
arise and so on—they do not seem to present a long-term kind of picture’.[121] Professor Karel Van Wolferen
stated simply:
When you ask Japanese government officials: what actually does
your policy look like?—nobody can really give you a succinct answer and tell
you this is where they are heading.[122]
4.108
As late as June 2000, doubts still lingered
about the ability of Japanese leaders to formulate a comprehensive reform
program that would tackle some of the most serious economic problems.
Ambassador Ove Juul Jorgensen, Head of the Delegation of the European
Commission in Japan, in assessing the regulatory reform process in Japan
stated:
The revised Programme is, as far as we are concerned, still
rather patchy. For example, competition policy plays a greater role than ever
in the Programme, but the measures promised are still basically ‘nibbling
around the edges’. Effective competition policy enforcement could resolve many
of Japan’s regulatory reform bottlenecks in one fell swoop.[123]
4.109
Many commentators share misgivings about the
government’s ad hoc response to reform and its capacity to carry out the
more difficult reforms that lay ahead.[124]
Austrade could imagine ‘a scenario in which Japan undertakes some reforms but
leaves the major part of its economic institutions and relationships basically
intact’.[125]
It suggested:
The more likely outcome will be that Japan will implement some
reforms, largely in response to a major crisis brought on by internal, or more
likely external, pressure leaving intact many of the existing relationships and
institutions.[126]
4.110
The evidence shows that the government has
fallen short on two major fronts in pushing forward with a successful reform
program. First, to give an absolute and unequivocal commitment to the reform
process. Second, on a practical level, to put together a coherent and logical
plan that marks out the steps toward a well-defined goal. In essence, the
administration must provide the motivation for change and show that it is
prepared to act boldly in implementing reform as well as provide a clear sense
of direction.
Structural impediments
4.111
The government is not alone in frustrating the
effective introduction of structural reform. The leadership problem and the
lack of heart for reform also permeates the administration. The bureaucracy
carries a primary responsibility for formulating and implementing deregulatory
initiatives but their contribution to the reform process has been limited.
4.112
Japan’s bureaucracy has lost its authority. With
their record for economic management in tatters and their reputation as upright
public servants tarnished, Japanese public servants have retreated into the
background. Mr Pokarier maintained that basically, ‘the markets and individuals
discount anything public officials say these days because they have heard it
all before’.[127]
They have become increasingly reluctant to take risks thus making policy
formulation more difficult. One commentator observed:
With public attention focusing on their past failures,
bureaucrats have great incentives to avoid further policy mistakes. In
addition, turmoil in the political arena makes the bureaucrats more cautious:
absent strong political leadership and direction, bureaucrats are reluctant to
advocate bold actions or solutions. In short, those who have been expecting new
policy directions from the bureaucracy are likely to continue to be
disappointed.[128]
The bureaucracy—protecting their
patch
4.113
But there is a far more potent force within the
bureaucracy stifling any move for reform—conflict of interest. In essence, the
process of deregulation rests with the regulators themselves. Over time members
of the bureaucracy have built up a system that serves their interests and they
resist measures likely to weaken their influence. Messrs Lonny Carlie and Mark
Tilton, were not alone in voicing their scepticism at the sincerity of the
motives behind the reform measures. They wrote in 1996, ‘As presently
constituted, deregulation is being advanced largely at the discretion of the
bureaucracy—the very party whose powers would be reduced by the process—and for
that reason it is unlikely to be pushed forward with great enthusiasm or
haste’.[129]
4.114
Dr George Mulgan reinforced this point. She
maintained that because each ministry or agency has the primary responsibility
for deregulation they decide what is relevant or redundant. She stressed:
As a result, it is possible for ministry officials to keep major
regulatory powers unto themselves by relinquishing those that are less central
to their own interests and to slow the pace of change by offering up only small
numbers of reforms at each step in the deregulation process...[130]
4.115
With the interests of the bureaucracy
intertwined in the regulatory process; officials would have to measure any
deregulatory proposal against its potential to harm their interests and thus
would tend to favour the status quo.[131]
The iron triangle
4.116
But this self-interest has another dimension.
Not only are separate elements within the economic system such as government
and sectors of the bureaucracy pulling against reform but there is a fusion of
interests of government, business and the bureaucracy, sometimes referred to as
Japan Inc., blocking change. This powerful interlocking of mutual interests has
led to the entrenchment of an economic system where each element within the
system cooperates with the other in preserving and further promoting their
benefits.
4.117
In arguing this point, Dr George Mulgan
explained that the three primary sets of beneficiaries—the authorised
participants (producers and/or other business interests making
administratively-sanctioned profits), bureaucrats (maintaining untrammelled
regulatory powers and retirement jobs in semi-governmental regulatory
institutions and private sector business) and politicians (obtaining political
funding from protected industries)—form an iron triangle with a strong common
interest in resisting pressure for change.
4.118
She argued:
The lack of enthusiasm for deregulation amongst many Japanese
politicians derives from their interdependency relationship with the vested
interests which have grown up around the rents and benefits that regulatory
systems provide...sectoral interests rely on politicians to act as brokers on
their behalf in order to extract, maintain or increase rents and income
supports from administrators. The most powerful brokers cluster together in LDP
policy tribes (zoku) with connections to specific sets of sectoral
interests, and with the connivance of the bureaucracy, harness rents and other
benefits as political goods for distribution to their supporters. In exchange
they receive electoral goods such as political funding and voting support.[132]
She further noted that ‘While Diet members might express
support for deregulation as a general principle, if a particular item of
deregulation appears to threaten an interest they represent, they will
staunchly oppose it’.[133]
4.119
As this interdependency between the distinct
economic entities evolved into a stable and long-term structure, so did a
support network of sub-structures that further buttress and entrench the
system. Inter-company relationships, cross-shareholdings, a main bank system,
labour-management relations, the legal framework and a regulatory system that
includes administrative guidance work to lock-in the present system.[134]
4.120
Witnesses agreed that a
political-bureaucratic-vested interest triangle is at the very centre of all
Japanese regulatory systems and obstructs far-reaching efforts to deregulate
the Japanese economy. They argued that regulation encouraged collusion between
bureaucratic regulators and protected industries by institutionalising their
common interests.[135]
Dr George Mulgan noted:
...integral to regulatory regimes are the numerous
extra-ministerial groups (gaikaku dantai) and public corporations
spawned by the ministries and agencies of government...In most cases, these
groups established on the basis of regulations provide lucrative
post-retirement posts for officials through the process of ‘descending from
heaven’.[136]
4.121
The intricate, strong and wide-ranging web of
interdependency between the various components of the economic system make it
impervious to outside pressure to change. As Michael Backman explained:
The nexus between big business, the bureaucracy, and the LDP is
one that is complex and mutually reinforcing—so much so that it is scarcely
possible to treat each of the three as distinct entities. And the mutually
reinforcing nature of the relationships means that attempts to reform any one
pillar of the structure represent a direct attack on all the sections. It
simply isn’t possible to rope off one part of Japan Inc., remodel it, and then
move on to the next part. The interconnectedness of the system of client-patron
relationships means that it is all or nothing. So any attempt at reform, even
if relatively minor, is met with resistance from the entire establishment as
each part moves to safeguard its self-interest.[137]
Agriculture—vested interests meld
with tradition values
4.122
Within Japan’s political system, farmers have
stood out as a particularly powerful sector. Many agricultural organisations,
particularly Nokyo, are directly represented in the Diet by politicians who
hold or have held official positions in the agricultural cooperatives and who
are expected to deliver benefits to their agricultural supporters.[138] This sector also shows how
strongly vested interests and traditional beliefs are interlocked and mutually
reinforcing in Japan’s economic structure.
Reform in the face of
opposition
Chinks in the armour
4.123
The iron triangle stands as a major obstacle to
reform in Japan. Despite its ability to resist outside influences, the pressure
for change is starting to weigh heavily on this formidable power structure. The
three elements to the triangle are beginning to buckle under the forces pushing
for change.
4.124
First, the bureaucracy, which has strongly
resisted reform in its endeavour to head off any encroachment on its power is
showing signs of strain. The links between the administration and business, so
long regarded as integral to the success of the economic system, are now seen as
a liability and an obstacle to the development of the economy.
4.125
The growing public awareness of the failings
within the administration poses a threat to its cosy world. The exposure of
impropriety has eroded its credibility and given weight to pubic criticism.[139] Clearly, the bureaucracy has
lost status. Scandals involving some bureaucrats have tarnished the aura of
distinction they once enjoyed and diminished their stature as public servants
who put the national interest above their own.[140] This power group is no longer
above reproach, and has had to suffer the indignity of public probing into its
affairs. With its competency in doubt and its probity under question, it seems
likely that the bureaucracy will be more receptive to change—more likely to bow
to pressure than resist it.[141]
In summary, the growing distrust of elite bureaucrats is eroding this major
barrier to the reform process.[142]
Practical business—surviving in the
market place
4.126
Secondly, the belief that the economy must be
released from old managerial practices is strengthening. The perception of
Japan’s economic system as outmoded and in need of reform is becoming sharper.
The Japanese people are beginning to question the deeply ingrained ‘production
first’ and anti-competition principles introduced with Japan’s ‘catch-up’
system.[143]
4.127
Tolerance for the coddled domestic sector of
Japan’s two-tiered economy is wearing thin. International highly productive
companies are no longer prepared to carry the protected home industries that
enjoy special benefits under a huge array of rules and regulations. Such
practices drive up production costs and undermine the competitiveness of
successful export industries. In Japan, the market place is driving reform as
shown earlier in the move away from seniority-based wages and lifetime
employment. Market forces are pushing their way into the system and practical
business sense dictates that change must take place if business is to survive.
Many Japanese firms can no longer ignore global competition and have little
choice but to go along with global standards. They have to shift from the old
management system to one compatible with global practices.[144] Keidanren argued that the
economy of Japan was in such a grave situation and the dislocations coming out
of the economic crisis were pressuring business, ‘indeed, the economy itself—to
drastically restructure and rationalise their operations’.[145]
4.128
A situation has developed in Japan in which pure
business considerations now take precedence over the old-style emphasis on
close human relationships and attachment to traditions and habits that are far
removed from the values of today’s corporate world.[146] The growing urgency to make
adjustments to changed circumstances has begun to replace the complacency, the
lack of commitment and even the natural inclination to stay with the familiar.
Mr Chester Dawson noted:
For years, board rooms in Tokyo delayed making painful choices
in the hope that a strong tide of economic recovery would lift the country. But
after nearly a decade in the doldrums, the prospects for a return to the boom
years of the 1980s remain dim. Now, pressure for reform may finally be nearing
critical mass after years of losses and amid increased competition resulting
from deregulation.[147]
4.129
The recession has given added incentive for businesses
in Japan denied opportunities for growth because of existing regulations to
lobby for reform. These enterprises can see the gains to be made from a market
more open to international trade and investment. They can see the need to
become better managed and are jettisoning traditional management practices.
Business leaders frustrated at being beaten in international competition can no
longer wear unnecessarily high costs born of domestic inefficiencies. Japan’s
corporate giants are demanding reform. Moreover, they are no longer waiting for
government and the bureaucracy to make the difficult changes. They see the
urgent need to adjust and are proceeding to do so.[148]
4.130
Put simply, Japanese companies, facing
globalization, rapid advances in information technology, and other changes in
the economic environment amidst continuing domestic economic stagnation, are
compelled to radically restructure their operations.[149] Managers are taking a long
hard look at their business and some are now taking the lead. Nissan’s
announcement of its ambitious corporate remodelling plan in October 1999,
indicated that corporate Japan was finally accepting that it had no other
alternative—to survive it must restructure. The chief operating officer for
Nissan admitted that the restructuring plan, which involved the establishment
of a performance-based career advancement program and the closure of three
assembly plants and two powertrains operations, was ‘born of desperation’.[150]
4.131
The banking sector also demonstrates how
business is embracing reform in its struggle to survive in the market place.
Financial reform, which facilitated a series of bank mergers in 1999, has begun
to redefine banking in Japan. It has allowed the entry of foreign companies
into Japan and intensified competition.[151]
A number of major banks have responded to the changing climate by
restructuring. In May 1999, the Mitsui Trust & Banking Co. Ltd and the Chuo
Trust & Banking Co, Ltd announced a proposed merger. The board of directors
of both banks acknowledged that in the context of the ‘Big Bang’ financial
reforms, Japan’s economic environment and its financial industry has been
changing rapidly. They believed that their organisation must build a solid
management foundation that could withstand shifts in the environment.[152]
4.132
In August 1999, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Fuji Bank
and the Industrial Bank of Japan announced an alliance that would form the
world’s biggest bank. As part of the restructure, the new group announced its
intention to downsize its work force by 6,000 within five years and to commit
itself to create and develop a fair human resource management system in which
individuals would be evaluated on their level of expertise and job performance.
They stated that the group would invest in strategically important areas such
as information technology development.[153]
In October 1999, the Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank announced plans to merge.
This quest for greater efficiency and improved competitiveness in the banking
sector is forcing massive restructuring.[154]
4.133
Moreover, the entry of foreign companies
offering wider choices and better services is pushing change. In February 1998,
Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., announced its intention to establish a nationwide
network of private client offices in Japan. The company began to hire and train
approximately 2,000 people, most of whom worked for the former Yamaichi
Securities Company. The president of Merrill Lynch Japan Securities announced
that ‘we look forward to helping fulfil the objectives of the Big Bang
financial reforms in Japan which include increased competition and greater
choice for investors’.[155]
4.134
The recessionary environment has also given
consumers a renewed concern for value for money and they are now less inclined
instinctively to prefer Japanese products before foreign products. The economic
downturn has encouraged heavy discounting by retailers and introduced consumers
to lower priced, good quality foreign products. This has added to the
competitive pressures already at work in the domestic market.[156]
4.135
Mr Michael Hirsh, Business Editor for Newsweek,
and Mr E. Keith Henry from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Japan
Program, argued that the cutthroat competition has undermined the old
cartelized relationship between manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers—the
‘price-it-high-at-home-and-dump-it-abroad system’, at the heart of Japan Inc.,
no longer functions. Consumers now refuse to pay high prices at home to
subsidise inefficient producers.[157]
4.136
The need to survive in an increasing competitive
world has forced change and there appears to be no going back. International
business organisations involved in trade and investment, particularly those in
financial and capital markets, have no choice but to have their operations
conform to international standards. The practice adopted by the leading
businesses and institutions in spearheading international competition will
inevitably affect domestic practices.[158]
Practical politics—surviving at the
polls
4.137
Thirdly, there is the political imperative for
change. Indeed, as the voice for reform grows louder and more strident, the
government’s response is likely to become more positive. Despite the
leadership’s lack of aggression and urgency in tackling economic restructuring,
reform is nevertheless under way, although in some respects, especially on the
economic front, it has not been as far-reaching nor as timely as some critics
believe is required.
4.138
The decision to deregulate rests inevitably with
the government. Although political parties may represent special interest
groups, they also have to take account of matters of growing importance to the
broader community and particularly to issues around which a national consensus
is building. As the call for reform gathers force in Japan, political leaders
see benefits in presenting themselves as credible agents of change. In a
democratic country, politicians who ignore these general trends in public
opinion, who do not heed the growing voice for reform over special interest
groups, do so at their own risk.[159]
4.139
As Mr Pokarier pointed out, ‘Regulatory reform,
as in all democracies with well-organised interest groups where the
constituencies for reform are stronger than those resisting, has proceeded
apace.’[160]
It would seem that in Japan the time has arrived when the push for reform is
gaining over the pull against it. Although there are the inevitable points of
political resistance from industries likely to suffer because of change, the
emerging support for economic reform will eat into such resistance.
4.140
According to Dr George Mulgan, government and
party leaders can be expected to take a more reformist stance as business and
the public grow increasingly strident in their demands.[161] Indeed, the reforms
introduced to rescue and to restructure the banking system stemmed from
overwhelming public and business pressure.
4.141
Many commentators have noted the tendency for
government to respond only when confronted with immediate problems. For
example, the failure of major financial institutions in November 1997 provided
a jolt that prompted the administration to take decisive action to resolve
problems in the banking sector and gave the Big Bang reforms a sharp nudge. Mr
Arthur Alexander observed that these financial failures introduced an element
into economic policymaking in Japan that had been absent until then—utter fear.
He stated:
Political, bureaucratic and popular reactions led to strategies
to inject public funds into rescuing depositors and recapitalizing banks. The
new policies also resulted in the closure of several insolvent institutions,
albeit with great reluctance on the part of bureaucrats and mainstream
politicians alike.[162]
4.142
Clearly, the Japanese Government was forced to
deal with the bad debt issue—prevarication was no longer an option.[163] Throughout 1999, the
Financial Revitalization Commission, on finding a number of banks in financial
difficulties, directed that their operations and the management of their assets
be placed under financial reorganisation administrators. Although highlighting
the seriousness of problems in the banking sector, the actions of the
Commission nevertheless sent a loud and unmistakable statement of the
government’s determination to clean up the banking mess.[164]
4.143
To summarise Japan’s predicament, Mr Ken Curtis,
Managing Director, Deutsche Bank Group, explained:
...Japan is now squeezed in the vice of demographics; a very
quickly ageing Japan; debt, deflation, the enormously disruptive pressure that
comes from the new technologies, global competition. And so the whole thing now
is pushing and this country is in a massive pressure cooker, and that’s what’s
forcing the change.[165]
4.144
In brief, the process of deregulation is likely
to gather force because of the continuing recession and because of increasing
pressure both from within Japan and abroad for more radical change. Competition
in the market place is driving reform. The Japanese people are beginning to
feel more confident about putting their money into overseas financial
institutions, and are demanding better service from their bankers and brokers.[166] Deregulation and increased
competition have certainly undermined the highly regulated system.
4.145
Nonetheless, the tension between the different
vested groups within Japan will continue to tug the government in different
directions. The Economist Intelligence Unit observed in early 2000 that with
the next lower house election drawing closer, the government had started to
step back from economic reforms, fearful of their impact on its key supporters.[167]
4.146
The bureaucracy, government and business as
individual entities and together as the dominant power structure in Japan are
finding the pressure to reform compelling. The links between them have for a
long time controlled the ability of foreign firms to do business in Japan but
their influence has been weakened.[168]
4.147
Some fear, however, that rather than an overall
opening of markets, regulatory reform in Japan will lead to ‘selective market
openings based on a combination of strategic concerns, the political clout of
certain factions of business, market factors, and pressure from foreign
governments’. As Mr Mark Tilton argued, ‘managed deregulation will simply
substitute for managed markets’.[169]
Undoubtedly, reform in Japan will follow a course determined by a range of
factors, including the influence of factional interests and economic
imperatives. Nonetheless, the push for reform is gathering strength.
The momentum of change
4.148
The forces resisting change in Japan are lined
up against a powerful array of counter forces that are gradually but surely
gaining ground. Change which requires the application of concerted pressure
because of the strength and resistance of domestic vested interests in Japan is
not only occurring but is gaining momentum. In many cases, the course is fixed.
The banking sector reform provides an example of where reform and market
imperatives have joined forces to reshape the financial landscape in Japan.
4.149
Having introduced reform, the process is
difficult to reverse. Thus, although reform has been implemented piecemeal over
the last ten years, it has set in train a process that is gathering force and
appears irreversible. Put simply, reform will be difficult to pull back as it
gathers momentum. Peter Hartcher pointed out that where the government has
succeeded in clawing back resistance from vested interests and made some
inroads into the regulatory web choking Japanese economic activity, there has
been an upsurge in activity. The relaxation of regulations governing
telecommunications and retailing saw growth in the freer environment. Even
marginal relaxation of regulations has produced major changes.[170] Minister Taichi Sakaiya
recently noted:
The major reforms in the financial system have shaken the very
foundation of the vertical ‘keiretsu’ corporate groupings centered around large
financial institutions, and this trend will only intensify from next year as
the integration and mergers of the nation’s principal financial institutions
that have already been announced are implemented.
At the same time, the corporate ‘keiretsu’ affiliations linking
major manufacturers and general contractors with their subcontractors are
rapidly dissipating. Having been separated from their financial ‘keiretsu’
affiliates, manufacturers and general contractors are now facing harsh price
competition, forcing them to procure parts more quickly and at lower prices.[171]
4.150
Moreover, the low economic growth rate has been
an important stimulus for change. Increased competition in Japan has
transformed the market place. Consumers are beginning to see the benefits to be
gained from lower prices and wider choices and have become far more discriminating.
4.151
Japan has been walking on the edge of change for
some time. It seems as though it now, however reluctantly, has stepped onto the
road toward a more market-based and competitive society. How far it travels
along this route and at what pace it chooses to proceed will have a bearing on
Australia’s relationship with Japan. Australia and Japan have been partners for
many years and Australia will have to take close note of the changes taking
place in Japan so that it can support Japan through its transition and ensure
that their partnership will continue to develop and grow.
Recommendation
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government
take this opportunity to reaffirm its long-term and sincere commitment to the
Australia-Japan partnership.
Navigation: Previous Page | Contents | Next Page