CHAPTER 3
RESTRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING SERVICES: OVERSEAS
AND IN AUSTRALIA
Introduction
3.1 In the first part of this chapter, we describe proposals to restructure
the BBC World Service and close Radio Canada International (RCI), which
arose out of funding stringencies, and their outcomes. It is interesting
to note that these two international broadcasters and Radio Australia
were all subject to serious cuts in service or closure at about the
same time. With respect to the BBC World Service and RCI, their governments
accepted the foreign policy imperatives for maintaining their services.
3.2 We then describe the history of the main inquiries to which RA
and ATV have been subjected. This history helps to put the current predicament
of RA and ATV into context.
Overseas Restructuring
BBC World Service
3.3 In June 1996, the BBC announced a package of restructuring measures
for the World Service. In July 1996, a joint Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth
Office/World Service Working Group was set up to consider the detail
and implications of proposed restructuring and review of funding arrangements
for BBC World Service. The report of the Working Group, however, was
not final, with criticism of the proposed changes prompting further
discussion. Finally, a funding shortfall was averted which could have
involved the closure of up to six language services. In fact, funding
was increased by 3.1 per cent over the previous year, which also represented
an increase in real terms.
3.4 The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, which monitored
the restructuring and funding processes, commented:
We welcome the increased provision for World Service grant-in-aid
for broadcasting and the firm assurances that no closures of language
services will be needed. We also welcome the fact that the settlement
will enable the World Service to make investments most critical to maintaining
competitiveness. We believe it is right to link additional financial
provision in subsequent years to clear evidence of savings and increased
efficiency. [1]
3.5 The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee argued strongly
against any diminution of the World Service:
We also reiterate the crucial importance of ensuring that restructuring
does not lead to any diminution in the quality of the World Service
or any loss of its unique expertise and ethos. It is essential that
the World Service remains at the cutting edge of United Kingdom cultural
diplomacy and a key element in creating a favourable climate for the
pursuit of United Kingdom economic, political and security interests.
We are pleased to note the Foreign Secretary's endorsement of the essential
need for the World Service to be able to continue to play its very important
role, to maintain the quality of its output, to continue to meet its
targets and objectives and provide value for money. [2]
Radio Canada International (RCI)
3.6 During the same period, Radio Canada International (RCI) was experiencing
serious financial shortfalls. In 1995, its parent organisation, the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) was to have its operating budget reduced
by A$394 million over three years, a reduction of 33 per cent resulting
in a 50 per cent loss of staff. [3] At
the same time as these substantial cuts were made, an emphasis was placed
on improving CBC's domestic broadcasting services. It was decided that
RCI's 51 year broadcasting life would come to an end on 31 March 1997.
The Government was also considering possible participation of the private
sector in delivering international broadcasting services. [4]
3.7 On 14 December 1996, Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy announced
a plan in the Canadian House of Commons that would keep Radio Canada International
afloat for one year: the Departments of Heritage Canada and of Foreign
Affairs and international Trade would contribute $6 million each and additional
money would come from the Department of Defence and the Canadian International
Development Agency. [5]
3.8 The RCI submission to this inquiry reports that RCI now has a commitment
from the Government for long-term separate funding. No longer part of
CBC, RCI stated that the organisation will retain its 'traditional journalistic
independence' operating at 'arms length' from Government as before, but
now as part of a Crown Corporation. At the same time, it will be taking
a prominent role in 'Canada's diplomatic effort through an "International
Information Strategy" or "softpower" projection of information
in the national interest'. [6]
3.9 On 12 December 1996, the Hon Sheila Copps, Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Canadian Cultural Heritage, announced that RCI would be
funded as a 'long term service which is part and parcel of the Government's
foreign policy thrust … [as] a key cornerstone in foreign policy
information'. [7] Official ties between
Government foreign policy and the organisation's operations were therefore
explicitly made, moving RCI's operations into line with the British system.
Relationship between international broadcasters and their governments
3.10 International broadcasting services operated by Britain and the
USA are, to varying degrees, officially tied to the foreign policy objectives
of the Governments of those countries. American international information
services are under direct control of the US State Department while the
BBC World Service, established by Royal Charter, operates with funding
received from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The BBC World Service
is thus required by that Office to broadcast:
to such audiences overseas and in such languages as are approved
by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, in accordance
with the objectives, priorities and targets which may from time to time
be agreed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, or with such Departments
of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as may from time to
time be specified in writing by the Secretary of State. [8]
3.11 It should be emphasised, however, that the BBC World Service maintains
complete editorial control over programming.
3.12 By contrast, Radio Canada International, prior to the implementation
of the new arrangements had, like Radio Australia, a history as part of
an independent statutory broadcasting authority, established as such by
an Act of Parliament to provide national broadcasting services. [9]
Funding for international broadcasting services were drawn from within
the overall budget of the parent organisation. When that funding was cut,
support for international services came under scrutiny with resultant
pressure to either privatise or find other means of funding.
3.13 The Canadian example has resonances for the future structure of
Australian international broadcasting services. [10]
Canada's international radio services now follow the British model, offering
on the one hand a 'guaranteed editorial freedom' and, on the other, the
requirement that it follows the broad policy directives of its funding
agents, the departments responsible for foreign affairs and Canadian heritage.
Responsibility for and Funding of Radio Australia
3.14 Debate over the proper sources of funding and allocation of responsibility
for Radio Australia has been a feature of its operational history. The
close relationship which international broadcasting services have had
with departments responsible for international relations has been a
source of considerable tension in the Australian debate and has given
rise to a series of reviews and government inquiries.
3.15 During the Second World War, a notable conflict between the objectives
of the Department of Information and the Australian Broadcasting Commission
occurred over a joint Department/ABC series about the Japanese broadcast
in March 1942. While collaborating extensively in its programming at home
and overseas, the ABC in its 1942-43 report referred to its 'difference
of opinion' with certain Government departments on the manner in which
some types of propaganda should be handled. Using that series as example
it opined that: '... serious loss to the war-time effectiveness of our
national stations would result from any undermining ... [of public confidence
in the ABC's] impartiality and integrity.' [11]
3.16 The degree of interaction between the desire to maintain journalistic
'impartiality and integrity' and the need to respond to foreign policy
objectives, was an explicit or implicit component in the debate over
the following decades.
3.17 In 1964 and 1965 the possibility of Radio Australia being a separate
statutory authority, as a variant on the British model, was considered
by the Department of External Affairs. But this proposal was called into
question in a draft paper 'Location of Radio Australia', prepared by a
senior departmental officer, who 'said it might "take some time to
achieve the desirable end of a separate institution"'. He indicated
that time would be needed for Radio Australia to accept the Department
of External Affairs' uncompromising views on the fundamental difference
between the requirements for external and internal broadcasting: 'that
the considerations which govern the presentation of programmes of the
news on one are not necessarily valid for the other'. [12]
3.18 In 1973, Mr Peter Homfray, then head of Radio Australia and increasingly
frustrated by a perceived unwillingness on the part of the ABC to fund
the service adequately, proposed to the Minister for the Media, Senator
Douglas McClelland, that RA could become a separate statutory authority
under his Department. [13]
3.19 Accordingly, in April 1973, Senator Douglas McClelland wrote to
Prime Minister Gough Whitlam suggesting that Radio Australia should be
put directly under his ministerial responsibility and be attached to the
Department of the Media. The Prime Minister rejected the American model
option saying that Radio Australia must be able to demonstrate its 'comparative
freedom from direct Government control'. [14]
3.20 Over time, consideration of the cost factors involved in maintaining
international broadcasting services, either as part of the ABC, affiliated
with another department, or as a separate entity, increasingly dominated
discussion of the role and functions of RA.
3.21 In February 1975, the Public Service Board/ABC Inquiry into Radio
Australia again considered the option of placing Radio Australia with
the Department of Media (but as an autonomous unit). It was concluded,
however, that this would incur the same administrative and cost obstacles
involved in establishing complete independence. This latter option was
regarded by the inquiry as 'a last resort'. [15]
Later, in December 1975, the ABC submission to the Waller Inquiry also
rejected the possibility of RA becoming a separate statutory authority.
It suggested that although an independent board of directors would be
desirable, the establishment costs would be 'exceedingly high'. [16]
3.22 During the 1980s, a number of experienced commentators, all former
diplomats and former high ranking Defence and/or Foreign Affairs officers,
expressed severe criticisms of Radio Australia. Sir Arthur Tange, Mr William
Pritchett and Mr Malcolm Booker all considered the idea of an international
radio service operating on the premise of journalistic freedom was extremely
questionable. [17]
3.23 In 1988, all three made explicit statements to that effect, also
querying the cost effectiveness of RA's operations. Australian taxpayers,
in their view, were being tricked into supporting, as Mr Pritchett put
it, 'a small independent bureaucracy of journalists'. [18]
For Mr Booker, it was this group who, by their naive insistence on
a 'warts and all' approach to overseas reporting, caused regional disharmony
and embarrassment to Australia. At interview he later concluded: 'You
can't engender good will by exposing the deficiencies of your neighbours
and their governments. If you want to engender goodwill, it's a highly
expert propaganda exercise.' [19]
3.24 Sir Arthur Tange saw that a possible, but qualified, reason for
continued Radio Australia services could lie:
… in the circumstances in which Australian official policy
or the conduct of Australian diplomacy, the conduct of Australian
defence relations, was impeded by ignorance abroad, in societies with
whose governments we were dealing, of Australian motivations and Australia's
intentions - was impeded by misunderstandings such as we had, to use
an historical analogy, of Australia's white Australia policy: that
certainly was an obstacle 20 or 30 years ago.
3.25 He, nevertheless, concluded:
I doubt today that we have those obstacles residing in the minds
of countries with which we do official business. So the question arises:
why do we need Radio Australia? [20]
Major Inquiries of the 1980s and 1990s
3.26 In the 1980s and early 1990s, a number of major inquiries were
conducted into Australia's international broadcasting services and their
parent organisation, the ABC.
The Dix Report (1981)
3.27 In 1979, the then Government established a committee to conduct
a major review of the ABC. The committee, which was chaired by businessmen
Mr Alexander Dix, presented its report, The ABC in Review: National Broadcasting
in the 1980s, to the Minister for Communications, Mr Sinclair in May 1981.
The recommendations of the report, known as the Dix Report, were largely
implemented and resulted in the organisation which we know today. [21]
3.28 After receiving over 2,200 submissions and conducting hearings in
all states, the Dix inquiry noted that the organisation must respond to
the changed demography of Australian society. He emphasised the need to
move from an English bias in programming towards a model reflecting the
diversity of Australian society, including rural and remote, multicultural
and Aboriginal content. He rated the importance of news and current affairs
programming very highly and noted that restrictions on revenue coincided
with increased costs for program production. He thus recommended: broad
management restructuring (a corporate structure and outlook); an emphasis
on regionalism; greater commitment to Australian content (with an emphasis
on complementarity [22]); and, funding
support from program-related merchandising (resulting in the ABC shops
etc) and possibly from limited sponsorship. Dix also suggested that the
ABC should be relieved of its responsibility for orchestras and that the
states should fund educational programs. [23]
3.29 The Dix Report was convinced of the value of Radio Australia as
Australia's international presence and recommended that its status be
enhanced. One aspect of this was the upgrade which would result from
the ABC having control of its radio transmission facilities (still under
control of the National Transmission Agency). The clause for provision
of international services was to be included in the ABC's charter (within
the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act 1983) and the service would
be operated by the ABC with separate funding. The report had rejected
the possibility that Radio Australia be incorporated within a government
department saying:
it has become part of the conventional wisdom in Australia that
a service guaranteed independence from direct government control by
statute is bound to have more credibility with its audience than one
operated by a government department, as is the Voice of America. It
is a wisdom we share. [24]
Radio Australia Review [The Revill Review], (1989)
3.30 In response to a discussion paper, Policy Discussion Paper No
1 issued in early 1988 by the Minister for Transport and Communications,
Senator Gareth Evans, a major review of Radio Australia was announced
in November 1988.
3.31 The ABC Committee of Review, convened by Mr Stuart Revill and
assisted by Dr Rodney Tiffen as consultant, was appointed to inquire
into the role of Radio Australia within the ABC and to evaluate its
general performance in serving its target audience. It produced its
report, the Radio Australia Review, in August 1989.
3.32 The report found that Radio Australia services should continue,
and as part of the ABC. [25] It noted
that Radio Australia had been severely disadvantaged by lack of control
of its transmission facilities and, therefore, by its inability to upgrade
facilities in line with its competitors and by prohibitions on transmitting
off-shore and on contracting sharing of transmission time (as prescribed
by the National Transmission Authority Act). The report noted that figures
of comparative investment by governments were striking: over the preceding
five years, the BBC spent approximately $A120 million on its Audibility
Program, Voice of America spent roughly $A490 million, while less than
$3 million had been spent on RA's transmission from 1984-85 to 1988-89.
[26] Relative investment in transmission
facilities was, therefore, enormously disparate. [27]
3.33 The report stated that Federal Government funding was urgently needed
to upgrade RA's transmission facilities and that the ABC should have ownership
and control of RA's transmitters. At the same time, it noted that these
same problems had thwarted RA for years, as a 'parade of official reports'
had concluded. The Revill Review recommended 'urgent remedial action'
so that Radio Australia could be restored to a competitive position in
its target regions. [28]
3.34 As part of this enhanced profile, RA was also to advance its impact
on the Asia Pacific region, with the South West Pacific a priority. This
was in part because of growing instability in the region. As advised by
the Department of Foreign Affairs submission to the inquiry, there were
'internal tensions (eg. Fiji, New Caledonia and Vanuatu) and an increased
external interest that in some circumstances, could potentially destabilise
the region in ways inimical to Australian interests'. [29]
The report also referred to the South Pacific region's reliance on RA
for 'consistently reliable information on Pacific and international affairs',
the former not being offered by other main international broadcasters.
[30] For this focus to evolve, however,
the report recommended that restructuring, management and transmission
commitment to broadcasting in the region was vitally necessary. [31]
It noted that despite the ABC Board's directive of 1988 that the South
West Pacific should be given priority ahead of South East Asia, such commitment
had not yet been evinced by the organisation. [32]
3.35 Despite certain operational weaknesses the overall profile of Radio
Australia presented by the report was, however, strongly positive. Audience
response had shown that RA had continued to attract large audiences who
were satisfied with its services. Although some decline in audiences was
noted, short-wave was confirmed as an appropriate broadcasting medium
for its majority target areas, particularly the Pacific, while recommendations
were made for more advanced technologies for audiences in, for example,
Japan. [33] The report thus directed
that the organisation must see itself as an 'international communicator,
rather than as an international short-wave broadcaster alone' and recommended
regular review of programming schedules to keep focus on developments
in the targeted regions.
3.36 Finally, Radio Australia's independence from direct control of the
Department of Foreign Affairs was seen as crucial. The report noted that
insistence on this was echoed broadly by the submissions received. [34]
The review committee's conclusion, too, was that Radio Australia's independent
broadcasting status, as part of an independent Australian Broadcasting
Corporation, was a demonstration to its audience that Australia was the
democratic nation it projected itself to be: 'a nation which allows an
open flow of information, which nurtures debate on policy and holds its
government accountable through close critical examination of its actions.'
[35]
Radio Australia Review 1994-95
3.37 In 1995, Radio Australia was revisited by Dr Rod Tiffen in an independent
review resulting in the Radio Australia Review 1994/95. The review aimed
to assess broadly what were the implications of changes in the broadcasting
environment for RA's services and to evaluate RA's response to the recommendations
made in the 1989 review. For the first time, the desirability of RA providing
television services was seriously canvassed. [36]
3.38 In his review, Dr Tiffen attempted to ascertain whether the audiences
for short-wave services, particularly in RA's targeted areas, had been
maintained. Acknowledging the unreliability of surveys conducted over
the last couple of decades with their wildly divergent assessments, [37]
he noted that audience reception was down in Indonesia and that RA's relative
position had declined, especially as compared with the BBC. [38]
He remarked, however, that the opposite was true for the Pacific, an area
to which RA had applied itself in accordance with recommendations made
in the 1989 Revill review. [39] In particular,
Dr Tiffen reported that audiences in Papua New Guinea had dramatically
increased, so much so that RA's regular listenership there was substantially
ahead of both the BBC and VOA. [40]
3.39 Dr Tiffen's overall judgement about the future of short-wave radio
was positive. Despite evident developments in communication and reception
technologies in the Asian region, he speculated that this development
was likely to be a metropolitan one only, with correspondingly increased
short-wave reception in provincial and rural areas not surveyed. [41]
He also observed that new developments did not mean that older technologies
disappeared, rather that total media consumption increased. [42]
The direction was thus for an increase rather than winding down of RA's
services. Short-wave radio was a cost effective medium for reaching the
largest audiences, and its potential during political crises, as illustrated
during the coups in Fiji and the protests in China, was an important factor
when considering future directions for RA. [43]
3.40 Dr Tiffen raised the question of whether RA should diversify its
operations by moving into television but not, however, in direct competition
with ATV. Should such a move be made, Dr Tiffen considered that it should
be in indigenous languages, not in English. He also warned that it be
conducted in a measured way which did not endanger the value of its
current operations.
3.41 A major consideration for RA, as ever, remained the 'institutional
absurdity' of RA's transmission arrangements. [44]
Despite the directives made in the 1983 ABC Charter, and the repeated
recommendations made in following reviews, Dr Tiffen reported that RA
remained locked into a triangular arrangement with Telecom Australia and
the National Transmission Authority, and was denied funds and control
over its transmission. The review noted, once again, that this had to
end, emphasising that 'this is the single most important objective in
changing government policy towards RA'. [45]
3.42 Related to this were other budgetary considerations; the organisation
had experienced disproportionate cuts to its budget relative to other
ABC functions. [46] At the same time,
it had moved to new ABC premises at Southbank incurring large re-establishment
costs.
Our ABC: Report of the Senate Select Committee on ABC Management and
Operations (1995)
3.43 During 1994-95, a Senate Select Committee conducted an inquiry
into a number of areas of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, including
Australia Television. The original terms of the inquiry were agreed
to by the Senate on 21 September 1994 but were amended and expanded
on 13 October 1994. The Committee was chaired by then Shadow Minister
for Communications, Senator Richard Alston. Its report, Our ABC: Report
of the Senate Select Committee on ABC Management and Operations was
released in March 1995.
3.44 The terms of reference for the inquiry encompassed a wide range
of issues, including the performance of ATV in gaining an audience in
Asia, whether sponsorship undermined ATV's integrity and the financial
future of ATV.
3.45 The Select Committee reported that it:
accepts that the ABC's decision to rely on existing data on
audiences and the 'Assessment of Opportunity' it commissioned from
PA Consulting as its pre-launch research was reasonable. The Committee
notes that, after almost two years of transmission, the ABC now has
the results of actual audience surveys from Indonesia and Sri Lanka
which register ATV's daily audience at 150 000 and 500 000 respectively.
There is also an increasing body of anecdotal evidence which indicates
that the service is being received with approval by its target audience.
The Committee believes that as the service is more firmly established,
and as more data on audience share become available, ATV will have more
success in attracting sponsors. [47]
3.46 However, the Select Committee concluded that the ABC was not realistic
in its initial revenue projections and that, had it accepted a longer
lead time for the establishment of the service, ATV would not have been
put in a position where unrealistic forecasts were inevitably unfulfilled
and the viability of the service questioned. [48]
3.47 The Select Committee reported that the Government's Hutchinson and
Barrett review [49] had concluded that
the extension of the line of credit to ATV had not represented diversion
of funds for other services and that as long as they were repaid with
interest, it would not do so. [50] This
accorded with the statement of the Chief Executive of ATV, Mr Michael
Mann, who told the Committee that 'Based on our current conservative 10
per cent increase in sponsorship, we will break even in 1999. Repayment
of the line of credit would not occur till some years later.' [51]
3.48 In conclusion, the ABC conceded that, if appropriation funds were
not to be used after June 1995, 'additional sources of bridging finance
may be necessary'. [52] This, however,
was not seen to be inappropriate by the ABC, as the Chairman of the ABC
Board, Professor Mark Armstrong, confirmed to the Minister for Communications
and Arts, Mr Michael Lee. In a letter responding to the Minister, Professor
Armstrong emphasised that ATV was 'an important activity in the context
of [the ABC's] Charter' and that the 'ABC Board has never implied it was
a marginal activity'. He further stated:
It is the duty of the Board to set policy, allocate resources
and to ensure that the Charter functions are completed efficiently.
The introduction of the Australia Television service is entirely consistent
with these responsibilities [53]
3.49 The Select Committee considered 'allegations that the editorial
independence of the ABC is threatened by the requirements of BNA, ATV
and Pay TV to satisfy commercial sponsors, investors or clients'. [54]
No evidence was found that any editorial compromise had occurred as a
result of existing arrangements. However, the Select Committee stipulated
that, as a preventive measure, funding guarantees should be approved by
Parliament so that 'ATV will be eligible to make use of ABC's budget funds
[and] will be able to afford to lose a sponsor who makes the provision
of sponsorship funds subject to unacceptable conditions.' [55]
The Select Committee supported the principle of adequate funding for ATV:
The Committee recommends that when the ABC Board reviews the
ATV service in June 1996 it should make an assessment of the level of
government funding required to make up the difference between sponsorship
revenue and the amount required to operate the service. The Government
should then give serious consideration to including any such shortfall
in the ABC budget appropriation. [56]
3.50 With regard to general ABC funding, the Select Committee supported
the continued exemption of the two per cent efficiency dividend on the
grounds that it helped to 'provide greater planning certainty for the
ABC's capital works program'. [57] The
Select Committee also supported the maintenance of ABC funding at least
at its current level. [58]
Review of the Status and Funding of the ABC's International Broadcasting
Services (1995)
3.51 This review was conducted by an interdepartmental group consisting
of representatives of the Department of Communications and the Arts, the
Department of Finance and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
with the ABC. In the course of its inquiry it considered 60 written submissions
from interested individuals and organisations and submitted its report
in October 1995. [59] The impetus for
the review was the Government's continuing concern over the funding of
the ATV service. Despite the evidence and conclusions of the Barrett and
Hutchinson review, commissioned on 10 June 1994, recent revenue forecasts
for ATV suggested that the planned 1996-97 review of international broadcasting
services should urgently be brought forward. [60]
On 6 June 1995, the Minister for Communications and the Arts informed
Parliament of the revised schedule. At the same time, he advised that
the Government 'entered the review as a strong supporter of the contribution
which ATV has made in raising Australia's profile in the region'. [61]Timing
was also significant for other reasons. On 30 June 1995, the conditions
of the Government establishment grant of $5.4 million to ATV, as accepted
by ABC, were to lapse. These included clauses referring to the need for
the service to be self-funding in years subsequent to the grant period,
to run on sponsorship and promotional programming and to enter into consultative
arrangements with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. [62]In
supporting ATV, the Government had emphasised the need for the service
to operate on a commercial basis as soon as possible and to allow for
the show-casing of Australian trade, industry and tourism. [63]
Now that the conditional period had expired, the ABC could exercise its
option to close the service. The ABC decided to continue operation stating
that it saw the ATV as 'a valued and valuable part of the ABC, making
an important and valued and valuable contribution to the Australia's profile
in the important Asian region'. However, it also advised that it would
not continue the service at the expense of Radio Australia or other budget-funded
activities. [64]The Government therefore
had to consider overall cost considerations and other operational aspects
of the continuation of ATV services relative to ABC's other international
broadcasting service, Radio Australia. [65]
These were to be considered in the light of the functions of international
broadcasting services as contained in s.6(1)(b) of the Australian Broadcasting
Corporation Act which specified assessment of the importance of the foreign
relations dimension of the services. [66]The
review's conclusion was that ATV was not a viable satellite broadcaster
without additional resources [67] and
yet could not apparently deliver programming in the region other than
as a satellite broadcaster in its own right. [68]
The reviewers reported that, in mediation of this dilemma, both ABC and
DFAT saw potential for ATV in equity partnerships with investors (such
as other broadcasters, newspapers or newspaper organisations). [69]
However, DFAT was concerned that ATV should retain identity as 'a distinctly
Australian service'. [70] The ABC also
expressed reservations in regard to the sale of ATV news services because
of: 'risks to the integrity of ATV news should buyers seek to alter news
feeds to avoid adverse criticism from governments where buyers have strong
commercial interests'. [71] The ABC
further cautioned that even if guarantees were secured that ATV news would
be broadcast complete, 'such a guarantee would be impossible to monitor'.
[72]With regard to Radio Australia,
the report noted that while substantial investment in short-wave delivery
by other major international broadcasters had occurred over the last decade,
the predicted decline in short-wave use suggested that investment on that
scale in short-wave infrastructure could not be justified by an Australian
Government. [73] It thus recommended
that RA needed to 'develop further its role as an international communicator
and exploit alternative means of delivery to target regions' [74]
and to do so, the ABC was 'open' to pursue funding from Government in
the next budget triennium, commencing late 1996-97. [75]
Again, the organisation's need to control its transmission facilities
and transmission budget, so that it could use related contemporary broadcasting
mediums such as AM/FM rebroadcasting and satellite broadcasting, was pivotal
to RA's effectiveness. Accordingly, it was recommended that transmission
funding should be made over to the ABC. This time, however, the recommendation
was qualified by the Department of Foreign Affairs' suggestion that the
transaction should occur only with the proviso that the ABC should continue
its ATV service. [76]Specifically, the
Department of Foreign Affairs saw television as the major new medium for
reaching opinion makers in what it considered the priority regions of
Australian interest; East Asia followed by the South Pacific. [77]
It therefore favoured investment in ATV over Radio Australia. The ABC,
meanwhile, argued for a balance between television and radio services
which it believed should and would change over time. [78]
In defence of Radio Australia, ABC cited audience research which showed
that short-wave radio, including local language services, had enormous
impact in Asia and the Pacific. [79]Another
significant factor contributing to the report's assessment of the foreign
relations implications was that of the ABC international services' independent
status as guaranteed by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act. This
enshrined the consultative relationship between the Department of Foreign
Affairs and the ABC, whereby the ABC Board has independence from the Government
of the day in determining policies relative to the organisation's function.
The report concluded that 'A potential tension exists, therefore, between
the public diplomacy objectives of government and the ABC's editorial
independence'. [80]The Department of
Finance considered the fact that the 'ABC would continue to retain discretion
to depart from the Government's objectives' was a major flaw in the 'structural
arrangements' of Australia's delivery of international services. [81]
Further, the Department believed that the review had failed to assess
the effectiveness of the services in advancing Australia's international
objectives relative to the expense already committed in DFAT's diplomatic
effort, some $750 million in 1995-96. The Department of Finance therefore
determined that the Government needed advice on the best way of achieving
its objectives in the provision of international services and recommended
that a Cabinet Memorandum be commissioned for consideration by the Expenditure
Review Committee in the 1996-97 Budget.In consideration of all the evidence,
the report concluded that 'Australia's diplomacy objectives are best served
through the provision of independent broadcasting services as provided
by the ABC'. It stressed the respective strengths of each service and
cited future funding options for the services as follows:
- Option A: maintenance of RA budget and transmission funding at current
levels and full Budget supplementation for ATV;
- Option B: maintenance of RA budget funding; ATV funded through sponsorship,
reduction in RA transmission costs and additional Budget funding of
the 'gap';
- Option C: maintenance of RA budget funding; no further Budget funding
for ATV.
Conclusion
3.62 The role and future of Australian international broadcasting services
have been the subject of continual inquiry, review and debate. The same
issues have tended to recur: the effectiveness or value of international
services as Australia's voice to the world; the relative merits of an
independent service versus one more closely tied to Australia's foreign
affairs' objectives; the ethical and pecuniary factors which might direct
the range and nature of services offered; the relative effects of modern
communications developments, particularly in the targeted regions; and,
whether Australia can afford to run, or can afford to lose, these services
and, if they are to continue, how and by whom should the services be
delivered.
3.63 These same issues are also in the forefront of the Committee's
inquiry. However, before addressing these and other issues relevant
to the terms of reference, the Committee examines, in Chapter 4, the
relevant parts of the report of the most recent review of the ABC, that
conducted between July and December 1996 by Mr Bob Mansfield. Whereas
international broadcasting services had been key issues in most of the
earlier inquiries, this area of the ABC's operations received scant
attention by Mr Mansfield. Nevertheless, his conclusions and recommendations
in relation to these services, if implemented, have dire consequences.
It was these conclusions and recommendations, and Senator Alston's unquestioning
support for them, which gave rise to the Committee's inquiry.
Footnotes
[1] British House of Commons, Foreign Affairs
Committee Second Report, p. vi.
[2] British House of Commons, Foreign Affairs
Committee Second Report, The Organisation and Funding of the BBC World
Service (Follow-Up Evidence Sessions) 22 January 1997, p. vi.
[3] Karen Winton, 'CBC struggles to keep it
local', Communications Update, November 1996, p. 12.
[4] 'Radio Canada International: Broadcaster
wins second reprieve', Ottawa Citizen, 13 December 1996.
[5] 'Radio Canada International: Broadcaster
wins second reprieve', Ottawa Citizen, 13 December 1996.
[6] Radio Canada International submission,
p. 4.
[7] Radio Canada International submission,
p. 4.
[8] Quoted in Bob Mansfield, The Challenge
of a Better ABC, Volume 1: A Review of the Role and Functions
of the ABC, p. 41.
[9] The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
was created by an Act of Parliament on 2 November 1936 and now broadcasts
under the 1991 Broadcasting Act. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation
was established in 1932 under the Australian Broadcasting Act , with
Act amended in 1983 to incorporate the new ABC charter.
[10] Derek White, submission no. 400.
[11] Sixty Years Our ABC: Celebrating
Australia's 60th, Anniversary 1932-92, ABC Corporate Relations and
ABC Document Archives [1992], p. 9.
[12] Errol Hodge, Radio Wars, Truth Propaganda
and the Struggle for Radio Australia, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University
Press, Chap. 12, p. 257.
[13] Reported in Hodge, Radio Wars, Truth
Propaganda and the Struggle for Radio Australia, Cambridge UK: Cambridge
University Press, Chap. 12, p. 257.
[14] Sir Keith Shann to Acting Foreign Affairs
Minister, 6 August 1993, DFATA 570/1/6 part 2.
[15] Management Consultancy Division, Public
Service Board, Review of Radio Australia, Feb. 1975, p. 4.
[16] ABC Submission to the Waller inquiry,
28 July 1975. The conclusions reached by the inquiry were released as
Radio Australia, Independent Inquiry Report (the Waller report)
in December 1975.
[17] Tange was former Secretary of both the
Defence department and the Department of External Affairs, Pritchett
was a Secretary of the Defence department and Booker First Assistant
Secretary under Tange and his successor; as reported in Hodge, Radio
Wars, Chapter 12, passim .
[18] W. B. Prichett, letter to the editor,
Sydney Morning Herald, 13 August 1988.
[19] Recorded interview with Booker, Canberra
, 20 March 1989.
[20] Recorded interview with Tange, reported
in Hodge, Radio Wars, Chap. 12, p. 252.
[21] All but nine of the report's 273 recommendations
were implemented.
[22] Providing , for example, coverage of
high profile events that did not attract commercial media interest,
such as women's sport.
[23] This summary of the report is drawn
from 'Dix and the ABC', Communications Update, September 1996.
[24] Dix Report (1981), p. 31.
[25] Radio Australia Review, ABC,
August 1989, pp 35-36.
[26] Expenditure for both BBC and VOA figured
as part of longer term commitments. From 1981, BBC proceeded with a
decade long Audibility program (approved by the Callaghan government
and implemented by the Thatcher government) costing 100 million pounds
in new capital expenditure. Meanwhile the Reagan government announced
an US $1.3 billion modernisation program for Voice of America. Radio
Australia Review, ABC, August 1989, pp 24-25.
[27] See Radio Australia Review, ABC,
August 1989, p. 25 for details.
[28] Radio Australia Review, ABC,
August 1989, p. 28.
[29] Radio Australia Review, ABC,
August 1989, p. 13.
[30] Radio Australia Review, ABC,
August 1989, p. 14.
[31] Radio Australia Review, ABC,
August 1989, p. 2.
[32] Radio Australia Review, ABC,
August 1989, p. 14.
[33] Radio Australia Review, ABC,
August 1989, passim.
[34] Radio Australia Review, ABC,
August 1989, p. 9.
[35] Radio Australia Review, ABC,
August 1989, p. 9.
[36] Radio Australia Review 1994/95,
p. 1.
[37] Radio Australia Review 1994/95,
p. 8.
[38] Radio Australia Review 1994/95,
p. 4.
[39] Radio Australia Review 1994/95,
p. 41.
[40] Radio Australia Review 1994/95,
pp. 6-7.
[41] Radio Australia Review 1994/95,
p. 10.
[42] Radio Australia Review 1994/95,
p. 25.
[43] Radio Australia Review 1994/95,
p. 10-11.
[44] See Radio Australia Review 1994/95,
pp 61-66.
[45] See Radio Australia Review 1994/95,
p. 1.
[46] Radio Australia Review 1994/95,
p. 52.
[47] Our ABC: Report, March 1995,
pp 68-69.
[48] Our ABC: Report, March 1995,
p. 69 and at Evidence note 80.
[49] The review of the management and financial
arrangements of ATV was requested by the Minister for Communications
and the Arts in 1994 and was conducted by the Deputy Secretaries of
the Department of Communications and the Arts and the Department of
Finance, Mr Michael Hutchinson and Mr Pat Barret. The Our ABC
report notes that the major impetus for the Government's review of ATV
was the 'prior failure of ATV to meet its revenue targets, its recourse
to an internal line of credit for funding and the consequent concern
at the potential negative impact of ATV on the free-to-air domestic
service'. See Our ABC Report, March 1995, pp 67-8.
[50] Our ABC Report, March 1995, p.
71.
[51] Our ABC Report, March 1995, p.
71.
[52] Our ABC Report, March 1995, p.
71.
[53] Letter to Minister for Communications
& Arts, Mr M Hutchinson, Our ABC Report, March 1995, p. 60.
[54] Our ABC Report, March 1995, p.
75.
[55] Our ABC Report, March 1995, p.
77.
[56] Our ABC: Report, March 1995,
p. 75.
[57] Our ABC Report, March 1995, p.
96.
[58] Our ABC Report, March 1995, p.
99.
[59] Australian Broadcasting Corporation
Annual Report 1995-96, p. 67.
[60] Review of the Status and Funding
of the ABC's International Broadcasting Services, October 1995,
p. 3.
[61] Review, October 1995, p.3.
[62] Review, October 1995, p. 7.
[63] Review, October 1995, p. 7.
[64] Review, October 1995, p. 7-8.
[65] General issues for ATV were the necessity
of upgrading and replacing satellite services, the need to maximise
and assess audience reach so as to attract sponsorship and the need
to produce regionally-focussed programs with the possible assistance
of RA's language services. For RA, the range of considerations were
as reviewed in the sequence of previous reports, with the impetus ever
stronger to assert that short wave had had its day, particularly in
Asia, relative to television broadcasting. Again, and pivotal to RA's
effectiveness, was its lack of control of its transmission facilities
and transmission budget, a situation which ensured that it could not
advance into related contemporary broadcasting mediums such as AM/FM
rebroadcasting and satellite broadcasting.
[66] Specifically introduced by reference
2 (b) which called for assessment of 'the effectiveness of the ABC's
international services and the manner in which they complement the Government's
foreign and trade policy objectives'. See Review, October 1995,
p. 70.
[67] Review, October 1995, p. iv.
[68] Review, October 1995, p. 43.
[69] Review, October 1995, pp 41-2.
[70] Review, October 1995, p. 42.
[71] Review, October 1995, p. 40.
[72] Review, October 1995, p. 40.
[73] Review, October 1995, p. 36.
[74] Review, October 1995, p. 43.
[75] Review, October 1995, p. iv.
[76] Review, October 1995, pp vi &
43.
[77] Review, October 1995, p. iv.
[78] Review, October 1995, p. 17.
[79] Review, October 1995, p. vi.
[80] Review, October 1995, p. 9.
[81] Review, October 1995, p. vi.