6.1
Since the initial round of evidence received for the committee’s interim report, an update was sought on the wellbeing of Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel and veterans with the committee writing out to several veterans’ organisations. However, the committee received only one submission addressing wellbeing of ADF personnel and veterans, as well as some evidence from the Department of Defence (Defence) on its support programs.
Impact of serving in Afghanistan
6.2
The Royal Australian Regiment Association’s (RARA) submission discussed perceived issues in tactical and role clarity due to the way in which the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) and Royal Australian Infantry Corps were deployed. It was argued that there was an apparent mismatch between the roles each group played and what they were primarily trained for, and this led to a number of morale and mental health consequences for ADF personnel and veterans. The RARA explained:
Kicking in doors has never been a major tactic or operational characteristic of the SAS Regiment, yet that is what they were doing a great deal of the time in night raids…
Why could not some of these initial operational tasks be allocated to our Light Infantry Battalions? That question needs to be asked because not deploying them in what their primary role is, shows a lack of confidence in the fighting ability of our Infantry Battalions, which does nothing for their morale or reason for being. The Infantry Battalions are specialists in patrolling, ambushing, village cordon and search, establishment of OP’s [operations] and forward bases, house to house fighting and overall infantry small arms and supporting arms and services utilization. They have a critical mass that is able to clear areas, whereas by contrast our SF [Special Forces] are a niche force which excel in the core roles, but in their Afghanistan mis-conflation of roles meant an under employment of Infantry Battalions…
Had there been more opportunities to deploy our Infantry Battalions there would have been less pressure on SF and in some cases perhaps less mental health issues.
6.3
Additionally, when unconventional battlegroups were established that included Light Infantry Battalions and SASR, they were characterised by:
[D]iverse command and control structures, and custom fit for the operational theatre, requir[ing] significant development of operational procedures and training at all ranks that [couldn’t] be reasonably attained in the pre-deployment training time period to get the best performance from light infantry.
6.4
The result of the desired composition of these battlegroups meant that ‘many good officers and soldiers who had trained themselves into the ground to achieve maximum battalion war fighting capability, were left behind’ which RARA described as ‘[s]oul destroying and [had] a further demoralizing affect for some members of the battalions’.
6.5
However, RARA noted that:
[T]here is no axe to grind [vis-à-vis] the Special Forces and the Royal Australian Regiment and its Infantry Battalions. From the outset we are totally supportive and proud of the job our officers and soldiers, from all of the ADF but in particular our Special Forces, have done over this protracted period, and any observations and criticisms are not intended to be a slight on their commitment and sacrifice.
…
Our comments are made in good faith, not to besmirch or impugn any individual, but to highlight what we see as either weaknesses or problems in the system.
6.6
The RARA also described the ‘hidden cost which will be compounded in years to come’ of Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan as ADF personnel and veterans struggle ‘with their inner demons of PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder] and moral injury’ exaggerated by:
[T]he totally unrealistic and demanding rotations of SF, where many who redeployed already had major PTSD and moral injury issues, which were either hidden by the individual so that he could be redeployed, or the [distressing events] or psychological testing findings were hidden or ignored. This is further exasperated in a type A testosterone driven tribe, where any hint of a mental health issue was stigmatized, and the individual was ostracized and isolated from the rest of the operators. One such person, was an SAS operator who was so stigmatized and isolated, that he tried to commit suicide but thankfully survived and is now discharged and getting on with his life. This is fact, not anecdotal, where one of our board members was personally involved in helping the soldier and his family.
6.7
Finally, the RARA acknowledged the difficult situation that Australia was in during the withdrawal and stated it ‘was as good as it could have been in the circumstances’ but that it did have an impact on mental health, ‘in particular the way in which the withdrawal was executed created anger, resentment, anxiety, and fear for those left behind, which are all PTSD triggers’. The RARA reflected on conversations with young veterans stating:
…there was almost a [déjà vu] of what many had experienced in the withdrawal from South Vietnam. A feeling of loss, disappointment, and not worthwhile and in particular those affected by losing their soldiers or personal friends. Anecdotally it would appear that anger and resentment was highlighted by some, due to the Afghan Interpreters who had worked with the Australian forces being left behind.
Department of Defence support
6.8
Defence provided the committee with an update on its work, since the committee’s interim report, to support the wellbeing of ADF personnel, stating:
Defence has not needed to review or develop new supports/resources specifically relating to the withdrawal of Afghanistan, however Defence is cognisant that its services, programs and resources remain contemporary.
6.9
On whether Defence had received any feedback in relation to its mental health resources to support both ADF and Australian Public Service members, it was submitted that:
Joint Health Command commanders have provided feedback through their senior leaders indicating the resources have been received positively, and were timely and of good quality.
An increase in support access levels specifically due to the Afghanistan withdrawal has not been observed. The rates of engagement and uptake of mental health services in the Australian Defence Force exceeds community and international standards.
6.10
Information on Defence programs and assistance is detailed in the committee’s interim report.
Department of Veterans’ Affairs support
6.11
The Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) also updated the committee on its support to individuals impacted by Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan:
The Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) continues to provide support to individuals impacted by the Afghanistan unrest. While the initial surge in requests for support has settled, the Department continues to monitor the situation closely for any emerging issues and will respond accordingly.
…
The Department’s initial and ongoing service response to Afghanistan veterans and their families was in response to sudden changed circumstances. DVA will continue to monitor requests for additional support from this group as well as their feedback and will respond accordingly.
6.12
DVA provided the following example of how it responded to support those impacted:
[T]he website was updated in September 2021, to include a specific landing page, ‘Responding to the situation in Afghanistan’, that provides resources for veterans, families, mental health providers, teachers, and broader community members. The webpage includes resources on compassion; resilience and support; management of anxiety and fear; dealing with grief and loss; and speaking to young adults and children.
Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide
6.13
The committee notes the work of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide which was established on 8 July 2021 and will produce an interim report by 11 August 2022 and a final report by 15 June 2023.
Office of the Special Investigator
6.14
In looking at whether the recent changes in Afghanistan are inhibiting the ability to undertake investigations resulting from the Brereton report, the committee notes a recent update from the Officer of the Special Investigator to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee during additional estimates hearings. Mr Chris Moraitis, Director General, reported that they have ‘taken the initiative of translating parts of the Brereton report into Dari and Pashto so the community can understand what happened with that inquiry’ and to assist in in engagement with witnesses where they may not speak English. In relation to staffing and numbers of investigators, the committee was informed that the office has one special investigator and around 50 investigators. In addition, it was advised that to date, no matters have been referred to the DPP.