Executive Summary
Introduction
This inquiry into the administration of the Regional
Partnerships Program (RPP) and Sustainable Regions Program (SRP) has been
extensive, lengthy and important. It was established on 2 December 2004 following allegations raised in
parliament and the media about the misuse of the programs in the lead up to the
2004 federal election. Concerns raised included allegations of serious
impropriety in the approval and announcement of certain grants, and the
discovery that certain procedures governing the administration of the programs
had been concealed from public view. Allegations
were also made by a member of the House of Representatives that political
conditions were placed on several grants made under the Regional Partnerships
Program.
These allegations emerged against a background of concerns
about the expenditure of public money through these programs and their
predecessors, including an inquiry by this Committee into a funding matter
under the Dairy Regional Assistance Program (Dairy RAP), one of RPP's
predecessor programs.[1]
Between 2 February and 15 September 2005, the Committee conducted nineteen
public hearings across the length and breadth of Australia.
The Committee also conducted four site inspections of projects approved under RPP.
The Committee took evidence from 99 witnesses at these hearings, and received
56 submissions and seven supplementary submissions.
Obstacles to the conduct of the inquiry
DOTARS/ACCs/SRACs
The Committee's examination of the matters referred to it by
the Senate was hindered by a lack of cooperation from the Department of
Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS), the department responsible for the
administration of the RP and SR programs. On a number of occasions, DOTARS
failed to provide the Committee with timely and accurate information. DOTARS
also refused to provide access to departmental witnesses with specific
knowledge of the matters examined.
The Committee decided during the inquiry process to seek
access to copies of RPP and SRP applications and Area Consultative Committee
(ACC) and Sustainable Region Advisory Committee (SRAC) recommendations on these
applications. This information was of central importance to the Committee's
examination of the assessment and decision making process for both programs, as
well as addressing term of reference (b) regarding recommendations from area
consultative bodies. DOTARS refused this request, despite disclosing such
information to the Committee's earlier inquiry into Dairy RAP. This led to a
cost in terms of time and effort as the Committee was forced to seek this
information directly from ACCs and SRACs. All ACCs and SRACs eventually
provided the information, although some only complied after the Committee ordered
them to provide the documents.
Of grave concern, however, were the further attempts of DOTARS
to obstruct the inquiry by providing misleading information on two occasions to
ACCs and SRACs regarding the powers of Senate committees, the obligations on
those bodies to comply with the Committee's request and the privileges afforded
witnesses providing evidence to committees. This required the Committee Chair
to write to DOTARS warning that the dissemination of incorrect advice about
committee powers and procedures constitutes interference in the process of the
inquiry and may be considered a contempt of the Senate.
Further, at the time of finalising the report the Committee
was still awaiting answers to a substantial number of questions taken on notice
by the department. The Committee understands that the answers had been compiled
by the department and provided to the minister's office some time ago. The
delays and failure to respond by both the department and the minister are
unacceptable as they had had many months to provide the information requested.
Misleading evidence
The Committee received evidence in answers to questions on
notice which contradicted evidence given by Wyong Shire Mayor, Cr Brenton
Pavier, at a public hearing on 24
February 2005. The Committee considered that the answers to questions
on notice provided a prima facie case
that the Mayor's oral evidence was deliberately false and misleading and
therefore may have constituted a contempt of the Senate. The Committee resolved
to raise a matter of privilege under standing order 81, and wrote to the President
of the Senate asking that he give precedence to a motion to refer the matter to
the Committee of Privileges, in accordance with that standing order.
On 5 September 2005
the President made a determination giving precedence to the motion that the
matter be referred to the Senate Committee of Privileges. The motion was put to
a vote in the Senate on 7 September
2005 and negatived. This was a highly unusual development.
Normally, following a determination by the President such motions are passed
without debate. The Committee records its dismay that on this occasion the
Senate departed from longstanding practice.
Failure to provide evidence
Mr Greg
Maguire, a witness central to the
allegations made by Mr Tony Windsor MP that he was offered an inducement not to
stand for the seat of New England at the 2004 federal
election, failed to provide evidence to the Committee that he had previously
undertaken to provide on notice. The information the Committee sought concerned
Mr Maguire's
claims that his companies had made contributions to Mr
Windsor's state and federal election
campaigns. His refusal to provide the information made it difficult to not only
corroborate his evidence before the inquiry but also to verify whether Mr
Maguire had disclosed these election
contributions to the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). Mr
Windsor and his former campaign manager, Mr
Stephen Hall,
denied that Mr Maguire
had made any contributions to Mr Windsor's
election campaigns. Given the obligation on both donors and recipients to
disclose both cash and in-kind contributions to election campaigns, the
Committee is concerned that Mr Maguire
may be in breach of the Electoral Act. The Committee therefore intends to refer
this matter to the AEC for examination.
Regional Partnerships Program administration
Chapter 2 provides an overview of administrative aspects of
RPP, including the program guidelines, assessment and approval procedures,
funds approved, and evaluations and reviews of the program. A number of concerns
with the accountability of aspects of the program are raised, providing context
for the case studies presented later in the report. Areas of particular concern
include the use of the Strategic Opportunities Notional Allocation
(SONA) procedures to approve projects that do not meet the published RPP
eligibility criteria, political bias in the levels of funding approved across
electorates and the striking increase in funding approvals prior to the 2004
federal election. Analysis of grants approved from the commencement of the
program through to 31 December 2004
shows that over half of the total funding approved in this period was approved
in the three months preceding the election announcement.
Area Consultative Committees (ACCs)
ACCs fulfil two key roles in relation to the RP program:
providing information and assisting proponents in developing applications, and
providing comments and recommendations to the department on applications made
from their region. ACCs also have primary responsibility for promoting the
program. The Committee received generally favourable evidence regarding the
competence and effectiveness of the ACCs in performing these roles, and the
dedication of ACC members and staff to the progress of their regions.
The Committee considers that the involvement of ACCs in RPP
application development is an important safeguard for ensuring that
applications are of a high standard and meet the program guidelines. The
Committee also considers that the ACCs' comments on applications provide an
important source of advice and means of assessing the local priority given to
projects.
According to administrative procedures for RPP, applications
should be automatically referred to the relevant ACC, and ten working days
allowed for the ACC to provide comments and recommendations. However, the
Committee became aware of applications that were not forwarded to ACCs for
comment, or where the ACCs were given insufficient time to consider and rate
the applications. The Committee considers that in bypassing the ACC review
process, the department sidestepped an integral part of the assessment process.
Case studies
The Committee examined in detail the circumstances surrounding
the application, assessment, approval and announcement of RPP grants for the
following six projects:
-
The Beaudesert Rail heritage railway;
-
Dredging at Tumbi Creek;
-
Primary Energy Pty Ltd's grains to ethanol plant
proposal;
-
A2 Dairy Marketers' milk processing plant
proposal;
-
The Australian Equine and Livestock Centre; and
-
The University Of New England National Centre of
Science, Information and Communication Technology, and Mathematics Education
for Rural and Regional Australia.
These case studies point to serious deficiencies in the
transparency and accountability of processes by which projects are brought
forward, considered and approved for funding under RPP. In some cases, evidence
points to undue political pressure to expedite grant approval and announcement
at the detriment of sound application development and assessment. While the
Committee recognises that many beneficial projects have been funded under the
program, the case studies involving grants totalling in excess of $15.5 million
show that there is significant scope for improving the administration,
accountability and transparency of RPP.
Beaudesert Rail
The Beaudesert Rail (BR) was the recipient of four
Commonwealth Government grants totalling $5.7 million. These comprised a grant
of $75,000 plus GST to produce a business and marketing plan; $5 million from
the Centenary of Federation fund to develop and operate a heritage railway;
$10,000 plus GST for a report on BR's financial position and suggestions for a
way forward; and a $600,000 grant under the RP program.
The Committee concluded that the $600,000 RPP grant to BR approved
in November 2003 was made for political purposes. Documents provided in
evidence to the Committee reveal that in the final days leading up to the
decision to provide BR with an RPP grant rather than a loan, the then Deputy
Prime Minister, The Hon John Anderson MP, who was also the portfolio minister
for RPP, was involved in discussions with the Prime Minister's office about the
matter of government assistance for Beaudesert Rail. It appears that this was
when the proposed form of assistance changed from a loan to an RPP grant.
DOTARS was still unaware of this change the day before the grant was approved
and was continuing to work on the basis that any funding would be in the form
of a loan.
This project completely bypassed the program's normal
assessment procedures. Besides DOTARS being cut out of the process, BR was not
required to make an application for RPP funding and the relevant ACC was not
given an opportunity to comment on the project. Evidence also shows that the
department was not satisfied that the project was financially viable and was
still seeking evidence of the project's prospects of solvency just days before
the grant was approved.
The Committee considers that the BR grant serves as a
warning of the effects of expediting projects without undertaking adequate due
diligence checks. Beaudesert Rail's financial viability was marginal at best
(it was under administration at the time of the RP grant) and it ceased
operation in August 2004. Creditors took possession of its assets in February
2005.
The manner in which the government resorted to using program
funds for the BR grant reveals the disregard on the part of its most senior
ministers for the RPP guidelines. It is one of several examples the Committee
found of the virtually unfettered discretion in the hands of ministers under
this program. The other striking aspect of the BR case is that program funds
were used to achieve a political outcome in a government-held electorate
following direct intervention from the Prime Minister.
Tumbi Creek
Two grants totalling $1.496 million to Wyong Shire Council
for dredging work at the mouth of Tumbi Creek were approved by Parliamentary
Secretary Kelly
in mid 2004. The Committee was concerned about the allocation of such a large
grant to a project with limited beneficiaries which provided a short-term
rather than a long-term solution, particularly given that sustainability is an
important feature of the RPP project viability criteria.
The Tumbi Creek dredging grant applications were assessed
and approved within remarkably short time frames when compared with many other
RPP grants. Departmental witnesses advised the Committee that the Parliamentary
Secretary's office had requested that the department give the project priority.
The Committee is particularly concerned that the haste with
which these grants were approved meant that normal application development and
assessment processes were circumvented. On the advice of a ministerial staffer
the Council submitted its applications directly to DOTARS, rather than
preparing the applications in consultation with the relevant ACC. The Committee
received evidence that the relevant ACC had a number of concerns about the
project, yet the ACC's comments on the first application were not forwarded to
the Parliamentary Secretary before the funding decision was made and the ACC
was not provided with a copy of the second application.
A high degree of political collaboration involving
ministerial advisers, the federal member's office and members or officials of
the Council was evident in relation to this particular RPP project. In one
instance, involving a ministerial adviser countermanding departmental advice,
the Committee considers that the communication was entirely inappropriate and
is evidence of wider concerns about the unchecked growth in the power of
ministerial staffers.
The lack of necessary state licences, required before the
dredging work could proceed, is another example of the haste with which this
grant was approved and announced. The latitude in the RPP guidelines meant that
while the dredging project remained effectively ineligible to actually receive
funding until the relevant approvals and licences were obtained, the grant
announcement could still be made. RPP funding for the dredging work was
announced by the Prime Minister in a marginal electorate just days before the
2004 federal election was announced. Yet, as at mid-August 2005, a funding
agreement for the project still had not been entered into.
The A2 Dairy Marketers project
The Committee examined a $1.27 million RPP grant approved by
the Hon De-Anne Kelly MP, then Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for
Transport and Regional Services, on 29
August 2004. The grant was for A2 Dairy Marketers Pty Ltd (A2DM) to
establish a milk processing plant on the Atherton Tablelands, Qld. The
approval, which was announced during the federal election period, was rescinded
before funds were committed because A2DM went into voluntary administration
less than one month after the grant was announced.
The case of A2DM raises serious concerns about the
administration of the Regional Partnerships Program. In particular, it exposes
the risks inherent with fast-tracking applications and failing to heed an area
consultative committee's warning that a
project application required more investigation and development.
The Committee is concerned that due to political pressures
to process the application within a short timeframe, a proper due diligence
process was not undertaken by the department. The 'due diligence' assessment
carried out prior to the department making its recommendation to the minister
appears to have only been a compliance check. The Committee found that DOTARS
was unaware of information fundamental to the viability of the project,
including A2DM's tenuous financial situation and the legal action pending
against it by a Queensland
government department.
This 'after the fact'
due diligence, by making funding subject to conditions to be met after grants
are approved, allows applications to be expedited so that the political benefits
of announcements can be achieved. In this case, this practice had damaging
effects not only on the proponent, but also on project partners, the local
industry and community. The announcement of the grant with its implication of
government support for the project instilled confidence in local farmers that
the project was viable and would go ahead, and encouraged a number of farmers
to adjust their businesses towards producing A2 milk.
The Committee believes that the government must accept
responsibility for expressing support for projects that are ultimately doomed
to fail, and the consequences that reach beyond the proponent throughout the
local community and industry—even in cases where no public funding was
expended.
Primary Energy
The Committee's examination of the Primary Energy case
highlights concerns about the administration of applications made under one
program but funded under another, the way the Strategic Opportunities Notional
Allocation (SONA) procedures are employed to circumvent eligibility
restrictions and the latitude for intervention at the ministerial level under
discretionary programs such as RP.
The application was made under a predecessor program to RPP
but, on the cessation of that program, assessed and funded under RPP. While
DOTARS categorised the project as relatively 'high risk' compared to others
funded under RPP, like the cases of Tumbi Creek and A2DM, the assessment of
this project was fast-tracked at a minister's request and resulted in a $1.2
million grant.
The reason for the haste attached to the Primary Energy
application was not adequately explained but the evidence raised serious concerns.
Due diligence testing appeared to be short-circuited, despite the project being
considered 'high risk'. The evidence also revealed confusion between the
department and the ACC about who was responsible for due diligence and risk
assessment, symptomatic of the general level of confusion about this key check
under the RP guidelines.
The area of gravest concern about the Primary Energy project
relates to the ministerial involvement in the department's assessment of the
application. The direction from one minister to the department to expedite the
application to allow funding to be provided within two weeks seemed to pre-empt
any rigorous assessment of the project. The Committee found that the original
departmental advice to the minister on the application was altered following
the intervention of Mr Anderson's
chief of staff at senior levels in the department. Although departmental
officers gave conflicting evidence on the chain of events leading to the change
of advice, evidence from the former acting secretary of the department at the
time reveals that the revised advice differed markedly from the department's
original advice.
This was not only another example of the high degree to
which ministerial offices intervened in certain projects but also a case which transgressed
the department's practice of quarantining ministers from decisions related to
applications from their own electorates. Because the application concerned a
project in Minister Anderson's
electorate, neither the minister nor any of his staff should have been involved
in any way with the decision making on the project.
Another parallel with other case studies was the use of the
SONA guidelines to bypass the eligibility criteria of the RP program. DOTARS
admitted that the Primary Energy application fell outside the RP guidelines,
claiming that it conformed with the guidelines of the defunct program under
which the application had been made. Ministerial pressure to expedite the
processing of the application appears to have prevented the department from requesting
a fresh application from Primary Energy under the RP guidelines, with the
department opting instead to assess the project under the SONA guidelines. The
Committee found that in a case like Primary Energy the use of the SONA
guidelines leaves the way open for cutting corners in relation to due diligence
testing and circumventing proper rigorous assessment of 'high risk' projects.
RPP grants in the electoral
division of New England
The electoral division of New England
featured prominently in the inquiry due to the proliferation of issues that
emerged about the operation of the Regional Partnerships Program in that
electorate. The Committee examined allegations that the Independent member for New
England, Mr Tony Windsor MP was offered an inducement not to stand
for the seat of New England at the 2004 federal
election. The issues also included his claims that political conditions were
put on grants made to three projects in the New England
electorate.
Mr Windsor
claimed that the grant to the Australian Equine and Livestock Centre, which was
announced in September 2004 as a $6 million election commitment to be funded
from RPP, was made conditional on his removal from the equine centre working
group. He claimed that this condition had been imposed to prevent him taking
credit for the project. The Committee found that there was at least a
perception among some people involved in seeking an RP grant for the project
that Mr Windsor's
involvement would not be helpful in obtaining funding. However, the evidence
was not conclusive that any such condition had been imposed on the grant.
Allegations of electoral bribery were investigated by the
Committee in the context of Mr Windsor's
claims regarding the equine centre grant. This matter was also the subject of
an investigation by the Australian Federal Police, which had found that no
further action was necessary. Mr Windsor
alleged that an intermediary, Mr Greg
Maguire (the chair of the equine centre
working group), had offered him an inducement on behalf of the then Deputy
Prime Minister, the Hon John Anderson MP, and Senator Sandy
Macdonald. The Committee received
conflicting evidence. Without compelling and incontrovertible evidence, a
committee of the Senate cannot make an adverse finding against a Senator or
Member who has denied the allegations made against him. In the case of the
alleged inducement, the evidence is not sufficient for this Committee to depart
from that principle.
Mr Windsor
also alleged that staff members of the University
of New England had received a $4.95
million RPP grant for the National Centre of Science, Information and
Communication Technology, and Mathematics Education for Rural and Regional
Australia (SiMERR) in return for favourable comment in a local newspaper about
the National Party. The Committee found that the National Party sought to
obtain political advantage from the grant by way of advertisements carried in
the local newspapers at the time of the centre's official opening, and the
university did not act appropriately in having its SiMERR advertisement appear
with a party political advertisement. But the Committee found there was no
evidence to prove Mr Windsor's
allegation about 'cash for comment'.
In the case of the allegations about the opening of the Grace
Munro Centre,
which was not the subject of an RPP grant, the Committee believes that Senator
Macdonald's attempt to exclude Mr
Windsor from the opening was inappropriate.
There is no evidence, however, that the Senator attempted to coerce or threaten
the council, even when it became apparent that the council intended to proceed
to invite Mr Windsor
to participate in the opening.
The Sustainable Regions Program
The Committee examined a second regional development program
– the Sustainable Regions Program (SRP), which aimed to assist ten regions
facing major economic, social or environmental change. The Committee's
examination of the Sustainable Regions Program raised questions about the basis
on which the participant regions were selected and how members of the
Sustainable Region Advisory Committees (SRACs) were chosen. DOTARS declined to
provide the Committee with evidence on these matters on the grounds that they
were ministerial decisions.
The Committee noted that
the due diligence process for Sustainable Regions applications is more rigorous
than the Regional Partnerships requirements. It is of particular interest that
due diligence checks are conducted prior
to the SRAC recommendation and the department's
advice being presented to the minister, in contrast to the practice found in
some cases with RPP where due diligence checks only occurred after funding had been announced. Had
this process existed under RPP, several of the failed projects investigated by
the Committee may have been avoided.
The Atherton
Tablelands Sustainable Region Advisory Committee
The Atherton Tablelands Sustainable Region Advisory
Committee (ATSRAC) was the subject of a large
amount of evidence to the inquiry. The evidence from members of the Atherton
Tablelands community was overwhelmingly negative, and focused on perceptions of
conflict of interest arising from the presence of four local mayors on ATSRAC,
concerns about the inconsistent application of SRP guidelines, the lack of
transparency of the application process and allegations of misplaced regional
priorities. The Committee found that ATSRAC
has little credibility with members of the community because of the number of
projects that had failed or been viewed as unworthy.
The Committee notes that ultimately, responsibility for the
composition and functionality of the ATSRAC
board rests with the minister who appointed it. The Committee also recognises
the difficult position of the mayors, who were elected to represent their shire
but required, as members of ATSRAC, to subsume
the interests of the shire under a strategic view of regional benefit. However,
these tensions may not have been problematic had ATSRAC
been appointed with a more balanced membership.
The three projects discussed in detail, JAM Custom Kitchens,
the Atherton Hotel and Kalamunda
Ecostay, raised concerns relating to
competitive neutrality, conflict of interest and the lack of transparency of
the application process. These projects highlight the inherent difficulties in
providing government grants to the private sector, namely that while a grant
may have a particular purpose, it frees up capital for other purposes (for
example, in the case of the Atherton Hotel, the purchase of poker machines),
raises due diligence and competitive neutrality questions and can create
fractures in small and already fragile communities. This particularly applies
if the grant process is not seen as transparent, rigorous and equitably
accessible.
Findings and recommendations
In general terms, the Committee's inquiry found that the
main processes by which projects are proposed, considered and approved for
funding under the Regional Partnerships Program are reasonably sound, although there
is scope for strengthening these processes and building more rigour and
transparency into the governance framework. The Committee makes a series of
recommendations that would make it mandatory for all applications to be
developed in consultation with ACCs and for ACCs to have a minimum of ten
working days to consider all relevant applications. The Committee considers
that involvement of the ACCs in the application development process is an
important safeguard for the RP program. Multi-region funding applications would
also have to be referred to all relevant ACCs under the improved assessment
procedures that the Committee recommends DOTARS develops.
To assist ACCs to perform this enhanced role, the Committee
recommends a review of the resourcing of ACCs and enhanced training of
committee members and staff, as well as the adoption of three-year operational
funding contracts to support strategic planning. It also recommends the
Government conducts a review of the role of ACCs to ensure their contribution to
regional development is maximised.
The Committee considers that greater transparency around the
RP program is required to allow the Parliament to monitor this significant area
of expenditure and as a check on arbitrariness and politicisation. It recommends
that a biannual statement be tabled in the Senate that lists information basic
to providing an adequate level of scrutiny of the program, including all RP
grants approved in the preceding six months, the department's and ACC's
recommendations for each grant and a statement of reasons for decisions which
are inconsistent with departmental and/or ACC recommendations. The Committee
also recommends that ACC recommendations be disclosed to funding applicants on
request.
In the Committee's view, the SONA procedures represent a
fundamental accountability black hole and need to be removed. They expand the
scope for departmental and ministerial discretion to unacceptable limits,
providing a default to fund projects without reference to the program
criteria/guidelines. The Committee
recommends that the SONA guidelines be abolished.
The Committee also concluded that the processes and
procedures of the Sustainable Regions Program appear to be broadly sound, but
its examination of SR projects in the Atherton Tablelands region highlighted
problems arising from an insufficiently representative SRAC structure, opaque
processes for appointing SRAC members and a lack of transparency around
application processes. It makes recommendations to address those deficiencies.
To strengthen the governance framework for both programs,
the Committee recommends that projects must have obtained relevant approvals or
licences to be eligible for RP or SR funding. Similarly, it recommends that no
program funding be approved for projects that fail to meet either program's
guidelines and other tests including proper due diligence. It also calls for
due diligence processes and competitive neutrality procedures to be
strengthened.
One of the major areas of concern to emerge from the inquiry
surrounds the role of ministers and their staff. The Committee found that
current arrangements are not adequate to mitigate the risk of conflicts of
interest. It is also deeply concerned by the intervention by ministerial
offices in the department's assessment processes which the Committee considers
was inappropriate and antithetical to the principle of the public service
providing frank and impartial advice to ministers. While the Committee, on
balance, supports the retention of ministerial discretion for each program, it
recommends that ministers, parliamentary secretaries and their staff should be
prevented from intervening in the assessment of grants. It also recommends
strengthening existing measures to keep ministers at arm's length from
applications that originate from their own electorates.
The finding that over half of grants approvals occurred in
the three months leading to the federal election announcement in 2004 is
another critical area of concern. This can only feed allegations of 'pork
barrelling' with these programs and increase perceptions of bias, particularly
in the context of election campaigns. The Committee recommends improved
procedures to enhance the accountability of ministers during the sensitive
period leading up to federal election campaigns.
Navigation: Previous Page | Contents | Next Page