- Amendments to the International Health Regulations (2005)
- The Amendments to the International Health Regulations (2005) was referred to the Committee in the 47th Parliament, but lapsed due to the prorogation of Parliament. It was re-referred on 29 July 2025.
- The Committee received 307 submissions, four of these were bulk campaigns which received over 14,000 submissions combined. There were also two supplementary submissions and three responses to questions on notice. A public hearing was held in Canberra on 23 October 2025. A list of submissions can be found in Appendix A and the details of the hearing and witnesses can be found in Appendix B. The transcript of evidence from the public hearing can be accessed through the Committee’s website.
Overview and background
2.3The Amendments to the International Health Regulations (IHR) update regulations previously agreed to by all World Health Organisation (WHO) Member States (as well as Lichtenstein and the Holy See). The IHR was initially adopted in 1969 and has been amended on several occasions, with the current IHR being adopted in 2005 and amended in 2014 and 2022. The current amendments address lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic.
The World Health Organisation
2.4The WHO is an organisation with 194 Member States. Member States elect a Director-General, who leads the organisation. The World Health Assembly (WHA) is the highest-level decision-making forum at the WHO. Every year, Member States convene to set priorities and chart a course for global health priorities. The Secretariat of the WHO includes experts, staff and field workers who work at the WHO headquarters in Geneva, at the six regional offices and at other stations in over 150 countries globally.
The International Health Regulations
2.5The IHR are an instrument of international law that is legally-binding on 196 States Parties including the 194 WHO Member States. They were developed in response to epidemics in Europe. They are an overarching legal framework that defines countries’ rights and obligations with respect to handling public health events and emergencies which have the potential to cross borders.
2.6The IHR create obligations and rights for countries, including the requirement to report public health events and the criteria to determine whether an event constitutes a ‘public health emergency of international concern’.
2.7The IHR further require countries to designate a National IHR Focal Point to communicate with the WHO as well as the establishment and maintenance of core capabilities for surveillance and response, including at designated points of entry. There are also provisions in the IHR relating to international travel and transport including health documents required for international traffic. There are safeguards intended to protect the rights of travellers and others regarding the treatment of personal data, informed consent, and non-discrimination in the application of IHR measures.
Amendments
2.8The Amended IHR seeks to address the shortfalls in international cooperation and public health responses during the COVID-19 pandemic. The amendments focus on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response. The updates to the IHR encourage collective action and clarify countries’ rights, responsibilities, and the role of WHO in managing public health emergencies, including infectious disease outbreaks.
2.9The Amended IHR continues to focus on preventing and responding to the international spread of disease in a manner proportionate to public health risks while minimising disruptions to international traffic and trade. It retains the established procedures for public health measures at borders, serving as a safeguard against disease introduction.
2.10A key feature of the Amended IHR is the introduction of a new alert level, the ‘pandemic emergency’, which enhances global responsiveness and collaboration. This framework is expected to improve Australia’s access to critical public health information and support its domestic response. Australia will also be better positioned to contribute to coordinated international efforts, particularly in the Pacific region, reinforcing national security and regional resilience. Importantly, the amended IHR respects national sovereignty, affirming that Australia and other States Parties retain full control over their legal and health systems, and their responses to public health emergencies. In accordance with international law, ‘it does not prevail over Australia's Constitution, domestic laws, or sovereign right to design and implement health response policies in our national and regional interest’.
Justification
2.11The future emergence and spread of infectious disease remains a significant concern to Australia, our region, and the international community due to its potential to disrupt health systems, societies, and economies. Contributing factors include climate change and the increasing movement of people and goods across borders, which heighten the risk of widespread transmission. Recent experiences with COVID-19, Mpox, Japanese encephalitis virus, SARS, MERS, and Ebola underscore this risk. In this context, strengthening the global health architecture for prevention, preparedness, and response, is in Australia’s national interest.
2.12The Amended IHR expand the core capacities required of States Parties to prevent and control communicable disease, including surveillance, preparedness, and response measures at designated airports, ports, and ground crossings. Australia already demonstrates these capacities and will benefit from other countries strengthening their own, helping to contain public health risks before they escalate into pandemics. The new core capacities also allow Australia to offer technical expertise to support regional implementation, building resilience and contributing to stability.
2.13The Amended IHR enhance mechanisms for information exchange, joint risk assessment, and coordination between the WHO and States Parties, including the WHO’s authority to share information when health risks justify it and collaboration is lacking. These mechanisms enable early notification of public health threats, giving Australia time to plan a response, while also ensuring other countries are informed of risks emerging in Australia. This promotes trust and supports international cooperation in response efforts.
2.14Additionally, Australia will gain access to WHO assistance and mechanisms that support domestic response efforts and contribute to coordinated international action during public health emergencies. The unanimous adoption of the amendments at the 77th WHA suggests broad support among States Parties, reinforcing the multilateral system and strengthening international standards. Finally, the Amended IHR support Australia’s reputation as a leader in global health and enable it to shape reforms that align with Australia’s national health protection objectives.
Obligations
New obligation on IHR States Parties
- National IHR Authority (Article 4): States Parties must designate or establish a National IHR Authority to coordinate IHR implementation. This can be an existing agency, requiring no legislative change and allowing administrative flexibility. Formal designation supports coordinated national responses and preparedness. States must share contact details with WHO to enhance international collaboration.
- Consultation on non-notifiable events (Article 8): States are now expected to consult WHO on non-notifiable events in a timely manner. This supports early warnings and regional preparedness, benefiting Australia and its neighbours.
- Public health response and equitable access (Article 13): States must maintain response capacities and collaborate with WHO during emergencies. WHO’s role in coordinating responses is expanded, especially in fragile and humanitarian settings. The new obligations operate within the limits of States Parties’ ‘applicable law and available resources’. Within those parameters, States Parties have an obligation to collaborate and assist each other and support WHO-coordinated response activities, including WHO efforts to facilitate timely and equitable access to relevant health products during a public health emergency of international concern. States Parties will be obliged to 1) engage with and encourage relevant stakeholders in their jurisdiction to facilitate equitable access to relevant health products, 2) make available, as appropriate, relevant terms of their research and development agreements for relevant health products related to promoting equitable access and 3) support WHO in implementing the actions detailed in Article 13.
- Conveyance operators (Article 24 and Article 27): States Parties must ensure conveyance operators comply with, and inform travellers of, WHO-recommended health measures, where those have been adopted by a State Party. Quarantine is now explicitly included as an optional control measure.
- Additional health measures (Article 43): States may implement additional measures beyond WHO recommendations if consistent with the IHR. Affected States can request consultations about implemented measures, facilitated by WHO, with confidentiality protections.
- Collaboration, assistance and financing (Article 44): States must collaborate with each other on the assessment and response to notifiable events under the IHR. They should maintain or increase domestic funding, though no new financial obligations are imposed. Funding mobilisation should target developing countries, using existing mechanisms.
- Coordinating Financial Mechanism (Article 44bis): This is a new mechanism under the authority and guidance of the WHA which aims to increase the availability of funding for core capacities, especially in developing countries. It will coordinate financing sources and support States in accessing funds, without imposing new obligations.
Amendments enhancing the effectiveness of the WHO
2.15Pandemic emergency definition (Article 1): The NIA explains:
The Amended IHR introduces a new definition and top-tier level of international alert ‘pandemic emergency’ to complement the existing definition of ‘public health emergency of international concern’ (PHEIC).A ‘pandemic emergency’ is an escalated form of a PHEIC that signals a high level of risk and the need for rapid, coordinated international action. A ‘pandemic emergency’ determination takes into account not only public health risk but also social and/or economic considerations. This was supported as a means of reflecting the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, it is designed to address the challenge experienced at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic where a PHEIC was declared, but some countries did not appreciate or act upon the urgency or seriousness of the situation, which delayed and hindered their response and allowed COVID-19 to rapidly spread.
2.16Public health response, including equitable access to relevant health products (Article 13): The WHO’s support during PHEICs or pandemic emergencies is triggered by State Party request or acceptance of an offer from the WHO. Support includes the WHO facilitating and working to remove barriers to timely and equitable access by:
- Assessing needs for health products and factoring this into WHO recommendations during emergencies.
- Using WHO-led or other mechanisms to ensure timely, equitable access to health products.
- Supporting countries in scaling and diversifying production of health products upon request.
- Sharing product information amongst countries to aid regulatory approval, if requested.
- Promoting research and development and strengthening local production of safe, effective health products.
- Recommendations (Articles 15–18): The Amended IHR provides the WHO with additional guidance on the content of standing and temporary recommendations under Articles 15 and 16. Article 15 outlines the Director-General’s obligation to issue non-binding, time-limited recommendations during a PHEIC or pandemic emergency, while Article 16 allows for longer-term recommendations in response to specific public health risks. The Amendments now require the Director-General to consider the availability and accessibility of relevant health products when issuing these recommendations. Considerations about the need to facilitate international travel, particularly of health and care workers and persons in life threatening or humanitarian situations, and the need to maintain international supply chains for relevant health products and food supplies have also been added.
- Additional health measures, and collaboration and assistance (Articles 44): The WHO is now able to assist States Parties, upon request, by evaluating core capacities, providing technical and logistical support, mobilising financial resources, and facilitating access to health products in line with Article 13.
- Verification (Article 10): WHO’s mandate to share information when States don’t cooperate in verifying potential PHEICs is strengthened, improving early warnings.
Other amendments to the existing IHR
2.20IHR Committees (Articles 48, 49 and 54bis): These articles establish the terms of reference and outline the procedures of the Emergency Committee, which may be convened by the WHO Director General to advise on PHEICs.
2.21Changes to the IHR Core Capacities (Annex 1): This annex outlines States Parties core capacity requirements for surveillance, reporting, and response under Articles 5, 13, and 19.
2.22Other consequential amendments: Textual improvements include terminology updates (for example, ‘ship declaration of health’) and clearer references to ‘core capacities’. Health documents may now be issued in digital or non-digital formats, with WHO guidance on authenticity verification. The Amended IHR defines ‘relevant health products’ broadly, including medicines, vaccines, diagnostics, medical devices, vector control products, personal protective equipment, decontamination products, assistive products, antidotes, cell- and gene-based therapies, and other health technologies.
Consultation
2.23The Australian Government undertook extensive stakeholder engagement to ensure that its participation in the negotiations to amend the IHR aligned with national priorities and interests. This included consultations with:
- Civil society, academia, and industry experts in November 2022, October 2023, and April 2024.
- Pharmaceutical and research and development stakeholders in March and April 2024.
- Regular engagement with state and territory governments across five sessions between July 2023 and May 2024.
- A public consultation held from 7 August to 24 September 2023 via the Department of Health, Disability and Aging (Department of Health) Consultation Hub, with a summary of responses published in December 2023.
- The IHR amendment negotiations also featured open sessions where international organisations and civil society groups could present their views for consideration by States Parties.
Implementation
2.25No legislative amendments are required to implement the treaty amendments prior to their entry into force as all necessary Commonwealth, State and Territory legislation is in place for Australia to comply with its new obligations contained in the Amended IHR.
Termination
2.26Under Article 59 of the Amended IHR, WHO States Parties have 10 months from the date of notification by the Director-General to formally reject or enter reservations to the amendments; any submissions beyond this period are considered invalid. The Amended IHR does not include provisions for suspension, withdrawal, or denunciation, meaning any such action by Australia would be governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Should Australia consider suspending or terminating its participation, this would likely follow extensive consultation with the WHO and be subject to Australia’s domestic treaty-making process, including review by the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT).
Costs
2.27The obligations contained in the Amended IHR will be implemented through existing surveillance and reporting mechanisms and policy, operational and administrative practices. At the public hearing the Department of Health explained to the Committee that the amendments pose no additional costs to Australia:
Australia already delivers the core capacities through existing laws, policies, programs and operations administered by various departments and by jurisdictional health authorities, and the amendments do not create any new mandatory financial obligations for Australia.
Future treaty action
2.28Under Article 54 of the Amended IHR, the WHA is mandated to periodically review the functioning of the Amended IHR. Article 50 further establishes a Review Committee to provide technical advice to the WHO Director-General, the WHA, or individual States Parties on potential amendments. Such proposals may be submitted by either the Director-General or a State Party and must be circulated to all States Parties at least four months prior to WHA consideration. Once adopted by the WHA, amendments enter into force for all States Parties under the same conditions as the original IHR. Any future treaty action involving Australia would follow domestic treaty-making procedures, including tabling in Parliament and review by JSCOT.
Ratification status
2.29The Amended IHR entered into force for Australia and all other States Parties by deemed acceptance 12 months following its notification by the WHO Director-General. Any State Party intending to reject or to make reservations to any of the amendments was to notify the Director-General accordingly within a period of 10 months from the date of this notification. Any rejection or reservation received thereafter will have no effect.
2.30At the public hearing, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) provided the following further information about the ratification process of the treaty:
This [treaty] was a deemed acceptance provision, which operates with a due date, essentially, where, if a relevant number of states have taken or not taken an action by a certain date, it will enter into force. These are fairly common mechanisms for treaty amendments. Certainly, when there is a deemed acceptance provision, wherever possible, we will work with the relevant agencies to make sure that the parliamentary scrutiny process is able to be completed before that deemed acceptance date. Unfortunately, sometimes that's not possible.
Issues
Pandemic preparedness
2.31Throughout the course of the inquiry, the Committee examined how Australia’s response to a future pandemic would differ from its COVID-19 experience, in light of the proposed IHR amendments. Evidence presented to the Committee highlighted several key enhancements to global and national preparedness frameworks.
Enhanced alert mechanism
2.32One of the most significant changes introduced by the amendments is the creation of a new alert category: the pandemic emergency declaration. This mechanism supplements the existing PHEIC alert mechanism and is designed to elevate the visibility and urgency of emerging threats. At the public hearing, the Committee heard the following from the Department of Health:
This really allows for a quicker sharing of information of an emerging disease of concern that elevates that level of countries' attention to that disease…This is a way to elevate an emerging disease threat to really ensure that member states pay attention, prepare and have that extra time to ensure that we've got preparedness and response actions.
2.33The pandemic declaration aims to address shortcomings observed during the early stages of COVID-19, where the initial PHEIC did not trigger sufficient global action. This was partly because PHEICs are often issued for emergencies that do not directly affect the notified country — for example, Ebola in Sudan. The Department of Health explained:
…one of the main reasons [the pandemic declaration] was introduced was because there was a perception that at the time when COVID first appeared and a regular PHEIC was declared, some countries didn't appreciate the urgency of it, because there are, of course, PHEICs that are declared for other things that are very important but may not have pandemic potential. So it's not specifically so much what Australia would do differently as a result of these amendments but the better response from other countries that we could hope for and expect as a result of the amendments. We benefit when other countries uplift their ability to implement core capacities. We benefit when other countries are alerted more effectively of the urgency of a particular situation. We already implement all of the core capacities and the rest of the obligations in the IHR already. We would do so anyway because they are basically good things to do that Australia would do even if there wasn't an IHR, but the beauty of the amendments for us is that they are going to encourage and help uplift the capacity of other countries. The better they do where they are, the less likelihood that we will have to deal with it here or at least the greater lead time we will have.
Expanded core capacities
2.34The amendments also expand the definition and scope of core capacities required under the IHR. These now include capabilities to counter misinformation and disinformation, which were identified as major challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic. At the public hearing, Associate Professor Suman Majumdar from the Australian Institute for Infectious Diseases (AIID) explained:
…these core capacities have expanded and become more comprehensive. They include combating misinformation and disinformation, which is a major feature of what we've seen in this particular recent pandemic. We have seen it in all pandemics, but it's really been amplified in modern times. That does need to be addressed at many levels.
2.35The amendments enable more rapid and coordinated international responses to high-risk health events and improve equitable access to health products, particularly for developing countries. The Committee heard that early detection and response is critical in preventing the type of catastrophic impacts seen during COVID-19.
These core capacities span local, regional and national. They cover surveillance labs, health services and products as well as these really key health promotion messages. There are also these new mechanisms, the coordinating financial mechanism as well as some modest provisions to strengthen access to health products—these are all new and important contributions to strengthen the IHR. There are no risks to these; there are, in fact, strong benefits, and they are all in the right direction towards stronger cooperation, which all result in the outcome of improving the health and economic outcomes for Australians as well as reducing the risks of future threats.
2.36Australia’s geographic proximity to regions with limited health infrastructure underscore the importance of early detection and regional cooperation.
It's unlikely that the next pandemic will emerge in Australia; it's going to occur overseas. We responded swiftly and well [to COVID-19], but we know that measures such as border closures are not sustainable... We can't live in absolute isolation from these in our interconnected world, because of global travel and the fact that threats do cross borders. In Australia, we're less likely to be affected by that. However, we still have small maritime borders with Papua New Guinea to our north, for example, where there are significant needs to detect health issues early before they arrive—for example, tuberculosis. That's one of the areas that we're very familiar with.
Strengthened global health architecture
2.37The Committee heard that the modest but targeted amendments to the IHR represent a meaningful step toward strengthening global health architecture. Witnesses emphasised that Australia already has a satisfactory health infrastructure in place to identify and monitor genuine health emergencies and that it also meets its core obligations under the IHR. The benefits of these amendments for Australia therefore will be most evident in the strengthening of global health infrastructure, particularly in countries where future pandemics are more likely to emerge. At the public hearing Associate Professor Majumdar explained:
The best way to deal with these pandemics—and this is really informed by the independent review by the independent panel—is to act quickly, to pick up these threats where they occur at the source and to act to control and contained them there. Stopping an outbreak from becoming an epidemic, stopping an epidemic from becoming a pandemic—the only way to do that is by countries working together. That could have been the case with COVID-19 in the early stages. We saw delays, we saw some denial, we saw disparate responses, and we did not see international coordination. The mechanism we have is working together across countries through multilateral mechanisms, and currently that is through the system with the WHO. Withdrawing from the WHO or from that mechanism would further increase risks to Australia. There are only limited actions one can take to isolate oneself to protect against these threats. We live in a connected global world. From a health point of view, which is the focus of our submission and expertise, prevention is much better than cure or response, and that's what these amendments seek to do. The direction of all our efforts should be on preventing pandemics and epidemics.
2.38The amendments’ provision for faster, more coordinated international responses to high-risk health events, alongside more equitable access to essential health products for developing countries, serves Australia’s national interest by reducing the risk of future health threats and enhancing health outcomes in an increasingly interconnected world. At the same time, these measures represent a common good for other nations, strengthening collective resilience and promoting global health security.
Public concern
2.39A substantial number of submissions to the inquiry raised concerns regarding the amendments’ impact on Australian sovereignty, the privacy and security of Australian data, the integrity of the WHO, and financial obligations that may be posed upon Australia.
2.40The amendments were perceived as transferring decision-making and funding authority to an international body, the WHO, thereby undermining national sovereignty and transparency, and eroding democratic processes. The amendments were also seen to be imposing reporting requirements – interpreted by some as intrusive surveillance – on Australia, thereby threatening public trust and individual rights. Many submissions called on the government to reject the amendments, withdraw from the Treaty, or even consider Australia’s withdrawal as a Member State of the WHO.
Sovereignty
2.41During the inquiry process, the Committee found that the legal framework and operational realities of the Amended IHR would not allow the WHO to override Australia’s sovereignty and democratic processes. At the public hearing the Department of Health explained the following:
All countries retain sovereignty regarding their health policies, including public health and safety measures such as border measures, use of masks, and vaccines. This is enshrined in international law, including in article 3 of the existing IHR.
In addition to article 3 sub 4 clearly stating that states parties retain full national sovereignty over their public health legislation, their public health policy, the argument about the WHO being empowered to force countries to do things is inaccurate. Where a public health emergency of international concern has been declared, the WHO Director-General can issue a temporary recommendation to affected states parties suggesting that they do various things, but, as you will see in article 1, temporary recommendations are clearly stated to be non-binding.
2.42Associate Professor Jonathan Liberman from the AIID confirmed, Australia retains full discretion in responding to WHO recommendations. The temporary, non-binding recommendations issued by the WHO are typically general in nature and allow countries to tailor their responses based on local circumstances and capacities. The Department of Health explained:
…Australia is always going to review what the public health risk is, look at what the appropriate response measures will be and make those decisions based on the environment within Australia.
2.43Associate Professor Liberman further emphasised that the ‘WHO has an important mandate and responsibilities, but it’s in the context where it’s up to individual States Parties to decide how they’re going to respond domestically’. The process for declaring a public health emergency or pandemic emergency is detailed and transparent, involving an emergency committee whose reports are published and supported by additional documentation.
2.44Internationally, the vast majority of countries remain committed to the IHR framework. The Department of Health noted that, ‘of the over 190 countries who were State Parties leading up to 19 September, well over 180 presently remain so, with a few more to be resolved once they complete their domestic processes’. This widespread participation underscores the global consensus that the IHR respects national sovereignty while facilitating coordinated responses to health threats.
Privacy and data security
2.45Concerns that the Amended IHR compromise Australia’s data privacy protections proved to be unfounded during the course of the inquiry. Australia maintains strict privacy laws and regulations governing the collection and use of health data, as was clarified by the Department of Health at the public hearing:
Australia maintains very strict privacy rules and regulations around how we collect data and for what purposes. Any information that is shared on a public health issue with the WHO, through the international health regulations, is absolutely de-identified.
2.46The IHR framework respects national sovereignty over public health legislation and policy, including data governance. The Department of Health explained that ‘data provided to the WHO… is done under the laws and regulations of the country providing it’. Australia’s response to the Mpox outbreak was cited as an example of this:
Australia has chosen not to do that periodic reporting in the form recommended precisely, because to do so would breach our own data regulations. There is no compulsion upon a state party to provide personal health records or data about individual citizens in ways that go beyond the laws and regulations of the state party.
2.47The Committee heard that Australia applies rigorous internal clearance assessments on any data requests. The Department of Health described the process:
We have SOPs… and when we get information around [a disease], we will ensure that, if it's de-identified and it meets our other requirements around having a useful information or appropriate clinical information, we will then make a decision about whether we will provide it or not.
It was further confirmed that it is always Australia’s decision whether to respond to WHO data requests, which enables compliance with national privacy standards.
Integrity of the WHO
2.48Submissions to the inquiry raised concerns about the integrity of the WHO, including its process for determining the proposed amendments and the potential influence on the WHO from corporate interests. In response, the Department of Health and experts from the AIID provided explanations to clarify Australia’s role in the treaty making process and the safeguards that are in place.
2.49The Committee heard that Australia’s engagement with the WHO in negotiating the amended IHR followed standard diplomatic and treaty processes. The Department of Health explained, ‘the Department of Health jointly engaged with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in the negotiation process and the development of a whole-of-government mandate. We consulted with the community, with stakeholders, with state and territory governments to inform our engagement’. Another added, ‘I’ve been involved in several multilateral treaties, and this was by the book. It was no different to those’, reinforcing that the process was consistent with Australia’s established international negotiation practices.
2.50Concerns about corporate influence within WHO governance were also addressed. DFAT clarified that,
The WHO is a large organisation, but it is fundamentally a member-state-driven organisation. The agenda of the WHO and its governance are set by the members, the 190-odd members that form the World Health Organization.
2.51It was noted that while the WHO receives funding from philanthropic sources such as the Gates Foundation, decision-making authority rests with its member states.
2.52Experts further emphasised the robustness of WHO’s governance mechanisms. Associate Professor Majumdar stated, ‘There is pretty strong governance in WHO mechanisms, there’s transparency and… a lot of governance bureaucracy… but overall, that is needed; that is an important part of this institution’. Associate Professor Liberman reinforced this view, noting:
…it's a member state organisation, so it's governed by the World Health Assembly, which is comprised of governments. They make the decisions for how the WHO should operate.
Financial obligations
2.53Throughout the inquiry, the Committee heard concerns about the financial implications of the amended IHR, particularly the potential burden on Australian taxpayers expected to support WHO-led initiatives. Dr Foster from Australians for Science and Freedom argued the amendments place pressure on Australia to fund activities that are not subject to a clear benefit-cost analysis, stating, ‘There is no recognition of the opportunity cost of such financial decisions… These amendments exacerbate the potential for waste, corruption and abuse of Australian taxpayer funds during emergencies’.
2.54In response, DFAT clarified that Australia retains full discretion over how and when it contributes financially to international health efforts. DFAT provided a practical example from the COVID-19 pandemic, explaining that ‘Australia saw that our region had significant challenges accessing COVID-19 vaccines… We made a decision, as Australia, to step in to help fill that gap. At no stage were we purchasing vaccines directly from the WHO’. DFAT went on to outline the three channels through which Australia chose to provide vaccines to countries in our region:
One was in contributions to a global initiative coordinated by a network called COVAX—of which WHO was a member—that also included Gavi, which is a large international vaccine-procuring organisation. But the main channels that Australia used in this instance were donating supplies from our own domestic stocks when surplus doses were available and procuring additional vaccines through UNICEF for donation directly to countries in the region. In no case were we forced to use a particular mechanism; those were all decisions of government, as to which offered the best value for money and were best able to meet the region's need in a timely manner. The vaccines in question that were provided were all vaccines that were approved for use in Australia, and we weren't directed as to which particular ones to use.
Committee comment
2.55Australia already possesses a robust health infrastructure capable of identifying and managing health emergencies. The primary benefit of participating in the amended IHR is not to change Australia’s domestic health response, but to help strengthen health systems in other countries, particularly in regions where pandemics are more likely to emerge. By reducing vulnerabilities globally, the likelihood of future pandemics is reduced, ultimately safeguarding the health of Australians in an interconnected world.
2.56Australia retains full sovereignty over its health policies, and the IHR amendments do not override domestic law. Instead, they provide a cooperative framework for managing international health risks, with each country retaining full autonomy over its domestic implementation. The Committee reaffirms that implementation of the Amended IHR will be subject to Australia’s legislative and regulatory frameworks, ensuring that public health measures remain accountable to the Australian Parliament and people.
2.57The Committee found that the IHR amendments do not compel Australia to share personal health data or override its privacy laws. All data sharing remains voluntary, de-identified, and subject to Australia’s own legal and ethical frameworks.
2.58While the amended IHR encourage resource mobilisation to support under-resourced countries, they do not impose binding financial obligations on Australia. Decisions regarding funding, procurement, and international support remain under the control of the Australian Government, ensuring accountability, transparency, and alignment with domestic policy objectives. To maintain public trust and confidence during any future public health emergencies, the Committee recommends that the Australian Government clearly and consistently communicate the rationale and implications of these measures to the Australian public.
2.59The Committee found that the treaty-making process was consistent with established practice and procedural norms. The Committee also notes that the Amended IHR entered into force via deemed acceptance, a mechanism commonly used in treaty amendments. This process is legally valid under international law and was communicated publicly through the National Interest Analysis.
2.60The Committee supports the Amendments to the International Health Regulations (2005) and recommends that binding treaty action be taken.