Introduction
3.1
The Indian Ocean is one of the fastest growing regions on the planet. It is a melting pot of nations and cultures with populations that are becoming increasingly engaged within the global landscape. The region is also home to a number of rapidly developing economies with emerging economic and security interests.
3.2
As outlined in chapter 2, Australia’s interests in the Indian Ocean are broad and include economic and security interests, as well as a significant exclusive economic zone, and search and rescue region.
3.3
Australia has a number of strategic partners in the Indian Ocean region. Evidence to the Committee supports the view that Australia should continue to nurture these relationships, while also developing new relationships with emerging partners in the region. Benefits of further engagement in the region may include improved maritime trade and energy security.
3.4
Previous chapters have highlighted broadly the changing nature of the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region. While this presents some challenges, there may also be increased opportunities for further engagement with those in the region. This chapter will consider evidence relating to Australia’s current engagement with partners, as well as the significant opportunities that may emerge due to the changing dynamics in the region.
Australia’s current engagement with Indo-Pacific partners
3.5
The inquiry provided an opportunity for key stakeholders to provide evidence to the Committee about Australia’s current engagement with its partners in the Indian Ocean region, with a particular focus on the role played by Australia’s Indian Ocean Territories.
3.6
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade submitted that Australia works closely with partners in the region, both bilaterally and through regional forums, ‘to enhance maritime security and promote habits of cooperation.’ Inquiry participants considered Australia’s engagement through international forums and treaties, humanitarian assistance, and military cooperation.
International forums and treaties
3.7
Australia is involved in a variety of international forums focusing on the Indian Ocean region. These forums provide an opportunity for diplomatic engagement, the establishment of common interests, increased understanding of different regional perspectives and partnerships, and the ability to influence the strategic decisions undertaken by partners in the region.
3.8
In its submission to the inquiry, the Department of Defence outlined Australia’s participation in a number of forums in the Indian Ocean region. For example, Australia is one of 23 member states of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, which aims to enhance ‘maritime cooperation between littoral states, with a view to building effective maritime security architecture in the region.’ As Chair of the Symposium in 2014-15, Australia oversaw the creation of three working groups which considered issues relating to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security and information sharing and interoperability. The Department also noted Australia’s involvement in the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime.
3.9
Australia is also an active party to other regional agreements that consider matters including people smuggling, human trafficking and irregular migration, transnational crime, piracy, drug trafficking and the ‘conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.’
3.10
For example, the Department of Defence noted the 2005 treaty between Australia and France to combat illegal fishing operations and promote scientific research on marine living resources in territories administered by the respective nations in the Southern Indian Ocean and Southern Ocean. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade also noted Australia’s international advocacy for measures to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, including through active participation in relevant fisheries management organisations, such as membership of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission and the Commission on the Conservation of Southern Blue Fin Tuna.
Humanitarian and search and rescue assistance
3.11
Evidence to the Committee indicated that, as well as diplomatic forums and international agreements, Australia engages with its Indian Ocean partners through the provision of humanitarian assistance.
3.12
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade advised that ‘Australia also has obligations under international conventions to provide assistance to any person(s) or ship(s) in distress within the Australian Search and Rescue Region.’ By way of example, the Department of Defence highlighted Australia’s lead role in the search for missing Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 in the Indian Ocean region. The Department advised that the search was coordinated by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority with the assistance of 22 military aircraft and 19 ships provided by the Department of Defence and international partners China, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States.
3.13
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade referred to Australia’s provision of assistance to support the maritime safety and search and rescue capabilities of regional partners, and the conduct of joint search and rescue exercises and information sharing. The Department also noted that Australia provides support to countries in the Indian Ocean region to better prepare for disasters, and also humanitarian assistance and protection in response to rapid and slow onset crises.
Regional security and military cooperation
3.14
Regional security and military cooperation are also key planks in Australia’s engagement with its partners in the region. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade suggested that advancing:
… regional security and prosperity, and contributing to shaping and running regional institutions which reinforce the rule of law and international norms of behaviour, is at the heart of Australia’s foreign policy.
3.15
The Department advised the Committee that Australia was committed to ‘comprehensive maritime security engagement in the Indo-Pacific based on the principles of respect for international law, freedom of navigation and overflight and open sea lines of communication,’ which ‘facilitate the movement of a significant proportion of global energy and maritime trade, particularly trade to and from North and East Asia.’ Any blockage or threat to these trade routes could lead to instability and potentially substantial increases in energy prices.
3.16
While it is imperative that Australia carefully consider its military engagement, the Committee was told that military cooperation, including joint exercises, provide an opportunity to develop important partnerships in the region. In its submission to the inquiry, the Department of Defence referred to Australia’s participation in the United States-led Combined Maritime Forces exercise, which comprises deployments from 31 countries in the Middle East region and Western Indian Ocean. The focus of these operations is on defeating terrorism, preventing piracy, encouraging regional cooperation and promoting a safe maritime environment.
3.17
Major General Gus Gilmore of the Department of Defence highlighted Australia’s participation in Exercise Kakadu, which was hosted by the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Australian Air Force and involved 19 ships, 18 aircraft, and approximately 3000 people from around 20 nations. Major General Gilmore also highlighted that, since 1990, the Royal Australian Navy has conducted a range of maritime security exercises including Operation Manitou in the western Indian Ocean region and the Middle East, and also Exercise Northern Shield, last held in 2016.
Future engagement opportunities with regional partners
3.18
As discussed in chapter 2, the economic and security environment in the Indian Ocean region is evolving, with rapidly growing economies seeking greater engagement in the region alongside established regional powers. In some cases, a number of regional powers are increasing their strategic capabilities, including naval operations. The Indian Ocean region is becoming an increasingly important trade route for Australia, with key seaborne trade markets including: China, Japan, South East Asia and India.
3.19
Inquiry participants gave evidence on a range of opportunities for Australia to further develop its strategic partnerships in the region. While it was suggested that Australia needed to have different types of relationships with its strategic partners, evidence also highlighted opportunities for further engagement with existing partners, such as the United States, India and Indonesia. Opportunities to expand Australia’s strategic relationships with other countries in the region including Japan, China, Singapore, and Malaysia were also raised.
3.20
This section discusses evidence relating to Australia’s relationships with the United States, India, and Indonesia, as well as evidence relating to reciprocal access to Australian facilities for strategic partners in Australia’s Indian Ocean Territories, such as the Cocos (Keeling) Islands airport runway.
The Cocos (Keeling) Islands Airport runway
3.21
As discussed in chapter 3, an upgrade of the Cocos Islands airport runway has been proposed. Some inquiry participants suggested that, under the right conditions, Australia may wish to grant reciprocal access to that facility to strategic partners as part of collaborative efforts in the Indian Ocean region.
3.22
Dr Malcolm Davis raised one possible arrangement, noting that India is operating aircraft similar to the Australian Navy’s soon to be acquired P-8A Poseidon surveillance aircraft. Dr Davis suggested that Australia may wish to consider whether reciprocal access to the Cocos Islands airport runway could be granted in the spirit of increased cooperation with India.
3.23
However, Dr Anthony Bergin stated that Australia must exercise caution in the manner in which access to Australia’s strategic assets are granted. Mr Peter Jennings suggested that Australia should consider how any such arrangement may be perceived by other regional partners.
Australia’s relationship with the United States
3.24
Australia’s most important and enduring strategic alliance in the Indian Ocean is its relationship with the United States. It is a relationship that will remain important for Australia.
3.25
Several inquiry participants raised the issue of enhanced cooperation between Australia and the United States with respect to access to Australian defence infrastructure, particularly in relation to HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. While HMAS Stirling is closer to Perth than Australia’s Indian Ocean Territories, it nonetheless remains an important strategic capability for Australia’s security in the broader Indian Ocean region.
3.26
Mr Jennings noted that there had been discussions between the previous Australian and United States governments about several phases of cooperation, including ‘more American warships operating out of HMAS Stirling.’ He suggested that ‘the possibility for us to offer cooperation out of HMAS Stirling in the west is a real one.’
3.27
However, Major General John Hartley of Future Directions International suggested that in the short term the United States was unlikely to base major military capability in Western Australia. Major General Hartley noted that the United States now practiced rotating crews between their existing naval infrastructures, rather than rotating ships as had been the case previously. He added that, while it was possible that ‘US ships will occasionally pass through Fremantle … 10 years ago there was a much greater naval presence in this part of the world than there is now.’
3.28
Dr Ross Babbage suggested that, given its proximity to the United States base on the island of Diego Garcia, Australia may wish to consider granting some degree of reciprocal access to the Cocos Islands airport.
Australia’s relationship with Indonesia
3.29
Indonesia is Australia’s nearest neighbour and the two countries share a strong relationship. This includes joint efforts relating to law enforcement and people smuggling activities.
3.30
Inquiry participants submitted that Australia should seek to further strengthen its relationship with Indonesia through further cooperation such as joint naval patrols in the Indian Ocean region.
3.31
Dr Davis suggested that Australia should seek to develop defence-related capabilities together with Indonesia. In particular, he suggested that Australia should work with Indonesia ‘to develop common capabilities for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, data links, [and] space capabilities.’ The benefits of such cooperation, Dr Davis suggested, includes boosting the capacity of the Indonesian defence industry, information sharing, and the development of common platforms, sensors, and networks to further enhance cooperation.
3.32
Future Directions International suggested that there are benefits to the inclusion of Indonesian military personnel in future joint military exercises in the Indian Ocean region. It was suggested that this would improve the relationship between the two countries and provide a better understanding of joint and individual strategic philosophies.
Australia’s relationship with India
3.33
Evidence to the inquiry suggested that India, and South Asia more generally, are of growing importance to Australia, particularly in relation to the trade in merchandise. A number of witnesses submitted that Australia’s relationship with India could be developed through increased cooperation between the two countries. While it was noted that the nurturing of this relationship would take time, the signing of the 2014 whole-of-government security framework is an example of Australia’s increasing cooperation with India.
3.34
In developing the relationship between Australia and India, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade suggested that the Australian Government hoped that talks between Australian and Indian Ministerial and foreign agencies in late 2017 would encourage a high-level security dialogue. More broadly, the Department suggested that Australia’s strategic capabilities in parts of the Indian Ocean region and its close relationship with the United States meant that India viewed Australia as ‘a much more relevant actor and as a potential partner.’
3.35
According to Dr David Brewster of the National Security College at the Australian National University, Australia has the capacity to assist India in building its own maritime awareness capabilities in the Indian Ocean. Dr Davis also advised the Committee that a strong case could be made for joint anti-submarine warfare patrols should India be granted joint access to the Cocos Islands airfield.
Committee comment
3.36
The Indian Ocean region is home to a diverse range of national and economic interests, including those of Australia. Australia’s interests in the region are centred in the islands of the Indian Ocean Territories, strategically located and utilised as part of Australia’s defence, border protection and humanitarian activities in the region.
3.37
Australia has the right to protect its interests in the region and in the Committee’s view has an obligation to contribute to regional stability. The Committee is pleased that evidence to the inquiry highlights the regional engagement activities that Australia undertakes with a variety of partners in the region including in the areas of trade, humanitarian relief, deterrence of transnational crimes, border protection and regional security. The Committee encourages the Australian Government to continue to expand these efforts as appropriate.
3.38
As demonstrated by Australia’s pivotal role in coordinating the search for missing Maylasia Airlines flight MH370, Australia is a well-established leader in the region. The Committee understands that this process generated significant goodwill and extensive cooperation with many regional partners.
3.39
The Committee’s inquiry has highlighted the opportunities that exist for Australia to further engage in the region. In particular there exist opportunities for Australia to strengthen ties with its Indo-Pacific partners through regionally-focussed forums and bilateral and multilateral exercises in the Indian Ocean region. The Committee notes there may be local community concern regarding the presence of foreign militaries in the Indian Ocean Territories; this is examined in chapter 5.
3.40
In the Committee’s view, access to its strategic infrastructure should only be granted once the Australian Government has fully considered regional dynamics, its own security interests, and the potential impacts on local communities. Such consideration will allow the Australian Government to pursue an inclusive strategy promoting cooperation, stability and security within the region while it is beyond the scope of this inquiry for the Committee to comment on the details of any potential arrangements, it is clear that significant strategic opportunities exist and may be available for the Australian Government to pursue if appropriate.
3.41
Overall, the Committee is convinced of the benefits of the Australian Government conducting additional exercises and carrying out activities in the Indian Ocean region, in cooperation with its Indo-Pacific partners. While noting concerns raised by local communities about foreign military personnel on the islands, as detailed in chapter 5, the Committee considers that cooperative exercises can be carried out in a way that benefits the local communities, and that potential negative impacts can be carefully managed.
3.42
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government strengthen its engagement with Australia’s Indo-Pacific partners, through existing regional forums and alliances that Australia currently participates in, particularly through pursuing opportunities for bilateral and multilateral defence activities and training exercises in the Indian Ocean region.