List of Recommendations

Recommendation 1

6.8

The Committee recommends the Australian higher education and research sector, via the University Foreign Interference Taskforce, undertake a campaign of active transparency in relation to the national security risks. The Committee recommends that the University Foreign Interference Taskforce have oversight of this campaign and report to the Australian Government on progress.

Recommendation 2

6.9

The Committee welcomes the revised UFIT Guidelines and further recommends adherence to those guidelines be reported annually to the PJCIS in writing, accompanied by a classified briefing. This briefing should include an explanation of the capabilities developed to monitor and evaluate compliance with the guidelines.

The Government should further consider the UFIT terms of reference and update relevant guidance material to ensure the body remains fit for purpose.

Recommendation 3

6.10

The Committee recommends University Foreign Interference Taskforce assist universities to introduce, maintain and develop relevant training on national security issues for staff and students. Universities should employ an accountable authority who is responsible for managing foreign interference risks at their institution. This position should be based upon the framework set out in part 1.2 of the updated UFIT Guidelines.

Recommendation 4

6.14

The Committee recommends the University Foreign Interference Taskforce establish a working group to address the issue of on-campus intimidation, reporting on fellow students or staff to foreign embassies, and intimidation on campuses related to the national security risks and make recommendations to the Australian Government and the sector.

This group, as a matter of urgency, should provide clear guidance to universities on implementing penalties for foreign interference activities on campus, including reporting on fellow students to foreign governments. These should be clearly defined in university codes of conduct and communicated to students.

Recommendation 5

6.32

The Committee recommends the Department of Education, Skills and Training should, in concert with the University Foreign Interference Taskforce, annually publish a report that documents incidents of harassment, intimidation and censorship that occur as a result of foreign interference activities on Australian university campuses. This report should include the steps and responses, if any, taken by the university.

Recommendation 6

6.33

The Committee recommends the Department of Education, Skills and Training and the Department of Home Affairs work to develop a secure mechanism that allows individual students to anonymously report incidents of intimidation, retaliation, harassment, or censorship on campus where a student believes those behaviours are associated with foreign interference.

Recommendation 7

6.36

The Committee recommends that Universities who elect to host a Confucius Institute should disclose and make public details of those agreements and funding arrangements, and that at a minimum, Universities have a final say about the appointment of staff, curriculum content and that robust academic freedom and free speech clauses be included in any agreement.

The Committee supports the Foreign Minister using her existing veto powers under the Foreign Relations Act to make determinations in the national interest, including in relation to Confucius Institutes.

Recommendation 8

6.39

The Committee recommends the Foreign Minister exercise her power under the Foreign Relations Act to make a determination in the national interest relating to the agreement between Monash University and COMAC.

Recommendation 9

6.44

The Committee recommends the higher education sector take note of the “Blueprint for Critical Technologies” released by the Critical Technologies Policy Coordination Office within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet on 17 November 2021 as a reference for areas of research sensitive to the national interest and exercise greater caution with international research partnerships, PhD students and cyber-security. However, the Committee urges the sector not to consider this list exhaustive and to also use their own judgement about technologies which might subsequently emerge. In these sensitive research cases, universities should be required to provide additional security assurances regarding research personnel to Commonwealth funding agencies.

Recommendation 10

6.54

The Committee recommends ASIO, in their annual report to parliament, provide information on threats to the Australian higher education and research sector as a routine part of their broader threat assessment.

Recommendation 11

6.57

The Committee recommends the University Foreign Interference Taskforce establish clear policies on what constitutes acceptable dual appointments of foreign diplomats at Australian tertiary institutions. Universities should also make their own judgements about whether appointments are consistent with the values they seek to uphold.

Additionally, the Committee recommends the Attorney-General’s Department and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade consider whether appointments of foreign diplomats to Australian tertiary institutions are adequately addressed via existing legislative frameworks.

Recommendation 12

6.59

The Committee recommends the University Foreign Interference Taskforce provide guidance to support universities allowing for anonymous assignment submission.

Recommendation 13

6.60

The Committee recommends the Attorney-General’s Department should clearly communicate Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme requirements to foreign student associations operating at Australian universities and investigate possible cases of non-compliance.

Recommendation 14

6.71

The Committee recommends the Australian Government provide deeper and timelier security advice to assist the sector in their risk identification and management processes.

Recommendation 15

6.80

The Committee recommends the Department of Defence deny Defence Industry Security Program accreditation to institutions with exposure to talent recruitment programs that is assessed to be a security issue.

Recommendation 16

6.82

The Committee recommends more timely and relevant advice be provided by the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in support of the defence export control and autonomous sanctions schemes.

Recommendation 17

6.88

The Committee recommends employees of government departments and agencies be prohibited from participation in talent-recruitment programs.

Recommendation 18

6.90

The Committee recommends the Attorney-General’s Department and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade assess whether existing legislative tools are sufficient for addressing membership in talent programs that are against the national interest.

Recommendation 19

6.92

The Committee recommends the Department of Education, Skills and Employment commission a risk-based audit which samples Australian Research Council grants over the past decade to determine exposure associated with participation in talent recruitment programs noting the thousand talents program is one amongst many. The audit should investigate whether grant rules have been adhered to regarding intellectual property.

The Committee also recommends the Government investigate the adequacy of existing penalties for research institutions who are failing to detect or respond to any breaches to ARC grant rules identified in the audit.

Recommendation 20

6.94

The Committee recommends the University Foreign Interference Taskforce work with universities to develop best practice audit requirements regarding senior research staff members’ foreign interests, including participation in talent programs. These foreign interests should then be provided to UFIT and university-specific but individually anonymised information on foreign interests made publicly available via UFIT’s website. This should include transparency on measures taken to address incidences of security concern and conflicts.

Recommendation 21

6.96

The Committee recommends the Departments of Education, Skills and Employment and Foreign Affairs and Trade assist the sector in diversifying international student populations.

Recommendation 22

6.100

The Committee recommends the Government direct the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency to initiate a regular audit of national security issues and responses in the sector by establishing a National Research Integrity Office within the Agency. The findings of this audit should be publicly reported.

Recommendation 23

6.109

The Committee recommends representation from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade be included in the University Foreign Interference Taskforce.

Recommendation 24

6.111

The Committee recommends University Foreign Interference Taskforce assist universities to introduce, maintain and develop relevant training on national security issues for staff and students.

Recommendation 25

6.114

The Committee recommends the University Foreign Interference Taskforce develop a national security legislation implementation working group to assist universities in actioning national security legislation and related policies. This working group should develop understanding within the sector as to the relationship between various pieces of national security legislation.

Recommendation 26

6.118

The Committee recommends the Australian Research Council clearly communicate to the sector via the University Foreign Interference Taskforce the serious consequences of grant fraud to increase awareness of disclosure requirements. All Commonwealth funding organisations should consider the adequacy of existing compliance and accountability policies with regard to the provision of grant funding.

In addition the Committee recommends the Australian Research Council toughen penalties against grant fraud and inadequate or incomplete disclosure and prioritise investigation and enforcement of them.

Tenders issued by all government agencies providing grants to research institutions should include a standard clause requiring compliance with existing countering foreign interference policies.

Recommendation 27

6.120

The Committee recommends a review of the ARC’s performance in assessing foreign interference and national security risks in the context of grant decisions. A copy of the review should be made available to the PJCIS.

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