- Australia’s military Assistance to Ukraine
Overview
2.1Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 was the most significant hostile act against a European country since the end of World War II. The international community of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and non-NATO contributors, including Australia, are continuing to aid Ukraine’s efforts in its fight to retain its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
2.2The Defence Subcommittee (the Subcommittee) examined Australia’s response to this crisis specifically:
- The facilitation of military aid focused on platforms
- Munitions, and
- The contribution to Operation KUDU, which is the Australia Defence Force (ADF) commitment to the training of Ukrainian recruits in the United Kingdom.
Australia’s military assistance to date
2.3In describing the conflict to date, a submission from Dr Matthew Sussex summarised that:
The Russian Federation’s illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on
February 24, 2022 was a flagrant violation of the global rules-based order, and
engendered Europe’s largest conflict since World War II. Russia’s actions have
killed thousands of innocent people and displaced millions more.
Reconstructing Ukraine will be extremely costly, and will require at least a
generation to complete.
2.4Mr Stefan Romaniw, Co-Chair of the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisations reflected that the conflict has ignited a war of values and sovereignty and has the potential to change the world order if Russia ‘wins’ the war.
2.5Mrs Rebecca Shrimpton, Director, Defence and National Security at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) said that while the invasion of Ukraine commenced on 24 February 2022, the crisis originated ten years prior, when Russia entered Crimea by force. Mrs Shrimpton suggested that:
… it was a lack of response and a lack of action at that time that quite possibly set the conditions for Russia to decide and be emboldened, in the way that it was two years ago, to roll across that territorial border, breaking international law and invading Ukraine.
2.6Some submitters argued that Russia has mobilised its defence industry, demonstrating a clear production advantage. Mr Mick Ryan, Retired Major General of the Australia Army and Senior Fellow for Military Studies in the Lowy Institute’s International Security Program submitted that Russia has regained the initiative on the battlefield, combined with munitions provided by Iran and North Korea. Dr Sussex suggested that, consequently, it seems Ukraine and the West can expect a protracted, drawn-out conflict.
2.7In its submission to the inquiry, the Department of Defence (referred to in this report as Defence, which includes the Department of Defence and the ADF) explained that the objective of Australia’s support to Ukraine, in collaboration with its partners, is to ‘empower Ukraine to resolve the conflict on its own terms’ and to uphold the international rules-based order.
2.8Defence submitted that Australia has provided approximately $730 million in aid to date, ‘including equipment from ADF stocks and equipment purchased from Australian defence industry’, comprising:
- 120 Bushmaster protected mobility vehicles
- Six M777 155mm light weight towed howitzers plus ammunition
- 56 M113AS4 armoured vehicles and 14 special operations vehicles
- 28 MAN 40M medium trucks and 14 trailers
- De-mining equipment to help remove explosive ordnance
- Anti-armour weapons and other weapons
- Technology from Australia suppliers, including unmanned aerial systems, decoys and remote vehicles, and
- 105mm and 155mm artillery.
- In addition to this assistance, the ADF has provided support to Ukraine through Operation KUDU, including the:
- training of Ukrainian recruits in the United Kingdom (UK), and
- deployment of a Royal Australian Air Force E-7 Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft.
- Operation KUDU is a component of a larger multinational program under the UK-led Operation INTERFLEX, which has trained more than 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers since June 2022.
- Since January 2023 the ADF has deployed four rotations of 70 to 90 personnel to the UK to train Ukrainian ‘“citizen-soldier” recruits’ in over 1,300 in basic military skills and infantry tactics for urban and wooded environments. There is potential for an expansion of training to include a junior leadership program at the request of Ukraine and the UK.
- In October 2023 the ADF completed a six-month deployment of a Royal Australian Air Force E-7A Wedgetail aircraft and 100 crew and support personnel to Germany, in support of Ukraine. Integrating the capability with US and NATO partner capabilities to provide early warning of threats against vital supply lines for humanitarian and military assistance to Ukraine.
- In July 2024, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, the Hon Richard Marles MP, announced that the Australian Government has provided several additional assistance packages to Ukraine, with military assistance amounting to more than $1.1 billion and the overall assistance package amounting to more than $1.3 billion.
Domestic reactions to Australian military assistance
2.14Australia’s assistance in sustaining Ukraine’s war efforts was considered highly significant in much of the evidence provided to the Subcommittee. However, it was also noted as sporadic and made up of existing military stocks. At the time of making the submission to the inquiry, Defence’s equipment accounted for 80 per cent of Australia’s support to Ukraine.
2.15The Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisations highlighted concern that Australia’s contributions have become ‘smaller and less frequent over time’. Similarly, Mr Ryan pointed to Australia’s ranking of 35 out of 41 donors on the German Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support index which ranks donors of aid to Ukraine by their assistance as a percentage of their gross domestic product.
2.16The Subcommittee received evidence from multiple stakeholders about the need to improve the training support Australia is providing to Ukraine. Some submitters recommended that Operation KUDU be expanded to include more training for staff officers and senior leaders, and that more sophisticated warfighting concepts be developed to ‘solve several battlefield mobility and offensive problems’. Increasing the duration and types of training was also strongly recommended by Dr Sussex who explained:
The training cycle is five weeks. It simply isn't enough. There was a very good study that came out by Michael Kofman from CSIS [Center for Strategic and International Studies], who assessed what it was that caused Ukraine's counteroffensive to fail...
One of the chief things that came up was the training provided for [the Ukrainian National Guard]. He made the argument that a much longer block that would include things beyond just small unit tactics and hand signals and recognition would be very important.
2.17However, Dr Sussex went on to note that increasing the duration of training to ensure recruits are equipped for combat conflicts with the need to ‘get people to the front’ as soon as possible. He also suggested that training Ukrainian civilians in areas such as de-mining would assist with clearing, rebuilding and reconstruction efforts, while freeing up military personnel for service on the front lines.
2.18Mr Ryan submitted that as Defence equipment comprises most of Australia’s assistance to Ukraine, the Australian Government should mandate that any disposal of high value Defence assets be prioritised for Ukraine. He argued that this should include the armoured personnel carriers, Tiger attack helicopters and the M1 Abrams battle tanks.
2.19Mr Ryan also stated that to assist with the identification and delivery of these capabilities, options should be developed to seek pre-approval of the gifting of equipment to ensure timely delivery once decommissioned from Australian service. Similarly, Dr Sussex argued that concurrent processes are also required to review International Traffic in Arms Regulations and contractualapprovals for re-export of capabilities prior to decommissioning to reduce gifting lead times.
2.20Dr Alex Bristow, Deputy Director at ASPI, argued that the review and assessment process should include Ukrainian government officials to assist with confirming what capabilities are a priority for export to Ukraine.In its submission, ASPI also argued that where Defence has firm grounds to reject requests for materiel, broader efforts should be made to look for alternative ways to increase Australia’s contribution to Ukraine beyond supply considerations alone.
2.21However, Mr Bernard Philip, First Assistant Secretary, International Policy Division at the Department of Defence noted that Australia’s geography creates significant challenges with transport and logistics to Ukraine. He noted that compared to European countries, costs are higher and planning times are longer to transport military equipment from Australia to Ukraine.
2.22Mr Philip informed the Subcommittee that Defence was in the process of strengthening and enhancing current arrangements for its assistance to Ukraine. Anticipated outcomes of enhancing these arrangements included more proactive identification and progress options, more engagement with partners, and more detailed assessments of opportunities for donations, gifting and other contributions.
2.23With reference to assistance to Ukraine, Professor Rain Liivoja, Research Lead at the Law and the Future of War Research Group at the University of Queensland recommended:
Defence's broader gifting policy should be reviewed in conjunction with the ongoing review of Australia's export control system. In particular, Defence's approach to donating defunct ADF equipment to countries engaged in an existential armed conflict may be unnecessarily conservative. The current policy certainly appears to be more restrictive than Australia's international legal obligations would require.
2.24Whether Taipan helicopters, Hawkei vehicles, Abrams tanks and F/A-18 classic Hornets could be gifted to Ukraine was another significant issue raised in several submissions. For example, the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisations submitted that Ukraine urgently needs platforms and munitions including Bushmasters, Hawkei vehicles or soon-to-be-retired ADF material such as ASLAVs or Tiger helicopters.
2.25Defence advised that the MRH-90 Taipans have been disposed of in accordance with the approved disposal strategy, with the required Section 23 [of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth)] assessment of value for money. Major General Jeremy King, Head of the Joint Aviation Systems Division in the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group at the Department of Defence stated that the department has not obscured the decision process or planned disposal of capabilities; however, equally, it has not actively placed this information into the public domain. He stated that Defence had been in conversations with the original equipment manufacturers, and that the process is complex, and that their preference was, in this case, to feed the parts back into the NATO community users.
2.26The Subcommittee queried Defence about whether it had approached the United States of America (USA) regarding the gifting of the Abrams main battle tank or approached Canada about gifting the F/A-18 Hornet. Defence said that it is in regular contact with a range of partners, including the USA and Canada, about how to best support Ukraine, including through the USA-led Ukraine Defence Contact Group.
2.27Defence was further queried about whether it had enquired with Thales, the manufacturer of the Hawkei, about its preparedness to support the Hawkei if it were gifted to Ukraine. Defence responded that it had discussed the potential to support the Hawkei in Ukraine. However, in its written submission Defence pointed out that as the capability support system for Hawkei was still under development, any gifting of the Hawkei to Ukraine would adversely affect the ADF’s ability to achieve Final Operational Capability. Defence further cited that unresolved issues with the Hawkei’s antilock braking system and a limited supply of parts as further operational limitations.
2.28The Australian National Audit Office’s (ANAO) submission highlighted the Auditor-General’s report No.45 2022-23, Australia’s Provision of Military Assistance to Ukraine. This report found that Defence’s approach to providing military assistance to the Government of Ukraine was largely effective. The ANAO submitted that ‘Defence delivered military assistance quickly and in line with Australian Government expectations, while assessing the risks and implications for Australian national interests and capability’. However, the ANAO found that ‘not all legislative and administrative requirements were met in the context of this rapid implementation activity’.
2.29The ANAO’s report identified two opportunities for improvement:
- resolving, in consultation with the Department of Finance and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), issues identified in its administration of financial assistance grants provided by the Australian Government to assist the Government of Ukraine; and
- reviewing and evaluating current arrangements for the delivery of military assistance to the Government of Ukraine, to inform its approach to and implementation of any future assistance initiatives.
- In response to the ANAO’s report, Defence submitted it has implemented the suggested opportunities for improvement by:
- consulting with Finance to request a delegation from the Minister for Finance to the Secretary of Defence to enable the gifting of Defence property in support of Ukraine; and
- establishing an internal consultation process to consider and implement current and future Ukraine gifting.
Transparency around Australian military assistance
2.31In its submission, the Law and Future of War Research Group highlighted ‘there does not appear to be a consistent approach to the disclosure of information on support to different states’. They suggested that information about support to Ukraine is ‘well reported and readily discoverable by the public’, but, details of export control permits to states such as Israel and Saudi Arabia are more difficult to determine. The Law and Future of War Research Group argue that Australia needs to create a process that brings information into the public domain about to which states it is considering transferring military equipment and arms, complemented by a parallel process that allows the input of relevant information from the broader Australian community.
2.32Dr Lauren Sanders, who gave evidence in a private capacity, suggested that an additional proposal is that Australia's export control permits should change from being regionally based to reporting exports by state, which would achieve greater transparency because concerns from public and human rights organisations are typically single state focussed.
2.33A submission from the Law and Future of War Research Group also pointed out that:
The current ADF practice in providing training in the use of gifted military equipment is representative of best practice and should continue. This is both in terms of export controls and in discharging Australia’s international legal obligations to ensure respect for the laws of armed conflict.
2.34The Law and Future of War Research Group also observed the prevalent use of commercial-off-the-shelf equipment in Ukraine and highlighted the need for acquisition systems to include processes to streamline assessment of Australia’s international legal obligations as well as general ‘due diligence contracting and liability assessments’.
2.35However, while the nature and extent of assistance to Ukraine has been widely publicised, that is not the case generally. Professor Liivoja from the Law and Future of War Research Group at the University of Queensland argued:
More transparency is needed with respect to arms transfers to other countries, both through gifting by the government and through commercial exports by Australia's defence industry.
Coordination of Australian military assistance
2.36While Defence equipment has comprised most of Australia’s support to Ukraine, the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisation emphasised that this is only ‘one element of support that [Australia] has delivered to Ukraine’. It argued that no central point exists where ‘Ukraine’s needs can be evaluated against Australia’s [supply] capacities and prioritised for delivery’. This view was supported by Mr Ryan, who stated there is no central coordination mechanism to ensure a robust, whole-of-government approach is taken to ensuring Ukrainian needs are compiled, prioritised and met where possible.
2.37Dr Sussex recommended the establishment of ‘a small inter-agency group to monitor Australia’s assistance efforts and to anticipate future Ukrainian needs’. Defence subsequently confirmed in its evidence that an inter-agency group regularly meets to discuss the full range of Ukraine policy issues, including the assistance Australia provides.
2.38The Subcommittee queried the channels through which community members and stakeholders can engage the Australian Government on a range of issues that have arisen out of the conflict in Ukraine. Examples like humanitarian, reconstruction or visa issues were suggested. Defence informed the Subcommittee that individuals and groups tend to write to the Hon Richard Marles MP, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence. Defence considers the inquiries and proposals and then provides advice to the Deputy Prime Minister.
2.39Further, Mr Philip of the Department of Defence told the Subcommittee that Australian Government agencies work closely with the Ukrainian embassy, regularly meeting with the ambassador and occasionally with Ukrainian community representatives. Defence submitted those channels of communication are functioning well.
2.40The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) discussed the high degree of public interest in Australia’s support to Ukraine. Mr Chris Cannan, First Assistant Secretary, Europe Division at DFAT stated:
… we have regular engagements with the Embassy of Ukraine here. Obviously, we're aware of a high degree of public interest, and that comes through a full range of channels, whether it's correspondence to the minister or ministers. We don't have a formal front door per se, in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade at least, that people can direct queries to, but certainly there's very regular engagement, including with the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisations and the embassy. We have a range of interested stakeholders that approach the department, as you would expect, on issues of significant substance to Ukraine.
2.41Defence told the Subcommittee that it engages with the US-led Ukraine Defence Contact Group when considering options and priorities in support of Ukraine. Chaired by USA Defence Secretary Austin, this group provides insights into both Ukraine’s emerging priorities for support and the contribution that international partners are making.
2.42Defence stated there is also regular engagement with the government of Ukraine, through the Defence attaché who is based in Berlin, and through the Ukrainian Embassy located in Canberra. Defence stated that it regularly engages with partner countries to develop ‘capability consortiums’ to consider support to Ukraine across different capability areas, assessing priorities within available funding.
2.43Defence stated that internally, it has continued to evolve its processes with the establishment of a policy coordination unit in the International Policy Division, to act as a ‘focal point on Ukraine support’ and work with other defence stakeholders. Defence’s internal coordination is led by ‘a senior executive service star-ranked officer working group’. Defence said it believed it can competently respond to Ukraine's needs and ‘coordinate the potential gifting of ADF equipment as it reaches the end of its shelf life’.
Strategic messaging around Australian military assistance
2.44Mr Ryan suggested the Australian Government ‘has not consistently spoken to the Australian people about why Australia should support Ukraine and its people’. He recommended the Australian Government publicly outline the compelling national interest for our investment in the defence of Ukraine. Further, he also recommended that the Australian Government develop and publish a strategy for supporting Ukraine to garner public support and ensure transparency and accountability.
2.45Similarly, Dr Bristow, Deputy Director at ASPI commented that there is ‘insufficient information in the public domain’ for the public to know there is a strategy in place. He contended that it is important for the government, including the Prime Minister, to inform the Australian people about the inextricable ‘linkbetweenthesecurityofUkraineandEuropeandthesecurityofourownregion,theIndo-Pacific’.
2.46Dr Sussex pointed out that ‘cooperation with the Ukrainian government over requests for support has at times been challenging’. He observed that often there is ‘confusion about what is being sought’. For example, confusion over the potential gifting of Hawkei light protected vehicles, whether the F/A-18 classic Hornets might be donated to Ukraine and the inadvertent message that Australia would rather discard its Taipans than donate them to the Ukrainian war effort.
Australian Embassy in Ukraine
2.47In February 2022, shortly after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the Australian Government directed Australian Embassy staff to relocate from Kyiv to Warsaw, Poland. At the time of writing this report, the Australian Embassy for Ukraine continues to operate from Warsaw.
2.48Mr Ryan said that Australia should commit to returning its Ambassador to Ukraine with an accompanying Australian military attaché. He stated emphatically:
If Australian diplomats can remain in Port Moresby during riots, and in Tel Aviv during Hamas rocket attacks, why can’t they serve in Kyiv with its superb air, drone and missile defence system? This is an issue that has been raised with me on each of my visits to Ukraine, and is a topic also raised with me on visits to Washington DC, London, and Warsaw. Given nearly 70 nations have returned their ambassadors to Ukraine and reopened their embassies, the Australian position is inconsistent with its support of Ukraine and out of step with all its allies. Australia should commit to immediately returning its Ambassador to Ukraine.
2.49Similarly, Mr Stefan Romaniw, Co-chair of the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisations stated:
It would be very helpful to have the Australian ambassador on the spot in Kyiv, and who could then liaise with his or her colleagues …We need somebody on the ground who can talk to the Canadians, the Americans and the Europeans; therefore this whole-of-government strategy, this strategy for Ukraine and where everybody fits in, of course, makes a lot of sense. Sometimes we talk about the fact that we punch above our weight. We do. In a lot of things, we do; but, in other areas, we have to take a second seat and say, 'What's everybody doing?' If Defence is already doing that, from what we're seeing, there's a bit of a lack.
2.50When asked about re-establishing the Australian Embassy in Ukraine, officials advised that DFAT Secretary Jan Adams had provided evidence on this matter at a Senate Estimates hearing earlier in 2024, and that she had said it was under ‘active consideration’. DFAT stated that the ‘decision to return diplomatic personnel to Ukraine will be the subject of a detailed assessment to ensure the risks to staff, both physical and psychological, can be controlled to an acceptable level’. DFAT also stressed that the Australian Ambassador to Ukraine, currently based in Poland, has travelled to Kyiv five times since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
2.51As referred to above, Ms Adams, DFAT Secretary told the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee on 15 February 2024 that:
My assessment of my WHS [workplace health and safety] responsibilities is unchanged. As I've said before, I view staff safety and security as paramount. The risks to personnel there are high. Kyiv's air defence systems have… performed admirably, but… they're not able to defend completely against missile attacks from the Russians. The situation remains unpredictable and quite difficult to mitigate. The embassy is operating remotely out of Warsaw. They're able to manage Australia's interests quite effectively from there. That is supplemented by the active engagement that we have with the Ukraine embassy here in Canberra.
2.52Mr Adam McCarthy, DFAT Chief Counsel and First Assistant Secretary told the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee 3 June 2024 that:
… these are very much point-in-time, point-in-situation calculations. Under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 [(Cth)], the obligations, which are onerous, apply directly to the secretary as the accountable authority. There are a series of balances that are contained within the act, and it's almost impossible to extrapolate out and say 'in this position' or 'in that place' or 'in these times'. They are decisions that have to be made in real time, and those balances and the responsibility for those fall, in the final analysis, on the secretary.
2.53Mr Ryan also raised the proposition of a military attaché being sent to Kyiv. He contended that the presence of a military attaché would be important in:
… prioritising military assistance requests, facilitating ongoing logistic support for equipment provided by Australia, ensuring Australian Army trainers are providing the most relevant training to Ukrainians in the United Kingdom, and facilitating a steady flow of lessons on modern warfare to the Australian Defence Force leadership for its ongoing modernisation efforts.
2.54Defence said that the current defence attaché (DA) in Berlin is responsible for Australia’s relationship with Poland and is also accredited to Ukraine. Defence stressed that the DA travels to Kyiv periodically and is very well coordinated in his efforts. In addition to the DA, Defence identified that:
… we are also connected at multiple levels within NATO and within the Ukraine Defence Contact Group at our other embassies, including in Washington and London, so we are able to draw upon a wide body of information and reporting to inform the government's decisions.
2.55The Subcommittee queried Defence on the co-location requirements for defence attachés within embassies. Specially, it sought clarity on the barriers, legalities and workplace safety requirements around the placement of a defence attaché in Kyiv. Defence said that it is usual practice to locate defence attachés within Australian diplomatic missions overseas and that the current Australian Embassy Ukraine continues to operate from Poland with periodic visits to Kyiv.
2.56DFAT separately confirmed it does not require defence attachés to be to be co-located within an embassy, but there are attachés located within embassies, who may also have accreditation to other countries outside the location of that embassy.
The future of Australian support for Ukraine
2.57The Australian Government, at the highest levels, has given clear indications of ongoing Australian support for Ukraine. For example, the Hon Anthony Albanese MP, Prime Minister of Australia, articulated Australia’s ongoing support to Ukraine, stating ‘Australia remains steadfast in supporting Ukraine to defend itself against Russia’s illegal and immoral invasion’. He continued:
We stand with Ukraine in support of its courageous people and also in defence of a fundamental principle – the right to every sovereign nation to be secure in its own borders and to determine its own future.
2.58The Hon Richard Marles MP, Deputy Prime Minister, also stated:
Australia is proud to stand with its partners at this historic NATO Summit to demonstrate our unwavering commitment to the Government of Ukraine…
Russia’s illegal and immoral invasion of Ukraine stands as an affront to international law and the rules-based order.
2.59Further, Senator the Hon Penny Wong, Minister for Foreign Affairs, said:
Australia strongly supports Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and we will continue to support Ukraine to end the war on its own terms…
[Australia] will continue to consistently condemn Russia's invasion, which is an attack on the UN Charter - a Charter which protects all nations, including Australia.
Committee comment
2.60Before turning to comment on the evidence, the Subcommittee wishes to acknowledge the untimely passing of Mr Stefan Romaniw OAM on 26 June 2024. Mr Romaniw was the Co-Chair of the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisations and had a long and distinguished public policy and community career in Victoria. He was a champion of multiculturalism and diversity. He also appeared before this Subcommittee in this inquiry to implore Australia to continue to assist Ukraine and support its fight for sovereignty to defeat the Russian invasion. He will be remembered for his powerful advocacy in Australia and abroad.
2.61The Subcommittee recognises the significant efforts of the Australian Government, government departments, civil interest groups and of individual Australians who have advocated for, coordinated and provided military and civil assistance to Ukraine also.
Australia’s ongoing commitment to Ukraine
2.62The Subcommittee believes it is important to reinforce Australia’s ongoing commitment to supporting Ukraine. Statements by the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs reaffirm Australia’s support for Ukraine is steadfast. In addition, Australia will continue to seek and maintain an international rules-based order and supports every sovereign nation’s right to be secure in its own borders and to determine its own future. This view was consistent throughout the evidence. As is commonly believed, the Subcommittee anticipates the Ukraine conflict will take years to resolve and will continue to impact Ukraine and its citizens for decades to come, requiring continued Australian and international assistance well into the future.
2.63The Subcommittee appreciates the significant roles that Defence and DFAT play in managing Australia’s support for Ukraine. It has noted the Department of Defence’s engagement with the US-led Ukraine Defence Contact Group. The Subcommittee commends DFAT for maintaining bilateral relations with Ukraine, while promoting Australian diplomatic support in international forums such as NATO and the United Nations.
2.64The Subcommittee was encouraged to hear that there is an inter-agency group that routinely meets to coordinate and manage Australian efforts and contributions to support Ukraine. While Defence and DFAT currently coordinate most of the support, the Subcommittee anticipates a future broadening of Australia’s assistance to include Australian defence and civil industries as reconstruction efforts increase overtime. The Subcommittee anticipates that support will require an increasing involvement of other government departments and agencies to achieve a whole-of-government effort into the future.
2.65The Subcommittee was surprised to learn there is no ‘one-stop-shop’ to which Australian or international organisations, stakeholders or community members can approach on a range of issues that have arisen out of the conflict in Ukraine. Instead, most representations are made to either the Deputy Prime Minister or the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Respective departments then coordinate responses with the Ministers’ offices. While Defence and DFAT said that the current channels of communication function well and they actively engage with the Ukrainian embassy, the Subcommittee considers the current processes to be disjointed, obscure, causing duplication and additional workload for ministerial offices.
2.66Thus, the Subcommittee considers there is an urgent need to appoint a lead coordination mechanism, via a unit or agency set up within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. The Subcommittee envisages that this unit or agency would act as the primary lead on Australia’s support to Ukraine, by coordinating cross departmental efforts, be a single point of entry for requests for Australia’s assistance and enable a smooth, more flexible, transition of Australia’s support into the future.
2.67The Subcommittee acknowledges the challenges and workload being placed on Defence to provide requested capabilities and notes that most of Australia’s assistance to Ukraine has comprised military hardware. The Subcommittee recognises that each request is assessed against Australia’s own preparedness requirements to meet the National Defence: Defence Strategic Review 2023 (2023 DSR) and 2024 National Defence Strategy.
2.68The Subcommittee anticipates a significant amount of ongoing assistance will need be sourced from Defence. As such, the Subcommittee recommends that a ‘Ukraine lens’ be applied to all capabilities and equipment being transitioned out of service. Proactively identifying capabilities several years in advance is essential to ensure Defence and the Australian government have sufficient time to plan for transitioning the capabilities to Ukraine, seek out appropriate export approvals, International Traffic in Arms Regulations waivers and sufficient time to conduct training, sourcing parts and original equipment manufacturer support ahead of time. Critical in the process is an appropriate cost benefit analysis of donating the capabilities noting Australia’s geographical remoteness to Ukraine. The significant cost and logistical effort required may outweigh the benefit of transferring the capabilities to Ukraine. In these instances, Australia may seek to contribute through alternative means.
Ukrainian input into Australian decisions on assistance
2.69The Subcommittee was also concerned by the lack of input from Ukrainians into the risk assessment of transitioning capabilities to their country. While the Subcommittee appreciates Defence’s views on not wishing to burden Ukraine with potentially faulty or unreliable equipment, the Subcommittee considers Ukraine to be the final arbiter on its acceptance of risk. The Subcommittee encourages the Australian Government and the Department of Defence to consider inviting Ukrainian input into the assessment and acceptance of risks when identifying and transferring capabilities.
2.70During the inquiry, the Subcommittee sought to understand Defence’s decision-making and approval processes in identifying capabilities for transfer to Ukraine. The Subcommittee recognises the complexity and the multitude of legislative and governance requirements plus the significant number of internal, external and international stakeholders involved in identifying and transferring military hardware to Ukraine.
2.71However, the Subcommittee feels this complex process results in an opaqueness, making it difficult for it and broader Australian public to understand decisions on support for Ukraine. The Subcommittee felt a prime example was the public discussion around the potential gifting of the Hawkei vehicles and Taipan helicopters, which lacked clarity and transparency.
2.72The Subcommittee thus urges the Department of Defence to draft a publicly available summary of its decision-making processes, which will elucidate on how it considers and approves (or not) Australian military assistance to Ukraine. The Subcommittee believes this will improve transparency, community understanding and confidence in Defence processes.
2.73The Subcommittee considers the evidence to show that Operation KUDU is a highly successful ADF contribution to the training of Ukrainian forces. The Subcommittee recommends the continuation of the operation and is highly supportive of the identification of additional opportunities for Australia and the ADF to be involved in expanding Ukraine training programs for defence personnel and civilians alike. The Subcommittee notes the success of the E-7 deployment to guard the gateway for vital supply lines for humanitarian and military assistance to Ukraine in particular. The Subcommittee expects future requests will be considered against Australia’s own security and preparedness requirements.
Australian diplomatic representation in Ukraine
2.74The Subcommittee heard the calls for the reopening of the Australian Embassy in Ukraine.
2.75The Subcommittee acknowledges concerns around the importance of, and obligations arising out of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) around the physical and psychosocial safety of diplomatic staff. The Subcommittee notes DFAT’s evidence that Australian diplomatic and military attaché functions are being met by Australia’s ambassador located in Warsaw, Poland and the military attaché located in Berlin.
2.76However, the Subcommittee notes that Australia has previously maintained embassies in Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel and Papua New Guinea during periods of conflict and civil unrest, and that there must be a solution found for the Australian diplomatic presence in Ukraine.
2.77The Subcommittee agrees that the conflict in Ukraine conflict will be long running and will continue to impact Ukraine and its citizens for some time to come. Significant effort and investment from around the world will be required to end hostilities and commence rebuilding Ukraine’s infrastructure.
2.78The Subcommittee strongly believes that the reopening of Australia’s embassy in Kyiv will align our diplomatic presence and support for Ukraine with the 70 other countries and allies who have reopened their embassies in Ukraine since Russia’s invasion. The Subcommittee believes that this should also include an Australian military attaché to provide logistical support for Australian donated equipment, feedback to Australian Operation KUDU trainers, and to convey any lessons learned on modern warfare to the ADF leadership.
2.79The Subcommittee acknowledges the world is at an inflection point with more conflict and regional hostilities in eastern Europe, the middle east plus a major strategic power competition in the Indo-Pacific. In meeting these changing times, the 2023 DSR emphasised the importance of deploying national power through statecraft, which requires the deepening of diplomatic engagement with many other countries facing similar circumstances.
2.80Considering this, the Subcommittee encourages the Australian Government to review any legislation, regulations or policies that govern the decisions around the placement of diplomatic personnel in high-risk locations, to enable Australia more flexibility to assert a diplomatic presence when it is needed most, while minimising the risks to the safety of its personnel.
2.81The Subcommittee recommends the Australian Government continue providing military assistance to Ukraine while exploring additional opportunities to encourage and support Australian industry and institutions to further contribute to the support effort.
2.82The Subcommittee recommends Defence (inclusive of the Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Force) publish a statement on its internal policy approach to Ukraine, that is, whether it prioritises support to Ukraine, and if so, how it prioritises that support.
2.83The Subcommittee recommends the Australian Government establish a whole-of government mechanism, a ‘one-stop-shop’, potentially within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, for the coordination and liaison around Australia’s support to Ukraine.
2.84The Subcommittee recommends the Australian Government review any legislation, regulations or policies that govern decisions around the placement of diplomatic personnel in high-risk locations, to enable Australia to more flexibly assert a diplomatic presence when needed, without sacrificing personnel safety.
2.85The Subcommittee recommends that the Australian Government reopen the Australian Embassy in Ukraine, with a permanent military attaché alongside it, as soon as possible.