



# Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services

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Report on the 2016-2017 annual reports of bodies  
established under the ASIC Act

July 2018

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# Committee membership

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Mr Steve Irons MP, <b>Chair</b>	WA, LP
Senator Deborah O'Neill, <b>Deputy Chair</b>	NSW, ALP
Ms Terri Butler MP	QLD, ALP
Mr Jason Falinski MP	NSW, LP
Mr Matt Keogh MP	WA, ALP
Senator Chris Ketter	QLD, ALP
Mr Bert van Manen MP	QLD, LP
Senator Peter Whish-Wilson	TAS, AG
Senator John Williams	NSW, NATS
Senator Jane Hume	VIC, LP
(from 13 September 2016 – 30 November 2016 and from 16 November 2017)	
Senator Nick Xenophon	SA, NXT
(from 30 November 2016 – 31 October 2017)	

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## Duties of the Committee

Section 243 of the *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001* sets out the Parliamentary Committee's duties as follows:

- (a) to inquire into, and report to both Houses on:
  - (i) activities of ASIC or the Panel, or matters connected with such activities, to which, in the Parliamentary Committee's opinion, the Parliament's attention should be directed; or
  - (ii) the operation of the corporations legislation (other than the excluded provisions); or
  - (iii) the operation of any other law of the Commonwealth, or any law of a State or Territory, that appears to the Parliamentary Committee to affect significantly the operation of the corporations legislation (other than the excluded provisions); or
  - (iv) the operation of any foreign business law, or of any other law of a foreign country, that appears to the Parliamentary Committee to affect significantly the operation of the corporations legislation (other than the excluded provisions); and
- (b) to examine each annual report that is prepared by a body established by this Act and of which a copy has been laid before a House, and to report to both Houses on matters that appear in, or arise out of, that annual report and to which, in the Parliamentary Committee's opinion, the Parliament's attention should be directed; and
- (c) to inquire into any question in connection with its duties that is referred to it by a House, and to report to that House on that question.



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# Abbreviations

AAT	Administrative Appeals Tribunal
AASB	Australian Accounting Standards Board
ACCC	Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
ANAO	Australian National Audit Office
APRA	Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
APX	Australia Pacific Exchange
ASIC	Australian Securities and Investments Commission
ASIC Act	<i>Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001</i>
ASX	Australian Securities Exchange
AUASB	Auditing and Assurance Standards Board
CALDB	Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board
CAMAC	Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee
CAMAC Bill	Australian Securities and Investments Commission Amendment (Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee Abolition) Bill 2014
CIO	Credit and Investments Ombudsman
Corporations Act	<i>Corporations Act 2001</i>
CSEF	Crowd Sourced Equity Funding
EU	Enforceable Undertakings
FIRB	Foreign Investment Review Board
FOS	Financial Ombudsman Service
FRC	Financial Reporting Council
FSI	Financial System Inquiry
IASB	International Accounting Standards Board
IAASB	International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board
IFRS	International Financial Reporting Standards
PGPA Act	<i>Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013</i>
SMSF	Self-Managed Super Fund
The Panel	Takeovers Panel
The Treasury	Department of the Treasury



## **List of recommendations**

### **Recommendation 1**

**2.15 The committee recommends that the Government review the adequacy of auditor disciplinary functions.**



# Chapter 1

## Scrutiny of annual reports

1.1 The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (the committee) is established by Part 14 of the *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001* (the ASIC Act). This report is prepared in fulfilment of the committee's duties under subsection 243(b):

to examine each annual report that is prepared by a body established by this Act and of which a copy has been laid before a House, and to report to both Houses on matters that appear in, or arise out of, that annual report and to which...the Parliament's attention should be directed.<sup>1</sup>

1.2 The ASIC Act establishes the nine bodies listed below:

- Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB);
- Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB);
- Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC);
- Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board (CADB) (formerly Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board);
- Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC);
- Financial Reporting Council (FRC);
- Office of the Australian Accounting Standards Board (Office of the AASB);
- Office of the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (Office of the AUASB); and
- The Takeovers Panel (the Panel).<sup>2</sup>

1.3 Collectively, these bodies form the 'administrative organs' of the national financial services regulatory scheme established by the ASIC Act and the *Corporations Act 2001* (Corporations Act).<sup>3</sup>

1.4 While nine bodies are established under the ASIC Act, only six annual reports have been prepared for 2016–17. The ASIC Act directs that one annual report will cover both the AASB and the Office of the AASB. Similarly, the AUASB is required

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1 ASIC Act 2001, ss. 243(b).

2 ASIC Act 2001, Parts 2, 9–12.

3 The Hon Lionel Bowen MP, Attorney-General, House of Representatives Hansard, Second Reading Speech, Australian Securities Commission Bill 1988, 25 May 1988, pp. 2990–2991. The ASIC Act predominantly replicates the administrative structure established in the *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989*. Section 261 of the ASIC Act 2001 directs that bodies established under the *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989* continue in existence as if they had been established under the ASIC Act 2001.

to prepare an annual report that addresses its activities and the activities of the Office of the AUASB. CAMAC has not prepared an annual report since 2013–14 as it has ceased operation pending passage of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Amendment (Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee Abolition) Bill 2014. Accordingly, this report examines the 2016–17 annual reports of the AUASB, the AASB, ASIC, CADB, the FRC and the Takeovers Panel.

1.5 The committee notes that the annual reports of bodies established under the ASIC Act are also the subject of scrutiny by the Senate Economics Legislation Committee. Senate Standing Order 25(20) requires the Economics Legislation Committee to:

- (a) Examine each annual report referred to it and report to the Senate whether the report is apparently satisfactory.
- (b) Consider in more detail, and report to the Senate on, each annual report which is not apparently satisfactory, and on the other annual reports which it selects for more detailed consideration.
- (c) Investigate and report to the Senate on any lateness in the presentation of annual reports.
- (d) In considering an annual report, take into account any relevant remarks about the report made in debate in the Senate.
- (e) If the committee so determines, consider annual reports of departments and budget-related agencies in conjunction with examination of estimates.
- (f) Report on annual reports tabled by 31 October each year by the tenth sitting day of the following year, and on annual reports tabled by 30 April each year by the tenth sitting day after 30 June of that year.
- (g) Draw to the attention of the Senate any significant matters relating to the operations and performance of the bodies furnishing the annual reports.
- (h) Report to the Senate each year whether there are any bodies which do not present annual reports to the Senate and which should present such reports.

1.6 Therefore, in conducting its review of the annual reports of bodies established under the ASIC Act, the committee will focus on the statutory requirements under the ASIC Act, pertinent operational matters, and other matters that in the committee's opinion Parliament should consider.

## **Report structure**

1.7 Chapter two examines the annual reports of the bodies established under Parts 9–11 of the ASIC Act: CADB and the Takeovers Panel.

1.8 Chapter three examines the annual reports of the three agencies established by Part 12 of the ASIC Act to oversee the financial reporting framework: the AASB, the AUASB and the FRC.

1.9 Chapter four examines ASIC's annual report.

1.10 In reviewing the annual reports, the committee also considers whether there are opportunities to strengthen the operation of the corporations legislation. However, the committee has not done so in this report.

**Mr Greg Medcraft**

1.11 Mr Greg Medcraft concluded his service as Chairman of ASIC in November 2017. The committee acknowledges Mr Medcraft's contribution to the agency in his six years and seven months as Chairman.

1.12 The committee recognises Mr Medcraft's focus on the need to improve the conduct, culture, and accountability of participants in the financial services sector including the vital role that Boards play in setting the 'tone from the top'. The committee thanks Mr Medcraft for his cooperation with the committee.





## Chapter 2

### Bodies established under Parts 9–11 of the ASIC Act

2.1 This chapter considers the 2016–17 annual reports of the:

- Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board (CADB); and
- The Takeovers Panel (the Panel).

#### Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board

2.2 CADB was previously known as the Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board until the *Insolvency Law Reform Act 2016* (ILR Act) commenced on 1 March 2017. Under the ILR Act, the powers to discipline liquidators were transferred to ASIC.

2.3 CADB is currently established by Part 11 of the *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001* (ASIC Act). CADB's primary purpose in the administration of Australia's financial services system is to hear applications from ASIC or the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) in relation to an auditor that is suspected of failing to carry out their duties and functions adequately and to consider the cancellation or suspension of an auditor's registration.<sup>1</sup> CADB is required to provide a 'Respondent' with the opportunity to appear at a hearing held by a panel of three or five CADB members including the Chairperson and to make submissions to and present evidence before CADB in relation to the application. The provisions for applications are established under Section 1292 of the *Corporations Act 2001*.

2.3 CADB categorises matters brought before it as either 'administrative' or 'conduct'. Administrative matters include failing to lodge annual statements, ceasing to be a resident of Australia, becoming disqualified from managing corporations or becoming incapable because of mental infirmity of managing affairs.<sup>2</sup> Conduct matters include playing a significant role in an audit without being eligible to do so, failing to comply with a condition of registration, not performing any significant audit work for five years, failing to carry out the duties of an auditor, not being a fit and proper person to remain registered as an auditor.<sup>3</sup>

2.4 The Board's casework is not self-generated as it holds no powers to instigate applications. Applications are brought only by either ASIC or APRA for the Board's adjudication in either administrative or conduct matters. Accordingly, the Board operates as an expert disciplinary body for auditors in Australia.<sup>4</sup>

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1 Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 16.

2 Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 15.

3 Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 16.

4 *Corporations Act 2001*, s. 1292.

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*Annual Report of CADB*

2.5 The ASIC Act directs the annual report to 'describe the operations' of CADB for the relevant financial year.<sup>5</sup>

2.6 There was one new application to CADB from ASIC in 2016–17 which related to conduct of an auditor. No new administrative applications were received.<sup>6</sup>

2.7 Matters before CADB in 2016–17 resulted in the suspension of one registration and one undertaking.<sup>7</sup>

2.8 As noted in previous reports by this committee the number of cases referred to CADB has continued to decline since 2005–06. No matters were referred to the CADB in financial years 2009–10 and 2011–12 and only one matter was referred in each year of 2015–16 and 2016–17. This is a substantial decrease from the 12 matters referred in 2005–06.<sup>8</sup> This decrease is unrelated to changes to CADB's powers in relation to liquidators as a result of the ILR Act.

2.9 CADB continued to operate under transitional provisions relating to the ILR Act 2016 until the commencement date of 1 March 2017. This included CADB having general powers of investigation in relation to liquidators who failed to comply with duties before the commencement day.<sup>9</sup>

2.10 As at 30 June 2017, CADB noted that no new liquidator matters under its transitional provisions had been referred to it. However one matter is currently on appeal with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and may be referred to CADB pending the AAT's decision. The matter would fall within the scope of the transitional provisions.<sup>10</sup>

2.11 The committee notes the increase in CADB's overall administrative expenses from \$267 281 to \$353 630 was due to a one-off redundancy staff cost incurred as a result of the Board's restructure of administrative support arrangements. Travel and accommodation expenses also increased as a result of a hearing that took place over two separate periods which required three members empanelled to travel interstate. Conversely, there was a decrease in overall members' fees as a result of a decreased number of hearing days compared to the prior reporting period.<sup>11</sup> The daily rates for members of CADB were reset by the Commonwealth Remuneration Tribunal to commence from 1 January 2016. The rates are unchanged and consist of the

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5 *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*, s. 214.

6 Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 6.

7 Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 7.

8 Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 1; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, *Report on 2015–16 annual reports of bodies established under the ASIC Act*, pp. 4–5.

9 *Insolvency Law Reform Act 2016*, Part 23, s. 303.

10 Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 4.

11 Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board, *Annual Report 2016–17*, pp. 9–10.

Chairperson being allocated \$1 411, the Deputy Chairperson allocated \$1 270 and members allocated \$1 129.<sup>12</sup> Costs incurred includes travel time to hearing venues, consideration of written determinations and frequently a final hearing and decision on sanction and appropriate orders.<sup>13</sup>

2.12 The committee notes that for this reporting period the Board continues to operate without its full complement of 14 members.<sup>14</sup> The Board currently consists of a Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, three accounting members and three business members. The Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson must each be enrolled as a barrister, as a solicitor, or as a barrister and solicitor or as a legal practitioner of the High Court, any Federal Court or the Supreme Court of a state or territory and must have been enrolled for a period of at least five years.<sup>15</sup> Accounting members must be a member of a professional accounting body or any other body prescribed by regulation. Business members are selected for their qualifications, knowledge or experience in business or the financial and legal sectors.<sup>16</sup>

### **Committee view**

2.13 The committee considers that CADB has fulfilled its regulatory and reporting responsibilities for the 2016–17 financial year. The committee will continue to monitor the effect of the passage of the *Insolvency Law Reform Act 2016* on CADB's responsibilities and functions.

2.14 The committee remains concerned about the efficiency and effectiveness of CADB being such a small body, with such a small and irregular workload. The committee notes that the explanatory memorandum for the ILR Act indicates that one of the arguments for removing the liquidator functions from CALDB was the perceived inefficiency and cost of the CALDB process.<sup>17</sup> The committee also notes that the reforms associated with the ILR Act were focussed on insolvency and may not have adequately considered the adequacy of CADB continuing in its current form. ASIC has also continued to raise concerns about audit quality in its audit inspection program.<sup>18</sup> The committee therefore recommends that the Government review the adequacy of current arrangements for auditor disciplinary functions.

### **Recommendation 1**

**2.15 The committee recommends that the Government review the adequacy of auditor disciplinary functions.**

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12 Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 10.

13 Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 7.

14 Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 5.

15 Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 5.

16 Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 5.

17 Insolvency law Reform Bill 2015, *Explanatory Memorandum*, p. 268.

18 See Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Report 534 Audit inspection program report for 2015–16*, June 2017, p. 4.

## The Takeovers Panel

2.16 The Takeovers Panel (Panel) was established by Part 10 of the ASIC Act as a peer review body largely comprised of takeover experts, whose main purpose is the resolution of takeover disputes. During a takeover bid, the Panel is able to declare unacceptable circumstances with respect to the public interest in relation to the affairs of a company. The Panel examines the way in which control of a company is acquired. The Panel can also establish orders to remedy those circumstances.<sup>19</sup>

2.17 The Panel is also able to review decisions made by ASIC<sup>20</sup> and maintains its operations with a rule making power.<sup>21</sup> The Panel's annual report states that:

The Panel improves the certainty, efficiency and fairness of Australia's takeovers market by:

- resolving disputes in a fair, timely, consistent, informal and sound manner; and
- publishing clear, well-developed guidance.<sup>22</sup>

2.18 As at 30 June 2017, the Panel had 45 members, up from 39 in 2016.<sup>23</sup> Members are nominated by the Minister and appointed by the Governor-General.<sup>24</sup>

## Annual Report of the Takeovers Panel

2.19 During 2016–17, the Panel received 23 applications to have matters considered. This was below the yearly average of 28.4 applications since July 2000, but consistent with the yearly average of 22.3 applications since July 2009.<sup>25</sup>

2.20 The proportion of applications for which the Panel declined to conduct proceedings increased to 55 per cent in 2016–17, up from 30 per cent in 2015–16. The Panel indicated that this financial year witnessed a return to the rising decline rate to conduct proceedings which peaked at 60 per cent in 2014–15.<sup>26</sup>

2.21 Of the 23 applications received in 2016–17, three were withdrawn. The Panel conducted proceedings in nine matters, accepted undertakings in two of those matters, made declarations and orders in seven, and declined to conduct proceedings in eleven matters.<sup>27</sup>

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19 *Corporations Act 2001*, s. 657A.

20 *Corporations Act 2001*, s. 656A.

21 *Corporations Act 2001*, s. 658C.

22 Takeovers Panel, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 7.

23 Takeovers Panel, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 13.

24 *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*, s. 172.

25 Takeovers Panel, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 5.

26 Takeovers Panel, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 5.

27 Takeovers Panel, *Annual Report 2016–17*, pp. 5, 20.

2.22 In terms of its decisions not to conduct proceedings, the Panel makes an assessment of whether the circumstances being complained of would, if established, give rise to a declaration of unacceptable circumstances taking into account the strength of the evidence and the remedies that might be available.<sup>28</sup>

2.23 Timeliness is a key performance indicator for the Panel. The average calendar days between application and a Panel decision in 2016–17 was 16.3, broadly consistent with the 16.1 days since 13 March 2000 and slightly less than the 16.6 days since 1 July 2009.<sup>29</sup>

2.24 The average number of calendar days between decision and publication of reasons in 2016–17 was 22.2 compared to 35.2 since 13 March 2000 and 11.7 since 1 July 2009.<sup>30</sup>

2.25 Consistency of decision-making is another key facet of the Panel's work. In order to facilitate discussion of past proceedings, policy issues and market developments, the Panel holds meetings of all its members at least twice a year. Furthermore, the Panel has issued an index of Panel decisions from 2000–16.<sup>31</sup>

2.26 During 2016–17 the Panel conducted consultations in relation to two guidance notes: GN 12 Frustrating Action and GN 4 Remedies General. The Panel received a total of six submissions for GN 12 and 1 submission for GN 4. The Panel issued amendments to both guidance notes.<sup>32</sup>

2.27 The Panel's decisions were not subject to any judicial reviews during 2016–17. However, the committee notes that, subsequent to the annual reporting period, on 14 September 2017 the Panel was served with a Federal Court application for judicial review of the Panel's decision in the matter of Molopo Energy Limited.<sup>33</sup>

2.28 The Panel may refer matters to ASIC where the Panel wants ASIC to consider making an application. Matters are also referred to ASIC where a sitting panel is of the view that ASIC should examine aspects of the application that might give rise to concerns under the *Corporations Act 2001*. The Panel referred one matter to ASIC for review during reporting the period.<sup>34</sup>

## **Committee view**

2.29 The committee considers that the Panel has fulfilled its regulatory and reporting responsibilities during the 2016–17 financial year.

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28 Takeovers Panel, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 20.

29 Takeovers Panel, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 5.

30 Takeovers Panel, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 5.

31 Takeovers Panel, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 21.

32 Takeovers Panel, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 22.

33 Takeovers Panel, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 23.

34 Takeovers Panel, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 25.



## **Chapter 3**

### **Bodies established under Part 12 of the ASIC Act**

3.1 This chapter considers the 2016–17 annual reports of the:

- Financial Reporting Council (FRC);
- Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB); and
- Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB).

#### **Financial reporting framework**

3.2 Part 12 of the ASIC Act establishes Australia's financial reporting system. As outlined in section 224 of the ASIC Act, the objectives of the financial reporting system include:

- developing accounting standards that require the provision of information that is relevant, reliable, easy to understand, allows users to make and evaluate financial decisions, and assists directors to fulfil their statutory financial reporting obligations;
- developing auditing and assurance standards that provide Australian auditors with relevant and comprehensive guidance in determining whether financial reports comply with statutory requirements, and require auditors' reports to be reliable and readily understood by users;
- facilitating the Australian economy; and
- maintaining investor confidence in the Australian economy.<sup>1</sup>

3.3 The FRC annual report notes that, under Part 12 of the ASIC Act, the core objectives for accounting and auditing standard setting in Australia are to support the Australian economy by:

- reducing the cost of capital and enabling Australian entities to compete effectively overseas;
- maintaining investor confidence in the Australian economy, including its capital markets; and
- being clearly stated and easy to understand.<sup>2</sup>

3.4 Three agencies are established under Part 12 of the ASIC Act as the administrative arms of the financial reporting system: the FRC, the AASB and the

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1 *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*, s. 224.

2 Financial Reporting Council, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 5.

AUASB. All three bodies are required to advance and promote the object of Part 12 of the ASIC Act.<sup>3</sup>

3.5 ASIC is also involved in the administration of the financial reporting system. ASIC's role in identifying and addressing audit deficiency is set out under division 5A of the ASIC Act—audit deficiency notifications and reports.<sup>4</sup>

***Coordination between the FRC, the AASB and the AUASB***

3.6 The ASIC Act sets out the relationship between the FRC, the AASB and the AUASB. The FRC has specific functions relating to accounting standards and auditing standards with respect to certain activities of the AASB and the AUASB, including:

- appointing members of the AASB and the AUASB, other than the Chair;
- advising the AASB and the AUASB on priorities, business plans and procedures;
- advising the Office of the AASB and the Office of the AUASB on budgets and staffing arrangements;
- determining the broad strategic direction of the AASB and AUASB;
- monitoring the development of international accounting and auditing standards; and
- monitoring the effectiveness of the AASB and AUASB's consultative arrangements.<sup>5</sup>

3.7 The ASIC Act sets out express restrictions on the FRC's ability to become involved in the technical deliberations of the AASB and AUASB. In particular, it provides that the FRC does not have the power to:

- direct the AASB or AUASB in relation to the development, or making, of a particular standard; or
- veto a standard made, formulated or recommended by the AASB or the AUASB.<sup>6</sup>

3.8 These restrictions are designed to ensure the independence of the standard setting boards.<sup>7</sup>

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3 *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*, s. 225, 227, 227B.

4 *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*, s. 50A.

5 *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*, ss. 225(2), 225(2A).

6 *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*, ss. 225(5)–(8).

7 Financial Reporting Council, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 5.



## The Financial Reporting Council

3.9 The FRC was established in 1989 and operates pursuant to Part 12 of the ASIC Act 2001.<sup>8</sup> As the peak body responsible for overseeing the effectiveness of the financial reporting framework in Australia,<sup>9</sup> the FRC's role in the operation of Australia's corporations law includes:

- providing broad oversight of the processes for setting both accounting and auditing standards in Australia; and
- advising the Minister on these matters.<sup>10</sup>

3.10 The FRC's specific auditor quality functions direct it to give the Minister and professional accounting bodies strategic policy advice and report on the quality of audits conducted by Australian auditors, including:

- the systems and processes used by auditors to comply with legislative provisions dealing with the conduct of audits, auditing standards, and codes of conduct;
- the systems and processes used by professional accounting bodies for quality assurance reviews of audit work;
- the action that auditors who have been subject to review have taken in response;
- the action taken by professional accounting bodies to ensure that auditors who have been subject to review respond appropriately;
- the investigation and disciplinary procedures of professional accounting bodies applied to auditors;
- the adequacy of relevant legislative provisions;
- standards, and codes of conduct; and
- the teaching of professional and business ethics by professional accounting bodies related to audit quality.<sup>11</sup>

3.11 The FRC's functions also reflect the objective of section 224 of the ASIC Act which is to 'facilitate the Australian economy by enabling Australian entities to compete effectively overseas'.<sup>12</sup> Accordingly, the FRC is required to:

- monitor developments in international accounting standards and auditing standards;

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8 Section 261 of the ASIC Act directs that bodies established under the *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989* continue in existence as if they had been established under the *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*.

9 Financial Reporting Council, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 5.

10 *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*, ss. 225(1).

11 *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*, ss. 225 (2B)–(2C).

12 *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*, ss. 224(b)(ii).

- further the development of a single set of accounting standards and auditing standards for world-wide use; and
- promote the continued adoption of international best practice accounting standards and auditing standards if doing so would be in the best interests of the private and public sectors of the Australian economy.<sup>13</sup>

### ***FRC annual report***

3.12 The FRC annual report is required to include an analysis of its achievements against the objects of the financial reporting system.<sup>14</sup> The committee examines whether the FRC's achievements are satisfactory in its ASIC Oversight report.

3.13 The FRC engaged in a number of activities during 2016–17, including:

- approving its Strategic Plan for the 2017 financial year; and
- making a submission to the Public Interest Oversight Board (PIOB) on the PIOB's 2017–19 Strategy.<sup>15</sup>

3.14 The FRC's Strategic Plan for 2017 outlines six Strategic Priorities:

- (a) to promote initiatives to improve the financial reporting system for both the public and private sectors (including the not-for-profit sector as well as the for-profit sector) and to make financial reports more useful, simple and relevant;
- (b) to continue to monitor the quality of audits carried out by Australian auditors;
- (c) to continue to influence international accounting and auditing developments, particularly by promoting suitably qualified Australians and New Zealanders for appointment to relevant international boards;
- (d) to consider external reporting initiatives including their alignment with, and impact on, financial reporting requirements;
- (e) to continue and enhance interaction with stakeholders, including users, preparers and auditors of financial reports; and
- (f) to encourage appropriate use of technology in the preparation and auditing of financial reports.<sup>16</sup>

3.15 The FRC recommended the Minister support, and encourage others to support, initiatives to improve the financial reporting system according to the first Strategic Priority of the FRC<sup>17</sup> (above).

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13 *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*, ss 225(2), 225 (2A).

14 *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*, s. 235B.

15 Financial Reporting Council, *Annual Report 2016–17*, pp. 1, 3.

16 Financial Reporting Council, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 4.

17 Financial Reporting Council, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 1.

3.16 In its submission to the PIOB's 2017–19 Strategy, the FRC 'rejected implications that technical members (or those affiliated with the accounting profession) cannot be assumed to be setting standards in the public interest'. The FRC voiced support for the current standing setting model and did not support a change that would lead to the issue of public interest overriding the need to have sufficient technically competent members.<sup>18</sup>

#### *Oversight of Australian standard setting*

3.17 As noted earlier, a key role of the FRC is to determine the strategic direction of the standard setting boards. The FRC annual report notes that since its establishment, the FRC has made three determinations concerning the broad strategic direction of the AASB and AUASB:

- to require the AASB to work towards the adoption of accounting standards that are the same as those issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB);
- to require the AASB to pursue the harmonisation of Government Financial Statistics and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles reporting; and
- to require the AUASB to use auditing standards issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) as a base from which to develop the Australian standards, to develop auditing and assurance standards other than for historical financial information, and to participate in audit research that is conducive to the AUASB's standard-setting activities.<sup>19</sup>

3.18 The FRC notes that 'each of these directions is still current and the FRC continually monitors their appropriateness and is satisfied that the Boards have implemented these directions to the extent possible'.<sup>20</sup>

3.19 The FRC's reporting on audit quality will be covered in chapter 4 of this report.

#### **Committee view**

3.20 The committee considers that the FRC has fulfilled its annual reporting responsibilities during the 2016–17 financial year. The committee is reserving its judgement about whether the FRC has fulfilled its regulatory functions due to the committee's concerns about audit quality that are discussed in chapter 4.

#### **The Standards Boards**

3.21 Following a major restructure in 2016, the AASB and AUASB implemented a new joint operating model. The governance structures of the two Boards were further aligned and updated and included a new combined AASB/AUASB Board Charter.

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18 Financial Reporting Council, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 3.

19 Financial Reporting Council, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 11.

20 Financial Reporting Council, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 11.

During 2016–17, the AASB and AUASB held a joint Board and Staff Strategy Day and collaborated to align strategies, visions and missions.<sup>21</sup>

3.22 As part of the restructure, the AASB and AUASB combined administrative staff to support both Boards. The annual report sets out the lines of authority and administrative arrangements:

In 2016 the AASB and AUASB implemented a shared support model, effectively operating, to the extent permitted by legislation, as a single Office supporting both Boards. The Chairs remain Chief Executive Officers and the Accountable Authority under the PGPA and are responsible for the preparation of the financial reports for each entity, however have delegated to the maximum extent possible the CEO responsibilities to the National Director. The National Director supports the Chairs of the respective Boards, and manages the technical staff of both Boards and the professional staff. The AASB provides all administrative services for the AUASB and charges the AUASB a management fee based on recharge of direct costs without mark-up and an appropriate recoupment of common expenses.<sup>22</sup>

3.23 The Chairs of the AASB and AUASB must, as soon as practicable after the end of each financial year, prepare and give to the Minister, for presentation to the Parliament, reports on the operations of the AASB, AUASB and their respective offices.<sup>23</sup>

3.24 The AASB and the AUASB presented their financial reports jointly with a column for each entity. This was supplemented with a detailed segment note outlining the appropriations received, the direct costs incurred by each agency, as well as common expenses.<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, this report examines the AASB and AUASB as individual entities.

### **The Australian Accounting Standards Board**

3.25 The AASB is currently established by Subdivision B, Division 1, Part 12 of the ASIC Act.<sup>25</sup> The AASB's role is to develop a conceptual framework by which to evaluate proposed accounting standards and international accounting standards as well as to develop accounting standards. Additionally, the AASB contributes to the development of 'a single set of accounting standards for world-wide use'.<sup>26</sup> The ASIC

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21 AASB and AUASB, *Annual Report 2016–17*, pp. 8–9.

22 AASB and AUASB, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 66.

23 Public Governance, *Performance and Accountability Act 2013*, s. 39, 46.

24 AASB and AUASB, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 66.

25 Section 261 of the ASIC Act directs that bodies established under the *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989* continue in existence as if they had been established under the *ASIC Act 2001*.

26 *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*, s. 227.

Act also establishes the Office of the AASB, to provide the AASB with administrative and technical support.<sup>27</sup>

### ***Annual report of the AASB***

3.26 The AASB's role in Australia's financial reporting framework is defined in its mission statement:

Develop, issue and maintain principles-based Australian accounting and external reporting standards that meet user needs and enhance external reporting consistency and quality.

Contribute to the development of a single set of accounting and external reporting standards for world-wide use.<sup>28</sup>

3.27 The annual report notes that key achievements of the AASB during the 2016–17 financial year include the issue of three new standards:

- AASB 1058 *Income of Not-for-Profit Entities* issued December 2016.
- AASB 1059 *Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors* issued July 2017.
- AASB 17 *Insurance Contracts* issued July 2017 (within two months of the issuance of the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 17 *Insurance Contracts*).<sup>29</sup>

3.28 The AASB contributed to international views by actively participating at the Accounting Standards Advisory Forum (ASAF), International Forum of Accounting Standard Setters (IFASS) and Asia Oceanic Standard Setters Group (AOSSG). The AASB contributed on a number of key topics including:

- discussions organised between IASB Board members and staff and AASB Insurance Project Advisory Panel members as part of IASB's insurance project;
- publication and presentation of a position paper on digital currency at the ASAF December 2016 and IFASS March 2017 meetings;
- presentation of a paper at the ASAF meeting on country-by-country reporting by promoting improving tax disclosures for users of financial statements;
- presentation on Financial Instruments with Characteristics of Equity (FICE) at the AOSSG annual meeting November 2016; and
- roundtable events in collaboration with IASB staff to gather feedback from Australian constituents on Principles of Disclosure.<sup>30</sup>

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27 *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*, s. 226A.

28 AASB and AUASB, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 10.

29 AASB and AUASB, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 16.

30 AASB and AUASB, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 17.

## Committee view

3.29 The committee considers that the AASB has fulfilled its annual reporting responsibilities during the 2016–17 financial year. The committee is reserving its judgement about whether the AASB has fulfilled its regulatory functions due to concerns about audit quality discussed in chapter 4.

## The Auditing and Assurance Standards Board

3.30 The AUASB is established under Subdivision C, Division 1, Part 12 of the ASIC Act. The AUASB's responsibilities include facilitating an Australian financial reporting system that provides guidance to auditors.<sup>31</sup> The AUASB formulates auditing standards, in the form of legislative instruments, which operate under the *Corporations Act 2001*.<sup>32</sup>

3.31 Consistent with the objective of section 224 of the ASIC Act to 'enable Australian entities to compete effectively overseas', the AUASB is required to contribute to the 'development of a single set of auditing standards for world-wide use.'<sup>33</sup> The ASIC Act also establishes the Office of the AUASB, which provides technical services and administrative support to the AUASB.<sup>34</sup>

## AUASB annual report

3.32 The AUASB's statutory responsibilities are reflected in its mission statement as contained in the 2016–17 annual report:

Develop, issue and maintain in the public interest, best practice Australian auditing and assurance standards and guidance that meet user needs and enhance audit and assurance consistency and quality.

Contribute to the development of a single set of auditing and assurance standards for world-wide use.<sup>35</sup>

3.33 The annual report indicates that key activities of the AUASB during 2016–17 included:

- issuing five new standards;
- publishing the Guidance Statement GS 001 *Concise Financial Reports Under the Corporations Act 2001*;
- publishing FAQs: Enhanced Auditor Reporting;
- making four IAASB (International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board) Discussion Paper submissions; and

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31 *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*, s. 224, 227A, 227B.

32 *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*, s. 227B; *Corporations Act 2001*, s. 336.

33 *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*, s. 227B.

34 *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*, s. 227AB.

35 AASB and AUASB, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 9.

- publication of *Audit Committees: A Guide to Good Practice – 3<sup>rd</sup> edition*.<sup>36</sup>

3.34 The AUASB hosted a number of auditor reporting panel events during 2016–17 that included audit firms, preparers, audit committee members and relevant professional bodies.<sup>37</sup>

3.35 The AUASB continued to work closely with the New Zealand Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (NZAuASB) on a number of developments, such as the New Zealand auditing standards on service reporting information.<sup>38</sup>

3.36 During 2016–17, the AUASB achieved seven key performance indicators. The committee notes AUASB was unable to formally issue Auditing Standard (ASA) 250 until after the reporting period as a result of issues associated with processing conforming amendments to other ASAs. The committee also notes that the formal stakeholder satisfaction survey process was delayed until 2017–18. The survey will be performed in conjunction with the AASB.<sup>39</sup>

### **Committee view**

3.37 The committee considers that the AUASB has fulfilled its annual reporting responsibilities during the 2016–17 financial year. The committee is reserving its judgement about whether the FRC has fulfilled its regulatory functions due to concerns about audit quality discussed in chapter 4.

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36 AASB and AUASB, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 10.

37 AASB and AUASB, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 37.

38 AASB and AUASB, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 38.

39 AASB and AUASB, *Annual Report 2016–17*, pp. 40, 44.





# Chapter 4

## ASIC's 2016–17 annual report

4.1 This chapter discusses the 2016–17 annual report of ASIC.

### Statutory requirements for the ASIC annual report

4.2 Statutory requirements for the ASIC annual report set out in section 136 of the ASIC Act and Section 46 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) cover tabling, distribution and the contents of the annual report.

#### *Tabling and distribution*

4.3 The 2016–17 ASIC annual report was provided to the Minister on 5 October 2017 and was tabled in the House of Representatives on 26 October 2017.<sup>1</sup> As a result, the legislative requirements as set out below were satisfied:

- Section 46(1), PGPA Act: After the end of each reporting period for a Commonwealth entity, the accountable authority of the entity must prepare and give an annual report to the entity's responsible Minister, for presentation to the Parliament, on the entity's activities during the period; and
- Section 46(2), PGPA Act: The annual report must be given to the responsible Minister by: the 15th day of the fourth month after the end of the reporting period for the entity; or the end of any further period granted under subsection 34C(5) of the *Acts Interpretation Act 1901*.

4.4 Section 136(4) of the ASIC Act requires that 'the Minister must cause a copy of each annual report to be sent to the Attorney-General of each State and Territory as soon as practical after the Minister receives the report'. ASIC informed the committee that the Minister had provided the Attorney-General of each State and Territory with a copy of the ASIC annual report in December 2017.<sup>2</sup>

#### *Contents of the annual report*

4.5 In addition to the requirements for annual reports as approved by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, ASIC is subject to statutory requirements for the contents of the ASIC annual report as set out in sections 136(1)(a–e) and 136(2A) of the ASIC Act. It should be noted that changes to section 136(1) and 136(2) of the ASIC Act were imposed by the *Public Governance and Resources Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2015* which sought to align annual report requirements, where

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1 House of Representatives, *Votes and Proceedings*, No. 87–26 October 2017, p. 1226.

2 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, answers to questions on notice, 19 February 2018 (received 4 April 2018).

possible, with the PGPA Act.<sup>3</sup> Table 4.1 lists where in the 2016–17 ASIC annual report the current requirements in the ASIC Act are met.

**Table 4.1: Statutory requirements for the ASIC annual report**

Section	Reporting requirement (ASIC Act)	2016–17 Annual Report
136(1)(a)	Exercise of ASIC's powers under Part 15 of the <i>Retirement Savings Accounts Act 1997</i> and under Part 29 of the <i>Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993</i> .	Page 184
136(1)(b)	ASIC's monitoring and promotion of market integrity and consumer protection.	Pages 30–40 Pages 46–76
136(1)(c)	In relation to ASIC's functions under subsection 11(14), and each agreement or arrangement entered into by ASIC under that subsection, information about the activities that ASIC has undertaken during the period in accordance with that agreement or arrangement.	Page 184
136(1)(d)	Operation of the <i>Business Names Registration Act 2011</i> .	Pages 9, 42–43, Pages 82–86, 96, Page 182
136(1)(e) 136(2)(a)	Information relating to the exercise by ASIC, members of ASIC, or staff members, of prescribed information-gathering powers.	Pages 190–191

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3 Public Governance and Resources Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2015, Revised Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 17–18 of 26  
[http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/ems/r5402\\_ems\\_126da0a5-fac4-4fa7-989e-acfc994bec58/upload\\_pdf/500599.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf](http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/ems/r5402_ems_126da0a5-fac4-4fa7-989e-acfc994bec58/upload_pdf/500599.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf), (accessed 6 November 2017).

## Strategic priorities

4.6 ASIC has retained three strategic priorities and the 2016–17 annual report is structured according to achievements in these three areas as follows:

- investor and consumer trust and confidence;<sup>4</sup>
- fair and efficient markets; and<sup>5</sup>
- efficient registration services.<sup>6</sup>

## Matters identified in the annual report

4.7 The remainder of this chapter considers the following matters identified in the annual report:

- ASIC's industry funding model;
- Surveillance;
- Enforcement;
- Compensation and remediation;
- ASIC Enforcement Review;
- ASIC Product Intervention Powers;
- Audit quality;
- Professional Standards for Financial Advisers;
- Illegal phoenix activity;
- Innovation Hub;
- Granting or varying AFS licences;
- Service Charter Performance;
- Relief applications;
- Building Financial Capability;
- Revenue, appropriations and expenditure; and
- ASIC Staffing.

### *ASIC's industry funding model*

4.8 ASIC's industry funding model commenced on 1 July 2017. The *ASIC Supervisory Cost Recovery Levy Act 2017* passed Parliament on 14 June 2017 and the *ASIC Supervisory Cost Recovery Levy Regulations 2017* commenced in 2017.<sup>7</sup>

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4 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, pp. 30–35, 46–61.

5 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, pp. 36–41, 62–81.

6 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, pp. 42–43, 82–86.

4.9 The Act imposes a levy on entities regulated by ASIC to recover its regulatory costs.<sup>8</sup> In determining the levy for a financial year, ASIC may include the following costs relating directly or indirectly to:

- the regulation of leviable entities;
- surveillance;
- education;
- guidance;
- engagement with industry; and
- policy advice.<sup>9</sup>

4.10 The annual report states that industry funding will:

- provide ASIC with greater certainty about its funding and ensure adequate resourcing;
- create price signals for industry on the use of ASIC's resources; and
- ensure that industry participants who create the need for ASIC's regulatory activities will bear the associated costs.<sup>10</sup>

4.11 The annual report also notes that ASIC will continue to work with stakeholders to implement the model throughout 2017–18 prior to issuing invoices in early 2019.<sup>11</sup>

4.12 The committee will continue to monitor the operation of the regulations and how they are assisting ASIC in recovering revenue.

### ***Surveillance***

4.13 Australia's financial system relies heavily on the roles performed by gatekeepers. As such, the conduct of these gatekeepers has an influence on consumer and investor trust and confidence. The surveillance of, and enforcement action against, gatekeepers is therefore a vital and substantial part of ASIC's work. ASIC allocates about 70 per cent of its regulatory resources to surveillance and enforcement.<sup>12</sup>

4.14 The number of high intensity surveillances and investigations completed by ASIC during 2016–17 is similar to the 2015–16 financial year. During the reporting

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7 ASIC Supervisory Cost Recovery Levy Act 2017, <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017A00043>; ASIC Supervisory Cost Recovery Levy Regulations 2017 [F2017L00805], <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2017L00805>

8 ASIC Supervisory Cost Recovery Levy Regulations 2017 [F2017L00805], *Explanatory Statement*, <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2017L00805/Explanatory%20Statement/Text>

9 ASIC Supervisory Cost Recovery Levy Act 2017.

10 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 6.

11 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 6.

12 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, pp. 4, 34.

period, ASIC conducted 1437 high-intensity surveillances and completed 157 investigations (a high-intensity surveillance generally takes more than two days of effort to complete).<sup>13</sup> This included:

- 154 high-intensity surveillances to monitor whether lenders, brokers and insurers complied with their obligations;<sup>14</sup>
- 227 high-intensity surveillances to monitor whether financial advisers complied with their advice obligations;<sup>15</sup>
- 140 high-intensity surveillances of how responsible entities, superannuation trustees and other entities operating in the wealth management sector complied with their obligations;<sup>16</sup>
- 404 high-intensity surveillances to monitor how companies and their directors complied with their obligations under the *Corporations Act 2001* (Corporations Act) concerning their operations as a company, such as in relation to fundraising and control transactions;<sup>17</sup>
- 49 high-intensity surveillances of insolvency practitioners (focused on independence, competence and improper gain);<sup>18</sup>
- 157 high-intensity surveillances to monitor compliance with financial reporting and audit requirements;<sup>19</sup> and
- 270 high-intensity surveillances of the market.<sup>20</sup>

### ***Enforcement***

4.15 As a result of its surveillance and investigation activity, ASIC achieved the following outcomes in enforcing the law across the financial system:

- 20 criminal convictions;
- 13 people imprisoned;
- \$5.2 million in civil penalties;
- 100 people/companies banned from financial services;
- 108 people/companies banned from credit services;
- 51 people disqualified or removed from directing companies; and

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13 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, pp. 4, 22.

14 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 46.

15 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 51.

16 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 53.

17 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 63.

18 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 66.

19 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 69.

20 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 74.

- 29 successful actions against auditors and liquidators.<sup>21</sup>

### *Criminal and civil litigation*

4.16 In relation to the priority of investor and consumer trust and confidence, ASIC was successful in 9 of the 10 criminal cases completed in 2016–17, resulting in 10 convictions.<sup>22</sup> Of the 55 civil cases completed in the same period, ASIC was successful in 91 per cent of cases, with a total dollar value of \$3.9 million in civil penalties.<sup>23</sup>

4.17 In its report last year, the committee noted that it would monitor ASIC's first test case on the best interests duty in relation to financial advisers under the Corporations Act.<sup>24</sup> The case was part of ASIC's attempt to 'address the culture and incentives that lead to poor financial advice by taking action against misconduct in the financial advice industry'.<sup>25</sup>

4.18 In April 2017, the Federal Court found that financial advice firm NSG Services Pty Ltd (NSG) breached the best interests obligations of the Corporations Act. In its annual report, ASIC states:

NSG clients were sold insurance or advised to roll over superannuation accounts that committed them to costly, unsuitable financial arrangements.<sup>26</sup>

4.19 The NSG case was the first judicial finding of liability against a licensee for breaching the requirements under the Future of Financial Advice reforms.<sup>27</sup> The Federal Court imposed a \$1 million civil penalty against NSG for breaches of the best interests duty.<sup>28</sup>

4.20 In relation to the priority of fair and efficient markets, ASIC was successful in 92 per cent of the 13 completed criminal cases, resulting in 10 convictions. Of the 23 civil cases completed, ASIC was successful in 87 per cent of cases, with a total dollar value of \$1.3 million in civil penalties.<sup>29</sup>

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21 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, pp. 5, 32.

22 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 31.

23 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 31.

24 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, *Report on the 2015–16 annual reports of bodies established under the ASIC Act*, June 2017, p. 23.

25 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 51.

26 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 51.

27 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 51.

28 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 17-365MR *Financial advice firm to pay \$1 million penalty for breach of best interests duty*, <http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/find-a-media-release/2017-releases/17-365mr-financial-advice-firm-to-pay-1-million-penalty-for-breach-of-best-interests-duty/> (accessed 13 November 2017).

29 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 37.

4.21 In its report last year, the committee noted the work done by ASIC against banks including advice fees for no service, irresponsible lending, unclear fee disclosures, and failure to disclose credit card foreign transaction fees.<sup>30</sup>

4.22 During 2016–17, ASIC progressed legal action against Australia's four largest banks. ASIC alleged the banks traded in a manner that was unconscionable and attempted to create an artificial price for bank bills to affect the bank bill swap rate (BBSW), Australia's key interest rate benchmark, in order achieve a financial gain.<sup>31</sup>

4.23 ASIC commenced civil penalty proceedings in the Federal Court against the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ) on 4 March 2016<sup>32</sup> and against National Australia Bank (NAB) on 7 June 2016.<sup>33</sup> The Federal Court imposed pecuniary penalties of \$10 million on both ANZ and NAB. ASIC also accepted enforceable undertakings from ANZ and NAB which provides for both banks to pay \$20 million to be applied to the benefit of the community and \$20 million towards ASIC's investigation and other costs.<sup>34</sup>

4.24 ASIC also commenced civil penalty proceedings in the Federal Court against Westpac Banking Corporation (Westpac) on 5 April 2016 and Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) on 30 January 2018.<sup>35</sup> As at 1 May 2018, ASIC's case against Westpac is awaiting judgement.

4.25 The committee will continue to monitor ASIC's activities in relation to proceedings against banks for manipulation of the BBSW.

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30 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, *Report on the 2015–16 annual reports of bodies established under the ASIC Act*, June 2017, pp. 22–23.

31 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 4.

32 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 16-060MR *ASIC commences civil penalty proceedings against ANZ for BBSW conduct*, <http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/find-a-media-release/2016-releases/16-060mr-asic-commences-civil-penalty-proceedings-against-anz-for-bbsw-conduct/> (accessed 13 March 2018).

33 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 16-183MR *ASIC commences civil penalty proceedings against National Australia Bank for BBSW conduct*, <http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/find-a-media-release/2016-releases/16-183mr-asic-commences-civil-penalty-proceedings-against-national-australia-bank-for-bbsw-conduct/> (accessed 13 March 2018).

34 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 17-393MR *ASIC accepts enforceable undertakings from ANZ and NAB to address conduct relating to BBSW*, <http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/find-a-media-release/2017-releases/17-393mr-asic-accepts-enforceable-undertakings-from-anz-and-nab-to-address-conduct-relating-to-bbsw/> (accessed 13 March 2018).

35 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 18-024MR *ASIC commences civil penalty proceedings against Commonwealth Bank of Australia for BBSW conduct*, <http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/find-a-media-release/2018-releases/18-024mr-asic-commences-civil-penalty-proceedings-against-commonwealth-bank-of-australia-for-bbsw-conduct/> (accessed 13 March 2018).

*Administrative actions*

4.26 In relation to the priority of investor and consumer trust and confidence, ASIC banned 108 people/companies from financial services in 2016–17 (up from 81 in 2015–16) and 108 people/companies from credit services (up from 55 in 2015–16). However, the annual report notes that 'the number of bannings in 2016–17 includes instances where conditions were placed on an AFS licensee', but does not specify the number of such instances. The annual report also notes that increase in bannings from credit services resulted from failures 'to lodge Annual Compliance Certificates or maintain EDR scheme membership'.<sup>36</sup>

4.27 During the reporting period, ASIC conducted a review of how effectively Australia's largest banking and financial services institutions oversee their financial advisers. ASIC's review identified:

- failure to notify ASIC about institutions' serious non-compliance concerns about adviser conduct;
- inadequate background and reference checking when recruiting new advisers; and
- ineffective (or partially ineffective) audit processes to assess whether advice complied with the best interests duty and other legal obligations.<sup>37</sup>

4.28 ASIC banned 35 financial advisers 'who were reported during the review as having demonstrated serious compliance failures'. Approximately \$37 million was paid to an approximately 2200 customers 'who suffered loss or detriment as a result of non-compliant conduct by advisors' for the period up to 31 May 2017.<sup>38</sup>

4.29 In relation to the priority of fair and efficient markets, ASIC disqualified or removed 51 people from directing companies (up from 39 in 2015–16).<sup>39</sup>

4.30 In 2016–17, ASIC issued infringement notices under its market integrity rules with a total dollar value of \$2.29 million. As part of that total, ASIC also issued the first infringement notice for an alleged breach under the ASIC Derivative Transaction Rules (Reporting) since it was implemented in 2013. The notice was issued to Westpac with a penalty of \$127 500.<sup>40</sup>

4.31 During the reporting period, ASIC published two six-monthly reports on enforcement statistics. The reports focussed on key themes that have been identified from the enforcement data for the preceding periods. These themes were:

- gatekeeper culture and conduct in financial services and credit;

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36 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 32; see also footnote 13.

37 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 51.

38 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 51.

39 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 38.

40 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 38.



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- gatekeeper culture and conduct in markets;
  - digital disruption;
  - cyber threats;
  - misalignment of retail product design and distribution with consumer understanding;
  - cross-border businesses, services and transactions;
  - market integrity;
  - corporate governance; and
  - financial services.<sup>41</sup>

#### *Enforceable undertakings*

4.32 In its annual report, ASIC stated that 'culture and incentives that drive poor conduct by gatekeepers, including directors and market participants, can undermine investor trust and confidence in our markets'.<sup>42</sup>

4.33 ASIC's annual report shows that one of the ways that ASIC tries to address poor culture is through enforceable undertakings. In 2016–17, ASIC accepted 16 enforceable undertakings. After accepting an enforceable undertaking, ASIC works with companies and independent experts to improve culture and compliance practices. ASIC states that, as a result of this collaborative approach, there has been an improvement in 'compliance with the law and positive, long-term behavioural change'.<sup>43</sup>

4.34 The enforceable undertakings may involve:

- write-offs, refunds, and interest reductions to consumers;
- payments to fund consumer advocacy, financial literacy and financial counselling programs;
- strengthening systems and controls;
- engaging independent experts to review and test compliance frameworks; and
- an agreement by a registered liquidator not to re-apply for registration for three years.<sup>44</sup>

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41 Australian Securities and Investments Commission., *Report 536 ASIC enforcement outcomes: January to June 2017*, <http://download.asic.gov.au/media/4442431/rep536-published-22-august-2017.pdf> (accessed 8 November 2017); ASIC, *Report 513 ASIC enforcement outcomes: July to December 2016*, <http://download.asic.gov.au/media/4175428/rep513-published-8-march-2017.pdf> (accessed 8 November 2017).

42 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 39.

43 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 60.

44 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 60.

4.35 ASIC also reports publicly on how companies and individuals comply with enforceable undertakings. During 2016–17, ASIC published four interim reports setting out compliance with enforceable undertakings.<sup>45</sup>

### ***Compensation and remediation***

4.36 During 2016–17, ASIC oversaw \$837.7 million in compensation and remediation that was paid, or ordered to be paid, to investors and consumers.<sup>46</sup>

4.37 This total included \$617.2 million that the Supreme Court of Queensland ordered four former officers and the fund manager of MFS Investment Management Limited (MFSIM) to pay in compensation. The court found the former officers and fund manager did not act honestly in carrying out their duties in managing MFSIM which was the responsible entity for a managed investment scheme.<sup>47</sup>

4.38 Another significant part of the overall compensation to consumers related to the four major banks and AMP charging their customers fees for no service. ASIC's breach reports identified that the four major banks and AMP had:

- charged clients annual fees for services, including an annual advice review, where those services were not provided; and
- continued to deduct fees for advice and other services from customers' accounts in circumstances where the adviser was no longer attached to the customer, or where the customer had given instructions for the deductions to stop.<sup>48</sup>

4.39 In terms of factors contributing to licensees charging fees for no service, ASIC observed that some licensees:

- prioritised advice revenue and fee generation over ensuring that they delivered the required services; and
- did not have in place adequate systems, data, policies or procedures to provide ongoing advice services.<sup>49</sup>

4.40 At 30 June 2017, a total of \$112.1 million had been paid or offered to customers. ASIC noted that 'the banks and AMP estimate that they will have to pay a further \$93 million in compensation to customers'.<sup>50</sup>

4.41 ASIC also noted that they have asked each of the banks, AMP and Macquarie to:

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45 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 60.

46 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 4.

47 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 4.

48 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 52.

49 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 52.

50 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 52.

...conduct a comprehensive further review into the practices of the advice licensees within their groups to determine whether similar issues exist elsewhere in these businesses. These reviews are ongoing.<sup>51</sup>

4.42 During 2016–17, ASIC also monitored the remediation program established by Macquarie Equities Limited under its enforceable undertaking with ASIC. ASIC noted that, as at 5 June 2017, the remediation program had paid approximately \$24.7 million of compensation (including interest) to 263 clients, and was now substantially complete.<sup>52</sup>

### ***ASIC Enforcement Review***

4.43 On 19 October 2016, the ASIC Enforcement Review Taskforce (Taskforce) was established to review the enforcement regime of ASIC. The Taskforce, chaired by the Treasury, consists of a panel of senior representatives from ASIC, the Attorney-General's Department and the Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. The panel is supported by an expert group and a reference group of stakeholders.<sup>53</sup>

4.44 The ASIC Enforcement Review was established to examine 'the adequacy of ASIC's enforcement regime to deter misconduct and foster consumer confidence in the financial system'. The annual report sets out ASIC's priorities for the review, including:

- addressing the type, level and consistency of penalties available to ASIC;
- enhancing the breach reporting regime; and
- introducing a power to ban people from managing firms that provide financial services.<sup>54</sup>

4.45 The Taskforce completed eight consultations during 2017. The consultations examined legislation dealing with corporations, financial services, credit and insurance and assessed the suitability of regulatory tools presently available to ASIC to perform its functions effectively.<sup>55</sup>

4.46 The committee notes the Taskforce reported to government in December 2017 and that the government response was released in April 2018.<sup>56</sup> The committee

51 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 52.

52 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 52.

53 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 7; The Treasury, *ASIC Enforcement Review*, <http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Reviews/2016/ASIC-Enforcement-Review> (accessed 11 May 2017).

54 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 7.

55 The Treasury, *ASIC Enforcement Review*, <http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Reviews/2016/ASIC-Enforcement-Review> (accessed 11 May 2017).

56 The Treasury, *Australian Government response to the ASIC Enforcement Review*, <https://treasury.gov.au/publication/p2018-282438/> (accessed 1 May 2018).

will pursue matters arising from the Taskforce report and government response through its ASIC Oversight process.

### ***ASIC Product Intervention Powers***

The Financial System Inquiry (FSI) 2015 made recommendations in relation to protecting consumers from purchasing harmful financial products where there is a risk the product will be significantly damaging to the consumer.<sup>57</sup>

4.47 As part of the government's response to the FSI recommendations, Treasury instituted a consultation process on the design and distribution obligations and product intervention powers.<sup>58</sup>

4.48 In March 2017, ASIC made a submission to the Treasury consultation paper on the proposed:

- design and distribution obligation that requires issuers and distributors to establish processes and controls for ensuring that products are designed with consumer needs in mind and are targeted at appropriate sections of the population; and
- product intervention power that would enable ASIC to take direct action to deal with significant shortcomings in products or conduct that result in consumer detriment.<sup>59</sup>

4.49 In essence, the design and distribution obligation creates new accountability mechanisms. In its annual report, ASIC stated that the combination of design and distribution obligations and product intervention powers should improve consumer outcomes.<sup>60</sup>

4.50 The committee notes that on 21 December 2017, the government released for consultation draft legislation on the design and distribution obligations for financial products and product intervention powers for ASIC.<sup>61</sup>

4.51 The committee acknowledges that the new obligations and powers have resulted from a recognition that a regulatory regime based solely on disclosure can be ineffective for a variety of reasons and that further measures are required. The committee will consider the new accountability mechanisms and stronger consumer

57 Financial System Inquiry 2015, *Final Report*, pp. 206–212.

58 Treasury Proposals Paper, *Design and Distribution Obligations and Product Intervention Power*, December 2016, p. 3.

59 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 8.

60 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 8.

61 Treasury Laws Amendment (Design and Distribution Obligations and Product Intervention Powers) Bill 2017—Exposure Draft,  
<https://static.treasury.gov.au/uploads/sites/1/2017/12/c2017-t247556-Exposure-Draft.pdf>;  
 Treasury Laws Amendment (Design and Distribution Obligations and Product Intervention Powers) Bill 2017—Exposure Draft Explanatory Memorandum,  
<https://static.treasury.gov.au/uploads/sites/1/2017/12/c2017-t247556-Explanatory-Memorandum.pdf>

protections in relation to financial and credit products contained in the draft amendment bill. The committee will pursue these matters further through the ASIC Oversight process.

### *Audit quality*

4.52 Audit quality underpins investor trust and confidence in the quality of financial reports and is vital in ensuring that markets and investors are properly informed.<sup>62</sup>

4.53 In June 2017, ASIC released a report of the results of its audit firm risk-based inspections for the 18 month period between July 2015 and December 2016. A total of 390 key audit areas across 93 audit files from 23 firms of various sizes were reviewed. ASIC's published its findings in Report 534 *Audit inspection program report for 2015–16*.<sup>63</sup>

4.54 In 25 per cent of key audit areas, auditors did not obtain reasonable assurance from public listed entities that the financial report as a whole was free of material misstatement. This compares to 19 per cent of 463 key audit areas reported for the 18 month period to June 2015.<sup>64</sup>

4.55 ASIC found that audit firms need to continue to focus on ensuring that auditors:

- obtain sufficient and appropriate audit evidence;
- exercise an appropriate level of professional scepticism; and
- use the work of experts and other auditors appropriately.<sup>65</sup>

4.56 The Financial Reporting Council noted ASIC's review findings in its annual report for 2016–17. In its report, the FRC warned that caution is needed in generalising the results across the entire market due to the review's focus on higher risk audit areas. The FRC argued that the results should be viewed as an indication of how some firms address more challenging audit situations.<sup>66</sup>

4.57 The FRC also considers that it is premature to propose changes to the Minister regarding audit quality and instead believes in encouraging greater consistency and transparency of audit quality review programs conducted by accounting bodies such as the CPA, IPA and Chartered Accountants ANZ.<sup>67</sup>

62 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 69.

63 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 69; see also Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Report 534 *Audit inspection program report for 2015–16*, June 2017, <http://download.asic.gov.au/media/4331127/rep534-published-29-june-2017.pdf> (accessed 15 November 2017).

64 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 69.

65 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 69.

66 Financial Reporting Council, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 17.

67 Financial Reporting Council, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 20.

4.58 The committee recognises the critical importance of audit quality. The committee has had a long-standing interest in this matter and is particularly concerned that audit quality continues to deteriorate. This raises questions about ASIC's response over the past decade and the measures that ASIC, the FRC and the standards boards have taken thus far. The committee will cover these matters in greater detail in its ASIC Oversight report.

### ***Professional Standards for Financial Advisers***

4.59 On 15 March 2017 the *Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017* (Professional Standards Amendment Act) commenced.<sup>68</sup> The Professional Standards Amendment Act introduced measures relating to compulsory standards of education for new and existing advisers, the supervision of new advisors, a code of ethics, an exam and ongoing professional development.<sup>69</sup>

4.60 The legislative amendments reflect nine of the fourteen recommendations made by the committee in its report on proposals to lift the professional, ethical and educational standards in the financial services industry.<sup>70</sup>

4.61 Prior to the commencement of the Professional Standards Amendment Act, financial advisers were required to complete a course at an education level broadly equivalent to the 'Diploma' or 'Certificate III' levels under the Australian Qualifications Framework. There were no ongoing education requirements.<sup>71</sup>

4.62 The committee observes that, as of 1 January 2019, new financial advisers will be required to pass an exam in compliance with the Professional Standards Council.<sup>72</sup> Existing financial advisers will be required to meet the full educational standards, including a completed bachelor degree or equivalent qualification, by 1 January 2024.<sup>73</sup>

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68 *Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017*, <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017A00007>

69 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 52.

70 Australian Government response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services report, *Inquiry into proposals to lift the professional, ethical and education standards in the financial services industry*, December 2014 (tabled 8 August 2017) [https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary\\_Business/Committees/Joint/Corporations\\_and\\_Financial\\_Services/Financial\\_Adviser\\_Qualifications/Additional\\_Documents](https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Corporations_and_Financial_Services/Financial_Adviser_Qualifications/Additional_Documents) (accessed 14 November 2017).

71 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *RG 126: Licensing: Training of financial product advisers*, July 2012, pp. 5 and 20, <http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1240766/rg146-published-26-september-2012.pdf>, (accessed 15 March 2018).

72 *Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017*, Part 1, Division 8A, Subdivision A, Section 921B(3), <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017A00007>.

73 *Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017*, ss. 1546B(1).

4.63 The Professional Standards Amendment Act also established the functions of a standards body. This resulted in the government establishing the Financial Adviser Standards and Ethics Authority (FASEA) as a Commonwealth company on 11 April 2017, to set the education, training and ethical standards of financial advisers who provide personal advice on relevant financial products to retail clients.<sup>74</sup>

4.64 Under the Corporations Act, FASEA is responsible for:

- approving degrees or higher or equivalent qualifications;
- approving foreign qualifications;
- approving and/or administering the exam;
- determining the requirements for the professional year;
- selecting an appropriate common term for provisional relevant providers;
- setting supervision or other requirements for provisional relevant providers;
- determining the continuous professional development (CPD) requirements in relation to licensees' CPD years;
- determining the requirements for financial advisers whose CPD year changes and whether to modify the operation of the Corporations Act for these individuals, for example, by requiring licensees to report non-compliance with the CPD requirement at a time other than at the end of their new CPD year;
- determining the bridging course requirements for existing providers; and
- setting the Code of Ethics.<sup>75</sup>

4.65 The committee also observes that the requirements under section 921D of the Corporations Act for relevant providers to meet continuing professional development standards exempts advisers of time-sharing schemes.<sup>76</sup> The committee will monitor the appropriateness of this exemption as well as the overall effect of the Professional Standards Amendment Act through its ASIC Oversight process.

### ***Illegal phoenix activity***

4.66 Phoenix activity is not defined in legislation. Legal phoenix activity essentially encompasses business rescue activities and is a legitimate use of the corporate form. By contrast, illegal phoenix activity involves company directors stripping and transferring assets from one company to another in order to intentionally

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74 Treasury, *Financial Adviser Standards and Ethics Authority Limited (FASEA)*, <https://treasury.gov.au/programs-and-initiatives-banking-and-finance/financial-adviser-standards-and-ethics-authority-limited-fasea/> (accessed 15 March 2018).

75 Treasury, *Financial Adviser Standards and Ethics Authority Limited (FASEA)*, <https://treasury.gov.au/programs-and-initiatives-banking-and-finance/financial-adviser-standards-and-ethics-authority-limited-fasea/> (accessed 15 March 2018).

76 *Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017*, ss. 921D(2).



and dishonestly deny unsecured creditors (for example, employees and providers of goods and services) fair access to their entitlement to the company's assets.<sup>77</sup>

4.67 During 2016–17, ASIC took action against illegal phoenix activity through surveillance and enforcement work by:

- targeting surveillance and action against directors with a history of failed companies where allegations of illegal phoenix activity exist;
- enforcing the law against advisers, directors and registered liquidators who facilitate illegal phoenix activity;
- disrupting collusion between pre-insolvency advisers, directors and registered liquidators on illegal phoenix activity;
- undertaking joint operational matters with other government agencies, such as the ATO, including prosecuting facilitators of illegal phoenix activity;
- reviewing registered liquidator declarations of independence to identify inappropriate relationships between registered liquidators and pre-insolvency advisers; and
- funding liquidators through the Assetless Administration Fund to investigate failed companies with few or no assets that raise concerns about illegal phoenix activity.<sup>78</sup>

4.68 As part of its work to help detect and combat illegal phoenix activity, ASIC continued to work with other member agencies in the Serious Financial Crime Taskforce (a multi-agency taskforce led by the Australian Federal Police) and the Phoenix Taskforce (which comprises 28 federal, state and territory government agencies including the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), Department of Employment, and the Fair Work Ombudsman).<sup>79</sup>

4.69 The committee notes that the government undertook a consultation process on reforms to address illegal phoenix activity during the year.<sup>80</sup> The committee will use the ASIC Oversight process to monitor the progress of the government's anti-

77 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 68; Australian Government, *Combatting illegal phoenixing*, Consultation paper, September 2017, pp v and 1, <https://static.treasury.gov.au/uploads/sites/1/2017/09/170928-final-Phoenixing-Consultation-Paper-1.pdf> (accessed 1 May 2018).

78 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 68.

79 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 68; see also Commonwealth Serious Financial Crime Taskforce, <https://www.acic.gov.au/about-crime/taskforces/commonwealth-serious-financial-crime-taskforce> (accessed 1 May 2018) and Australian Tax Office, *Phoenix Taskforce*, <https://www.ato.gov.au/General/The-fight-against-tax-crime/Our-focus/Illegal-phoenix-activity/Phoenix-Taskforce/?=redirected> (accessed 23 January 2018).

80 Department of the Treasury, *Reforms to address illegal phoenix activity*, <https://treasury.gov.au/consultation/c2017-t221952/> (accessed 23 January 2018).



phoenixing agenda, including proposals to introduce a Director Identification Number (DIN).

### ***Innovation Hub***

4.70 In March 2015, ASIC launched an Innovation Hub to help financial technology (fintech) businesses navigate Australia's regulatory system in the financial services sector.<sup>81</sup> The aim is to assist these businesses without compromising investor and financial consumer trust and confidence. The Innovation Hub is designed to help fintech businesses by providing access to senior staff at ASIC to streamline licensing and by offering informal guidance that assists businesses to navigate the regulatory system.<sup>82</sup>

4.71 The Innovation Hub has four key elements:

- stakeholder engagement;
- informal assistance and guidance for eligible businesses;
- the Innovation Hub website; and
- coordination of ASIC's innovation-related work.<sup>83</sup>

4.72 In 2016–17, ASIC worked with 95 entities through the Innovation Hub resulting in 93 entities receiving informal assistance in relation to areas including crowd-sourced funding, marketplace lending, digital advice, consumer credit, payments and remittances and other areas such as insurance and superannuation.<sup>84</sup>

### ***Fintech***

4.73 'Fintech' refers to the technology used to support or enable banking and financial services companies. These may include mobile and web-based applications, processes, products or business models. The most common fintech business models engaging with ASIC are in relation to digital advice, marketplace lending and consumer credit.<sup>85</sup>

### ***Regtech***

4.74 'Regtech' refers to the technology developed to assist financial services companies to comply with regulation in a simple, inexpensive and efficient way.<sup>86</sup>

4.75 ASIC has identified several challenges regtech businesses are addressing including:

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81 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Report 523: *ASIC's Innovation Hub and our approach to regulatory technology*, <http://download.asic.gov.au/media/4270022/rep523-published-26-may-2017.pdf> p. 5.

82 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 79.

83 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 79.

84 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 81.

85 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 79.

86 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 80.

- identity verification;
- fraud prevention through transaction analysis;
- trade tracking and analysis;
- anti-money laundering (AMI);
- know your customer (KYC) compliance; and
- monitoring culture through people analytics.<sup>87</sup>

4.76 In May 2017, ASIC published a report that outlined their proposed future approach to regtech. The proposed initiatives include:

- establishing a new regtech liaison group;
- conducting future technology trials; and
- hosting a problem-solving event challenging regtechs to find a solution to a compliance issue identified by ASIC.<sup>88</sup>

#### *Regulatory Sandbox*

4.77 In December 2016, ASIC launched a 'regulatory sandbox' to allow innovative businesses to develop and test their ideas. The framework for the regulatory sandbox provides three ways to test a new product or service without a licence:

- using the existing flexibility in the regulatory framework or exemptions in the law, which mean that a licence is not required; or
- using ASIC's fintech licensing exemption, which allows eligible businesses to test certain services for 12 months without holding an AFS licence or credit licence;
- obtaining tailored, individual licensing exemptions to facilitate product or service testing.<sup>89</sup>

4.78 The regulatory sandbox program allows eligible businesses to test services for up to 12 months with up to 100 retail clients.<sup>90</sup> Eligible businesses may provide advice on, and deal in, (other than acting as a product issuer):

- listed or quoted Australian securities;
- debentures, stocks or bonds issued or proposed to be issued by the Australian Government;

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87 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Regtech*, <http://asic.gov.au/for-business/your-business/innovation-hub/regtech/>, (accessed 19 April 2018).

88 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 80.

89 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 80.

90 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 17-429MR ASIC's regulatory sandbox proposal to remain unchanged, <http://www.asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/find-a-media-release/2017-releases/17-429mr-asic-s-regulatory-sandbox-proposal-to-remain-unchanged/> (accessed 16 January 2018).

- simple managed investment schemes;
- deposit products;
- some kinds of general insurance products; and
- payment products issued by authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs).<sup>91</sup>

4.79 On 24 October 2017, Treasury released an exposure draft for the *Treasury Laws Amendment (Measures for a later sitting) Bill 2017: FinTech Sandbox Regulatory Licensing Exemptions* which proposes to extend the scope of fintech licensing exemption in a number of areas, including the testing period, caps, limits and number of times a business can make use of the sandbox.<sup>92</sup>

4.80 In December 2017, ASIC released a consultation paper seeking feedback from industry participants on the proposal to retain and expand the regulatory sandbox licensing exemptions. ASIC was due to report their findings in March 2018.<sup>93</sup> As at 1 July 2018, ASIC has yet to release its findings.

4.81 In the consultation paper, ASIC stated:

- the regulatory sandbox framework involves licensing exemptions for fintech companies;
- that ASIC is not involved in selecting applicants and negotiating individual testing terms for people using the licensing exemption. Instead, eligible businesses are able to notify ASIC and then commence testing without an individual approval process;
- that ASIC is 'balancing the benefits of concept validation testing against the risks of consumer harm from poor conduct by unlicensed businesses that have not demonstrated their competence to deal with consumers'; and
- that it is challenging to compare ASIC's regulatory sandbox framework with fintech sandbox environments introduced in other jurisdictions, as the regulatory regime and approach to authorising fintech businesses differ significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.<sup>94</sup>

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91 Consultation Paper 297, Retaining ASIC's fintech licensing exemption, 12 December 2017, <http://download.asic.gov.au/media/4570456/cp297-published-12-december-2017.pdf> (accessed 16 January 2017).

92 Treasury Laws Amendment (Measures for a later sitting) Bill 2017, <https://treasury.gov.au/consultation/c2017-t230052/>, (accessed 19 April 2018).

93 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Retaining ASIC's fintech licensing exemption, *Consultation Paper 297*, 12 December 2017, <http://download.asic.gov.au/media/4570456/cp297-published-12-december-2017.pdf> (accessed 16 January 2017).

94 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Retaining ASIC's fintech licensing exemption, *Consultation Paper 297*, 12 December 2017, pp. 7–8.

4.82 Noting both the above, and that as at 1 July 2018, ASIC has yet to release its findings, the committee will monitor the operation of the regulatory sandbox, including how ASIC is managing the risks as well as the overall outcomes.

### ***Granting or varying AFS licences***

4.83 ASIC assesses applications for AFS licences and credit licences as part of its regulatory framework. Each application must be subject to a detailed, comprehensive assessment in order to ensure the competence of providers of financial and credit services.<sup>95</sup>

4.84 In 2016–17, ASIC assessed more than 3000 AFS licence and credit licence applications and approved 1159 AFS licences and 406 credit licences.<sup>96</sup> ASIC reported an increase in approved applications for new and varied AFS licences. The increase was attributed to the government's decision to repeal the limited exemption for accountants giving advice to Self-Managed Super Funds from 1 July 2016.<sup>97</sup>

### ***Service Charter Performance***

4.85 The ASIC Service Charter covers the most common interactions between ASIC and its stakeholders and sets performance targets for these interactions.<sup>98</sup>

4.86 ASIC's Service Charter targets are based on sustainable target levels with current resources. ASIC met or exceeded most Service Charter performance targets during 2016–17.<sup>99</sup>

4.87 ASIC's annual report showed it did not meet performance targets in relation to deciding whether to grant or vary an AFS licence. Targets were measured in two stages. ASIC set a target of processing 70 per cent of regular applications within 60 days from the date of application. For more complex applications often requiring additional work, ASIC set a target of ensuring 90 per cent of applications were processed within 120 days from the date of application.<sup>100</sup>

4.88 During 2016–17, ASIC granted AFS licences within 60 days in 21 per cent of instances and licence variations in 51 per cent of instances, falling short of the 70 per cent target. AFS licences were granted within 120 days in 38 per cent of instances and license variations in 73 per cent of instances, again falling short of the 90 per cent target.<sup>101</sup>

4.89 ASIC's annual report attributes the decline of ASIC's performance in this area to ASIC's resourcing and a more rigorous approach to assessing regulatory concerns

95 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 35.

96 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 35.

97 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 187.

98 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 96.

99 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 97.

100 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 97.

101 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 97.

in licence applications. Another contributing factor was the increase in licence applications following the expiry of the transition period for accountants' limited licences (see previous section).<sup>102</sup>

4.90 ASIC advises in its annual report that it will continue to review their Service Charter to determine sustainable target levels consistent with current resources.<sup>103</sup>

4.91 The committee welcomes ASIC adopting a more rigorous approach to assessing licence applications. However, ASIC has fallen significantly short of its Service Charter performance targets in this area. The committee will continue to monitor ASIC's progress towards meeting these Service Charter performance targets.

### ***Relief applications***

4.92 ASIC has the power to grant exemptions from, or modifications to, the law in certain situations. Companies and individuals can apply to ASIC for relief from the:

- Corporations Act; or
- *Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993*.<sup>104</sup>

4.93 ASIC most frequently uses its discretionary powers for provisions of the Corporations Act involving accounting, takeovers, fundraising, managed investment schemes, licensing and disclosure.<sup>105</sup>

4.94 In its annual report, ASIC noted that it is frequently approached by business 'for help to make the law work better for them'. ASIC set out its rationale as follows, stating that in order to 'cut red tape', ASIC 'may vary or set aside certain legal obligations when the compliance cost savings outweigh the risks to investors and consumers'.<sup>106</sup>

4.95 ASIC is able to provide these legislative waivers to an individual business (individual relief) or to a class of businesses (by legislative instrument).<sup>107</sup>

4.96 ASIC received 1818 applications for individual relief in 2016–17, down from 1982 applications in 2015–16 and 2157 applications in 2014–15.<sup>108</sup>

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102 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, pp. 35, 97.

103 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 97.

104 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Apply for relief*, <https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/dealing-with-asic/apply-for-relief/> (accessed 24 July 2018).

105 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Information Sheet 82: *Apply for relief*, <http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/dealing-with-asic/apply-for-relief/>, (accessed 19 April 2018).

106 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 9.

107 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 9.

108 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 9; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, *Report on the 2015–2016 annual reports of bodies established under the ASIC Act*, p. 27.

4.97 In 2016–17, ASIC granted relief to 1129 entities, refused 79 applications, and 381 applications were withdrawn. There were still 229 applications under assessment at 30 June 2017.<sup>109</sup>

4.98 In December 2016 and June 2017, ASIC published reports on relief applications received and where ASIC had exercised its exemption and modification powers under the Corporations Act and the *National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009*.<sup>110</sup>

4.99 In its report for 2015–2016, the committee noted that ASIC had stated that it was not possible to determine how many waivers for individual entities were currently in effect. ASIC also informed the committee that such waivers for individual entities are not subject to parliamentary disallowance and that consumers are notified about individual relief instruments through the ASIC gazette. The committee therefore encouraged ASIC to provide information in future annual reports about how many applications or waivers are in effect and to consider more accessible ways for consumers to obtain information on published individual relief instruments outside of the ASIC Gazette. To this end, the committee recommended that ASIC investigate the feasibility of establishing a searchable public register containing information on the applications or waivers for relief currently in effect as well as indicative information for consumers regarding how they might be affected.<sup>111</sup>

4.100 The committee notes that the government responded on 13 June 2017 to the recommendation the committee made in its 2015–16 annual report that ASIC investigate the feasibility of establishing a searchable public register containing information on the applications or waivers for relief currently in effect as well as indicative information for consumers regarding how they might be affected.

4.101 In its response, the government noted that ASIC generally grants relief based on policy positions on which they consult, and that ASIC publishes in its regulatory guides. These guides are available on ASIC's website.<sup>112</sup>

4.102 The government further noted that:

ASIC's individual relief decisions can be appealed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and, in the case of applications for relief from the takeovers provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act), the

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109 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 9.

110 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 9.

111 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, *Report on the 2015–2016 annual reports of bodies established under the ASIC Act*, pp. 27–28.

112 Australian Government response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services *Report on the 2015–2016 annual reports of bodies established under the ASIC Act*, p. 1.

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Takeovers Panel. ASIC's legislative instruments are subject to Parliamentary disallowance.<sup>113</sup>

4.103 The government further noted that it may be challenging to establish a register of waivers that are 'in effect' because most ASIC individual instruments 'apply and are limited on their face by reference to a specific event or transaction rather than having an expiry date'.<sup>114</sup>

4.104 ASIC noted that it was not aware of significant consumer concerns about its use of relief powers. Furthermore, ASIC stressed that:

...it usually will only grant relief in new policy applications where it considers that there is a net regulatory benefit, or any regulatory detriment is minimal and is outweighed by the commercial benefit. ASIC will also not generally offer relief to reverse the usual and intended effect of the Corporations Act or National Credit Act.<sup>115</sup>

4.105 In conclusion, the government was of the view that the existing transparency and accountability mechanisms around ASIC's exemption and modification powers meant that creating a searchable database of relief instruments would not necessarily add significant value.<sup>116</sup>

### ***Building Financial Capability***

4.106 ASIC is the lead government agency with responsibility for financial capability and coordinates the National Financial Literacy Strategy 2014–17. ASIC's annual report defines financial capability as:

'the combination of an individual's attitude, knowledge, skills, confidence and ability to make sound financial decisions.'<sup>117</sup>

4.107 In its study of Australian financial attitudes and behaviours, ASIC found that in the six month period from September 2016 to February 2017, 36 per cent of respondents reported that 'dealing with money is stressful and overwhelming'.<sup>118</sup> This

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113 Australian Government response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services *Report on the 2015–2016 annual reports of bodies established under the ASIC Act*, p. 1.

114 Australian Government response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services *Report on the 2015–2016 annual reports of bodies established under the ASIC Act*, pp. 1–2.

115 Australian Government response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services *Report on the 2015–2016 annual reports of bodies established under the ASIC Act*, p. 2.

116 Australian Government response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services *Report on the 2015–2016 annual reports of bodies established under the ASIC Act*, p. 1.

117 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 192.

118 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 33.

was an increase from the 30 per cent reported in the previous study period.<sup>119</sup> Such findings have prompted ASIC to further develop education tools and resources to improve people's confidence with managing their money.<sup>120</sup>

4.108 During 2016–17, ASIC aimed its financial capability programs at particular demographic groups including school students, older Australians, women, culturally and linguistically diverse communities, indigenous Australians and people facing divorce and separation.<sup>121</sup>

### *MoneySmart*

4.109 ASIC's MoneySmart website offers free, impartial and comprehensive information on money matters for all Australians across a wide range of demographic groups. There were over 7 million visits to the website during the reporting period, up from 6.1 million 2015–16. Follow-up research has shown 89 per cent of users reported taking action on their finances after visiting the MoneySmart website in 2016–17.<sup>122</sup>

4.110 ASIC works with state and territory education departments to deliver its MoneySmart Teaching program under a National Partnership Agreement. In 2016–17, ASIC engaged over 5800 schools—more than 62 per cent of the nation's schools—with ASIC's MoneySmart Teaching program. Since 2012 more than 32 000 teachers have received training in financial literacy through the teaching program.<sup>123</sup>

4.111 ASIC also improved its MoneySmart website through actions such as the launch of the Simple money manager tool to assist culturally and linguistically diverse Australians with routine budgeting. The tool is available in eight community languages in addition to English.<sup>124</sup>

4.112 ASIC has also focussed on helping indigenous consumers. In July 2016, ASIC launched the 'Take a minute with your money' videos aimed at providing key financial tips to Indigenous consumers around:

- motor vehicle finance—how to get the best deal on a car and your loan;
- consumer leases and renting items for your home; and
- book up—how to manage your store account or tab.<sup>125</sup>

4.113 In March 2017, ASIC launched 'Knowing, Growing, Showing', a financial literacy teaching resource to support learning opportunities for Indigenous Australians launched in March 2017. The resource is aligned to the Australian Curriculum and

119 Australian Securities and Investments Commission and EY, *Australian Financial Attitudes and Behaviour Tracker, Key Findings Report: Wave 5 – March 2017*, p. 5.

120 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 33.

121 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 25.

122 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, pp. 24, 30.

123 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 59.

124 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 25.

125 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 117.



addresses cultural and community values around money, finances, and consumer issues in three stages:

- Knowing—introduces the basics of money;
- Growing—develops the skills needed to make smart choices with money; and
- Showing—uses applied learning to demonstrate an understanding of money and enterprise.<sup>126</sup>

### ***Revenue, appropriations and expenditure***

4.114 In 2016–17, ASIC raised \$920 million for the Commonwealth in fees and charges, an increase of 5 per cent from 2015–16. ASIC noted that the increase in revenue was due to continued net company growth and fee indexation.<sup>127</sup>

4.115 In 2016–17, ASIC received approximately \$342 million in appropriation revenue from government, including \$27 million from the Enforcement Special Account. This was a \$30 million increase in appropriation on 2015–16. ASIC also received approximately \$7 million of own-source revenue, \$2 million more than in 2015–16.<sup>128</sup>

### ***ASIC Staffing***

4.116 As at 30 June 2017, ASIC staff totalled 1930 people, an increase from the 1826 people employed at this time in the previous year. The most significant increases occurred at Executive Levels 1 and 2 with 175 additional staff, while staff at ASIC 2 level was reduced by 100.<sup>129</sup>

4.117 The committee notes that as of 30 June 2017 ASIC had increased the number of employees within ASIC who identify as Indigenous to 16, an increase of 23 per cent. This means that nearly 1 per cent of ASIC staff identify as Indigenous. The committee notes that ASIC has used Indigenous specific employment initiatives to recruit and retain Indigenous staff members as part of its target of 3 per cent Indigenous employment by 2018.<sup>130</sup>

4.118 As at 30 June 2017, ASIC had 50.1 percent women at Executive Level 1, 48.4 per cent women at Executive Level 2, and 42.1 per cent women at SES level. ASIC has several mentoring programs in place to support women in leadership roles and senior positions. In addition to broader mentoring program for all employees, ASIC provides the 'Women in Law Enforcement Strategy' (four SES mentors and three

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126 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 117.

127 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 26.

128 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 26.

129 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 108; Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2015–16*, p. 105.

130 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 116.

executive-level mentees) and 'Women in Banking and Finance' (four SES mentors and five executive-level mentees).<sup>131</sup>

4.119 ASIC has made efforts to raise awareness about LGBTI issues and provide support to staff. ASIC participated in the Pride in Diversity's Australian Workplace Equality Index (a benchmark for LGBTI inclusion for Australian workplaces) and launched an LGBTI mentoring program in February 2017.<sup>132</sup>

### **Committee view**

4.120 The committee acknowledges that significant changes to ASIC's regulatory environment and to ASIC's powers are either being proposed or under way. The committee will continue to monitor ASIC's activities as set out in this chapter, including ASIC's approach to enforcement, ASIC's measures to improve audit quality, ASIC's supervision of financial markets, ASIC's industry funding model, the government response to the ASIC Enforcement Review, the design and distribution obligations and ASIC's product intervention powers and associated draft legislation, the government's proposed changes to the penalty regime, the professional standards for financial advisers and the overall effect of the Professional Standards Amendment Act, the progress of the government's reforms to address illegal phoenix activity, ASIC's management of risks associated with the regulatory sandbox, and the progress of ASIC's efforts to raise the financial literacy of Australians.

4.121 The committee considers that ASIC has fulfilled its annual reporting responsibilities during the 2016–17 financial year. The committee will continue to use annual reports and other mechanisms to monitor ASIC's performance.

4.122 The committee thanks ASIC for its contributions at hearings and responding to questions on notice.

**Mr Steve Irons MP**

**Committee Chair**

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131 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 112.

132 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, *Annual Report 2016–17*, p. 113.

# **Appendix 1**

## **Tabled documents**

1. ASIC: Payday lending outcomes (public hearing, Canberra, 16 June 2017).
2. ASIC: Payday lending outcomes - responsible lending (public hearing, Canberra, 16 June 2017).
3. ASIC: Australian financial market turnover (public hearing, Canberra, 16 June 2017).
4. ASIC: Australian financial market turnover (public hearing, Canberra, 16 June 2017).
5. ASIC: Enforcement Statistics (public hearing, Canberra, 16 June 2017).
6. ASIC: Data Strategy (public hearing, Canberra, 16 June 2017).
7. ASIC: Opening statement by Mr Greg Medcraft, ASIC Chairman (public hearing, Sydney, 11 August 2017).
8. ASIC: Accenture 'Australian Banking Consumer Survey' (public hearing, Sydney, 11 August 2017).
9. ASIC: finder.com.au 'Burnt out borrowers: Just a \$100 repayment rise could tip some over the edge' (public hearing, Sydney, 11 August 2017).

## **Additional information received by the Committee**

### ***Answers to Questions on Notice***

1. ASIC: Answers to questions 1-20 taken on notice from a public hearing on 25 November 2016 (received 17 January 2017).
2. ASIC: Answers to questions on notice posed on 23 May 2017 (received 9 June 2017).
3. Department of the Treasury: Answers to questions on notice posed 23 May 2017 (received 6 June 2017).
4. ASIC: Answers to questions on notice posed on 26 May 2017 (received 15 June 2017).
5. ASIC: Answers to questions taken on notice from a public hearing on 16 June 2017 (received 11 August 2017).
6. Department of the Treasury: Answers to questions on notice posed 23 August 2017 (received 6 October 2017).
7. ASIC: Answers to questions 1, 8, 11-13 taken on notice from a public hearing on 11 August 2017 (received on 20 December 2017).
8. ASIC: Answers to questions 1-3, 9-13, 17-29 posed on 23 August 2017 (received on 20 December 2017).
9. ASIC: Answers to question 1, 5-7 taken on notice from a public hearing on 27 October 2017 (received 13 December 2017).
10. ASIC: Answers to questions 3-5 posed on 23 August 2017 (received 12 January 2018).
11. ASIC: Answers to questions 6-8 posed 23 August 2017 (received 9 January 2018).
12. ASIC: Answers to questions 5, 8-9 taken on notice from public hearing 1 December 2017 (received 2 March 2018).
13. Takeovers Panel: Answers to questions taken on notice from a public hearing on 16 February 2018 (received 1 March 2018).

14. ASIC: Answers to questions on notice posed 8 February 2018 (received 12 February 2018).
15. ASIC: Answers to question 2 posed 19 February 2018 (received 29 March 2018).
16. Australian Accounting Standards Board & Auditing and Assurance Standards Board: Answers to questions on notice from a public hearing on 16 February 2018 (received 13 March 2018).
17. ASIC: Answers to questions 1, 3 posed 19 February 2018 (received 4 April 2018).
18. ASIC: Answers to questions on notice posed 15 December 2017 (received 26 March 2018).
19. Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions: Answers to questions on notice posed 23 May 2018 (received 3 July 2018).

### ***Government Response***

1. Australian Government response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, *Report on the 2012-13 annual reports of bodies established under the ASIC Act*, 21 June 2017.
2. Australian Government response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, *Statutory oversight of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the Takeovers Panel and the Corporations Legislation (report No. 1 of the 44th Parliament)*, 21 June 2017.
3. Australian Government response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, *Report on the 2015-2016 annual reports of bodies established under the ASIC Act*, 10 May 2018.

## **Appendix 2**

### **Public hearings and witnesses**

#### **Canberra, 16 June 2017**

*Australian Securities and Investments Commission*

Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman

Mr Peter Kell, Deputy Chair

Ms Cathie Armour, Commissioner

Mr John Price, Commissioner

Mr Warren Day, Senior Executive Leader

Mr Greg Kirk, Senior Executive Leader

Ms Louise Macaulay, Senior Executive Leader

Mr Tim Mullaly, Senior Executive Leader

Mr Michael Saadat, Senior Executive Leader

Mr Greg Yanco, Senior Executive Leader

Ms Joanne Bird, Senior Executive Leader

Ms Sharon Concisom Senior Executive Leader

Mr Oliver Harvey, Senior Executive Leader

Ms Katharine Goulstone, Senior Manager

Mr Gerard Fitzpatrick, Senior Executive Leader

#### **Sydney, 11 August 2017**

*Australian Securities and Investments Commission*

Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman

Mr Peter Kell, Deputy Chair

Ms Cathie Armour, Commissioner

Mr John Price, Commissioner

Mr Warren Day, Senior Executive Leader

Mr Greg Kirk, Senior Executive Leader

Ms Louise Macaulay, Senior Executive Leader

Ms Sharon Concisom Senior Executive Leader

Mr Tim Mullaly, Senior Executive Leader

Mr Michael Saadat, Senior Executive Leader

Mr Gerard Fitzpatrick, Senior Executive Leader

**Sydney, 27 October 2017**

*Australian Securities and Investments Commission*

Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman

Mr Peter Kell, Deputy Chair

Ms Cathie Armour, Commissioner

Mr John Price, Commissioner

Ms Joanna Bird, Senior Executive Leader

Mr Warren Day, Senior Executive Leader

Mr Greg Kirk, Senior Executive Leader

Ms Louise Macaulay, Senior Executive Leader

Ms Sharon Concisom Senior Executive Leader

Mr Tim Mullaly, Senior Executive Leader

Mr Michael Saadat, Senior Executive Leader

Mr Gerard Fitzpatrick, Senior Executive Leader

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**Canberra, 1 December 2017***Australian Securities and Investments Commission*

Mr Peter Kell, Deputy Chair

Ms Cathie Armour, Commissioner

Mr John Price, Commissioner

Mr Chris Savundra, Chief Legal Officer

Mr Warren Day, Senior Executive Leader

Ms Jane Eccleston, Senior Executive Leader

Mr Greg Kirk, Senior Executive Leader

Ms Louise Macaulay, Senior Executive Leader

Mr Tim Mullaly, Senior Executive Leader

Mr Michael Saadat, Senior Executive Leader

Mr Doug Niven, Senior Executive Leader

**Sydney, 16 February 2018***Australian Securities and Investments Commission*

Mr James Shipton, Chairman

Mr Peter Kell, Deputy Chair

Ms Cathie Armour, Commissioner

Mr John Price, Commissioner

Mr Doug Niven, Senior Executive Leader

Mr Warren Day, Senior Executive Leader

Ms Jane Eccleston, Senior Executive Leader

Ms Laura Higgins, Senior Executive Leader

Mr Greg Kirk, Senior Executive Leader

Ms Louise Macaulay, Senior Executive Leader

Ms Sharon Concisom Senior Executive Leader

Mr Michael Saadat, Senior Executive Leader

Mr David McGuinness, Senior Executive Leader

*The Takeovers Panel*

Mr Allan Bulman, Director

Mr Bruce Dyer, Counsel

*Financial Reporting Council*

Mr William (Bill) Edge, Chair

Mr Stephen Powell, Secretariat

*Australian Accounting Standards Board*

Ms Kris Peach, Chair

*Auditing and Assurance Standards Board*

Professor Roger Simnett