Chapter 3

Annual performance

Performance framework

3.1
The Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity’s (ACLEI) reporting framework consists of:
the Integrity Commissioner’s function and priorities, and annual reporting requirements, as set out in the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (LEIC Act) and Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Regulations 2017 (LEIC Regulations),
the Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS), and
ACLEI’s Corporate Plan.1
3.2
The PBS 2020-21 sets out the following outcome and corresponding program for ACLEI:
Outcome 1: Independent assurance to the Australian Government that Commonwealth law enforcement agencies and their staff act with integrity by detecting, investigating and preventing corruption.
Program 1: Detect, investigate and prevent corruption in prescribed law enforcement agencies; assist law enforcement to maintain and improve the integrity of staff members.2
3.3
ACLEI’s Corporate Plan 2020-24 establishes the agency’s purpose, which is to make it more difficult for corruption to occur or remain undetected in the Australian Government law enforcement agencies it oversees.3

Performance metrics

3.4
As mentioned in Chapter 2, this is ACLEI’s first year reporting against its revised performance framework. ACLEI assessed its yearly performance against its performance metrics that correspond to ACLEI’s four key activities (refer to Table 3.1 below).4
3.5
ACLEI reported that it ‘performed well’ against its performance measures, meeting 17 out of the 19 performance metrics that were due to be assessed in 2020-21. In assessing its performance, ACLEI considered the environment in which it operated, acknowledging its increased assessment workload, expanded jurisdiction and investigative achievements.5
3.6
Performance measures 1.4, 2.8, 3.5 and 4.6 were not assessed in 2020-21. ACLEI plans to undertake a biennial stakeholder survey in 2021-22 to collect baseline data for each measure.6
3.7
ACLEI advised that it is not ‘reasonably practicable’ to include targets for some of its performance measures, and an ‘annual count’ of a particular event or outcome is provided instead (as shown in Table 3.1 below). ACLEI noted that when combined with other measures, an annual count provides important information about the management of ACLEI’s workload.7
3.8
ACLEI explained that the results from performance measures 2.3, 2.5 and 3.3 (refer to Table 3.1 below) will establish a comparative baseline for future reporting years and ‘will be kept under evaluation to ensure they provide a true measure for comparison’.8
Table 3.1:  Overall performance
Measure
Target
Results for 2020-21
Key activity 1: Assessments
1.1 Number of notifications and referrals of alleged corrupt conduct received by ACLEI
Annual count
478
1.2 Number of completed assessments
The equivalent of 90% of the number of matters received that year
102%
1.3 Percentage of assessments completed within 30 days
90%
64%
1.4 Percentage of survey responses from agencies indicating a rating satisfied (or better) with the timeliness of ACLEI’s assessment work
70%
Biennial survey will be run in 2021-22
Key activity 2: ACLEI investigations
2.1 Number of investigations commenced
Annual count
33
2.2 Number of investigations finalised, either through being completed, discontinued or reconsidered
The equivalent of 80% of the number of investigations commenced that year
106%
2.3 Average duration of finalised investigations
Baseline to be established
651 days
2.4 Percentage of briefs of evidence where a charge is recommended after assessment by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP)
90%
50%
2.5 Number of reports under section 54 of the LEIC Act completed
Baseline to be established
11
2.6 Number of corruption findings made
Annual count
10
2.7 Number of times evidence is disseminated under
section 146 of the LEIC Act
Annual count
8
2.8 Percentage of survey responses from agencies demonstrating a rating of satisfied (or better) with the timeliness and professionalism of ACLEI’s investigations
70%
Biennial survey will be run in 2021-22
Key activity 3: Supporting partner agency investigations
3.1 Number of investigations referred to partner agencies for investigation (broken down by referred, referred with oversight and referred with management)
Annual count
90
3.2 Number of investigations by partner agencies finalised and report provided under
section 66 of the LEIC Act
Annual count
91
3.3 Average duration of finalised investigations by partner agencies
Baseline to be established
862 days
3.4 Percentage of reviews of section 66 reports completed within 30 days
80%
97%
3.5 Percentage of survey responses from agencies demonstrating a rating of satisfied (or better) with the quality of ACLEI’s contributions
70%
Biennial survey will be run in 2021-22
Key activity 4: Prevention
4.1 Number of presentations provided
Annual count
22
4.2 Percentage of feedback from participants in presentations demonstrating a rating of satisfied (or better)
80%
92%
4.3 Number of corruption prevention products published
Annual count
3
Trends are identified in:
notifications and referrals, and
section 66 reports received from partner agencies
Qualitative survey of the trend analysis undertaken on incoming notifications and referrals
Yes
4.5 Number of submissions made to, and appearances before, parliamentary committee processes
Annual count
11
4.6 Percentage of survey responses from agencies demonstrating a rating of satisfied (or better) with the quality of ACLEI’s corruption prevention work
70%
Biennial survey will be run in 2021-22
Source: ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, pp. 36–37.
3.9
ACLEI’s Annual Performance Statement 2020-21 presents the agency’s results against each of its key activities and corresponding performance measures and targets. These are discussed in more detail below.

Key activity 1: Assessments

3.10
ACLEI met two of three performance targets relating to the number of allegations received and assessed, that is, 1.1 and 1.3. ACLEI fell short of meeting its target of assessing 90 per cent of assessments within 30 days (target 1.2). This is discussed further below under ‘stretch target’.9

Corruption allegations

3.11
ACLEI receives allegations of corruption via notifications from the heads of ACLEI agencies and referrals from other agencies or the general public.10 ACLEI also identifies potential corruption issues on its own, which are known as ‘own-initiative’ matters.11
3.12
In 2020-21, ACLEI reported it received 478 allegations of corruption, the highest number of matters received in a reporting year.12 Table 3.2 below provides a breakdown of the matters received by agency.
Table 3.2:  Total matters received in 2020-21 by agency
Agency
Notifications
Referrals
Own-initiative
Total
Entire 2020-21 year
ACIC
3
9
0
12
AFP
63
43
4
110
AUSTRAC
0
1
0
1
Home Affairs
289
42
7
338
DAWE
3
2
0
5
Sub-total
358
97
11
466
Since 1 January 2020
ACCC
0
0
0
0
APRA
0
0
0
0
ASIC
2
3
1
6
ATO
5
1
0
6
Sub-total
7
4
1
12
Total matters received
365
101
12
478
Source: ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 43.
3.13
ACLEI advised that the Department of Home Affairs (including the Australian Border Force) (Home Affairs) accounted for 71 per cent of total matters, followed by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) with 23 per cent. Although ACLEI received more matters for both agencies compared to previous years, it stated that these numbers are expected due to the size and functions of the agencies.13
3.14
ACLEI pointed out that during the reporting year, on two occasions, it received ‘bulk notifications’ from Home Affairs (172 notifications in total) following the department’s active detection program into unauthorised access to one of its key systems. This led to a large increase in notifications received by ACLEI during 2020-21.14
3.15
Only 12 matters relating to the four expansion agencies were received in the reporting year. Notably, no matters were received from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) or the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA).15

Assessment of matters

3.16
ACLEI assesses matters (that is, notifications, referrals and own-initiative matters) to determine whether they raise a corruption issue and fall within ACLEI’s jurisdiction. ACLEI’s process for assessment treats all matters in the same way, regardless of their source.16
3.17
Table 3.3 below shows that ACLEI had a total of 534 matters available for assessment during 2020-21. It assessed 486 matters, including 434 matters received within the year and 52 matters that were under assessment on 1 July 2020. This is equivalent to 102 per cent of the total number of matters received in the year (478) and exceeds ACLEI’s target of assessing 90 per cent of matters received in that year.17
Table 3.3:  Total matters available for assessment
Total
Matters under assessment at 1 July 2020
56
Matters received in 2020-21
478
Total matters available for assessment
534
Matters assessed in 2020-21
486
Matters under assessment at 30 June 2021
48
Source: ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 45.

Matters which raised a corruption issue

3.18
ACLEI advised that of the 486 assessments completed in 2020-21, 73 per cent of matters (353) raised a corruption issue. This is the greatest number of matters assessed as a corruption issue by the agency in the last five years.18
3.19
Regarding the 172 notifications received from Home Affairs following its active detection program, ACLEI was able to successfully assess 57 per cent of notifications within 30 days and the remainder within 45 days.19
3.20
ACLEI stated that its increased ability to assess matters as raising a corruption issue over the years ‘demonstrates that [ACLEI’s] assessment function is maturing and building efficiency’. ACLEI explained that additional resources for its Intake and Assessment team and the establishment of the Assessments Board supported the agency to conduct considerably more assessments than previous years.20

‘Stretch target’

3.21
ACLEI completed 64 per cent of assessments within 30 days and hence did not meet its target (described by ACLEI as a ‘stretch target’) of assessing 90 per cent of assessments within 30 days. ACLEI explained that its shortfall reflects several factors, including the increase in the number of matters received over the year, the complexity of notifications from agencies that joined ACLEI’s jurisdiction on 1 January 2021, and the time required to assess referrals from the public.21
3.22
In the committee’s previous examination report tabled in August 2021, the committee questioned whether the ‘stretch target’ is realistic and encouraged the agency to monitor the appropriateness of the target’s metrics and include a narrative around its performance for perspective.22
3.23
To ensure that it can complete assessments in a timely manner, ACLEI advised in this annual report that it will:
ensure its Intake and Assessment team is appropriately resourced;
continue to improve its understanding and expertise in applying the third limb test;
provide information and guidance about ACLEI’s role and jurisdictional coverage; and
simplify assessment processes wherever possible.23
3.24
ACLEI advised it would review the stretch target during 2021-22 to consider if it is ‘achievable in the long term or whether it could be further refined to reflect the complexity of some of the assessments [it] undertakes’.24

Committee comment

3.25
The committee notes that ACLEI received the highest number of matters ever in 2020-21. It recognises that the Home Affairs’ detection program contributed significantly to the increase in notifications and appreciates that ACLEI is putting steps in place to manage any bulk notifications received in the future.
3.26
The committee commends ACLEI for completing 486 assessments in the reporting year, clearly exceeding its target. This significant achievement demonstrates the considerable work of the Intake and Assessment team and the Assessments Board.
3.27
The committee acknowledges the factors that impacted ACLEI’s capacity to achieve its stretch target and thanks ACLEI for including a narrative regarding its result as it provides a more nuanced perspective of ACLEI’s performance, which was overall positive. The committee encourages ACLEI to continue to monitor the stretch target in 2021-22 as planned and consider whether it can be further refined.

Key activity 2: Investigations

3.28
ACLEI recorded positive results against six of its measures that were due to be assessed in 2020-21. It did not meet its target of 90 per cent of briefs to be accepted by the CDPP. This is discussed further under ‘ANAO suggested measures’.25

Positive investigation results

3.29
ACLEI reported positive investigation results in 2020-21 as demonstrated by the following achievements:
ACLEI finalised investigations into 35 corruption issues;
eight prosecutions were concluded, with six resulting in convictions;
eleven final investigation reports were provided to the Attorney-General, covering 14 corruption issues;
four briefs of evidence were provided to the CDPP; and
ACLEI distributed information concerning serious breaches of duty identified during investigations to agencies on eight occasions to enable appropriate disciplinary action.26

Decrease in investigations

3.30
During 2020-21, ACLEI advised that 108 corruption issues were under investigation (either alone or jointly), including 33 corruption issues that ACLEI commenced investigating in the year, and 75 corruption issues carried forward from 2019-20.27 This is the lowest number of corruption issues under investigation by ACLEI in the last five years and contrasts with 2020-21 having the highest number of allegations received in a year.
3.31
Of the corruption issues under investigation, most related to Home Affairs (63), followed by the AFP (30), the ACIC (8), DAWE (6) and the ATO (1). There were no investigations undertaken related to AUSTRAC, the ACCC, APRA or ASIC.28
3.32
As discussed in previous annual report examinations by this committee, ACLEI set out to achieve a more manageable investigative workload in recent years. ACLEI has steadily reduced its workload by finalising older investigations and decreasing the number of new and active investigations it undertakes each year.29
3.33
Table 3.4 below compares the number of ACLEI investigations, including joint investigations, over the last five years. It shows the changes in ACLEI’s ongoing investigative caseload.
Table 3.4:  Corruption issues investigated by ACLEI (including joint investigations)—5-year comparison
2016-17
2017-18
2018-19
2019-20
2020-21
Number commenced during the year
107
55
28
36
33
Total active during the year
242
282
252
168
108
Number finalised
14
52
116
93
35
Number open at the end of the reporting period
228
230
136
75
72
Source: ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 53; and ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2019-20, p. 31.
3.34
To maintain an appropriate level of work for the agency, ACLEI stated it focused on completing investigations in a timely manager and assisted agencies in managing corruption risks and vulnerabilities. ACLEI’s 90-day review process allows the agency to ‘quickly identify matters where further investigation is not warranted’ and ensure investigative resources are applied efficiently. Importantly, ACLEI continues to prioritise serious and systemic matters for investigation and refer less serious matters to ACLEI agencies to investigate.30

Finalised investigations

3.35
ACLEI reported it finalised investigations into 35 corruption issues, surpassing its target to finalise the equivalent of 80 per cent of the number of investigations commenced that year.31
3.36
Of the 35 investigations finalised:
thirteen were completed, and a report was prepared for the Attorney-General pursuant to section 54 of the LEIC Act,
twenty were discontinued after reconsideration under section 42 of the LEIC Act, and
two were determined not to involve a staff member of a law enforcement agency.32
3.37
ACLEI explained that of the 20 corruption issues that the Integrity Commissioner reconsidered:
six matters did not identify a person of interest within ACLEI’s jurisdiction, and
in the other 14 matters, the investigations did not identify any evidence to support the allegation.33

ANAO suggested measures

3.38
ACLEI adopted two new performance measures suggested by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) in its Operational Efficiency of the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 2018 report, including:
the average duration of finalised investigations, and
the percentage of briefs of evidence where a charge is recommended after assessment by the CDPP, with a target of 90 per cent.
3.39
ACLEI advised that the average duration of its investigations finalised in 2020-21 was 651 days. This includes several historical investigations that were finalised in 2020-21.34
3.40
ACLEI pointed out that the average duration of finalised investigations that commenced in 2019 or later was 427 days, representing a ‘significant improvement in the timelines of [ACLEI’s] investigations’. Furthermore, it reflects the agency’s diligence in addressing its backlog of investigations.35
3.41
To support timely investigations, ACLEI noted the establishment of its internal ‘Operations Board’ in 2020-21. The board monitors the age of investigations and considers the ‘resourcing required to support investigations and the capacity of teams to complete their investigative load or take on more investigations’. ACLEI stated it will continue to monitor the average duration of investigations to identify any patterns or what might contribute to prolonged, more complex investigations.36
3.42
Regarding the ANAO’s second suggested measure, during 2020-21 the CDPP assessed four briefs of evidence from ACLEI, and in two of those cases, a charge was recommended. As a result, ACLEI did not meet its target of 90 per cent of briefs of evidence assessed by the CDPP recommending a charge. However, ACLEI pointed out that although two matters did not proceed, this was not due to a deficiency in ACLEI’s investigations or briefs of evidence; rather, the matters ‘raised points of law and public interest’.37
3.43
As discussed in Chapter 2, under section 142 of the LEIC Act, the Integrity Commissioner cannot exercise discretion to not provide a brief of evidence to the AFP or the CDPP when admissible evidence is obtained.

Investigation reports

3.44
ACLEI advised it completed 11 reports as required under section 54 of the LEIC Act in the reporting year, relating to 14 corruption issues. ACLEI noted that this is a sizeable increase from the three reports that were completed in 2019-20. It reflects the help of additional legal resources and ACLEI’s focus on finalising investigations and preparing reports.38
3.45
In 2020-21, ACLEI made 10 corruption findings in its investigative reports. Of the 10 findings, nine related to ‘abuse of office’ and one concerned ‘corruption of any kind’.39

Committee comment

3.46
The committee welcomes ACLEI’s positive investigative achievements in 2020-21, and notes in particular that ACLEI provided the most section 54 reports to the Attorney-General since its establishment. The committee also acknowledges ACLEI’s commitment to achieving a more manageable workload for the agency.
3.47
The committee notes that although ACLEI did not reach its CDPP target (90 per cent of briefs to be accepted by the CDPP), this was beyond ACLEI’s control. However, the fact that a performance measure is not met but this does not reflect actual performance, is itself less than ideal. Noting that this is a new performance target, the committee will closely monitor ACLEI’s performance against this target going forward, and notes that, as a general rule, whether a target is met or not should ideally stand as a reasonable indicator of agency performance.
3.48
The committee thanks ACLEI for addressing the committee’s recommendation outlined in its 2018-19 examination report by detailing the reasons (at a high-level) why investigations were discontinued under section 42 of the LEIC Act during 2020-21.

Key activity 3: Supporting partner agencies

3.49
ACLEI reported positive results against all four of its performance measures for key activity 3 that could be assessed in 2020-21.40

Corruption issues investigated by ACLEI agencies

3.50
During the reporting year, ACLEI advised that its agencies investigated 306 corruption issues, the second-highest number of active investigations by jurisdictional agencies in the last five years. Of the 306 corruption issues, 216 matters were carried forward from 2019-20, while the other 90 were referred by ACLEI to agencies for investigation in 2020-21.41
3.51
Home Affairs was referred the most investigations (65), followed by the AFP (22). The ACIC, DAWE, ASIC and the ATO were all referred one each. Only one investigation was referred with oversight by ACLEI, and that was to Home Affairs.42
3.52
Table 3.5 below provides a comparison over the last five years of agency-led investigations.
Table 3.5:  Agency investigations — 5-year comparison
2016-17
2017-18
2018-19
2019-20
2020-21
Number commenced during the year
54
88
79
129
90
Total active in the year
183
232
278
332
306
Number finalised in the year
70
30
66
117
91
Number open at the end of the year
110
206
212
216
201
Source: ACELI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, pp. 66 and 70 and ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2019-20, p. 34.
3.53
In 2020-21, partner agencies completed 91 investigations and provided section 66 reports to the Integrity Commissioner. The AFP completed the most investigations (43), followed by Home Affairs (37), the ACIC (6) and DAWE (5).43
3.54
ACLEI reported that it took an average of 862 days for agency-led investigations to be finalised. ACLEI stated it has a responsibility to ensure all investigations are carried out in timely manner and that it expects that this measure ‘will help [it] to understand the variables and pressures faced by different agencies and investigations’.44
3.55
During the public hearing, the Integrity Commissioner raised that ACLEI is mindful that some of its agencies, such as Home Affairs, are carrying a significant number of investigations. She stated that it is important that ACLEI is ‘conscious of the resourcing available to each agency in relation to conducting their own investigations’ when referring matters for investigation. To reduce the high number of investigations on hand, the Integrity Commissioner advised that ACLEI is conducting a review of agency-led investigations, in partnership with the agencies, to determine whether investigations can be finalised, discontinued or referred back to ACLEI, where it is appropriate to do so.45
3.56
Mr Peter Ratcliffe, Executive Director, Operations Southern, advised that ACLEI does not want to prevent agencies from working on their most serious matters due to a large number of historical cases they are unable to conclude. He added that the increase in agency resources had provided ACLEI with the scope to undertake a review, which will be beneficial.46

Section 66 reports reviewed by the Integrity Commissioner

3.57
Under section 66 of the LEIC Act, once an agency-led investigation is completed, the agency is required to provide a report to the Integrity Commissioner setting out its findings, action taken or proposed action to be taken. After a review of the report, the Integrity Commissioner determines whether to make any comments or recommendations to the head of the agency.
3.58
During the 2020-21 reporting period, the Integrity Commissioner reviewed 106 section 66 reports. Ninety-seven per cent (103) were reviewed within ACLEI’s target of 30 days, thus exceeding the target of 80 per cent.47 Table 3.6 below shows the number of section 66 report reviewed for each agency.
Table 3.6:  Number of section 66 reviews completed within 30 days, by agency
ACIC
AFP
Home Affairs
DAWE
Total
Number reviewed
6
45
47
8
106
Number completed within 30 days
6
45
45
7
103
Percentage that met benchmark
100%
100%
96%
95%
97%
Source: ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 72.
3.59
During the public hearing, the Integrity Commissioner highlighted that ACLEI ensures it has ‘meaningful conversations’ with ACLEI agencies about their investigations, particularly around their progress, what actions have been taken and whether ACLEI’s powers are needed to further the investigation. This exercise plays a vital role in reducing the need for the Integrity Commissioner to comment or provide recommendations on section 66 reports.48

Committee comment

3.60
The committee acknowledges that there was a considerable number of active agency-led investigations in 2020-21 but notes it was less than the previous reporting period. The committee is satisfied ACLEI is working to understand agency resourcing and capacity to better inform how matters should be managed. In addition, the committee looks forward to learning of the results of ACLEI’s review to reduce the number of active agency-led investigations.

Key activity 4: Corruption Prevention

3.61
ACLEI reported positive results for all five of its measures that were due to be assessed in 2020-21.

Corruption prevention activities

3.62
The Integrity Commissioner and ACLEI staff engaged in a range of corruption prevention activities in 2020-21:
Delivered 22 corruption prevention presentations to a range of audiences and ran several workshops to support awareness-raising activities among ACLEI jurisdictional agencies and the broader public service.
ACLEI received positive feedback regarding its presentations, with 92 per cent of feedback responses from participants stating ACLEI’s presentations were either satisfactory or better.49
Published three corruption prevention products, including a fact sheet titled Why corruption matters.
ACLEI noted it published fewer products in 2020-21 than it did in 2019-20 as resources were redirected to other needs, such as supporting the expansion agencies. However, ACLEI was still able to develop a significant corruption prevention video aimed at improving the understanding around risks of grooming.50
Provided three submissions to Parliamentary inquiries and appeared before eight Parliamentary committees.51
3.63
ACLEI’s Corruption Prevention team identified trends, observations, and vulnerabilities for inclusion in investigation reports as well as for ACLEI’s internal use. The team also reviewed its data collection and survey methods to improve its future trend analysis, vulnerability reporting and internal reporting to the Operations Board.52

Patterns and trends in corruption

3.64
Each year, ACLEI provides classified vulnerabilities reports to agencies outlining key corruption observations from its operational work. The Annual Report 2020-21 outlines three unclassified corruption vulnerabilities it observed:
Unauthorised access to and disclosure of protected information—Investigations revealed that officers had assessed systems and made unlawful disclosures to companies, criminal syndicates, and family and friends. To protect sensitive or valuable information, agencies need to regularly audit systems and databases to detect unauthorised access. In addition, agencies should limit user access to information, systems or databases for staff members who do not require routine access to undertake their role.53
Integrity of decision-making processes—Recent investigations, such as the Visa Integrity Taskforce, highlighted potential corruption risks in decision-making processes, particularly in high-volume processes that involve discretion or where decision-makers can access cases to make decisions. To address vulnerabilities, agencies focused on offshore record-keeping practices, electronic system audit capability, and improved case management processes.54
Grooming—Commercial and criminal organisations deliberately targeted law enforcement officials to secure undue advantages. Sometimes, staff members can unknowingly fall victim to grooming. Agency staff must understand the value of the information they have access to and report any approach for information to their manager or integrity unit. Agencies should ensure their staff only have access to the information they need to perform their role and have reporting mechanisms in place for staff to speak up if they become aware of exploitative relationships.55

Impact on corrupt conduct

3.65
At the public hearing, the Integrity Commissioner underscored the importance of reporting on ACLEI’s investigations in a timely manner to demonstrate the agency’s impact on corrupt conduct. Additionally, Ms Hinchcliffe advised that ACLEI’s corruption prevention activities are critical as they assist agencies to ‘think about corruption risk, learn from each other and implement different mechanisms as corruption controls within their agencies’.56
3.66
Ms Lucinda Atkinson, Executive Director of Corporate Services and Governance, pointed out that although ACLEI’s corruption prevention capability is still emerging, it offers considerable anti-corruption insight and value to the broader public service. Ms Atkinson advised that the types of vulnerabilities that ACLEI identifies within its jurisdiction are common across other Commonwealth agencies. For this reason, the Integrity Commissioner decided, for the first time, to publish the Corruption Vulnerabilities Brief 2020-21 to ensure it is widely available.
3.67
In addition, Ms Atkinson stated that ACLEI works closely with other sectors of the Commonwealth government that are focused on anti-corruption, including the Commonwealth Fraud Prevention Centre and the Australian Public Service Academy.57

Committee comment

3.68
The committee notes ACLEI’s achievements against its corruption prevention measures and targets, and the positive feedback from presentation participants. It is evident that ACLEI’s corruption prevention activities assist agencies in recognising corruption risks and identifying different mechanisms to mitigate corrupt conduct.
3.69
The committee is also pleased that ACLEI’s corruption prevention work, such as its awareness-raising on corruption vulnerabilities, is being shared more broadly within the Commonwealth public service.

Use of powers

3.70
ACLEI accesses a range of special law enforcement powers and methods to investigate corrupt conduct, such as telecommunications interception, surveillance devices, and the use of the Integrity Commissioner’s statutory coercive powers. There are a range of safeguards in place to ensure that ACLEI uses its powers lawfully and proportionately, such as independent oversight by the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman (Ombudsman).
3.71
Part 218 of the LEIC Act requires the Ombudsman to privately brief this committee, at least once a year, about ACLEI's use of controlled operations58 under Part 1AB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Crimes Act). Although not a specific requirement under the LEIC Act, the Ombudsman also briefs this committee on the involvement of ACLEI in the use of other covert powers over which the Ombudsman has oversight, including powers under the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (SD Act) and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act).

Controlled operations

3.72
The Report on the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s activities monitoring controlled operations—for the period 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021, stated that during two inspections in 2020-21, the Ombudsman inspected four controlled operations authorities that expired or were cancelled between 1 July 2019 to 31 December 2020.59 The Ombudsman identified several issues with the authorities:
Not specifying controlled conduct on an authority.
Not keeping records that demonstrate controlled conduct was in accordance with an authority.
Insufficient information in applications for controlled operation authorities.
Issues regarding variations of authorities, including inadequate procedure and the absence of required information.
Several omissions and inaccuracies in ACLEI’s general register.60
3.73
The Ombudsman provided ACLEI with suggestions to address the issues mentioned above and noted that ACLEI had either implemented the suggested amendments or that it is in the process of doing so.61
3.74
The Ombudsman reported that it inspected the comprehensiveness and adequacy of ACLEI’s six-monthly statutory reports covering the periods 1 January to 30 June 2019 through to 1 July to 31 December 2020 (four reports in total) and was satisfied with the reports. The Ombudsman concluded that ‘ACLEI has adequate processes in place to achieve compliance with the reporting requirements of Part 1AB of the Crimes Act’.62

Surveillance devices

3.75
The Report to the Minister for Home Affairs on agencies’ compliance with the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth)—for the period 1 January to 30 June 2021, stated that in March 2021, the Ombudsman inspected ACLEI’s surveillance device records and examined warrants and authorisations that expired between 1 July and 31 December 2020. The Ombudsman identified three instances where ACLEI did not keep accurate records of each use and disclosure of protected information (as required under section 52 of the SD Act), and instances where actions were inadequately recorded under four surveillance device warrants.63
3.76
The Ombudsman suggested that ACLEI amend the three warrants to include the correct information and remind officers of the importance of including an appropriate level of detail in its records regarding warrants. ACLEI accepted both suggestions, and the Ombudsman will review ACLEI’s corrective actions during its next inspection.64
3.77
The Report to the Minister for Home Affairs on agencies’ compliance with the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth)—for the period 1 July to 31 December 2020, advised that in September 2020, the Ombudsman inspected ACLEI’s records of warrants and authorisations that expired between 1 July 2019 and 30 June 2020 and did not identify any significant issues.65

Telecommunications interception records and stored communication records

3.78
The Ombudsman’s report titled Monitoring agency access to stored communications and telecommunications data under Chapters 3 and 4 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979—For the period 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 stated that the Ombudsman inspected ACLEI telecommunications data in July 2019, examining records from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2019. The Ombudsman identified several issues:
ACLEI was unable to locate records to confirm how the stored communications obtained under four warrants were used or communicated.66
Four stored communications warrants issued to ACLEI were missing form fields that allow the authority to specify any conditions or restrictions that the warrant is subject to.67
3.79
As a result, the Ombudsman made two suggestions (including one better practice suggestion) to ACLEI to address the issues and satisfy the requirements of the TIA Act, which ACLEI agreed to undertake.68
3.80
The Ombudsman inspected ACLEI’s telecommunications data authorisations in July 2019, covering records from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2019. The Ombudsman found numerous issues:
Whether an authorised officer considered relevant privacy considerations when making an authorisation.
Requests for telecommunications data did not always establish a link between a person of interest and service number or the offence being investigated.
Failure to notify carries of authorisations as required under section 184(3) of the TIA Act.69
3.81
Consequently, the Ombudsman made 10 suggestions issues (including three better practice suggestions) to ACLEI to remedy the issues.70

Committee conclusion

3.82
The committee is satisfied that ACLEI performed well against its revised performance framework in 2020-21, achieving most of its performance targets. In short, ACLEI achieved many positive operational and investigative results during the year, as detailed above in this chapter.
3.83
Despite ACLEI’s very busy year, it successfully managed several substantial projects while maintaining its increased operational tempo.
3.84
The committee notes that ACLEI conducted 23 recruitment processes to support the jurisdictional expansion and obtain additional resources. The committee acknowledges that the agency will grow further in the 2021-22 reporting year, greatly benefiting the agency.
3.85
Regarding the jurisdictional expansion, the committee is pleased that ACLEI and the expansion agencies worked collaboratively to understand one another’s role and functions, apply the law enforcement function test and meet the legislative requirements of the LEIC Act.
3.86
The committee notes that ACLEI plans to continue reviewing and refining its performance metrics during 2021-22 to ensure the measures are appropriate and provide an accurate picture of the agency’s performance. The committee recognises the considerable effort ACLEI put into its Annual Report 2020-21, particularly to include a narrative that provides a more nuanced understanding of its performance and operational environment. The committee looks forward to any further performance framework refinements in the future reporting year
3.87
Overall, the committee is pleased ACLEI is focused on undertaking its work, including investigations and reporting, in a timely manner; prioritising matters of serious and systemic corrupt conduct; maintaining a sustainable workload; and ensuring it is as transparent as possible regarding identified corruption issues and ACLEI’s operations and decisions.
3.88
Looking forward, the committee appreciates that ACLEI has developed productive working relationships with the expansion agencies, and that ACLEI’s work with the agencies is ongoing. In addition, the committee will be interested to hear of ACLEI’s work to reduce the number of agency-led investigations and the finalisation of its own investigations in a timely manner.
3.89
The committee recognises ACLEI’s corruption prevention work is evolving. ACLEI is increasingly sharing its significant corruption findings and making valuable contributions to the corruption prevention space in the broader Commonwealth public service.
3.90
Finally, the committee congratulates the Integrity Commissioner, Ms Hinchcliffe and ACLEI staff for their efforts and achievements in 2020-21 and thanks the agency for a comprehensive annual report.

  • 1
    Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI), Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 34.
  • 2
    Commonwealth of Australia, Attorney-General’s Portfolio, Portfolio Budget Statements 2020-21,
    pp. 101–116.
  • 3
    ACLEI, Corporate Plan 2020-24, p. 3.
  • 4
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, pp. 36–37.
  • 5
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 35.
  • 6
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, pp. 35–37.
  • 7
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 37.
  • 8
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 35.
  • 9
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 38.
  • 10
    Under section 19 of the LEIC Act, heads of agencies within ACLEI’s jurisdiction are required to notify the Integrity Commissioner of potential corruption issues in their agencies.
  • 11
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 39.
  • 12
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, pp. 41 and 44.
  • 13
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 42.
  • 14
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 42.
  • 15
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 42.
  • 16
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 39.
  • 17
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 45.
  • 18
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 46.
  • 19
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 45.
  • 20
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 46.
  • 21
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 47.
  • 22
    Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, Examination of the Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2019-20, pp. 17 and 25.
  • 23
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 47.
  • 24
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 48.
  • 25
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 49.
  • 26
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 50.
  • 27
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, pp. 51–52.
  • 28
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 54.
  • 29
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 53.
  • 30
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, pp. 52–54.
  • 31
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 55.
  • 32
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 55.
  • 33
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 56.
  • 34
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 57.
  • 35
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 57.
  • 36
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 57.
  • 37
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 58.
  • 38
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 59.
  • 39
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 62.
  • 40
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, pp. 64–65.
  • 41
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 66.
  • 42
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 67. Section 26 of the LEIC Act sets out how the Integrity Commissioner may deal with corruption issues.
  • 43
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 69.
  • 44
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 71
  • 45
    Ms Jaala Hinchcliffe, Integrity Commissioner, ACLEI, Committee Hansard, 21 February 2022, p. 5.
  • 46
    Mr Peter Ratcliffe, Executive Director, Operations Southern, ACLEI, Committee Hansard,
    21 February 2022, p. 5.
  • 47
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 71.
  • 48
    Ms Jaala Hinchcliffe, Integrity Commissioner, ACLEI, Committee Hansard, 21 February 2022, p. 5.
  • 49
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 75.
  • 50
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 74.
  • 51
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 77.
  • 52
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, pp. 74 and 76.
  • 53
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, pp. 28–29.
  • 54
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 29.
  • 55
    ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2020-21, p. 29.
  • 56
    Ms Jaala Hinchcliffe, Integrity Commissioner, ACLEI, Committee Hansard, 21 February 2022, p. 4.
  • 57
    Ms Lucinda Atkinson, Executive Director, Corporate Services and Governance, ACLEI,
    Committee Hansard, 21 February 2022, p. 6.
  • 58
    Controlled operations are covert operations carried out by law enforcement agencies under Part 1AB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and are carried out to obtain evidence that may lead to the prosecution of a person for a serious offence. An authority to conduct a controlled operation permits, within limits, a law enforcement officer to engage in conduct that might otherwise constitute an offence.
  • 59
  • 60
    Commonwealth Ombudsman, A report on the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s activities in monitoring controlled operations—for the period 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021, 2021, pp. 3 and 13–16.
  • 61
    Commonwealth Ombudsman, A report on the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s activities in monitoring controlled operations—for the period 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021, 2021, pp. 13–16.
  • 62
    Commonwealth Ombudsman, A report on the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s activities in monitoring controlled operations—for the period 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021, 2021, p. 16.
  • 63
  • 64
    Commonwealth Ombudsman, Report to the Minister for Home Affairs on agencies’ compliance with the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth)—For the period 1 January to 30 June 2021, September 2021, pp. 3–4.
  • 65
  • 66
  • 67
    Commonwealth Ombudsman, Monitoring agency access to stored communications and telecommunications data under Chapters 3 and 4 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979—for the period 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020, 2021, p. 17.
  • 68
    Commonwealth Ombudsman, Monitoring agency access to stored communications and telecommunications data under Chapters 3 and 4 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979—for the period 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020, 2021, pp. 16–17.
  • 69
    Commonwealth Ombudsman, Monitoring agency access to stored communications and telecommunications data under Chapters 3 and 4 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979—for the period 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020, 2021, p. 63.
  • 70
    Commonwealth Ombudsman, Monitoring agency access to stored communications and telecommunications data under Chapters 3 and 4 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979—for the period 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020, 2021, pp. 62–64.

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