3.1
The Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS) 2018–19 set out the following outcome and corresponding program for the Australian Commission on Law Enforcement and Integrity (ACLEI):
Outcome 1: Independent assurance to the Australian Government that Commonwealth law enforcement agencies and their staff act with integrity by detecting, investigating and preventing corruption.
Program 1.1: Detect, investigate and prevent corruption in prescribed law enforcement agencies; assist law enforcement agencies to maintain and improve the integrity of staff members.
3.2
The PBS also outlined five key performance indicators and correlating targets, which track how ACLEI is progressing toward meeting its outcome.
3.3
This chapter summarises and assesses ACLEI's results against its performance framework in 2018–19, to the extent such matters were not addressed in the previous chapter on 'key issues'.
Delivery against strategic priorities and activities
3.4
ACLEI’s Corporate Plan 2018–22 identifies ten strategic priorities, with five each listed under 'capability' and 'delivery'. These priorities specify ten key activities (each aligned to a priority) for ACLEI to undertake to meet its performance criteria in 2018–19. The ten activities below have evolved from the 2017–18 activities.
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Integrity leadership
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Place a focus on Integrity Leadership as a driver of culture and mitigator of risk. Continue to engage with [Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (LEIC Act)] LEIC Act agency heads—and, as appropriate, across government—to focus and align anti-corruption efforts. Encourage innovation and sharing of insights and methods between anti-corruption practitioners.
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Government strategy
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Respond to priorities of Government, including the implementation of the Home Affairs Portfolio, the strengthening of whistle-blower protections, and continuing reviews of ACLEI's jurisdiction and resources. Contribute to external reviews and dialogues about ACLEI's role in the public sector integrity framework.
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Corruption-enabled crime
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Engage with relevant agencies to strengthen joint understandings of corruption methods and motivations—including in administration of biosecurity, anti-money laundering and visa arrangements—and the role of corruption as an enabler of serious crime types. Continue to partner with State-based law enforcement and integrity agencies to share criminal intelligence relating to law enforcement and border corruption.
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Internal culture
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Maintain and reinforce a professional, adaptive culture across ACLEI's Canberra and Sydney locations—focussing on efficiency, accountability and delivering value. Strengthen measures of resource allocation and undertake regular case management reviews to ensure agency resources are directed effectively. Look for opportunities to automate workflow and digitise records.
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Priority setting
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Integrate decision and risk tools into everyday practices that better support operational case selection and resource allocation in a more complex organisational environment. Undertake a feasibility study to improve case data management, intelligence linking and statistical reporting.
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Intelligence gathering
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Further invest in ACLEI's ability to detect serious and systemic corruption through the enhancement of ACLEI's intelligence collection capability—including through human intelligence collection and undercover operations—as well as targeted detection projects and investigation task forces with other agencies.
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Technical capabilities
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Consolidate gains already made in ACLEI's key operational capabilities—namely, forensic financial analysis, law enforcement data access, and legal service delivery—to enhance operational efficiency and effectiveness, and to better manage operational risk.
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Prevention
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Proactively disseminate information about corruption risks and vulnerabilities to assist LEIC Act and other relevant agencies to disrupt insider threat. Work with LEIC Act agencies to continue to attune their integrity systems to a dynamic risk environment.
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Relationships
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Explore new or strengthened relationships with counterpart agencies, and more broadly, to build capability and capacity to combat corruption-enabled crime. Assess the feasibility of establishing additional interstate taskforces or offices, where such a measure would lead to breakthroughs or otherwise improve outcomes.
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Facilities
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Commission a fit-for-purpose secure operations facility in Sydney.
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Source: ACLEI, Annual Report 2018–19, p. 3.
3.5
The Annual Report 2018–19 lists various projects, actions and deliverables undertaken throughout the reporting period which correspond to the planned 2018–19 activities. As the committee also noted in its examination of the Annual Report 2017–18, the activities do not have quantitative or qualitative measures, making it difficult to ascertain whether they met expected outcomes.
Annual performance statement
3.6
ACLEI's Annual Performance Statement 2018–19 presents ACLEI's results against each PBS performance criteria. For the 2018–19 reporting period, ACLEI concluded it had 'performed well or strongly against its performance measures'.
Performance criterion one—the corruption notification and referral system is effective
3.7
Criterion one relates to the effectiveness of ACLEI’s corruption notification and referral system and is measured against the following:
law enforcement agencies notify ACLEI of corruption issues and related information in a timely way;
other agencies or individuals provide information about corruption issues, risks and vulnerabilities to ACLEI;
partner agencies indicate confidence in sharing information or intelligence with ACLEI;
ACLEI prioritises credible information about serious or systemic corruption; and
ACLEI supports awareness-raising activities in agencies within the Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction, including by participating in joint initiatives.
3.8
ACLEI reports that the heads of LEIC Act agencies are notifying ACLEI of corruption issues as required, demonstrating an effective notification and referral system. The Annual Report 2018–19 highlights that LEIC Act agencies 'engage positively with their obligations to notify the Integrity Commissioner of corruption issues' and that a majority of notifications are provided in a timely manner.
3.9
The then Integrity Commissioner, Mr Michael Griffin AM, held meetings with all LEIC Act agencies during the reporting period to ‘reinforce the importance of timely notifications’, and to inform the respective agencies of specific corruption vulnerabilities identified through investigations and how these vulnerabilities might be addressed.
3.10
Partner agencies, according to the Annual Report, 'continue to indicate confidence in sharing information and intelligence with ACLEI', shown through their willingness to share corruption issues and take part in joint investigations. As a majority of ACLEI investigations are conducted with partner agencies and with a number of staff seconded between ACLEI and partner agencies, cooperative relationships are crucial to the success of the investigations.
3.11
During the reporting period, ACLEI staff delivered 26 presentations to both LEIC Act agencies and the broader public service to support awareness-raising activities. ACLEI also held a number of training sessions for agencies under its jurisdiction to strengthen and refine integrity systems and the notification process.
Notifications from LEIC Act agencies
3.12
In 2018–19, the number of notifications from LEIC act agencies to ACLEI decreased slightly from the previous year. The number of notifications from LEIC Act agencies from 2014–15 to 2018–19 is detailed in Table 2.
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Number
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71
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185
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135
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128
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115
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Source: ACLEI, Annual Report 2018–19, p. 24.
3.13
A total of 88 notifications were received for abuse of office in 2018–19. Although this total has fallen from the previous two reporting periods, abuse of office remains the primary driver of corruption notifications.
3.14
Corruption issues notified in 2018–19 remained more or less stable for the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC), the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC). Corruption notifications increased for the then Department of Agriculture and decreased for the Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs). Further detail is provided in Table 3, below. The notifications for 2018–17 are indicated in brackets.
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Abuse of office
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4 (2)
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42 (48)
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10 (2)
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0 (0)
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32 (51)
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88 (103)
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Pervert the course of justice
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0 (0)
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2 (0)
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0 (0)
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0 (0)
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1 (1)
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3 (1)
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Corruption of any other kind
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0 (1)
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22 (18)
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0 (0)
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0 (0)
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2 (5)
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24 (24)
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Total
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4 (3)
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66 (66)
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10 (2)
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0 (0)
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35 (57)
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115 (128)
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Source: ACLEI, Annual Report 2018–19, p. 67.
Referrals from other sources
3.15
ACLEI reported that other government agencies continue to provide credible information about corruption to ACLEI. This information often arises incidentally when these agencies are conducting criminal investigations. The number of referrals fluctuates year to year, dependent upon the operational focus of these external agencies. In 2018–19, 87 per cent of corruption issues referred from other sources concerned 'abuse of office'. The number of referrals provided by other sources for 2018–19 is detailed in Table 4.
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Government agencies only
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24
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39
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18
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24
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12
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Total referrals (all sources)
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30
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48
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19
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28
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31
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Source: ACLEI, Annual Report 2018–19, p. 24.
3.16
ACLEI states it fosters inter-jurisdictional partnerships to support a continued flow of referrals and sharing of credible information, including by holding regular meetings with state-based law enforcement agencies.
Own-initiative investigations
3.17
Under the LEIC Act, the Integrity Commissioner has the power to commence investigations without a notification or referral. In 2018–19, ACLEI commenced three such investigations—two for Home Affairs and one for AUSTRAC, and all related to an alleged ‘abuse of office’.
Assessment notifications
3.18
ACLEI assesses notifications and referrals against the Integrity Commissioner's guidelines on assessing priority concerning serious or systemic corruption. In 2018–19, 141 assessments were completed within 90 days of receipt. Further details are in Table 5.
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Total assessments completed
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120
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190
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193
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167
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141
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Number that met the 90-day benchmark
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100
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120
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172
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167
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141
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% that met the 90-day benchmark (against the target of 75%)
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83%
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63%
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89%
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100%
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100%
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Source: ACLEI, Annual Report 2018–19, p. 24.
3.19
At the public hearing on 25 June 2020, the Integrity Commissioner was asked if the key performance indicator (KPI) for assessing notifications had changed. The Integrity Commissioner responded that a new KPI—90 per cent of assessments to be completed within 30 days—had been implemented and the results will be reflected in the 2019–20 reporting period. A KPI has not been implemented for the remaining 10 per cent of assessments. However, the Integrity Commissioner also advised that:
We haven't put a second KPI on about the additional 10 per cent but I'm happy to go away and have a think about that. Yes, I would be expecting that it would be outliers that can't be done in the 30 days and it would be because there was some particular technical issue that we needed some advice on. For example, sometimes there can be difficult technical issues about whether a matter actually falls within our jurisdiction—those types of issues—which need some legal advice.
3.20
The Integrity Commissioner further advised that ACLEI has recently implemented a new assessment board to support the assessment of matters within a shorter timeframe. The board meets weekly to review assessments and make recommendations to the Integrity Commissioner. Ms Hinchcliffe emphasised that assessments need to be completed 'as quick as possible' so the matter can be investigated or referred to another authority if it constitutes criminality.
Committee comment
3.21
The committee supports ACLEI’s continued effort to work closely with LEIC Act agencies to encourage prompt notification of corruption issues, and the sharing of integrity risks and vulnerabilities.
3.22
The committee also commends ACLEI on its achievement of completing 141 assessments within 90-days of receipt and acknowledges ACLEI has implemented a new KPI for the next reporting period—90 per cent of assessments to be completed within 30 days of receipt. The committee notes that the Integrity Commissioner indicated she is willing to consider implementing a KPI for the remaining 10 per cent of assessments. The committee looks forward to learning of the results against this KPI in future reporting years.
Performance criterion two–investigations are conducted professionally and efficiently, and add value to the law enforcement integrity system
3.23
Criterion two relates to the professional and efficient conduct of ACLEI’s investigations and the value that ACLEI adds to the law enforcement integrity system. Criterion two requires that:
each investigation considers corruption risk and the broader impact on law enforcement outcomes;
operational resources are actively managed and targeted for maximum effect; and
risks relating to the operating context of law enforcement agencies are taken into account and, in appropriate circumstances, mitigation strategies are agreed with the agency concerned.
3.24
ACLEI reported positive operational results for 2018–19. These included:
five prosecutions concluded with convictions;
three final investigation reports provided to the Minister;
the Visa Integrity Taskforce's success in investigating allegations of corruption in visa processing; and
a number of disseminations of information were completed, providing criminal intelligence, vulnerability assessments or to enable disciplinary action concerning serious breaches of duty.
Decrease in investigations
3.25
ACLEI's total active investigations decreased from a historic high of 282 investigations in 2017–18, to 252 in 2018–19. As discussed in chapter 2, ACLEI's workload had been trending upwards since 2015–16, when its jurisdiction expanded to include the then Department of Immigration and Border Protection. This expansion resulted in an increase in the number of investigations commenced by ACLEI and the number of investigations carried forward into later years. However, the number of investigations commenced in 2018–19, at 28, was the lowest it has been in the five years for which the Annual Report has observed. Refer to Table 6 and Table 7 below.
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Number commenced
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42
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76
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107
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55
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28
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Total active in the year
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75
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144
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242
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282
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252
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Number concluded
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7
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8
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14
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52
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116
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Source: ACLEI, Annual Report 2018-19, p. 25.
3.26
As noted in the previous chapter, by the end of 2018–19, ACLEI had 136 investigations under investigation, a notable reduction from the high of 230 at the end of 2017–18. Of the 136 investigations, 92 concerned Home Affairs (approximately 68 per cent). Notably, there was a 91 per cent reduction in the number of investigations carried forward relating to the Australian Federal Police, from 82 investigations in 2017–18 to 18 in 2018–19.
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2009–10
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3 (3)
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0 (0)
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N/A
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N/A
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N/A
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3 (3)
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2010–11
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0 (0)
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2 (2)
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N/A
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N/A
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0 (0)
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2 (2)
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2011–12
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2 (2)
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2 (4)
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N/A
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N/A
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1 (1)
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3 (5)
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2012–13
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0 (0)
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0 (0)
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N/A
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N/A
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0 (2)
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0 (2)
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2013–14
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0 (0)
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2 (9)
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1 (2)
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0 (0)
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0 (4)
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3 (15)
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2014–15
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1 (2)
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1 (8)
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0 (1)
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0 (0)
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5 (8)
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7 (19)
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2015–16
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3 (4)
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3 (31)
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3 (3)
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0 (0)
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11 (25)
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20 (63)
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2016–17
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2 (2)
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5 (23)
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3 (7)
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0 (0)
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38 (46)
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48 (78)
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2017–18
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1 (3)
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3 (7)
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2 (2)
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0 (0)
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27 (31)
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33 (43)
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2018–19
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3
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3
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1
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1
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11
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19
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Total under investigation by ACLEI as of 30 June 2019
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15 (16)
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18 (82)
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10 (15)
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1 (0)
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92 (117)
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136 (230)
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Source: ACLEI, Annual Report 2018–19, p. 74.
Reviewing investigations for closure
3.27
In 2018–19, ACLEI concluded 116 investigations, a significant increase from the 52 investigations concluded in 2017–18; numbers in preceding years were smaller still—7 in 2014–15, 8 in 2015–26, and 14 in 2016–17. This notable reduction, as discussed in chapter 2, was largely achieved through ACLEI's work to discontinue investigations where appropriate to do so. Refer to chapter 2 for further information on this process, including a breakdown and discussion of the outcomes of these 116 concluded investigations.
Positive operational work
3.28
In 2018–19, three investigation reports were provided to the Minister (accounting for three of the 116 investigations concluded during the year). These included:
Operation Volker—an investigation into alleged false document production by a staff member of the Department of Agriculture and Water Resources;
Operation Delaney—an investigation into whether an Australia Border Force officer improperly disclosed sensitive information; and
Operation Chloris—an investigation into the conduct of a staff member of the Home Affairs concerning a corruption issue.
3.29
Additionally, five prosecutions arising from ACLEI investigations were concluded. Four of the five individuals prosecuted were employed by agencies within ACLEI's jurisdiction at the time of offending—one by Home Affairs, one by the Department of Agriculture, and two by the AFP—and a fifth person prosecuted had been a member of the then Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, but not at the time of offending.
3.30
ACLEI highlighted the work of the Corruption Prevention and Intelligence Assessments Team. The team was integrated into operational teams to 'identify vulnerabilities observed in the course of investigations, disseminate information to agencies and provide insight into current and emerging integrity risks.' Additionally, ACLEI completed a 'successful covert project assessing the corruption vulnerabilities in one element of a jurisdictional agency' and detected early indicators of corruption and high-risk individuals. The project proved the methodology for detecting early indicators of corruption and high risk individuals and provided useful information for the agency involved.
Committee comment
3.31
The quantitative results from this reporting period demonstrate ACLEI is working towards a more manageable workload, with investigations dealt with in an effective and efficient manner to reduce workload backlog.
Performance criterion three—monitor corruption investigations conducted by law enforcement agencies
3.32
Criterion three considers ACLEI's support to LEIC Act agencies undertaking internal investigations, specifically that:
all agency corruption investigation reports provided to ACLEI for review are assessed for intelligence value and completeness; and
ACLEI liaises regularly with the agencies' professional standards units about the progress of agency investigations.
Corruption issues investigated by LEIC Act agencies
3.33
In 2018–19, LEIC Act agencies investigated 278 corruption issues, which accounts for approximately 53 per cent of all corruption issues under investigation (noting that 252 corruption issues were investigated by ACLEI, including joint investigations). This was the highest number of LEIC Act agency investigations conducted in the past five reporting years, as shown in Table 8 below.
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Number referred to agencies during the year
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42
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54
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54
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88
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79
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Total active in the year
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134
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136
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183
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232
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278
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Number concluded in the year
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57
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21
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70
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30
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66
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Source: ACLEI, Annual Report 2018–19, p. 28.
3.34
Home Affairs and the AFP conducted the majority of the internal investigations for 2018–19 (approximately 45 per cent each). ACLEI conducted regular review meetings with these agencies to discuss the progress of these internal investigations.
Section 66 reports
3.35
When an LEIC Act agency completes a corruption investigation, the agency head is required under section 66 of the LEIC Act to prepare and provide a report to the Integrity Commissioner setting out, among other things, the agencies findings, and actions taken or proposed to be taken. In 2018–19, the Integrity Commissioner reviewed 65 section 66 reports, compared to 26 in 2017–18.
3.36
While the Integrity Commissioner may, under section 67 of the LEIC Act, make comments or recommendations back to the agency head on a section 66 report, in 2018–19 the then Integrity Commissioner did not comment on any of the 65 section 66 reports reviewed. During the public hearing, the current Integrity Commissioner stated that ACLEI has several processes to support ‘well-rounded investigations’ including a senior investigator to review draft section 66 reports, and a point of contact for LEIC Act agencies to seek advice and feedback. She assured the committee that if section 66 reports came to her that were deficient, she would not hesitate to notify the agency head under section 67 of the LEIC Act.
3.37
The Integrity Commissioner also acknowledged that ACLEI had improved the process of managing section 66 reports by tightening the procedures over the reporting process, following up with agencies to ensure they investigate and send through section 66 reports. The Integrity Commissioner predicted that agencies would undertake more investigations in 2019–20 and ACLEI will retain oversight to ensure that they are completed on time.
3.38
ACLEI advised in the Annual Report that in 2019–20 it would:
…review its processes for monitoring the progress of investigations by LEIC Act agencies and for the consideration of section 66 reports. The aim of the review is to put in place more effective processes with improved monitoring, and to maximise the value obtained from review of section 66 reports.
Committee comment
3.39
The committee notes that in 2018–19 LEIC Act agencies investigated a historically high number of corruption issues. The committee acknowledges that ACLEI has continued to prioritise the investigation of serious and systemic corruption issues and refer lower risk matters back to LEIC Act agencies for investigation. The increase in LEIC Act agencies conducting their own investigations over the past five years demonstrates ACLEI’s growing confidence in these agencies to appropriately manage corruption matters.
3.40
The committee also recognises the important role the Integrity Commissioner has in reviewing LEIC Act agencies section 66 reports. The committee is comfortable the Integrity Commissioner will use section 67 under the LEIC Act to provide feedback and recommendations on reports to heads of LEIC Act agencies, if required.
3.41
The committee looks forward to ACLEI's findings from its review of how it monitors the progress of investigations by LEIC Act agencies and how to maximise the value of section 66 reports.
Performance criterion four—insights contribute to accountability and anti-corruption policy development
3.42
Criterion four addresses ACLEI's accountability and anti-corruption policy development, particularly:
the Integrity Commissioner makes recommendations for improvement in corruption prevention or detection measures;
submissions that relate to corruption prevention or enhancing integrity arrangements are made to government or in other relevant forums;
targeted presentations about integrity are made to diverse audiences; and
the Integrity Commissioner's Annual Report or other publications contain analysis of patterns and trends in law enforcement corruption.
Promote anti-corruption and corruption detection measures
3.43
In 2018–19, ACLEI shared insights into corruption methods and motivations and engaged with stakeholders on anti-corruption work. Activities included:
the Integrity Commissioner and ACLEI staff delivered 39 presentations to domestic and international audiences on integrity risks, vulnerabilities within systems and processes, and corruption prevention;
ACLEI staff attended a number of forums with a host of international law enforcement counterparts;
ACLEI published a major report, International Deployments: corruption risks for law enforcement, that provided 20 recommendations to mitigate potential corruption risk across the deployment cycle, and released a number of awareness-raising factsheets and short videos;
ACLEI contributed to a joint submission with other integrity agencies to the inquiry by the Parliament Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security Review of the Telecommunication and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 in April 2019; and,
ACLEI staff participated in three meetings of the Community of Practice for Corruption Prevention and provided input on amendments to the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).
Patterns and trends in law enforcement
3.44
ACLEI's investigations and intelligence operations provide insights into patterns and trends in law enforcement corruption. ACLEI shares these insights with stakeholders to strengthen anti-corruption frameworks and to educate stakeholders about corruption methods and motivations, including how agencies can respond to corruption threats.
3.45
In 2018–19, a large portion of ACLEI's investigation activity related to 'potential corruption-enabled border crime, such as the importation of illicit drugs, visa fraud, and attempts to gain commercial advantage through the circumvention of Australia's biosecurity processes'. ACLEI found criminal entities, companies and individuals using 'sophisticated methods' to corrupt law enforcement officers and obtain sensitive information.
3.46
The personal circumstances of law enforcement officers, such as problem gambling and illicit drug use, can increase their vulnerability to exploitation or lead to corrupt conduct. ACLEI has reported that social capital is an emerging driver of corruption vulnerabilities. Social capital, defined by ACLEI as the 'non-monetary benefit and/or improved social standing that can be gained through corrupt conduct' may motivate officers to act corruptly. For example, ACLEI identified social capital motivators within the visa-processing environment where locally engaged staff in overseas posts may face social pressures to make favourable decisions when granting visas.
3.47
ACLEI reported that in 2018–19, it devoted resources to investigate allegations of corruption by senior staff of LEIC Act agencies. While the number was small, the seniority of the staff involved makes it sensitive and requires monitoring by the Integrity Commissioner. Investigations into administrative activities continued, and as noted in ACLEI's previous annual report, most behaviours were misconduct rather than corruption. Still, they could be classed as corruption if rampant, contributing to a toxic workplace.
Committee comment
3.48
The committee commends ACLEI for its effort to reinforce anti-corruption measures throughout 2018–19. The committee recognises that ACLEI’s anti-corruption strategies such as sharing research analysis and resources, engaging with relevant agencies, and contributing to the development and strengthening of integrity structures, are essential to prevent corruption in law enforcement agencies.
3.49
The committee notes the trends and patterns that ACLEI has described in its Annual Report 2018–19. Of particular interest are the insights (including those drawn from the Visa Integrity Taskforce operation, which was discussed in the previous chapter) to understand and educate others on how social capital can expose law enforcement officers to corruption risk. The committee considers that this will likely be an increasing risk going forward, and will continue to monitor with interest how ACLEI responds to it.
Performance criterion five—ACLEI’s governance and risk management controls are effective and take account of its operational role
3.50
Criterion five considers ACLEI’s internal risk management processes to ensure:
systems are in place to ensure ACLEI officers act ethically, comply with legislative requirements and adhere to standards set by the Integrity Commissioner; and
regular reviews and audits indicate effective governance, risk management and integrity.
3.51
During the reporting period, ACLEI reviewed its risk management framework and controls. ACLEI stated the agency updated its:
Standard Operating Procedures which guide 'staff members on best practice when performing administrative and operational tasks';
Fraud and Corruption Control Plan;
Risk Management Framework;
Business Continuity Plan; and
property and security plan to include the Sydney office.
3.52
ACLEI's Annual Report 2018–19 outlined several strategies it has in place to ensure its operations are supported by effective governance, risk management and integrity. These strategies include various recruitment practices, reviews and audits of operations and guidance and governance-related boards and committees.
3.53
ACLEI noted that its Internal Governance Board meets monthly and receives reports about 'ACLEI's governance, performance, human and financial resources, corruption prevention and outreach activities, and to monitor operational risks and resources and compliance with legislation'. ACLEI's Audit Committee meets five times a year. It provides 'independent assurance and assistance to the Integrity Commissioner on ACLEI's risk, control and compliance framework and its financial performance statement responsibilities'.
3.54
Potential ACLEI employees underwent a number of integrity checks including one-on-one interviews, criminal background checks, psychological assessments and a security questionnaire. Once employed, staff must comply with the integrity reporting scheme and maintain an appropriate security clearance. Staff members also undertake general and ACLEI-specific training according to a mandatory training calendar.
Ombudsman inspections
Ombudsman report on controlled operations
3.55
The Commonwealth Ombudsman (the Ombudsman) annually releases the Report on the Commonwealth Ombudsman's activities in monitoring controlled operations. To date, no report has been released for the 2018–19 period. However, in the first half of 2020, the Ombudsman released two reports covering the periods 1 July to 2017 to 30 June 2018 and 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017, which address ACLEI's involvement in controlled operations. As these reports could not be discussed in the committee's examinations of the Annual Report 2016–17 and the Annual Report 2017–18, they are included here for the sake of completeness.
3.56
The Ombudsman's Report on the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s activities in monitoring controlled operations (1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018) states the Ombudsman conducted two inspections on ACLEI's premises and assessed three controlled operations authorities during 2017–18. The findings state that no compliance issues were identified during the inspections, and ACLEI had a number of good administration practices including, 'contemporaneous record keeping for each controlled operation.'
3.57
In accordance with section 15HM of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), ACLEI provided the Ombudsman with its six-monthly reports for the periods 1 January to 30 June 2017 and 1 July to 31 December 2017, and its Annual Report 2016–17 under Part 1AB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The Ombudsman noted it was satisfied ACLEI provided the required information in all reports, except for two instances in the report from 1 July to 31 December 2017 where it identified information was incorrect. However, ACLEI rectified the incorrect information and provided an amended report to the Minister and the Ombudsman.
3.58
The Report on the Commonwealth Ombudsman's activities in monitoring controlled operations (1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017) states that no inspections of ACLEI's controlled operations records were conducted in 2016–17, as ACLEI advised the Ombudsman that no controlled operations authorities expired or were cancelled from 1 January to 31 December 2016. It further states that in 2015–16, no compliance issues were identified regarding previous inspections. The Ombudsman was satisfied ACLEI provided the required information in its reports submitted under section 15HM for the periods 1 January to 30 June 2016 and 1 July to 31 December 2016, as well as its Annual Report 2015–16 according to Part 1AB.
3.59
Section 218 of the LEIC Act requires the Commonwealth Ombudsman to provide a briefing to the committee at least once each year about the Integrity Commissioner’s involvement in controlled operations under Part 1AB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) during the preceding 12 months. The committee must meet in private to receive such a briefing.
Ombudsman report on surveillance devices
3.60
The Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Report to the Minister for Home Affairs on agencies’ compliance with the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (1 January to 30 June 2019) details the outcomes from an inspection of ACLEI’s surveillance records which took place on 13 and 14 May 2019. The inspection assessed records from 1 January to 31 December 2018 and identified two issues: a retrieval warrant issued twice by an issuing authority and non-compliance with section 49 reporting obligations, and inaccuracies in section 49 reports to the Minister. Following the inspection, ACLEI advised the Commonwealth Ombudsman it had amended and provided the Minister with revised reports.
Committee conclusion
3.61
The committee is satisfied ACLEI has performed strongly against the five performance criteria for 2018–19. ACLEI has shown it has made significant progress in addressing its increasing workload by reducing work on hand and ensuring it is focusing on matters of serious and systemic corruption, and allocating resources appropriately. Simultaneously, ACLEI delivered positive investigative and operational results, such as five prosecutions all resulting in convictions, and productive outcomes from the Visa Integrity Taskforce.
3.62
The committee appreciates that ACLEI is increasingly managing more complex investigations and that corruption risks rapidly evolve. ACLEI demonstrated that its ability to manage this increasing complexity is increased through integrated approaches to operations and corruption prevention. Integrating corruption prevention capability into investigations has allowed ACLEI to monitor and respond to emerging risks and vulnerabilities promptly, allowing agencies to be more proactive in their response to the threats identified.
3.63
Throughout the year, ACLEI continued to foster and strengthen its relationships with key stakeholders and share information about corruption vulnerabilities to build anti-corruption expertise. A variety of corruption prevention strategies are vital in creating environments where it is difficult for corruption to occur. The committee encourages ACLEI to explore how it can further assess and report on the outcomes of its prevention work.
3.64
The committee is confident ACLEI will continue improving case management and prioritisation to deliver better operational effectiveness and efficiency. The committee looks forward to learning about the progress and outcomes from a number of positive initiatives in this regard, as highlighted in the Annual Report 2018–19 and by the Integrity Commissioner at the public hearing.
3.65
Finally, the committee commends the Integrity Commissioner, Ms Hinchcliffe, and the staff of ACLEI for their work over the reporting period and for a comprehensive annual report.