Maritime Strategy Concepts

Introduction

2.1 Maritime strategies are significant in military planning because they provide the means to apply power to areas of interest along coastlines and inland. This area is called the littoral. The littoral is defined ‘as the areas to seaward of the coast which are susceptible to influence or support from the land and the areas inland from the coast which are susceptible to influence from the sea.’ Defence operations in the littoral require the need for effective joint operations.

2.2 The Parliamentary Information Research Service (IRS) notes that at the turn of the 21st century, ‘the littoral accommodates over three quarters of the world’s population, hosts over 80% of the world’s capital cities and nearly all of the marketplaces for international trade.’

2.3 The role and influence of maritime strategies are therefore a significant feature of many credible military strategies. In appreciating this point it is essential to fully understand the key features of a maritime strategy. This chapter provides background information on the key elements of a maritime strategy and its potential field of influence.

2.4 In addition, a brief account is given of the key historical developments in Australian defence strategy since the Dibb Report of 1986.

Maritime strategy – a definition?

2.5 A modern maritime strategy involves air, sea and land forces operating jointly to influence events in the littoral together with traditional blue water maritime concepts of sea denial and sea control. A maritime strategy is not just about naval forces or naval strategy.

2.6 The key elements of a maritime strategy include sea denial, sea control and power projection:

- **Sea Denial** has the ‘aim of prevention of the use of the sea’ by another force against us. This is ‘defined as the condition that exists when an adversary is denied the ability to use an area of sea for its own purposes for a period of time.’\(^4\) Sea Denial implies a more passive posture where the emphasis is on defence (although this does not preclude the employment of offensive capabilities), and where the initiative is likely to remain with the attacking power;

- **Sea Control** is ‘defined as that condition which exists when one has freedom of action to use an area for one’s own purposes for a period of time and, if required, to deny its use to an opponent’; and

- **Power Projection**, while not exclusively a maritime strategic concept, recognises that maritime forces, through Sea Control, can shape, influence and control the strategic environment, and can deliver combat force ashore if necessary.\(^2\)

2.7 Some of the modern technologies that underpin each of the key maritime strategy elements are shown in Table 2.1. It should be noted that the technologies listed in Table 2.1 are not in all cases relevant to Australia.

### Table 2.1  Maritime strategy representative technologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maritime Strategy Element</th>
<th>Technology</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sea Denial</td>
<td>mines, moored and bottom mines</td>
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<td></td>
<td>submarines using mines, torpedoes or anti-ship missiles</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captor, a homing torpedo encapsulated in a moored mine case</td>
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<td></td>
<td>fast patrol boat (PTFG) armed with anti-ship missiles (SSM)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>surface ship armed with anti-ship missiles, gunfire and torpedoes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>surface ship armed with ship-launched homing torpedoes including long range delivery by Ikara and Subroc</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>aircraft carriers with fixed and rotary wing aircraft</td>
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<td></td>
<td>land based aircraft with bombs and anti-ship missiles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sea assertion</td>
<td>aircraft carriers with Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft and fighters armed with air to air missiles (eg Phoenix, AAMRAM),</td>
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\(^2\) Centre for International Strategic Analysis, *Submission 6*, p. 4.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maritime Strategy Element</th>
<th>Technology</th>
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<tr>
<td>(Sea Control)</td>
<td>Sidewinder), and guns</td>
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<td></td>
<td>surface ships armed with area surface to air missiles (eg standard) guns, Close in Weapons Systems (CIWS), electronic warfare, and point defence missiles</td>
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<td></td>
<td>surface ships for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) using sonar, depth charges and homing torpedoes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>submarines to provide intelligence of enemy air, launched from land bases, and as SSK (Hunter-Killer submarines) to provide ASW defence</td>
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<td>ship-borne ASW aircraft, both rotary and fixed wing</td>
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<td>land-based aircraft – long range maritime patrol aircraft, maritime strike aircraft and land-based fighter if within range</td>
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<td>minesweeping, mine hunters and clearance divers</td>
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| Power projection          | aircraft carriers with ground attack aircraft and fighters |
|                           | surface ships for naval gunfire support (NGFS) |
|                           | amphibious warfare ships such as landing platform helicopters (LPH), assault ships |
|                           | landing craft |
|                           | ship launched land attack cruise missiles |


2.8 In addition to the power projection capabilities described in Table 2.1, significant power projection is provided through the capacity for submarines to launch land attack cruise missiles.

2.9 The Navy League of Australia highlights the advantages that derive from a modern maritime strategy:

...A maritime strategy enables Australia to contribute in a meaningful way to containing any instability at a distance from our island continent. Such a strategy enables Australia to go to the aid of friendly states in our region, particularly those island countries whose geographic locations control the approaches to our island. Maritime strategy will enable Australia to control and develop its important offshore resources, including oil and gas. Australia must also have the capability to control fisheries, illegal immigration, smuggling, piracy and national security matters anywhere around our coasts or offshore islands. These capabilities will not always or only be exercised by the Australian Defence Force.3

2.10 The IRS and the majority of submissions to the inquiry, however, suggest that the 2000 White Paper only articulates a strategy of sea denial for the sea air gap to the north of Australia as the focus of our defence effort. Sea Control is another step up from sea denial in that it provides for the elements of presence, reach and power to control an area of ocean in order

3 Commodore Geoffrey Evans, Navy League of Australia, Transcript, p. 256.
to pursue strategic interests. Sea control is not continuous and is based on the achievement of objectives and the resources available to enforce sea control.

2.11 Power projection, in relation to maritime strategy, is about using maritime power to influence affairs on land. The IRS commented that ‘the reach, poise, and flexibility of maritime forces enable them to strike at the land from unexpected and/or advantageous directions, making them, in the words of Liddell-Hart “the greatest strategic asset that a maritime nation can possess”’. As part of evidence to the inquiry, the arguments for a shift in maritime strategy away from an initial focus on Australia’s maritime approaches to a primary focus on littoral operations were examined. For example, Dr Michael Evans states:

From the military perspective we are best served by developing a genuine joint maritime strategy as the centrepiece of future defence planning. A maritime strategy is flexible, it is multidimensional and, above all, has the best chance of integrating the special capabilities of all three services in an efficient manner. To create a national security system whose main military component is a maritime strategy, Australia will need to shift its strategic thinking away from prescriptive strategic analysis that is based solely on defending territory towards scenario based analysis that takes much greater account of the defence of non-territorial interests.

2.12 Those who argue against this proposition, in support of long standing Government propositions, would argue that the ability to sustain operations in the littoral is sustained through current or planned force structure.

2.13 Up to this point the discussion of maritime strategy has focused on the more military objectives of maritime strategy. However, maritime strategies can include national maritime objectives.

2.14 A national concept of maritime strategy takes the understanding and significance of maritime strategy a few steps further. While the military concepts of maritime strategy described above are also a part of a national maritime strategy, the wider elements of national security are also considered. These include our nation’s economic, environmental, societal and political security. The military concept of maritime strategy encompasses diplomatic, constabulary and warfighting elements. As

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5 Dr Michael Evans, *Transcript*, p. 59.
suggested above this concept of maritime strategy is a subset of broader military strategy.

2.15 The IRS commented that in the case of a national maritime strategy ‘the term encompasses a national approach to its security that is either continentalist or maritime-focussed and considers responsibilities, not only for military forces, across a wide spectrum of security sectors.’6 This concept of both levels of maritime strategy was discussed by Mr Alastair Cooper:

I would like to emphasise a distinction I see between national maritime strategy and military maritime strategy. Although the two are related they are not the same. National maritime strategy incorporates all arms of government and is usually focused on marine areas out to the edge of the exclusive economic zone or the seabed boundary. Military maritime strategy denotes the involvement of all arms—sea, land and air—which can influence operations or activities in the marine environment. That strategy is concerned more with the implementation of government policy wherever it is deemed that Australia’s interests lie: for example, in waters adjacent to Australia, throughout the region or indeed throughout the world.7

2.16 Similarly, the Navy League of Australia suggested that a maritime strategy needs to be all embracing. The Navy League suggested that a maritime strategy should not just be limited to defence issues but include a range of maritime activities including ‘developing a thorough knowledge of the physical, economic, cultural, political and strategic attributes of the oceans and island states and areas adjacent to Australia.’8

2.17 Figure 2.1 provides a graphical account of the key elements which comprise a national concept of maritime strategy together with a military concept of maritime strategy.

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7 Mr Alastair Cooper, Transcript, p. 184.
8 Commodore Geoffrey Evans, Navy League of Australia, Transcript, p. 256.
Conclusions

2.18 Maritime strategies can relate to solely military objectives or broader national security objectives. For the purpose of this inquiry, both definitions of maritime strategy are considered. Chapter three, for example, will discuss in more detail the importance of recognising national security objectives in the consideration of maritime strategy. Chapter four will focus more on the military objectives of maritime strategy.

2.19 Where reference is made to a ‘modern maritime strategy’, the meaning is meant to convey a maritime strategy involving air, sea and land forces operating jointly to influence events in the littoral together with traditional blue water maritime concepts of sea denial and sea control. The littoral is defined ‘as the areas to seaward of the coast which are susceptible to influence or support from the land and the areas inland from the coast which are susceptible to influence from the sea.’ Defence operations in the littoral require the need for effective joint operations.

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Capability

2.20 Military strategies should determine capability development. In turn, the development of military capabilities should give effect to the strategy. For example, the broad military strategy outlined in the 1987 White Paper has influenced force development to the present day. This includes the development of the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN), movement of the Army north, the establishment of bare bases in the north, the location of a squadron of F/A-18s in northern Australia, and the establishment of a second fleet base in Western Australia.

Sea power

2.21 The current debate on Australia’s maritime strategy has generally emphasised a joint approach to capability and operations. This approach seeks to combine the forces of Navy, Air Force and Army ensuring there are no conflicting issues arising between branches of the armed forces. The three services must be connected in a unified manner that facilitates joint fighting capability. In relation to the role of sea power, there has been less focus on the role of blue water navies and more emphasis on operations in the littoral. The IRS commented that ‘the RAN has increased its focus on joint operations in the littoral and the RAN’s future warfare concepts envisage maritime forces providing protection and sustainment of embarked land forces while enroute and while the land forces remain in the littoral.’

2.22 While operations in the littoral are receiving greater attention, the classic concepts of sea denial, sea control and power projection are still important. The type of capabilities needed here include submarine, surface, air and mine warfare. The Royal Australian Navy’s current and projected fleet needs are shown in Table 2.2.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2025</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Surface Combatants</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>6 Adelaide class FFG</td>
<td>2 upgraded FFG</td>
<td>2 Air Warfare Destroyers (1 building)</td>
<td>3 Air Warfare Destroyers</td>
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<td>5 Anzac class FFH</td>
<td>3 FFG</td>
<td>3 upgraded FFG</td>
<td>8 upgraded FFH</td>
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<td>2 upgraded FFH</td>
<td>2 upgraded FFH</td>
<td>2 upgraded FFH</td>
<td>8 upgraded FFH</td>
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<td>5 FFH</td>
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<td>Transitioning to next generation</td>
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<td>16 Seahawk</td>
<td>16 Seahawk</td>
<td>Common type warfare/utility</td>
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<td>11 Super Seasprite in course of delivery</td>
<td>11 Super Seasprite</td>
<td>11 Super Seasprite</td>
<td>helicopter</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7 Sea King</td>
<td>7 Sea King</td>
<td>Utility Helicopter</td>
<td>UAVs</td>
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<td>12 Squirrel</td>
<td>12 Squirrel</td>
<td>Possibly UAVs</td>
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<td><strong>Patrol Boats</strong></td>
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<td>15 Fremantle Class</td>
<td>11 Fremantle class</td>
<td>12 Armidale class</td>
<td>Next generation patrol capability</td>
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<td>4 Armidale class</td>
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<td><strong>Submarines</strong></td>
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<td>6 Collins class SSG</td>
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<td>6 upgraded Collins class SSG</td>
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<td>6 SSG transitioning to next generation</td>
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<td>submarine capability</td>
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<td><strong>Afloat Support</strong></td>
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<td>1 Auxiliary Oiler (AO)</td>
<td>1 AO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1 Fleet Replenishment Ship (AOR)</td>
<td>1 AOR</td>
<td>1 AOR</td>
<td>2 AOR</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mine Warfare</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>6 Huon class Coastal Minehunters (MHC)</td>
<td>6 MHC</td>
<td>6 MHC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3 Auxiliary Minesweepers</td>
<td>2 Auxiliary Minesweepers</td>
<td>2 CDT</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2 Clearance Diving Teams (CDT)</td>
<td>2 CDT</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Amphibious Lift</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1 Landing Ship Heavy (LSH)</td>
<td>1 LSH</td>
<td>2 large amphibious ships</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Landing Platform Amphibious (LPA)</td>
<td>2 LPA</td>
<td>1 LPA</td>
<td>2 large amphibious ships</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Landing Craft Heavy (LCH)</td>
<td>6 LCH</td>
<td>ADF Watercraft Replacement</td>
<td>Strategic sealift capability</td>
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<td>ADF watercraft</td>
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<td><strong>Hydrographic</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>2 Leeuwin class Hydrographic Ship (HS)</td>
<td>2 HS</td>
<td>2 HS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4 Paluma class Survey Motor Launches (SML)</td>
<td>4 SML</td>
<td>4 SML</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Laser Airborne Depth Sounder</td>
<td>1 LADS</td>
<td>1 LADS</td>
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<td>airborne system</td>
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<td>1 HODSU</td>
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</table>
Land forces

2.23 The role and capability of Army has been influenced by the Defence of Australia, as articulated in previous Defence White Papers, and also through the need to operate offshore in support of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The East Timor operation, for example, demonstrated the need for short notice operations supported by air and sea lift capabilities. The 2000 White Paper has acknowledged the need for greater capability in managing operations offshore. The IRS stated:

In an attempt to balance the demands between defence of Australia and operations in the region, the 2000 White Paper reinforces the importance of an amphibious lift capability by committing to retaining and eventually replacing the Amphibious Support Ships, HMAS Manoora and HMAS Kanimbla, and also HMAS Tobruk. This combined with the additional squadron of troop lift helicopters to operate from the Amphibious Support Ships provides Defence a limited amphibious capability.¹¹

2.24 The growing emphasis on amphibious operations and the increasing role of Army in maritime strategy is demonstrated through the Army’s doctrine and concept document *Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment* (MOLE).¹² The IRS claims that this document demonstrates ‘that the maritime approaches to our territory are littoral in nature and therefore the capability to conduct joint operations in the littoral is essential to an effective maritime strategy.’¹³ Mr Hugh White emphasised the role played by land forces in maritime strategy:

The third point is that maritime strategy in no sense excludes a role of land forces in that maritime strategy. Maritime strategy is not about navies but about being able to control maritime approaches. That includes, amongst other things, being able to control what goes on in the bits of land in those maritime approaches. There is an important role for land forces in a

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¹² Note that the Army’s document *Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment* is a classified document but some comments about the document have been made in the public domain.
maritime strategy, particularly for the inner arc for operations in
the islands in our immediate neighbourhood. In fact, the 2000
white paper put a new emphasis on the capacity of our land forces
to deploy to, be sustained in and operate in our immediate
neighbourhood as part of a defence of Australia strategy.\(^{14}\)

2.25 The 2000 White Paper emphasises that Australia requires a ‘limited
amphibious capability’ sufficient to allow lodgement of land forces in an
un-opposed landing. A forced entry from the sea involving conflict would
seriously test the ADF under its current capability. The IRS commented
that in relation to possible operations offshore ‘the ADF’s limited force
projection, sea control and surface air warfare capability, combined with
the lack of endurance associated with air power, raises questions about
how the ADF might be able to effect this operation with the current and
planned capital investments.’\(^{15}\)

2.26 The 2000 White Paper, compared to previous defence white papers,
increased the emphasis on Army capabilities. The White Paper stated that
‘Army will be structured and resourced to ensure that we will be able to
sustain a brigade on operations for extended periods, and at the same time
maintain at least a battalion group available for deployment elsewhere.’\(^{16}\)

**Aerospace power**

2.27 Aerospace power incorporates air arms from both the Army and Navy in
addition to the Air Force. In certain scenarios, commercial air lift would
also be relevant. The IRS suggests that, since Dibb, aerospace power has
remained largely unchanged.

2.28 The 2000 White Paper comments that ‘Air combat is the most important
single capability for the defence of Australia, because control of the air
over our territory and maritime approaches is critical to all other types of
operations in the defence of Australia.’\(^{17}\) The air combat role is provided
through a fleet of 71 F/A-18s. In addition, a significant strike capability is
provided through the fleet of F-111s. In addition, Australia’s P3C Orion
maritime patrol aircraft are able to launch harpoon anti-ship missiles and
anti-submarine torpedoes.

2.29 In support of these capabilities are airborne early warning aircraft and air-
to-air refuelling capabilities. Technological developments are seeing
advances in stealth and guided munitions. The Government’s decision to

\(^{14}\) Mr Hugh White, *Transcript*, p. 28.


\(^{16}\) *Defence 2000, Our Future Defence Force*, 2000, p. XIV.

\(^{17}\) *Defence 2000, Our Future Defence Force*, 2000, p. 84.
sign up as a level three partner for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is influenced by these developments. At the same time, aerospace power is being influenced by the development of Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV).

**Information and Intelligence capability**

2.30 A discussion of military capability is incomplete without mentioning the importance of information and intelligence. The key features of this include intelligence collection, surveillance and command and control. Australia’s intelligence community provides a vital role in collecting a range of intelligence which can assist defence decision-makers. Australia’s intelligence capability is provided through the:

- Australian Secret Intelligence Service;
- Australian Security Intelligence Organisation;
- Defence Intelligence Organisation;
- Defence Signals Directorate;
- Defence Imagery and Geo-spatial Organisation; and
- Office of National Assessments.

2.31 Australia’s surveillance capability is provided through a range of sources including Australian Customs, Orion maritime patrol aircraft, JORN which became fully operational in April 2003, and Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft when they enter service. In addition, the Collins Class submarines provide an effective covert surveillance capability.

2.32 Command and control of the ADF is undertaken through Headquarters Australian Theatre. In addition, there is a single deployable joint task force headquarters and a second is being developed for deployment on HMAS KANIMBLA and HMAS MANOORA.

**Military strategy historical developments**

**Dibb and the 1987 Defence White Paper**

2.33 This discussion begins with the Dibb Report of 1986 and moves through to the present. Dibb’s task was not to second guess overall national strategy. The latter assumed a continuation of the US alliance, and a continuation of regional defence cooperative arrangements such as the five power defence arrangement.
Nevertheless, the absence of the broader strategic picture in the Dibb report led to criticisms at the time. The subsequent Defence White Paper did set the Dibb force structure and military strategy within the wider context. His views were largely adopted as a means of disciplining the acquisition of equipment and general force structure.

The then Government made clear that the character of forces acquired would be capable of deployment with friends and allies within Australia’s immediate region and further afield.

The 1987 Defence White Paper was heavily influenced by the Dibb report. The 1987 White Paper focused on the defence of Australia, through emphasising defence of our northern approaches with a strategy of defence in depth.

The 1987 White Paper identified the following eight national defence interests:

- the defence of Australian territory and society from threat of military attack;
- the protection of Australian interests in the surrounding maritime areas, our island territories, and our proximate ocean areas and focal points;
- the avoidance of global conflict;
- the maintenance of a strong defence relationship with the United States;
- the maintenance of a strong defence relationship with New Zealand;
- the furtherance of a favourable strategic situation in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific;
- the promotion of a sense of strategic community between Australia and its neighbours in our area of primary strategic interest;
- the maintenance of the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, which ensure that continent remains demilitarised.

The 1987 White Paper emphasised the importance of self-reliance within the framework of alliances and agreements. The report stated that the ‘first aim of defence self-reliance is to give Australia the military capability to prevent an aggressor attacking us successfully in our sea and air approaches, gaining a foothold on any part of our territory, or extracting concessions from Australia through the use or threat of military force.’ In particular, the White Paper stated that the ‘wider concept of self-reliance rejects the narrow concept of ‘continental’ defence.”

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2.39 Defence in depth gave priority to air and sea defences in Australia’s area of direct immediate interest. JORN formed the basis of a multi-layered detection system focused on Australia’s vast northern approaches. The Royal Australian Navy was established as a two ocean navy, and a major portion of the Navy’s surface and submarine fleet was based in Western Australia. A comprehensive network of air bases was established in Australia’s north to support air operations. A squadron of F/A-18s was based permanently at Tindal, Northern Territory. In addition, long range forces comprising the F-111 and submarines are capable of striking land targets such as enemy bases and force concentrations. The then Minister for Defence, the Hon Kim Beazley, MP, stated:

The defence program adopted by the Australian Government this year encompasses the largest defence investment program in Australia’s peacetime history. By the year 2000, the Australian Defence Force will have new surveillance systems, new submarines, new frigates, new aircraft and helicopters, new rifles and armoured fighting vehicles, mine countermeasures, new bases in the north of Australia, and new transport. The shape of the new ADF has been based on a rigorous analysis of Australia’s force structure requirements. We identified Australia’s first but not our only defence priority as being the development of the forces needed to defend the Australian continent, our island territories and our approaches.21

2.40 The 1987 Defence White Paper indicated that the defence of Australia task will provide the Government with practical options for use of the ADF ‘in tasks beyond our area of direct military interest in support of regional friends and allies.’ The White Paper concluded that these contingencies would not ‘themselves constitute force structure determinants.’22 The 1987 White Paper stated:

Clearly the possibility of deployments beyond our region should not determine the structure and capabilities of the ADF. Should the Government wish to respond to developments in areas other than our own, the capabilities being developed for our national defence will, subject to national requirements at the time, give a range of practical options.23

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1994 Defence White Paper

2.41 The 1994 Defence White Paper was drafted in the context of the end of the Cold War. The then Defence Minister, Senator the Hon Robert Ray, commented that the ‘end of the Cold War had ‘fundamentally changed the global security environment’, that no part of the globe was unaffected and that strategic circumstances have changed in the region and worldwide.24

2.42 The 1994 White Paper indicated that ‘the fundamental precepts of self-reliance remain valid’ but ‘the approaches we take to developing and sustaining our defence capabilities and strategic relationships will need to continue to evolve.’25 While maintaining essential military capabilities to help deter military aggression against Australia, the White Paper emphasised the role of the ADF ‘in maintaining the international policies and relationships which help ensure the security of Australia and its interests.’

2.43 Similar to the 1987 White Paper, the key defence priority remained the defence of Australia through ‘depth in defence’. The 1994 White Paper emphasised our strategic geography and the role this plays in our defence. The 1994 White Paper stated:

Our strategic geography is central in planning our defence posture and capabilities. Australia’s location, size, population and infrastructure provide both advantages and challenges for our defence. As an island continent, the primary focus of our defence effort is on our sea and air approaches, which can be turned to our decisive advantage.26

2.44 In addition to focusing on the defence of Australia, the 1994 White Paper emphasised that Australia’s security rests with regional security. The White Paper stated that ‘we have always recognised that Australia cannot be secure in an insecure region, and we have worked hard over many decades to support security in the region.’27

2.45 The 1994 White Paper noted that forces designed for the defence of Australia provide sufficient versatility for other tasks such as deployments in the Gulf, Namibia, Cambodia, Rwanda, and the South Pacific. The White Paper stated:

Important as these international and domestic activities are for Australia, they do not determine the force structure of the

Australian Defence Force. The structure of the Defence Force is determined by its essential roles in providing for the defence of Australia.\textsuperscript{28}

**Australia’s strategic policy 1997 (ASP97)**

2.46 This statement focused more on the Asia Pacific region and put renewed emphasis on the US alliance. The term ‘defence of Australia’ was replaced with ‘defeating attacks on Australia.’ In particular, ASP97 stated that ‘we need to recognise that regional conflicts—which may well relate directly to our security, or at least have a knock-on effect—are more likely than direct attacks on Australia.’\textsuperscript{29}

2.47 ASP97 repeated the findings of previous White Papers that defeating attacks on Australia would remain paramount. In addition, the security of the region was also essential. ASP97 stated:

> The security of Australia is, and should always remain, the paramount concern of our national strategic policy. Maintaining confidence in our ability to defeat an attack on Australia is, in a sense, the focus of all our defence activities. But obviously, developments in our region determine the possibility of Australia coming under military threat. It would be a serious miscalculation to think we could remain unconcerned behind some illusory ‘fortress Australia’ if the strategic environment in the Asia Pacific were to deteriorate. Our aim must be: a secure country in a secure region.\textsuperscript{30}

2.48 ASP97 identified the following three tasks which could require the ADF to undertake operations:

- defeating attacks on Australia;
- defending our regional interests; and
- supporting our global interests.

2.49 In relation to ‘defeating attacks on Australia’, ASP97 stated that this ‘is our core structure priority.’\textsuperscript{31} ASP 97 stated:

> The possession by Australia of the forces needed to defeat any substantial attack on our territory by a regional power is the essential foundation of our wider posture. These capabilities are the ultimate guarantee that if all else fails, we can still answer force


\textsuperscript{30} Department of Defence, *Australia’s Strategic Policy*, 1997, p. iii.

\textsuperscript{31} Department of Defence, *Australia’s Strategic Policy*, 1997, p. 29.
with force. They ensure that we are taken seriously by our neighbours and allies, and provide Australia with the confidence to participate effectively in the region—particularly in its strategic and security affairs.\(^\text{32}\)

2.50 ASP97 reiterated the position of previous White Papers that self-reliance was important to our overall strategic posture and image. However, and as other White Papers stated, self-reliance does not mean self sufficiency in all areas of capability, intelligence and re-supply. At the same time, ASP97 noted that self-reliance does not mean isolationism but rather close regional engagement and a focus on alliances particularly with the US and New Zealand.\(^\text{33}\)

2.51 ASP97, in addressing the complex task of developing defence capabilities, commented that ‘limited resources require us to establish a clear hierarchy of priorities to resolve conflicting capability needs for different tasks’. ASP97 stated:

Our approach is to identify a set of core tasks which carry highest priority—which our forces must be best able to handle—and then seek to ensure that the forces developed to perform those tasks are also capable of performing the others to an adequate level. The hierarchy of tasks would be based on the importance of the strategic interests involved.\(^\text{34}\)

2.52 In relation to capability development, ASP97 concluded that ‘it is evident that defeat of attacks on Australia carries the highest priority and that this task is the core criterion for decisions about priorities for capability development for the ADF.’\(^\text{35}\)

**Defence 2000 and Defence Update 2003**

2.53 The 2000 *White Paper* sets out Australia’s key strategic interests and objectives in order of importance. These strategic objectives, shown below, aim to:

- ensure the Defence of Australia and its direct approaches;
- foster the security of our immediate neighbourhood;
- work with others to promote stability and cooperation in Southeast Asia;

\(^\text{32}\) Department of Defence, *Australia’s Strategic Policy*, 1997, p. 29.


\(^\text{34}\) Department of Defence, *Australia’s Strategic Policy*, 1997, p. 35.

\(^\text{35}\) Department of Defence, *Australia’s Strategic Policy*, 1997, p. 36.
contribute in appropriate ways to maintaining strategic stability in the wider Asia Pacific region, and

support Global Security.\textsuperscript{36}

2.54 These strategic objectives are in turn supported by Australian military strategy. The 2000 White Paper identifies four priority tasks for the ADF:

- the defence of Australia, as stated in the 2000 White Paper, is shaped by three principles:
  - we must be able to defend Australia without relying on the combat forces of other countries – self-reliance;
  - Australia needs to be able to control the air and sea approaches to our continent – a maritime strategy; and
  - although Australia’s strategic posture is defensive, we would seek to attack hostile forces as far from our shores as possible – proactive operations;
- the second priority for the ADF is contributing to the security of our immediate neighbourhood;
- the third priority for Australian forces is supporting Australia’s wider interests and objectives by being able to contribute effectively to international coalitions of forces to meet crises beyond our immediate neighbourhood; and
- in addition to these core tasks in support of Australia’s strategic objectives, the ADF will also be called upon to undertake a number of regular or occasional tasks in support of peacetime national tasks.\textsuperscript{37}

2.55 In March 2003 the Government released an update on the Defence 2000 White Paper. The 2003 Update concluded that ‘while the principles set out in the Defence 2000 White Paper remain sound, some rebalancing of capability and expenditure will be necessary to take account of changes in Australia’s strategic environment.’\textsuperscript{38} The key focus of the 2003 Update was the rise of global terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) which ‘have emerged to new prominence and create renewed strategic uncertainty.’\textsuperscript{39} In addition, the Defence Update examined some of the key challenges faced by certain countries in our region.\textsuperscript{40}

2.56 Further analysis of the 2000 Defence White Paper and the Defence Update 2003 is included in Chapters four and five.

\textsuperscript{36} Defence 2000, Our Future Defence Force, 2000, p. X.
\textsuperscript{37} Defence 2000, Our Future Defence Force, 2000, pp. XI-XII.
\textsuperscript{38} Australia’s National Security, A Defence Update, March 2003, pp. 5-6.
\textsuperscript{39} Australia’s National Security, A Defence Update, March 2003, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{40} Australia’s National Security, A Defence Update, March 2003, pp. 18-22.