

The need

Background

- 3.1 Until 1993, each element of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) maintained its own intelligence organisation and conducted its own intelligence training. Following a review of defence intelligence matters the intelligence training resources of the Defence Intelligence Organisation, the Royal Australian Air Force and the Royal Australian Navy were amalgamated as the Defence Intelligence Training Wing in January 1994. With a view to future integration, the newly formed Defence Intelligence Training Wing was collocated with the existing School of Military Intelligence already accommodated in the Main Instructional Facility at Kokoda Barracks, Canungra. In October 1997, the Defence Intelligence Training Wing and the School of Military Intelligence were amalgamated as the Defence Intelligence Training Centre.
- 3.2 The implementation of Australia's strategic policy requires the development of an intelligence capability through the enhancement of analytical and assessment expertise in military and strategic intelligence. The Defence intelligence mission is to provide accurate, timely, relevant, and high quality intelligence to support the planning and conduct of ADF operations, policy-making and force development. Training is provided at the Centre for all Defence intelligence specialists and for other Defence personnel as required.¹
- 3.3 The White Paper on Defence 2000 recognised the critical importance of good intelligence to strategic decision making and to the deployment of ADF assets. High quality training will be essential if Defence is to

¹ Submissions, p. 4.

maximise the potential of the intelligence technologies outlined in the White Paper.²

Inadequacies of existing accommodation

- 3.4 The Defence Intelligence Training Centre continued to occupy the Main Instructional Facility that was completed as a purpose-built facility for the School of Military Intelligence in 1987. The building was designed to meet very different organisational, functional and security requirements to those that apply today and since the 1997 amalgamation it has become increasingly dysfunctional. Defence Intelligence Training Centre staff are currently accommodated in three separate buildings at Kokoda Barracks and training is being conducted in temporary facilities that are unsatisfactory.
- 3.5 There has been a significant, operationally driven, increase in the demand for Defence intelligence training over the past four years. This has resulted in more trainees attending courses at the Defence Intelligence Training Centre and there has been some commensurate increase in staff since 1997. Despite the increase in trainee numbers it has not been possible to close the gap between the number of Defence personnel requiring intelligence training and the places actually available for them on courses conducted by the Defence Intelligence Training Centre.
- 3.6 A range of courses is delivered with most requiring trainees to live at Kokoda Barracks for the duration of the course. The courses are of varying duration with most between five and twenty days. The longest course held twice each year runs for eighteen weeks. Trainees from intelligence units and agencies throughout Australia are trained at the Defence Intelligence Training Centre. It also conducts Defence Cooperation Program sponsored training of foreign trainees.
- 3.7 Courses comprise a mix of theoretical and practical training, with the majority of training time spent in syndicate (or tutorial) rooms. More than 85% of training is heavily reliant upon information technology - particularly in the use of classified systems that are used in the intelligence community workplace.
- 3.8 The Main Instructional Facility cannot physically accommodate any more trainees and there is no space available for the additional staff that would be needed to support them. Nine demountable buildings have already been provided as barely adequate supplementary instructional facilities.

Over 65% of the trainees are required to complete training activities in these demountable buildings. Offices for some staff, including the headquarters element, are now located in other buildings while offices in the Main Instructional Facility remain overcrowded and dysfunctional. For sound security reasons, as well as on occupational health and safety grounds, the current use of temporary buildings as instructional facilities should not continue.

- 3.9 Defence advised the Committee that the Centre's position within 35 metres of a main road is unsatisfactory from a security point of view. The road is heavily trafficked and is not controlled by Defence. The potential for access to the immediate surrounds of the main instructional facility has been a security concern for some time. Defence believes that it is desirable that the new facility be sited as far away as possible from public roads.³
- 3.10 To meet the steadily escalating demand for existing courses and the demonstrated requirement for new courses, staff numbers at the Defence Intelligence Training Centre will be increased from the current 72 to 95 by 2004-2005. By that time, the estimated trainee throughput is expected to reach about 1450 per annum from about 820 trainees during 2000-2001.

Summary

- 3.11 Defence stated that the requirement for improved facilities for the Defence Intelligence Training Centre can be summarised as follows:
- current intelligence training requirements are not being met because of the physical limitations imposed by existing buildings in respect of working accommodation for both staff and trainees;
 - the intelligence training requirement is expected to rise steadily over the next four years and increased training delivery to minimise the shortfall is impossible because of the shortcomings of the existing facilities; and
 - part of the Defence Intelligence Training Centre is accommodated in high maintenance structures that do not comply with current standards and training is conducted in transportables that do not meet either occupational health and safety or security requirements.⁴

3 Evidence, p. 11.

4 Submissions, p. 6.