
The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia

Advisory Report on the Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Maintaining Address) Bill 2011

Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters

February 2012
Canberra

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Chair's foreword

The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) advises that there are 1.5 million eligible Australians missing from the Commonwealth electoral roll. The AEC estimates that 600 000 of those 1.5 million eligible electors had previously been on the roll.

In Australia, enrolment and voting is both a right and an obligation. All Australians should take responsibility to meet their enrolment obligations in order to ensure they can participate in selecting their representatives. The methods to enrol and update enrolment details are not onerous. However, some electors neglect to update their details unless they are motivated by an impending electoral event. While others believe that the Commonwealth roll will reflect state enrolment or change of address details that have been supplied to another government agency.

Currently a change to address details must be elector initiated. When the AEC receives information about a change of residential address, it writes to the person instructing them to update their details, but it cannot take the next logical step and update the address details. Worse still, if the person fails to respond, the AEC is obliged to remove them from the roll on the basis that they are no longer entitled to be enrolled at the previous address.

The AEC's Continuous Roll Update (CRU) process is limited because it can only use the third party data received to encourage the elector to update their details; it cannot do it for them. However, if the person does not respond, the same data can be used to remove them from the roll. There is a fundamental inconsistency that this data can be used to remove eligible electors from the roll but not keep them on the roll.

The Electoral Referendum and Amendment (Maintaining Address) Bill 2011 (the Bill) seeks to address this problem. It is proposed that the AEC will be able to take the next logical step by extending its CRU process and directly update the address details of electors who are already enrolled, rather than removing them from the roll.

The state of the roll necessitates the introduction of direct address update as a matter of urgency. It will provide the AEC with greater flexibility to help counter the trend in declining enrolment over the last decade.

It is appropriate for the AEC to have this power and to determine the agencies from which it will receive data. In the past the committee has considered making the data sources subject to Ministerial approval, or to be determined by the AEC and made a disallowable instrument.

However, having examined the mechanisms proposed in the Bill and the AEC's advice on how address update will operate, it is reasonable to conclude that the AEC is best placed to select the agencies that will provide the most accurate and appropriate data for roll management purposes. The AEC will continue to use data from Centrelink, roads and traffic authorities and Australia Post, which has been tried and tested in the CRU and objection processes.

On behalf of the committee I thank the organisations and individuals who assisted the committee during the inquiry through submissions or participating at the hearings in Canberra. I also thank my colleagues on the committee for their work and contribution to this report, and the secretariat for their work on this report.

Daryl Melham MP
Chair

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Membership of the Committee

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Members The Hon Bronwyn Bishop MP

The Hon Alan Griffin MP

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Senator Simon Birmingham

Senator Carol Brown

Senator Helen Polley

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Terms of reference

On 24 November 2011 the House of Representatives Selection Committee requested the committee inquire into and report on the Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Maintaining Address) Bill 2011.

Under Standing Order 222(e), reports of the Selection Committee are treated as having been adopted by the House when they are presented.



List of abbreviations

AEC	Australian Electoral Commission
APF	Australian Privacy Foundation
CRU	Continuous Roll Update
Electoral Act	<i>Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918</i>
EM	Explanatory Memorandum
the Bill	Electoral Referendum Amendment (Maintaining Address) Bill 2011



Recommendation

2 Analysis of the Bill

Recommendation 1 (paragraph 2.52)

That the House of Representatives pass the Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Maintaining Address) Bill 2011 as proposed.

Introduction

Referral of the Bill

- 1.1 On 24 November 2011 the House of Representatives Selection Committee referred the Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Maintaining Address) Bill 2011 to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (the committee) for inquiry and report.

Origins and purpose of the Bill

- 1.2 Currently, an eligible elector must initiate new enrolments or direct the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) to make a change to their enrolment. The Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Maintaining Address) Bill 2011 (the Bill) amends the *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* (Electoral Act) to allow the AEC to directly update an elector's enrolled address details 'following the receipt and analysis of reliable and current data sources from outside the Australian Electoral Commission that indicate an elector has moved residential address'.¹
- 1.3 This Bill does not provide for the direct or automatic enrolment of eligible electors who are not already on the electoral roll.²

1 Explanatory Memorandum, Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Maintaining Address) Bill 2011, p. 1.

2 Explanatory Memorandum, Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Maintaining Address) Bill 2011, p. 1.

- 1.4 The Bill is described in the Explanatory Memorandum (EM) as implementing recommendation 10 of the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters' *Report on the conduct of the 2007 federal election and matters related thereto*. It was a unanimous recommendation. The members of the committee for that report were:

Mr Daryl Melham MP (Chair)	Senator Simon Birmingham
Mr Scott Morrison MP (Deputy Chair)	Senator Bob Brown
Mr Michael Danby MP	Senator Carol Brown
Hon Bruce Scott MP	Senator Steve Hutchins
Mr Jon Sullivan MP	Senator the Hon Michael Ronaldson

- 1.5 In the report on the 2007 election the committee considered strategies for maintaining an effective electoral roll. Recommendation 10 proposed that data received from approved agencies be used to update the electoral roll. It stated:

The committee recommends that the *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* be amended to allow the Australian Electoral Commission to receive and use information for the purposes of directly updating the electoral roll, where that information has been:

- provided by an elector or electors to an agency approved by the Minister as an agency which performs adequate proof of identity checks; and
- the elector or electors have indicated their proactive and specific consent to opt in for the information to be used for the purposes of directly updating the electoral roll; and
- the data has been provided by that agency to the Australian Electoral Commission for the purposes of updating the electoral roll.³

- 1.6 The Government response to the report was provided in March 2010. In response to recommendation 10, the Australian Government indicated its in principle support for the recommendation, stating:

The Government agrees that efficiencies and benefits would be gained by allowing data provided by trusted agencies to be used for the purposes of directly updating the electoral roll. The Government considers that providing for the direct update of data in relation to individual electors is an important step towards improving the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the electoral roll. The implementation of this recommendation will require the AEC to develop bilateral agreements with relevant agencies, and work through a range of agency-specific issues related to the

3 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, *Report on the conduct of the 2007 federal election and matters related thereto*, June 2009, Commonwealth Parliament of Australia, p. 114.

collection, use and storage of personal information. Noting that the *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* requires all Australian citizens to be enrolled, the Government will ensure that appropriate privacy protections, including provisions for opt-out where appropriate, are incorporated into the arrangements to be developed. The AEC will consult with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner and conduct detailed Privacy Impact Assessments in the course of developing agreements with trusted agencies.⁴

1.7 The Special Minister of State, the Hon Gary Gray AO MP, in his second reading speech indicated that the aims of this Bill are to improve electoral roll accuracy and to 'assist in meeting the urgent need to arrest the decline in enrolment rates across Australia'.⁵

1.8 The AEC currently uses Continuous Roll Update (CRU) to assist with maintaining the currency and accuracy of the electoral roll. The AEC described this method as:

The most significant method now used by the AEC to actively review the roll and encourage enrolment...introduced in 1999. The core of the program is regular mail reviews, in which the AEC conducts large mail-outs to specific electors and to specific addresses where it believes eligible persons who are not on the electoral roll or not correctly enrolled reside. The mail reviews are, in some cases, supplemented by targeted field work. Follow-up activity aimed at people who have not responded to an initial mail-out, is also conducted.⁶

1.9 The targeted mail-outs are often based on data received from third party sources that indicate address details of enrolled persons may have changed. CRU places the onus on the elector to confirm the address details at which they are eligible to be enrolled. The AEC advised that response rates were generally between 15 and 20 per cent for the monthly mail-outs during periods when there are not major electoral events.⁷

1.10 While electors' address information cannot currently be updated based on third party data, electors can be removed from the roll as part of the objection process in Part IX of the Electoral Act. If the AEC has reasonable

4 Commonwealth of Australia, *Government Response to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters 'Report on the conduct of the 2007 federal election and matters related thereto'*, March 2010, p. 5.

5 The Hon Gary Gray AO MP, Special Minister of State, *House of Representatives Hansard*, 23 November 2011, p. 13568.

6 Australian Electoral Commission, *Submission 2*, p. 7.

7 Australian Electoral Commission, *Submission 2*, p. 7.

grounds for believing that a person does not live at their enrolled address, the AEC will contact the elector and indicate that they will be removed from the roll. If no response is received within 21 days of the notice, the elector is removed from the roll. Consequently, the person in question will not be able to vote in a federal election unless they re-enrol.

- 1.11 The amendments in the Bill also enable the Electoral Commissioner to discontinue the objection process and update an elector's address details rather than remove an elector from the roll.
- 1.12 The Special Minister of State asserted that the Bill will also serve to reduce removal of eligible electors from the roll by the objection process, stating in his second reading speech that:

The Electoral Commission currently uses this information as the basis to remove someone from the electoral roll. The result is that eligible electors are being removed from the roll despite the fact that the Electoral Commission has accurate information on the elector's current address. This restriction is having a detrimental effect on enrolment.⁸

Requirement to enrol and update details

- 1.13 Under the Electoral Act, it is compulsory for eligible electors to enrol to vote in federal elections, and to update their residential address details within 21 days after having lived at the new address for one month. Section 101 provides that an eligible elector who does not fulfil these obligations is guilty of an offence and is punishable by a fine of \$110.
- 1.14 However, the AEC estimates that around 1.5 million Australians who are eligible are not on the roll. When questioned by the committee, the AEC advised that no prosecutions for non-enrolment had been pursued in recent years.⁹

8 The Hon Gary Gray AO MP, Special Minister of State, *House of Representatives Hansard*, 23 November 2011, p. 13568.

9 Mr Paul Pirani, Chief Legal Officer, Australian Electoral Commission, *Committee Hansard*, 8 February 2012, Canberra, p. 9.

Objection process

- 1.15 Part IX of the Electoral Act sets out the objection process under which electors can be removed from the electoral roll.
- 1.16 A person enrolled in a particular electoral division may object to the enrolment of another elector if they believe the person is not entitled to be enrolled in that division or is enrolled at an address at which they do not currently live and have not lived for at least one month.¹⁰
- 1.17 Section 114 also requires the Electoral Commissioner to object to the enrolment of an elector in these circumstances. The AEC indicated that objection action initiated by the Electoral Commissioner 'are most commonly triggered by CRU mailing based on third party data'.¹¹ The Electoral Commissioner writes to the elector notifying of the AEC's intention to remove them from the electoral roll. If the elector does not respond to this notice within 21 days of the notice being issued, they will be removed from the roll. The AEC will then send a second notice to the same address advising the elector that they have been removed from the electoral roll.

Contents of the Bill

- 1.18 Schedule 1 of the Bill seeks to standardise references to the Electoral Commissioner by substituting a number of occurrences of the 'Electoral Commission' with the 'Electoral Commissioner'. The EM indicated that the *Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Pre-poll Voting and Other Measures) Act 2010* made a number of amendments to the Electoral Act that specified the Electoral Commissioner as the person responsible for enrolment related and pre-poll tasks and functions rather than the AEC.
- 1.19 Item 1 of Schedule 1 also extends the Electoral Commissioner's power in section 28 to delegate the roll review functions under section 92.
- 1.20 Schedule 2 contains the significant amendments of the Bill to enable the Electoral Commissioner (or a delegate) to change the address at which an elector is enrolled. It includes the insertion of new section 103A 'Updating or transferring a person's enrolment without claim or notice from the person'.

¹⁰ Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, s 114.

¹¹ Australian Electoral Commission, *Submission 2*, p. 8.

- 1.21 Item 3 sets out proposed section 103A, which covers:
- the circumstances in which this direct update of address mechanism will apply – s 103A(1);
 - the action the Electoral Commissioner may take to update an elector's address – ss 103A(3)-(5);
 - that the Electoral Commissioner may notify the relevant elector when a change of address is proposed (s 103A(2)) and must notify when the address is updated or of the decision not to update – ss 103A(6)-(7); and
 - to allow the Electoral Commissioner to provide the required notices by electronic means, whether or not the recipient has consented to receiving information by electronic communication – s 103A(8).
- 1.22 Item 2 amends section 101 (that requires eligible electors to enrol and update their address details) by providing that if an elector's address details are updated under section 103A then proceedings must not be brought against that elector for their prior failure to update their details.
- 1.23 The Bill also proposes to change the operation of the objection process, by requiring that the Electoral Commissioner must not complete the removal of challenged electors from the electoral roll in certain prescribed circumstances.
- 1.24 Item 4 provides that objection action must not be taken against electors who have been issued with a notice under subsection 103A(2) of the Electoral Commissioner's intention to update their address.
- 1.25 The Electoral Commissioner must also dismiss an objection in the following circumstances (Item 5):
- if a notice under subsection 103A(2) has already been issued prior to a person challenging the elector, and the person does not provide information inconsistent with data that formed the basis of the notice; or
 - if a notice under subsection 103A(2) is issued to the elector after the objection was made but before notice is given of the objection.
- 1.26 In cases where an objection notice has already been issued, the Electoral Commissioner 'must not determine an objection' if a subsection 103A(2) notice is issued, and must advise the person who initiated the objection and the challenged elector accordingly (Items 7 and 8).
- 1.27 Item 9 provides that a person who raised the objection can, within 28 days of the notice of the decision, request an internal review of the Electoral

Commissioner's decision, under section 118, to dismiss or not determine an objection.

- 1.28 An elector who has had their address updated may also seek an internal review of the decision to change their enrolled address.
- 1.29 Items not explicitly mentioned above are smaller amendments consequential to the more substantial changes.

Policy background

- 1.30 The increasing numbers of eligible Australians missing from the electoral roll has motivated the examination by the AEC of strategies to combat this trend. Currently, the AEC estimates that around 1.5 million Australians who are eligible to vote are not on the electoral roll and so cannot exercise their voting rights.¹²
- 1.31 The AEC advised the committee during the inquiry into the 2010 federal election that over 200 000 people cast pre-poll, absent and provisional votes at the election that were rejected, due to these individuals being incorrectly enrolled or not enrolled. The Electoral Commissioner suggested that 'they are clearly potentially part of the group that have fallen off the roll because, at some stage, they did not respond to an AEC letter', and were removed under the objection process.¹³
- 1.32 One key strategy that the Australian Government is pursuing to arrest this trend in non-enrolment – not applying to be on the roll or failing to update their address details and potentially being removed from the roll – is by providing the AEC with greater powers to make changes to eligible electors' enrolment. In general terms, this involves removing the onus from eligible Australians to initiate enrolment and update their information, and enabling the AEC to perform these actions in certain circumstances based on data obtained from third party sources.
- 1.33 Systems of direct enrolment currently operate at the state level in New South Wales and Victoria.

12 Mr Ed Killesteyn, Electoral Commissioner, Australian Electoral Commission, *Committee Hansard*, 8 February 2012, Canberra, p. 1.

13 Mr Ed Killesteyn, Electoral Commissioner, Australian Electoral Commission, *Committee Hansard*, 8 February 2012, Canberra, p. 7.

- 1.34 This Bill focuses on updating the information for enrolled electors, who have already established their identity and eligibility. However, direct enrolment and the reinstatement of eligible electors who have been removed in the objection process are the subjects of another bill.¹⁴

Date of effect

- 1.35 The amendments in the Bill will take effect from the day following Royal Assent.

Objectives and conduct of the inquiry

- 1.36 The objective of this inquiry is to investigate the adequacy of the Bill in achieving its policy objectives and, where possible, identify any unintended consequences.
- 1.37 On 13 December 2011, the committee Chair, Mr Daryl Melham MP, issued a media release announcing the inquiry and called for submissions to the inquiry.
- 1.38 The committee received five submissions for this inquiry, which are listed in Appendix A. Public hearings were held in Canberra on 8 and 15 February 2012, during which the committee heard from the Australian Electoral Commission and the Australian Privacy Foundation (see Appendix B). The submissions and transcripts of evidence are available on the committee's website at: www.aph.gov.au/em.

14 The Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Protecting Elector Participation) Bill 2012 was introduced in the House of Representatives on 15 February 2012 and was referred to the committee on 16 February 2012.

Analysis of the Bill

Overview

- 2.1 The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) estimates that at the end of 2011, the federal enrolment participation rate was 90.2 per cent. This means that around 1.5 million people who are eligible to vote are not enrolled and consequently cannot vote. The AEC predicts that this will worsen if the pattern of the last decade is allowed to continue. The growth in enrolment participation has not matched the growth in eligible persons.
- 2.2 The AEC uses a number of strategies to encourage and facilitate enrolment to help ensure a current and accurate federal electoral roll. Since its introduction in 1999, the Continuous Roll Update (CRU) program has become central to the AEC's maintenance of the electoral roll.
- 2.3 In relation to changes of address, under the CRU process the AEC will receive data from other agencies that indicate that an enrolled elector has changed their address and so is no longer entitled to be enrolled at the previous address. The AEC communicates with an elector to advise them to update their enrolment details. However, the AEC cannot update an elector's address details without instruction from an elector. Instead, because of the objection process, the AEC is required to remove the elector from the roll.
- 2.4 A number of eligible electors fail to enrol. However, many others may have neglected to update their address details with the AEC and are consequently removed from the roll. The AEC estimated that of those 1.5 million missing from the federal electoral roll, 600 000 people have previously been on the roll and could have voted.

- 2.5 The Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Maintaining Address) Bill 2011 (the Bill) will enable the Electoral Commissioner to update an elector's address details rather than removing them under the objection process.
- 2.6 The Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (the committee) focused its discussion on the requirements to enrol and update details, the sources of data to be used by the AEC to update address details, and privacy concerns. Other issues were also raised but were not of direct relevance to the Bill.

Requirement to enrol and update details

Background

- 2.7 For the purposes of federal elections in Australia, an eligible elector is a person who is:
- 18 years of age or over;
 - an Australian citizen, or was a British subject on a Commonwealth electoral roll as at 25 January 1984; and
 - has lived at their current address for at least one month.
- 2.8 The *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* (Electoral Act) requires eligible persons to enrol and to update their enrolment details when they change address. Section 101 provides that an eligible elector who does not fulfil these obligations is guilty of an offence and is punishable by a fine of one penalty point, which is currently \$110.
- 2.9 However, the AEC estimates that 1.5 million eligible electors are not on the federal electoral roll.¹
- 2.10 When questioned by the committee, the AEC advised that no prosecutions for non-enrolment (not enrolling or not updating address details) had been pursued in recent years.² Instead, the emphasis is on encouraging enrolment rather than punishing those who have not enrolled or failed to update their details. This is reflected in subsection 101(7) of the Electoral

1 Mr Ed Killesteyn, Electoral Commissioner, Australian Electoral Commission, *Committee Hansard*, 8 February 2012, Canberra, p. 1.

2 Mr Paul Pirani, Chief Legal Officer, Australian Electoral Commission, *Committee Hansard*, 8 February 2012, Canberra, p. 9.

Act which provides that once a person has enrolled or updated their details, proceedings cannot be brought against them for prior failures to do so.

Analysis

2.11 The AEC advised the committee that:

The evidence suggests that as each year passes by the number of unenrolled citizens will continue to increase. Significantly, many of these are people who were enrolled in the past; indeed, the AEC estimates that over 600,000 of the 1.5 million unenrolled have been enrolled before and could have voted.

In part, this reflects the imbalance of the existing provisions which allow the AEC to commence action to remove a person from the roll on the basis of reliable third-party data, which indicates they no longer reside at their enrolled address but does not allow the AEC to update the same person's details to an address for which we have information that they do reside at.³

2.12 The Democratic Audit of Australia observed that:

While it is true that enrolling to vote may not appear an onerous requirement, the sheer numbers of unenrolled Australians make it evident that the current system is evidently not working.⁴

2.13 This Bill still places the onus on eligible electors to meet their enrolment obligation, but the AEC would be able to update their address details rather than relying on a response from the elector to the CRU letter or removing them from the roll under the objection process.

2.14 The AEC commented that:

...direct update of elector addresses using reliable third-party information is not only a next logical step in the evolution of electoral roll administrative practices but also consistent with growing expectations of many in the community for seamless use of data across government agencies.⁵

3 Mr Ed Killesteyn, Electoral Commissioner, Australian Electoral Commission, *Committee Hansard*, 8 February 2012, Canberra, p. 1.

4 Democratic Audit of Australia, *Submission 1*, p. 2.

5 Mr Ed Killesteyn, Electoral Commissioner, Australian Electoral Commission, *Committee Hansard*, 8 February 2012, Canberra, p. 2.

2.15 The Australia Privacy Foundation (APF) opposed the passage of the Bill. However the APF conceded that 'the community does indeed expect that government agencies will move with the times and take advantage of and make available improved electronic mechanisms'.⁶ As an alternative, the APF argued for a consent-based cross-notification arrangement, in which individuals could request that their information be passed on to the AEC for the purposes of updating the roll.⁷

2.16 The APF argued that removing the onus from the elector could compromise the accuracy of the roll. The APF submitted that:

...there is a risk that allowing enrolment changes from secondary sources without positive confirmation from the electors concerned will in many cases lead to a reduction in quality, with electors incorrectly enrolled, or erroneously removed from the database. By definition, use of incorrect information will mean that the notices supposedly offered as a safeguard will not reach the elector who will therefore have no way of objecting. It seems inevitable that in some cases electors who want to vote will be disenfranchised – surely a worse outcome than rolls missing a few electors who have failed to positively confirm change of address?⁸

2.17 The Electoral Commissioner outlined the process to the committee, indicating that:

...the activity for direct address update is very similar indeed to the current activity that we have been undertaking for the last decade on the Continuous Roll Update program. The processes are much the same. We take data from third-party agencies. We take that data and match it against our existing electoral roll using computer systems. We make a determination based on that third-party data in comparison with the electoral roll as to whether a person is at their latest known address. We then take action; we test it. In this case or in the current CRU activity, the letter goes out to the individual. In a direct address update, we would still send a letter to the person but, where there is no response, we would take action to update the address.⁹

6 Dr Roger Clarke, Chair, Australian Privacy Foundation, *Committee Hansard*, 15 February 2012, p. 5.

7 Dr Roger Clarke, Chair, Australian Privacy Foundation, *Committee Hansard*, 15 February 2012, pp. 11-12.

8 Australian Privacy Foundation, *Submission 3*, p. 2.

9 Mr Ed Killesteyn, Electoral Commissioner, Australian Electoral Commission, *Committee Hansard*, 8 February 2012, Canberra, p. 2.

Conclusion

- 2.18 All Australians should take responsibility to meet their enrolment obligations in order to ensure they can participate in selecting their representatives. The processes to enrol and update enrolment details are not onerous, with the latter made easier with the means to update online.
- 2.19 However, it is also reasonable that electors expect some degree of data sharing between government agencies. It is appropriate for the Electoral Commissioner to be provided with the flexibility to further simplify the process for eligible electors, help combat the decline in the enrolment rate, and improve the currency and accuracy of the roll.
- 2.20 The emphasis that the AEC places on encouraging and facilitating enrolment of eligible electors rather than pursuing punishment for non-enrolment is appropriate.
- 2.21 Enabling the AEC to update address details will make inroads into saving the franchise of some of the 600 000 eligible electors who the AEC estimates have previously been enrolled but are no longer on the roll. This is particularly important for those who still believe themselves to be on the electoral roll – as they expected that an update of address details to another government agency or at the state electoral roll level would translate to the federal roll – and in cases where they were unaware of their removal under the objection process.

Data from other agencies

Background

- 2.22 The AEC outlined the current CRU data matching process, stating that:

Over the last decade the AEC's CRU program has come to rely on large and regular volumes of change of address information obtained from data provided by Centrelink, state and territory motor registry (more recently via the National Exchange of Vehicle and Driver Information System), and Australia Post. The process of CRU data matching operates as follows:

- data is matched against AEC enrolment records to establish whether or not a person is enrolled;
 - ⇒ data relating to specific categories of electors is excluded, e.g. silent electors, Members of Parliament, eligible overseas

electors (and their kin), Antarctic electors, itinerant electors, and prisoners;

- date of enrolment is compared against the currency of the data record supplied by the third party to determine further action;
 - address data is matched against the AEC address register to establish whether or not an address is valid for enrolment purposes; and
- ⇒ addresses with no mail service are excluded where no postal address is provided.¹⁰

2.23 The Electoral Commissioner will be responsible for the selection of organisations from which the data will be obtained. Mr Killesteyn advised that the agencies to be used for the update of address details will be Centrelink, Australia Post and the data from roads and traffic authorities, which is collected into a single database nationally, NEVDIS.¹¹ These are the sources currently used by the AEC.

Analysis

2.24 The APF expressed concern about what it described as the AEC's practice of 're-purposing' information from other government agencies to use it for electoral administration purposes.¹²

2.25 Concerns were also raised about who should be responsible for determining which organisations are appropriate sources of information.

2.26 In previous parliaments, the committee has expressed similar reservations. In the context of recommending the AEC have the powers to update electors' details, the committee in its report into the 2007 federal election, concluded that source agencies should require Ministerial approval.¹³ In its report on the 2010 federal election, in the context of adding electors to the federal roll, the committee recommended that the 'approval of such agencies by the AEC should be made by disallowable instrument'.¹⁴

10 Australian Electoral Commission, *Submission 2*, pp. 7-8.

11 Mr Ed Killesteyn, Electoral Commissioner, Australian Electoral Commissioner, *Committee Hansard*, 8 February 2012, Canberra, p. 7.

12 Dr Roger Clarke, Chair, Australian Privacy Foundation, *Committee Hansard*, 15 February 2012, p. 4.

13 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, *Report on the conduct of the 2007 federal election and matters related thereto*, June 2009, Commonwealth Parliament of Australia, p. 114.

14 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, *The 2010 Federal Election: Report on the conduct of the election and related matters*, June 2011, Commonwealth Parliament of Australia, p. 36.

- 2.27 The APF argued that data contained in other agency systems may be unsuitable for AEC purposes and commented that:

The way in which systems are designed, the way in which data definitions are made of data items like address, like spouse, like child, in each government agency for each program reflect the needs of that agency and that program, and they are different in every circumstance.¹⁵

- 2.28 In particular, the APF questioned the quality of the sources used by the AEC, stating that:

Centrelink is merely a funnel for the 100 welfare programs that are run in Australia, which are formally administered by in the order of twenty different agencies. So, when we say that there is one Commonwealth agency involved, there are twenty, and there are 100 programs that are being sucked in through those Centrelink accesses. The second set is state and territory government agencies. The mechanics are that the data is acquired from NEVDIS but that data is sourced and is acquired in the first instance from citizens by motor registries. The third is a completely different category again, which is a government business enterprise. We have crossed out to the grey zone of government in the form of Australia Post.¹⁶

- 2.29 The APF also expressed concern about the type of sources that the Electoral Commissioner may seek to use in the future. The APF commented that:

...at this stage private sector sources are not used but there is absolutely nothing stopping the Electoral Commissioner from deciding that he will become a subscriber to Veda Advantage, the credit bureau, and that he will become a subscriber to AXIOM, the consumer profile aggregator in Australia and elsewhere, and absorb that data into the electoral roll as well.¹⁷

- 2.30 The AEC advised the committee that:

I think the point that underlines the CRU activity and that will also underline the proposed activity under a direct address update

15 Dr Roger Clarke, Chair, Australian Privacy Foundation, *Committee Hansard*, 15 February 2012, p. 2.

16 Dr Roger Clarke, Chair, Australian Privacy Foundation, *Committee Hansard*, 15 February 2012, p. 4.

17 Dr Roger Clarke, Chair, Australian Privacy Foundation, *Committee Hansard*, 15 February 2012, p. 4.

model is that the third-party data is not accepted at face value. We take the information, we confirm firstly that the identity of the elector is the same. We examine the address against our address register, to ensure that it is a properly enrollable address. Only when we are satisfied as to the veracity of the information do we then, according to the model in the proposed legislation, issue a letter to the elector advising of the intention to update the address. The third-party data – I am happy to indicate to you now – is data we get from Centrelink, from Australia Post or roads and transport authorities, will be subjected to veracity checks prior to the AEC taking any further action.¹⁸

- 2.31 While the Electoral Commissioner acknowledged that the legislation does not prescribe the sources to be used, he indicated that:

...at this point it would be our intention, given the experience and the knowledge that we have with those databases as well as the comprehensiveness of those databases, to continue to use those that are available to us.¹⁹

Conclusion

- 2.32 A healthy democracy must aim for an electoral roll that is accurate and maximises the potential for all eligible electors to vote. This Bill provides the AEC with another mechanism, which will operate alongside its other activities, to monitor the accuracy of the federal electoral roll.
- 2.33 The sources proposed to be used as the basis for updating elector's address details are already being used by the AEC, and have been tried and tested in the CRU and objection processes.
- 2.34 The committee is confident that the Electoral Commissioner will exercise appropriate discretion in the selection of sources and in setting in place suitable checks to verify the accuracy of the data received.

18 Mr Ed Killesteyn, Electoral Commissioner, Australian Electoral Commissioner, *Committee Hansard*, 8 February 2012, Canberra, p. 3.

19 Mr Ed Killesteyn, Electoral Commissioner, Australian Electoral Commissioner, *Committee Hansard*, 8 February 2012, Canberra, p. 7.

Privacy concerns

Background

- 2.35 In the Government response to the recommendation that this Bill is implementing, the Australian Government made specific reference to certain privacy considerations:

Noting that the *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* requires all Australian citizens to be enrolled, the Government will ensure that appropriate privacy protections, including provisions for opt-out where appropriate, are incorporated into the arrangements to be developed. The AEC will consult with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner and conduct detailed Privacy Impact Assessments in the course of developing agreements with trusted agencies.²⁰

Analysis

- 2.36 While other submitters were supportive of the Bill, the APF opposed the Bill and raised certain privacy concerns. The APF supported the current requirement for elector initiated changes and argued that:

...the basis of a positive action by an eligible voter, should not be abandoned lightly. It is consistent with fundamental privacy principles, which favour use of personal information only for the purpose for which it is collected, with exceptions being strictly limited, and a preference for consent for any secondary use.²¹

- 2.37 The APF also expressed concern that special categories of people, such as silent electors, need to be protected, highlighting:

...silent electors or, perhaps more broadly, the needs of many people to suppress data. I think it is clear from the discussions previously in the last hearing that the committee is well aware that lots of people in society have something to hide. In general, everybody has at least something to hide – some people more than others. For some people it is for nefarious reasons; for many

20 Commonwealth of Australia, *Government Response to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters 'Report on the conduct of the 2007 federal election and matters related thereto'*, March 2010, p. 5.

21 Australian Privacy Foundation, *Submission 3*, p. 2.

people it is for reasons not of their own fault and reasons which the public respects.²²

- 2.38 The Electoral Commissioner confirmed that consultation had been undertaken with the Australian Privacy Commissioner:

We have been in consultation with the Privacy Commissioner over this particular bill. The Privacy Commissioner has examined all of the processes that we are currently proposing to use for the direct address update. The Privacy Commissioner has not raised any particular issues that should be of concern, primarily because processes that we are suggesting be adopted for direct address update are exactly the same as those processes that we currently use for the continuous roll update program.²³

- 2.39 The AEC advised that data relating to specific categories of electors, such as silent electors, Members of Parliament, eligible overseas electors, Antarctic electors, itinerant electors, and prisoners, would be excluded from the address update process.²⁴

- 2.40 The AEC also responded to privacy concerns raised, noting that Information Privacy Principles 8 and 9 criteria include that the information to be used is 'accurate, up to date and complete' and that information can only be used where it is 'relevant'.²⁵

- 2.41 In a supplementary submission, the AEC noted that:

...legislation dealing with the update of enrolment details from third party sources are already in place in both NSW and Victoria. Both of these jurisdictions also have privacy regimes. Given the similarity of the measure contained in this Bill with that which already exists in NSW and Victoria, the privacy concerns set out in [the APF's] submission appear to be overstated.²⁶

22 Dr Roger Clarke, Chair, Australian Privacy Foundation, *Committee Hansard*, 15 February 2012, p. 3.

23 Mr Ed Killesteyn, Electoral Commissioner, Australian Electoral Commission, *Committee Hansard*, 8 February 2012, Canberra, p. 9.

24 Australian Electoral Commission, *Submission 2*, p. 15.

25 Australian Electoral Commission, *Submission 2.1*, p. 3.

26 Australian Electoral Commission, *Submission 2.1*, p. 4.

Conclusion

- 2.42 Protecting an individual's privacy is an important consideration when accessing information from one agency and seeking to use it for another agency's purposes.
- 2.43 The Australian Privacy Commissioner has already examined the methods that the AEC proposes to use for the direct address update, which are in keeping with existing AEC roll management processes. The committee also notes the AEC's advice that privacy concerns have to some degree already been tested in the Victorian and New South Wales contexts.
- 2.44 The state of the roll necessitates the address update measure as a matter of urgency. It will provide the AEC with greater flexibility to help abate declining enrolment.

Overall conclusion

- 2.45 The current state of the federal electoral roll is cause for concern. One and a half million eligible Australians are missing from the roll, including 600 000 who had previously been on the roll. Many of these electors are unaware they are no longer on the roll. This was evident at the 2010 federal election when more than 280 000 people attended polling places and cast pre-poll, absent and provisional votes which were subsequently rejected because they were either incorrectly enrolled or not enrolled. This means hundreds of thousands of wasted votes.
- 2.46 In Australia's system of compulsory voting, eligible Australians have an obligation to enrol and update their address details. Some absences from the roll are deliberate, for a variety of reasons. Others will be inadvertent; due to lack of understanding about current arrangements, the expectation that information will be shared between government agencies or a lack of motivation to update details when there is no imminent election event.
- 2.47 Eligible electors must take some responsibility to perform the small tasks of enrolment and update to help ensure they are able to participate in selecting their federal representatives. It is also logical and appropriate for the Australian Government to provide the AEC with the flexibility and legislative framework to achieve a complete and accurate electoral roll.
- 2.48 Allowing the AEC to update the address details of already enrolled electors extends the CRU process by removing the limitation of requiring an elector to submit the change of address form. It also provides the AEC


with increased flexibility in the objection process, allowing address updates rather than removing electors from the roll.

- 2.49 If the AEC had been able to update the address details of enrolled electors prior to the 2010 federal election, this could have saved many of the 280 000 votes rejected at that election.
- 2.50 Enabling address updates provides a valuable service to eligible electors in assisting them to maintain their voting franchise. The AEC will communicate with the elector to notify them of both the proposed update and its outcome. These electors will be able to contact the AEC and advise if the change is incorrect. In most cases, electors can be confident that when advising Centrelink, road and traffic authorities and Australia Post that their new address will be available to the AEC and the appropriate changes will be made to the roll.
- 2.51 The AEC is already using data from these agencies to encourage new enrolments and update of enrolment details, and to remove electors from the roll. The provisions in the Bill provide the AEC with the legislative basis to act to maintain the accuracy of the roll and preserve an elector's voting franchise.

Recommendation 1

- 2.52 **That the House of Representatives pass the Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Maintaining Address) Bill 2011 as proposed.**

Daryl Melham MP
Chair
29 February 2012



**Dissenting report – The Hon Bronwyn
Bishop MP, The Hon Alex Somlyay MP,
Senator Scott Ryan and Senator Simon
Birmingham**

Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters

Dissenting Report -

Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Maintaining Address) Bill 2011

Introduction

Coalition Members and Senators strongly disagree with the Committee's recommendation that the *Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Maintaining Address) Bill 2011* be passed by the Parliament and recognises that this legislation has been designed by Labor and the Greens solely for their own electoral advantage. The Coalition believes that the Bill will lead to a weakening of the integrity of the Electoral Roll, a significant decrease in privacy for individual electors and will remove virtually all responsibility for individual electors to take care of their own enrolment. As predicted by Coalition Members upon its introduction, this Bill is nothing but a precursor to automatic enrolment which the Government first denied it would be but then introduced the *Bill Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Protecting Elector Participation) Bill 2012*. The Coalition has consistently stated that it is important to ensure that Australian citizens maintain responsibility for their own enrolment, and not permit the Government change personal address details on their behalf without their consent and often without their knowledge leading to corruption of the integrity of the Roll.

Integrity of the Electoral Roll

The greatest concern about the Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Maintaining Address) Bill 2011 is the impact on the integrity of the Electoral Roll. When the responsibility for maintaining correct address details for an elector is taken from the individual person and given to the Australian Electoral Commission, the potential for errors on the Electoral Roll increases significantly. The 2010 Federal Election demonstrated that the outcome of elections can come down to a small number of votes, this legislation gives the potential for individual seats and, as a result, which party forms Government to be determined by an unreliable Electoral Roll which is open to fraud.

If the address of an elector is changed without their knowledge, there is obviously a significant chance for an error to occur. This could particularly impact electors who maintain more than one residence with a high chance that these electors may be incorrectly re-enrolled under this legislation. Mr Ed Killesteyn, the Electoral Commissioner, admitted in the JSCEM public hearing on 8 February 2012 that it will only write to what they consider to be the elector's new address when they propose to change an elector's address details and if there is no response within 28 days they will change the address automatically, without the elector's consent:

Mrs BRONWYN BISHOP: *I want to go back to the process. Supposing you have decided, because of your checking with your material, that Mrs Bloggs has actually moved from her previous address. Under this legislation, you would write to the new address and say, 'We have changed you', because you are satisfied that she has moved.*

Mr Killesteyn: *We would not say that we have changed it; we would write to the individual and say, 'We have information which leads us to believe that you are at this address. You have 28 days to advise us whether that is not the case.' If there were no response, then we would change the address at that point.*

Mrs BRONWYN BISHOP: *But you have got to write to the old address?*

Mr Killesteyn: *No – as we do not do under the current CRU process.¹*

The Coalition notes the impact this will have on people who move temporarily, those who have more than one place of residence, individuals whose place of employment is a residential address or who receive mail at different addresses for a whole host of reasons. It should not be up to the AEC to determine when a person has moved, but up to the individual to notify the AEC, as is their duty as an Australian citizen.

Mr Killesteyn further noted on 8 February 2012 that only 20 per cent of electors respond to letters from the AEC under their current arrangements. The Coalition is concerned that because such a large number of electors are not responding to AEC requests, taking a non-response from an elector as confirmation that they have changed address, as is proposed under this legislation, will mean a large number of electors will become incorrectly enrolled.

The only way to make sure that the integrity of the Electoral Roll is maintained is to ensure that individuals are responsible for updating their details when they change address, the Coalition does not believe this responsibility is too onerous for individual electors.

Data Sources

The Coalition has great concern that this legislation will allow the AEC to determine what are “current and reliable data sources” from which they can change elector address details. This is an extraordinary amount of power to give to a Government agency without any checks or balances.

¹ JSCem Public Hearing, 8 February 2012, Hansard, p. 14.

In their dissenting report in July 2011 to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters' investigation into the 2010 Federal Election, Coalition members of JSCEM noted the risks of using external data sources such as the ATO, Medicare or other Government agencies to update elector details:

"The reliance on external data sources that have been collated and that are utilised for other purposes does not make them fit for use in forming the electoral roll. As outlined in the previous report into these proposals, a 1999 report by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration: Numbers on the Run – Review of the ANAO Report No.37 1998-99 on the Management of Tax File Numbers, found that:

There were 3.2 million more Tax File Numbers than people in Australia at the last census; There were 185,000 potential duplicate tax records for individuals; 62 per cent of deceased clients were not recorded as deceased in a sample match.

*Similarly, an ANAO Audit Report (No.24 2004–05 Integrity of Medicare Enrolment Data) stated that 'ANAO found that up to half a million active Medicare enrolment records were probably for people who are deceased'"*²

It is clear that where there are such examples of inconsistency in Commonwealth data, there cannot be sufficient faith in this data being used to automatically update individuals on the Electoral Roll. The potential for error is even greater when using data from state or territory governments, as the Commonwealth cannot determine its accuracy. The only way to ensure that the integrity of the Electoral Roll is maintained is to ensure electors continue to be responsible for changing their individual details.

What is considered a "reliable and current data source" is open to interpretation and the Coalition believes this power should not be within the purview of the Australian Electoral Commission. Coalition Members of JSCEM noted this in July 2011 in their dissenting report:

*"We are concerned that the power to deem data sources 'trusted' in determining the use of such data in compiling the roll as a potential risk to the office. The inclusion of such data, if erroneous, would be extremely damaging to public faith in our electoral process. Furthermore, the inclusion of such data may well be controversial due to lack of faith in its inclusion or utilisation. Placing the Electoral Commissioner at the heart of such a potentially politically charged dispute can only damage the standing of the office and the AEC."*³

Mr Ed Killesteyn, the Electoral Commissioner, noted on 8 February 2012 at the JSCEM hearing that the only records the AEC proposed to use were Centrelink, Australia Post and state motor registry records. The decision about which records to use, however, are

² <http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/em/elect10/report/Dissenting.pdf>, p. 183

³ <http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/em/elect10/report/Dissenting.pdf>, p. 184

entirely at the discretion of the Electoral Commissioner and could be changed at any time. Whilst Mr Killesteyn specifically ruled out using records from the Australian Tax Office on 8 February 2012, there is nothing in the legislation which would stop the Commissioner from changing his mind:

***Mrs BRONWYN BISHOP:** I am glad you raised the tax office. To try and make the entitlement to vote equal with obligations that we might have under different legislation is to me appalling. That is why your and my philosophy will be different. I would just, on that question of tax, note that it was found in 1998-99 that there were 3.2 million more tax file numbers than people in Australia in the last census, 185,000 potential duplicate tax records for individuals and, in a sample batch, 62 per cent of deceased clients of the tax office were not recorded as deceased. That is how accurate the material that you are proposing to use can be.*

***Mr Killesteyn:** I am not proposing to use tax records.*

***Mrs BRONWYN BISHOP:** At the moment, but you can change your mind under this bill. ⁴*

Dr Roger Clarke from the Australian Privacy Foundation, told JSCem on 15 February 2012 that there were a large number of concerns about the accuracy of Centrelink data and he further noted that nothing stops the AEC from using other sources:

There are declarations by the AEC about three key things. We draw to attention that those three key organisations that are used as sources. The first is a Commonwealth agency, Centrelink. Centrelink is merely a funnel for the 100 welfare programs that are run in Australia, which are formally administered by in the order of twenty different agencies. So, when we say that there is one Commonwealth agency involved, there are twenty, and there are 100 programs that are being sucked in through those Centrelink accesses. The second set is state and territory government agencies. The mechanics are that the data is acquired from NEVDIS but that data is sourced and is acquired in the first instance from citizens by motor registries. The third is a completely different category again, which is a government business enterprise. We have crossed out to the grey zone of government in the form of Australia Post.

Contrary to the sentence I have said here, 'It is unclear whether this list is complete': I am sorry, the evidence – which I read subsequently to finalising this submission, at 6:30 – last week said that that list is currently complete but totally extensible. That means that at this stage private sector sources are not used but there is absolutely nothing stopping the Electoral Commissioner from deciding that he will become a subscriber to Veda Advantage, the credit bureau, and that he will become a subscriber to AXIOM, the consumer profile

⁴ JSCem Public Hearing, 8 February 2012, Hansard, p. 9

aggregator in Australia and elsewhere, and absorb that data into the electoral roll as well.”⁵

Dr Clarke, who is also a consultant focussing on strategic and policy aspects of eBusiness, information infrastructure, data surveillance and privacy, further noted that there are large number of concerns about the data matching processes currently used by the AEC and the agencies which the AEC proposes to use for automatic updates of the Electoral Roll. This further backs up the Coalition’s view that the best way to ensure that accurate details are kept is for individuals to maintain responsibility for their own address details:

“This data is matched. I could have written, and have written in the past, lengthy treatises on data matching—how it works, what its deficiencies are and what controls ought to be imposed upon it. I have kept it mercifully brief here, I think you will agree; it is only three short paragraphs. The point about data matching is that it is extraordinarily error-prone. It is based on, firstly, name; secondly, usually, elements of address and, thirdly, date of birth. Date of birth is commonly unreliable. People fib about their ages. Many people are not very pleased about having to disclose their ages, and that includes males as well as females. Address in this context cannot be used because the whole purpose of the study is to come up with different addresses and therefore you cannot match on it. So you have you got to reduce quality of data matching in this data-matching program compared to all the other data-matching programs that go on in government.

Name is enormously variable in its recording and is routinely 'scrubbed'—that is the term used—in order to try to muck around with the data, modify the data, in order to make it seem right. It is differently scrubbed by every different agency, so we have differential collection for different purposes in different ways with different data-quality measures with different data-scrubbing measures, and then we bundle all this together and match it. The false positives that arise from this are enormous, as indeed are the false negatives, because there are enormous numbers of occasions where matches could in principle be discovered which in fact are not discovered by the algorithms that are used. It is extraordinarily error prone. In circumstances like these you would think enormous care would be taken, enormous justification would have to be provided, proportionality would be taken account of and it would only be done when there are very serious benefits to be gained. Unfortunately that is far from the case.”⁶

⁵ Dr Roger Clarke, JSCem Public Hearing, 15 February 2012, Hansard, p. 4

⁶ Dr Roger Clarke, JSCem Public Hearing, 15 February 2012, Hansard, p. 4

Privacy Concerns

The Inquiry into the Maintaining Address Bill heard some evidence from Dr Roger Clarke from the Australian Privacy Foundation regarding the extensive concerns about individual privacy which accompany this legislation. There are a number of risks for people who do not want their details published on the Electoral Roll because of domestic violence disputes, stalking fears or who may be in police protection, with the very real possibility these details could be placed on the Electoral Roll without the elector's knowledge because of this legislation. Dr Clarke outlined a number of these concerns, which could be exacerbated by this legislation, to the JSCem hearing on 15 February 2012:

*"Stalking and, in recent times, cyberstalking, is quite common. Stalking is not only of celebrities. Victims of domestic violence are of course the extreme end of that problem. We are not suggesting that these are things that the AEC is unaware of and does not deal with, but there are a great many of these circumstances and very few of them are directly supported by government. Protected witnesses and undercover operatives, which is a subset of the very last category, are the only forms which are directly supported by governments in Australia. The rest of those people have to fend as they can, and in this case the point that we make in this section is that, where people suffer from these difficulties, they have to fight with the electoral commissioner, they have to apply, they have to disclose a considerable amount of distressing information—which is a further source or vulnerability for them—and they then have to fit into the very narrow constraint of 'because it places the personal safety of the elector or members of their immediate family at risk'. That is the only head that they are allowed to argue from. Then they depend on the grant of the discretion by the Electoral Commissioner. This is not something that represents care being taken by the federal parliament or by the Electoral Commissioner of the many people in Australia who are at risk."*⁷

Conclusion

The Coalition believes that this legislation should be rejected by the Parliament and notes that it is merely a ploy by the Australian Labor Party and the Greens to improve their electoral chances at the expense of the integrity of the Electoral Roll. Coalition Members and Senators note the very real risks this legislation poses to the privacy of individual electors and the power it gives the Australian Electoral Commission to access lists from other Government agencies and determine their validity, far beyond what the purview of the AEC should be. The Coalition notes the negative precedent this legislation will set when it comes to individual responsibility and again reaffirms its strong belief that the responsibility of an individual to enrol, update their address and vote at elections are not

⁷ Dr Roger Clarke, JSCem Public Hearing, 15 February 2012, Hansard, p. 3


responsibilities that should be considered too onerous for Australian citizens, as the Labor Party, Greens and AEC seem to believe.

The Hon Bronwyn Bishop MP
Shadow Special Minister of State

The Hon Alex Somlyay MP
Deputy Chair – JSCEM

Senator Scott Ryan

Senator Simon Birmingham




Appendix A – Submissions

No.

1. Democratic Audit of Australia
2. Australian Electoral Commission
- 2.1 Supplementary to submission 2:
Australian Electoral Commission
3. Australian Privacy Foundation
- 3.1 Supplementary to submission 3:
Australian Privacy Foundation

Total submissions = 5



Appendix B – Hearings and witnesses

Wednesday, 8 February 2012—Canberra

Australian Electoral Commission

Mr Ed Killesteyn, Electoral Commissioner

Mr Thomas Rogers, Deputy Electoral Commissioner

Mr Pablo Carpay, First Assistant Commissioner

Mr Paul Pirani, Chief Legal Officer

Mr Andrew Gately, Assistant Commissioner, Roll Management

Wednesday, 15 February 2012—Canberra

Australian Privacy Foundation

Dr Roger Clarke, Chair

