



## **Atlassian's Response to Question on Notice from PJCIS hearing on 8 July on Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure) Bill 2020**

Committee Secretary  
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security  
PO Box 6021  
Parliament House  
Canberra ACT 2600

27 July 2021

### **Question from Senator Paterson:**

As per the line of questioning pursued at the public hearings on 8 and 9 July 2021, I ask that all companies represented at the public hearings please review the evidence below from the Director-General of the Australian Signals Directorate and confirm that it could not refer to your company as outlined in your verbal evidence to the committee:

*Ms Noble: Bad looks like this—and this is a real example, but I'm not going to name names, because that's really important. We found out something happened because there were media reports. Then we tried to reach out to the company to clarify if the media reports were true, and they didn't want to talk to us. We kept pushing— sometimes we have to use our own very senior-level contacts; sometimes through people in this building who might know members of boards or chairs of boards—to try to establish trust and build a willingness to cooperate. At times, we have spent nearly a week negotiating with lawyers about us even being able to obtain just the basic information that I described in the first scenario, asking, 'Can we please just have some data from your network; we might be able to help by telling you quickly who it is, what they're doing and what they might do next?' In this case that I'm referring to, five days later we were still getting very sluggish engagement and were trying to get them to provide data to us and to deploy some of our tools so that we could work out what was. By on day 14 we were only able to provide them with generic protection advice, and their network was still down. Three months later they got reinfected and we started again. That's the sort of scenario where this legislation gives us, through Home Affairs, the authority for more leverage, firstly, to expect these critical infrastructure providers to have better cybersecurity standards in the first place. The best part of this legislation, from my point of view, is that if they look after themselves it doesn't become work for my people. And if their defences are much higher, they're keeping the low-level crims out and then we might be able to focus on the much more sophisticated, highly organised criminal syndicates or state actors. That's where we'd like to focus our energy.*

*CHAIR: That's frankly extraordinary evidence. I presume this was not a small business. I appreciate you can't name them in this context but I assume they fell into the critical infrastructure space. They were a systemically important business.*

*Mr Pezzullo: We can say it was a nationally known case involving a nationally known company that Ms Noble and I are declining to name at this point.*

**Response:** Atlassian can confirm that it is not the company referenced in Ms Noble's evidence.

**David Masters**

**Director of Global Public Policy  
Atlassian**