

**Senate Environment and Communications References Committee
Inquiry into the Triple Zero service outage**

Questions on notice – Ericsson Australia

Canberra hearing – 9 December 2025

Question:

On notice, could you please provide a copy of the review. How do you know that this won't happen again? What steps are you taking to ensure it won't happen again?

Answer:

An Executive Summary of Ericsson Australia's 'Dapto Incident and Root Cause Progress Report' is **attached**.

Notification

Ericsson witnesses provided evidence to the Committee that we did not notify anyone about the Dapto Incident. This is accurate. However, following the publication of the Optus media statement of 30 September 2025 (Optus Media Statement) that referred to Ericsson, Michelle Phillips, Ericsson's Regional Director, Government and Policy Advocacy, Asia, called and left a message and then sent a text message to provide a point of contact to:

- Daniel Goodman, Adviser, Office of the Hon Anika Wells MP, on 1 October at 3:16pm. Daniel replied, "Thanks Michelle, much appreciated."
- Rachel Dryden, Chief of Staff, Office of Melissa McIntosh MP, Shadow Minister for Communications, on 1 October at 4:16pm. Rachel replied, "Thanks so much Michelle, really appreciate you reaching out."

In addition, Mr Sam Grunhard, First Assistant Secretary, Communications Services and Consumer Division, Communications and Media Group, Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts, emailed Ericsson on 1 October 2025 at 8:41am in relation to the Optus Media Statement. Questions raised by Mr Grunhard, and Ericsson's response, is **attached**.

Executive Summary

Final Root Cause Analysis (RCA) Report: West Dapto Incident
on 28 September 2025

12 February 2026

RCA findings:

- Regarding the incident at West Dapto on 28 September 2025, Ericsson's analysis has found that a 4G data traffic memory buffer in the base-station at the West Dapto site had become full as it was not discarding old memory packets that should normally be discarded.
- As this 4G data traffic memory buffer became full, the majority of the 4G downlink data was not being forwarded to the next step in data transmission. This downlink data disruption resulted in voice call failures in the geographic area covered by this site, as voice call data is carried on the 4G data traffic path.
- Ericsson has developed, tested and implemented a solution that has resolved this issue as described in page 3.

Solution:

- As a first step, Ericsson provided Optus with advice on how to monitor this memory buffer issue. This was to ensure that no further 4G voice and data service interruptions would occur due to this issue. Ericsson also provided Optus with a procedure to quickly resolve the issue if it is detected again.
- Then, to resolve this issue, Ericsson created a base-station software enhancement that monitors the memory buffer and ensures old memory packets are deleted in a timely manner. This ensures that the memory buffer does not fill up and impact the processing of 4G traffic including voice services.
- This software enhancement was delivered to Optus as a fast tracked Advanced Delivery (AD) software release. The AD software enhancement was tested, validated and successfully loaded at the West Dapto site on 25 November 2025.
- Subsequent monitoring of the West Dapto base-station during November and December 2025 confirmed that the AD software enhancement had resolved the memory buffer issue.
- Upon validation that the software enhancement was working well in the field, Ericsson's Product Development Unit (PDU) added the software enhancement to its main base-station software track to ensure that the software correction is delivered to all 4G base-stations as part of regular software upgrades.
- The final main track software has been delivered to Optus for deployment to all base-stations.



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Sebastian Zwalf

From: Sebastian Zwalf
Sent: Friday, 5 December 2025 10:17 AM
To: Grunhard, Samuel
Subject: Re: Optus Dapto incident [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Hi Sam

I am coming back to you about your fourth question (below).

Ericsson is not involved in the manufacture or supply of handsets and the international standards that apply. Given this, we do not think we are in a position to provide an informed opinion on this question.

As always, we remain available to assist the Dept with general observations about industry matters if it is of interest.

Kind regards

Sebastian



Dr Sebastian Zwalf
Director, Government & Policy Advocacy, Australia and New Zealand



Ericsson
Level 23, 555 Collins Street
Melbourne VIC
Australia
ericsson.com



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From: Michelle Phillips [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, 1 October 2025 3:28 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: Sebastian Zwalf [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Optus Dapto incident [SEC=OFFICIAL]

Hi Sam

Thank you for your email.

To note that Ericsson is working with Optus to investigate the issue that occurred at a single mobile tower in Dapto, NSW on 28 September 2025.

We have ascertained that this issue was limited to this particular cell site and that what has occurred on this cell site is an anomaly.

We are taking this issue seriously and it has the full attention of our Australian and global teams. Ensuring the resilience and performance of our mobile network solutions for our customers remains our highest priority.

Provided below is Ericsson's response to the questions you raised.

Michelle Phillips

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1. **Does Ericsson agree with Optus' characterisation of the incident?** Broadly speaking yes.
2. **Is it correct to say that this is an isolated incident?** Yes. To the best of our knowledge. **Have there been other examples of equipment acting in a manner that prevents customers' emergency calls camping on to other available networks?** We are aware of industry examples of equipment acting in a manner that prevents customers emergency calls camping onto other available networks.
3. **Can Ericsson provide further details of the way customer devices interact differently in scenarios such as these, such that some emergency calls correctly transit to another network but others do not?** This is a broad and complex question that involves the wider ecosystem. It requires a multiparty approach - for e.g. mobile operators, device manufacturers and equipment suppliers - to review this issue.
4. **Does Ericsson believe further clarification is needed in either international or national standards to remediate these problems?** We are considering this question.
5. **Any other matters you wish to raise.**



Michelle Phillips

Regional Head Government and Policy Advocacy Asia

GFMC GPA

Mobile: [REDACTED]

Ericsson
555 Collins Street
3000, Melbourne
Australia
ericsson.com



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From: Grunhard, Samuel [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, October 1, 2025 8:41:47 AM
To: Sebastian Zwalf [REDACTED]
Cc: CHISHOLM, James [REDACTED] Silleri, Kathleen
Subject: Optus Dapto incident [SEC=OFFICIAL]

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Hi Sebastian,

Noting the media release from Optus (attached) regarding the recent Dapto outage, grateful if Ericsson could confirm your understanding of events. In particular:

1. Does Ericsson agree with Optus' characterisation of the incident?
2. Is it correct to say that this is an isolated incident? Have there been other examples of equipment acting in a manner that prevents customers' emergency calls camping on to other available networks?
3. Can Ericsson provide further details of the way customer devices interact differently in scenarios such as these, such that some emergency calls correctly transit to another network but others do not?
4. Does Ericsson believe further clarification is needed in either international or national standards to remediate these problems?
5. Any other matters you wish to raise.

I note that the Department is not a regulator and cannot conduct regulatory investigation or enforcement. Instead we are seeking to better understand the current operation of networks to inform improved policy to ensure Triple Zero calls are carried. For this reason we would be grateful for a response as soon as possible.

Thank you
Sam

Sam Grunhard
First Assistant Secretary
Communications Services and Consumer Division
Communications and Media Group

E: [REDACTED]

P [REDACTED] M [REDACTED]

GPO Box 594 Canberra, ACT 2601

EA: [REDACTED] E: [REDACTED] P [REDACTED]



*I would like to acknowledge the traditional custodians of this land on which we meet, work and live.
I recognise and respect their continuing connection to the land, waters and communities.
I pay my respects to Elders past and present and to all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders.*

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