

Director | Stranded Assets Programme

RE: Stranded Assets and Thermal Coal

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To Whom It May Concern:

In January 2016, researchers from the Stranded Assets Programme at the University of Oxford’s Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment published a technical report entitled: “Stranded Assets and Thermal Coal: An analysis of environment-related risk exposure.” The principal aim of this report is to turn the latest research on environment-related risk factors facing thermal coal assets into actionable investment hypotheses for investors. By examining the fundamental drivers of environment-related risk, creating appropriate measures to differentiate the exposure of different assets to these risks, and linking this analysis to company ownership, debt issuance, and capital expenditure plans, our research can help to inform specific investor actions related to risk management, screening, voting, engagement, and disinvestment. Throughout the research process, major obstacles to analysis were asset disclosure and report transparency, affecting estimates of exposure to various risk factors; in particular, carbon- and environmental-related risks. We overcame this challenge by bringing together a wide range of different datasets and sources for the first time. To our knowledge, this report contains the most comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of the environment-related risks facing thermal coal companies that is publicly available.

Implications for disclosure and reporting

Financial disclosure and reporting is critical for the functioning of efficient capital markets. Disclosure and reporting comes from a wide array of voluntary and regulated activities, but generally seeks to resolve principal-agent problems of information asymmetry and agency¹. Information asymmetry between investors and companies leads to the inefficient allocation of capital as investors do not know the relative merits of each company. Disclosure resolves agency problems as investors are able to evaluate the performance of the managers they have delegated to run their companies. Greater disclosure has been empirically observed to improve market liquidity, lower costs of capital, increase market valuations, and improve investment efficiency².

Companies with securities listed on regulated exchanges must submit the required information periodically to the regulator. This information is provided to the public so that they can make informed investment decisions. Companies may also voluntarily submit information to the regulator, public, or private investors. *The Economist* writes that it is the

¹ Healy, P. & Palepu, K. (2001). 'Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature', *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 31: 405-440

² Leuz, C. & Wysocki, P. (2015). 'The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research' SSRN.



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In November 2015, the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) issued their guidance on ESG reporting¹³. WFE issued a list of 34 recommended ESG metrics to its 64 member exchanges, including 10 environmental metrics specifically. Many of the WFE's member exchanges already adopt some form of sustainability reporting¹⁴.

Also in late 2015, the Financial Stability Board launched its Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). The Task Force is to develop consistent, comparable, reliable, clear, and efficient climate-related disclosures and is expected to release its recommendations by the end of 2016¹⁵.

Insights from our research

Our work to date has highlighted some of the challenges associated with turning an understanding of environment-related factors facing particular sectors into analysis that is decision-relevant for financial institutions. These experiences are germane to extant processes on disclosure and corporate reporting, particularly the TCFD.

To take one specific example, without accurate geo-location data for assets it is very hard to accurately overlay spatial datasets or to use remote sensing and satellite data to further research assets. Existing datasets for coal-fired power stations only have precise geo-location data for 30% of power stations and only regional or city level geo-location data for the remaining power stations. This means that spatial datasets representing certain types of risk (e.g. air pollution) are not uniformly accurate – they become less useful for power stations with inaccurate geo-location data. It also means that when, for example, we wanted to use satellite imagery to identify the type of cooling technology installed on a power station (for assets where cooling data was missing from existing datasets), we could only do this for assets with accurate coordinates. Unfortunately, tracking down power stations on satellite imagery when the geo-location data is inaccurate is challenging and time consuming. This means that we have only been able to secure 71% coverage for the type of cool technology installed on coal-fired power stations, though we aim to improve this through further work.

One simple way around this particular problem would be for companies that are signed up to voluntary or mandatory reporting frameworks to disclose the precise coordinates of their key physical assets. But a more general principle would be for companies, especially those with portfolios of large physical assets, to disclose asset specific characteristics so that researchers and analysts can undertake their own research on the risks and opportunities facing company portfolios. Natural resources companies, particularly those involved in upstream fossil fuel production, appear reluctant to disclose any asset specific

¹³ World Federation of Exchanges (2015). *Exchange Guidance & Recommendation – October 2015*, WFE Sustainability Working Group.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Financial Stability Board (2015). *FSB to establish Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures*, Press Release.

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improve the analysis of company exposure to environment-related risk and opportunity, would not be particularly costly – it would certainly be much cheaper, quicker, and more plausible than all companies actually disclosing all the asset specific data needed for bottom analyses of environment-related factors.

CDIS could support the development of new techniques and approaches to secure data that was hard to get or inaccessible due to cost or other barriers, whether through ‘big data’ or remote sensing, and foster the developments of new techniques to analyse data. CDIS could also have the task of integrating all existing environment-related corporate reporting into one system, allowing for analysis of data provided via a wide range of initiatives.

Through our research process it has become clear to us that the current company-level reporting paradigm – where some companies annually disclose data; where reported data might not actually be relevant for assessing real exposure to environment-related risk and opportunity; where reported data may be inaccurate and out of date; where companies that report spend a significant amount of time filling in forms for different reporting systems; and where third parties spend significant effort trying to assure reported data – could be significantly improved. Current reporting is slow moving, unable to achieve universal coverage of companies, and currently disconnected to the requirements of bottom up analysis. While current reporting efforts are an incredibly important contribution that we commend, much more can be done and more cost-effectively. In addition to putting more emphasis on asset specific disclosures in current and emerging reporting regimes, the development of a public goods CDIS-type initiative is something that the TFCF should consider recommending as part of its deliberations.

Yours faithfully,

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