

9 February 2011

Ms Christine McDonald, Committee Secretary
Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee
PO Box 6100
Parliament House
Canberra ACT 2600
Australia

By email

Dear Ms McDonald,

Privacy Concerns and Offshore Cloud Based Computing Services

Please find attached a submission to the current Senate inquiry into the Exposure Drafts of Australian Privacy Amendment Legislation. Macquarie Telecom strongly believes that the two papers, attached, will be of significant interest to Committee members in their consideration of this important public policy issue.

The papers were recently commissioned by Macquarie Telecom from a leading international law firm, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer. The papers, *The Cloud and the US Cross-Border Risks* and *The Cloud and the Singapore Cross-Border Risks*, consider the privacy and business risks, actual and implied, to Australian businesses and their customers though storing data offshore, with a focus on data storage in the United States and Singapore.

Macquarie Telecom would be keen to provide any further background or other relevant briefing to the Committee in relation to these matters.

Yours sincerely

Matt Healy
National Executive, Government & Regulatory



Whitepaper

The Cloud and US Cross-Border Risks Roundtable

Connie Carnabuci, Partner, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
Heather Tropman, General Counsel, Macquarie Telecom

What is the objective of the paper?

Macquarie Telecom has commissioned this paper by International law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer to analyse the key risks associated with storing data in the U.S. and to assist Australian businesses and government in taking a holistic, balanced and informed view of their data storage options.

The opportunities presented by improved global networks and the internet have allowed some hosting service providers to offer Australian customers data storage in offshore jurisdictions through global or regional Clouds.

As many of the commercially available Cloud computing services are in the U.S., this analysis compares Australian and U.S. laws and regulations to identify the relative advantages of storing your data in Australia.

While the potential cost benefit of shifting data storage overseas (or within a global Cloud) may appear simple to calculate, the risks of managing compliance and navigating the cross-border legal landscape are hidden costs not often considered in the business case.

Data is subject to the laws of the jurisdiction in which it is stored. For Australian customers considering a move to offshore data storage in the U.S., this has potentially wide ranging implications.

Can your data be sent offshore?

The first step in considering whether to store your data offshore is to confirm whether the data relating to a particular business activity or the particular type of data involved can readily be sent offshore, from a regulatory and compliance perspective.

Any regulated entity and businesses using or storing personal or business sensitive data should exercise particular caution. For example, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) which oversees the domestic financial services sector, has stated that financial services companies that wish to transfer data offshore must first notify APRA and demonstrate to the regulator that appropriate risk management procedures are in place to protect the data. The company must also secure guarantees in its contract with the data hosting company that APRA will have access to that company to conduct site visits if required. In the context of the global Cloud, where the third party provider is likely to be using one of a number of data centers in different countries, this has proved to be a difficult issue to overcome because providers have been reluctant to provide guarantees around data security to a level which is satisfactory to the regulator. APRA's approach to date has been cautious.

Some classes of customer may simply refuse to have their data transmitted and stored overseas. For example, the Commonwealth of Australia Government Contract for IT Services expressly prohibits suppliers from transmitting or storing their customer data outside of Australia.



How do you effectively maintain compliance across multiple jurisdictions?

Data stored in an offshore Cloud may move across multiple foreign jurisdictions, each with its own set of rules. As such Australian based customers would have limited visibility over where their data is at any point in time, seriously reducing their ability to ensure continuing regulatory compliance with Australian law and to manage the associated non-compliance risks. Imposing strict compliance reporting or audit provisions in your Cloud service agreements will have cost and price implications. However, U.S. Cloud service agreements are typically on standard “click wrap” terms. In any event, the value of any audit right (if obtained) is also questionable given that the results only verify the state of the data at the particular time of the audit and it is difficult (if not impossible) to constantly supervise the data considering the virtual nature of the Cloud.

In Australia, there is concern regarding compliance with Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards in a global Cloud. Those standards include requirements such as restricted physical access and the ability to track and monitor all access to card details. Community concern around data privacy is also rising, leading to greater regulator scrutiny and many companies are concerned that storing their data in an offshore Cloud will jeopardise their ability to continue to adhere to the National Privacy Principles. This is particularly so in light of the Australian Government’s Exposure Draft which, if enacted, will introduce even more stringent regulation of cross-border disclosures of personal information. Under the Exposure Draft, if a company holding “personal information” in Australia discloses that information to an offshore recipient, it may be vicariously liable for any misuse of that personal information by its offshore Cloud provider.

A lack of consistency in privacy laws across jurisdictions makes monitoring continuing compliance with Australian law and assessing risk of non-compliance extremely difficult and expensive. Unlike Australia, the U.S. does not have a comprehensive overarching data privacy regime and has taken a sector specific approach by enacting laws only when required by specific industries or circumstances. The upshot is that there has been very limited take-up of offshore Cloud-storage (PaaS or IaaS) opportunities among Australian companies, particularly those businesses that rely on a high level of data privacy protection and security.

In an effort to address some of these concerns, some commentators (such as Microsoft) are calling for a “free trade” type agreement, which effectively sets up bi-lateral agreements between governments for adherence to a universal set of operational standards in respect of the Cloud. Whilst universal standards would help remove operational uncertainty, they are likely to result in additional “compliance” costs to service providers which would be automatically passed on, unless there is an agreed change control provision in the contract (which is unlikely under standard terms).

What are the tax consequences of hosting a transactional website in the US and the resultant data collection?

Hosting a transactional website on servers in the U.S. can create a taxable presence for U.S. federal income tax purposes. While mere storage of data typically should not amount to the conduct of business within the U.S. for tax purposes, the activity can be treated as the conduct of business if the non-U.S. person stores data for the account of others, or allows customers or other third parties access to the data.

If a website within the U.S. does involve the conduct of business, an Australian company entitled to the benefits of the Australian-U.S. income tax treaty might have a taxable U.S. presence if the website arrangements constitute a permanent establishment. Website arrangements could constitute a permanent establishment of the company if: (i) the company contracts for the right to use particular facilities such as a particular data center within the U.S.; (ii) the company's requirements mandate its exclusive use of particular facilities; or (iii) the facilities provider is not a legally and economically independent third party providing the facilities in the ordinary course of its business of providing similar services to many other unrelated customers.

Whether a particular website arrangement would create a taxable presence for U.S. federal income tax purposes would need to be evaluated in light of all of the facts (principally, the terms of the arrangement, the transactional activity and the circumstances of the storage provider).

Any non-U.S. person that conducts business within the U.S. must file a U.S. income tax return even if the person does not have a U.S. permanent establishment. There are penalties for failure to file, even if no tax is due. Such penalties may prove especially problematic for Australian entities with future plans for future expansion into the U.S.

Once a particular U.S. service or facilities provider or location has been identified, U.S. state and local taxes also need to be considered. Most U.S. states and some U.S. localities impose income tax, which sometimes can apply to non-U.S. persons that are not subject to U.S. federal income tax. Some states (such as California) may tax an allocable part of the non-U.S. income earned by a global business doing business within their borders. States and localities also impose business and licensing taxes, and they may apply to a non-U.S. person doing business within the jurisdiction even if that person has no computer or other facilities within the jurisdiction.

It is important to note that U.S. states and localities impose sales taxes on sales of goods (and sometimes sales of services) made within their jurisdiction. Sellers generally are liable to collect and remit those taxes. States and localities increasingly have asserted that e-commerce sellers operating outside their borders who regularly make sales to persons within their borders may be liable to collect sales tax.

U.S. TREASURY RULES OBLIGE US TO TELL YOU THAT STATEMENTS ABOUT U.S. TAX MATTERS IN THIS PAPER ARE GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY ADVICE ON WHICH YOU CANNOT RELY TO AVOID U.S. TAX PENALTIES.

Will storing your data offshore subject you to the jurisdiction of the US courts?

Data stored in the U.S. is subject to U.S. law, regardless of whether the data user or the data subject is based in Australia, or elsewhere.

However, whether the receipt or transmission of data over the Internet on a server located in the US is sufficient for a US court to assert that it has jurisdiction over the parties is an area of U.S. law which is far from settled.

Generally speaking, whether a U.S. court may assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant turns on whether an exercise of jurisdiction comports with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The touchstone of this analysis is whether the "defendant purposefully established "minimum contacts" in the forum state".¹ The minimum contacts requirement is premised on the notion of purposeful availment, which ensures that a non-resident defendant will not be hauled into court based upon "random, fortuitous or attenuated" contacts with the forum state.² In short, a non-resident defendant's contacts with a jurisdiction must have a basis in "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state".³ In most Internet contexts, advertising alone is an insufficient basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who has no active contacts with the forum state. To be hauled to court in the forum, the non-resident defendant generally must have had systematic and continuous contacts with the state, as demonstrated for example by the number of internet sales to the forum residents, the volume of business generated in the forum and the amount of revenue earned from sales with residents of the state.

Today, the long-standing principles of personal jurisdiction in the U.S. face serious challenges stemming from the rapid advancement of electronic telecommunication services and offshore data sharing and storage worldwide. Faced with a borderless communication medium, U.S. courts have been increasingly inconsistent in their interpretation and application of the minimum contacts test and their assertion of personal jurisdiction in the internet context.

Some courts have asserted jurisdiction in civil tort and criminal cases where the data transmission comprises part of the crime or intentional tort, or where there is evidence that a party specifically or intentionally directed a data transmission to the jurisdiction. Some states have enacted aggressive jurisdictional statutes which permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-residents who use a computer (or computer network) located within the state, limited only by vague notions of fairness embodied in the U.S. constitution. At the same time, where a party transmitting the data to a remote database was not aware that the subject database was located within the jurisdiction, courts have held that the mere act of accessing a computer database remotely is an insufficient rationale for asserting jurisdiction.

¹ *Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (quoting *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))

² *Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S. at 475.

³ *Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S. at 475.



In addition, if you enter into an agreement with a U.S.-based Cloud provider for the use of servers located in the U.S., in the absence of clear contractual language to the contrary, a U.S. Court would likely find that it had jurisdiction over any issue or dispute arising out of, or in connection with, that agreement. In most cases, contracts with offshore global Cloud providers contain a foreign governing law and submission to foreign jurisdiction and it would be prudent to seek foreign legal advice in relation to both the interpretation and the enforcement of the contract.

Litigating anywhere offshore is more costly and inconvenient for a business located in Australia. However, due to the breadth and reach of U.S. discovery laws, the costs of litigation in the U.S. in particular, are typically far greater than in Australia.

What document retention obligations does the offshore location impose on you?

If you do fall within the jurisdiction of the US courts then you will also need to ensure you can comply with the civil procedure rules regarding retention and discovery of documents. For example, U.S. Rule 34 of the U.S. *Federal Rules of Civil Procedure* imposes a legal duty on companies to retain all documents, including electronic documents, that may be relevant to pending and reasonably foreseeable litigation. During the discovery process, companies with data stored in the U.S. could be required to produce this data. It is possible that storing data within the U.S. may provide enough of a connection for a U.S. court to find jurisdiction over an Australian company storing its data there and subject the company to the US discovery obligations.

In comparison, Australian civil procedure rules regarding discovery and document retention are less onerous.

Will you be able to effectively enforce your rights against a foreign Cloud provider and what remedies are available to you?

It would be extremely difficult to enforce a statutory right arising under Australian law in the U.S., as those laws would not necessarily have extraterritorial effect. Even if a contract with a U.S. Cloud provider is governed by Australian law (which is unlikely under standard terms), enforcement of that contract in a U.S. Court will require expert evidence as to the interpretation and effect of the Australian law, which is costly and difficult.

A U.S.-based Cloud provider would be required to comply with U.S. laws and obey all orders issued by a U.S. Court, even if compliance caused the provider to violate an order issued by an Australian Court.

Even where there is no conflict between U.S. and Australian law, a U.S. court is not obligated to automatically give effect to the orders of an Australian court, absent a specific treaty or U.S. legislative rule. The U.S. is not a party to any treaty for the mandatory enforcement or recognition of foreign judgments. Thus, for a U.S. court to give effect to an Australian judgment, it must be justified under



general principles of comity, i.e., it would have to be shown that the U.S.-based Cloud provider was subject to Australian law and had been given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard by the Australian court, and that the Australian order did not offend the public policy of the U.S. forum state.

Further, an Australian court is likely to be reluctant to exercise its discretion to grant equitable relief in the form of an interim or final injunction against a U.S.-based Cloud provider, to the extent that the Court cannot supervise compliance with its order under the rules of contempt of court.

Is data stored in the U.S. at any greater risk of being accessed by government than data stored in Australia?

Formal U.S. Government Requests

Private data stored in the U.S. is at a higher risk of being accessed by government agencies than data stored in Australia. In the U.S., formal requests by government entities in the form of subpoenas and warrants generally compel the provision of data and information. Under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Federal Constitution, which guards against unreasonable searches and seizures by the state, a warrant is issued only when the request is supported by probable cause that a criminal offense has been or is being committed, a description of the place to be searched and items to be seized is provided, and notice is given to the subject of the search.

However, Fourth Amendment protection is afforded only to information in which one has a reasonable expectation of privacy. The rationale is that once information is shared with a third party, that expectation of privacy ceases to exist. In the context of electronically stored information, the impact of this is extensive.

Subpoenas may be issued without showing cause by administrative agencies as well as private litigants. In recent cases, U.S. government agencies have relied on the 'Third Party Exception' to gain warrantless access to personal information, including:

1. the name, address, e-mail address and media access control address from Comcast Cable Communications of a person who used Comcast's Internet services in the course of sharing movie files online;⁴
2. the information on an individual's computer that was accessible by a peer-to-peer file sharing program;⁵
3. the chat account information from Yahoo! of a person who used Yahoo's internet services to access chat boards;⁶

⁴ *Worldwide Film Entm't LLC v. Does 1-749*, D.D.C., No. 10-38 (May 13, 2010); *Web User Lacked Privacy Interest in Account Data*, 9 PVLR 768 (May 24, 2010).

⁵ *U.S. Perrine*, 518 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. March 11 2008) No. 06-3336; <http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2008/03/06-3336.pdf>, *Tenth Circuit Finds no Expectation of Privacy in Data Given Freely to ISP*, 7 PVLR 418 (Mar. 24, 2008).



4. the log-in information, including the date, time and IP address of each log-in, from Microsoft of a person who used Microsoft's MSN/Hotmail program;⁷ and
5. the contents of an iTunes files library shared over an unsecured wireless network.⁸

U.S. Government Surveillance

The power of U.S. government agencies to obtain information in any matter related to national security or terrorism has also expanded substantially in recent years through changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("**FISA**"). FISA sets forth procedures for, *inter alia*, requesting judicial authorisation for electronic surveillance of persons engaged in espionage or terrorism against the U.S. on behalf of a foreign power. The 2002 USA Patriot Act abolished the prior requirement that the "primary purpose" of the FISA surveillance be for the gathering of foreign intelligence and relaxed the standard so that the government now need only show that the collection of foreign intelligence is "a significant purpose" of the surveillance. The Patriot Act also amended the procedures for judicial oversight of FISA surveillance and expanded the definitions of "foreign intelligence information" and "agents of foreign powers." Under the current statute, there is no requirement that a target be engaged in criminal activity, although the government still must show probable cause that the "target of the surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power."

The availability of access without a warrant and the broad powers available under the Patriot Act have no parallel in Australian law. The scale of surveillance activity undertaken in the U.S, and the corresponding concern expressed by industry around the extent of expanding government powers, have not been mirrored in Australia. The U.S also lacks a number of privacy protections and other limitations that constrain the ability of government agencies in Australia to compel access to data.

Broad new regulations being drafted by the Obama administration would also make it easier for U.S. law enforcement and national security officials to wiretap Internet and e-mail communications within the U.S. According to a recent article in the New York Times, the White House plans to submit a bill this year that would require all "communications service providers" to be technically equipped to comply with a wiretap order. The Times reported that government officials behind the proposal have not yet defined who would qualify as a "communications service provider," but officials have suggested that the regulations may be applied broadly, including to companies that operate from servers located abroad.

Whilst some Australian government agencies possess powers similar to those held by U.S. agencies, the Australian government agencies' powers are only applicable in quite limited circumstances compared to the U.S.

Government Access to Data Pursuant to Mutual Assistance Treaty

Treaties between foreign governments also affect what kind of protection data enjoys, and become particularly relevant where data is stored in the Cloud. The U.S. and Australia have in place a *Mutual*

⁶ *U.S. v. Bynum*, No. 08-4207, 4th Cir. (May 5, 2010); *Yahoo! User Lacked Privacy Expectation in Account Data Shared with Yahoo!, Others*, 9 PVLR 707 (May 17, 2010).

⁷ *U.S. v. Li*, S.D. Cal., No. 07 CR 2915 (Mar. 20, 2008); *No SCA Reasonable Privacy Expectation for ISP Customer IP Address, Log-In Data*, 7 PVLR 501 (Apr. 7, 2008).

⁸ *U.S. v. Ahrndt*, D. Ore., No. 08-468, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7821 (Jan. 28, 2010); *No Fourth Amendment, ECPA Privacy Claims in Documents Shared on Unsecured Network*, 9 PVLR 257 (Feb. 15, 2010).

Assistance Treaty that allows the countries' respective law enforcement agencies to gain access to data in the other jurisdiction in certain circumstances. The Council of Europe's *Convention on Cybercrime* is yet to be ratified by the Australian government, but has been ratified by the U.S. This means that Australian data stored in the U.S. is already subject to the European agreement and could be forcibly shared with the European signatories. If Australia also ratifies the European agreement, companies should be aware that Australian data hosted in a European Cloud will be exposed to access from other signatories, including the U.S government.

What reputational risks will you assume by offshoring?

Within Australia, government, community and industry concern around data privacy is growing. The current federal government has expressed particular concern about the potential exposure of personal data once it is transferred offshore.

The recent Exposure Draft which amends the National Privacy Principles flags a rising level of community and political concern around the issue, as well as the potential for new regulations over time. Any proposed offshoring would need to be supported by a clear PR and communications strategy in order to maintain credibility and able to refute actual or perceived security risks associated with the offshoring to a global Cloud.



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About Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer

Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer is a global law firm with more than 470 partners and over 2,500 lawyers around the world. We have offices in China and other countries in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and the United States and have worked with clients on their transactions in almost every country in the world. In jurisdictions where we do not currently have an office, we maintain excellent relationships with the leading law firms and work with them regularly.

About Macquarie Telecom

Founded in 1992, Macquarie Telecom is Australia's only business-specific hosting and telecommunications company. Working with and supporting some of Australia's best-known organisations including SBS, Cricket Australia, Webjet and the Australian Rugby Union, Macquarie Telecom provides data network services, mission critical hosting facilities and telecommunication services underpinned by industry-leading customer service.

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The Cloud and Cross-Border Risks - Singapore

January 2011

What is the objective of the paper?

Macquarie Telecom has commissioned this paper by international law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer in collaboration with Rajah & Tann LLP to analyse the key risks associated with storing data in Singapore and to assist Australian businesses and government in taking a holistic, balanced and informed view of their data storage options.

The opportunities presented by improved global networks and the internet have allowed hosting service providers to offer Australian customers data storage in offshore jurisdictions through global or regional Clouds.

As some of the commercially available Cloud computing services are located in Singapore, this analysis compares Australian and Singapore laws and regulations to identify the relative advantages of storing your data in Australia.

While the potential cost benefit of shifting data storage overseas (or within a global Cloud) may appear simple to calculate, the risks of managing compliance and navigating the cross-border legal landscape are hidden costs not often considered in the business case.

Data is subject to the laws of the jurisdiction in which it is stored and a Cloud provider located in Singapore will typically provide standard contract terms that are governed by the laws of Singapore. For Australian customers considering a move to offshore data storage in Singapore, this has potentially wide ranging implications.

Can your data be sent offshore?

Regulated entities and financial services institutions in Australia should pay particular vigilance to any regulatory restrictions which may limit their ability to store their data offshore. For example, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) requires authorized financial services institutions to notify APRA of any transfer of data offshore and to demonstrate that appropriate risk management procedures are in place to protect the data. The institutions must also secure guarantees in their contracts with the hosting service providers to allow APRA access and site visits to the services provider if required. Where the hosting service provider uses a number of offshore data centres to store the data, it may be reluctant to provide guarantees regarding data security and access of a sufficient standard to satisfy APRA.

In some circumstances, there may be a blanket prohibition on the transfer and storage of data overseas. For instance, the Commonwealth of Australia Government Contract for IT Services currently forbids suppliers from transferring or storing their customer data outside Australia (although a cloud computing strategic direction paper issued by the Department of Finance and Deregulation in January 2011 does contemplate a liberalisation of this prohibition and poses a risk based assessment).

How do you effectively maintain compliance across multiple jurisdictions?

Data hosted in an offshore Cloud may be stored in several locations across multiple foreign jurisdictions, which may limit your visibility over your data at any particular time. This may create difficulties in ensuring your continued compliance with Australian law and regulatory requirements.

A lack of consistency in data privacy laws across jurisdictions makes continued compliance with Australian law particularly difficult to monitor. The risk of non-compliance with Australian privacy laws is exacerbated by Singapore's lack of a unified and comprehensive regime for data protection and Singapore does not constitutionally recognise a general right to privacy. This is a key disadvantage to storing data in Singapore. Without a comprehensive data protection law, storage of your data in Singapore may cause your customers to have concerns about the standards of data security and available protection of their data. This may have serious reputational consequences and commercial implications for your business. It also carries risk implications in terms of your ongoing compliance with the Australian National Privacy Principles. The Australian Government's recently released Exposure Draft, if enacted, will introduce vicarious liability whereby if a business holding "personal information" in Australia discloses that information to an offshore entity such as a Cloud provider, it may be vicariously liable for any misuse of that personal information by the offshore entity, in this case the Singapore Cloud provider. Given the disparity in the privacy regime between Singapore and Australia, this may prove to be a tangible issue for Australian businesses and should be factored into any business case for offshoring data to Singapore.

Whilst it may be possible to impose compliance reporting or audit provisions in your agreement with the offshore Cloud provider (to track compliance with Australian laws), the costs of this are likely to be passed on to you and your Cloud provider may not be prepared to or able to guarantee compliance with Australian laws.

What Singapore laws might apply to my business?

160+ Disparate Statutes Regulate Data in Singapore

In addition to compliance with Australian law, businesses offshoring data to Singapore will have to comply with over 160 disparate, sector-specific statutes that regulate the use and disclosure of data management in Singapore including in relation to consumer protection laws, employment laws, e-commerce, telecommunications regulations and other industry specific laws particularly in health, banking and insurance. Any failure to store data offshore in the manner required by applicable Singapore laws may necessitate a restructuring of your data storing arrangements which may be expensive and disruptive. Furthermore, you may be exposed to the risk of non-compliance with Singapore laws which may have dire consequences to your business including wide reaching penalties such as fines, revocation of operating licences and other regulatory privileges, as well as adverse effects on your reputation.

Stringent data management laws in banking

Requirements for data management and protection are especially stringent in the banking industry due to the sensitive nature of customer information held by banks. Banks in Singapore owe a statutory duty of confidentiality to customers under the Banking Act which prohibits banks and its officers from disclosing confidential customer information, unless expressly permitted by the Act. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has issued Circulars and Guidelines setting out the risk management and data security framework that banks are expected to implement in managing their data. Appropriate security solutions to address the risk of data theft, data loss and data leakage from endpoint devices, customer service locations and call centres, whether domestic, overseas or under outsourcing arrangements should be implemented. MAS expects banks to formulate a definitive plan containing specific implementation dates to achieve the security targets. MAS' Internet Banking Technology Risk Management Guidelines require deployment of strong cryptography and authentication mechanisms to protect customer data and transactions. If an Australian business is deemed to be a financial institution to which these laws apply, such a business will need to understand these specific laws and guidelines and comply with them. This could lead to complex legal issues for Australian banks storing data in Singapore if, for example, under Australian law there is a duty to disclose customer information but such a disclosure would be a breach of the Singapore Bank Act.

What are the tax consequences of hosting a transactional website in Singapore and the resultant data collection?

Hosting a transactional website on a server located in Singapore may expose you to Singapore income tax if the hosting arrangement amounts to a permanent establishment ("PE") where you are deemed to: (i) have a fixed place of business in Singapore; and (ii) carry on business activities (wholly or partly) through the fixed place of business. However, even a company without a PE in Singapore could still be liable for income tax if it has 'substantial business activities' in Singapore which create a source of income in Singapore. What constitutes 'substantial business activities' will be decided on a case by case basis but could include circumstances where, for example, a website hosted in Singapore results in substantial sales to Singapore customers. If considering whether to store data in Singapore, Australian businesses should obtain advice regarding their set up and operations to determine whether their business will involve a level of economic connection to Singapore that will give rise to a tax liability.

The precise tax liability of the PE will depend on the relevant Singapore and Australian domestic income tax laws as well as the extent of any relief provided under the terms of the Singapore-Australia Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreement ("DTA"). Certain types of expenditure, such as software payments, may qualify for deduction or capital allowances, depending upon the circumstances.

Where an Australian entity conducts business in Singapore that involves making taxable supplies, it is required to register for Goods and Services Tax (GST) if the turnover of its goods and services in Singapore exceeds or is expected to exceed S\$1 million in any calendar year. Penalties will be imposed for failure to register. The supply of taxable services is chargeable to GST at 7%.

Service fees paid by an Australian business to a Cloud provider in Singapore may be subject to withholding tax. To the extent withholding is required, the Cloud provider could demand that it receive a net sum equal to the amount of its fees and that you gross up as necessary to cover any withholding tax.

Will you be able to effectively enforce your rights against a Cloud provider in Singapore and what remedies are available to you?

There are inherent difficulties in effectively enforcing your rights against a hosting service provider in Singapore. You may not be able to avail yourself of the statutory rights and remedies arising under Australian law, as they would not necessarily have extra-territorial effect in Singapore. In Singapore, only foreign judgments which are for a fixed and ascertainable sum of money are enforceable under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments Act (“RECJA”). The foreign judgment is not automatically recognized in Singapore, but needs to be registered with the courts in Singapore before it can be enforced. Prior to registration, the defendant may raise a number of defences against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment. If any of the defences succeed, the foreign judgment will not be recognized or enforced in Singapore.

For all other Australian court judgments, (e.g. interim judgments, orders for specific performance and other judgments not for fixed sums of money) new proceedings have to be filed in the Singapore courts, citing the Australian judgment as the cause of action. These new proceedings will incur additional expenses and there is no guarantee that you will be able to obtain a valid, enforceable Singapore judgment.

Similarly, there are also inherent difficulties in seeking to enforce an Australian arbitral award in Singapore. There are certain circumstances where the defendant may successfully request that the enforcement of the Australian arbitral award be refused.

Is data stored in Singapore at any greater risk of being accessed by government authorities than data stored in Australia?

Police Powers under Computer Misuse Act

There is a tangible risk that data stored in Singapore may be exposed to extremely onerous police investigative power granted under the Computer Misuse Act. The Computer Misuse Act empowers any police officer who has reasonable cause to suspect that a computer is or has been used in connection with any offences under the Computer Misuse Act to: (i) have access to and inspect the operation of the computer at any time; and (ii) with the consent of the Public Prosecutor, require the person having charge of the computer to release information sufficient for the police officer to decrypt scrambled data held in the computer for inspection and investigation.

The territorial scope of the Computer Misuse Act is far-reaching and extends to any person regardless of his nationality or citizenship, even if the offender was not in Singapore at the material time of the commission of the offence, provided that the data itself was then in Singapore.

In light of the breadth of the police powers under the Computer Misuse Act, in the event that a Cloud provider is subject to any investigation, there is a possibility that your business data (and that of your customers) may be accessed for the purpose of such investigation.

General police and government investigative powers

In general, Singapore law grants extremely wide-reaching powers of investigation to compel the disclosure of data, including encrypted data, to government bodies and law enforcement agencies for the purpose of criminal enquiries.

Under Singapore's anti-terrorism legislation, there is a duty to disclose information to the police where there is reason to believe that national security, public safety, order or interest are at issue.

Disclosure of data for the purposes of public interest extends to the discovery process in civil court proceedings, where the court considers that the administration of justice would be frustrated by the withholding of information stored in Singapore which needs to be disclosed if justice is to be done.

The Singapore High Court recently held that a court order made against a bank requiring disclosure of customer information would prevail over the duty of confidentiality under the Banking Act (VisionHealthOne Corp Pte Ltd v HD Holdings Pte Ltd). Data stored in Singapore risks being subject to disclosure even where this may conflict with your obligations for data confidentiality under Australian privacy laws.

Therefore, you should consider that data transferred and stored in Singapore may be at a greater risk of being accessed by the government and law enforcement agencies, than data stored in Australia.

Will storing your data offshore subject you to the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts?

Australian businesses may fall under the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts where the Singapore courts find there is a sufficient nexus (established on the facts) between the dispute and Singapore. The Singapore courts may also assert jurisdiction where you have agreed to submit to their jurisdiction in any contract between you and your Cloud provider.

The Singapore courts may grant leave to a Singapore Cloud provider to serve the originating process on you in Australia, or elsewhere. Any judgment obtained against you in the Singapore Court can be enforced in any state or territory in Australia pursuant to the Foreign Judgments Act, provided that the judgment is final and for a money award. An arbitral award awarded in Singapore can also be enforced against you through the Australian courts under the International Arbitration Act.

What reputational risks will you assume by offshoring?

There are increasing concerns over data privacy in Australia and the security risks involved in offshore data storage. The Australian government's cloud computing strategic direction paper issued in January 2011 highlights a number of these potential risks and issues including the legal and regulatory issues canvassed in this paper. The government paper also noted the lack of legal precedent regarding liability in the Cloud.

Any proposal to transfer data overseas for storage would need to be supported by an effective PR and communications strategy in order to promote confidence and credibility amongst customers and refute any perceived security risks. The additional resources required to conduct such a PR campaign, as well as the costs to your business arising, from reputational damage in the event of an overseas data security breach, should be carefully factored into your assessment of offshore data storage.

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