



Telstra submission

Senate Environment and Communications References Committee Inquiry into the Triple Zero Service Outage

Supplementary submission

22 December 2025



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Executive Summary

Telstra and others appeared before the Senate Environment and Communications References Committee (**Committee**) inquiry into the Triple Zero service outage (**Inquiry**) on 9 December 2025.

At the Inquiry, the Committee asked several questions about a TPG customer in Wentworth Falls who had been unable to call Triple Zero¹ and who Telstra was advised had passed away (**Wentworth Falls Incident**). Telstra would like to emphasise upfront that we understand and acknowledge the serious and tragic nature of the Wentworth Falls Incident.

Telstra only became aware on 8 December 2025 (the day before the Inquiry hearing) that TPG did not believe the Wentworth Falls Incident involved a fatality, and that they had informed the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts (**Department**) of this belief. Telstra became aware during the Inquiry on 9 December 2025 that the Department had then passed this information on to the Australian Communications and Media Authority (**ACMA**).

As a result, the Committee, understandably, raised concerns about the steps taken by various parties to notify the ACMA and other stakeholders in the Triple Zero ecosystem of the Wentworth Falls Incident.

Telstra is providing this supplementary submission to provide further information about specific issues raised during the hearing, to assist the Committee with its Inquiry. This supplementary submission focusses on Telstra's role as the Emergency Call Person (**ECP**), Telstra's role in the Wentworth Falls Incident, Telstra's knowledge of the issues with Samsung devices and further information about the timeline surrounding the Optus outage.

Given the seriousness and unusual nature of the Wentworth Falls Incident, Telstra proactively informed the Department, after being advised by NSW Ambulance that they would be notifying TPG (as the Carriage Service Provider) and the ACMA.

Telstra then independently began to investigate the cause of the issue to determine what had happened. As a result of its investigations Telstra identified an issue with the Samsung device in question. Once the issue was identified, Telstra promptly communicated this to the ACMA, the Minister's Office and the Department.

At all times, Telstra was conscious of the sensitivity of the Wentworth Falls Incident, and the importance of respecting the privacy of the family of the person that we understood had passed away. Given the person was not a Telstra customer, not using Telstra's network or a Telstra device, and that we understood from NSW Ambulance and the Department that they were notifying TPG and the ACMA, it was not a matter for Telstra to communicate more widely about.

Telstra remains committed to working collaboratively with government, industry, and the community to strengthen Australia's emergency call service and ensure the safety and wellbeing of all Australians.

¹ In this document, the term 'Triple Zero' refers to the emergency phone numbers 000 and 112.



1 Introduction

Telstra and others appeared before the Inquiry on 9 December 2025. This supplementary submission elaborates on, or clarifies, a number of points raised at the hearing.

Telstra acknowledges the critical nature of the Triple Zero service and is committed to working collaboratively with government, industry and the community to strengthen Australia's emergency telecommunications. Our submission is structured as follows:

- Telstra as the ECP
- The Wentworth Falls Incident
- Telstra's knowledge of issues with Samsung devices
- Further information on the timeline surrounding the Optus Outage

2 Telstra's Role as the Emergency Call Person (ECP)

The ECP is the person who operates an Emergency Call Service (**ECS**) (which means a service for receiving and handling calls to an emergency service number and transferring such calls to an emergency service or a service for despatching an emergency service). The ECP has a very specific role in answering and handling all emergency calls to 000 and 112. This role is specified by the ACMA in the *Telecommunications (Emergency Call Service) Determination 2019* (Cth) (**Determination**) and summarised below. Telstra is the ECP for the emergency service numbers 000 and 112 and Telstra is contractually obliged to supply the ECS in accordance with the *Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Services Standards) Act 1999* (Cth) and Determination under Telstra's contract with the Department (the **TUSOPA**).²

Telstra's role as the ECP is one input into a broader ecosystem that supports Australians making calls to 000 and 112. The success of this ecosystem relies on inputs not only from the ECP but from all Australian carriers, carriage service providers, emergency service organisations and other entities such as handset manufacturers, regulators and the Department.

2.1 Emergency Call Person – Telstra's Regulated Role

As outlined in the Determination, Telstra's key obligations as an ECP are to:³

- answer an emergency call made to the ECS that reaches the relevant termination point for access to the ECP, unless a matter beyond the ECP's control materially and adversely affects its ability to do so (practically – emergency calls will be carried to the ECP's termination point via the relevant primary network carrying the call (i.e. Telstra, Optus or TPG));
- transfer the emergency call to the appropriate emergency service organisation (**ESO**) (Police, Fire, Ambulance) or State/Territory emergency service; and
- provide the appropriate ESO with information about the emergency call (including the most precise location information available at the time of the call, the name of the person making the call and the public number from which the call is made).

In some cases, the ECP has an obligation to tell other affected entities in the 000 and 112 ecosystem of a disruption to the ECS. A "disruption to the emergency call service" is defined in the Determination as "*the situation where due to an incident or series of incidents, an ECP is unable to answer, handle or*

² Section 19, *Telecommunications Act 1997* (Cth); *Telecommunications (Emergency Call Persons) Determination 2019* (Cth). TUSOPA means the Telstra Universal Service Obligation Performance Agreement.

³ Sections 41 to 43, and 51, *Telecommunications (Emergency Call Service) Determination 2019* (Cth). The ECP has other obligations in the Determination (see Part 3) such as in relation to interactions with the ECP for 106, response times and record keeping.



transfer an emergency call" (the Determination uses an ECS disablement event as an example of an incident that can lead to a disruption).⁴ In this case the ECP is required to:⁵

- conduct a welfare check on a person who made an emergency call, which has been carried to the relevant termination point for the ECP but the ECP is not able to answer the emergency call (unless the call was made using a public payphone, had a default Calling Line Identification or is a Caller No Response Call);
- where the ECP reasonably believes a carrier, CSP or ESO is affected by the disruption, the ECP must inform the relevant affected carrier, CSP or ESO of the disruption; and
- where the ECP reasonably believes the disruption is likely to materially and adversely affect its ability to provide the emergency call service, the ECP must inform the ACMA, the Department, the Home Affairs Department and affected members of the public of the disruption.

In the Wentworth Falls Incident (further described in section 3 below), the ECS was operating without issue. As heard at the 9 December hearing, the problem was the Samsung device used by the individual was unable to make calls to Triple Zero. Telstra cannot see a call to Triple Zero until it reaches the Point of Interconnect within the Telstra network. In the event a call does not reach the ECP (i.e. the device cannot make a call to Triple Zero), Telstra (as the ECP) is not required to make any regulatory notifications under the Determination.

Despite there being no obligation, given the sensitivity of Triple Zero issues at the time of the incident, Telstra (as ECP) believed that it was prudent to notify the various relevant stakeholders as outlined in section 3, including advising the Department.

3 The Wentworth Falls Incident

3.1 Background

On 24 September 2025, Telstra, as the ECP, was made aware via communications from NSW Ambulance that a TPG/Vodafone customer in Wentworth Falls had been unable to successfully connect to Triple Zero and that the person was deceased (**Wentworth Falls Incident**).

Until 8 December 2025, Telstra was unaware that TPG did not believe the incident involved a fatality and that they had told the Department it did *not* involve a fatality. Telstra became aware during the Inquiry on 9 December 2025 that the Department had informed the ACMA the same thing. Telstra appreciates the Committee's interest in this. Telstra has no insight into TPG's discussions with NSW Ambulance, the Department or the ACMA on the day of the Wentworth Falls Incident or why TPG understood and advised those parties that the incident did *not* involve a fatality. Telstra had no reason to suspect TPG would be given less or different information to what was provided to it. It is likely these matters will be clarified in supplementary submissions from those parties.

Telstra also appreciates the Committee's interest in the sequence of events on 24 September 2025 and what steps Telstra took once it was contacted by NSW Ambulance. The actions Telstra took are detailed below.

3.2 Communications and investigations

The notification of the Wentworth Falls Incident by NSW Ambulance to Telstra ECP occurred at 9.37am on 24 September 2025. Over the next two days, Telstra engaged with NSW Ambulance, the Department, TPG, Samsung and the NSW Minister for Health. Telstra understood from its engagement with NSW Ambulance that the ACMA would be informed. Telstra assumed that the Department would notify the

⁴ An ECS disablement event is defined as "*an incident (whether deliberate or not) that results in a disruption to the emergency call service and may include: (a) unauthorised impairment of communications; (b) equipment programming errors which result in a high volume of non-genuine calls being made to the emergency call service; or (c) a denial of service attack*"

⁵ Sections 55, 81 and Schedule 1 (Disruption Protocols), *Telecommunications (Emergency Call Service) Determination 2019* (Cth).



Minister's Office and believed it was a reasonable assumption to make that other appropriate authorities and officials would be informed.

As outlined above, Telstra did not have any regulatory obligation to provide any notifications or to undertake investigations as an ECP (once it had established there was no issue with the ECS call handling platform). Nor did it have an obligation as a CSP, because Telstra was not the relevant CSP in this instance. However, Telstra did notify the Department, as well as engage with various stakeholders. Once informed of the Wentworth Falls Incident and on the understanding that all relevant stakeholders were going to be notified, Telstra's attention properly and immediately turned to investigating the reason the person was unable to initiate connection to Triple Zero. At this point, Telstra's focus was on identifying the cause and any required remediation.

The Wentworth Falls Incident was unusual in that the Samsung device in question did not successfully connect to the termination point for the ECP (i.e. it did not connect to Triple Zero) but NSW Ambulance had advised that the paramedics on scene had been able to successfully call their own phone from it. The Telstra networks team were advised by TPG that the service had successfully made four calls to other numbers within a similar period. As a result of its investigations Telstra identified an issue with the Samsung device in question.

Notably, on the day of the incident, NSW Ambulance informed Telstra that it would contact TPG, and TPG also separately contacted Telstra directly about the Wentworth Falls Incident (to seek assistance to investigate camp-ons and whether the person had successfully "latched-on" to the Telstra network). Telstra's usual practice – out of respect for individuals involved – is to refer to events of this nature as "incidents" and not to refer to what might be personal and private consequences of these events out of respect for the individuals involved. Telstra does this because it is mindful there are human beings involved and that not every stakeholder Telstra speaks to has a need to know in relation to the individual's personal health outcomes.

3.3 Timeline of events – 24 and 25 September 2025

On 9 December 2025, senior Telstra representatives appeared before the Committee and answered questions in relation to the Wentworth Falls Incident. Telstra appreciates the Committee is interested in the events of that day and immediately after, including what was communicated to who and when.

To assist the Committee in understanding what happened, we have prepared a table of relevant communications between Telstra and other stakeholders.

Timeline:

| Date | Time | Communication | What was communicated |
|-------------------|--------|---|---|
| 24 September 2025 | 9:37am | Email from NSW Ambulance to Telstra ECP: Subject: Difficulties connecting to Triple Zero (000) - Wentworth Falls – 24 September 2024 | <p><i>Note: all references to "Vodafone" or "Vodaphone" in this table should be read as a reference to TPG.</i></p> <p>From NSW Ambulance:</p> <p><i>Reports from a caller in Wentworth falls of difficulties connecting to Triple Zero (000) – at 0730 and 0731 this morning from number 04XX XXX XXX⁶ Vodaphone Service according to the caller). They called National Relay service at 0735 reached NSW Ambulance at 0750. The patient is deceased.</i></p> <p><i>Paramedics on scene attempted to phone both 000 and 112 unable to connect despite service signal on phone (original callers). They were able to call their own mobile phone from the service.</i></p> |

⁶ Caller phone number was provided in the email from NSW Ambulance however is redacted in this excerpt for privacy reasons.



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| | | | <i>Any advice would be appreciated.</i> |
| 24 September 2025 | 10.25am to 10.41am | Email chain between ECP and Telstra; Subject: FW: Difficulties connecting to Triple Zero (000) - Wentworth Falls – 24 September 2025 | Telstra ECP forwarded email from NSW Ambulance to Telstra senior management. Email chain confirms: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> call records to be investigated. person was a customer of Vodafone. network searches requested. successful camp-ons at sites in area to be investigated. Telstra was checking it was receiving 000 calls from Telstra or Optus customers during the same time frame in the Wentworth Falls area. |
| 24 September 2025 | 10:33am | Phone call from Telstra as ECP to NSW Ambulance | During this telephone call: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Telstra advised that it did not find any call records for the service. Telstra advised the customer was a TPG customer. NSW Ambulance requested the ACMA's details. Telstra responded saying they would provide the ACMA's details via email. Telstra acknowledged that NSW Ambulance would be contacting the ACMA. Telstra confirmed the National Relay Service (NRS) was used by the individual. |
| 24 September 2025 | 10.35am | Email Telstra ECP to NSW Ambulance Subject: RE Difficulties connecting to Triple Zero (000) – Wentworth Falls – 24 September 2024 | Telstra provided NSW Ambulance with contact details for the ACMA. |
| 24 September 2025 | 11.01 am & 11.02 am | Phone call from Telstra to the Department; Return call from the Department | In this call: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Telstra advised it had been made aware by NSW Ambulance of a fatality of a TPG customer. Telstra confirmed it was undertaking an assessment of its network to ensure both Triple Zero and camp-on capability was working. the First Assistant Secretary indicated they had spoken to TPG about the incident and requested to be kept updated in relation to Telstra's investigations. |



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| 24 September 2025 | 11.11 am to 11.50 am | <p>Chain of emails between TPG's Nokia team and Telstra's IMO Triple Zero Support, IMS Technology and MIM-Mailbox; Subject: Request to Verify Emergency Call on Telstra Network – MSISDN: [redacted]</p> | <p>At 11.11am TPG's Nokia team emailed Telstra to ask whether a caller had successfully "latched" on to the Telstra network between 07.15 and 08.15 am AEST.</p> <p>At 11.18am TPG Nokia noted the incident was directly reported by the NSW Telco Authority and NSW Ambulance team and provided Telstra with the IMEI and IMSI information to assist Telstra with its investigations.</p> <p>At 11.24am Telstra's Triple Zero & Life-Threatening Call Trace indicated they would investigate.</p> <p>At 11.50am Telstra advised Nokia TPG that: <i>We can not see any camp on calls on the Telstra Network to 000/112 from the number and details provided for the time frame of 07:15am to 08:45am this morning as requested. [sic]</i></p> |
| 24 September 2025 | 11.33am | <p>Email Telstra network team provided update to ECP; Subject: FW: Difficulties connecting to Triple Zero (000) - Wentworth Falls – 24 September 2025</p> | <p>Telstra network team provided update to ECP regarding investigations and noted:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the Vodafone service made 4 successful phone calls between 7.33 and 7.49 am. NSW Ambulance has engaged Vodafone to investigate. <p>Vodafone has requested Telstra investigate any camp-on calls from the service (and have provided the IMEI).</p> |
| 24 September 2025 | 12.13pm | <p>Email Telstra network team provided update to ECP; Subject: FW: Difficulties connecting to Triple Zero (000) - Wentworth Falls – 24 September 2025</p> | <p>Telstra network team provided an update to ECP and advised:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> no evidence of camp-on calls from the service between 8pm 23 September to 10am 24 September. Telstra is seeing other camp-on calls on the Telstra network. nil deviation in the daily call patterns for 000 from Vodafone to Telstra in NSW. the ECP continues to receive calls from Vodafone in NSW from 000. a call was made at 8.42am from the Vodafone service to another mobile number, which may be the reported call to the paramedic's mobile phone. |
| 24 September 2025 | 4.44pm | <p>Phone call from Telstra to the Department</p> | <p>In this call Telstra:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> advised there was no evidence of camp-on from the phone in question. |



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| | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> confirmed, from Telstra's side, camp-on calls were working as intended on the day and Telstra had seen other camp-on calls. confirmed it had reviewed the number of calls coming from Vodafone to Telstra in NSW for TPG customers and no deviation in call patterns was seen. confirmed it was continuing to receive calls from Vodafone in NSW for Triple Zero. <p>In response the Department official suggested that it sounded like the issue was with the device, which Telstra acknowledged seemed to be the case.</p> |
| 25 September 2025 | 7:45am (approx.) | Phone call from the Chief of Staff of the NSW Minister for Health to Telstra | As part of this call the Chief of Staff indicated they were aware of an incident that occurred on 24 September resulting in a fatality. The Chief of Staff acknowledged the deceased person was not a Telstra customer and said that "NSW will continue to investigate". |
| 25 September 2025 | 2.36pm to 2.45pm | Email exchange between Telstra ECP and TPG; Subject: Query | <p>2.36pm – Telstra ECP emails TPG: <i>Assume you are across the Wentworth Falls Issue xxx?</i></p> <p>2.45pm - TPG replies to Telstra: <i>Yes, it appears to be a handset issue for that caller. We are still investigating.</i></p> |
| 25 September 2025 | 5.58pm | Phone call from Telstra to TPG | Telstra called TPG to inform them what information it had provided to the Department about the Wentworth Falls Incident, that is, that the Telstra network was working as intended. |
| 25 September 2025 | 10:07pm | Email from Telstra to Samsung; Subject: Emergency call handling, Samsung Galaxy J2 Pro, SM-J250, IMEI TAC 35406209 | <p>In this email, Telstra:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> advised of an issue connecting to 000 on a competitor's network using the Samsung Galaxy J2 Pro, SM-J250. confirmed a significant number of emergency calls on the Telstra network from that model. requested Samsung confirm their understanding was correct in relation to this model supporting VoLTE emergency calls including in limited service. requested Samsung advise of any known issues in any firmware version that may cause issues with emergency calling or if there is a minimum software version required to support device emergency calling. noted the device was not "ranged" by Telstra and queried if the device configuration changed or firmware changed if a Telstra SIM was inserted. |



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| | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none">requested a device be made available to Telstra for testing. |
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3.4 Telstra's role in the Wentworth Falls Incident

In relation to the Wentworth Falls Incident, Telstra acknowledges and agrees that all relevant stakeholders should be informed of necessary information by those equipped and empowered to pass on such information. In this context, it is important to understand Telstra's actions following notification by NSW Ambulance, by reference to the whole Triple Zero ecosystem. After notification, the steps Telstra took reflect the fact that:

- it was not the primary notifier of the incident (this was NSW Ambulance);
- there was no detected issue with the operation of the ECS call handling platform (which Telstra provides as ECP) or Telstra's network platform (which Telstra provides as CSP);
- the person involved was a TPG customer and the device was a non-Telstra device; and
- Telstra (including as ECP) did not have direct access to the full picture or all relevant information – this was knowledge held by NSW Ambulance and TPG.

Importantly, between:

- NSW Ambulance advising Telstra it would inform the ACMA and TPG;
- Telstra informing the Department – including of the fact that we understood the incident involved a fatality (who in turn told Telstra it was engaging with TPG); and
- TPG Nokia advising Telstra the incident was directly reported to it by the NSW Telco Authority and NSW Ambulance team,

Telstra was confident the issue would be properly examined and that the required stakeholders would be informed of all relevant pieces of information.

At the hearing on 9 December 2025, the Committee expressed particular interest in areas of Telstra's involvement with the Wentworth Falls Incident. Telstra hopes that the information provided in this supplementary submission clarifies the relevant factual matters, in particular:

- Telstra agrees with the Committee that the Wentworth Falls Incident is an incident the ACMA should have been informed about. NSW Ambulance advised Telstra it would make this notification and requested the ACMA's details from Telstra. If NSW Ambulance had not provided that assurance, Telstra would have made the notification. Telstra notes the relevant CSP (in this case TPG) also has obligations to notify the ACMA.
- Telstra briefed the Department on the day of the incident:
 - At 11:01am, Telstra called the Department, to advise that Telstra had been made aware by NSW Ambulance of a fatality of a TPG customer and confirmed Telstra was undertaking an assessment of its network to ensure both Triple Zero and camp-on capability were working. During this call, the Department advised they had already spoken to TPG about the incident.
 - At 4.44pm Telstra called the Department again to provide an update. Telstra told the Departmental official there was no evidence of camp-on from the phone in question and that camp-ons were operating successfully from Telstra's side. Additionally, Telstra reported no deviation in call patterns was seen and that it was continuing to receive calls from TPG in NSW for Triple Zero.
- Telstra did not directly brief the Minister or the Minister's Office of the Wentworth Falls Incident. Telstra was not the relevant CSP for this individual and consequently, did not hold all relevant information regarding the circumstances and technical diagnostics (which only TPG had access to). Telstra understood the Department was engaging with other relevant stakeholders, including



TPG. Without full information, any direct briefing by Telstra would have required assumptions or speculation about causes, responsibility, or contributing factors.

- While Telstra did engage with TPG on 24 and 25 September about the incident, Telstra did not contact TPG specifically to advise it that we understood the Wentworth Falls Incident involved a fatality. NSW Ambulance was the original notifier of the incident and had told Telstra there was a fatality and that it was going to contact TPG. TPG advised Telstra that same day that it had been notified of the incident by NSW Ambulance. Telstra also advised the Department that we had been advised there had been a fatality and the Department informed Telstra it had spoken to TPG about the incident.
- Telstra used the term “Wentworth Falls Incident” to refer to events of that day out of respect for the person and their family and used this terminology in its communications with TPG and all other stakeholders. This approach was informed by Telstra’s experience of families not wanting the death of a loved one to be the subject of unnecessary attention, speculation and discussion.

On 8 December 2025, the day before the Committee hearing, Telstra, Optus, TPG and the Australian Telecommunication Alliance participated in a weekly call. During this call (at 9.30 am), Telstra asked TPG how they were proposing to approach the Wentworth Falls Incident and that Telstra thought it would request from the Committee that it be discussed “in camera” out of concern for the deceased’s family. It was in response to this question that TPG advised they were not aware the incident involved a fatality.

Later that day at 6.17pm, TPG called Telstra back to advise it had spent the day checking and no one at TPG knew about a fatality.

Consequently, Telstra spoke with the Department at 7.32pm who indicated:

- they recalled the discussion with Telstra on the day of the Wentworth Falls Incident and recalled Telstra believing it involved a fatality;
- TPG later informed the Department the incident did not involve a fatality; and
- despite the differing understandings of what occurred, the incident instigated a range of actions with the Department and the ACMA for several weeks.

It remains unclear from discussions with TPG and the Department and the evidence given by TPG at the Inquiry, the basis on which TPG held the belief, and informed the Department, that the person was not deceased.

3.5 Investigations following the Wentworth Falls Incident

As noted above, it was appropriate for TPG to manage the Wentworth Falls Incident with the ACMA and the Department, as the CSP involved. Telstra was already aware that both the ACMA and the Department had been notified. The reason Telstra (as a CSP⁷) took further steps to investigate was to ensure that we understood why the Samsung Galaxy J2 Pro, SM-J250 device failed to successfully connect with Triple Zero and ensure there weren’t any broader impacts on Triple Zero or Telstra customers. This was an unusual incident in that the device in question was able to make other calls on the TPG network but was unable to make Triple Zero calls.

As a result, Telstra proactively investigated the behaviour of the device involved in the Wentworth Falls Incident. It was due to this investigation that the broader Samsung device issue was identified. Telstra then actively drew this issue to the attention of other carriers as well as to the attention of Samsung. This is detailed at section 4 below.

⁷ In the Committee hearing, Telstra gave evidence that it had escalated the issue to the Telstra network team in its capacity as ECP – this was an error, the investigation by the Telstra network team was undertaken by Telstra in its capacity as a CSP.



4 Telstra's knowledge of issues with Samsung devices

This section of our supplementary submission provides further detail on some of the tests and other steps that Telstra has undertaken to ensure that Telstra customers with Samsung devices continue to be able to make Triple Zero calls on Telstra's network and while "camped-on" to the TPG and Optus networks.⁸

This section uses the term **Samsung Handset Issue** to refer to issues faced by people using certain Samsung devices attempting to call Triple Zero using VoLTE over the TPG 4G network.

4.1 Initial indications of a Triple Zero calling issue impacting Samsung devices

Telstra's significant investment in ongoing routine device testing has assisted the mobile industry participants in Australia to identify and promptly resolve issues with devices attaching to the Telstra network, helping to ensure that Telstra customers and those who roam and camp-on to the Telstra network have access to Triple Zero calling. The Samsung Handset Issue referenced in the Samsung submissions and evidence to the Committee was first identified by Telstra in 2021 through routine testing of Samsung devices that might be used by Telstra customers. Once identified, Telstra promptly referred the issue to Samsung for resolution.

Below we provide the further information about Telstra's understanding of the Samsung Handset Issue referenced in submissions and evidence to the Committee.

1. **TPG's evidence:** Mr Berroeta's evidence to the Committee was that TPG first raised concerns about the Samsung devices in 2023. Telstra's understanding from Samsung, which is confirmed in Samsung's written submission to the Inquiry dated 5 December 2025, was that Samsung had raised the Samsung Handset Issue with TPG and the ACMA in 2021, following Telstra alerting Samsung to the Samsung Handset Issue.
2. **Samsung's evidence:** Mr Chou's evidence to the Committee was that since 2021 (when Samsung identified the list of 71 models referenced in their evidence), Samsung had made requests of MNOs to provide them with the individual identifiers for affected handset models. The Draft Hansard record states that Mr Chou said, *"Since the point when we discovered that there were 71 that were not correctly identified, we have been proactively seeking all the devices of the same model number with a unique identifier and providing them to Samsung. Samsung will then be able to provide them with live information as to whether those devices have the relevant software update"*. Our team do not recall or have a record of Samsung making this request before Telstra raised the Samsung Handset Issue with them in October 2025.

In 2021, Telstra's understanding was that the Samsung Handset Issue was highly unlikely to manifest in the field (i.e. in any live customer situation)⁹, because it would only arise if the person making the Triple Zero call was within range of the TPG 4G network only (no other networks available). Telstra understood that Samsung was working with TPG to resolve the issue and TPG subsequently disabled the capability within their network for devices to make Triple Zero calls over VoLTE – meaning that the issue would have been resolved and customers could call Triple Zero on these devices even if a 3G network were no longer available. Telstra considered it appropriate for Samsung and TPG to address the issue directly.

⁸ References to both "latched on" and "camped-on" are used interchangeably by the industry (and in these submissions) to refer to a successful connection to Triple Zero and should be read as meaning the same thing

⁹ We understood at the time that the TPG 3G network was TPG's 'coverage network' and had broader coverage than the TPG 4G network (excepting the potential for small areas of fortuitous 4G only coverage).



4.2 Telstra's preparations to exit its 3G network

Telstra spent 5+ years preparing to exit our 3G networks. The decision to exit 3G networks in Australia was consistent with decisions to exit 2G and 3G networks made in many other countries¹⁰.

Telstra was very conscious of the safety of end users seeking to access Triple Zero following the 3G exit, and this informed the conservative approach to categorising devices that we adopted. As part of preparing for the exit, our team worked over several years to identify devices not able to make calls to Triple Zero over VoLTE (using the 4G network). These devices were blocked upon 3G exit in accordance with the Determination. The process undertaken was detailed and thorough and incorporated multiple data sources and checks to classify impacted devices, specific to both the hardware and software level. We also engaged regularly with device manufacturers (including Samsung) to confirm whether their devices supported Triple Zero calling over VoLTE, as well as conducting testing. Based on advice from Samsung, Telstra understood that all Samsung devices that we did not block as part of exit of Telstra's 3G network would be able to make Triple Zero calls over Telstra's VoLTE network upon 3G exit.

4.3 Telstra's further investigations concerning Samsung devices following the Wentworth Falls Incident

As Telstra explained to the Committee, Telstra conducted further investigations on Samsung devices following the Wentworth Falls Incident of 24 September 2025, because Telstra considered it unusual that the device was able to make other calls on the TPG network, but was not able to make a Triple Zero call.

Telstra's first priority was to confirm that Telstra customers would not be prevented from making calls to Triple Zero due to the same issue that had arisen with the TPG customer's Samsung device (the **Wentworth Falls Issue**). We decided to conduct our own tests using a Samsung Galaxy J2 Pro, SM-J250G device sourced from Samsung which was configured with the same Vodafone firmware and hardware version as the device that experienced the Wentworth Falls Issue. The device used for testing was supplied by Samsung. These tests revealed that version of the device, with a Telstra SIM card, was unable to camp-on and make triple zero calls on the TPG network. The Telstra testing revealed that the issue impacted all TPG customers using the particular Samsung devices to call Triple Zero. The testing also revealed that the issue impacted Telstra and Optus customers in the very rare circumstances where neither Telstra nor Optus networks were available in a location. Telstra proceeded with notifying the ACMA, Minister's office and Department on 20 October 2025, once we had confirmed the scope of the issue and root causes, as well as the device numbers impacted.

5 Further information on the timeline surrounding the Optus Outage

In section 3.2 of Telstra's submission to the Senate Committee, Telstra provided a detailed outline of the communications between Telstra (as ECP) and Optus upon receiving Optus's notification of an incident at 14:19 AEST, 18 September 2025. Telstra has set out in this section of this Supplementary Submission, two additional communications that occurred on 18 September 2025 relevant to the Optus incident. The first was between the South Australian Ambulance supervisor and Telstra's Triple Zero call centre in Sydney prior to when Optus initially notified Telstra (as ECP) of the incident via two SMS's at 14:19 AEST. The second was a follow-up SMS from Optus to Telstra's ECP after the two initial SMS's from Optus.

¹⁰ The Mobile Suppliers Associate (GSA), which is the most credible consolidated and independent source of network closure information that Telstra is aware of, had identified 177 completed, planned or in progress 2G and 3G network closures across 59 countries and territories by the end of November 2023, in a report titled '2G and 3G Switch-Off' dated December 2023.



5.1 Communication between South Australian Ambulance supervisor and Telstra's Triple Zero call centre in Sydney

Telstra's Triple Zero call centre in Sydney received a phone call from a South Australian Ambulance (**SAA**) supervisor at 13:14 AEST, 18 September 2025. The South Australian Ambulance supervisor advised that a caller had reported to them that they could not call Triple Zero from their Optus service, and they requested if the ECP had received any information in relation to a broader Optus issue. The Telstra Triple Zero supervisor on duty advised the SAA supervisor that they were not aware of any incidents however would pass the request to the Telstra Triple Zero Incident Management Operation Team (**IMO**) and provide an update back to the SAA supervisor. The IMO conducted a series of internal checks confirming that no incident had been reported by Optus and that the ECP's performance dashboard (which monitors the volume of emergency calls received) showed no abnormal patterns and no failed emergency calls had been recorded between 00:40 AEST and the time of the call from the SAA supervisor to alert Telstra (as ECP) ahead of Optus contacting the ECP. This information was reported back to the SAA supervisor.

5.2 Additional SMS from Optus

After the two initial SMS's the ECP received from Optus at 14:19:47 and 14:19:48 AEST, 18 September 2025 (described in the original submission), the ECP received a third text message from Optus at 14:48 AEST. The full chain is set out below:

- **14:19:47** - "Heads up: we've just identified an issue with Triple Zero calls from SA& WA, possibly since 3am today. Networks team investigating. We're commencing welfare checks."
- **14:19:48** - "Issue now resolved by rolling back a network change. It appears only~10 TZ calls impacted. We've notified ACMA, SAPOL & WAPOL as well."
- **14:58** - "Plus Dept & Minister's Office"